THE LITERATURE OF THE PERSONALISTS OF EARLY BUDDHISM

BHIKSHU THICH THIENV CHÂU
The Literature of the Personalists of Early Buddhism

Bhikshu Thích Thiên Chậu

English translation by
Sara Boin-Webb

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This is indeed a remarkable book. It has the best treatment of the schools called Vātsiputriya and four other minor ones (p.5) that espoused the theory that a pudgala (a sort of person) supported the five personal aggregates (skandha) and made possible the Intermediate State (antarābhava) between death and rebirth. The author, Bhikshu Thích Thiên Châu, points out that this school of the Personalists (Pudgalavādin) once had its own version of three classes of scriptures (āgama) but they are now lost. The remaining schools of Buddhism condemned these personalists. And the author mentions that there are only four surviving texts of this sect, which are in the Chinese language (listed, p. 19). The author, obviously skilled in that period in the development of the Chinese language, devotes the major part of this book, originally written in French, to presenting the contents of those four treatises.

Sara Boin-Webb deserves credit for translating his book from French into English (including a number of long, technical footnotes). The technical terms—however translated—do not alter the superb coverage of this work on the ‘Personalists’.

Alex Wayman  
New York, Nov. 1998
FOREWORD

Comme le prouvent des témoignages nombreux, divers et sérieux, les sectes ou écoles "personnalistes" (pudgalavādin) du bouddhisme indien ancien comptèrent parmi les plus importantes de celui-ci et formèrent un groupe bien défini qui subsista une dizaine de siècles. Les docteurs theravādin et sarvāstivādin consacrèrent de nombreux et parfois longs passages de leurs œuvres à exposer et critiquer les thèses personnalistes ; un certain nombre d'inscriptions attestent l'existence de leurs différentes écoles en divers points du territoire indien au début de notre ère ; enfin les grands pèlerins chinois Huan-tsang et I-tsing signalent avec précision leur implantation et leur importance numérique considérable, au VIIe siècle, en plusieurs régions de l'Inde et aussi de l'Asie du Sud-Est. Si l'on en croit certaines traditions, les Vatsiputriyas se seraient détachés les premiers du groupe des Śhāvīravādin peu avant le règne d'Aśoka en soutenant l'existence du pudgala, sorte de substitut du principe personnel, ātman ou jīva, que niait l'enseignement attribué au Bouddha. Plus tard seraient apparus d'autres écoles personnalistes, dont celles des Śāmmitiya, qui devint bientôt la principale d'entre elles, puis celles des Dharanottariya, des Bhadrayāniya et des Sānāgārika ou Śandagiriya.

Malheureusement, toute leur littérature, qui a dû être volumineuse comme celle des autres sectes antiques, a disparu depuis bien longtemps, à la seule exception de deux traités assez courts, conservés seulement dans leur traduction chinoise. Pour comble de malchance, ces deux témoignages, que leur rareté rend d'autant plus précieux pour notre connaissance de ces écoles personnalistes, sont très difficiles à utiliser à cause de la grande médiocrité de ces traductions, qui manquent beaucoup de clarté et de précision. Contrairement à ce qui est généralement le cas avec les très nombreuses versions chinoises classiques d'anciens ouvrages bouddhiques dont le texte indien a disparu, il est souvent impossible de retrouver dans ces deux traités les termes techniques du vocabulaire bouddhique sanskrit avec un degré satisfaisant de probabilité et, à plus forte raison, de donner de ces deux ouvrages une traduction complète en une langue occidentale.

Cela est d'autant plus décevant que la discussion des thèses proprement personnalistes semble bien avoir été à l'origine de la métaphysique bouddhiste, qui allait bientôt atteindre un tel développement et donner naissance, plus tard, aux subtiles conceptions des grands maîtres du Mahāyāna. Cela est aussi décevant parce que les écoles pudgalavādin prirent une part fort active aux controverses qui opposèrent les docteurs du bouddhisme indien sur des problèmes doctrinaux très divers, comme le prouvent les commentaires critiques transmis jusqu'à nous par leurs adversaires theravādin et sarvāstivādin, qui nous renseignent ainsi, mais trop succinctement, sur les positions adoptées par les écoles personnalistes dans ces discussions.

On doit donc remercier le Vénérable Thich Thien Chau d'avoir pu, grâce à sa grande érudition, tirer le maximum d'informations de ces deux petits traités et d'apporter ainsi une contribution de haute valeur à notre connaissance des doctrines du bouddhisme ancien dans l'ouvrage ici présenté.
La carrière et les titres de l'auteur de ce dernier l'avaient bien préparé à accomplir une telle tâche. Après avoir passé cinq ans à étudier à l'Université bouddhique de Nālandā, au Bihar, alors récemment créée, et y avoir obtenu les diplômes de B.A. et de M.A., attestent sa sérieuse connaissance du sanskrit et du pāli, le Vénérable séjourna pendant deux années à la School of Oriental and African Studies de l'Université de Londres pour s'initier aux méthodes de la recherche, puis il vint à Paris pour suivre l'étude du bouddhisme. Il y prépara et soutint d'abord une thèse de doctorat d'Université portant sur l'un des deux traités pudgalavādin, puis une thèse de doctorat d'État dont le texte est reproduit ci-après.

André Bareau
Personalism (pudgalavāda) was a remarkable and durable aspect of an important part of early Buddhism. For more than ten centuries it was taught and defended by several schools and had numerous followers but was strongly criticised by other Buddhist schools.

The literature of the Buddhist Personalist schools is practically entirely lost, so much so that we know their doctrine mainly through the attacks of their adversaries.

Of importance to us is that four authentic works pertaining to the Vātsiputriyas and Sāmmitiyyas have been preserved. The four works are:

1) The San fa tu lun тридхарманаstra (Tridharmakāśāstra), Taishō XXV, No.1506.
2) The Ssū a-han-mu ch'ao chieh 四阿含纂抄解 Taishō XXV, No.1505.
3) The San-mi-ti pu lun 聖毘奈 (Sāmmitiyaniśāstra) Taishō XXXII, No.1649.
4) The Lū ěrh-shih-érh ming-liao lun 魯帝師明著 (Vinayadvavimśatāvidyāśāstra), Taishō XXIV, No.1461.

This thesis, entitled The Literature of the Personalists (Pudgalavadins) of Early Buddhism, attempts to present an historical overview of the Personalist schools and studies on the formation and content of the doctrine (dharma) and monastic discipline (vinaya) of the Pudgalavadins, in accordance with the documentation available.

With respect to the doctrinal problem, the literary evidence which exists has revealed to us the main thesis of the Pudgalavadins, the pudgala, and fifteen other secondary theses. The pudgala, the ineffable, being neither identical to nor different from the aggregates (skandha), entails three designations:

a) the pudgala-designated-by-the-support (āśrayaprajñāpātapudgala),
b) the pudgala-designated-by-transmigration (saṃkramaprajñāpātapudgala),
c) the pudgala-designated-by-cessation (niradhaprajñāpātapudgala).

The creation of the theory of the pudgala represents a reaction to the depersonalisation of the dogmatic Abhidharma masters. The Personalists (pudgalavādin), however, were determined to preserve the essence of the doctrine of insubstantiality (anatmavāda). They insisted on the fact that adherence to the pudgala did not prevent the attainment of the knowledges (jñāna) and fruits (phala). The position of the pudgala was misinterpreted by its adversaries. Nonetheless, the theory of the pudgala offered much of interest in the doctrinal domain for Buddhist theoreticians.

It is most agreeable for us to be able to express here our profound gratitude to Professor André Bareau, of the Collège de France, who was kind enough to direct our research in this field. We would also like to thank Michel Soymié, Director of Studies at the École Pratique des Hautes Études, who took the trouble to give us valuable advice. We also offer our profound gratitude to Professor Paul Demiéville, Membre de l'Institut, Honorary Professor at the Collège de France, who has done us the honour of rereading the manuscript with patience and compassion, and correcting its essentials.
Our deepest thanks also go to the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique which supported us in our research by giving us working contracts for several years; it is due to its financial assistance that this research could be brought to a successful conclusion.

Bhikshu Thích Thiền Châu
Paris 1977

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

We would like to express our profound gratitude to Sara Boin-Webb for undertaking this English translation, to Ven. Dr Dhammaratna for his careful perusal of the proofs, and to Most Ven. Dr. Thích Minh Chau, President of the Institute for Buddhist Studies of Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City, for publishing this work.

Bhikshu Thích Thiền Châu
Paris 1996
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>AN</td>
<td>Aṅguttara Nikāya (PTS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCE</td>
<td>Before the Common Era</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEFEO</td>
<td>Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient</td>
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<td>CE</td>
<td>Common Era</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ch'u</td>
<td>Chu san-tsang chi chi (T LV, 2145)</td>
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<td>DÂ</td>
<td>Dirghāgama (T I, 1)</td>
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<td>EA</td>
<td>Etudes Asiatiques</td>
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<tr>
<td>EĀ</td>
<td>Ekottarāgama (T II, 125)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFEO</td>
<td>Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>Era of the Parinivvāna and (= EN: Era of the Nirvāṇa)</td>
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<td>EI</td>
<td>Epigraphia Indica</td>
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<td>Dictionnaire encyclopédique du Boudhisme d'après les sources chinoises et japonaises, Tokyo and Paris 1927 —</td>
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<td>IAOS</td>
<td>Journal of the American Oriental Society</td>
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<td>Jà</td>
<td>Jātaka (PTS)</td>
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<td>Kao</td>
<td>Kao-sèng ch'uan (T L, 2059).</td>
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<td>Lu ming-liao lun</td>
<td>Lu erh-shih-érh ming-liao lun (Vinayadvā-vimśatividyāśāstra, T XXIV, 1461)</td>
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<td>MN</td>
<td>Majjhima Nikāya (PTS)</td>
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<td>MN-A</td>
<td>Majjhima Nikāya athakathā (PTS)</td>
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THE LITERATURE OF THE PERSONALISTS

'L'origine'

L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'après Paramārtha' by P. Demiéville, Brussels 1931-2

Nanjio


PTS

Pali Text Society, London and Oxford

Pug

Puggalapaññatti (PTS)

Pug-A

Puggalapaññatti atthakathā (PTS)

Record


Religions

Les Religions de l'Inde (Bouddhisme), by A. Bareau, Paris 1951

SĀ

Samayabhed (T II, 99)

Samayabheda

Samayabhedoparacanacakra of Vasumitra (I pu tsung lun lun - T XLIX, 2031)

Sectes

Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, by A. Bareau, Saigon 1955

SN

Sānyutta Nikāya (PTS)

Sn

Suttanipāta (PTS)

SnS

Sāmmittiyaniyākaśāstra (San-mi-ti pu lun — T XXXII, 1649)

ŚSū

Śū a-han-mu ch'uo-ch'ieh (T XXV, 1505)

T

Taishō shinshū daitōkyō (Sino-Japanese Buddhist Canon), Tokyo 1924-35

Tds

Tridharmakāśāstra (San ta tu lun — T XXV, 1506)

Traité

Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahā- prajñāpāramitāśāstra upadeśa), by E. Lamotte, 5 vols, Louvain and Louvain-la-Neuve 1944-80 [English version in the press]

Ud-a

Udāna atthakathā (PTS)

Vin.

(Vālī) Vinaya (PTS)

Vism

Visuddhimagga (PTS)
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II. Secondary Theses of the Pudgalavādins

1. The Existence of an imperishable thing (*avipramāṇa*)
2. The twelve Knowledges in the Path of Vision (*darśanamārga*)
3. The Adjoining Concentration consists of four Stages: Patience (*kṣānti*), the Name (*nāma*), the Notion (*samjñā*) and the Supreme Worldly Dharma (*laukikgradvardhana*)
4. Clear Comprehension (*abhisamaya*) is progressive (*anupūrva*)
5. The five Superknowledges (*abhijnā*) can be acquired by Worldlings (*prthāgjana*) or Heretics (*tīrthika*)
6. Morality (*śīla*) designates (actions) of Body (*kāyakarmāṇa*) and Speech (*vācikarmāṇa*)
7. Merit (*puṇya*) accumulates continually even during Sleep
8. It is impossible to say whether the Characteristic of Dharmas (*dharmaśāna*) is permanent or impermanent
9. There is an Intermediate Absorption (*dhyānātura*) between the first and second Absorption
10. Only one Absolute Truth exists: Nirvāna
11. There are five, six or seven Destinies (*gatī*)
12. Knowledge (*jñāna*) is also called the Path (*mārga*)
13. The Arhat is susceptible to Regression
14. There is an Intermediate Existence (*antarābhava*) in the World of Desire (*kāmadhātu*) and the World of Form (*rupadhātu*)
15. There are seventeen Categories of Heavenly Beings in the World of Form (*rupadhātu*)

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Chapter One

Historical Survey

A—Early Buddhism

Shortly after the Parinirvāna1 of the Buddha (in about 420 BCE2), his teaching was interpreted in different ways by his disciples. The divisions due to interpretations of the Doctrine and Discipline led to successive schisms in the community of monks.

After the First Council, that of Vaiśāli (in about 100 years of the Era of the Parinirvāna of the Buddha, abbreviated to EP)3, the teaching of the Buddha was interpreted in various ways. Consequently Buddhism, after the appearance of the schisms, was divided into several schools or sub-schools. Furthermore, it was then introduced and implanted outside India, such as in Sri Lanka, Central Asia, China, Tibet, etc. In the countries neighbouring on India, Buddhism had necessarily to adapt to foreign languages, mentalities and beliefs. At present it is difficult to rediscover the exact form of original Buddhism. The teachings of the Theravādin school, despite its antiquity, cannot be considered to be the original teaching of the Buddha4. That is why it is necessary, before tackling the school of the Personalists (Pudgalavādins), to distinguish, by using existing documents as a basis, the different forms of Buddhism under their doctrinal aspects:

1) Original Buddhism, the teachings of which have been preserved to a certain degree, in Pāli in the Nikāyas, in Sanskrit and Chinese in the Āgamas, as well as in

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1 Of interest regarding the dating of the Parinirvāna is a symposium on 'The Date of the Historical Buddha and the Importance of its Determination for Indian Historiography and World History' which was held in Göttingen in April 1988, the results of which have been published in two volumes, The Dating of the Historical Buddha, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Göttingen 1991-2.

2 Abbreviation of Before the Common Era, more acceptable in non-Christian works than BC (hence for AD, read CE = Common Era).

3 On the date of the Council of Vaiśāli, see A. Breau, Les premiers conciles bouddhiques, p.31, n.1.

4 The Theravādin school was introduced into Sri Lanka under the auspices of Asoka in 242 BCE, i.e. after the first schisms in the community of monks. Furthermore, the literature of this school in which the Pāli language was much influenced by Sanskrit literature (E. Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme indien dès origines à l'ère Śaka — the version referred to here being the English translation by Sara Boin-Webb entitled History of Indian Buddhism (abbreviated to History), pp.567-8), is no older than that of other schools, particularly that of the Sarvāstivādins (see, e.g. Edward Conze, 'Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies', repr. in Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, Oxford 1967, p.3), and that of the Pudgalavādins (cf. 'Le Tridharmakāśāstra (Etude philologique et doctrinale)'. Conclusion, my unpublished thesis). [Tr.] 'According to tradition, the editing of the Canon took place in Sri Lanka, shortly before the Common Era; the commentaries were compiled from the fifth century onwards by Buddhaghosa (of Magadha) and his followers; in contrast, the manuscripts are no earlier than the twelfth century (L. Renou, Les Littératures de l'Inde, p.62). Hence it is impossible to say that they preserve original Buddhism in its entirety without the intervention of opinions, interpretations, events, etc., subsequent to the Parinirvāna of the Buddha'.

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the Vinaya collections.

2) Early Buddhism, the doctrine of which is recorded in the literature of various schools, with interpretations in the Nikāyas, Āgamas, Vinaya collections and, especially, in the Abhidhamma (Sanskrit, Abhidharma) syntheses and the Śāstras.

3) Mahāyāna Buddhism which consists of multiple texts which form a developed literature quite distinct from the two preceding forms of Buddhism.

It is in the second form, that is, in early Buddhism, that we situate the doctrine of the Personalist schools (Pudgalavādin). This early Buddhism included schools or sub-schools which developed in the second or third century EP and lasted for approximately fifteen centuries in India. Its history is muddled and obscure, since the various sources are full of confusions and contradictions.

Nonetheless, several Orientalists have made efforts to reconstruct the historical facets of the development of the Buddhists schools during this period. By basing ourselves on this research, we present here a short introduction on the development of these schools, before tackling in detail the history of the Personalist schools which is the main subject of this study.

According to Bareau, the Council of Vaiśāli and the dispute over the ten disciplinary usages did not lead to a major scission, at least in the doctrinal domain.
of early Buddhism. However, it was the divergence of opinion over the five propositions of Mahādeva
in 137, 116 or 160 EP, after the Council of Vaiśāli, which provoked a serious doctrinal scission in the community of monks (bhikṣusamgha). The consequence of this scission was the separation of the Elders (Sthaviras, in Pali: Theras) who contested the five propositions, and the majority (Mahāsāṃghikas) who approved them.

Since that schism, the division in the community of monks was irreparable, and eventually these two fundamental schools successively incurred series of schisms which resulted in the appearance of twenty different schools including the two parental ones: the Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas.

I - The Sthavira School.

The first schism in the school of the Sthaviras was provoked by the Vātsiputriyas, at about the end of the second century EP. Later, in the reign of the emperor Aśoka, another major schism was started by the Sarvāstivādins. After becoming detached from the Sthavira trunk, these two branches later gave rise to other sub-schools.

The Vātsiputriyas caused the appearance of the following four sub-schools: the Dharmottariyas, Bhadrayāniyas, Sāṃjñiyas and Saṃnāgārikas or Saṃdagiriyas. Among the other Sthaviras arose the following sub-schools: the Sarvāstivādins, Sautrāntikas and Kāśyapas. The orthodox Sthaviras were henceforth known as Vibhajyavādins in order to distinguish them from their adversaries. From them developed the Theravāda.

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11 On Mahādeva, the author of the five theses, the I pu tsung lun lun shu-ch'i (abbrev. Iplbac) 15b4-4 says: Two hundred years after (the Buddha's Parinirvāna), there was an heretical monk who renounced the false way and returned to the right way; he also was called Mahādeva, left the world and received full ordination in the Mahāsāṃghika school. He was learned (bahāsrutā) and vigorous (vīryavatā), and resided in the Čaityaśila. With the community of monks of that school, he again explained the five theses. This provoked argumentative discussions and a division into three schools. Čaityaśila, Aparasīlīa and Uttarāśila. Cf. also Shih pa pu lun 十八部論 , T XLIX, 2032, 18a17-20; Pu chih i lun 破析藏論 , T XLIX, 2033, 20b2-4.

The five theses are:
1 - An Arhat may be subjected to demonic temptations (may have a nocturnal emission under the influence of one of Mara's goddesses);
2 - he is still subject to ignorance;
3 - to doubt;
4 - he may learn with the help of others;
5 - he may attain the Noble Path by means of words.

Cf. Inde classique II, § 2218. Cf. also Barbeau, Religions, p.84; id., Sectes, pp.64-5; L. de La Vallée Poussin, 'The Five Points of Mahādeva and the Kathāvaththa', JRAS, 1910, pp.413, 423; Lamotte, History, pp.274-85, with full details of the five theses, their author and a comparison; Demiéville, 'L'origine', under the title 'Les thèses de Mahādeva et la scission doctrinale des écoles Sthaviriya et Mahāsāṃghika sous la règle d'Aśoka', pp.30-40.

These theses, the main point of which is that the Arhat may regress, were admitted by all sub-schools of the Mahāsāṃghika group and rejected by the whole Sthaviravādin group. Cf. Barbeau, Sectes, p.261.

12 Only the main schools are listed here. In his Sectes (pp.15-35), Barbeau deals with 36 schools or sects in all. There are several different lists of schools or sub-schools in related studies, a bibliography of which can be found in Lamotte, History, p.518, footnote. Cf. also 'The Buddhist Sects' in ibid., pp.518-48.
vādins of Ceylon who considered themselves to be the oldest and most orthodox, the Mahiśāsakas and the Dharmaguptakas. Another small school, the Haimavatas, is considered as descending from the Sthaviras. Hence, in all, fourteen schools belong to the Sthavira tradition.

II - The Mahāśāṃghika School.

Like the Sthaviras, the Mahāśāṃghikas split into several sub-schools. The Ekavyāvahārikas (= Lokottaravādins) and the Gokulikas appeared very early on. From the latter came first the Bahuśrutiyas and the Prajñāaptivādins, and then the Caitikas.

Although the dates of the appearance of the schools have not yet been established, a table is necessary to give us a general view of the entirety of the two schools and their sub-schools:

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<th>Nirvāṇa</th>
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<td>Sarvāstivādins (beginning of 3rd cent. EP)</td>
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B - THE PERSONALIST SCHOOLS

The Personalist schools (Pudgalavādins) were based on the main theme of the *pudgala* or *pudgalavāda*, which can be translated as personalism. Of course, the notion of personalism in Buddhism is something quite unusual. It has nothing to do with the notion of personalism used by ancient or modern philosophers, whether Eastern or Western. Obviously, the universe of the person is always the universe of mankind. In this sense, such as it is, Buddhist personalism is not a system of thought, but more a particular interpretation of the person within the framework of the Buddhist teaching. In other words, this interpretation is not very far from the teaching of the Buddha. Nonetheless, its central affirmation is the existence of the person as a

13 This simplified table of the appearance of the Buddhist schools is taken from Bareau, Religions, pp81–93.
principle which would explain the doctrine of insubstantiality (*anātmavāda*) without falling into nihilism.

Hence the personalism of early Buddhism and other types of personalism, such as Christian and agnostic personalism, differ in their sources as well as in their philosophical structure. However, they emphasize a point in common: this is the fundamental affirmation of the existence of the person. It is also the reason for which the word person is used in Buddhism.

Generally speaking, early Buddhism comprised twenty main schools which can be divided into two groups. The first group includes the schools which, despite their various doctrinal interpretations, faithfully accepted the doctrine of insubstantiality (*anātmavāda*) in all its strictness. They affirmed the continuity of the five aggregates which lies at the heart of the problem of insubstantiality. However, this explanation did not satisfy everyone. The second group is represented by the schools which opposed radical depersonalisation and accepted the thesis of the *pudgala*. Being Personalists (*pudgalavādins*), they were condemned as ‘inner heresies’. Although they were attacked by many opposing schools, the numerical importance of their followers and the persistence of these schools prove that they constituted a very important branch of early Buddhism.

The Pudgalavādins consisted of the Vatsiputriyas, Sāmmitiyas, Dharmottariyas, Bhadrānīyas and Śāṇḍagarikas.

Obviously, sources concerning the history of the Personalist schools are extremely limited. Therefore research on this subject undertaken by scholars such as P. Demiéville, É. Lamotte, A. Bareaux, and N. Dutt is much appreciated. An historical reconstruction is necessary in order to approach further studies, namely, the literature, doctrine and theses of the Personalists.

I — THE VATSIPUTRIYAS

All the direct or indirect sources indicate that the Vatsiputriya school is the mother school of the Pudgalavādin sub-schools derived from the Sthaviras. Although very little is known about the first schism of the Sthavirian branch, the majority of Orientalists agree in thinking that the schism occurred in about the year 200 BCE, that is, at the beginning of the third century BCE. This date is also given by the Sāmmitiya tradition and confirmed by works on Buddhist history in Tibetan such as Bu-ston, *History of Buddhism* (tr. E. Obermiller, Vol.II, p.96), Tāranātha's *History of Buddhism in India* (tr. L. Chimpa and A. Chattopadhyaya, pp.71-4). It was adopted by La Vallée Poussin in *The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol.VI, p.193, by A. Bareaux (*Le Bouddhisme indien*, p.84) and by É. Lamotte (*History*, p.281), etc.

This is an important passage on the development of the schools, according to a Sāmmitiya tradition which is generally accepted:


15 Cf. above, n.9.
'One hundred and thirty-seven years after the Parinirvāna of the Buddha, under the kings Nanda and Mahāpadma, when a number of very conspicuous Elders — Mahākāśyapa, Mahâloma, Mahâtyâga, Uttarâ, Revata, etc. — were assembled in Pâtaliputra, Mûra the Wicked assumed the form of a bhikṣu named Bhadra and manifested various wonders and, with the help of the five theses, caused a great debate in the Community [of monks].

Later, those five theses were adopted by the Sthaviras Nâga (Nagasena) and Sâramati. From then on the Community split into two sects: the Sthaviras and the Mahâsâṃghikas.

In the year 63 after this scission was completed, that is in the year 200 after the Nirvâna, the doctrine was reviewed by the Sthavira Vâtsiputra. As to the founder of the Vâtsiputra school, we must suppose that a brahmin named Vâtsiputra, converted by the Sthaviras, upheld the thesis of the pudgala. This Arhat Vâtsiputra was the instigator of the Stâhavirian scission. His theory convinced other monks who formed a separate school called Vâtsiputriya.

With regard to the name of this school, Vâtsiputriya, it means either 1) the disciples of the Arhat named 'son of the Vatsa country' (Vatsyaputra) the capital of which was Kauśāmī; or 2) 'son of the woman Vatsa', personal names composed in this way were common in ancient India, such as, e.g., Śrîputra, Videhiputra, etc.; or 3) 'son of the heifer' (Vâtsiputra), linked with the following legend recorded by K'uei-chi:

'Vâtsiputra (son of a heifer) is the by-name of a Vinaya master. In times long past, there was a sage living in a tranquil spot on the mountain. When sexual desire arose, he was unable to control himself. There was a female buffalo nearby. Because of that sexual congress she gave birth to a child. The family of that sage was then named Vâtsiputra; it was a brahmin family.'

A treatise by Chi-tsang gives some indications on the date of the schism and the

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16 Quoted in Lamotte, History, p.281 and footnote.
20 Chi-tsang 只藏 (549-623) was the son of a Parthian merchant married to a Chinese woman from Nanking. Despite his foreign origin, his education was Chinese. His father became a monk after his birth and Chi-tsang himself, in his childhood (aged seven or thirteen), joined the Community as a novice. He then became a disciple of Master Fa-lang and became famous as a student of the Sên-lun School. 三輸玄義. He was honoured by the emperors of the Sui and T'ang dynasties. Besides commentaries concerning the School's doctrine, he wrote a commentary on a treatise on Vasumitra by Paramârtha. This work was translated and annotated by P. Demiéville in 'L'origine'.
name of the founder of the Vātsiputriya school (let us leave aside the problem of the Abhidharma inheritance which we will speak of in the chapter on the literature of the Pudgalavādins).

'In the year 300', says Chi-tsang, 'from the Sarvāstivādin school there emerged a school called of the "disciples of the son of the Inhabitant" (Vatsyaputriya); this is (what was called) formerly "school of the Heifer's Son" (Vatsyaputriya). As for the name of that school, there was a rṣi named K'è-chu (who can inhabit': Vatsya? Vāsi?); a woman of the race of that rṣi had an son who was an Arhat named "Son of the Inhabitant" (Vatsyaputra); since that school was formed of disciples of that Arhat, it was called Vatsyaputriya. Vatsyaputra, whose disciples formed that school, had Śāriputra as his upādhyāya. Śāriputra had explained the Buddha's teaching in nine parts; that is what is called the Abhidharma of the characteristics of the Dharma (Dharmalaksana-Abhidharma). Rāhula had propagated (transmitted) the Abhidharma of Śāriputra, Vatsyaputra the teachings of Rāhula. That school in turn propagated the teachings of Vatsyaputra.

On this subject, A. Bareau has written in his Secrètes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule: 'According to the agreement of all the sources, the school of the Vātśipūtṛyas is the first derivation from the Śāhaviṃśa trunk, possibly, however, after that of the Haimavatas. The schism that gave rise to it would have occurred exactly 200 years after the Nirvāṇa, that is, about 280 BCE, according to the Śāṃmītiya tradition which must be based on the Vātśipūtṛya tradition.

21 Note by P. Demaille: [17] 'Root vas, basis of the future vatsya, vāṣi, "inhabitant", etc. Similar etymology in Bhāva (Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p.184). Of the two inscriptions given by Paramāṭha, Po-tzu 增都, archaic Bua-tsie (< i'sia) and Po-sa 政私, archaic Bua-si (cf. above and Taishō, 2003, p.220), the former seems to correspond to Vatsya and the latter to Vāsi. It is this latter form which is followed by Hsūn-tsang and Kuei-chi, who translate "school of the Heifer's Son" and explain that the founder was born in a brahmin clan descended from a rṣi and an heifer'. Demaille, 'L'origine', p.57.

22 Note by P. Demaille: [17] 'Cf. Mahāprajāpāramitāsstrā, tr. Przyluski, Concile, p.73: When the Buddha was in this world, Śāriputra, in order to explain the Buddha's words, made the Abhidharma. Later, the Vatsiputria monks received (that work). Until today, that is what is called the Śāriputra Abhidharma. The late T. Kimura showed, in his excellent Researches on the Abhidharma (Tokyo 1922), the close analogy which exists between the Chinese version of the Śāriputra Abhidharma (Nanjo 1926) and the Pali Abhidhamma, in particular the Vibhanga and Pajñāpaniṇī. He even thinks the two treatises go back to the same source as the Śāriputra Abhidharma. From the doctrinal point of view, Kimura's investigation leads to the following conclusions: if we compare the Śāriputra Abhidharma to those which the Vibhāṣa and Kāśa attribute to different schools, it is the school which in these two works is called Vibhāṣyavāda, and not the Vatsiputriya, to which the Śāriputra Abhidharma is closest; as for the Pali Abhidhamma, it is closest to the doctrines attributed in the same works to the Mahāsāṃghika school. We saw above that Paramāṭha links that (Bahusrtika-) Vibhāṣyavāda school with the Mahāsāṃghika school. Cf. p.49, n.4. — For the expression Dharmalaksana-abhidharma, cf. the definition of Abhidharma given at the beginning of the Vibhāṣa (Taishō, 1545, p.4a): "It is called Abhidharma because it consists of making a clear and perfect analysis (nirvedha) of the characteristics of the Dharma (dharmalaksana)." A similar definition is attributed, in a later passage of the Vibhāṣa, to Venerable Vasumitra'. Demaille, 'L'origine', pp.57-8.

itself, or at the beginning of the third century of the Era of the Nirvāna, that is, shortly after 280 BCE, according to the North-Western traditions. We would not go far wrong in placing that event in the reign of Bindusāra Maurya (289-264 BCE). The Vatsīputryas derive their name from the founder of their school, Vatsiputra. According to the Mañjuśrīparipṛcchāsūtra, the latter was a discipline master (vinayadharma). According to K’uei-chi, he was from the brahmin caste. Paramārtha makes him a disciple of Śāriputra.24

Tāranātha gives us some facets of his personality and career, as follows: “There was then in Kashmir a monk called Vatsa born in a brahmana family. He was cruel, wicked and, though vastly learned, was in favour of the doctrine of the (permanent) soul (ātmaka-vāda). He went around corrupting the common monks to the wrong view. This resulted in a minor controversy within the saṃgha.”25

In this connection, some people claim that the Arhat Gopa was the precursor of the Pudgalavādins because he was a contemporary of Devaśarman who died about 100 years after the Nirvāna.26 In the account of his travels, Hsūan-tsang informs us that in Viśāka, the place where Devaśarman wrote his Vijñānakāyapādasātra, in which he denies the existence of the pudgala like that of the ātman, lived the Arhat Gopa who wrote a treatise in which he, in contrast, defended the existence of the pudgala. According to Hsūan-tsang, there was a lively controversy on these doctrinal points between the two masters.27

Unfortunately, we cannot know Gopa’s exact opinion on the pudgala, since his treatise does not exist, either in Chinese or Tibetan.

The author of the Vijñānakāyapādasātra presents the theory of the pudgala, with his interpretation and intention to criticise it. According to Devaśarman, the pudgala is susceptible to being perceived in reality, it is considered as an individual which transmigrates from one life to another, and which obtains the fruits of the Path. This pudgala is subject to the creation of actions (karman) and the reaping of

24 Tr. after A. Bareau, Sectes, p.19.
25 Tāranātha’s History of Buddhism in India, pp.71-2.
27 Hsūan-tsang 玄奘 (602-664) was born into a good family of literati in Hsukü and entered a monastery in Lo-yang at the age of 13. In 618, he went to Ch’ang-an and received full ordination (upasampāda) as soon as he was 20. His Buddhist studies were mainly concentrated on the Abhidharma. At the age of 25 or 27 Hsūan-tsang set out, with imperial consent, for India (in 627 or 629) to deepen his knowledge. His outward journey lasted nearly two years. He then spent a dozen years in India and returned to Ch’ang-an with 657 works in 645. From the age of 43 until the end of his life, Hsūan-tsang devoted all his time (645-664) to translating 75 works. He was the greatest scholar and Chinese translator of Buddhism.


28 Cf. S. Beal, Si-yu ki 西遊記 (Buddhist Records of the Western World) I, p.240.
pleasant or painful fruition. It is the centre of knowledge with respect to external phenomena.

A. Bareau does not share this opinion and considers that the story of Gopa, precursor of the Pudgalavādins or Vātsiputriyas, is certainly legendary or, rather, that it occurred much later, since Buddhist works had not begun to be written down until just before the Common Era; until then they were only transmitted orally. The Vijñānakāyāpādaśāstra, pertaining to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, therefore post-dates the appearance of the latter and therefore even more so that of the Vātsiputriyas. It dates at the earliest three hundred years after the Nirvāṇa.

According to J. Przyluski, the Vātsiputriyas formed a distinct group around Kaśām, the ancient Buddhist capital. The inscription on an Aśokan pillar, from the Gupta period (fourth century CE), at Sarnāth (Vārānasi), indicates that it existed in parallel with the Śāmmitiṇīyas. It existed as an independent school in the fifth century CE.

According to Tāranātha, the school still existed separately along with the other five schools, namely, the Kāruṇikullakas, the main Śāmmitiṇīya school, the Prajñāptivādins, Lokottaravādins, Tāmraśaṭṭiyas and Mūlasarvāstivādins, at the time of the Pāla kings (eighth century CE). However, the Vātsiputriyas themselves have not left much trace of their residence in India or elsewhere. The certain outcome was that

30 The Vijñānakāya of Devāsāman is one of the seven books of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, entitled Śādābadhidharma (Abhidharma with six feet).

1 — the Jñānaprasthāna of Kātyāyaniśānī, T XXVI, 1543, is like a body, the six feet (pāda) or supplements of which are:

2 — the Prakaraṇapāda of Vasumitra, T XXVI, 1541 and 1542;
3 — the Vijñānakāya of Devāsāman, T XXVI, 1539;
4 — the Dharmaśāstra of Śāriputra, T XXVI, 1537;
5 — the Prajñāptivātsāstra of Maugālīyana, T XXVI, 1538;
6 — the Dātukāya of Pūrṇa, T XXVI, 1540;
7 — the Saṃghiparṣad of Mahākauṭṣihila, T XXVI, 1536.

Of these seven texts, the first was translated by Gautama Sanghadeva with the collaboration of Chu Fo-nian 竺佛念 in 383 CE. The other six books were translated by Hsuan-tsang between 651 and 660 CE. 2 has been edited by J. Imamishi, Fragment of the Abhidharma-prakaraṇabhāṣya, Göttingen 1975, 4 by S. Dietz, Fragment of the Dharmaśāstra, Göttingen 1984; and 7 ed. and tr. by K. Mittal and V. Suste-Rosen, Das Saṅghitāśra und sein Kommentar Saṅghitāparṣad, Berlin 1968.

31 Cf. El VII, p.172, No.1; list by Lüders, 923; Sukumar Dutt, Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India, p.216.
33 The Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu (A-pi-ta-mo-chu shè lun 阿毘達摩俱舍論, T XXIX, 1558), the important treatise which appeared in the 5th cent. CE, devotes its ninth chapter to criticising the principle thesis of the pudgala of the Vātsiputriyas as an independent school and not associated with the Śāmmitiṇīya (cf. Kośa, Ch.IX, p.227 ff; Engl. tr. p.1313 ff). Hence the Vātsiputriyas were the strongest adversaries of the Sarvāstivādins as well as the Sautrāntikas, particularly in the doctrinal sphere.
34 Cf. Tāranātha's History of Indian Buddhism, pp.341-2. Cf. also Bareau, Religions, p.92.
they were soon eclipsed by one of their sub-schools, the Śāṃkritiyas. Nonetheless, the Vātsiputriya school was "one of the most powerful and flourishing of early Buddhism". The Vātsiputriyas had no connection with the Vṛjiputaka (Pāli, Vajjiputtaka) monks who were condemned at the Council of Vaiśāli as practitioners of the ten usages against discipline.

II - THE VĀTSĪPUTRĪYA SUB-SCHOOLS

In that they were dissatisfied with the Abhidharma of the mother school (Śāriputraśāristhādharmā in nine parts, or Dharmalakṣanābhidharma), the disciples of Vātsiputra 'attempted to complete its meaning by means of śāstras [Lamotte's 'sūstras' should correctly read 'śāstras'], and that enrichment of the doctrine caused the blossoming of four new schools: Dharmottariyas, Bhadrayāniyas, Śāṃkritiyas and Chāṇāgirikas'.

Chi-tsang gives the following explanation of the development of these four sub-schools:

"Then, within three hundred years, from the Vātsyaputriya school emerged a further four schools... Dissatisfied with the Śāriputraśāristhādharmā, which they considered incomplete, they each compiled śāstras in order to complete the meaning of the sūtras. Since their opinions differed, they formed four schools bearing the following names: 1) school of the Elevation of the Dharma (Dharmottariya), which was in antiquity called T'an-wu-tê ; 2) school of the Vehicle of the Sages (Bhadrayāniya); 3) school of the disciples of the "Correct Measure" (Śāṃkritiya); that is, the disciples of the Arhat (named) Correct Measure (Śāṃmita); 4) school of the Dense Forest (Ṣaṇḍagairika), which takes its name from its residence."

According to North-western sources, the four sub-schools appeared during the third century CE. However, if the birth of those sub-schools was caused by different interpretations of the Abhidharmapitākā, as is claimed by Paramārtha, their appearance must date to the first century BCE or CE, as the development of the Abhidharma could not have existed before then.

Before tackling the situation of the four sub-schools in detail, it is useful to summarise the ideas concerning the origin and development of the Vātsiputriya school by means of the following table:

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35 Baraæ, Secræ, p.115. According to Vinitadeva, the Śāṃkritiyas were sub-divided into three sub-schools: Kœrukujlawes, Avantakas and Vātsiputriyas. Thus, at that time, these last were considered as a sub-school of the Śāṃkritiyas Tataraftu's History of Indian Buddhism, p.340. Bu-ston, History of Buddhism 11, tr. Obermiller, p.100.


37 Lamotte, History, p.531.

38 Tr. after Demièville, L'origine' pp.58-9.

39 On the biography of Paramārtha, cf. below, 'The translator of the Lù ērk-shih-ērh ming-liao lun'.

THE LITERATURE OF THE PERSONALISTS — CHAPTER ONE

Parinirvāna of the Buddha
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1. **THE SĀMMITIYĀS**

Among the four sub-schools which emerged from the Vatsiputriya school, that of the Sāmmitiyās is most noteworthy. It was the most developed sub-school in India, perhaps in the seventh century CE, despite its possible appearance later than the other sub-schools. Its founder, according to Bhavya, was the Arhat Sāmmīta whose history is not known. According to Bareau, the meaning of this name is not established since there are various spellings of it:

1) Sāmmatiyyās: those who live in accord, or those who should be respected.
2) Sāmmitiyyās (Pāli): those who are assembled or equal.
3) Sāmmitiyyās: those who have a correct measure, or the equal.

The school appeared between the second century BCE and the first century CE.

The main reason for the schism of the Sāmmitiyās among the Vatsiputriyās, according to Vasumitra, was because of the divergent explanations of those who, later, were to form the three sub-schools based on the following stanza:

"Being delivered, one regresses again."
"The fall comes from covetousness; one can return."
"The obtaining of security and joy, such is happiness."
"Following the practices of happiness, one reaches happiness."

The Sāmmitiyās, according to K'uei-chi, explained that to 'the four fruits (phala)...

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41 According to the lists by the Sthaviras and Bhavya, the Sāmmitiyās appeared after the Dharmottariyās and Bhadrayāniyās; the lists of the Mahāsāṃghikas in the Śāriputraparipṛcchā and Manjuśrīparipṛcchā: after the Dharmottariyās and Bhadrayāniyās and before the Śaṅnāgāriyās (the list in the Śāriputraparipṛcchā gives the date of the 3rd century EP); the Pāli and Sāmmitiyās lists: they appeared last in relation to the other three sub-schools. Cf. Taranātha's History of Buddhism in India, p.339-40; Lamotte, History, pp.530-6.
42 Bareau, Sectes, p.121; Demiéville, 'L'origine', p.59.
43 Bareau, Sectes, p.121.
44 Ibid., pp.122-3. The importance of the stanza obliges us to reproduce its Chinese translation:

已解脫更度 | 罪由貪穬還
解脫法所樂 | 像樂行至樂

Cf. K'uei-chi, Iptlsc, 230b, 1, 2.
correspond six kinds of person:

1) he who is delivered (vimukta); that is, the 'Stream-winner' (srotāpānna) who has obtained deliverance (vimukti);
2) he who goes from family to family (kuṭaṅkula), that is, he who is aiming for the second fruit;
3) he who has obtained the fruit of a single rebirth (sākrādā-gāmin);
4) he who has only a single interval (ekavīcika);
5) he who will not return again (nāgāmin)
6) the Arhat.

The first line of the verse (pāda) indicates the one who is delivered but who can regress to delusion. The second line indicates he who goes from family to family; the fourth person, who can regress due to craving (kāma), and the third person, who will return to this world. The third indicates the fifth person (who will not return to this world), and the fourth line designates the Arhat.45

Basing ourselves on the Tridharmakāsāstra (abbrev. TDS, T XXV, 1506) and the Sāmmitīyanikāyaśāstra (abbrev. SNS, T XXXII, 1649), we can ask ourselves a question: is it possible that one of the causes of the scission between the Sāmmitiyas and the Vātsīputriyas could have been the difference in the lists of the Śrāvaka fruits, the Vātsīputriya list consisting of 29 categories46 while that of the Sāmmitiyas contains only ten or eleven categories47?

The presence of the school is proved by two inscriptions: one in Mathurā, from the Kuśāna period (second century CE)48, the other at Sārnāth, from the Gupta period (fourth century CE)49. The first attests the installation of a statue of a Bodhisattva dedicated to the Sāmmitiya monks, at the Sirivihāra, made by a monk whose master was Dharmaka. The second bears witness to the presence of Sāmmitiya masters otherwise known as Vātsīputriyas (ācāryānāmparigrahe Vātśīputridānām).

It was around the third or fourth century CE that the Sāmmitiyas became so influential and popular that they replaced the Sarvāstivādins in Sārnāth50. That school flourished most noticeably in the reign of King Harsavardhana (606-647 CE)51. It is

45  Bureau, Sectes, pp.22-3.
46  Cf. Thich Thién Châu, 'Le Tridharmakāsāstra', Ch.IV.
47  Ibid., Ch.I; below, 'The Śrāvaka lists of the Pudgalavādins'.
49  Lüders, 923 of the Sāmmitiyas at Sārnāth.
51  Harsavardhana (606-647 CE) succeeded his father, King Prabhākasavardhana, called Pratāpaśīla, of the kingdom of Thanesvar, founded by Puspadhūti. According to Hsüan-tsang, the frontiers of India in the reign of Harsavardhana went no further than Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Orissa. This king is described by Hsüan-tsang as a king in accord with the Dharma. He was just in his administration and punctilious in the execution of his duties. In his devotion to good works, he forgot to eat or sleep. He banned the consumption of animals throughout the five Indias, and forbade killing under the most serious of punishments' (tr. after P. Lévi, 'Les pèlerins chinois en Inde', Présence du Bouddhisme, p.417.)
said that the king's sister Rājyaśri became a nun (bhikṣuṇi) in the Sāṃmitiśya women's Order.

According to I-ching, the Sāṃmitiśyas were represented in the regions of Lāṭa and Sindhu, that is, eastern India.

The importance of the school was very obvious, as Hsüan-tsang, the Chinese pilgrim, observed in the second quarter of the seventh century: more than 1,351 monasteries scattered throughout nearly all the large regions, sheltering approximately 66,500 monks.

The table below, based on information supplied by Hsüan-tsang [and the chart in Lamotte, History, p.542], gives us an idea of the Sāṃmitiśya communities' expansion:

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Although Hārvardhana belonged to the Vaiṣya caste, he was a generous patron of philosophers, poets, sages and the religious of Hinduism as of Buddhism. He erected about a thousand viṣayas on the banks of the Ganges, built monasteries in the Buddhist holy places and generously endowed the Mahāvihāra at Nalanda. Owing to his religious policy, Buddhism regained its former vigour. This is proved by the fact that in Kanauj (Kanyākubja), Hārvardhana's capital, Hsüan-tsang counted more than an hundred monasteries and more than ten thousand Buddhist monks; whereas, two centuries earlier, Fa-hsien had only counted two monasteries. It was in particular during the reign of Hārvardhana that the Sāṃmitiśya school flourished the most.


52 According to Bāna, in his Harṣacarita, Rājyaśri (c. end of 6th. cent. or beginning of 7th cent CE) was the younger daughter of Emperor Prabhākara-vardhana, called Pratāpaśila, and Queen Yāsomati. This king was a sun-worshipper and skilful warrior who vanquished the Hūnas of the North-west, the Gaurjra king of Rajputana and the lords of Sindhu, Gandhāra, Lāṭa and Mālava. Rājyaśri was intelligent, cultured and actively interested in Buddhism. She married Grahavarman, the son of Avantivarman of the Mau-khari family of Kanauj. Her husband was soon killed in a plot hatched by the Mālava king and Rājyaśri was herself imprisoned in Kanauj, her feet in fetters. At the time when her brothers Rājavarman and Hārvardhana were involved in military operations against the Hūnas of the North, King Prabhākara-vardhana died. Hārvardhana, who had not joined the battle with his brother, returned to the capital Rājavarman, on the way to attack the Mālava king, was killed by the Gauda king Śāstānska. Hārvardhana was then able to mount the throne. His friend, Kumāragupta, the Mālava king's son, rescued his sister Rājyaśri.

Once released from prison and informed that her husband Grahavarman had been killed, Rājyaśri entered the Vindhyā forest and decided to commit suicide. Harṣa-vardhana set out in search of his sister, found her in the forest before she could take her life and persuaded her to abandon her decision. Rājyaśri then became a nun in the Bhikṣuṇī Samgha of the Sāṃmitiśyas (after the article 'Harṣa-vardhana and Harṣacarita' by N. Dutt in his Mahāyāna Buddhism, London 1978. pp.48–50; cf. Harṣacarita, Ch.VIII, English tr. by Cowell and Thomas; cf also L.M. Jashi, Studies in the Buddhist Culture of India, pp.32-3).

53 I-ching (634–713: 635– says Takakusu) is the foremost of the great Chinese pilgrims in India. He was born in Chih-li 齐鲁, near Peking. When seven years old, he entered a monastery and, at the age of fifteen, resolved to go to India. He embarked on a Persian ship at Yang-chou 函, and stayed ten years in India. Returning to Lo-yang in summer 695, he brought back 400 works composed of 500,000 stokas. From 700 to 712 he translated 56 works consisting of 230 volumes. I-ching died in Lo-yang in 713 in his 79th year. (Cf. Nan hai chi kuei nei ja chuan 南海奇域内法律 T LIV, 2125, 204c–234a; the article 'Yi-tsing' by Paul Levi, in 'Les pèlerins chinois en Inde', Présence du Bouddhisme, pp.423–6; L'Inde classique II, 2063, pp.407–8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MONASTERIES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ahicchatra</td>
<td>10 +</td>
<td>1,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kapitha (Śārkāśya)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ayumukha (in Oudh)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Viśoka (in Oudh)</td>
<td>20 +</td>
<td>3,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Śrāvastī</td>
<td>some hundreds in ruins</td>
<td>very small number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Kapilavastu</td>
<td>1,000 in ruins</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Vārānasī</td>
<td>30 +</td>
<td>3,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mr gadāva</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Vaiśāli</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>very small number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Īranaparvata (Monghyr)</td>
<td>10 +</td>
<td>4,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Karnasavarna</td>
<td>10 +</td>
<td>2,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mālava</td>
<td>some hundreds</td>
<td>20,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Valabhī (in Kāthiāwār)</td>
<td>100 +</td>
<td>6,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Ānandapura</td>
<td>10 +</td>
<td>1,000 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Sindh</td>
<td>some hundreds</td>
<td>10,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Aviddhakarna</td>
<td>80 +</td>
<td>5,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A-tien-p'ō-chih-lo Indus delta)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Badakshān</td>
<td>50 +</td>
<td>3,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Pi-to-chih-lo delta area)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. A-fan-t'u (Middle Sindh)</td>
<td>20 +</td>
<td>2,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,351 +</td>
<td>66,500 +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers of monasteries and religious inhabitants are larger than those relating to other schools of the period pertaining to early Buddhism.

Sthaviras 401 monasteries 36,800 religious
Mahāsāṃghikas 24 " 1,100 "
Sarvāstivādins 158 " 23,700 "
Unspecified 145 " 6,700 "

728 monasteries 68,300 religious
The important point in Hsüan-tsang’s narrative is that there is no trace of the existence of the Vatsiputriya school, which reinforces the likelihood that the Vatsiputriyas were, to a certain degree, eclipsed by the Sāmmitiyas. This is what is known as the Vatsiputriya-Sāmmitiya school. On the other hand, being so widespread, the Sāmmitiyas divided into two sub-schools: 1) the Avantakas, that is, the Sāmmitiyas of Avanta or Avanti residing to north of the Narbada and east of the lower Indus; 2) the Kurukulas, that is, the Sāmmitiyas of the Kuru family, residing in Kurukṣetra on the upper Ganges, around Śhāneśvara. About half a century after Hsüan-tsang’s departure from India, another Chinese pilgrim, I-ching, supplies some details on the presence of the Sāmmitiyas. According to him, the Arya-Sāmmitiya school was, at that time, subdivided into four sub-schools which were above all represented in Lāṭa and Sindhu; they were also active in Magadha and, a little, in the south of India; they co-existed with other schools in eastern India. I-ching notes that there were some Sāmmitiyas in the Sunda Islands and a large group in Champa, where they predominated. According to Tāranātha, the Avantaka sub-school had disappeared by the seventh century. Only the Kurukula sub-school, which came under the influence of the Mahāyāna in the eighth century, continued until the time of the Pāla kings (ninth-tenth centuries CE).

2. THE DHARMOTTARĪYAS, BHADRAYĀNIYAS AND ŠANṆĀGĀRIKAS

We do not have much documentation concerning the Dharmottariyas, Bhadrayāniyas or ŠanṆāgārikas, which is why these three sub-schools will be dealt with together:

a) The Dharmottariyas

The appearance of the Dharmottariyas may date back to the middle of the third century CE. This school, according to Bhavya, took its title from the name of its founder, Dharmottara: the Dharma is superior, the superiority of the Dharma, the elevation of the Dharma. Dharmottara was a Vinaya master. The causes of the Dharmottariya scission from the Vatsiputriyas may have been:

1) discontent concerning the Abhidharma of the Vatsiputriyas, according to Paramārtha;
2) divergent interpretations among the four sub-schools of the stanza common to the school, according to Vasumitra.

With regard to the stanza common to the Vatsiputriyas, the Dharmottariyas said,
according to K'uei-chi: "The Arhat has dharmas of regression (parihāṇī), stability (sthitī) and progress; the first two lines of the verse concern regression, the third, stability, and the fourth, progress."

The presence of the sub-school is attested by some inscriptions:
1) on pillars 8 and 9 of the caitya at Karle in the second century, marking the installation of the pillar with relics by the Thera Sātimita, the son of Nanda and disciple of a master from the Dharmottariya Community in Śūparāka;
2) in a cave at Junnar, in mountains of the Bombay region, a dedication concerning a cave and a tank, by Patibadhaka Giribhuti Sakhuryani, son of Savagin Yaśa of the Apaguriyas. These establishments and a nunnery belonged to the Dharmottariyas of the town.

The date of this sub-school's disappearance is unknown.

b) The Bhadrāṇīyas

The Bhadrāṇīyas seemingly appeared about the middle of the third century CE. According to Bhavya, the name Bhadrāṇīya means: those whose way (yāna) is auspicious (bhadrā), or the vehicle of the sages. While, according to K'uei-chi, Bhadrāṇīya can be defined as meaning: disciples of the descendants of the Arhat Bhadrā.

The causes of the sub-school's scission may have been similar to those of the Dharmottariyas, namely:
1) dissatisfaction with the Vātsiputriya Abhidharma;
2) divergent interpretations among the four sub-schools of the stanza common to the Vātsiputriyas.

According to K'uei-chi, the Bhadrāṇīyas explained the common stanza as follows: 'The first two lines of the verse apply to the Arhats, who can therefore regress; the third line concerns the Pratyekabuddhas, and the last line the Buddhas proper.'

The existence of this sub-school is also confirmed by several inscriptions:

An inscription in the cave at Kanheri, in the reign of Jayāśrī Śatakarni (174-203 CE), and two epigraphs in the cave at Nashik which were engraved in the year 19 of the reign of Sātavāhana king Vāsiṣṭhiputra Pulomā (130-150 CE) contain the name of Bhadrāṇīya. One of the inscriptions at Nashik (Lüders' list No.1123) ends by indicating the gift of a cave and village of the Pijipadakas to the south-west of Mount Tirānu (Trirāṣmi) (Bombay) by Queen Gotamī Balāsrī and Vāsiṣṭhiputra Pulomā, lord of

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64 Bureau, Sectes, p.127; cf. K'uei-chi, Iptlisc, 230b, 1, 2; Kośa, IV, p.253 ff; Engl. tr., p.1001 sq.
65 Lüders, 1094–5.
67 Bureau, Sectes, p.128 and n.1.
68 Lamotte, History, p.320; Demièville, 'L'origine', p.59.
69 Ibid., cf. K'uei-chi, Iptlisc, 234a 1.
71 Lüders, 987.
72 Ibid., 1123.
Daksināpatha (Dakshināpathesaro), to the Bhadrayāniya Community.

In the second inscription, still in the cave at Nāsik (Lüders' list No.1124), Vāsiṣṭhiputra Pulomā orders his Sivikhandila officials from Govardhana to give the village of Samalipada to the monks of the Bhadrayāniya school in exchange for the village of Sudasana (Sudarśana). These facts inform us that the Bhadrayāniyas had a residence at Nāsik and were supported by the Satavahana royal family in the mid-second century CE. The sub-school flourished equally in Kānheri where a caitya (Lüders' list No.987) was constructed and a cave and a water tank (Lüders' list No.1018) donated to the Bhadrayāniyas.

c) The Saṇṇāgārikas

The Saṇṇāgārika or Saṇḍagiriya sub-school is considered as the last to have emerged from the Vātsiputriyas and appeared in the middle of the third century EP.

The name of the school has several meanings: Saṇṇāgārika means 'those with six (sād) towns (nagara)', Saṇḍagiriya, 'those who dwell on the mountain (giri) of brushwood (sāṇḍa)'. K'uei-chi explains that the Saṇḍagiriyas took their name from their master's dwelling, a dense forest situated near a mountain.

The causes of the scission of the Saṇṇāgārikas or Saṇḍagiriyas from the Vātsiputriyas are:
1) discontent as to the Vātsiputriya Abhidharma, according to Paramārtha;
2) divergent interpretations of the common stanza, according to Vasumitra.

The Saṇṇāgārikas or Saṇḍagiriyas, according to K'uei-chi, interpreted the stanza as follows: ‘There are six kinds of wise people (asaikṣa), that is, of Arhats, who are respectively characterised by regression (parihāni), cogitation (cetanā), protection (anurakṣāna), stability (sthita), penetration (prativedhāna) and immovability (akopya); he who is already delivered is the second, he who can regress is the first, he who reverts to the passions because of his regression is the third, he who returns is the fourth, the third line of the verse concerns the fifth, and the last line the sixth.’

No geographical or epigraphical trace of this sub-school has yet been discovered. However, it is certain that its followers lived in western India, as did other sub-schools of the Vātsiputriyas. The date of its disappearance is equally unknown.

73 According to A.M. Shastri, Govardhana is identical to the modern village of Govardhan. Gangapur is on the right bank of the River Godavari, about six miles to the west of Nāsik. Formerly, it was the centre of a territorial division (Bombay Gazetteer XVI, p.541). Cf. A.M. Shastri. An Outline of Early Buddhism, p.84, n.4.


75 Bareau, Sectes, p.130 and n.5; cf. K'uei-chi, Iptūsca, 230b 2.
CHAPTER TWO

THE LITERATURE AND DOCTRINE OF THE PUDGALAVĀDINS

A - GENERALITIES

I. The Pudgalavādin Tripitaka

The Buddha did not produce any literary works during his lifetime; he only expounded his teaching. His disciples listened to him, learnt his teaching by heart and verbally transmitted it to others. It is probable that little use of writing was made in India at that time. Furthermore, the oral transmission of knowledge was traditional in religious circles. Throughout most of his life, the Buddha carried out his ministry in the regions of the Ganges Delta. That is why it is thought that he generally spoke the dialects of Magadha, Kośala and others from neighbouring provinces. He was not attached to any particular language, as he said:

'I allow, monks, each of you to learn the Word of the Buddha in your tongue'.

According to tradition, immediately after the decease of the Buddha, his disciples assembled at a Council in Rājagṛha in order to recite and fix his teachings in two collections, namely, the Vinaya, and the Dharma or śāstras.

After the formation of the schools, these two collections were established in canonical texts, parallel to the output of scholastic works: Abhidharma and śāstra. Hence the schools separately elaborated their three collections of Canonical Texts or Tripitaka.

It is probable that the Pudgalavādins possessed a large collection of canonical and post-canonical texts in relation to the number of their sub-schools: Vātsiputriyas, Sāmmitiyas, Dharmottariyas, Bhadrayāniyas and Sannāgārikas, which lasted for about fifteen centuries. They possessed large numbers of monasteries and monks in comparison to the seventh-century schools.

Since the Sāmmitiya sub-school rapidly eclipsed the mother school, that of the Vātsiputriyas, and the three other sub-schools which were too small and which left no trace of literature, it is difficult to distinguish the Sāmmitiya literature from that of the other four schools.

In this sense, the Sāmmitiya literature can, in general, be considered as that of the Pudgalavādins.

According to I-ching, the Tripitaka of the Sāmmitiyas contained 200,000 ślokas for a single Vinayapitaka.76 Hsuan-tsang had brought back fifteen works of the Tripitaka of the Sāmmitiya school from India, but he did not translate them.77

The Pudgalavādins have left few traces of their literature. Once and for all, only the following four treatises remain:

76 Vin., Cullavagga V, 33, I, p.139: Anujānāmi bhikkhave sakāya niruttiyā buddhavacakanaṃ pariṣūpyamini.tum.
77 J. Takakusu, Record, pp.XXIV and 8.
78 Watters, On Yuan Chwang’s Travels in India I, pp.20-1.
1. The *San fa tu lun* (abbrev. Tds) (T XXV, 1506); this is a treatise that systematises the basic doctrinal elements of the Pudgalavādins in general, and the Vatsipūrīyas in particular.

2. The *Śsū a-han-mu ch'ao chieh* (abbrev. Śsū) (T XXV, 1505); it is probable that this treatise is another version of the Tds since its contents are similar to the latter; also, the same title *San fa tu* (Tridharmaka) is indicated in the last line of the text (Śsū, 15b 25).

3. The *Scan-mi-lu pu lun* (abbrev. Sns) (T XXXII, 1649); this treatise elucidates in particular the Sāmmitiya theses of the pudgala and intermediate existence (*antarābhava*), as is indicated by the title.

4. The *Lū èrh-shih-èrh ming-liao lun* (abbrev. Lū ming-liao lun) (T XXIV, 1461); this is a short Vinaya treatise pertaining to the Sāmmitiyas.

Due to these works, together with the details they supply, we can confirm that the Pudgalavādins, like the Sarvāstivādins, Theravādins, etc., possessed three collections of canonical texts plus some treatises. Here are some justifications of this:

1. Regarding the existence of the Tripitaka and its significance, the Tds describes them under the heading of erudition (*bahuśrutatā*) as follows:

   'Erudition (*bahuśrutatā*) is (comprehension) of *Sūtras*, Abhidharma and Vinaya . . . Of the three, *Sūtras*, Abhidharma and Vinaya, the *Sūtras* (contain the discourses) expounded and approved by the Omniscient One (*sarvajña*). The *Sūtras* explain the defilements and purities, illustrate the four Noble Truths (*āryasatya*) and the elimination of countless wrongs. The Abhidharma is the exhaustive analysis of the *Sūtras*. The Vinaya explains conduct and ceremonies leading to purification. These are the three elements of erudition. Of these three elements, the Vinaya especially curbs desire (*kāma*), and the Abhidharma especially curbs hatred (*dveṣa*). The Abhidharma explains the nature of actions (*karmabhava*), that is why it can dispel hatred, which is the cause (*hetu*) of infractions of the discipline (*duhkṣila*). Through such infractions, one falls into the hells. The *Sūtras* especially curb delusion (*moha*). They explain the twelve factors of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*)' (Tds, 17a 4-13).

2. Substantially the same as the Tds, the *Śsū* also mentions the existence of the Tripitaka in the definition of erudition (*bahuśrutatā*), the additional commentary to which reaffirms: 'This is the Tripitaka' (Śsū, 2b 28).

3. In the *Lū ming-liao lun*, the author notes the existence of the Pudgalavādin Tripitaka, saying: 'relying on the Tripitaka, the three studies (*sīkṣa*) are established' (Lū ming-liao lun, 665c 14-15).

At all events, we can confirm that the Pudgalavādins had their own texts, as La Vallée Poussin mentions: 'While we are not willing to maximise the importance of the few scriptural texts which affirm the existence of a Self, under the name of *pudgala* (an individual, a person), these texts cannot be ignored altogether. They are old; they are no less authentic than the selflessness texts; they are the authoritative
texts of the Sāṃmitīya sect, an important school.\(^79\)

Having affirmed the existence of the Pudgalavādins' three collections of canonical texts, we will examine them in detail, according to the order given by the Tds or Ssū.

1. Pudgalavādin Sūtrapitaka

Each school, or group of schools, had its own Āgama or Nikāya, different from those of the other schools and compiled in the language particular to that school (Sanskrit, whether more or less hybrid, Gandhārī, Prākrit, Pāli . . . ). At present, apart from the five Nikāyas in Pāli, we still have the four Āgamas in Chinese, and fragments of Āgamas in Sanskrit.\(^80\) The four Āgamas in Chinese were translated between the final years of the fourth century and the middle of the fifth century CE. There are still no integral studies on the origin of the four Āgamas that we possess today in the Chinese translation, except for the Madhyamāgama (Chung-a-han + 忍 + 古), T I, 26 translated by Gautama Sanghadeva between 397 and 398), which is presented as the work of the Sarvāstivādins.\(^81\) According to Bareau, the Dirghāgama (Ch'ang-a-han + 望 + 古), T I, 1, 30 sūtras, translated by Buddhayaśas between 412 and 413) pertained to the Dharmaguptakas; the Ekottarāgama (Tsèng-i-a-han + 省 + 古), T II, 125, translated by Gautama Sanghadeva between 397 and 398) seems to belong to the Mahāsāṃghikas; the Samyuktāgama (T'sa-a-han + 席 + 古), T II, 99, 1,362 sūtras, translated by Gunabhadra between 436 and 443) probably comes from a school connected with the Sthaviras, the Sarvāstivāda.

There is another partial Samyuktāgama (Pieh-i tsa-a-han + 席 + 古), T II, 100, 364 sūtras), translated by an unknown hand in the year 400 and which pertained to the Kāśyapiya school, according to Lamotte.\(^82\)

Tao-an 道安 (312-385)\(^83\), in his preface to the Ssū, confirms that the Ssū or the Tds is a summary of the four Āgamas or the twelve sections (dvādasāṅga)\(^84\) (Preface

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81 Ibid., p.18.
82 É. Lamotte, History, p.154.
83 Tao-an 道安 (312-385), born into a family already famous for its studies of the classics, was drawn to Buddhism while still quite young. He studied the canonical texts at Lo-yang, where he also took instruction on Buddhism from the best intellectuals who were shortly to become the most respected teachers in the whole country, then subjected to the Northern Wei (北魏 386-416 CE). He invited to China many Indian scholars, then settled in Central Asia, to teach Buddhism and translate Buddhist texts. Tao-an himself was not a translator or direct collaborator but acted as general manager or adviser playing an extremely important part in the translating activities. He wrote several prefaces to translations of that time and Kumārajīva called him The Saint of the East. Cf. Kao V, T L, 2059, 35lc 4; E. Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, pp.187-204; Ui Hakuju 子井伯二, Shaku Dōan kenkyū 講道安研究 Tokyo 1956.
84 The twelve sections including those of the texts of the Small Vehicle (dvādasāṅga) constitute a traditional classification of all the Sanskrit Buddhist texts, which is distinct from another classification of texts consisting of only nine sections. They are:

1. Suttas: discourses by the Buddha and others.
2. Gēyas: discourses with verses.
3. Vākaranas: solemn statements, announcements, predictions.
to the Sūța a-han, la). Furthermore, through the additional commentary on the word sūtra in the same text, its translator Kumārabuddhi\(^{85}\) writes:

"The Sūtras, that is, the four Āgamas which are the explanation of the twelve sections (Sūța, 2b 27). However, we have no information enabling us to know which kind of Āgama is indicated by Tao-an and Kumārabuddhi since there are, in fact, many collections bearing the name Āgama. What did the Sūtrapitaka or the four Āgamas of the Pudgalavadāns contain? Until now we have received no clarification and the question remains unanswered. Hence, although the four Āgamas which Kumārabuddhi indicates are not the four Āgamas which exist in Chinese translation, it cannot be denied that the Pudgalavadāns certainly possessed their own Sūtrapitaka.

Moreover, several titles of discourses appear in the existing treatises, for example: Shēng fa yin ching 師法印經, Āryadharmamudrāsūtra (Tds, 19a 19)\(^{86}\); Shuo ch'ū ching 說初經, Deśanasthānāsāstra (Tds, 19a 23)\(^{87}\) (the same two titles exist respectively in the Sūța, 4b 17; 4c 21); Tsūi-shang-nū-jên hsiu-to-lo 隨上士人修多羅 Uttamāstrisūtra (Sns, 463a 25); Pa-ch'a-yeh-na hsiu-to-lo 迦葉那時修多羅 Vātsyāyanaśūtra (Sns, 471a 12); etc.

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7. Iiyuktas: 'Thus has it been said'.
10. Abhāvadharmas: stories of marvels.
11. Avadānas: various adventures.

The nine sections of the Pāli Canon are found in MN I, 133; AN II, 103, 178; III, 86, 117:


85 On the biography of Kumārabuddhi, see below, The translations of the Sūța a-han-ma ch'uo chieh.
86 Shēng fa yin ching 師法印經 or Fo shuo sheng fa yin ching 佛說聖法印經, T II, 103, 500a-b, translated by Shu Fa-hu 無法護 (Dharmarakṣa) of Yüeh-chih origin, born in Tun-huang 順陽 under the Western Chin (Hsi Chin 西晉) dynasty, deals with the following basic points:
1. Emptiness (k'ung 空 國 ), 2. signlessness (wu-hsiang 五相, asamjña = animitta), 3. wishlessness (wu-yü 萬 頂, aprajñā), 4. consciousness is dependently originated, that is why it is impermanent and empty, consequently pride and immodesty have no basis.

There is another discourse, the title and contents of which are similar to the former: this is the Fa yin ching 法印經 or Fo shuo fa yin ching 佛說法印經, T II, 104, 500c-d, translated by Shi Hu 許護 (Dānapāla ?). It deals with the following basic points. 1. the nature of emptiness (k'ung hsing 國性), 2. sānyatá, the three doors to deliverance: a) deliverance through the concentration on emptiness (k'ung chieh t'uo mān 空識無門), b) deliverance through the concentration on signlessness (wu hsiang chieh t'uo mān 無想無門), c) deliverance through the concentration on non-action (wu iso chieh t'uo mān 無作識門).
87 According to León Hurvitz, Shuo ch'ū ching 說處經 (Deśanasthānāsāstra) is the name of two treatises in the Mahāyānagama (26-86, T I, 26 562a-566c; 29-110 ibid., 609). The first is similar to the Chachakkasutta of MN, No.148. However, in these three discourses there is no passage corresponding to that cited. Cf. L. Hurvitz, 'The Road to Buddhist Salvation as Described by Vasubhadra', JAOS 87, No.4, Oct.-Dec 1967, p.439, n.31.
On the other hand, owing to several passages from extant texts and also to other equivalent sources, in either Chinese or Pāli, we can infer the titles of these discourses. The idea of a good life-style without a family is expressed in the Tds, 17b 12:

‘The peacock (barhin, mayūra) with majestic wings and wondrously decorated green plumage will nonetheless never catch up with the wild goose (hamsa) in flight.

Equally, the householder (gṛhī) will never equal the monk (pravrajīta) who lives in serenity, far (from all care). Leisurely, seated, he is absorbed in meditation (dhyāna)’.

Sū, 3a 17-19:

‘Just as the peacock with the lovely green neck
Does not equal the wild goose in flight,
So the layman is not like a monk, a sage (muni) who meditates in solitude’.

These two passages with the same contents resemble the following passage which is found in Pāli in the Munisutta of Sn:

‘Just as the peacock will never attain the speed of a wild goose,
So the householder can never resemble a monk,
a sage meditating in solitude in the forest’.

Another example is in Sns, 466c 2-3:

‘As the T’ien-shi hsiu-to-lo 天使修多羅 (Devadūtasūtra: ‘Discourse of the heavenly messenger’) says:

“He speaks to King Yama: that person formerly

88 Tds, 17b-12: 如孔雀雖美鮮妙色
终不能及鵞鶘飛行
在家如是不及比丘
牟尼遠離間居坐禪

89 Sū, 3a 17-19 如孔雀雖美鮮妙色
雖行不如野鷗步
如是白衣不似比丘
牟尼遠離間居坐禪

90 Sn. 221: Sīkhi yathā nilagivo vihangamo
hamsassā nopeti javam kudācanam
evan gīhi nanakarotti bhikkhu
munino vivisassā vanamhi jhūyato ti.

In the Traiśī l, p.232, there is another verse expressing similar ideas, the origin of which is unknown:

“The peacock (barhān, mayūra), despite its splendid body, cannot fly as far as the swan (hamsa),

In the same way, the layman (avāsatasanā), despite his fortune and nobility, cannot equal the monk (pravrajīta) whose qualities are prominent.”
recognised neither his parents, nor his brothers, etc; he recognised neither merit, nor good, nor bad, etc.

I wish (Your Majesty) to teach him . . ."91.

This passage has its equivalent in following Pāli passage from the Devadūtasutta in AN:

"Then the guardians of hell hold him by both arms and lead him to Yama, the king (of death), saying: "This person, Your Majesty, has not respected either his mother, or his father, or monks, or brahmins; he has not revered the family elders. I wish Your Majesty to punish him!"92.

The same context, but not word-for-word text, is found in the T’ien-shih ching 天使經 (Devadūtasūtra. ‘Discourse of the Heavenly Messenger’) in Chinese in MA (T 1, 503c 25):

"The man of King Yama seizes and then leads (the hell-bound) to the king’s residence and says: "This living being, when he was a man, had no filial piety towards his parents, nor respected monks or brahmins; did not practise in accordance with the truth, did not perform meritorious acts, did not fear (the result) of misdeeds in the future life. May Your Majesty condemn him according to his misdeeds!"93.

Another example, in Sns, 463b 11:

‘The Buddha said: "The burden is the five aggregates; the bearer is the person"94. and Sns, 465b 10:

‘Basing oneself on the burden, one says that (the bearer of the burden) exists!95.

and Sns, 463b 9-12:

‘Furthermore, some schools admit that the person is different from the five aggregates. Why? Answer — Because it is like a person bearing a burden.

‘The Buddha said: "The burden is the five aggregates; the bearer is the person". Hence, the person is separate from the five aggregates. That is why the
person is different from the aggregates. The three passages above are certainly found in a sūtra with a similar title to that of the Pāli: Bhāra(hāra)-sutta in SN III, 25, the following sentence of which is characteristic: 

'The burden is really the five aggregates. The bearer of the burden is the person.'

The contents of the Sns here are also similar to those of two Chinese translations of the Chung-tan ching, the original texts of which are different: one is in the SĀ (T II, 99, 19a), the other in the EĀ (T II, 125, 63lc).

Another example in Sns, 463c 4-5:

'The cycle of birth and death in which all living beings turn is without beginning.

The origin of birth and death is inconceivable'

This passage recalls the Pāli discourse in the Tinakathāsutta in SN (II, 178):
'Monks, the beginning of the cycle of rebirth of beings is inconceivable. It is impossible to discover the first point from which beings, veiled in ignorance, fettered by craving, wanders at random from birth to birth.'

This is the same discourse in Chinese: Wu-chih ching of SĀ (T II, 99, 69b-c):

'The cycle of birth and death is beginningless; it is veiled in ignorance, fettered by the bonds of craving; in this very long round of rebirth, the origin of suffering cannot be known.'

The writings of the Pudgalavādins are virtually all lost. Consequently, it is difficult to ascertain out what characterised their collections of canonical texts. Nonetheless, while waiting for a full comparison of the Āgamas of the Dharmaguptakas, Mahāsāṃghikas, Sarvāstivādins, etc., we believe the majority of main points of the three doctrinal treatises, namely, the Tds, Sūḷ and Sns, are identical to those of the Pāli texts. It is probable that both schools started out from the same source for their canons. There are certainly divergencies between the two canonical collections of texts of the two schools — Pudgalavādin and Theravādin — over certain specific points, but not over general ideas; over the letter but not the spirit. There are doctrinal affinities between the two canons. As La Vallée Poussin wrote:

'The Pāli Canon contains the majority of documents which are relied on by the partisans — heretics in the eyes of the Pāli school — on the permanent principle and "docetism".'

Hence, we can conclude that the Pudgalavādins not only composed orally but also fixed in writing their own Sūtrapitaka.

2. The Pudgalavādin Abhidharmapitaka

The Abhidharmapitaka played a very important role in the separation of the Buddhist schools. Whilst the Sūtrapitaka was the joint inheritance of the doctrine of all the schools and the Vinayapitaka the rules of the life of the community of monks, only the Abhidharmapitaka was the systematisation of the teachings contained in the sūtras according to the more or less free interpretation of individuals or groups. Generally, each school or sub-school had its Abhidharma in which its doctrinal interpretations were delineated and defended.

Consequently, except for a few schools such as the Sautrāntikas and Mahāsāṃghikas, nearly all the schools compiled their Abhidharma or their sūstras to illustrate their doctrinal point of view. Several schools possessed a very developed...
Abhidharmapiṭaka, such as the Therāvādins\textsuperscript{104} or Sarvāstivādins\textsuperscript{105}.

With regard to the Pudgalavādin Abhidharmapiṭaka, as things are at present, we have not yet found any of that type of text, except for treatises (śāstra) which we are still studying. However, it is from these treatises that we learn that the Pudgalavādins assuredly possessed Abhidharma texts.

We often find the word Abhidharma in them, such as in the second collection, in the Tds (17a 5 ff, 30a 7) and the Sns (2b 28; 15b 18); in the Ṭhū ming-liao lun in particular, the word Abhidharma appears frequently. Also, in this first Vinaya text, the Abhidharma is used as a point of reference in the explanations of mental states in relation to the observance of the precepts, as it says: 'The literature of the Vinaya and Abhidharma illustrates the correspondence between the precepts (śīla) and the man who observes them' (Ṭhū ming-liao lun, 665b 18-19)\textsuperscript{106}.

On the other hand, a later tradition claims that the Vātsipatīryas inherited a book of Abhidharma in nine parts and, not satisfied with that Abhidharma, the descendents of the Vātsiprutiyas subdivided into four lesser schools in order to remedy the discrepancies of that book.

It says in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadesa:

'Some say: "When the Buddha was in this world, Śāriputra, in order to explain the Buddha's words, compiled the Abhidharma. Later, the T'ū tsū (Vātsiprutiyas) monks recited (that work). Until this day, this is what is known as the Shē-li-fu-a-p'i-t'un (Śāriputrābhikarma, T XXVIII 1548)'\textsuperscript{107}.

... In the Tu-tsū-ehr-a-p'i-t'an (Vātsiprutīyābhikarma), the samyojanas are the same, but the paryavasthānas are 500 in number\textsuperscript{108}.

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{105} Cf. above, Ch.I, n.30.

\textsuperscript{106} This stanza and its commentary prove that the Sāṃmatyus or Pudgalavādins possessed their own Abhidharmapiṭaka. For example, when explaining the stanza, the commentary gives the exact figures of the correspondence between the man and the observance of the rules to be observed in order to dispel defiled thoughts: 588 (a 294 defiled thoughts + 294 observances) and, in the totality of defiled thoughts, the observance in relation to the three worlds: 1658 — 972 in the Kāmadhātu + 544 in the Rūpadhātu + 142 in the Ārūpyadhātu (cf. Ṭhū ming-liao lun, 665b-8).

\textsuperscript{107} Traité I, p.112.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p.424. This is further proof that the Vātsipatīryas possessed their own Abhidharmapiṭaka. The Tds confirms that there are 98 samyojanas, latent defilements, the same number as with the Sarvāstivādins, Kośa, V, p.9 and n.2; Engl. tr., pp.772 and n.21: The 6 anuṣayas — rūga, pratīgha, māna, avidyā, dṛṣṭi, vimutti — (Kośa V, p.2, Engl. tr., p.767) make 10, according to their nature, divided into five deśits. They make 98 by counting 36 anuṣayas in the Kāmadhātu, 31 in the Rūpadhātu and 31 in the Ārūpyadhātu. On the 500 paryavasthānas, active defilements, cf. Pi-ni-ma ching 昆尼母論 (T XXIV, 1463, p.860; Hōbōgirin, Bonnō, p.124).

The Pudgalavādins distinguished the latent defilements (anuṣaya = samyojana) from the active
\end{footnotesize}
In Paramārtha's commentary on the 'Treatise of Vasubandhu', the information is more precise:

'Sāriputra had developed the Abhidharma in nine parts; that is what is known as the 'Abhidharma of the Characteristics of the Dharma' (Dharma-laksanābhidharma). Rāhula, Sāriputra's disciple, transmitted the Abhidharma to the Arhat Vatsyaputra, and the latter's disciples formed the Vatsiputriya school. Then, within three hundred years, from the Vatsiputriya school emerged a further four schools: the Dharma-tattva, Bhadrayāniya, Śāntimitiya, and Śānta or Śānagārika. Dissatisfied with the Sāriputrābhidharma, which they considered incomplete, they each compiled śāstras in order to complete [the Sāriputrābhidharma] wherever it was deficient'109.

In fact, there is now in existence no actual Abhidharma book bearing the title 'Sāriputrābhidharma' or 'Dharma-laksanābhidharma' in nine parts and containing the doctrine characteristic of the Vatsiputriyas, particularly the thesis of the pudgala. There is a voluminous treatise in Chinese entitled Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra, translated by Dharmayāsas assisted by Dharmagupta in Ch'ang-an between 407 and 408. The work is divided into four parts and refutes the thesis of the pudgala and intermediate existence (antarābhava)110. In brief, the Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra did not belong to the Pudgalavādins but most probably to the Dharmaguptakṣas111.

Thus we can say that, until now, we have only rediscovered Pudgalavādin śāstras but no Abhidharma texts despite indications that a Pudgalavādin Abhidharma did exist.

3. The Pudgalavādin Vinayapitaka

The Vinaya, or Basket of the Disciplinary Code of the community of monks, is the collection which preserves the tradition of that community and reflects the break-up of the communities into various schools. After the first Buddhist schism caused by the dispute over the ten disciplinary usages and dissensions caused by doctrinal differentiations, each school retained and developed its collection of disciplinary writings (Vinayapitaka).

Consequently, we possess at present different texts concerning the Vinayapitaka, namely:

a) that of the Theravādins in Pāli112,

b) the Chinese translations of those of the Sarvāstivādins (T XXII, 1428), Mahāsāṃghikas (T XXII, 1425), Mahāśākas (T XXII, 1421) and Mulāsārvāstivādins (T

defilements (paryavasthāna). The former are seeds remaining dissociated from thought, they do not involve moral causality and are neutral in moral conflict. The latter are associated with thought and participate directly in antagonistic moral forces (Tr. after A. Baréau, 'Richesse et diversité de la pensée bouddhique ancienne', Présence du Bouddhisme, p.459).

109 Tr. after Demieville, 'L'origine', pp.57-8.


112 The Theravādin Vinayapitaka: Suttavibhaṅga, Khandhaka and Parivāra. The five volumes edited by H. Oldenberg in the PTS edition are well presented. A complete English translation by I.B. Horner is also published by the PTS.
XIII, 1442 and following),
c) the Tibetan translation of the latter,
d) Sanskrit fragments of those of the Sarvástivādins, Mūlasarvastivādins and Lokottaravādins; also commentaries belonging to the Sāmmitiyas, Kāśyapīyas, Mahāsāṃghikas and other undetermined schools113.

As for the Vinayapiṭaka of the Pudgalavādins, all we can find is a single treatise of commentaries, the Lū ming-liŭo lun, which is attributed to the Sāmmitiyas. However, having the highest number of monks and monasteries of the whole community which existed for several centuries, and which were also 'reputed to be more attached to the Vinaya than the other Pitakas'114, the Pudgalavādins certainly possessed a considerable Vinaya collection. The Lū ming-liŭo lun commentary supplies us with valuable data on this subject.

I-ching tells us of the existence of a Sāmmitiya Vinaya which, he says, contained 30,000 ślokas115.

a — The Vinaya texts

Due to the Lū ming-liŭo lun, we know in detail a certain number of the Vinaya texts of the Sāmmitiyas which contained 420 precepts uttered by the Tathāgata as well as a Prātimokṣa treatise:

1. P'o-shu-tou lū 萬劫善根
   (Vastuvinaya) (Lū ming-liŭo lun, 666a 7) : 200 precepts.
2. Yu-pa-ti-she lū 終牧思含
   (Upadeśavinaya) (Lū ming-liŭo lun, 666a 8) : 121 precepts.
3. Pi-ch'iu-ni lū 毘丘尼体
   (Bhikṣunīvinaya) (Lū ming-liŭo lun, 666a 8-9) : 99 precepts.
4. Po-lob-t'i-mu ch'a lun 心業惟業又餘
   (Prātimokṣastra) (Lū ming-liŭo lun, 666a 13).

Moreover, in this work we find precise ideas of the structure of the Pudgalavādin Vinaya:

b — The structure of the Vinaya

The Pudgalavādins divided their Vinaya into nine categories:

1. Vinaya of the monks (bhiksuvinaya), dealing with the rules specific to monks;
2. Vinaya of the nuns (bhikṣunīvinaya), dealing with the rules specific to nuns;
3. Vinaya of both communities (bhiksabhikṣunīvinaya), dealing with the rules common to the monks and nuns, for example, the first pārājīka;
4. Vinaya dealing with offences, causes of offences and means of making amends;
5. Vinaya dealing with doubts, the definitive absence of consciousness or death;

113 On the Vinayapiṭakas of the different schools, cf. the analytical description in Lamotte, History, pp.165–79.
114 Tr. after Demieville, L'Inde classique II, § 2317.
115 Takakusu, Record, pp.XXIV and 8.
6. Vinaya dealing with resolutions, ten types of training (śaikṣa)\(^\text{116}\);
7. Vinaya dealing with non-resolutions, the spontaneous origin of the 42,000 types of training after the end of the formal propositions (karmāvacāna)\(^\text{117}\);
8. Vinaya dealing with applications at a single time, practices for receiving ordination, for bathing, etc;
9. Vinaya dealing with applications at all times of training that should be practised together and at all times (Lū ming-liao lun, 666a 7 - b II).

The Pudgalavādin Bhikṣuniprātimokṣa consists of nine categories of precepts and seven groups of offences.

— Five categories of precepts:
1. Po-lo-i 波羅夷 (Pārājikas) : 6 offences
2. Sēng-ch'i-hı́ Shī h - shu 僧伽癡指沙 (Sanghādisesas) : 52 offences
3. Po-lo-ni-ka 波羅尼柯 (Pārasarnikas) : 360 offences
4. Po-t'i-ša-ni 波羅提舍尼 (Pratideśaniyas) : 12 offences
5. Tu-k'ao 根打多 (Duṣkritas) : offences

which are not included in the four preceding categories (śaikṣa) or in the offences mentioned in the P'o-shu-tou-lù 普敷斗律 (Vinayavastu). Cf. Lū ming-liao lun, 666b 13-18).

— Seven groups of offences:
1. Pārājikas : 4 offences leading to defeat.
2. Sanghādisesas: 13 offences leading to temporary exclusion from the Community\(^\text{118}\).
3. Sthūlāryayas (T'ou-lan-chih-ye b 聖露隆齊葉 ), Lū ming-liao lun, 666c 6): offences not justifying classification in the preceding two groups.
4. Niḥsarga pārāsarnikas (Ni-sa-ch'i-po-lo-i-nī-k'ā 尼諸遊波羅尼柯, Lū ming-liao lun, 666c 8): 30 offences leading to the relinquishment of objects obtained unduly.
5. Pārāsarnikas: 90 offences to be declared.

\(^{116}\) A detailed commentary is lacking. It could be that these are the well-known ten rules of training (sīkṣāpada or sikkhāpada). The novice should abstain from: 1. taking life (pāñātipāta), 2. theft (adinnādāna), 3. sexual relations (abrahmacarīya), 4. falsehood (musāvāda), 5. spirituous drinks (sūramerayamajapamādāsthāna), 6. meals at the wrong time (vīkālabhojana), 7. attending worldly entertainments (naccigatiavāditavisūkadassana), 8. the use of unguents, perfume and bodily ornaments (mālāgandhavilepanadhārāmanamandanaibhūsānaṭhāna), sleeping on a bed which is too high or wide (uccāsyanamahāsayaṇa), 10. accepting gold or silver (jātaradurjapapātigghaṇa). After Traité II, p.847, n.3. Cf. Vin. I, pp.83-4, II, p.258; AN I, p.221.

\(^{117}\) The commentary merely mentions 42,000 types of training, without any explanation. It could be that there is a link between them and the 42,000 merits (punya) which can purify the defilement of the transgression of morality and which are divided as follows: 420 precepts (Vastuvinaya, 200 + Upadeśavinaya, 121 + Bhikṣunjivinaya, 99) each of which produces 10 merits; each merit, in turn, produces 10 good factors (5 faculties (indriya) + 3 roots (māla) + 2 bodily and vocal observances). That makes 420 precepts x 10 merits x 10 good factors = 420,000 merits. Cf. Lū ming-liao lun, 666a 5-14.

\(^{118}\) The Pudgalavādin Vinaya uses the term sanghādisesa, reconstructed by the Chinese notes: sēng-ch'i-hı́ Shī h - shu 僧伽癡指沙 (Lū ming-liao lun, 666c 5), but not sanghāvaśesa, often found in the Sanskrit texts.
7. *Śāikṣadharma* (Hsü tui steller, Lü ming-liao lun, 666c 11): offences not belonging to the six preceding groups.

It is noteworthy that the commentary on the text does not give the number of articles in the śāikṣadharma group. Only the number of articles in the main groups are stated. There are 141 articles in all. By comparing the number of articles in the main categories, other than those of the Prātimokṣa, there is no difference between those of the various Prātimokṣas, except for the Mahāśāsaka Prātimokṣa (T XXII, 1421) which counts 91 pārāsarnikas instead of 90. Later, it is in the number of śāikṣadharma which the schools or sub-schools added separately to the Prātimokṣas that the latter differ from each other. The following table shows the similarities and differences of the number of articles of the precepts in the extant Vinayas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vinaya of the</th>
<th>Extant today in</th>
<th>Number of śāikṣadharma</th>
<th>Total of precepts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pudgalavādins</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theravādins</td>
<td>Pāli</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahāsāṃghikas</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarvāstivādins</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Prātimokṣa)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaibhāṣikas</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Vinaya)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharmaguptakas</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mūlasarvāstivādins</td>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāśyapiyas</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahāśāskas</td>
<td>(pārāsarnikas: 91)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the conduct and monastic traditions of the Śāmmitiyas, apart from the abundance of material found in the Lü ming-liao lun, we have discovered details of some of their specific rules:

‘The lower section of their monastic clothing was cut according to an irregular shape; they slept in kinds of enclosures demarcated by ropes and serving as communal dormitories’. Their robes (*cīvara*) were made up of 21 or 24

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119 Bureau, Sutras, p.122; J. Takakusu, Record, p.7.
pieces\textsuperscript{120} and their emblems were *sorci\(k\)a* flowers like those of the Thera-
va\(\text{\textdagger}dins\textsuperscript{121}. They draped their upper robe in the manner of Indian women,
gathering the right edge on the left side and leaving the ends floating free\textsuperscript{122}.

In brief, although the texts of the Pudgalav\(\text{\textdagger}din Vinaya no longer exist, apart
from the very informative *Lù ming-liao l\(\text{\textdagger}n*, we can conclude that the Pudgalav\(\text{\textdagger}dins
possessed a considerable Vinayap\(\text{\textdagger}taka.

\section*{II — LANGUAGES USED BY THE PUDGALAV\(\text{\textdagger}DINS}

The literature of the Pudgalav\(\text{\textdagger}dins is virtually entirely lost, except for a few post-
canonical treatises. This is why it is difficult to give an idea of the languages used by
the Pudgalav\(\text{\textdagger}dins, particularly to record their writings.

Furthermore, the history of the Personalist schools lasted for more than ten
centuries, and their geographical expansion covered all the regions of India. This is the
second reason why we cannot determine their method of written expression. A
well-known Tibetan tradition records that the S\(\text{\textdagger}m\(\text{\textdagger}t\(\text{\textdagger}\)iy\(\text{\textdagger}tas used Apabram\(\text{\textdagger}sa as the
language of their texts\textsuperscript{123}. This language, in fact, appeared before Sanskrit as the
inheritor of Pr\(\text{\textdagger}k\(\text{\textdagger}t which it survived for a few centuries\textsuperscript{124}.

\begin{itemize}
\item There are three kinds of *sa\(\text{\textdagger}gh\(\text{\textdagger}\(\text{\textdagger}t*: the least, middling and best [in quality], each of which are
subdivided into three:
   \begin{enumerate}
   \item The least three are made with 9, 11 and 13 hands of material or rags (each hand consists of 2 long
   pieces and 1 short one),
   \item the middling three, with 15, 17 and 19 (each band: 3 long and 1 short);
   \item the best three, with 21, 23 and 25 (each band: 4 long and 1 short); the Pudgalav\(\text{\textdagger}dins used only the
   three best ones.
   \end{enumerate}

   The Sar\(\text{\textdagger}v\(\text{\textdagger}ś\(\text{\textdagger}ś\(\text{\textdagger}\(\text{\textdagger}ūd Vinaya mentions the three types of *sa\(\text{\textdagger}gh\(\text{\textdagger}\(\text{\textdagger}t*, whilst the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya only
mentions the first two; that is, the Dharmaguptakas differed from the Pudgalav\(\text{\textdagger}dins by not using the

   This is the design of a *sa\(\text{\textdagger}gh\(\text{\textdagger}\(\text{\textdagger}t* consisting of nine bands each of which is made of two long pieces
and one short one:
\end{itemize}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{design.png}
\caption{Design of a saṅghāṭi}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{120} Bu-ston, II, p.100.
\textsuperscript{121} Barueu, Sectes, p.122; Takakusu, Record, pp.66–7.
\textsuperscript{123} L'Inde classique II, § 2410.
Notwithstanding, with the literary documentation we have, we can infer that, before the fifth century CE, the Pudgalavidins used Middle-Indian dialects, Prikrit, Sanskrit and hybrid Sanskrit and, from the seventh century onwards, Apabramśa.

On the use of languages by the Pudgalavidins before the fifth century CE, we do however have some indications. Among the four treatises from which Chinese translations were made in the fourth and fifth centuries CE, the Sns, translated in 385-431 (?) CE, must have been taken from a text written in a Middle-Indian dialect of the North-West: either Prikrit, or Apabramśa, but more likely in mixed or Buddhist Sanskrit, since the transcription and style appear to be the same as those of the languages we find in other treatises.

The Tds, translated in 384-417 CE, and the Sū, translated in 382 CE, must have been texts in mixed or Buddhist Sanskrit, a kind of Sanskrit mixing Prikrit and pure Sanskrit, as these texts indicate (Sū, 15b 27)\(^{125}\).

As for the Lù ming-liao lun, translated in 568 CE, this was a text in Buddhist Sanskrit\(^{126}\). On the other hand, the Tds was compiled and preserved in the course of the first centuries CE by monks from Kashmir\(^{127}\) which was the centre of Buddhist studies in Sanskrit, not only of the Sarvāstivādins but also the Pudgalavidins\(^{128}\).

The above proposition is reasonable since it is progressively confirmed by the observations of Orientalists, among whom É. Lamotte is one of the most qualified, regarding the use of languages by Buddhists throughout the centuries some hundreds of years after the decease of the Buddha at the beginning of the Common Era: 'During the last centuries of the ancient era, the Buddhist literature used only Middle-Indian Prākrt: Māgadhi, North-Western Prākrt (Gāndhārī) and Pāli. During the first three centuries of the Christian era, these Prākrt were strongly rivalled by the use of mixed Sanskrit. Finally, from the beginning of the Gupta dynasty (fourth cent. A.D.), Buddhist Sanskrit, which was relatively correct, finally replaced the Prākrt and mixed Sanskrit. However, this final stage of evolution had been developing since the second century A.D., during the period of the great Kuśānas\(^{129}\).

Hence, it is probable that the Pudgalavidins used Apabramśa and mixed Sanskrit for their canonical writings. Nonetheless, in the present state of our knowledge of the Pudgalavādin literature, a firm conclusion cannot be reached.

\[\text{B — THE PUDGALAVĀDIN TREATISES}\]

All that we have today on the literature of the Personalist schools of early Buddhism

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125 Cf. the preface of the Sū composed by Tao-an 道安 1a 15, and the preface to the Tds by Hui-yuán 慧遠 in the CHu san ts'ao chi chi 出三藏記集 (abbrev. Chu) X, T LV, 2145, 7a 22, 23. It is not certain whether the word "fan" indicates only the Sanskrit language and not all Indian languages, namely, hybrid Sanskrit, Prākrt, etc., because at that time Chinese knowledge of Indian languages was not precise.
126 See below, 'The language and translation of the Lù ming-liao lun'.
127 The Tds must have been brought to China by Gautama Saṅghadeva, a native of Kashmir.
128 Tārānātha's History of Buddhism in India, pp.71-2.
129 Lamotte, History, p.583.
amounts to four works:

1. The San fa tu lun 三法度論, Tridharmakāśstra, T XXV, 1506.
2. The Ssu a-han-mu ch'iao chieh 四阿含纂抄, T XXV, 1505.
3. The San-mi-ti pu lun 三藏記部論, Sāntimīyānikiyāsāstra, T XXXII, 1649.
4. The Lü ērh-shih-érh ming-liao lun 昔二十二明論, Vinayadāvīmśatīvīyāsāstra, T XXIV, 1461.

They will be studied one by one under the following headings:

1 — Title
2 — Author, commentator and translators
3 — Date
4 — Language and translation
5 — Contents
6 — Original school

I. THE SAN FA TU LÜN

I — TITLE

The San fa tu lun 三法度論 (Treatise on the Three Dharmas) is a treatise of about fifteen pages and 223 questions and answers, in the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏経 (abbrev. Taishō or T) (Vol. XXV, No.1506, pp.15c - 30a).

The reconstruction of the title in Sanskrit is TRIDHARMAKĀŚTRA.130

It consists of a systematic elucidation of essential ideas disseminated in the Āgamas. It deals with three doctrinal points based on the theme: ‘Knowledge (jñāna) of the Good (kuśala), the Bad (akūśala) and the Support (niśraya) constitutes the Dharma access (dharmapāryāya) leading to the Supreme Good’.

The treatise is entitled Tridharmakāśtra because it deals with elements of the teaching which are three in number. Not only are the three points — the Good, the Bad and the Support — dealt with in the three main chapters, they are also dealt with in the nine sections each time they need to be defined. Consequently, the author endeavoured to compress or expand the traditional elements of the teaching and only

131 Cf. the preface to the Tās composed by Hui-yūn in the Chu, X, T LV, 2145, 73a 3 and the preface to the Ssu, T XXV, 1505, la 6–8.
retained groups of three. For example, instead of counting five aggregates (skandha), he retained only three: form (rupa), the formations (samskara) and consciousness (vedana, samjna, vijnana); or else he added another. Nirvana — the oneness of the two (Nirvana with a remainder and Nirvana without a remainder) so as to get the number three.

II — THE AUTHOR, COMMENTATOR AND TRANSLATORS.

a. The Author.

The Taisho edition only mentions the name of the main translator, Gautama Sanghadeva. However, the notes tell us that the editions from the Yuan (1280-1368) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties mention the name of the author: the Venerable Shan-hsien (tsun-che Shan-hsien) the name of Shan-hsien is also found. If the translation from Sanskrit into Chinese by Gautama Sanghadeva and Hui-yuan is correct, the author's name can be reconstructed in Sanskrit as Giribhadra or Parvatabhadra, etc., but not Vasubhadra as is often done. There is no doubt over the word hsien which translates bhadra, as there are in fact several names, such as Dharmabhadra (Fa-hsien), Gunabhadra (Kung-te-hsien), Jhanabhadra (Chih-hsien), Sanghabhadra (Chung-hsien), etc., the second part of which is also translated by hsien. So there remains only the word vasu, the Chinese translation of which should be 'shih', as in the translation of the name of Vasubandhu, which is shih-ch'in. Vasu cannot be translated by shan which has a different meaning. The hypothesis of the mistaken transformation of the character shih into that of shan by the copyists cannot be excluded, but neither can it be fully asserted.

Leaving aside the Sanskrit reconstruction 'Vasubhadra' which may correspond to the Chinese transcription P'o-su-pa-to (Sui, 1b 5) which, as the name of the author, appears several times in the Sui, the text related to the Tds. We will first of all attempt to justify the reconstruction Giribhadra from the name Shan-hsien.

We know that there was a sub-group of the Vaistiputraivas called Mahagiriyas, that is, those who reside on great mountains (mahagiri) and that there was an Arhat whose disciples had formed the Bhadrayaniya school in order to complete the Vaistiputraiva Abhidharma.
Through such information, we can infer that the author of the Tds was Giri-bhadra (Shan-hsien (Vertex), a Vāśiputriya master, named Bhadra, who lived in the mountains (giri). (This kind of name was popular, particularly for eminent monks).

Nonetheless, the Ssū cites different authors' names: Po-su-pa-t'o  (Ssū, lb 5), or Po-su-pa-t'o  (ibid., 5c 21) or Po-su-pa-tu  (ibid., 8b 27), whose Chinese translation by Kumārabodhi or Tao-an is Chin-hsien 141, and not Shan-hsien 141. This leads us to another supposition: the translator of the Ssū, by defining the name VASUBHADRA 'the sage (BHADRA) precious as goods (VASU = ts'ai-wu  of which gold (chin  is the most valuable element'. Since the phonemes of the Chinese words chin  and chin  are the same, it was probably through a misunderstanding of the meaning of the word chin  that the copyist, instead of copying the character chin  , copied the character chin  ; therefore, the name of the author was Chin-hsien 141. (It should be noted that Kumārabodhi did not know Chinese).

All the difficulties with the problem of the reconstruction of the name and history of the author oblige us to retain that name as it is mentioned in the texts of the Ming  and Yuan  dynasties, and in the preface to the Tds by Hui-yuan, that is, Shan-hsien  .

b. The Commentator

According to the writings of Hui-yuān, Sanghasena (Sêng-ch'ieh-hsien  ) is the commentator of the Tds. Sanghasena was certainly a Buddhist of the Great Vehicle. We cannot be sure whether he was a monk or merely a devout layman since, in the San ta tu ching  , he is called a monk (bhi- ksu), while in the San ta tu lun hsū  , he is called a Buddhist layman. Nonetheless, his name Saṅghasena shows that he probably was a monk.

Only a few lines describing the portrait of this commentator are found in the preface to the Tds by Hui-yuān:

'. . . there was a Mahāyānist layman who was called Saṅghasena. He considered the work of Shan-hsien  as (a work in which) the idea is profound and simple, but its expression still hidden. That is why he retained the chapters and phrasing of Saṅghasena or Shan-hsien for the teaching, and commented on the text to widen its sense. He greatly emphasised the (doctrinal) elements in order to develop their meaning. To comment on those which are still obscure does not seem possible. Since this commentary was made, the light of the Way (shines) on the world. Such is Saṅghasena's feat of teaching'.

This description, however, is not enough reason to conclude that Gautama Saṅghadeva personally knew Saṅghasena in India or that Hui-yuān wrote those lines

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141 Ssū, 4a 12.
142 Cf. Cha X, T LV, 2145, 73b 2.
143 Ibid., 73a 11-12.
144 Ibid., 73a 8-10
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141 Ssū, 4a 12.  
142 Cf. Chu X, T LV, 2145, 73b 2.  
143 Ibid., 73a 11–12.  
144 Ibid., 73a 8–10.
(Āryavasumitra [bodhisattva] saṅgītīśāstra, 10 fascicles, T XXVII, 1549), and Dharmarāṇḍa (Tan-mo-nan-ti) had published two Āgamas (the Madhyamāgama and Ekottarāgama), the Abhidharma, Vibhāṣa (Kuang-shuo and the Tridharmakaśāstra (San fa tu) entailing more than an hundred myriad words. However, their translations were deficient.

At that time, political troubles were common. Furthermore, Tao-an, the great Buddhist scholar, was already dead. There was no competent person to revise and correct the translations.

Later, Saṅghadeva, accompanied by the śramaṇa Fa-ho from Chi-chou, went to Lo-yang where he stayed for four or five years in order to revise and explain the translations which had already been made. Fa-ho asked Saṅghadeva to publish the texts of the A-p’i-t’an (Abhidharma, T XXVI, 1543) and the Kuang shuo chung ching.

In the sixteenth Tai-yüan year (391 CE), Saṅghadeva crossed the (Yang-tzū) river and went to the South where Yao-hsing had mounted the throne and where Buddhist affairs flourished. Saṅghadeva was invited by Hui-yüan to stay in the Lu-shan to translate the canonical books. That same year, he translated the Abhidharmahādayāśāstra (A-p’i-t’an hsìn lun) and the Tridharmakaśāstra (San fa tu lun) on the belvedere of Pan-jo (Prajñā).

In 397 CE, the first Lung-an year, he went to Chien-k’ang (Nanking), the capital, and was greatly admired by the king, the mandarins and nobles of the Chin court. A devout Buddhist, the high mandarin Wang-Hsün, invited Saṅghadeva to stay and teach the Abhidharma in the monastery which he had built. On that occasion, Wang-Hsün invited the śramaṇa Shih Hui-ch’i and forty other monks to stay in the same monastery. It was in Wang-Hsün’s Tung t’ing monastery that Saṅghadeva was asked to translate the Sanskrit texts. He then translated two large works: the Tsêng-i a-han ching and the Chung a-han ching (Madhyamāgama), with a carefully composed group. There were: the śramaṇa Saṅgharaksé (Sêng-ch’ieh-lo-ch’á), a monk from Kashmir who read the Sanskrit text, the

152 Dharmarāṇḍa (Tan-mo-nan-ti) was a monk from Tukhāra and probably a native of India. An Āgama specialist, he reached Ch’āng-an in 384 CE and translated five works into Chinese. Cf. Kao, T L, 328c-c; Bagchi, op. cit., p.157; Shih, op. cit., pp.48-51.

153 The śramaṇa Fa-ho, a native of Hu-p’eh, was a childhood friend of Tao-an. He was well-versed in the sacred literature and, after Tao-an’s death in 385, he continued the work of correcting the translations of canonical texts with foreign scholars such as Gautama Saṅghadeva. Cf. Bagchi, op. cit., p.336, n.4: Kao V, T I, 2059, 254a.

154 According to Bagchi, this is the Abhidharmavibhāṣā, T XXVIII, 1547. Cf. Canon bouddh., p.162. This treatise is attributed to Saṅghabhadra. There is another translation, made by Buddhakara, of this text recited by memory by Saṅghabhadra in 383 at Ch’āng-an. Cf. Shih, op. cit., p.53, n.196.

155 Shih Hui-ch’i (337–412) was both the younger brother and disciple of Hui-yüan under the direction of Tao-an. He was probably a translator in the field of Chinese language rather than a copyist for Gautama Saṅghadeva. He lived for 76 years and predeceased Hui-yüan. Cf. Kao VI, T L, 2059, 361b.

The literature of the Personalists — Chapter Two

Dramana Tao-tsu\textsuperscript{157} from Yu-chou (齊) who wrote the Chinese; Li-pao (李) and T'ang-hua (唐) from the kingdom of Wu (吳) were the translation copyists.

The final days of Gautama Sanghadeva's life are still unknown to us.

Sanghadeva's translations in China can be divided into two periods corresponding to two different dynasties:

I. In the first period (385-391 CE) under the dynasty of the Early Chin (Ch'ien Chin (前秦 350-391 CE), at Lo-yang, Sanghadeva translated the following three works:
   1. The A-p'i-t'an pa chien tu (a-han) (Abhidharmāśāntaśrīmadhāsaṭṭhāna; Abhidharmajñānaprasthānasūtra).
   2. The A-p'i-t'an hsin lun (a-han) (Abhidharmahṛdayasūtra), this is the first translation of this work.
   3. The Pi-po-sha-o-pi-t'an (阿毘他毘多羅) (Abhidharmavibhāṣā or Kuang shuo chung ching (光明普經) (lost).

II. In the second period (391-398 CE), under the dynasty of the Eastern Chin (Hsi Chin (後燕 317-420), in the Lu-shan and Chien-k'ang, Sanghadeva translated five works in one hundred and eighteen fascicles:
   1. The Chung a-han ching (阿含纂) (Madhayamāgama, T I, 26);
   2. The Chung i a-han ching (阿含集) (Ekottarāgama, T II, 125);
   3. The A-p'i-t'an hsin lun (阿毘他毘多羅) (Abhidharmahṛdayasūtra, T XXVIII, 1550);
   4. The San fa tu lun (三法度) (Tridharmakāśāstra, T XXV, 1506);
   5. The Chiao-shou pi-ch'ü-ni fa (校表比丘尼法) (lost).

It is therefore Gautama Sanghadeva who translated and checked these eight works in all. According to the Hōbōgirin, only five works exist in Chinese in the collections of canonical texts.

ii) Hui-yuan and his career in Buddhist literature

Hui-yuan (慧遠) (334-416 CE)\textsuperscript{158}, whose appellation was Chia (稽), was born in 334 CE in Yen-men (燕). He was a keen student of Confucianism and Taoism. At the age of thirteen, he accompanied his uncle to study at Lo-yang and Hsü-ch'ang (漆) at twenty-one, he went to hear Tao-an propound Buddhism and became his disciple. At twenty-four, Hui-yuan began to give lectures on Buddhism, particularly on the doctrine of 'Reality' (bhūtalaksana? saryalaksana?) in Buddhism. In 365 CE, Hui-yuan was thirty-two and had lived in the company of Tao-an for more than ten years. He accompanied his younger brother Hui-chih, who was also a disciple of Tao-an, to the South. On their way, they stayed for a time at Hsiang-yang (湘). Later,

\textsuperscript{157} For the biography of Tao-tsu 道遂, cf. Kao VI, T L, 2059, 361b. He was a disciple of Hui-yuan 慧遠 who, in 419, completed the catalogue of the Chung ching mu lu (中經目録). Cf. La Concentration de la marche héroïque (Sūrāngamisamādhisūtra), tr. É. Lamotte, p.76.

\textsuperscript{158} Li-pao 李寳 and T'ang-hua 唐化 the copyists cannot be found in the list of monks by Ch'en-yüan 陳延. Shi shi i nien lu 詩氏疑年錄 Peking 1964.

\textsuperscript{159} Cf. Kao VI, T L, 2059, 357c-361b; Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest, p.240 sq. W. Liebenthal, Shih Hui-yuan's Buddhism', JAOS 70, 1950. He should not be confused with Hui-yuan 慧遠 (523-592) who lived under the Sui (隋) dynasty.
Hui-yuan settled in the Lu shan, where he remained for thirty years, Lo-yang being a place of retreat much appreciated for its picturesqueness and the beauty of its mountains. It was there that, in 391 CE, he invited Gautama Saṅghadeva to come and translate the A-p’i-t’an hsin lun (Abhidharmahṛdayāsāstra, T XXVIII, 1550) and the San fa tu lun (Tridharmakāśāstra, T XXV, 1506).

In 393 CE, Hui-yuan sent his disciple Fa-lin to the West to search for approximately two hundred canonical texts. In 402 CE, when he was sixty-nine years old, he founded the Society of the White Lotus (Po-lien nis) with 123 members, with the aim of practising the teaching of the Pure Land school (Ching-t’u tsung). He had corresponded with Kumārajiva on the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatāvāda).

His life came to a peaceful end in Lo-yang in 416 CE. His portrait can be summarised as follows: ‘Hui-yuan was a typical Chinese scholar who converted to Buddhism’. He was not, in fact, a translator but a commentator famous in Buddhist literary history. He wrote and translated (in collaboration with Gautama Saṅghadeva) some thirty works, the most important of which are:

1. The San fa tu lun (Tridharmakāśāstra, T XXV, 1506);
2. The A-p’i-t’an hsin lun (Abhidharmahṛdayāsāstra, T XXVIII, 1550);
3. The Chiu-mo-lo-shih fa-shih tai (T XLV, 1856).

Among the shorter works by Hui-yuan, his preface to the Tds is important for an understanding of that text. It gives us information on the history of Gautama Saṅghadeva as well as on that of the translation of the Tds.

III — THE DATE

In ‘L’état actuel des études bouddhiques’, Paul Demiéville wrote: ‘India has no history, and as regards the beginning of Buddhism and the first period of its history, it would be better to admit straight out that we are still reduced to hypotheses’. In attempting to find the date of the Tds, we get a similar impression, and there is nothing we can do but try to guess from a few vague pointers.

The Tds consists of two parts: one is the original text by Po-su-pa-t’o, and the other is the commentary by Saṅghadeva. That is why two dates need to be determined for the two parts.

160 His longevity is indicated by variants 82, 83, 84 years. Cf. Ch’en-yuan, op. cit., p.6.
162 On Hui-yuan’s works, see R.H. Robinson, Early Madhyamika in India and China, pp.180-1.
163 The Hūbogirīn. Rep., p.247, only mentions two works: the Abhidharmahṛdayāsāstra (T XXVIII, 1550) and the Chiu-mo-lo-shih fa-shih tai (T XLV, 1856).
If we retain the hypothesis according to which the Tds is the work of the founder of the Vatsiputriya school, we can infer that the original text was composed in the third century CE at the earliest, and more probably towards the beginning of the Common Era, that is, at a time when the Tripitaka had already been formed (the existence of the terms Sūtra, Abhidharma and Vinaya as well as extracts in the text prove this) and the Vatsiputriya school was sufficiently stable and flourishing for it to provoke strong controversy over the theory of the pudgala and other theses specific to that school.

As for the date of the commentary, it might be limited shortly before 383 CE, at the time of the arrival in Ch’ang-an of Sanghadeva, who may have studied the teaching under the direction of Sanghasena and brought the treatise to China.

All this is mere hypothesis.

IV — THE LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION

1. The Language

It is probable that the original text of the Tds was in Sanskrit or hybrid Sanskrit, a kind of Sanskrit mixing Prākrit and pure Sanskrit. In Hui-yuan’s preface to the Tds, we find:

‘At that time, Sanghadeva held the text in Sanskrit (?) and translated it into the language of the Chin ( ). Equally, in the text of the Ssū, the contents of which are similar to the Tds, there are indications according to which that text was also in Sanskrit (?)'. However, according to Bareau, the difficulties with the Chinese translations of the Tds, as well as the other related texts the Ssū and Sns, could well explain in part that they were compiled, not in Sanskrit, a language familiar to Chinese Buddhists of the period, but in highly hybridised Sanskrit, or Prākrit.

With regard to the form of expression, the Tds was written in prose in the form of questions and answers, except for short verses in the introduction, at the beginning of the work, and a few stanzas here and there in long passages. This style of dialogue between master and pupil probably originated in debates and was popularised in the first centuries after the Parinirvāna of the Buddha, when the tradition of oral transmission of the holy teachings was still preserved. The Milindapañha, part of the Abhidharmakosa, and of the Vimuktimargasūtra, etc., are also in the form of dialogues. Dialogue language is characterised by simplicity and clarity so as to elucidate philosophical problems and polemics. Furthermore, the author and commentator were faithful to this tradition, always using, in all the answers, two methods of expression: 1) the condensed teaching for whomever can reach understanding through condensed teaching, 2) developed teaching for whomever can reach understanding through developed teaching. There is always a sentence which sum-

165 See above, n.125.
166 Cf. Chu X, T LV, 2145, 73a 22–23.
167 Ssū, 15b 27: jān pān 柴本
168 Patañjala’s II, p.30: ‘ugghahastetanau’ and ‘neva’.
marises the explanations as a conclusion to each heading\textsuperscript{169}.

It is in the part on the developed teaching that the commentator often used well-known examples to illustrate abstract philosophical ideas\textsuperscript{170}.

Moreover, a comparison between the two translations, the Tds by Gautama Sanghadeva and the Ssu by Kumārabodhi, enables us to think that there was a rearrangement of the doctrinal elements and a perfecting of the style of the text, made by Gautama Sanghadeva in collaboration with Hui-yuan\textsuperscript{171}.

2. The Translation

The Tds was translated in the Lu shan in 391 CE, during the sixteen year of the reign of Emperor T'ai-yüan 

\textsuperscript{169} Cf. Tds, 166 15-16.
\textsuperscript{170} Tds, 18c 17-21.
\textsuperscript{171} Cf. Thien Chau, 'Le Tridharmakusāstra', Chap.l.
\textsuperscript{173} Cf. G.H. Sasaki, 'Hinayāna Schools in China and Japan' (Présence du Bouddhisme), France.
\textsuperscript{174} Asie 153-7, p.500 sq.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., p.499 sq.
\textsuperscript{176} Chu, T LV, 2145. 73a 1 sq.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 73a 23-24.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 72c 26 sq.
period, such as those by Kumārajiva\(^{178}\) and Fa-hsien \(^{179}\), we can see that the translation of the Tds by Gautama Sanghadeva contains several inexact and erroneous doctrinal terms, apart from mistakes which may have been made by the copyists, engravers and printers in the course of time\(^{180}\).

On the whole, despite the defects of Sanghadeva's translation, the form is light, elegant and rhythmic in the prose and verses. Compared to the translation of the more favourable conditions: the translators knew the languages neither polished nor rhythmic, this translation of the Tds by Kumārabodhi, most of which is unclear and the style of which is heavy, neither polished nor rhythmic, this translation is better since it was realised under more favourable conditions: the translators knew the languages and doctrines well. Gautama Sanghadeva frequently recited the Tds and his knowledge of the Chinese language was good after having lived in China for so long and travelled widely; Hui-yuān, his collaborator, was a scholar of the time.

It seems that Hui-yuān himself, having compared the Tds translation to other bad translations of the time, was satisfied with the work he had written:

"From the rise of the Han dynasty until this Ch'in dynasty, among the famous sages, whether religious or lay, who studied and appreciated the holy Canon in order to disseminate Buddhism widely, numerous works were translated. (However, in their translations), the style masked the ideas or the meaning overwhelmed the words. On comparing this translation to others, it surpasses the early works. If the sages of the future were to know the Ch'in language and Sanskrit and were good translators, they would be able to find the correspondence of the two texts to judge the contents of this translation"\(^{181}\).

V — THE CONTENTS

The Tds consists of three volumes containing three chapters each with three sections.

\(^{178}\) Kumārajiva (344-413) was born into a family living in Kuća, his father being Indian and his mother a princess of Kuća. He entered a Buddhist monastery at the age of eight. He studied in Kashmir and became a famous scholar in Central Asia. Kumārajiva arrived in Ch'ang-an in 401 CE, where he worked until 412 and probably died in 413. He translated 106 works into Chinese.

\(^{179}\) Fa-hsien (330-413) was born in 340; his family name was Kung, from Wu-yang in the command post of P'ing-yang, a region now known as Shan-si. In order to save him from the death that had overtaken his three elder brothers, his parents put him in a monastery. When he was nearly sixteen, he left Ch'ang-an for India. Accompanied by four colleagues, his journey lasted fifteen years (399-413). The main object of this first-generation pilgrimage was to look for texts on discipline (Vinaya) which were then lacking in China. He was not their translator. Later, Fa-hsien went to Ch'ing-chou and died in Hsin shā at the age of 86. He left a long account of his travels through various kingdoms (Kao-hsing fa-hsien chuan).

\(^{180}\) Cf. Chau K., 'Le Tridharmakāsāstra', Chap 1.

\(^{181}\) Chau K., 'Le Tridharmakāsāstra', Chap. 1.
CHAPTER ONE: THE GOOD (KUSALA ?)
(Vol.I, 15c 7 - 21b 25; verses + questions 1-88)

The first chapter begins with an introduction in verse and prose, in which the purpose for which the work was composed is indicated. It is clear that the author, like the Buddha, envisages helping living beings to eliminate 'the innumerable sufferings caused by rebirth' by explaining the Buddhist teaching to them. The author probably takes as his basis the main theme of this teaching, which amounts to this affirmation: It is knowledge (chior, jñāna ?) of the Good (tē, kuśala ?), of the Bad (ē, akusala ?) and the Support (i, nīrāya ?) (which) is the Dharma access (dhammadhāya) leading to the Supreme Good's, Nirvāṇa. At question 6 (16b 7), the Tds really explains the Good which is related to the qualities and spiritual assets and designates as such merit (punya), means (upāya) and the fruit (phala).

First section: Merit (punya)
(Vol.I, 16a 12 - 18b 18)

I — Merit (punya) constitutes the first condition of the Supreme Good:

1. Merit (punya) consists of three elements:
   - Giving (dāna), with reference to the conduct of oneself and others. It consists of three factors:
     a. the relinquishment of possessions (dhanaparītyāga);
     b. the will to give (cetanā) ;
     c. non-intimation (avijñapti) .
   There are three kinds of gifts:
   1. The gift of the Dharma (dhammadāna);
   2. The gift of fearlessness (abhayaadāna);
   3. The gift of objects (āmisadāna).

   The fruit obtained by the accomplishment of meritorious action together with the others is greater than the fruit obtained by accomplishing it alone. Pure giving is giving accomplished in total purity of causes and conditions.

   182 Cf. Tds, 15c 7.
   183 Ibid., 15c 21: shan shèng 善勝 . Kumārabodhi’s translation: Chieh-t’ao (Si, 1b 16).
   184 AN II, 415: ‘I declare, monks, that will is action. Having willed, one acts with body, speech and mind’ (cetanāham bhikkhave kammaṁ vadāmi; cetayivā kammaṁ kāri käyena vācāya manasā). Kośa III. 1: ‘Volition is mental action; it gives rise to two actions, bodily and vocal action’ (cetanā mānasam tajje vakkākatmanī, p.2, n.5; Engl tr. p.552).
   185 Wu chiao 無敘 (avijñapti = non-intimation, non-manifestation, etc.); this is the old translation (prior to Hsüan-tsang), whilst the 'new translation' of avijñapti is wu-piao 無敘 (without externalisation). According to Lin Lu-kouang, Saṅghadeva translated avijñapti by wu-chiao 無敘 (also in the Abhidharmasāra by Dharmasīri), as did Narendrayāsa (6th c) in the commentary by Upāsanta; Dharmagupta and Dharmasyāsa, the translators of the Śāriputrābhidhamma, did the same. The definition of it is different from that of the Sarvāstivādins. Here it means the moral character or wish which precedes intention and will in the relinquishment of possessions. Cf. E.J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, p.229; T. Stecherbausky, Central Conception of Buddhism, p.6 and n.4.
2. **Morality** (śīla) is intimation by the body and speech in a positive sense; it is defined as 'leading others, not harming others and increasing the good'. The first two characteristics are aimed at eliminating wrong actions of body and speech\(^\text{186}\). The continual growth of these two characteristics, even during sleep, constitutes the third\(^\text{187}\).

3. **Cultivation** (bhāvanā), or mental development, is compared to the action of perfuming sesame seeds with flowers or services rendered to the king who in return necessarily gives a reward. It includes:

a) The four absorptive meditations (dhyāna), named after what they obtain:
   1. the discarding of desire (kāma);
   2. the discarding of discursive thought (vīcāra);
   3. the discarding of joy (prīti);
   4. the discarding of suffering and happiness (duḥkhasukha).
   These correspond to the four stages of the world of form (rupadhātu)\(^\text{188}\).

b) The four immeasurables (apramāṇa), the spheres of action on living beings, which are immeasurable:
   1. Goodwill (maitrī);
   2. Compassion (karunā);
   3. Altruistic joy (muditā);
   4. Equanimity (upeksa)\(^\text{189}\).

c) The four formless attainments (ārūpyadheartusamāpatti):
   1. The sphere of the infinity of space (ākāśananyāyatana);
   2. The sphere of the infinity of consciousness (vijñānānanyāyatana);
   3. The sphere of nothingness (ākicanyāyatana);
   4. The sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana)\(^\text{190}\).

II — The Roots (mūla).

The word root, the origin of all (means) leading to the Supreme Good, is synonymous with cause (hetu). By dealing with the roots in the context of the Good (kusala), the

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187 Morality, in the sense given by the first two characteristics, is taken generally; however, the third characteristic expresses the specific Vāsiputriya theme; see below, 'Secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins'.
188 This is meditation (dhyāna) classified according to various mental states, in relation to the four stages of the rūpadhātu. Cf. DN I, 73; II, 186, 313; MN I, 139, 181, 276; SN II, 210; V, 307–8; Kośa VIII, 1 sq. Meditation in five divisions is based on texts such as AN II, 63. Cf. Dhammasaṅgani, 160–75.
189 The four immeasurables (apramāṇa) are practices added to those of the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipākṣika, DN II, 119–20). They enable good attitudes to be acquired with regard to beings but do not form part of the way of transcendental accomplishment which leads to enlightenment (cf. DN III, 233). They are also called the four divine abodes (brahmavihāra). Cf. DN I, 250; MN II, 76; AN II, 130; IV, 330; SN V, 115; Kośa VIII, § 29: '... They are called apramāṇas because they apply to an immeasurable number of beings, drawing after them an immeasurable merit (outflowing fruit) and producing immeasurable (retributive) results' (Pruden, p1264).
190 These four attainments (samāpatti) are mental states in respect of the four abodes of the gods of the ārūpyadhartu. Cf. DN I, 34, 112; MN I, 41, 159–96; AN IV, 433.
Tds tackles only the three good roots: the absence of craving (alobha), hatred (advesa) and delusion (amoha).  

The influence of the roots is very strong. The absence of craving increases giving, the gift of objects, the deed of leading others, the absorptive meditations and the abandoning of the bad. The absence of hatred reinforces morality, the gift of fearlessness, the deed of not harming others, the immeasurables and patience. The absence of delusion develops cultivation, the formless attainments and erudition.

In this sense, the roots, like the roots of a tree, support good conduct and become the power (bala) of the spiritual life.

III — The Absence of the bad (apāpa).

The absence of the bad is a collective term to designate:

1. 

Patience (ksanti) is a twofold quality: it consists of patience towards oppression caused by the potency of wealth, pardon for wrong actions by the poor, and endurance of suffering provoked by inanimate phenomena such as cold, heat, hunger, etc. The analysis of things which engender anxiety according to the law of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya), reinforces endurance. Patience, in this sense, comprises knowledge (jnana) or right view (samyagdrsti).

2. 

Erudition (bahusruratā) is wide knowledge of the Sutras, Abhidharma and Vinaya. He who can destroy craving, hatred and delusion in himself is erudite. Hence, he who is knowledgeable of the Tripitaka is erudite because his three bad roots are eliminated.

3. 

Non-illwill (avyāpāda) consists of three factors:

a. the friendship of virtuous people (kalyānamitra) is an indispensable condition of the pure life (brahmacarya); it is communion in goodwill (maitri), skill (kausalya) and capabilities (sāmarthya), of the preceptor (upādhyāya), disciples (antevasin) and co-disciples (sabrahmacārin).

b. true mastery of thoughts, identical to concentration (samādhi), means: the stopping of perturbing thoughts and ideas; the elevation of a weak, soft and unenergetic thought. The protection of a balanced thought to maintain the

191 These three good roots (kusalamulā), corresponding to three bad roots (akusalamulā) (cf. DN III, 214; AN I 263), in the sense of negation of the latter, constitute the origin of the good. AN I, 230: itī imāni bhikkhave kusalamulāni. kālamāñhi tīnī alobho kusalamulām, adoso kusalamulām, amoho kusalamulām. imāni kho bhikkhave tīnī kusalamulānī. Cf. MN I, 49, 489.

192 Kōsa VI, § 26: 'Immediately after dukkhe dharmajñānakusāviti there arises a dharmajñāṇa having as its object the dukkha of the kāmadhātu' (cf. Pruden, p.945).

193 In the Meghiyasutta (AN IV, 354-8), the Buddha commends to Meghiya the important role played by a good friend. The good friend constitutes the first of five conditions, namely: (1) good friend (kalyānamitto), (2) morality (sīlavā), (3) serious conversations which help to open the mind (yāyaṁ kaṭṭhanā sābhisaḷekkhaṁ cetovivaranaṁ āparyo), (4) purposeful vigorous deportment (āraddhaviriyo viharati), (5) wisdom (paññāvā), in order to attain liberation.

SN I, 87-8: 'The whole of this religious life, Ānanda, is good friendship, good companionship and good association' (sukatam eva hidad Ānanda brahmacariyān yad idam kalyāṇa mūtutā kalyāṇa sahāyutā kalyāṇasampavāka). On the seven qualities of a good friend, cf. AN IV, 32; Visn I, 98.
function of the mind.

c. the right path (pratipad), considered as the means which amount to the three preparatory practices (prayanga) and lead to the other shore of the flux of existence:

I. the virtue of asceticism (dhūtaguna)\(^{194}\), aimed at distancing oneself from inhabited places and opening oneself to serenity and simplicity, consists of twelve practices:

I — The practice of wearing robes made from rags collected from heaps of ordure (pāṃsukūlika)
II — That of possessing only three robes (traicivarika);
III — That of wearing coarse robes (nāmatika);
IV — That of being content with any seat (yathāsamstarika);
V — The practice of living in a tranquil place (aranyaka);
VI — That of sheltering under a tree (vṛksamūla);
VII — That of living in the open air (abhyavakāsika);
VIII — That of sitting correctly (naṁsadika)\(^{95}\);
IX — The practice of alms-seeking (piṇḍapātika);
X — That of eating only one meal (ekāsanika)\(^{196}\);
XI — That of not eating broth in the afternoon (khalupascādbhakti-ka?)\(^{197}\);
XII — That of living in a cemetery (smasānīka)\(^{198}\).

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\(^{194}\) Tds, 17b 13-14: shan-hsun chë shih ching po i 善護者善淨業, and ibid., 17b 15: ching kung 慎護清淨, These comments enable us to reconstruct the Sanskrit dhūtaguna behind the Chinese words shan-hsun 善護 and to translate them by 'virtue of asceticism' or 'quality of discarding (impurities)' or 'quality of purification'.

Dhūtaguna is often found in Sanskrit works, especially those of the Sarvāstivādins, namely: Mahāvyutpti, p.49; Dharmasamgraha, p.63 with lists of twelve articles, whilst dhutanga, the article of purification, is used in the Pāli texts. According to the Vin. (p.61), dhutanga means: (1) the practices observed by a monk practising austerities with a view to purification (sabbāññeva pan'etāni tena tena samādānena dhutakilesatā dhutassa bhikkhuno angāni); (2) knowledge, derived from those practices, of the purification which dispels defilements (kilesadhananato dhutan ti laddavo āharam nānām angān etesen ti dhutangāni); (3) those practices constitute the path leading to the discarding of defilements (dhutanı ca tani patipakkhaniddhananato angani ca patipatilaya ti dhutangāni). Cf. Vin. V, p.193, Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, p.23, n.1.

\(^{195}\) Although the words cheng ise 坐正 (Tds, 17c 22) are translated as 'sitting correctly', the commentary in the Tds (18a 3-7) enables us to interpret this practice as being that which consists of sitting up but never lying down (naisadika, Pāli nesajjika'anga).

\(^{196}\) The words i shih 一食 (Tds, 18a 8-15) with the commentary: 披毛食已数数食至時, 以是說, 世尊教彼當一食 (Tds, 18a 14-15) enables us to understand that this practice is identical to that which consists of sitting down only once for a meal (ekāsanika).

\(^{197}\) Tds, 18a 8: kuo chung pu yin chang 進中不飲食. This practice may mean that which consists of refusing all food after the meal-time (khalupascādbhakti, Pāli khalupacchābhabhakti).

\(^{198}\) There are other lists of twelve ascetic practices in the original Sanskrit texts (cf. L. Li-kouang, L'Aide-mémoire, p.87, n.1), but they do not always give 'the elements in the same order and they often cite different terms (cf. L'Inde classique I, § 2371 (p.599); Fo shuo shih-érh t'ou-i's-ē ching 尋說十二頭陀緣, Dyādaśa-dhātastūra, T XVII, 783, pp.720b-722a.
2. Restraint of the faculties (indriyasamvara); this is control of the sense faculties, non-deterioration, protection and submission of the faculties. Furthermore, restraint of the faculties means perception accompanied by correct reflection (yonisomanaskāra)\(^{199}\);  

3. Adjoining concentration (upacārasamādhi)\(^{200}\) is preparatory practice (prayoga) in the stage of vision (darśanabhūmi). It is in this concentration that, through correct reflection, one gradually examines the truth and obtains a clear comprehension (abhisamaya)\(^{201}\) of it. It is divided into three steps:  

a) patience (ksānti), in which the practitioner profoundly penetrates the reality of compounded things;  

b) name (nāma), in which the mind of the practitioner becomes imper turbable in correct reflection.


\(^{199}\) Tds. 18b 2, 14, 15: ch’eng ssü-wéi 正思惟 can be translated as 'correct reflection'. However, the context and the mechanical and erroneous translation by Kumārabhadra, yin hsing 眼行 practice of sensual misconduct (Sū, 5a 13, 16, 18), enables us to guess the Sanskrit word behind the translation: yonisomanaskāra (lit. yoni vulva) reflection coming from the source or womb, profound reflection. See below, 'The Sū, a-han-mu chiao chieh'. It is synonymous with yonisovikalpa. Its opposite is ayonisomanaskāra or ayonisomanaskārika (cf. MN I.7). MN I, 294: 'Friend, there are two conditions through which right view arises: the voice of others and profound reflection' (dve kho avuso pacayyā sammadāthiyā uppadāya: parato ca ghoṣo ca manasikāro). Cf. AN I, 87; SN I, 105. Petakopadesa, i: 'What is called profound reflection within oneself is that which conforms to the doctrine taught (by the Buddha) and is not drawn to external objects' (ajjhatāṃ yonasu manasikāro nāmu yo yathādeseti dhamme bāhāddā ārammaṇanum abhāvaharīvā yonisu manasikāro ayam vaccati yonisu manasikāro).  

\(^{200}\) Kośa II, 24 (Engl tr. p.190): 'Manasikāra is the modification (abhoga) of the mind (cetas); in other words, 'to bend' or 'to apply' the mind towards an object (āłambane cetasassa āvarjanam avadhāranam). [Manasikāra is explained as manasāk kārah or matā kareyā āvarjayati]. Yonisomanaskāra is one of four things which are necessary and favourable to the development of wisdom and stream-entry (sotāppati), namely, sappurisasaṃvesa (association with virtuous persons), sadhmahasamāsanam (hearing the wonderful Dhamma), yonisamanaskāra (profound reflection), and dharmadhammapaṭipatti (practice of the Dhamma and its corollaries) DN III, 227; MN II, 17; SN V, 345-411.  

\(^{201}\) Tds. 18b 7: T d s, 1 18b 8-9. Sū, 4a 2-3: 進定 (Chin Ting)  

The Sanskrit term upacārasamādhi here indicates the degree of concentration just preceding entry into any meditation (dhyāna or samādhi) and corresponds to the context of the Tds and Sū, which is why it has no connection with access concentration (upacārasamādhi): the mind becomes concentrated on the level of access through the discarding of obstacles, in the heading 'the two kinds of concentration' in the Theravadin Visn. Cf. The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), tr. Nānāmoli, p.131.  

\(^{202}\) Translates the words chén chék shih 眞知識 (Tds 18b 14). This true comprehension is certainly identical to total penetration (abhisaṃyata) of the four noble truths, since the term abhisamaya is frequently found linked to the four noble truths (āryabhisaṃaya). Sn 758: te ve saccăbhisaṃyāniccatājīvaśāparīnibbāti. Vism, 690: dukkhaṃ pariṇābhisaṃyataṇā abhisameti, samudayaṃ pahānābhisaṃyataṇā abhisameti, maggaṃ bhāvanābhisaṃyataṇā abhisameti, nirodham saṃcikkiryaḥbhisaṃyataṇā abhisameti.  

47
c) perception (hsiang 眼 , samjñā) or clear comprehension; this includes the stage of the supreme worldly dharma (laukikgraharma) since it is so with the perception of the Buddha.

**Second section: Means (upāya)**

(Vol. I, 18b 20 - 20a 27)

The second question in the first chapter dealing with the Good (kusala) explains means (upāya) which include morality (śīla), superior calm (uttaraśamatha) and wisdom (prajñā).

I — Morality (śīla).

Morality is divided into two categories:

1. Natural morality (shou-shêng chieh 修生 , prakrīśīla)\(^2\), which includes the precepts which are not connected with the path and transcendental fruits (lokuttaraphala).

2. Morality of release (ch'u-yao chieh 極道 , nihsaranāśīla)\(^3\), which is composed of what pertains to three factors of the Noble Eightfold Path (āryā-stāngikamārga). Consequently, it consists of:

   a. Right speech (samyagvāc): abstention from slander (paśunyavāda), harsh speech (pārusyavāda), falsehood (mrśāvāda) and frivolous speech (sam-bhimapralāpa);
   
   b. Right action (samyakkarmānta): abstention from taking life (prānātipāta), theft (adattādāna) and sensual misconduct (kāmamithyacāra);
   
   c. Right livelihood (samyagājīva): for monks (bhikṣa), to live contentedly with the four necessities (niśraya)\(^4\) supplied by devotees (upāsaka, upāsikā); for devotees, not practising the five types of livelihood which are harmful to others, trading in arms, poisons, intoxicants, flesh and living beings\(^5\).

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202 Here morality which is natural (shou shêng chieh 修生 , prakrīśīla) is indicated. These are disciplinary rules of the monks or laity prescribed by the Buddha in order to eliminate bad actions of body or speech (see above. First section: merit (puṇya), heading 'morality (śīla)'.

203 Ch'u-yao chieh 極道 , nihsaranāśīla, constitutes the morality of release.

DN II, 123: silam samādhi parina ca vīmaati ca anuttarā, anubuddha ime dharmā Gotamena yasassīnā.

Cf. DN I, 204, 211, 233-4; AN II, 2; SN II, 81.

204 These are: 1) alms-seeking (pindapātikā); 2) using robes made from rags collected from heaps of ordure (pamsukālikā); 3) sheltering under a tree (vṛksamālikā); 4) using the concentrated urine of cows as medicament (pūmuktiḥkhaṇājaya). Cf. Vin. I, 58; L'Inde classique II, § 2370.

205 The elements and order of the five harmful or forbidden types of livelihood of the Tds are slightly different from those in AN II, 208: saṅhavaṇijjā, saṅvannaṇijjā, māṃsavaṇijjā, māmavaṇijjā, māmavaṇijjā.
II — Superior calm (uttaraśamatha ?)

Superior calm is full and complete calm, the eradication of the three bad roots; it is the deed of aiming towards the other shore (pāra) and staying there. It collectively designates three factors of the Noble Eightfold Path: vigour (vīrya), mindfulness (smṛti) and concentration (samādhi).

1. Vigour (vīrya) is also the power (hala) which designates action conducive to the Supreme Good, it consists of:
   a. faith (śraddhā) which indicates purification (viśuddhi) — the destruction of defilements (āsrava); aspiration; desire and love for the Dharma; and determination (adhimokṣa); commitment to the way;
   b. diligence (apramāda) which indicates beginning — beginning to do good; exercise — repetition of action; and perseverance — adhering to an under-taking;
   c. tenacity (aprahāna ?) which indicates not stopping, not being repulsed and not renouncing.

2. Mindfulness (smṛti) is the absence of forgetfulness regarding the four applications of mindfulness (smṛthypapasthāna) concerning:
   a. inwardness (adhyātmika) — the grasping aggregates (upādānaskandha), the elements (dhātu) and spheres of one’s senses (āyatana);
   b. outwardness (bāhya) — others; and
   c. a combination of both — grasping (upādāna) and non-grasping (anupādāna).
   Moreover, the three modalities of mindfulness can be realised through the elimination of three kinds of passions (kleśa), craving (kāma), anger (krodha ?) and delusion (moha), which are found inwardly, outwardly and in both.

The Yās lists the twelve modalities of mindfulness after adding feelings (vedāna), thoughts (citta) and ideas (dharma), by multiplying them by the three modalities of mindfulness.

3. Concentration (samādhi) designates:
   a. concentration on emptiness (śūnyatāsamādhi) which indicates the absence of an agent (nirahāṃkāra) and what pertains to an agent (mamaṃkāra) and both;
   b. concentration on wishlessness (apranihitasamādhi) by means of which one understands that compounded things (samskṛta) are painful and consequently
one does not fix (wish for) them. It is noteworthy that this passage informs us of the five categories which are accepted and defended by the Vatsiputriyas:

1 to 3 — the phenomena of the three time-periods,
4 — Nirvāṇa, and
5 — the pudgala.

Of these five categories, the first three are compounded things from the past, present and future; the fourth is Nirvāṇa which is separate from the conditioned world and pertains only to the non-compounded (asamśkrta); the fifth is that which is not totally separated from the things of the three times as is Nirvāṇa.207

c. concentration on non-perception (signlessness) (wu-hsiang, asamjñā (samādhi) or animittat(samādhi)208: this is the renunciation of a perception of deeds, acts and both, compounded things (samśkrta)209.

III — Wisdom (prajñā)

Wisdom is transcendental knowledge or intuitive comprehension which leads to enlightenment specifically concerning three stages:

1. The stage of vision (darśanabhūmi), the process of which includes twelve kinds of knowledge, namely: knowledge of things (dharma-jñāna), knowledge of investigation (vīcārajñāna) and knowledge of what is not yet known (ajñāta-jñāna); these three knowledges relate to the four Truths: suffering (duḥkha), its origin (samudaya), its cessation (nirodha) and the path (mārga), in connection with the three worlds.210

207 See below, 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavīdīna'.
208 Tds, 19a 27: wu hsiang, 無想; Tds, 19a 27, 28: wu hsiang chē, shīh tsē chū hsiang, lī shīh tsē chū hsiang, lī shīh wu hsiang 無想者，事作俱想，離事作俱想，離是無想。Saū, 4c 26: wu hsiang hsiang chē wu hsiang 無想行作俱無想。Hence the Sanskrit reconstruction of the term wu hsiang 無相 should be asamjñāsamādhi, not animittasamādhi which is translated in Chinese by wu hsiang 無相. However, the ideas do not differ, since the former indicates subjectivity and the latter objectivity.
209 This triad of concentrations, the three subjects of which are emptiness (śānyāta), wishlessness (apraṇihita) and non-perception or signlessness (asamjñā or animittā), is the most prescribed and famous. On this subject, see the complete text in EĀ (T II, 125, 630b), translated by A. Bureau in Bouddha, Paris 1962, pp.162–3. The Kośa VIII, 5 24, presents a long explanation and notes on this triad of concentrations but the order of the three subjects is not the same: (1) animitta, (2) śānyāta, (3) apraṇihita. DN III, 219: sannāto samādhi, animittat samādhi, appaṇihito samādhi. Cf. MN III, 104, 109; AN I, 299; III, 397; SN IV, 360; Vin. III, 93.
210 See below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavīdīna: thesis No.2'.
2. The stage of cultivation (bhāvanābhūmi): the stage in which the fetters (samyojana) are destroyed and where one is perfumed with the qualities, including three kinds of knowledge:

a. Knowledge of marks (laksanajñāna?) concerning the three marks — arising (utpāda), duration (sahiti) and disappearance (vyaya)\(^{211}\). It may be noted that the Tds says about this: 'The living being (sattva = pudgala) and Nirvāṇa are not identical to the marks'\(^{212}\). This adherence, according to the Tds, avoids belief in extreme views: eternity and annihilation; existence and non-existence. The Tds also admits that these three marks are objects (visaya) of wisdom; consequently, they no longer pertain to compounded things (samskṛta) but become qualities (guna);

b. Knowledge of aspects (ākāraajñāna) is integral comprehension which discerns the marks known by aspects: impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha) and impersonality (fei wo ≠ आ , anātmaka)\(^{213}\);

c. Knowledge of varieties is:
1. Comprehension of the flavour (rasa) of the happiness of mankind (manusya) and the gods (deva);
2. Comprehension of unhappiness, suffering in the three bad destinies (durgati) and,

\(^{211}\) AN I, 152: Monks, there are three marks of compounded things pertaining to compounded things. What are those three? They are arising, disappearance and change (tin’ imani bhikkhave samkhataassa samkhataalakkhonani. katamani tini? uppado panñayati vayo panñayati thuassa aha aaathitam panñayati).

\(^{212}\) Kośa II, § 45 counts four marks: the marks are birth, old-age, duration, impermanence (laksanani ... jātir jara sthūri anityatā).

\(^{213}\) See below. 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavidins'. See also Bareau, Sectes, p.117.

\(^{214}\) These are the three marks of existence which constitute the basic teaching of Buddhism. They are also aspects of reality. The Buddha is only a 'reveler' of these aspects, not their creator or inventor: 'All compounded things are impermanent (sabbo sankhārā anicca), all compounded things are suffering (sabbo sankhārā dukkha), all things are impersonal (sabbo dhamma anattā). Cf. AN I, 286. Kośa VII, § 13: 'The aspects, ākāras, are, in their mental nature, prajñā, a discernment.'
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3. Renunciation of both, demerit and merit\(^{214}\). Due to right views (samyagdṛṣṭi) in relation to the realities explained above, one understands that all defilements (āsrava) should be renounced.

3. The stage of him-who-has-no-more-to-train-in (aśaikṣaḥbhūmi), identical to the Arhat, possesses:
   a. Higher knowledge (vidyā), including:
      1. Knowledge of the recollection of former existences (purvaṃvāsānu-smṛtiṁ);
      2. Knowledge of the births and deaths of beings (shēng shē chih 生 死 , upapāda-cyutīṃ);
   3. Knowledge of the destruction of the defilements (āsravakṣaya-jñāna)\(^{215}\).

   b. Superknowledges (abhijñā); the Tds lists only three elements of these since the others are counted under higher knowledge (vidyā). They are:
      1. Supernormal power (rddhi) — mastery of displacement (gamana-aiśvārya), mastery of transformation (nirmāna-aiśvārya) and mastery of holiness (ārya-aiśvārya);
      2. The divine ear (divyāśrōtra) and,
      3. Knowledge of others’ thoughts (paracittajñāna)\(^{216}\).

   It may be noted that, in this passage, the Tds mentions only five superknowledges, excepting the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements (āsravakṣaya-jñāna), which can be obtained by worldlings (pratigjana)\(^{217}\);

   c. Analytical knowledge (pratisamvid) including:
      1. analytical knowledge of the Dharma (dharma-pratisamvid);
      2. analytical knowledge of the meaning (artha-pratisamvid);
      3. analytical knowledge of languages (nirukti-pratisamvid);
      4. analytical knowledge of eloquence (pratiḥānupratisamvid)\(^{218}\).

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\(^{214}\) Dhp, 412: In the world he who has transcended the two attachments that of merit and that of demerit, will be free of sadness, unblemished and pure, him I call brahman (yo dha puññan ca pāpaī ca ubho saṅgam upacayā asokum virañjum suddham tamaḥ brūmi brāhmāṇāṃ).

\(^{215}\) On the three higher knowledges (vidyā), cf. DN III, 28; MN I, 22–4, 482. Kośa VII, § 45: Three abhijñās are higher knowledge, because they bring about the cessation of non-knowledge concerning the past, etc. (śīrṣa vidyā avidhyā, purvanād ūś nirvartanā). One the six superknowledges (abhijñā), cf. DN I, 8; III, 110; MN I, 34; II, 238; AN I, 254–5.

The attainment of the six superknowledges by the Buddha is described in MN I, 69, by his disciples in SN II, 217–22. It is said that, of the 500 monks living with the Buddha, 60 monks attained the six superknowledges. Cf. SN I, 191.

In fact, the first five are qualities common to worldlings (pratigjana) and holy ones (ārya), the sixth (āsravakṣaya-jñāna) is the quality specific to the holy ones. See below. The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādinā, thesis No.5. Cf. La Vallee Poussin, ‘Les Buddha et les Abhijñā’, in Le Muséon, 1931, pp.335–42.

\(^{217}\) See below, ‘the secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins, thesis No.5’.

\(^{218}\) On the four analytical knowledges (pratisamvid), cf. AN II, 160; III, 113, 120; Kośa VII, §§ 37–40.
Third Section: The Fruit (phala)

The third section of the first chapter on the Good (kuśala) deals with the fruit. These fruit pertain to Nirvāṇa with a remainder (sopadhiśesam) which is differentiated from Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiśesam). Nirvāṇa, identical to liberation (vimukti), is divided into three: it is related to the level and career of its aspirants: Buddha, Pratyekabuddha and Śrāvaka.

I — The Buddha, Pratyekabuddha and Śrāvaka

The Buddha is a perfectly and fully Enlightened One (samyaksambuddha). All the Buddhas are equal not only in their accomplishments (śila, samādhi, prajñā), but also in the domains of their attributes (buddhadharma). The Pratyekabuddha is a solitary Buddha. He realises his enlightenment (bodhi) by himself and does not

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219 Nirvāṇa with a remainder (sopadhiśesam) is obtained through the elimination of the passions (kleśa). We understand by 'remainder' (upadhi) what is left, i.e., the five grasping aggregates (panca upādānakandha), which still remain although Nirvāṇa has already been attained. Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiśesam) is the elimination of the passions; at the same time, the five grasping aggregates are also destroyed. In other words, it is Nirvāṇa without the psycho-physical process of existence. Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiśesam) occurs on the death of an Arhat or Buddha. Cf. Itivuttaka, 41; Udāna VIII, 9; MN II, 257; Kośa VI, p. 211, n. 2 (Engl tr. p. 303).

220 Tds. 20b 10ff., mentions the ten powers (phala), four confidences (vaiśāradya), and all the Buddha attributes (buddhadharma). In the Pali texts, the ten powers and four confidences are also found. Cf. MN I, 69ff.; AN II, 8, 4v, 83.

According to the Kośa, the Buddha attributes are eighteen in number: the ten powers (phala), four confidences or absences of fear (vaiśāradya), three mindfullnesses (smṛtyupasthāna) and great compassion (mahākaruna). Cf. Kośa VII, §§ 28-33.

L'Inde classique II, § 2278, summarises as follows the ten powers through which the Buddha knows:

1. The established and the non-established (sthānāsthāna),
2. The fruition of actions (karmavipāka),
3. The path where it leads (sarvatragānuma pravipad),
4. The world with various bases (nānadhāta),
5. The various tendencies [of beings] (nānadhimukti),
6. The raising and lowering of their faculties (smṛtyavāravāra),
7. The affliction, purification and establishment of the meditations (svayāmindevaśamādhiṣamāpātiklesvayāvadānayutāhā),
8. The recollection of former abodes (in existences, parvaniyasmṛtis),
9. Decreasing and arising (caya-vatattva),
10. The destruction of the defilements (āsravasaya).

Cf. MN I, 69ff.; AN V, 33, X, 21; Kathāvaththu (Points of Controversy) 140, §§ 3-12. Also, L'Inde classique II, summarises the four absences of fear or confidences as follows:

The Tathāgata does not fear (1) that anyone will say that he does not possess supreme Enlightenment, (2) that his defilements are not destroyed, (3) that he did not clearly announce the removal of obstructions, and (4) that the Dharma he proclaimed does not lead to the cessation of suffering. Cf. AN II, 8, 4v, 83.
teach others\textsuperscript{221}. The Śrāvaka, the listener, is the disciple of the Buddha, his liberation comes from teaching by others.

Liberation (vimukti) is the common goal of the Buddha, Pratyekabuddha and Śrāvaka\textsuperscript{222}. Nevertheless, the means which they use are not the same. The Buddha attains liberation through compassion (karunā), whilst the Pratyekabuddha and Śrāvaka acquire liberation through repugnance (nirvidyata); the difference is that the Pratyekabuddha obtains repugnance by himself, the Śrāvaka through others.

Moreover, they have all attained the elimination of defilements and, furthermore, the Buddha is an Omniscient One (sarvajña); the Pratyekabuddha is not an Omniscient one, his qualities are not equal to the Buddha's; the Śrāvaka does not possess all the qualities and his career depends on others.

\textsuperscript{221} The Pratyekabuddhas are a kind of intermediate person between Arhats and perfect Buddhas (Bureau, Religions, p.62; cf. MN III, 86). They only appear in the world at times when there are no Buddhas (cf. Le Compendium de la super-doctrine ... d'Asanga, tr. and ann. by W. Rahula, p.146 and n.3). It is through timidity and lack of courage that the Pratyekabuddhas do not teach the Dharma (Kośa III, § 94). The Isigiliṣutta (MN III, 69-71) gives a long list of names of Pratyekabuddhas (Pāli, Paccekabuddhas), and DN II, 142-3, and AN I, 77, mention their importance. There are two types of Pratyekabuddha: those who live in groups (vagucārīna) (who appear during the period of increase) and those who are like the rthincoer (Tr.: or 'rthincoer horns', i.e. solitary) (living alone, khadgavisāṅkalpa) (Kośa III, § 94, cf. Sn (Gavissasutta), p.6. On the difference in their wisdom and acquisition, the Pug, pp.14, 73, declares: The Pacceka buddha and the Sammāsambuddha both attain the truth without receiving instruction from others but the former attains neither omniscience nor mastery of the fruit. Cf. Miln, pp.104-5; Rin Kloppenborg, The Pacceka buddha, A Buddhist Ascetic, Leiden 1974, pp.13-35.

\textsuperscript{222} The Buddhas are Arhats in the sense of having exhausted the fetters of existence (parikṣñinabhavasamyojana). Cf. DN I, 87; MN I, 29. On the other hand, SN III, 66, says that the Tathāgata and a monk liberated by wisdom (pāññāvimutta-bhikkhu) are equal with regard to their liberation (vimukti), but the Tathāgata is different from the monk liberated by wisdom because he discovered and showed the Path (maggā) which was previously unknown.

It is the Buddha himself who declared: 'I am truly an Arhat in the world' (ahām hi arahā Lokā — MN I, 171), when he replied to Upaka, a man he met on the road from Gayā to Bārānasi. MN I, 179: iṭṭhāgato araham sammāsambuddho.

Consequently, Arhat is one of the ten epithets of the Buddha: He is, in truth, the Blessed One, the Liberated One, the Perfectly Enlightened One. Endowed with knowledge and conduct, the Auspicious One, the Knower of worlds, the incomparable guide of men to be tamed, the Master of gods and mankind, the Enlightened One, the Blessed One (iti pi so bhagavā, araham, sammāsambuddho, viḍīcarana-sampanno, sugato, lokavidhā, anutara purisadānamussatthu, satthā deva manussānam, buddho, bhagavā ti — DN I, 49, 87, 224; Vin. I, 35).

\textsuperscript{223} The Buddha is called the Omniscient One since he possesses the threefold knowledge: pāravanīvāsanumiti, dvīyacaksus, āsaravakṣaya MN I, 482: Vaccha, the monk Gotama truly possesses the threefold knowledge. It is right to say so, in relation to what has been said about me and I am not accused of what is false (tevijjo samanlo Gotamo ti kho Vaccha byākaramāno vivutavā ēva me assa ca man abhāsena abbhāsikkheyya ...). In reality, the Buddha is not possessed of a knowledge or vision which encompasses everything at all times as has falsely been attributed to him. MN I, 482: The monk Gotama is all-knowing, all-seeing; he claims to possess unlimited vision; he says 'Whether I am moving or standing still, awake or asleep, my knowledge is always and constantly with me. Those people do not say what has been said of me, and accuse me without foundation' (samanlo Gotamo sabhānā tabbadassāvi, aparissesaṁ nānadassanam patijñāti: carato ca me itthakato tattassā va jāgarassā ca satām sāmiṁ nānadassanam paccuppaṭhīhanti, na me te vutuvaṅino, abbhāsikkhanti ca pana man 'te asatā abbhāsenātī).
II — The Śrāvakā

The Buddha is incomparable. The Pratyekabuddha is unique. As for the Śrāvakā, he is the disciple of the Buddha.²²⁴ Because of the degree of their five faculties²²⁵ which are either soft, middling or sharp, numerous categories of them are known, corresponding to three stages:

1. the stage of not yet abandoned desires (āvītarāgabhūmi);
2. the stage of abandoned desires (vītarāgabhūmi);
3. the Arhat.

Here, the reversal of the order of the three stages, as described in the Tds, is made to assist comprehension.

1. The stage of not yet abandoned desires

The stage of not yet abandoned desires consists of three main fruit: each of these fruit is further divided into three categories:

1a. The eighth²²⁶, the first Śrāvakā fruit is he who has realised the Path of Stream-entry (srotāpatti-pratipannaka)²²⁷ consisting of:

1. he who has pursued the truth through faith (śraddhānusārin)²²⁸.

²²⁴ Śrāvakā: the disciple, in a restricted sense, in relation to the four fruit of the eight categories of noble disciples (āryapudgala). Cf. MN I, 181; AN I, 208; SN V, 202.

²²⁵ SN V, 227: Monks, the faculty of faith is favourable to enlightenment; the faculty of vigour . . . the faculty of mindfulness . . . the faculty of concentration . . . the faculty of wisdom is favourable to enlightenment. That is why they are called the auxiliaries of enlightenment, the qualities of enlightenment (saddhāhīyindriyaṃ bhikkhave . . . viriyindriyaṃ . . . sattindriyaṃ . . . samādhindriyaṃ . . . paññindriyaṃ bodhipakkhiyo dhāmo tam bodhāya sāpattvāti). Cf. also AN II, 149.

²²⁶ Kośa II, § 35: 'the five faculties, faith, power, mindfulness, recollection, determination (prajñā), are the support (āśraya, prajñāhā) of Nirvāṇa'.

²²⁷ Kośa VI, § 35: ' . . . the eighth holy one is srotāpanna.' Also, Kośa VI, § 36: 'the 'eighth' aśāmaka Pu-kuang indicates two explanations: 1) the srotāpatti-pratipannaka; 2) the man possessed of the dukkhe dhammañānakārini.' The second explanation has the same meaning as that of the eighth in the Tds. Cf. Kathāvattu, 243–51; Mahāvagga, Vin. I, 159.

²²⁸ It is also called sotāpattamagga, a term explained in the Aṭṭhasāliṇī as: 'The path of Sotāpanna is called dassana because it is the seeing of Nirvāṇa for the first time . . .' (cited and tr. in Kośa VI, p.191, n.3; Englı. tr., p.1059, cf. Aṭṭhasāliṇī, 43).

²²⁹ Tds, 20c 20, 21: 信信勝基隨śraddhānusārin he in whom faith prevails and wisdom is secondary.

MN I, 479: Monks, who is he who has pursued the truth through faith? Monks, there is a certain person who has not touched with his body the peaceful liberations relating to the formless world which are beyond the world of subtle form, dwells there, and when he has seen delivery through his wisdom, his defilements are completely exhausted; furthermore, he has faith in and affection for the Tathāgata, and also possesses these qualities, namely: the faculties of faith, vigour, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. That person, monks, is called him who has pursued the truth through faith (katamo ca bhikkhave puggalo saddhānusāri? idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā te na kāyaṃ phassitvā viharati, pannāya cāssa disvā asāvā aparikkhāna hoti, tathāgata c’assa saddhāmattam hoti pema-mattam, api c’assa ima dhāma hoti, seyyathidham: saddhindriyaṃ, viriyindriyaṃ, sattindriyaṃ, samādhindriyaṃ, paññindriyaṃ ayam vuçcati bhikkhave puggalo saddhānusāri). Cf. MN–A III, 190. The translation of the phrase ' . . . ekacco puggalo ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā . . .' is made in consultation with the commentary in MN–A III, 188: . . .
2. he who has pursued the truth through wisdom (prajñānusārī)\(^{229}\);
3. he who has pursued the truth through faith and wisdom (śraddhāprajñānusārī)\(^{230}\).

These three categories are differentiated once the practitioner is at the stage of maturity (gotrabhūmi) where the knowledge of things (dharmaṇāna) appears. They depend on the dominant faculty (indriya). The first category, in which faith (śraddhā) prevails, is that of the soft faculty (mrdvindriya); the second, in which wisdom prevails, is the middling one (madhyendriya) and the third, in which both faculties are equally powerful, is the sharp (tīkṣṇendriya).

1b. He who has entered the stream (śrotādāpana) or he who has stood on the path\(^{231}\) consisting of:
4. he who has no more than seven rebirths at the most (saptakṛd-bhavaparāma), soft faculty\(^{232}\);
5. he who is reborn in several families (kulaṁkula)\textsuperscript{233}, middling faculty;  
6. he who is middling, sharp faculty.  

1c. The stage of the refining of desire (saṁābhūmi) is the stage of those who possess all the Srotāpānna qualities and have reduced the passions to be destroyed by cultivation which relate to the world of desire (kāmadhātu), consisting of:  
7. he who is a once-returner (sakṛdāgāmin)\textsuperscript{234}, soft faculty;  
8. he who will not be reborn again (ekabijin)\textsuperscript{235}, middling faculty;  
9. he who is middling, sharp faculty.  

2. The stage of the abandoning of desire (vītarāgabhūmi)  
The stage of the abandoning of desire is the stage in which the practitioner has eliminated the passions of the world of desire or the five lesser fetters (pañcaddhāvarabhāgīya)\textsuperscript{236}; they consist of three main fruit; each of those main fruit is divided into three categories:  

2a. He who is freed by faith (śraddhādhimukta) is the fruit in which faith predominates in the attainment of Parinirvāṇa\textsuperscript{237}, consisting of:  

\textsuperscript{233} Tds. 2la 7–8: "三結盡恩恩斯斷盡。「從家至家而般涅槃」 : having exhausted the three fetters (saṁyojana) and refined the passions to be destroyed through cultivation (bhāvanāḥâyakā~ṣa) ... he passes from family to family before attaining Parinirvāṇa. The Pāli texts give a precise description of the Kulaṁkula category as follows: "śīna samyojanaṁ parikkhayā kulaṁkolo hoti, dvē vā siti vā kūli samadhavitaṁ samsaritaṁ dukkhasamantam karoti" — AN I, 233; IV, 381.  

\textsuperscript{234} Tds. 2la 12–13: "此終生天上，一來而般涅槃": having deceased in this world, he is reborn in the world of gods, then returns once more before attaining Parinirvāṇa.  

\textsuperscript{235} Tds. 2la 13–14: "一種者，受一而般涅槃":增益功德故: he who will be reborn once only is he who receives only one existence before attaining Parinirvāṇa in order to increase his merit. Probably the Sanskrit word behind the Chinese i-chung — 炎 should be ekabijin, lit. he who would have only one seeding, since bija: seed, grain, germ, but not ekavičika: the definition of which in the Kösa VI, § 36, recalls vici: signifies interval, separation. Nirvāṇa is separated from that holy one by one rebirth; the fruit of anāgāmin is separated (vyavahāva) from that holy one by one category of passion: he is therefore called ekavičika. AN I, 233: "he who has only one 'seeding' is he who has eliminated the three fetters, being born once only as a human being, he puts an end to suffering (tinṇaṁ saṁyojanaṁ parikkhayā ekabi jī hoti, ekāṁ yeva manusyaṁ bhavam nibbatteva dukkhasamantam karoti)." Cf. Pug. 16.  

\textsuperscript{236} Satkāyadeśī, śītrataparamārśa, viciśā, kāmacchanda and vyāpāda, are called the five lesser fetters (astrapariyājasya saṁyojana) because they bind beings to the lower destinies of the world of desire (kāmadhātu), namely: those of the hells (nāraaka), hungry ghosts (preta) and animals (īrya). Cf. AN II, 5, 134; Kösa V, § 43.  

\textsuperscript{237} Tds. 2ob 22–23: "以信為首德故曰信解脫": because faith is dominant in his liberation, that is why he is called he who is liberated through faith. MN I, 478: Monks, who is he who is liberated through faith? There is, monks, a certain person who has not touched with his body the peaceful
liberations relating to the formless world which are beyond the world of subtle form, dwells there, and when he has seen deliverance with his wisdom, some of his defilements are completely exhausted; furthermore, his faith in the Tathāgata is fixed, rooted, established. That person, monks, is called he who is liberated through faith (katamo ca bhikkhave puggalo saddhāvimutto) idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppa tesa na kāyena phassitvā viharati, pāṇāhāya c’assa divvā ekacce āsava parikkhiññā hoti, tathāgata c’assa saddhā nivittā hoti mūlajātā pariṇīthiā. Ayantu vucaati bhikkhave puggalo saddhāvimutto). Cf. MN-A III, 189-90.

Kośa VI, § 31: "When faith (śraddhā) predominates [in the ascetic with weak faculties], the ascetic is "informed" by his aspiration (adhimokṣa); he is therefore called a śraddhā-adhimukta". Cf. Vism XXI, § 74; Bureau, Religions, p.59.

238 Tds, 20b 25-27:上流者愛彼將至上，復次流者遠，彼於 卻界將至上故曰上流：he who goes upstream (ārdhvasrota) is he who, through aspiration, is on the point of obtaining the higher stages. Moreover, the stream (srota) designates the path (mārga). The practitioner, living in the world of desire, is on the point of attaining the higher stages, that is why he is called he who goes upstream.

DN III, 237 = uddhamrota Akanīthā-gāmi: he who goes upstream towards the Akanīthā heaven and there attains Parinirvāṇa.

Kośa VI, § 37: "The ārdhvasrotas is the saint for whom there is srotas, that is, gāti or movement upwards. Srotas and gāti have the same meaning. He does not obtain Nirvāṇa wherever he is reborn on leaving the Kāmadhātu, because he goes upwards; that is to say, the Akanīthas consist of three kinds: (1) the jumper (pluta), (2) the half-jumper (ārdhapluta) and (3) the one who dies everywhere (sarvacīya)" (cf. Kośa VI, § 38).

239 Tds, 20b 28-29:行澀澀漸者，行謂之有為，多方便及道緣行至無為：he who attains Parinirvāṇa through compounded things (sābhīsamkāra-parinirvāṇa): The sāṃskāras are compounded (sāṃskṛta) things, and it is with numerous means (upāya) and the path (mārga) and through compounded things (sāṃskāra), that he reaches the uncompounded. Cf. Pug, 17; Kośa VI, § 37. The sābhīsamkāraparinirvāṇa attains Nirvāṇa via a path whose object is the compounded (sāṃskṛta) (= sāṃskāra), namely, suffering, its origin and the path (dukkha, samudava, mārga).

240 Tds, 20b 29-20c 2:無行澀漸漸者，行謂之無為，少方便及道，緣無為至無為：he who attains Parinirvāṇa through the uncompounded (anabhīsamkāraparinirvāṇa): anabhīsamkāra is the uncompounded; it is with few means (upāya) and the path (mārga), and through the uncompounded (asāṃskṛta) that he attains the uncompounded.

Kośa VI, § 37: The anabhīsamkāraparinirvāṇa attains Nirvāṇa via a path which has as its object the Unconditioned (asāṃskṛta), namely, cessation on the third Truth (nirodha).

241 Tds, 20b 23: 以慧為首度故見到：because wisdom dominates his liberation, that is why he is called he who is endowed with correct views (dṛṣṭiprāpta). MN I, 478: Monks, who is he who is endowed with correct views? There is, monks, a certain person who has not touched with his body the peaceful liberations relating to the formless world which are beyond the world of subtle form, dwells there, and when he has seen deliverance with his wisdom, some of his defilements are completely exhausted; furthermore, he has seen and understood the doctrines expounded by the Tathāgata. That person, monks, is called he who is endowed with correct views (katamo ca bhikkhave puggalo dṛṣṭiprāptavo) idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo ye te santā vimokkhā viharati, pāṇāhāya c’assa te na kāyena phassitvā viharati, pāṇāhāya c’assa divvā ekacce āsava parikkhiññā hoti, tathāgataappavetā c’assa dharmā paṇāhāya voditthā hoti
4. he who attains Parinirvāna in the interval (antarāparinirvāyin)\(^{242}\);
5. he who attains Parinirvāna by being reborn (upapadyaparinirvāyin)\(^{243}\);
6. he who goes upstream (ūrdhvasrotā)\(^{244}\).

2c. The bodily witness (kāyasāksin)\(^{245}\) pertains to the formless world (ārūpyadāhātu). That is why he attains Parinirvāna without an intermediate existence. The bodily witness also includes three categories identical to those of the two preceding groups (sraddhādhimukta and drṣṭiprāpta):
7. he who attains Parinirvāna through compounded things (sābhīsams-kārapiarinirvāyin);
8. he who attains Parinirvāna through the uncompounded (anabhīsamskāra-parinirvāyin);
9. he who attains Parinirvāna in rebirth (upapadyaparinirvāyin)\(^{246}\).

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Kośa VI § 31: The ascetic with sharp faculties, who was dharmānasārin, takes the name of drṣṭiprāpta. . . When prajñā dominates in the ascetic with sharp faculties, the ascetic is 'informed' by speculative view: he is therefore called drṣṭiprāpta. Cf. also Kośa VI, §§ 61, 63.

242 Tds. 20c 46: Middle ācārya, his mission will never be fulfilled, middle ācārya is dualistic: he who attains Parinirvāna in the interval (antarāparinirvāyin) is he who, his life having come to an end and whose rebirth in another (world) has not yet occurred, obtains the path (mārga) and attains Parinirvāna in the interval; he is like a spark which is extinguished before reaching the ground. Cf. Pug. 16. The Abhidharmakośa and Abhidharmasamuccaya explains the antarāparinirvāyin differently as he who attains Nirvāna (parinirvāt) in an intermediate existence (by going to the rupadhātu). Cf. Le Compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asanga (abbrev. Compendium), tr. and ann. W. Rahula, p.115; below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavāda: thesis No.14'.

243 Tds. 20c 6-7: Middle ācārya, his mission will never be fulfilled, middle ācārya is dualistic: he who attains Parinirvāna by being reborn is he who obtains the path (mārga), then attains Parinirvāna at the moment of rebirth (uppannamātā) like a spark which is extinguished the moment it touches the ground.

Kośa VI, §37: The second (upapadyaparinirvāyin) acquires Nirvāna immediately he is reborn (uppannamātā), quickly by means of sopadhīśeṣa- (or, according to other masters, nirupadhīśeṣa-) Nirvāna, because he is zealous (abhiyukta) and because the path is spontaneous, realising it himself (abhiyukta-vahināmagatāti).

244 This is the same category as that of the ūrdhvasrotā in the sraddhādhimukta group. See above, n.237.

245 Tds. 20b 23-24: निरूपिता (insight) is liberation through two elements (faith and wisdom) together is the bodily witness (kāyasāksin). MN I, 478: Monks, what is the bodily witness? There is, monks, a certain person who has 'touched' with his body the peaceful liberations relating to the formless world which are beyond the world of subtle form, dwells there, and when he has seen deliverance with his wisdom, some of his defilements are completely exhausted. That person, monks, is called bodily witness (katamo ca bhikkhave puggalo kāyasakkhi? idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo ye te santā vimokkha atikkamma rupē aruppā te kāyena phassitvā viharati, patidhāya cāsasā divisā ekacca āsavā parikkhāna honor. ayam vaccati bhikkhave puggalo kāyasakkhi). Cf. MN-A III, 189; AN IV, 451; Pug. 14.

Kośa VI, § 43: The Anāgāmin, whichever he may be, who has acquired nirodha — as he has in his body, seen the absence of thought, immediately experienced (vāsamārogti) a dharma similar to Nirvāna, namely the nirodhasamāpatti — is called kāyasāksin, a bodily witness. For details, see Kośa VI, § 43 (pp.223-5; Pudde, pp.977-8).

246 The three categories have already been explained above. The characteristic of these fruits is that they pertain to the formless world (ārūpyadāhātu) in which the intermediate existence (antarāabhava) does not occur. That is why those who possess them attain Parinirvāna without an intermediate existence (Tds,
3. The Arhat

The Tds maintains that the Arhat is susceptible to regression\(^{247}\) and, consequently, it deals with the nine categories corresponding to the three faculties:

3a. **Sharp faculty (tīkṣṇendriya):**
1. he who is stable (śhitākampyadhārman), he who eliminates the passions by renouncing means (upāya)\(^ {248}\).
2. he who progresses (prativedhanādharman): he who by eliminating the passions seeks and obtains the excellences\(^ {249}\).
3. he who is immovable (akopyadhārman): he who possesses an immovable analytical knowledge\(^ {250}\).

3b. **Weak faculty (mrddvindriya):**
4. he who regresses (parihānadhārman): he who regresses from comprehension of the Noble Truths (satyābhikṣamaya) or the stage of cultivation (bhāvanā-bhūmī)\(^ {251}\).
5. he who thinks (cetanādharman): he who thinks of abandoning his existence after having attained Arhatship\(^ {252}\).

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\(^{247}\) See below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādin: thesis No.13'.

\(^{248}\) Tds, 21a 20–21: 住法者，從方便除煩惱故：lit. he who is stable is he who renounces means by eliminating the passions. *Kośa VI, § 57:* the *śhitākampy* is the Arhat who, while lacking strong causes for regression, even without taking care is subject to not moving, that is, remaining in the fruit; and who, by not regressing, lacks effort (abhīyoga) and is not able to progress (vardhāyita). Cf. Rahula, *Compendium,* p.157.

\(^{249}\) Tds, 21a 21–22: 升進者，除煩惱故：勝者速速退：lit. he who progresses (prativedhanādharman) is he who eliminates the passions, seeks the excellences and obtains them, . . . the excellences are higher: knowledge (vidyā), superknowledge (abhiṣajñā) and analytical knowledge (pratisaṃvid).

*Kośa VI, § 57:* The *prativedhanādharman* (= *prative dhanābhaya*) is the Arhat able to penetrate (prativedh) without effort (abhīyoga) the Immoveable Ones. Cf. Rahula, *Compendium,* p.158.

\(^{250}\) Tds, 21a 24: 无動法者，已得勝果，一切論無動者：lit. he who is immovable (akopyadhārman) is he who, having obtained the excellent fruits, possesses analytical knowledge (pratisaṃvid) which no discussion can move. *Kośa VI, § 57:* the *akopyadhārman* or Immoveable One is the Arhat not subject to regression. The *Compendium* gives a similar definition. Cf. Pug, 11.

\(^{251}\) Tds, 21a 25: 退法者，或差降退非聖諦：lit. he who regresses (parihānadhārman) is he who regresses from comprehension of the Noble Truths (satyābhikṣamaya) or the stage of cultivation (bhāvanā-bhūmī).

\(^{252}\) Tds, 21a 19–21b 3: 退法者，已得阿羅漢，劣行故及身劣便作是念，我所作已作，我何為住，知足念語：lit. he who thinks (cetanādharman) is he who after having become an Arhat, due to the lessening of practice and weakening of the body, thinks that, having accomplished all the tasks to be done, it is useless to remain. Thus does he think.

*Kośa VI, § 57:* The *cetanādharman* is an Arhat who is capable of putting an end to his existence at will (cetayītum), without being an anurakṣanādharman, etc. It is interesting to note the different interpretation of the Arhat *cetanādharman* in *Compendium,* p.157 (fr). This is a person by nature having weak faculties, whether distracted or not, who regresses from his state of happiness in this life if it is not reflected upon, but does not regress if it is reflected upon. According to *Kośa VI, § 57* (p.255, n.5; Pruden, n. 348, p.1072) the *cetanādharman* is he who, fearing falling away, always thinks of putting an end to his existence. Thus, the therā Godhika who, having regressed six times from abounding mental liberation (samādhiṣa cetovināti), committed suicide so as not to regress when he realised it for the seventh time (SN I, 120), was probably a *cetanādharman.* Cf. Pug, 12: *cetanābhukho.*
6. he who preserves (anuråksaṇådåharman): he who protects what he has attained with all available means253.

3c. Middling faculty (madhyendriya):
7. he who is liberated through wisdom (prajña vimukta): he who attains liberation through wisdom pertains to the lower category254;
8. he who attains complete liberation255;
9. he who attains incomplete liberation256.

The last two categories together are also called he who is doubly delivered (ubhaya tobhāgavimukta), who possesses both faith (śraddhā) and wisdom (prajña) and pertains to the excellent category257.

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253 Tds, 21b 3–4. 疫法者，不退亦不思念，但極大方便護，如食多方便得才守：he who preserves (anuråksaṇådåharman) is he who does not regress and does not think but (mobilises) all available means (upāya) to protect himself, just as a poor man acquires a fortune through numerous means and guards it.


254 Tds, 21b 4 does not give a definition of the prajña vimukta, except for the indication of the lower category. MN I, 477: Monks, who is he who is liberated through wisdom? There is, monks, a certain person who, not having touched with his body the peaceful liberations relating to the formless world which are beyond the world of subtle form, dwells there, and when he has seen deliverance through wisdom, his defilements are completely exhausted. That person, monks, is called he who is liberated through wisdom (katamo ca bhikkhave puggalo pannāvimutito? idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo ye te sāntā vimokkha atikkamma rūpe druppā te kāyena phassivā viharati, pannāya c’assa disvā āsavā paripākhina koni. ayam vucaati bhikkhave puggalo pannāvimutto). Cf. MN–A III, 188, pug, 14. According to Kośa VI, § 64, he who is delivered from the klesava-rana through the power of wisdom is a śraddhādhamukta.

255 See next note.

256 Tds, 21b 5 does not give a definition of these two fruits Kośa VI, § 65. The ubhaya tobhāgavimukta who is samaya vimukta is complete from the point of view of his attainment. The ubhaya tobhāgavimukta who is asamaya vimukta is complete from the point of view of his faculties and attainment.

Cf. Pug, 11.

Kośa VI, § 57: or else samaya means 'time': the first five Arhats are susceptible to falling from deliverance (vimukta), they are therefore delivered for a time (kālāntara), and so are samaya vimukta; the sixth Arhat (cf. Kośa VI, § 56) is not susceptible to falling from deliverance, he is therefore definitively delivered (ayantaravimukta), and so is asamaya vimukta.

Hence, he who attains complete liberation 'from the point of view of his faculties and attainment' is probably identical to the asamaya vimukta, while he who attains incomplete liberation 'from the point of view of his faculties and attainment' is identical to the samaya vimukta. For, moreover, the two pairs of fruits pertain to the ubhaya tobhāgavimukta at Tds, 21b 6 as well as in Kośa VI, § 65: the Asaikha is complete from two points of view (faculties and attainment).

257 Tds, 21b 7. 侀解脫者，信及慧已得此二故勝：lit. he who is doubly delivered is he who (possesses) faith and wisdom, having acquired those two elements, he is excellent. MN I, 477: Monks, who is he who is doubly delivered? There is, monks, a certain person who, having touched with his body the peaceful liberations relating to the formless world which are beyond the world of subtle form, dwells there, and when he has seen deliverance with his wisdom his defilements are completely exhausted. That person, monks, is called he who is doubly delivered (katamo ca bhikkhave puggalo ubhato bhāgavimutto? idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo ye te sāntā vimokkha atikkamma rūpe druppā te kāyena phassivā viharati, pannāya c’assa disvā āsavā paripākhīnā koni. ayam vucaati bhikkhave puggalo ubhato bhāgavimutto). Cf MN–A III, 188, Pug, 14.
III - Liberation (vimokṣa)

Liberation means the elimination of all passions (kleśa) relating to the triple world. Consequently, it consists of the following three categories divided into eight levels:

1 - Liberation in relation to the world of desire (kāmadhātuvimokṣa) includes three liberations:
   1. Liberation accomplished through the contemplation of the repulsive (aśubhābhāvanā), in the perception of beings endowed with internal forms: meditation on the decomposition of a corpse in a cemetery;
   2. Liberation accomplished through contemplation of the repulsive, in the perception of beings devoid of form: without perceiving any form and entering the meditation in which the body of another is perceived like that described earlier;
   3. Liberation accomplished through contemplation of the lovely (subhābhāvanā): meditation on detachment from colours.

2 - Liberation in relation to the world of subtle form (rupadhātuvimokṣa) includes four liberations in which the desires of the world of subtle form are already eliminated. These are the four attainments (samāpatti) related to the formless world (ārupyadhātu);

3 - Liberation through cessation (nīrodhavimokṣa) is liberation accomplished through the cessation of thoughts (citta) and concomitant mental actions (cittasamprayukta).

These eight levels of liberation designate the lowest to the highest degrees of meditation practice.

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258 The eight liberations (vimokṣa) constitute one of the best known methods of meditation and are described in all the canonical texts; for example: DN II, 262; MN II, 12-13; AN I, 40; IV, 306. The Kośa VIII, §§ 32-4, gives a detailed analysis of this subject.

259 See next note.

260 Among the eight liberations, the first are accomplished through contemplation of the repulsive (aśubhābhāvanā) aimed at eliminating desire, and practised in the first two absorptions (dhyāna). On the contemplation of the repulsive, cf. DN II, 296; MN III, 82; Kośa VI, § 9.

261 This liberation accomplished by the contemplation of the lovely (subhābhāvanā), practised in the fourth absorption (dhyāna). Cf. Kośa VIII, § 32.

262 These four liberations are identical to the four attainments (samāpatti) of the formless world.

263 This liberation is none other than the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling (samāveditaniruddhasamāpatti). It is considered as true Nirvāṇa in this world.

AN IV, 454: Moreover, a monk, having gone completely beyond the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, enters the cessation of perception and feeling, dwells there and, when he has seen deliverance, his delusions are completely exhausted. In that sense, the Blessed Lord calls it Nirvāṇa in this world, in the real sense (puna ca param... bhikkhu sabbaso nevasatthānādānāyatanam samatokkamma samāvediṣṭāniruddham upasampajjā viharati, panāyā c'assa disvā āsavā parikkhīna hoti. Ettavaṭā pi kho... diṭṭha dharmasānikaṇān vuññāt bhagavatā nippariyāya).
CHAPTER TWO: THE BAD (AKUŚALA)
(Vol.II, 21b 26 - 25a 26, questions 89-150)

In the second chapter, the Tds deals with the Bad (akuśala). The bad is defined as 'blemish', that which blemishes good conduct. It consists of misconduct (duṣcarita), thirst (īrṣṇā) and ignorance (avidyā).

First section: misconduct (duṣcarita)
(Vol.II, 21b 28 - 23a 7)

Instead of dealing with the ten kinds of misconduct as do other canonical books\(^{264}\), the Tds lists only nine of them, grouped into three main categories:

I — Misconduct of body (kāyaduṣcarita)

Misconduct of body is of three kinds:

1. Taking life (prāṇātipāta), the action of killing beings, accomplished with:
   a) the intention of killing which consists of: 1) mental desire: the idea of killing; 2) the desire to be killed by another: inciting others to kill; 3) joy at the action of others: feeling joy at killing by others;
   b) the order to kill which consists of: 1) advising; 2) ordering others to kill; and 3) approving the killing of others;
   c) the deed of killing, the realisation of killing which consists of: 1) the idea of living beings; 2) the idea of relinquishing life; and 3) the destruction of life\(^{265}\).

2. Theft (adattādāna) is the action of voluntarily taking the possessions of others, accomplished with: a) the idea of the possessions of others; b) the idea of stealing, and c) appropriation with intention\(^{266}\).

\(^{264}\) Kośa IV, § 65. Bad actions of body, speech and mind are regarded as being the three bad practices. On the ten kinds of misconduct, cf. MN I, 44, 360; III, 23; AN I, III; Vin.V, 138.

\(^{265}\) Kośa IV, § 73. Taking life is to kill, consciously, without making an error (prāṇātipātaśaṃcitvaḥ bhāvāna parāmarṣaḥ, p.153, n.1; cf. Pruden, p.649). The Āṭṭhasālīni, 97, lists the five conditions necessary for taking life: 'a living being, consciousness that there is a living being there, the intention of killing, the attack and the death resulting therefrom' (tassa pācā sambhiṅā honti: pāna, pānasahālinti, vadhukacittam, upakkamo, tena maraṇantī), and the six methods of achieving it: with one's own hand, by instigation, by a projectile, by stratagem, by ruse or by supernormal means (cha payogā: sāhatiko, anālīkino, nisakkino, thavaro, vijjamayo, iddhinayo it). Cf. Traité II, p.784, n.1.

\(^{266}\) Kośa IV, § 73. 'Theft, taking what is not given (adattādāna) — is to appropriate the possessions of another by force or in secret (adattādānam paravaśvikaṁ paravesālaṁ) — is to appropriate the possessions of another by force or in secret (adattādānam paravaśvikaṁ paravesālaṁ). There are six methods of stealing: with one's own hand, etc. One or another of these methods will be implemented according to circumstances, through stealing by false weights and measures, by force, by concealing, by intrigue or by counterfeiting (chappayogā saha theyyāvahāro patayāvahāro pātīchādānāvahāro pātikappāvahāro kusāvahāro it imesam avahāranam vatana pavaitā). Cf. Traité II, p.795, n.1.
3. Sensual misconduct (kāmamithyācāra) is forbidden sensual relationships, practised with: a) the women of others; b) persons observing the law\textsuperscript{267}, and c) through forbidden paths (amārga)\textsuperscript{268}.

On this subject, the Tds shows that sexual acts by lay people are not necessarily misconduct (duścārita), but that sexual wrong action is misconduct; whereas, for monks, all sexual relations constitute misconduct because they should observe continence (brahmācarya).

Next, the Tds affirms that all wrong things arise from three bad roots; it is possible that wrong things arise either from attachment (rāga), or from hatred (dveṣa) or from attachment alone since from attachment comes hatred. That is why there can be no confusion between the ‘initial resolve’ and the sequence of events. For example, ‘it is through covetousness of the teeth and skin (of animals) that hostility (towards them) ensues, then the action of killing’.

II — Misconduct of Speech (vāgduścārita)

Traditionally, misconduct of speech is of four kinds\textsuperscript{269}, but the Tds abridges them to three:

1. Lying (mrśāvāda) is discourse which dissimulates the truth, it is motivated by covetousness of a gain: a) for oneself; b) for another or c) for reasons of self-interest\textsuperscript{270}.

2. Speech which is too frank is speech which possesses the following three qualities: a) speech devoid of grace, harmful speech (pārusyavāda)\textsuperscript{271}; b) speech

\textsuperscript{267} The commentary in the Tds on the women of others and persons subject to the law is very clear and rich, cf. Tds 22a 5–18. MN I, 286: In sensuality, there are illicit practices: relationships with girls under the guardianship of a mother, father, mother and father, brother, sister or relatives; with girls who are under the protection of the law, already promised to a husband and protected by a stick, or even with girls crowned with the flower-garlands of a betrothed (kāmesu miśchācārī kho pana hoti, yā tā māturakkhitā piturakkhitā (matēpiurakkhitā) bhāturakkhitā bhaginirakkhitā nāṭirakkhitā sassānīkā saparidānā, antamaśo maṅgunaparikkkhitā pi, tathārūpāsā cāritām apajjita hoti). Translated in E. Lamotte, Traité II, p.799, n; cf. AN V, 176, Kośa IV, § 74.

\textsuperscript{268} According to the Tds, 22a 18–21, sexual relations through forbidden paths consist of sexual intercourse with (1) a woman after her confinement, (2) a young girl by force, (3) a man (= homosexuality) and (4) a hermaphrodite. Traité II, p.799, n, l : intercourse with one’s own wife through a forbidden pathway (amārga, ananga), that is to say, anywhere that is not the yoni. Cf. Kośa IV, § 74 (p.157, n3; cf. Pruden, pp.652, 739, n.330).

\textsuperscript{269} These are: (1) lying (musāvāda), (2) slander (pisuṇāvāda), (3) harmful speech (pharaśāya), (4) frivolous speech (samphappāpa), cf. MN I, 44.

\textsuperscript{270} Aṭṭhasalini, p.99: Lying has four constituent factors: (1) a false thing, (2) the intention to deceive, (3) a corresponding effort and (4) communication of the thing to another (tasxa cattam sambhāro honti: utaham vathu, visamvādanta vade, tajjo vayam, parassa tadathāvijānān ti). Translated by E. Lamotte in Traité II, p.804, note. Kośa IV, § 74: Lying is discourse held, with differing thoughts, with a person who understands its meaning.

\textsuperscript{271} Kośa IV, § 76: Harmful speech is abusive discourse.
which provokes separation, slander (paścunyavāda)\textsuperscript{272}; c) speech which possesses both characteristics of the first two, combined harmful and slanderous speech.

3. Frivolous speech (sambhinnapralāpa) consists of: a) inopportune discourse; b) untruthful discourse and c) senseless discourse\textsuperscript{273}.

III — Misconduct of thought (manodūścarita)

Misconduct of thought designates three mental actions:

1. Covetousness (abhīdyā) is desire for other peoples' goods, a wish to seize others' possessions; it is differentiated from intention which is the desire to act, because it is desire limited to itself\textsuperscript{274}.

2. Ill-will (vyāpāda) is malevolent thought which is disposed to oppress others\textsuperscript{275}.

3. False view (mithyādṛṣṭi) is heresy, of which there are three kinds: a) opinions denying actions (karma)\textsuperscript{276}; b) opinions denying results (vipāka)\textsuperscript{277} and c) nihilism (nāśīdṛṣṭi)\textsuperscript{278}.

The three preceding categories of mental misconduct include all bad causes opposed to all good causes.

Second section: thirst (trṣṇā)

(Vol.II, 23a 9 - 24a 8)

The second section of the second chapter deals with thirst (trṣṇā) which, according to the Tds, is pursuit\textsuperscript{279}, consisting of three elements: attachment (rāga), hostility (huiś, pratīgā?) and conceit (māna).

I — Attachment (rāga)

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid. malicious or slanderous speech is the discourse of a person with a defiled mind with a view to dividing.

\textsuperscript{273} Frivolous speech (sambhinnapralāpa) is inconsiderate speech. It is all defiled discourse which is not lying, slander or harmful. Cf. Kośa IV, §§ 76-7.

\textsuperscript{274} Kośa IV, § 77: Covetousness is the desire to appropriate, through illegal ways, the goods of others.

\textsuperscript{275} Kośa IV, § 78: Malevolence is hatred of living beings.

\textsuperscript{276} It is opinion that denies moral causality (ahetudṛṣṭi) or non-action (akirīya-vāda). For example, Makkhali-Gosāla denied will and all causes of corruption predetermined by fate. He accepted rebirth but denied that man can modify his destiny. Cf. DN I, 53-4; MN I, 25th. The Buddha criticised him as one of the most harmful persons. Cf. AN I, 33.

\textsuperscript{277} This is the opinion of Pūrṇa-Kassapa who denied merit and demerit or all the results of good or bad actions (akirīya-vāda). Cf. DN I, 5, 35, 52; MN-II, 404.

\textsuperscript{278} This is the opinion of ethical nihilism (naithikavāda) of Ajita-Kesakambali, asserting that all belief in a good action and its recompense is pure delusion because, according to him, life is nothing but a combination of the four great elements, namely: earth, water, fire and air, and after death, there is nothing. Cf. DN I, 55; MN I, 55; III, 7; Kośa IV, § 78.

\textsuperscript{279} Kośa III, § 23 gives the same definition: trṣṇā, the state of him who desires sense pleasures and sexual union.
Attachment\textsuperscript{280} consists of:

1. Attachment to sense-desire (kāmarāga)
   a) five kinds of attachment corresponding to five sense-objects (kāmagūna)\textsuperscript{281};
   b) three kinds of attachment: 1) attachment to desire for a man (weak category); 2) attachment to desire for a woman (middling category); and 3) attachment to desire for a hermaphrodite (strong category).

2. Attachment to existence (bhavarāga) which corresponds to the triple world:
   a) attachment to the world of desire (kāmarāga);
   b) attachment to the world of subtle form (rūparāga);
   c) attachment to the formless world (ārūpyarāga)\textsuperscript{282}.

3. Attachment to the pure life (brahmacaryarāga)
   a) attachment after having obtained the desired object;
   b) desire before obtaining the desired object\textsuperscript{283} and
   c) sorrow following the loss of the desired object.

Attachment to existence has as its object the living beings and things of the triple world, whilst attachment to sense-desire concerns the passions (kleśa). The process consisting of the three phases of attachment to the pure life can be applied to the other two attachments. As for attachment to sense-desire, this process applies to a woman, a man and a hermaphrodite; hence there are nine kinds of attachment in all. This number is equally valid for the last two attachments. In all, twenty-seven kinds of attachment are counted.

II — Hostility (hui भक्ति, pratigha?)

Hostility is discontent caused by oneself, by those close to one or by one's adversaries\textsuperscript{284}. The Tds deals with hostility in the section on thirst by explaining it as ill-will which also forms part of thirst.

Wishing ill occurs in four circumstances:

(1) for oneself, (2) for those close to one, (3) one seeks happiness which one has not yet obtained, and (4) happiness having been obtained, one does not wish to lose it; unhappiness which has descended on one, one wishes to escape, and the unhappiness which still spares us one wishes to avoid. As for the adversary, while unhappiness still does not affect him, one wishes that it will descend on him, and unhappiness having reached him, one desires it to endure; happiness not having

\textsuperscript{280} Cf. DN III, 254; MN I, 433; AN IV, 9. Kośa V, §§ 1, 2, defines attachment as a tendency (anusāya) associated with pleasure.
\textsuperscript{281} These are: form (rūpa), sound (śabda), odour (gandha), taste (rasa) and the tangible (spraṣṭārya).
\textsuperscript{282} On the triple world (dōru), cf. MN III, 63; AN IV, 67-8; Kośa II, § 73; E. Lamotte, History, pp.32-3.
\textsuperscript{283} MN I, 102: Based on thirst (tanhā) means that sort of morality aroused by desire for a happy life, for example, ‘because of this moral habit, custom, austerity, pure life, I will become a heavenly being or another god (iminā ham silena và这几天 và tapena và brahmacaryena và devo và bhavissāmi devaśatara và ni).
\textsuperscript{284} W. Rahula, in his Compendium, p.9, translates pratigha as ‘repugnance’; the definition of the former in the text is: ‘It is ill-will (aghāta) towards living beings, suffering, and conditions of suffering’.
been obtained by him, one wishes that he never obtain it, and, when he does obtain it, one wishes that he lose it quickly.

Amongst the three kinds of hostility, hostility caused by oneself or hostility caused by those close to one have the same nature: they are manifested in the three time-periods: the past, present and future, during which all pursuit is in vain. Hostility caused by an adversary is also manifested in the three time-periods, but it ensues from the success of the foe. Hence, there are nine kinds of hostility in all.

Hostility, in this sense, is different from ill-will (vyāpāda), described in the three kinds of misconduct, since the former has external causes, whilst the latter is anger caused by ignorance.

The Tds divides hostility into three categories, based on their duration:
1. The weak is compared to patterns which appear on the surface of water and which disappear instantaneously;
2. The middling, to patterns made by oneself, and which endure for a while;
3. The strong, to patterns engraved on stone, which only vanish along with it.

III — Conceit (māna)

Conceit is arrogance, originating in a thought of comparing oneself to others. There are nine kinds of conceit in all:

1. Conceit of inferiority (unamāna), arising from the idea: 'I am not like others'; this conceit is manifested according to the following characteristics: a) mistaken conceit (mithyāmāna); b) unreal conceit (abhiṣamāna); c) very lowly conceit (adhihiṇamāna);

2. Conceit of equality (samamāna), arising from the idea: 'I am equal to others'. It also has three characteristics: a) conceit due to oneself (asrmīndna); b) conceit due to arrogance; c) conceit due to disdain;

3. Conceit of superiority (adhimāna), arising from the idea: 'I am superior to others'. It is divided into three categories: a) profound conceit; b) extremely profound conceit (matimāna); excessive conceit (abhimāna).

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285 Kośa II, § 33: Māna, conceit—scorn, is arrogance; Compendium, p.9: It is mental exhalation (citaryonnaih) which is based on the idea of the self.
286 Similarly, the Jñānaprasthānāsāstra, T XXVI, 1544, 1028b 26–28 teaches nine types of māna, mānavidhā, or simply vidhā, namely: 1. 'I am better ( śreyān)'; 2. 'I am equal'; 3. 'I am less good'; 4. 'Another is better than myself'; 5. 'He is my equal'; 6. 'He is less good than I'; 7. 'Another is no better than myself'; 8. 'He is not equal to me'; 9. 'He is no less good than I'. These nine types come from three mānas, namely: māna, adhimāna and unamāna, while the Kośa counts only seven mānas, namely: māna, adhimāna, mānāttimāna, asimāna, abhimāna, unamāna, mithyāmāna. Cf. Kośa V, § 10.
Third section: Ignorance (avidyā)
(Vol.II, 24a 10 - 25a 24; questions 135 - 150)

According to the Tds, ignorance (avidyā)²⁸⁷ consists of: non-knowledge (ajñāna), erroneous knowledge (mithyājñāna) and doubt (vicikitsā).

I — Non-knowledge (ajñāna)

Non-knowledge designates:

1. Non-comprehension of compounded things (samskṛta), that is, non-comprehension of:
   a. appropriation (upādāna) — of the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhatu) and spheres (āyatana) of oneself and others, that is, attachment to the self (ātman) and attachment to what pertains to the self (ātmiya);
   b. non-appropriation (anupādāna) — grass, trees, a wall, etc., and the appropriation of others as an object;
   c. both together.

2. Non-comprehension of the uncompounded (asamskṛta) designates non-comprehension of:
   a. Nirvāṇa with a remainder (sopadhiṣeṣa);
   b. Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiṣeṣa);
   c. a combination of both²⁸⁸.

3. Non-comprehension of the ineffable (avaktavya) designates non-comprehension of:
   a. the designation of appropriation (upādānaprajñāpiti): the living being (sattva) who, not having appropriated the aggregates, elements and spheres, is considered as both identical to them and different from them²⁸⁹;
   b. the designation of the past (atitaprajñāpiti): the teaching based on the aggregates, elements and spheres of the past;
   c. the designation of cessation (nirodhaprajñāpiti): the teaching based on the cessation of appropriation, for example, the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha²⁹⁰.

²⁸⁷ Tds, 24a 12-13: 如人有惡子識無子，如是無明惡明故說無明: Just as having one's children devoured is equivalent to not having any at all, so, because ignorance (induces) aberrant knowledge, it is that which is called ignorance. The canonical texts give precise definitions: 'Ignorance is what hides the four Noble Truths' (cf. SN II, 4), the origin and disappearance of the aggregates (cf. SN III, 162, 171). Being one of the defilements (āsavas) and one of the tendencies (ānaśaya), it constitutes the original condition of the process of the twelve links of the cycle of birth and death.

²⁸⁸ Kośa III, § 28: 'Avidyā is an entity (dharma) apart, the contrary of vidyā, 'knowledge'; like non-friend, not-true, etc.' (vidyā-vyapakṣo dharmo 'nyo vidyāṁ nirāśray'étadāvā).

²⁸⁹ Cf. above, n.219.

²⁹⁰ Tds, 24b 2-3: 受施設者，眾生已受陰界入，計一及餘 The translation is based on the following meaning: appropriation (受 upādāna) is synonymous with the living being (sattva) who, in turn, is synonymous with the padgala.

²⁹⁰ See below, 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavādins'.
Moreover, the designation of the past has as its aim the remedying of the false views on annihilation (ucchadaṛśṭi) of living beings, the designation of cessation as remedying false views on eternalism (śāsvaṭaḍṛśṭi), the designation of appropriation as remedying non-existentism (nāṣṭiḍṛśṭi), and the designation of non-appropriation as remedying existentialism (astiḍṛśṭi).

II — Erroneous knowledge (mithyājñāna)

Erroneous knowledge designates:

1. Belief in individuality (satkāyaḍṛśti)\(^{291}\):
   a. belief in the reality of the self (ātman),
   b. belief in the reality of what pertains to the self (ātmiya), and
   c. belief in the reality of freedom (aśvarya)\(^{292}\).

2. Extreme views (antarāgaḥaḍṛśṭi):
   a. belief in annihilation (ucchadaṛśṭi),
   b. belief in eternity (śāsvaṭaḍṛśṭi), and
   c. belief in a combination of both\(^{293}\).

3. Attachment to views (drṣṭiṇiḥaṃśa)\(^{294}\):
   a. attachment to rules (śīla);
   b. attachment to views (drṣṭi)\(^{295}\); and
   c. attachment based on the two preceding ones\(^{296}\).

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291 This is the first of the ten fetturs (samyogana), consisting of twenty categories obtained by applying four categories of belief in individuality to each of the aggregates (skandha): (1–5) belief in being identical to the body (rupa), feelings (vedana), perceptions (sajña), formations (samskara) or consciousness (vijnana); (6–10) belief of being known in them; (11–15) belief of being independent from them; (16–20) belief in being their possessor.

292 Kośa V, § 7: Believing in me and mine (tāmātmagadā) constitutes satkāyaḍṛśti.

293 According to the Tds, 24b 14–16: 'Belief in the reality of freedom is the illusion regarding the five sense-objects (pahacakamāguna) which are similar to the trunk of a banana tree, to balls of foam on water; they are considered as freedom (aśvarya), (whereas) they are like heavenly cities'.

294 According to the Tds, 24b 18–22, the first two views (antarāgaḥaḍṛśṭi, uucchadaṛśṭi) maintain that: (1) the universe is eternal and non-eternal or is neither eternal nor non-eternal; (2) the universe is limited and unlimited or is neither limited nor unlimited; (3) the body and life (jīva) of living beings have an end and do not have an end or neither have an end nor do not have an end; and the last view (combination of both the above) maintains that: (1) the universe is simultaneously eternal, limited and unlimited; (2) living beings are simultaneously eternal and non-eternal.

295 Tds, 24b 23: twachien 益見 . The translation of the Sanskrit word-drṣṭiṇiḥaṃśa (chien 見 = drṣṭi, tao 目 = parāmāraśa) is probably mechanical. Here, the word means attachment to views.

296 According to Tds, 24b 27–29, attachment based on the (tw) preceding ones is attachment which rests either on rules or on views, by considering that they constitute means of purification, such as the five elements of purification; namely: morality (śīla), concentration (samādhi), wisdom (praṇā), deliverance (vinukti) and the knowledge of deliverance (vinuktiṃaṇa). Cf. AN III, 57.
The Tds also classes these three elements of erroneous knowledge as follows: belief in individuality and extreme views are found in the Truth of suffering, in relation to the triple world; attachment to rules is found in the Truth of suffering and the Truth of the Path in relation to the triple world.

**Sutkāyadrṣṭi**
- *duḥkhāsātya*
- *Kāmadhātu*
- *Rūpyadhātu*
- *Ārūpyadhātu*

**Antagrāhadrṣṭi**
- *duḥkhāsātya*
- *Kāmadhātu*
- *Rūpyadhātu*
- *Ārūpyadhātu*

**Śīlaparāmarṣa**
- *mārgasātya*
- *Kāmadhātu*
- *Rūpyadhātu*
- *Ārūpyadhātu*

### III — **Doubt** (vicikitsā?):

Doubt\(^{297}\) is indecision, hesitation:

1. Not understanding the jewels *(rāna)*:
   a) the Buddha; b) the Teaching *(dharma)*; c) the Community *(samgha)*;

2. Not understanding the truth *(satyā)*:
   a) conventional truth *(samvṛtisātya)* — the traditional habits, customs of society, and the rules of training;
   b) characteristic truth *(laksānasātya)* — suffering *(duḥkha)*, the origin of suffering *(samudāya)*, and the Path *(mārga)*;
   c) absolute truth *(paramārthaśātya)* — Nirvāṇa\(^{298}\).
   According to the Tds, only a single truth exists on the absolute level\(^{299}\).

3. Not understanding concentration *(samādhi)* which consists of:
   a. Concentration in relation to the world of subtle form *(rūpyadhyāna)*, the absorptions *(dhyāna)*, immeasurables *(upramāna)*, spheres of mastery

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\(^{297}\) This is the translation of the expression *hua chih* (Tds, 24a 10, 11, 24c 1). It is probable that the word *chih* is necessary for the first two elements: *fei chih* (chih), *hsieh chih* (chih), but is not needed for the third: *hua* (chih), where the Sanskrit word is *vicikitsā*.

\(^{298}\) Nirvāṇa is the absolute because it is the only reality which actions of body, speech and mind cannot attain or conceive. Cf. Tds, 25a 1–5.

\(^{299}\) See below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins, thesis No.10'.

\(^{300}\) These are the four absorptions *(dhyāna)*; see above, n.188.

\(^{301}\) These are the four immeasurables; see above, n.189.
(abhibhāvatana)\textsuperscript{302}, three deliverances (vimokṣa)\textsuperscript{303}, the first eight of the ten spheres of totalisation of the object (kṛṣṇāyatana)\textsuperscript{304};
\begin{itemize}
  \item [b.] attainment in relation to the formless world (ārupyaśamāpatti), the four attainments in relation to the formless world, the last two of the ten spheres of totalisation of the object (kṛṣṇāyatana)\textsuperscript{305};
  \item [c.] undefiled concentration (anāśravasamādhi): this is concentration leading to the exhaustion of the defilements. It consists of the concentrations on emptiness (sūnyatāsamādhi), on wishlessness (apraṇhitasamādhi) and on non-perception (or signlessness — uhiru, asamjñāsamādhi: animitasamādhi)\textsuperscript{306}.
\end{itemize}

Moreover, there are twelve categories of doubt by including non-comprehension of the four Noble Truths in relation to the triple world. The influence of doubt is very powerful, that is why doubt is also mentioned under the preceding headings.

Further on, the Tds states that in all there are ninety-eight tendencies; if thirst (trṣṇā) is analysed in detail\textsuperscript{307}.

\textsuperscript{302} The spheres of mastery (abhibhāvatana) are eight in number: (1) having a notion of visible forms internally, one sees limited (pariṭṭha) forms externally and masters them; (2) similarly, one sees unlimited (aprāmaṇa) forms; (3) having a notion of formlessness internally, one sees limited forms externally and masters them; (4) similarly, one sees unlimited forms; (5) having a notion of formlessness internally, one sees forms that are blue, . . . (6) . . . yellow . . . (7) . . . red . . . and (8) . . . white, and masters them. The first two spheres of mastery are identical to the first deliverance (vimokṣa); the next two to the second; and the last four, to the third. Cf. DN II, 110 sq; MN II, 11, 13; IV, 305, 348; AN I, 40, IV, 305; Kośa VIII, § 35; Vism, p.175, Dhs, p.52; Bureut, Religions, p.57; Rahula, Compendium, p.167, n.1.

\textsuperscript{303} These are: (1) deliverance through emptiness (sūnyatāvimokṣa) resulting from the elimination of the conception of self (ātman), (2) deliverance through signlessness (animitāvimokṣa), from the illusion of the impermanence of things; (3) deliverance through wishlessness (apraṇhitāvimokṣa), from attachment to objects of craving, hatred and delusion. Pujsambhidāmagga II, 35: tayo me bhikkhave vimokkhā suññato vimokkho anamītto vimokkho appaniñño. Kośa III, § 25: Immaculate, they are the three vimokṣamūkas. Cf. also p.187, n.2; Vism XX17).

\textsuperscript{304} The first eight of the ten spheres of totalisation of the object (kṛṣṇāyatana) are the spheres of totalisation of (1) earth (prthivikṛṣṇāyatana), (2) water (ap.), (3) fire (tejaś), (4) wind (vāyu), (5) blue (niḷa), (6) yellow (piṇḍa), (7) red (lohaḥ), (8) white (avasaśa). These spheres, which present elements of the whole universe, constitute an external means of arousing and developing concentation and attaining the four absorptions (dhyāna) pertaining to the world of subtle form (rūpadhātu). Cf. DN III, 268; MN II, 14; AN V, 46; Vism, p.110, Kośa VIII, § 36.

\textsuperscript{305} The last two of the ten spheres of totalisation of the object (kṛṣṇāyatana), namely, space (ākāśa) and consciousness (vjñāna), relate to the last two formless attainments (ārupyaśamāpatti).

\textsuperscript{306} See above, n.209.

\textsuperscript{307} There are 6 anuṣṭayas: rāga, pratigha, māna, avidyā, dṛṣṭi, vimacī (Kośa V, p.9). They make 98 by counting 36 anuṣṭayas in the world of desire (kāmadhātu), 31 in the world of form (rūpadhātu) and 31 in the formless world (ārūpyadhātu) (Kośa V, p.9) Cf. Traité I, 424, n.4.
CHAPTER THREE: THE SUPPORT (NIŚRAYA)
(Vol.III, 25b 5 - 30a 14; questions 151-223)

The third chapter deals with the Support (niśraya). The support signifies the criteria on which beings base their existence and knowledge. It includes the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātu) and spheres (āyatana). These three elements constitute the Support of the Good (kuśala) and Bad (akuśala).

First section: The Aggregates (skandha)
(Vol.III, 25b 26 - 26b 24)

The image the Tds uses to illustrate the word ‘aggregate’ (skandha) is ‘heap’, ‘pile’. Generally, the aggregates are five in number. Here, the Tds reduces them to three: form (rupa), psychological formation (samskāra) and knowledge (vijñāna). Although they are three in number, they encompass all the psycho-physical phenomena of existence.

I — Form (rupa)

Form designates the group of corporeality. It consists of:

a) the four great elements (mahābhūta): earth (prthividhātu); solidity (khakkhatāva); water (abhātāu); liquidity (dravatva); fire (tejodhātu); heat (usnātva); wind (vayudhātu); mobility (laghusamudirātva). These are the separate and mixed elements.

b) derived form (upādiyarūpa):
   1. the visible (sanidārāna): colours: blue (nila), yellow (pīta), red (lohitā), white (avadāta); shapes: rough (karkaṣava), silky (kāṣyā), tall (dīrga), short (hrasva), square (caturākṣa), round (parimandala).
   2. the invisible (anidārāna): sound (sabda), odour (gandha), taste (rasa), the tangible (sprastavya), the five sense-organs (pañcendriya) and four great elements (mahābhūta).

The Tds also counts smoke (dhuma), clouds (abhra), mist (mahika), etc. as derived form.

II — Formation (samskāra)

Formation designates the group of psychological elements, supported by the body, speech and mind, and which constitute bodily activities, vocal activities

308 These are the aggregates of (1) form (rupavskandha), (2) feeling (vedanā), (3) perception (samjñā), (4) the formations (samskāra), and (5) consciousness (vijñāna). They designate all the psycho-physical phenomena, as the Buddha declared, of the existence of a man or a being. Cf. SN III, 59-61.

309 The aggregate of form designates all that is form or matter in the universe. SN III, 86: All that is effected materially is called form (rupāt tā kho bhikkhave iasmā rūpaṁ tīt vaccañi; cf. MN I, 53, Kosā I, § 12 sq., gives a detailed explanation of this subject.
and mental activities. Accomplished activities pertain to the sphere of compounded things (samskāra), which is formation (samskāra). In reality, the five aggregates are formations from the sphere of compounded things (samskāra). There are innumerable kinds which act according to these combinations and innumerable ways. By analysing it according to the three worlds (dhātu), formation (samskāra) consists of:

a. meritorious formation (punyābhissamskāra);
b. demeritorious formation (apunyābhissamskāra);
c. immovable formation (āneñyābhissamskāra).

III — Knowledge (jñāna)

Knowledge is synonymous with the factors of the Path (margāṅga). Knowledge is a collective term to designate: (1) feeling (vedanā), (2) perception (samjñā) and (3) consciousness (vijñāna).

1. Feeling (vedanā) is merely feeling associated with life (jīva), but it is not life. It is nothing but itself. According to its nature, three categories of feeling can be distinguished:
   a. pleasant feeling (sukhavedanā), arising from sense-pleasures, non-illwill and non-attachment;
   b. unpleasant feeling (duḥkha vedanā), arising from birth, old-age and death;
   c. Neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling (aduḥkhasukhavedanti), contrasted

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310 The aggregate of psychological formations (samskāraskandha) includes different mental actions which it is difficult to reduce to a precise definition. The Theravādin Abhidhamma masters analyse this aggregate into 50 mental functions (cetasika), among which is volition (cetanā), with the sense of motivation, activity, attitude, etc. (cf. SN III, 60). This volition is manifested in three kinds of activity: bodily, vocal and mental (cf. MN II, 301). In this sense, this aggregate is identical to action (karma) (cf. AN III, 415; VI, 13, 15) and constitutes a force which influences the process of rebirth (cf. DN III, 258).

311 SN III, 87: What is it, monks, that you call the formations? Because they form all that is compounded, that is why they are called formations. What is the compounded that they form? They form perceptions, the compound of perceptions; they form mental functions, the compound of mental functions; they form consciousness as the compound of consciousness. Hence, monks, they form compounded things, that is why they are called formations (kiṅca saṅkhāre vadetha? saṅkhataṁ abhisankharoti, bhikkhave tasāṁ saṅkhara ti vuccati. kiṅca saṅkhataṁ abhisankharoti, rūpaṁ rupatiṣṭaya ... vedanāṁ vedanattaya ... saṅkaraṁ saṅkharattaya ... viññānaṁ viññānattaya saṅkhataṁ abhisankharoti; saṅkhaṁ abhisankharoti kho bhikkhave tasāṁ saṅkhara ti vuccati).

Kośa I, § 7: Compound things (samskṛta) constitute the pendulum of the skandhas, form, etc.

312 Amongst these three formations of action, the first two, meritorious formation extends from the world of desire to the world of subtle form; immovable formation, to the formless world. On the three formations of action, and their cessation, cf. SN II, 80–4.

313 See below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavāda: thesis No.12.'
to the two preceding ones\textsuperscript{314}.

Taken as a whole, feelings exist in the three worlds, but whilst pleasant feelings exist in the world of desire and the world of subtle form, unpleasant feelings only exist in the world of desire.

On the subject of the origin of feelings, pleasant feeling relies on an abundance of desire, unpleasant feeling on the magnitude of hate, and neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling on the depth of ignorance.

Moreover, there is pleasant feeling without craving, which can eliminate desires, such as the third absorption; unpleasant feeling without hatred, such as the Buddha who, suffering from a headache and wound in his foot, did not arouse hatred; and neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling, which exists in the fourth absorption and the attainments of the formless world.

All feelings arise from action (\textit{karman}), restraint and the elements (\textit{dhātu}).

1. Feelings arising from action consist of:
   a. pleasant feelings which arise from meritorious action (\textit{punyakarman}), which exist in the four absorptions, etc.; they can dispel misconduct (\textit{duścarita});
   b. unpleasant feelings which arise from demeritorious actions (\textit{apunya-karman}) constitute misconduct;
   c. immovable feelings which arise from immovable actions (\textit{āneñjya-karman}) such as the fourth absorption and the attainments of the formless world.

2. Feelings arising from restraint consist of:
   a. restraint by oneself, for example when, having harmed ourselves with a knife, we tend our wound;
   b. restraint by others, for example when someone, having given us a head-wound, tends us, and,
   c. restraint by oneself and others, for example when a man, having asked another to harm himself, tends him afterwards.

3. Feelings arising from the elements (\textit{dhātu}), understood in the sense of fundamental constituent parts, consist of:
   a. feelings arising with time (\textit{kāla}) — because of changes in time, one has pleasant or unpleasant feelings;
   b. feelings arising from the ill — physical illness which consumes the body; and
   c. feelings arising from misfortune — material or natural things which

\textsuperscript{314} On the three conditions, cf. DN III, 275, SN III, 86, IV, 232. They arise immediately on contact. Consequently, there are six kinds of feeling which are based on the five senses and the mind; cf. MN I, 50.

\textit{Kośa} I, § 14: Feeling (\textit{vedanā}) is a painful impression, etc. Cf. \textit{Compendium of Philosophy} (\textit{Abhidhammattha-sangaha}) by S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids. London 1890, p311 sq. Furthermore, there are other classifications of 36 or 108 feelings. Cf. \textit{Vibhāga}, 139, T XXVIII, 1545, 715a.
2. **Perception** (samjñā) implies the receptivity of images\(^{315}\). Because the field of action of knowledge relates to the three worlds, there are three kinds of perception:

a. perception (samjñā) is the receptivity of images, relying on two elements: subject and object;

b. the absence of perception (asamjñā) is the absence of receptivity, the state of non-reliance on two elements: subject and object; and

c. the attainment of non-perception (asamjñāsamāpatti); this is the total abandoning of receptivity of objects, namely, sound, form, etc.

The Tds adds:

a. perception also designates the attainment in the sphere of the infinity of consciousness (vijñānāntaryayatanasamāpatti)\(^{316}\); 

b. the absence of perception is the attainment in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (naivasamjñāsamjñāyatanasamāpatti); 

c. the attainment of non-perception is the attainment in the sphere of nothingness (ākimcanyāyatanasamāpatti)\(^{317}\).

3. **Consciousness** (vijñāna) is knowledge of different things\(^{318}\). It consists of:

a. what is born; it is at the moment of conception, by entering the mother's womb, that the different kinds of formation (samskāra) together produce consciousness\(^{319}\); 

b. what forms the sense spheres (āyatana); it is consciousness, continually increasing even in the mother's womb, which gradually forms the sense

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315 SN III, 87: What is it, monks, that you call perception? Because it perceives, monks, it is called perception. What does it perceive? It perceives (colour): blue, green, yellow, red, white . . . (kiñca bhikkhave saññam vadetha? saññānāti kho bhikkhave tasmā saññā i veccai. kiñca saññānāti? nilam . . . pīlīkam . . . lohiyakam . . . odatam pi saññānāti . . .). On the six kinds of perception which are aroused by contact, cf. AN III, 413.

*Kāśa I, § 4: notion (samjñā) consists of the apprehension of signs.

316 Tds, 26b 10: *Kuan shan shih ch'ü 見善識處 . The translation here is adapted to the context, since it cannot be translated otherwise despite the meaning of the Chinese words.

317 Perception, in Buddhism, implies not only the fact of receiving the qualities of objects, but also the knowledge of internal objects, ideas, memory, imagination, illusion, ideation, etc. Cf. MN I, 410, AN V, 105, Sn, 874.

318 SN III, 87: What is it, monks, that you call consciousness? It is conscious, monks, that is why it is called consciousness. Of what is it conscious? It is conscious of bitter (taste), etc. . . . (kiñca bhikkhave viññānam viññāti? viññānāti kho bhikkhave tasmā viññānam ti veccai. kiñca viññāti? ambilam pi viññāti . . .).

*Kāśa I, § 14: Consciousness (vijñāna) is the impression relating to each object. Cf. Atthasālinī III, 185.

319 I.e., consciousness (vijñāna) which is formed in the course of past lives and descends into the mother's womb at the moment of rebirth (samskāra pratitya viññāna). See below. "The main thesis of the Pudgalavādins: *pudgala*-designated-by-transmigration, and n.581."
spheres of four kinds: (1) disturbed spheres, (2) undisturbed spheres, (3) fixed spheres, and (4) unfixed spheres; and,

c. what is not formed by the sense spheres; this is consciousness, after birth, which is conditioned by the faculties and objects of the faculties (indriyārtha).

Consciousness, according to the Tds, is the point of support (aśraya) of wisdom (prajñā), what is supported (aśrita).

Second Section: The Elements (dhātu)

(Vol.III, 26b 26 - 28c 28)

As from the second section of the third chapter, the Tds deals with the elements of the three worlds. They include all living beings up to those who have attained

320 It is consciousness (viññāna) which conditions the production of mentality and corporeality (viññāna pratītya nāmarūpa) which, in turn, conditions the production of the six sense spheres (nāmarūpa pratītya sādāya nāma). The Tds shortens the process and merely emphasises the function of consciousness. SN II, 114: Just like, friend, two bunches of reeds stay upright supporting each other, so, friend, consciousness depends on name-and-form, and name-and-form is conditioned by consciousness, the ten sense spheres are conditioned by name-and-form, contact by the ten sense spheres, etc. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering (seyahāpi āvuso dve nañcakārapyā āñam nissāya tūtheyum. evam eva kho āvuso nāmarūpa paccayā viññānam viññāna paccayā nāmarūpam, nāmarūpapaccayā salāyanam salāyanapaccayā phasso, ph. evam etassa kevalassa dakkha khandaḥhassa samadayo hou). Cf. DN II, 63.

321 Tds, 26b 19: cheng pu cheng ju, ju ping pu ting ju 許不許入，定不定入。The translation is based only on the interpretation.

322 MN I, 11-12: By reason of the eye and the visible, friend, visual consciousness arises. . . And, friend, by reason of the ear and sounds auditory consciousness arises, . . . by reason of the nose and odour olfactory consciousness arises, . . . by reason of the tongue and taste gustatory consciousness arises, . . . by reason of the body and the tangible bodily consciousness arises, . . . by reason of the mind and mental objects mental consciousness arises . . . (cakkhapaccayo paticca rāpe ca uppayjati cakkhuviññānam, . . . sotānahāvuso, paticca sādhe ca uppayjati jātavinñānam, . . . ghananāvuso paticca gandhe ca uppayjati ghanaviññānam, . . . jīvahāvuso paticca rāse ca uppayjati jīvaviññānam, . . . kāyāvahāvuso paticca phoṭabbhe ca uppayjati kāyaviññānam, . . . mananāvahāvuso paticca dhamme ca uppayjati manaviññānam). Kośa III, § 32, Tātāra II, p.747, n.1.

323 In general, consciousness is discrimination (vijñāti vijñāti ti . . . tasmā viññānam ti vuccati — MN I, 292); it is discrimination of the pleasant, unpleasant and neutral (kiñca vijñāti: sukha ti pi . . . dukkhati pi . . . adukkhamasukhāti pi vijñāti — MN I, 292); or one knows things through consciousness (tena viññānam jñāti — MN III, 242), whilst wisdom is comprehensiveness (prajñāti pājñāti ti . . . tasmā paññāna ti vuccati — MN I, 292); it is the comprehension of suffering, its origin, cessation and the Path (kiñca pājñāti: idam dukkha-ti . . . ayam dukkasamudayo ti . . . dukkhaniruddho ti . . . dukkhanirodho gāmini pājñāti — MN I, 292). The difference between these two mental factors is that wisdom is cultivated, whereas consciousness is cognition, knowledge (paññā bhavetabba viññānam parinīpanna, idam nesaṃ nānakaranam — MN I, 293). Furthermore, wisdom pertains to the aggregate of the formations (saṅkhārakkhandha), whilst consciousness pertains to the aggregate of consciousness (viññānakhandha). However, in reality it is difficult to distinguish one from the other; as it is said in the text . . . such is wisdom, such is consciousness; these things are intermingled or are not intermingled. Can the difference between these things be demonstrated after having analysed them so many times? What one comprehends one knows, what one knows one comprehends (ya ca paññā yañca viññānam ime dharmā samsātthā no visamsātthā, no ca labhā ime suṇāṁ dhammānaṁ vinibbujjīvā vinibbujjīvā nānakaraṇaṁ paññāpetum, yaṁ pājñāti taṁ viññāti, yaṁ viññāti taṁ pājñāti — MN I, 292).
Parinirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiśēsa) and consist of:

1. the elements of the world of desire (kāmadhātu);
2. the elements of the world of subtle form (rūpadhātu); and
3. the elements of the formless world (ārūpyadhātu).

I — The world of desire (kāmadhātu)

Because sensual desire (kāma) dwells there and because sensual desire is maintained there, it is called the world of desire; it consists of five destinies,324 namely:

1. Mankind (manusya) consisting of:
   a. man (puruṣa),
   b. woman (śrī), and
   c. the hermaphrodite — all live on the four continents (catvāro dvipa) surrounded by the ocean: (1) Jambudvīpa, to the south; (2) Pūravadvēsa, to the east; (3) Aparagadānīya, to the west; (4) Uttarakuru, to the north.326

2. The gods of the world of desire (kāmadeva) who are gods who arouse sensual desire (yu shēng t'ien 生天) with goddesses (apsarśī)327; this distinguishes them from the gods who have abandoned sensual desire (li yu t'ien 生天), viharāgadēva. They are of three kinds:
   a. gods whose sensual desire is expressed by conversation (shuo yu shēng t'ien 生天), the Nīrmānaratīs;
   b. gods whose sensual desire is expressed by look (ch'in yu shēng t'ien 生天) the Paranirmittavāsavartins;
   c. gods whose sensual desire is expressed by contact (hsi hua yu shēng t'ien 生天) are of three kinds: (1) gods whose sensual desire is expressed by entwining: the Yāmas; (2) gods whose sensual desire is expressed by holding hands: the Tuśitas; (3) gods whose sensual desire is expressed by coupling: that is, the Trāyastrimśas, who dwell on the summit of Mount Sumeru; the Cāturmahārājakāyikas, who dwell in the middle of Mount Sumeru; the Bhūmidevas, who dwell in the forests of that land. All these gods obtain their sensual satisfaction as a man does, but in their case there is no emission of impurities, only of breath. Their longevity is great.

3. The bad destinies (durgāti) are places where there is more suffering than joy. Beings in those destinies always tend towards the Bad. They are considered as

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324 Kośa III, § 1: Hell, pretas, animals, mankind, six [spheres of] gods: such is the Kāmadhātu. On the five destinies, see below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādin: thesis Null'.
325 According to ancient Indian geographical knowledge, Jambudvīpa is the triangular continent or rose-apple continent in which India is situated. Cf. Bureau, Religions, p.43: A. Foucher, La vie du Bouddha, p.33.
327 Tāts, 26c 18: t'ien nü 天女: goddesses who are the equal of the gods in the six levels of the world of desire (kāmadhātu).
afflicted and there are three:

a. hells (naraka, niraya);
b. animals (tirvyagonyon);
c. hungry ghosts (pretas).

3a. The hells are places where one cannot be happy. There are many of them, which are divided as follows:

1. Cold hells (śītanaraka) which consist of:
   a) hells with distinctive lamentations: (1) the Arbuda, (2) the Nirarbuda, and (3) the Ababa;
   b) hells with non-distinctive lamentations: (4) the Hahava, (5) the Huhuva, and (6) the Utpala;
   c) hells without lamentation: (7) the Kumuda, (8) the Sogandhika, (9) the Pundarika, and (10) the Padma.

The ten cold hells are located between the four continents and touch the bottom of the great circle of the iron mountain (mahā-cakravāda). They are all hells destined for those who have spoken and thought ill on meeting the holy ones.

2. Hot hells (uṣyanaraka), which consist of:
   a) hells provided with torturers: (1) the Samjiva, (2) the hell of 'the aligned', and (3), the Kālasūtra;
   b) hells with a small number of torturers: (4) the Samghāta, (5) the Mahāraurava, (6) the Prātāpana. The guardians (narakapāla) of the two preceding hells are not burnt by fire, as are the hell-bound, because of their mission; as for the consequences of their actions, that cannot be contemplated;
   c) hells without torturers: (7) the Raurava, (8) the Tāpana, and (9) the

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328 The Buddha denounced popular, superstitious belief in hell during his time; but he spoke of repugnant, nauseous and ugly worlds. On the hells (naraka, niraya) in the canonical texts, cf. J. Masson, La religion populaire dans le canon bouddhique pāli. p.96 sq.; L. Ever. 'L'enfer indien', IA, 1892, II, p.213 sq.


330 On the problem of the infernal guardians (nimarapāla), the Tds does not supply satisfactory explanations. According to a Vimākha commentary, the Sāṃmitiyas believed that the guardians of the hells were real beings (Kośa III, § 59 — pp.152–3, n.3; Pruden, p.534, n.409). In contrast, the Sārvāstivādins accepted that the guardians of the hells were not living beings (Kośa, ibid, p. 153, n.1; Pruden, p.534, n.410). The Theravādins affirmed that there certainly existed infernal guardians just as executioners and punishments existed in this world; cf. Kathāvatthu (Points of Controversy), pp.345–7.
Avici\textsuperscript{331}.

3. Frontier hells (pratyantaranaraka) which are hells found under water, in mountains and in deserts\textsuperscript{332}. The hell-bound undergo, alone, the consequences of their bad actions there.

3b. Animals (tiryak) are all the species which are born as animals because of various criminal actions\textsuperscript{333}, that is to say:
   a) beings which walk on the ground;
   b) beings which swim in water; and
   c) beings which fly in the air.

   According to another classification, animals are distributed into: (1) apods, like the snake, etc.; (2) bipeds, like birds, etc.; (3) multipeds, like oxen, horses, bees, myriapods, etc.

3c. Hungry ghosts (preta) are living beings reborn in a particularly wretched condition in fruition of their bad actions \textsuperscript{334}. They consist of:
   1. The wretched, those who are most wretched: (a) hungry ghosts whose mouths spit fire; (b) hungry ghosts whose mouths are as small as the prick of a needle; (c) the deceased whose mouths are malodorous;
   2. The poor, those who sometimes obtain a little impure food: (a) hungry ghosts with pointed hair like needles; (b) the deceased with putrid hair; (c) the goitrous deceased;
   3. The rich: (a) the deceased who live off rejected things; (b) hungry ghosts living off lost things; (c) hungry ghosts who possess great power (the Yakşas, Rākşasas and Pişācas)\textsuperscript{335}.

II — The world of subtle form (rūpadhātu)

The world of subtle form is the world in which are reborn living beings who, due to meditation, obtain a wonderful form. It consists of:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{331} Hence, the Tds, 27b 24–28a 17 counts nine hot hells, including the hell of 'the aligned' (hsing ti-yū 行地獄) that is not found in other texts, which accept only eight hot hells; cf. Jātaka V, pp.266–71; Divyāvadāna, p.67; \textit{Chi shih ching} 起世經 T I, 14, 320c sq; Mahāvastu i, tr. J. J. Jones, London 1949, pp.6–13; L'Aide-mémoire, p.3. According to the Tds, 27c 12–14, the hell of the aligned is a hell in which 'the hell-bound are arranged in lines, as in abattoirs, (their) hands, feet, ears, noses and heads are severed. Those hell-bound were butchers, which is why they undergo such sufferings'.
  \item \textsuperscript{332} On the frontier hells (pratyantaranaraka) which are often sixteen in number, cf. \textit{Shih chi ching} 世紀經 (T I, 1, 12c), \textit{Ta liu t'an ching} 大樓辰經 (T I, 23, 283c). \textit{Chi shih ching} 起世経 (T I, 1, 320c). \textit{Kośa III}, § 59: The sixteen hells are created by the power of actions of all beings (.), there are hells, the prādēśika hells, created by the power of individual actions, the actions of one being, two beings, several beings. Their variety is great; their place is undetermined: river, mountain, desert, or elsewhere. Cf. also \textit{Kośa}, p.155, n.1; Pruden, p.335, n.415.
  \item \textsuperscript{333} Cf. AN II, 72–3; Vin II, 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{334} \textit{Kośa III}, 9: They (the pretas) are of two kinds, apparitional and also chorion-born. Cf. also \textit{Kośa}, p.29, n.3; Pruden, p.504–5, n.75.
  \item \textsuperscript{335} On the Yakşas, Rākşasas, Pişācas, cf. I. Mason, \textit{La religion populaire dans le canon bouddhique} pâli, pp.126 sq, 134 sq.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
1. The level of joy (prīti):
   a) the spheres endowed with reasoning (savitarka) of the Brahmapurohitas, Brahmakāyikas and Brahmapārisadyās;
b) the spheres endowed only with investigation (savācāramātra) of the Mahā-brahmas who are experienced in the intermediate absorption (dhyānāntara)\(^{336}\);
c) the spheres devoid of reasoning (avitarka) of the Parittābhās, Apara-mānābhās and Abhāsvaras;

2. The level of joylessness (apriiti): the spheres devoid of joy of the Parittāsūbhās, Apramānāsūbhās and Šubhākrtsmas;

3. The level of equanimity (upekṣā):
   a) the sphere with perception of the Brhatphalas;
b) the sphere without perception of the Asamjāins;
c) the sphere associated with the awakened mind of the Sudhāvāsikas: namely, Sudrās, Sudarśanas and Sudhās\(^{337}\).

III — The formless world (ārūpyadhatu)

The formless world consists of the four stages in which are reborn those who have practised the right attainments (samaṇapatti). This is explained under the heading of cultivation (bhāvanā) in the first chapter.

Third Section - The Domains (āyatana)

(Vol.III, 29a 9 - 30a 14)

The domains (āyatana) are the basis of the Good (kuśala) and Bad (akuśala). There are three domains: the domain of the tangible (hsi hua ju \(\mathcal{M} \mathcal{M} \mathcal{M}\), sprāṣṭavyāyatana ?), the domain of reasoning (iu ju \(\mathcal{M} \mathcal{M} \mathcal{M}\), tarkāyatana ?) and the domain of liberation (chīe-h-t'uo ju \(\mathcal{M} \mathcal{M} \mathcal{M}\), vimoksāyatana ?). Among them, the domain of liberation is that of the Good, the domain of reasoning is that of the Bad and the domain of the tangible is that of both.

I — The domain of the tangible (hsi hua ju \(\mathcal{M} \mathcal{M} \mathcal{M}\), sprāṣṭavyāyatana ?)

The domain of the tangible is based on objects (ātambana) and is divided into three fields of action (ching chieh \(\mathcal{M} \mathcal{M}\), visāya ?):

1. The nearby field of action (chin ching-chieh \(\mathcal{M} \mathcal{M} \mathcal{M}\), samaṇikrātva\(\mathcal{M}\)) is the field of action which is the origin of the different kinds of tangible which

\(^{336}\) On the intermediate absorption (dhyānāntara), see below, 'The secondary themes of the Pudgalavādins: thesis No.9'.

\(^{337}\) Generally, the canonical texts count five levels of Sudhāvāsikas (those of the pure abode), namely: (1) Avyhas (the not-large), (2) Atipas (the heatless), (3) Sudrīs (the good-looking), (4) Sudarśanas (those of good aspect), and (5) Akanīghas (the not-inferior). Cf. DN III, 237; MN III, 109; Kośa VI, § 37; L'Inde classique II, § 226i.
are attained through knowledge;

2. The not-nearby field of action (pu chin ching-chieh は境, vipra-krstitvisaya ?) is the field of action the objects of which are not in contact with the organs and which depends on the power of the faculty of perception of external objects;

3. The domain of the absence of a field of action (wu ching-chieh 无境, avisayayatana ?) is the domain in which no correspondence exists between the objects and the senses338.

II — The domain of reasoning (tu ju 理, tarkayatana ?)

The domain of reasoning is the domain of innumerable non-Buddhist opinions on the cause of compounded things (samskrtadharma). Generally, three theories exist in relation to this domain:

1. The theory of a single cause (i ch'u yin shuo 無一因, ekahetudrti)339; is belief in only one cause — actions (karman)340 among the three causes, namely (past) actions, (present) action by oneself and action performed by others;

2. The theory of the incorrect cause (pu ch'Cng.yin shuo 无因, visama- hetudrti ?) is the attribution of the origin of the world as well as of the good and bad to (i) creators — Brahmá, Ishvara, Visnu341, (2) things — time

338 According to the Tds, 29a 28-29b 4, the domain of the absence of a field of action (wu ching-chieh 无境, avisayayatana) is that of lack of contact between the sense faculties and their objects, i.e: form, sound, odour, taste and tangible (無境 svayamjana = Tds. 29a 9; 此五境無境 — Tds, 29b 2).

339 Accepting dependent origination (pratityasamutpáda) as the principal law, all Buddhist schools deny the theory of a Primal Cause as well as that of a single cause. Cf. MN I, 92-3, AN III, 61, AItthaúliini, 59: ekákaraúvado poissedhú hoti.

340 The expression ‘actions’ here indicates actions from the past; this is a belief according to which present existence is caused only by what was done in the past (pubba-kata hetu). This opinion was criticised by the Buddha as being the doctrine of passivity — fatalism. Cf. AN III, 61; MN II, 214 sq., Já V, 208.

341 Brahma, Ishvara or Mahéshvara, and Visnu are the gods of the brahmanic Trimurti; cf. Traiśe I, p.137, n.2. The belief according to which the world was created by Brahmá or Ishvara (issara-nimmána-hetu) was criticised by the Buddha as being theistic determinism.

DN III, 28: Certain monks and brahmanas believe, according to their traditional doctrine, that (the beginning of the universe) is the work of the Lord or of Brahmá (eké sánatábráhmaná issarakkutam brahmakutam ácaryakam aggaññam puññapente). MN II, 227: Monks, if living beings, having been created by a creator, receive pleasant or unpleasant feelings, then, monks, the Nigáñthus are truly created by a cruel creator; since, in the present, they receive such painful, severe, sharp feelings (sace, bhikkhave, satthá issaranimmána-hetu sukhadukkham patisamvedeti, adáhá, bhikkhave, nisuktá pàpakena issarena nimmúti, yam etarathi evarápa dukkhá tiññá kaúka vedaná vediyáti).

THE LITERATURE OF THE PERSONALISTS — CHAPTER TWO

(kāla)342, breath (prāna)343 and spontaneity344, and (3) both;

3. The absence of a cause (ahetudṛṣṭi)345 is the opinion which denies any cause of the good and bad, such as the theory of inherent nature (svabhāvadrṣṭi)346, the

342 Tds, 29c 7–8: Time creates everything.
   Everything ripens with time.
   Everything is destroyed by time.
   Ali worlds are created by time.

   Time (kāla) is thus a force outside compounded things and considered like līvara, Puruṣa, Prajāpati and Praķṛti, who are supposed to create living beings and the universe (Ud-a, 345: athato pareṇa īssarena vā puriṣena vā pājāpatina vā kālēna vā pākatiyā vā aṭṭhā ca lokoca nimmita ti aṭṭhā). In the Atharvaveda (19, 53, 54), Kāla, conceived as an hyponotised entity having everything under its control and 'beyond which there is no other greater force' (Gaśmad vai nā 'nyatparamasti te jñā), 53–4), is said to have produced both the past and the future (kāla ha bhūtām bhavyan ca . . . ajanayat, 19, 54–3), while it is itself eternally existent (ajayar, 19, 53–1; amśtām nayasah, 19, 53–2), according to Jayatilleke, op. cit., p.142 and the notes. The Traité, when criticising the opinion according to which time (kāla) is considered as the cause of all things, gives a stanza similar to that of the Tds.
   Time passes by and beings ripen,
   Time advances and beings burgeon.
   Time can understand men,
   That is why Time is a cause.
   Cf. Traité I, pp.76–9. Clearly, the two preceding stanzas are variants of a well-known verse of the Kālavāda:
   Time ripens beings, time embraces creatures . . .
   Time watches for those who sleep, Time, in truth, is difficult to overcome.


343 The word breath (prāna), according to the Veda, designates physical life (since as long as there is breath, there is life), which is identical to the Ātman and Brahman as life and cosmic principle. Cf. Bhrādārāyaka Upanisad, 1, 5, 3; 3, 4, 2a; Chāndogya Up., 3, 13, 5, etc; J. Gonda, Les religions d’Inde (Védisme et Hindouisme anciens), p.241; L. Silburn, op. cit., 'le souffle vital et cosmique, principe de continuité', pp.106, 108.

344 Tds, 29c 5: tiṣyān 自然 . There is no commentary concerning this theory. However, due to the criticism of the commentator: 'If spontaneity produces (things), it no longer makes sense (它然若生非自然) — Tds, 29c 16), we may suppose that this is the theory maintaining that things are produced by the very initiative of agents, without the intervention of other conditions.

345 The theory of the absence of a cause (ahetudṛṣṭi) is one of the three false opinions criticised by the Buddha (cf. AN III, 61). It was the doctrine of Maskara Gohaliputra, a contemporary of the Buddha, who was also a fatalist (cf. DN I, 53). Jā, 237: If actions have no cause, then who would be responsible for wrongs? (akāma-karaṇīyasmin kāvibhā pāpaṇa līpatt?).

346 Tds, 29c 20–22: सर्वभव्वविद्विंद्र्मनस्तत्रिद्वियत्ति 'the theory of inherent nature (svabhāvadrṣṭi) says that all things are engendered by their own nature and not by other causes. Why? For example, a pointed spine is sharp, there does not exist (any other thing) which made it sharp. L. Silburn, op. cit., p.133: [1] 'For the Svabhāvavādins, things spring into existence without the intervention of an internal or external final cause such as actions performed previously by each or by divine will. Things evolve in a mechanical way, through their own nature: if the spines which I come up against are therefore sharp and if they are found on my path, it is their nature to prick: it is not in any way through divine decree, nor because of faults I might have committed'. Cf. ibid., pp.132–5: 'Svabhāva vāda'.

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III — The domain of liberation

Liberation (vimukti) is the elimination of the bad and the reaching of the other shore (pāra). This domain consists of:
1. Perception (samjñā) — the penetration of the truth;
2. Absorptive meditation (dhyāna), and
3. Erudition (bahuśrutatā) — knowledge in conformity with the teaching of the Buddha.

In brief, the comprehension and application of the three doctrinal points (trīdharma) are essential to the obtaining of liberation.

VI — THE ORIGINAL SCHOOL

By minutely examining the main thesis, the pudgala, and fourteen secondary theses of the Tds\(^2\), it can be concluded that it is a treatise of the Pudgalavādins, in general, and of the Vatsiputriyas in particular. It might be possible to attribute it to the Sāmmityas, but the former hypothesis is preferable for the following reasons:

I. Although very little is known about the Vatsiputriya schism, the majority of Orientalists agree in thinking that the Vatsiputriyas were those who provoked the first schism among the Sthaviras through their personalist doctrine (pudgalavāda), in about 200 EP, that is, 280 BCE, whilst the Sāmmitya school, one of the first derived from that of the Vatsiputriyas, appeared between the third century BCE and the first century CE, a more precise date not being possible. Moreover, the

347 Tds. 29c: 22–23: 偶者，言萬物偶生，如大水現源草墾中合在一處：The theory of chance says that all things arise by chance, just as blades of grass fall into the source of a large river, meet and accumulate. It is the opinion which maintains that the arrival of beings in the world has no objective nor subjective reason. In other words, the existence of life is undefined; consequently, man is not responsible for his actions. It might be wondered if this theory is the same as that criticised by the Buddhists in MN II. 222, under the title of ditthadhampakkamahetu. Monks, if living beings, by chance as a cause, receive pleasant or unpleasant feelings, then, monks, the Nigantas fall into the chance of the bad since, at present, they receive such painful, severe and sharp feelings (sace, bhikkhave, satī ditthadhampakkamahetu sukha dukkhaṁ partisamvedenti, addhā, bhikkhave, nigantha pūpadittadhampakkamā, yam etarāhi evarūpā dukkhaṁ lippā kutukā vedanaṁ vediyantī). The translation has been made by consulting Nī-khan ching. T I. 2b, 442b

348 Tds. 29c: 25–26: 見者，言宇宙中無所有，雲何生由何生何處生，此非有也有：Non-existentialism (nāstidrṣṭi) affirms that nothing exists in the world; birth, the cause of birth, and place of birth: these things never existed. MN I. 71: This world does not exist, neither does the other world (naṁ thi ayam tīkā, naṁ thi paralokā). Cf. DN I. 55; SN II. 26.

In AN II. 173, 175: III, 61–2, the Buddha grouped the doctrines of contemporary religious and philosophical schools into three theories: (1) The first admits that all happiness, suffering and neutral feelings are engendered by former actions (pubbe kāsaḥiv). (2) the second admits that everything is the creation of a Supreme God (issaranimmanabhūtā). (3) The third admits that everything is uncaused and unconditioned (ahaṁ apracāya). He rejected them since they lead to passivity and regression; those three theories do not lead to the good life, according to them the religious life is futile.

349 See below, Chapter Three.
main reason for the Sāmmitiya schism among the Vātsiputriyas, according to Vasumitra, was not the pudgala theory but the different explanations given by the four schools of the stanza common to the Pudgalavādin schools. Beyond this information from Vasumitra, it is not known what provoked the appearance of the Sāmmitiya school.

II. The lists of the fruits of the two schools — Vātsiputriyas and Sāmmitiyas — are totally different:

1. According to the Tds, 20b 18 - 21b 7, there are twenty-nine categories of Śrāvakas, whilst the Sns (472a 13-21), which does indeed belong to the Sāmmitiya school, notes only ten or twelve of them that are different from the stanza mentioned which provoked the Sāmmitiya schism. According to the commentary on the stanza, the four fruits of the Sāmmitiyas in the Sns correspond to six kinds of persons.

By comparing this list with the Vātsiputriya one of the Śrāvaka fruits, in the Tds, 20b 18 - 21b 7, the latter is more complicated and prolix.

In this connection, it can be stated that neither did the Tds belong to three other schools, namely, the Dharmottariya, Bhadrayānīya and Sannāgārika, because their list of the fruits, according to the interpretations of the stanza cited by K'uei-čhi, are totally different from that of the Vātsiputriyas.

III. Nearly all the theses found in the Tds correspond to those attributed to the Vātsiputriya school by the treatises, namely, the Mahāvibhāsāstra, Samayabhedopacānakakra, Abhidharmakosa, etc., and the Buddhist literature of Kashmir.

IV. The Tds does not mention the basic theses of the Sāmmitiya school:

1. The thesis treating the ontological problem, cited by Bhavya, the absence of a commentary to which does not permit the obscurity to be cleared.

2. The thesis of the existence of an indestructible thing (aviprunāśa), which plays an important role in the process of action and fruition, which is found

350 See above, Chapter One, 'The Vātsiputriya sub-schools: the Sāmmitiyas', and n.44.
351 Bareu, Sectes, p.33: [tr] 'We do not know who provoked their appearance (the appearance of the four schools: Sāmmitiyas, Bhadrayānīyas, Dharmottariyas and Sannāgārikas) and we know little of what differentiated them'.
352 See below, 'The Pudgalavādin lists of Śrāvakas'.
353 See previous note.
354 See above, Chapter One, 'The Vātsiputriya sub-schools: the Sāmmitiyas', and n.45.
355 See below, 'The Pudgalavādin lists of the Śrāvakas'.
357 Ibid., p.123: [tr] 'What should exist (bhava) and what exists (bhava), what should cease (nirodhaya) and what has ceased (niruddha), what should be born (janitavya) and what has been born (jata), what should die (maranīya) and what is dead (mrtā), what should be liberated (muktravya) and what is liberated (mukta), what should go (gantavya) and what goes (gāmin), what should be cognised (viṣheya) and consciousness (vijnāna) exist'.
in the Sns, 462a 13-16.

V. The Tds gives us details of the essential doctrinal points included in several theses concerning the whole of the Pudgalavādin doctrine, whilst the Sns attributed to the Sāṃmitīyas reveals only a few fundamental Pudgalavādin theses, namely: 1) the indestructible thing (pu-mie = avipraṇāśa), 2) the pudgala, 3) the intermediate existence (antarābhava), etc.

In brief, all the preceding information enables us to conclude that the Tds is a basic work of the Pudgalavādin mother school, that is, the Vātsiputriya school.

II. THE SSŪ A-HAN-MU CH’AO CHIEH

I — TITLE

SSū a-han-mu ch’ao chieh (Fragmentary commentary on the four Āgamas) is a work which has come down to us only in Chinese translation. It occupies fifteen pages of the Taishō edition, volume XXV, No.1505, pages 1b-15b. The title was probably given by Tao-an (312-285), who wrote the preface, in order to conform to Chinese tradition: the title of the book is always placed at the beginning of the text. The original title is certainly the 'Treatise on the Three Dharmas', the Chinese translations of which, found in the text, differ: San fo chieh t’uo tuu (the Treatise on the Three Dharmas) SSū, 7a 12; 8b 27) which can also be reconstructed as Tridharmakāśāstra. The existence of a new title can be explained as follows: Tao-an wished to emphasise the importance and essence of the work which, according to him, is a 'necklace of pearls' of the four Āgamas.

The SSū was assuredly based on the same text as the Tds since the contents of the former are similar to those of the latter.

II - THE AUTHOR, COMMENTATORS AND TRANSLATORS

a. The Author

The SSū was composed by the Arhat P’a-su-pa-t’o (SSū, 1b 5), the Sanskrit reconstruction of which, made by Orientalists, is Vasubhadra. Since there is no historical certainty concerning the author of the SSū, it is better to retain the Chinese translation Chin-hsien (SSū, 4a 12) as the name of the author. It is noteworthy that the Chinese translation of the name of the author of the Tds, translated by Sanghadeva, is Shan-hsien. Obviously, the author of the

358 See below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins, thesis No.1'.
359 E. Zürcher considers that the Sun fa tu lien 三法受決 belonged to the Sarvāstivādin school. Cf. Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest II, p.408, n.73.
360 Cf. the preface to SSū, 1a 2.
361 Cf. ibid., la 6, 10.
Ssū gives only the essential messages which are followed by headings written by the commentator. The most developed section could have been written later by the commentator, Sanghadeva.

b. The Commentators

Unlike the preface to the Tds written by Hui-yüan, that of the Ssū by Tao-an does not mention the name of the commentator, Sanghasena. Nonetheless, through the words ch'ao chieh (fragmentary commentary) included in the title and through the language forms, it is easy to recognize the existence of passages of commentaries and sub-commentaries in the text. It is possible that the commentary was written by Sanghasena. The comparison of similar passages in the Tds and Ssū admits of this supposition. The sentences of sub-commentaries were written by the collaborators of Kumārabuddhi in consultation with the latter. This section is very short and printed in small characters at the end of passages and obscure words. It was Kumārabuddhi who, on the invitation of Tao-an, translated this work from Sanskrit into Chinese in the eighth month of the eighteenth Chien-yüan year (382 CE). He completed the translation at the monastery of Yeh prefecture in Honan in the space of two months. Kumārabuddhi belonged to the royal family of Turfan and had come with his master to Chang-an in 382 CE. This is the only work that he translated. The rest of his history remains virtually unknown to us.

Unlike Gautama Saṅghadeva, who was extremely familiar with the Chinese language after his long journeys in China, Kumārabuddhi, whose knowledge of that language was unsure, undertook the translation in the same year that he arrived in Chang-an (383 CE). Furthermore, the preface written by Tao-an indicates that Kumārabuddhi translated the work from the Sanskrit text. Tao-an does not mention that he translated orally into Chinese, as did Hui-yüan in his preface to the Tds, by indicating Saṅghadeva's method of translating.

It was Fo-nien and Fo-hu who then translated the Chinese

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362 Cf. ibid., la 21-22.
363 Cf. ibid., la 15-20; 15b 27.
364 Cf. ibid., la 15.
365 Cf. the preface to Tds, 73a 22, 23.
366 Fo-nien 佛陀念 or Chu Fo-nien 佛念. A native of Liang-chou 涼洲, he left home in his youth. He learnt and recited the canonical texts and he knew perfectly the languages of various countries, since his family came from Hsi ho 西河. Having gained mastery of Sanskrit, he became a translator-intermediary and cooperated with Saṅghabhadra and Dharmadāḍin. He himself published the following texts:

1. Pu sa ying lo ching 納墮經 (Bodhisattvamāli), T XVI, 656.
2. Shih chu tuan chieh ching wen p'u sa shih chu ch'u kou tuan chieh ching 十位斷結經 或具勝問菩薩十位除垢斷結經 , T X, 309.
3. Chu yao ching 出曜經 (Dharmapada, Ucānavarga), T IV, 212.
4. Tai king or Pu sa ts'ung lou shu tien ching shen mu tai shuo kuang p'u ching 胎經 or
Ssū after having understood the Sanskrit text explained by Kumārabuddhi. It is probable that these two important collaborators knew Sanskrit partially. The other collaborators, such as Sēng-tao, Tan-chiu, and Sēng-jui were transcribers.

III - THE DATE

We have no information concerning the date of the Ssū. Since the identity of the Ssū and the Tds is recognised, we should have two dates for the Ssū: one for the original text which must have been composed between the beginning of the third century BCE and the third century CE. The other, for the commentary which should date to the first half of the fourth century CE. The date of the sub-commentary is the same as that of the translation, 382 CE.

IV - THE LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION

a. The Language

Apparently the Ssū was in Sanskrit, as is indicated at the end of the text: 'The Sanskrit text consists of forty-six folios, each folio containing twenty-eight slokas'. This information is confirmed by the preface to the Ssū written by Tao-an: 'Kumārabuddhi took (the text) in Sanskrit in his hands'. Nonetheless, we cannot be sure that the treatise was in pure Sanskrit since it is certain that, at that time, the word fan for the Chinese, meant any language used in Buddhist books originating from eastern countries. A. Bareau's idea concerning the language of the Tds, namely that it was probably compiled in highly hybrid Sanskrit or Prakrit, can equally well be applied to this text.

b. The Translation

The translation of the Ssū was directed by Tao-an, who asked the translators to render it literally from Sanskrit into the Ch'in language (Chinese), that is to say, only a verbatim translation was made, whilst the style and substance of the text was preserved as much as possible.

If we compare this translation to that by Gautama Saṅghadeva, we see that it is

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Cf. ibid., 1a 15.
366 Cf. ibid., 1a 15, 16.
367 Cf. the preface to Ssū, 1a 15.
368 See above, n.125. Note 6 of the preface to Ssū (1a 15) reinforces the idea that the Ssū was probably written in the hu 仿 language rather than fan 般. The word hu 胡 has a very general meaning and designates all foreign languages west of China.
371 The preface to Ssū, 1a 19-21.

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and

**THESIS II** — 'Merit (puṇya) increases continually even during sleep'.

These two theses are explained in the same passage in *Sūtra, 1a 26 - 2a 6*:

'Morality (śīla) consists of actions of body (kāya) and speech (vāc) in relation to the life of others\(^{378}\), what is not the life of others, and the increase (of merit)\(^{379}\) (Sūtra).

Morality designates the three elements which are associated with the body and speech and which arise together.

**Question:** What does that mean? **Answer:** (With regard to morality concerning) the life of others, what is not the life of others and the increase (of merit, morality concerning) the life of others indicates the fact that, being hungry and weak, knowing ourselves, we do not harm the life of others; living beings, if they know themselves, do not harm (other) living beings. (Sub-commentary: this is not killing). It is the same for not taking (with a defiled mind) the possessions and women of others.

(Sub-commentary: hence, whatever is said about life (shou)\(^{378}\), it should be understood that it also encompasses all that is not life; outside body and speech, everything is what is not life)\(^{380}\). This is (respecting) what is not the life of others (?). Falsehood (mrśāvāda), slander (paśuṇyāvāda), harmful speech (pārusyāvāda) and frivolous speech (sambhiṇnapralāpa) constitute the fact of not being interested in the life of others. If the seven factors\(^{381}\) do not harm others, power is used to help the poor by thinking that we ourselves and others are the same (?).

Merit increases continually if one makes the following resolve: 'Henceforth, I shall abstain from killing living beings'. During that time, (merit) increases abundantly, just as invested capital yields interest. Merit grows in the element of consciousness\(^{382}\) just as seeds, once sown, produce stalks and leaves and grow until they bear fruit. It is the same for (merit) which continues to grow abundantly even during sleep. That is why the increase (of merit) is morality. (Sub-commentary: (merit) is not lost (even) during sleep).

The explanations concerning these two theses are quite clear in both texts, *Sūtra,*

\(^{378}\) *Sūtra,* 1c 26 "a shou 他受; the term is unclear. In this context, we can suppose it means the 'life of others' since the word shou 他 (upādāna ?) also means life.

\(^{379}\) The word haai 禮 (*Sūtra,* 1c 26) is meaningless in this context. After consulting the phrase 'a shou t'а pu shou tséng 他受他不受增 (*Sūtra,* 1c 27–28) and the word tséng 增 in the Tds, loc 3, we propose the translation given here.

\(^{380}\) The phrase chih fen shen ch'ou pu yeh 直分身口不受也 (*Sūtra,* 2a 1) is far from clear.

\(^{381}\) These are the three good bodily actions (kāyākarma), namely: 1) not killing living beings (prāṇaṭīrṇāvārātrimi); 2) not stealing (adattādānāvārī); 3) not indulging in sensual misconduct (kāmānītyācāra-vārāti); and the four good vocal actions, namely: 1) not lying (mrśāvādāpāvatāvārī); 2) not slandering (paśuṇyāpāvātāvārī;); 3) not using harmful words (pāruruṣyāpāvātāvārī); 4) not speaking frivolously (sambhiṇnaprājāpāvātāvārī).

\(^{382}\) *Sūtra,* 2a 4–5. *shen sheng ch'ieh shou 善生受 覆; this expression is not clear. However, in this context, we can propose the following translation: 'possessions grow in the element of consciousness'. The word ch'ieh 覦 means consciousness in this translation as in other old translations.
1c 26 - 2a 6, and Tds, 16b 3-13, with the exception of the following sentence in Sśū, 2a 4-5: 'Merit) grows in the element of consciousness, just as seeds, once sown, stalks and leaves grow until they bear fruit'. In Tds, 16b 11-12, the word ‘consciousness’ (chīeh ) is missing from the phrase: ‘When the resolve to observe morality is taken, the element of the good develops continually, just as, in a rotten fruit, the seed begins to germinate and grow.

Thus, the two translations do not have the same meaning. On the other hand, the sub-commentary of the Sśū, 2a 6, also states the meaning of the second thesis: ‘Merit) is not lost even during sleep’.

**THESIS III** — ‘The adjoining concentration (upacāra-
samādhi ?) consists of patience (ksānti) name (nāma) and perception (samjñā).

This thesis is explained in Sśū, 4a 2-12:

‘The adjoining concentration (chin sh'ān æ , upacārāsamādhi ?) is adjoining meditation which includes patience (ksānti), name (nāma)383, perception (hsiang æ , samjñā) (Sūtra).

That is why it (is called) adjoining concentration, (which adjoins) liberation, as was said earlier.

**Question:** If they have already been defined, why are the absorptions (dhyāna) explained here?

**Answer:** The earlier ones were worldly, (whilst if) one practises here, one will surely obtain a liberation which is the supreme liberation.

It is in this adjoining concentration that one obtains (clear comprehension) of the four Noble Truths (āryasatya). It is like a man who, having crossed a desert, finds a park, dwellings, fruit trees, flowers and fruit, and thinks that he will certainly not suffer any longer from hunger since he is so close to such an accumulation. Being tormented by craving (rāga), anger (æ, krodha ?) and delusion (moha), he is guided in meditation by a good friend (kalyāṇamitra). He assiduously practises the contemplation of the impermanence (anityaā), insubstantiality (anātmaka) and suffering (dukkha) of the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātu) and domains (āyatana). If he practises it with delight, that increases patience (ksānti). (When he) reinforces the meditation and becomes unshakeable (aneñjā), that is the name (nāma). When clear comprehension of suffering (dukkhābhisaṃaya ?)384 is as lucid as in a dream in which one sees pleasant images, that is an increase of perception (samjñā). The supreme worldly dharma (laukikāgradharma) is perception of the Blessed Lord. In the practice of that concentration, (if one attains) enlightenment, comprehension and joy, that is

383 The word wu 無 (Sśū, 4a 2) has no meaning here. Consulting Tds, 18b 7, we take from it the word ming 名 and translate as ‘name’ (nāma).

384 Sśū, 4a 10: ku shīh 知時. This is probably a mistranslation of the Sanskrit term dukkhābhisaṃaya. Consequently, the translation 'true comprehension of suffering' is a correction based on Tds, 18b 16: ku kuan hsiang 知概想.
clear comprehension of the Noble Truths (āryasyatābhīsastamaya)\textsuperscript{385}.

The formulation of this thesis and the examples which illustrate it in Sū, 4a 2-12, are as clear as those in Tds, 18b 9-18. However, the preceding paragraph does not contain elements which are found in the same paragraph of the Tds, such as: 'In concentration, one progressively examines the truth (satya)' (Tds, 18b 10), and 'It resembles, because of its successive levels, (the state one is found in) when coming out of a dream . . .; (Tds, 18b 17-18). Consequently, the Sū lacks a thesis in the Tds: 'Clear comprehension of the Noble Truths (āryasyatābhīsastamaya)' (Sū, 4a 11-12). Is this a shortening of the original text or an error of translation?

**THESIS IV** - There are five things subject to being known, the first three of which are compounded things (samskṛta); the fourth, the pudgala, which is neither identical to nor different from compounded things; and the fifth, Nirvāṇa, which is devoid of causes and conditions (ahetupratyaya).

This thesis is explained in Sū, 4c 20-25:

'That means the absence of attachment to the three (time-periods): the present (pratyutpanna)\textsuperscript{386}, the past (aitta) and the future (anāgata). These are all compounded things (samskṛta), as it is said in the 'Discourse on the Place of Teaching' (shuo-chu hsiu-tu-lu, Deśanāstānasūtra) and the 'Discourse on the Past' (kuo-chü hsiu-tu-lu, Atītasūtra). Are consciousness, the pudgala and Nirvāṇa included in the three (time-periods)? Are those three things identical (to the three time-periods) or different (from them)? The Nirvāṇa of relinquishing the body is devoid of causes and conditions (ahetupratyaya). When consciousness, in the present, ceases all reflection, that is the infinite consciousness, in the present, of Nirvāṇa\textsuperscript{387}. (As for the) pudgala, 'whether it is different (from the three time-periods) or not', is impossible to say'.

The contents of the preceding paragraph are quite similar to that in Tds, 19a 22-26. It is noteworthy that Kumārabuddhi, in Sū 4c 22, translates the Sanskrit word pudgala by 'our body' (chi shên 身), whilst Sanghadeva, in Tds, translates it as 'self' (我) (Tds, 19a 23). The interpretation thus given of the word pudgala in the Sū is as clear as that in the Tds. The Sū, 4c 24-25 writes: 'Whether the pudgala is different (from the three time-periods) or not, is impossible to say'. While the Tds,
19a 26 explains this idea in the following way: 'Whether the *pudgala* is separate from the three time-periods or not, is impossible to say\(^{388}\).

**THESIS V** — 'There are twelve knowledges (*jñāna*) in the path of vision (*darśanamārga*).

This thesis is explained in *Sūtra*, 5a 9-22:

'The path of vision consists of knowledge of things (*ta chih* \(\neq\) \(\neq\), *dharma*jñāna), knowledge of investigation (*kuan chih* \(\neq\) \(\neq\), *vīcārajñāna* ?) and knowledge of what is not yet known (*wei chih chih* \(\neq\) \(\neq\), *ājñatajñāna* ?) (*Sūtra*).

These three knowledges constitute knowledges of the stage of vision (*darśana-bhūmi*). With regard to the meaning of the knowledge of things and knowledge of investigation, it is comparable to a surgeon who discovers an abscess at its outset and as it develops, and who opens it with a lancet. With his fingers he probes the direction of the vessels in order not to harm them. It is only after that that he opens it fully. It is the same for the practitioner who makes use of correct reflection\(^{389}\) on suffering (*duhkhatā*), impermanence (*anityatā*) etc.

By practising (correct reflection on) impermanence (*anityatā*), he enters (the stage of) vision (*darśana-bhūmi*); his sufferings cease, his fetters are abandoned: 'Through those two knowledges, are the fetters broken or not broken?'. So reflects the practitioner (this expression applies to the knowledge of what is not yet known').

'Since the world of desire (*kāmadhātu*) is subject to impermanence (*anityatā*), it is the same for the world of subtle form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless world (*ārūpyadhātu*). Having gained this knowledge from reflection, one abandons the fetters pertaining to the world of subtle form and the formless world.

'Hence, the attainment of correct reflection on suffering in the domain of suffering constitutes knowledge of investigation (*vīcārajñāna*) and knowledge of what is not yet known (*ājñatajñāna*) relating to the world of subtle form and the formless world. Similarly, there are three knowledges relating to the origin (*samudaya*) of suffering. The attainment of correct reflection and the cessation (of suffering)\(^{390}\) is knowledge of things (*dharma*jñāna*). The cessation (of the origin) is (also) knowledge of investigation. When the fetters are abandoned\(^{391}\) that is knowledge of things; partial liberation is knowledge of investigation. It is the same for the knowledge of what is not yet known relating to the world of subtle form and the formless world'.

'It is the same for the three knowledges relating to cessation (*nirodha*) and the Path (*mārga*). The attainment of correct reflection and the cessation of suffering constitute the knowledge of things (*dharma*jñāna*); and also the knowledge of investigation (*vīcārajñāna* ?). It is likewise for the knowledge of what is not yet

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\(^{388}\) See below, 'The main thesis of the *Pudgala*.

\(^{389}\) It is certain that Kumāra-buddhi mistranslated the Sanskrit word *yoniskomancśāra*. Saṅghadeva translated it as *chēng sê-wei* 正思惟 (*Tds*, 19b 18, 19).

\(^{390}\) *Sūtra*, 5a 18 *yín hsing li mie hsi* 始行利滅息. The Chinese translation is completely word for word, hence the need for modification.

\(^{391}\) *chēng* 正 (*Sūtra*, 5a 19) is a mistake for *chih* 止.
known relating to the world of subtle form and the formless world\textsuperscript{392}.

'It is the same for the three knowledges relating to the Path (mārga).

Such are the twelve knowledges which should be understood in detail. Each of the four Truths relates to three (knowledges). That makes twelve (knowledges).

On the whole, the explanation of this thesis, both in the doctrinal elements and literary expression, is similar in the two treatises. We can note that Kumārabuddhi mechanically mistranslated the doctrinal term, the original Sanskrit of which is yanisomanaskāra (lit. reflection which goes to the source), by 'practice of lust' or 'giving way to lust' (yin hsing \textsuperscript{393} \textsuperscript{393} ) (Śū, 5a 13, 16, 18), whilst Saṅghadeva rightly translated it as 'correct reflection' (chēng sē-wei \textsuperscript{393} \textsuperscript{393} ) (Tds, 19b 18, 19). The first translation is incorrect both from the philological and doctrinal point of view.

\textit{THESIS VI} — 'It is impossible to say that the pudgala (= living being, sattva) and Nirvāṇa are different from the characteristics (laksana) or that they are identical to them'.

This thesis is explained in Śū, 5a 25 - 5b 2:

'(Is it) not said, furthermore, that the Living Being (sattva = pudgala) and Nirvāṇa are classed among the characteristics (laksana)? If it is said that the Living Being and Nirvāṇa are (characteristics), that is a great mistake, (since) they are impermanent (anitya). If it is not said, the mistake lies in the Sūtra. It should be said that the characteristics of compounded things (samskṛtalaksana) include arising (upāda), enduring (sthi), and disappearance (vyaya). In the increase of merit (punya), which is the merit of the characteristics of the person (pudgala)? Whether the pudgala is different or is not different (from the characteristics), is impossible to say. If it is different from them, it is permanent (nitya). If it does not differ from them, it is impermanent (anitya). Hence, those two theses are wrong. It is not said that Nirvāṇa is the absence of characteristics\textsuperscript{393}. That is why one is happy to say more about the characteristics of compounded things (samskṛtalaksana) as such. That is what is called the increase of merit. What are the merits of the characteristics? We must speak of knowledge (jñāna).

On the whole, despite everything, the explanation in the Śū, is less clear and rhythmic than that in the Tds, but there are no fundamental differences between the two treatises in respect of the doctrinal points.

\textit{THESIS VII} — 'The five superknowledges (abhijñā) can be obtained by worldlings (prthajjana).

This thesis is explained in Śū, 5c 11-12:

'... Flying, supernormal hearing and the knowledge of other's intentions

\textsuperscript{392} A proposition is obviously missing before the two words shik tao是道
\textsuperscript{393} See below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins, thesis No.10'.
(paracittajñāna ?) constitute the superknowledges, (which, with the knowledge of the recollection) of former lives (pūrvanivesānusmṛtijñāna ?) and knowledge of births and cessations, are the five superknowledges of worldlings (prthagjanābhiṣijñā).

With the exception of minor literary differences in the two translations, there is nothing to remark.

**THESIS VIII** — 'The intermediate existence (antarābhava) and Parinirvāṇa in the intermediate existence (antarāparinirvāṇa) exist in the world of desire and in the world of subtle form, but they do not exist in the formless world'.

This thesis is explained in Sū, 6a 27-28:

'Liberation in the world of desire and liberation in the world of subtle form, (due to) these two (liberations), all Parinirvānas in the intermediate existence (antarāparinirvāṇa) are abandoned'.

On comparing the two texts, we find the main point of the thesis is the same. However, the doctrinal elements which constitute it in the Sū are richer than those found in the Tds. Since, apart from the element of the intermediate existence, the Sū also mentions another element, namely, Parinirvāṇa in the intermediate existence (antarāparinirvāṇa). The Sū, 6a 27-28 states: '... Due to these two (liberations), all Parinirvānas in the intermediate existence are abandoned', whilst the Tds, 20c 10-12, recognises only the intermediate existence, which is defined as follows:

'Being delivered from the world of desire and the world of subtle form, one completely abandons the intermediate existence; there is no intermediate existence in the formless world'.

**THESIS IX** — 'The Arhat is susceptible to regression'

This thesis is explained in Sū, 6c 12-16:

'The weak faculty (mrddvindriya) includes him who regresses (pariññadharma) ...' (Sūtra).

'... Because of the diminution of thought which is called he who regresses. Regression does not mean falling among living beings (etc. sattva)\(^394\), (but) falling to the stage of cultivation (bhavānābhūmi). Cultivation (bhavāna) means regular practice. It is the same with paragraphs (of discourses) which one forgets through not reciting. (Equally), if one does not practise cultivation, one regresses. Regression (is

\(^394\) Sū, 6c 14: chien fa pu chung sheng chien. 滅法不至生滅. Regression does not mean falling among living beings. This translation is made in consultation with the following phrase from the text: fên pieh ti chien 分別地滅 : falling to the stage of cultivation — Kumārabuddhi translated fên pieh ti 分別地 from the word bhavānābhūmi, whilst Seihgeeva translated it as hsiu ti 修地. The interpretation, according to the Sū, is that when the Arhat falls from anākṣa to joikṣa, he remains in the stage of cultivation — the fruits of sakṛdgaṁiṇ and anāgāmin, and does not fall to the lower states of living beings.
caused by) suffering, business, arguments, long journeys and walking. Those are the five things which cause regression. They are also (the causes susceptible) to leading to falling to the stage of cultivation.

On comparing the translation of the Sst with that of the Tds, we see that there is a notable difference from the doctrinal point of view. With regard to the regression of the Arhat pertaining to the 'he who regresses' category, the Sst, 6a 14, says: 'Regression does not mean falling among living beings (satva), it is falling to the stage of cultivation', whilst the Tds, 21a 25-26, says: 'He who regresses is he who falls either to a lower state, (but) not (from comprehension of) the Noble Truths\textsuperscript{395}, or to the stage of cultivation (bhavanâbhûmi). The difference in the two texts is that the Sst admits that the Arhat does not fall among living beings whilst the Tds maintains that the Arhat falls to a lower state, apart (from comprehension of) the Noble Truths (satyâbhisamaya). Nonetheless, both texts have a point in common: falling to the stage of cultivation. It might be asked whether there is some difference in interpretation between the two texts in relation to the theory of the Arhat's regression.

THEESIS X — 'There is an ineffable (avaktavya), indicating:

a) the designation of appropriation (upâdânaprajñâpiti), the pudgala, which is both identical to and different from the elements;

b) the designation of means (upâyaprajñâpiti) associated with the past, present and future; and,

c) the designation of cessation (nirodhaprajñâpiti) concerning Parinirvâna'.

This thesis is explained in Sst, 10a 4-29:

'The ineffable (avaktavya) includes the designation of appropriation (shou chieh-shou 起故, upâdânaprajñâpiti), the designation of means (fang-pien chieh-shou 方便故, upâyaprajñâpiti ?) and the designation of cessation (mieh chieh-shou 起故, nirodhaprajñâpiti)' (Sûtra).

'If one ignores these three designations, that is non-comprehension of the ineffable. The designation of appropriation is the designation of life (jîva). (Subcommentary: as a phoneme from India the word [meaning] life and [that meaning] living being are the same). (Life is) internal appropriation (upâdâna) in the present and consists of the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhâtu) and domains (âyatana) (?).
That is to say, the objects of appropriation concerning internal life in the present (?), which is formed by compounded things (samskāra) and fetters (sayyojana); that is what is called the designation of appropriation (?); it does not pertain to either the past or the future.

'(With regard to) the designation of appropriation in relation to life (jīva = sattva = padgala), it is not identical to (the body; that) cannot be confirmed (?). If life and the body are identical, (life is) impermanent (anitya) and suffering (duhkha). If life is not different, it is eternal (sāśvara) and (not) suffering. If (life is) eternal, the pure life (brahmacārīya) is not practised. In eternity, it is not necessary to lead a pure life; the harvesting of fruit, receiving and giving have no meaning. (If life is) impermanent, neither would that make any sense. Since in both cases 398, either eternalism 397, or annihilation 399, neither suffering nor happiness exist. (Sub-commentary: the master is explaining [this idea] by saying that this is the answer of the Buddha whose aim is to satisfy sectaries so that they obtain this or that) 399.

'The designation of means signifies designation based on the past (attta), future (anāgata) and present (pratyāpanna). It is associated with the three time-periods. As (the Buddha said): 'In the past, I was King Sunetra 400. (Sub-commentary: The Sanskrit Sunetra corresponds to ten names: goat, eye, earth, sky, water, speech, direction, light, scissors, reality. These are ten comparisons. That man does not understand that he belongs to some [thing] in the ten births). In the future, there will be (a man) who will be named Ajita 401. In the present period, it is Gautama Siddhārtha 402. Compounded things (. . .) is appropriation (upādāna) in the future, (and) appropriation in the past. By

396 Srā, 10a 11: jang pien 方使 (upāya, prayoga), which means 'the means' or 'preparatory exercise', is not indicated here; that is why the modification in meaning is necessary.
397 Srā, 10a 11: pien tuan 诬断 ; in this context, these words should be translated as 'eternalism and annihilation'.
398 See previous note.
399 It is probable that Kumārabuddhi is referring to the attitude of the Buddha who remained silent when Vacchagotta asked him questions about the existence or non-existence of the self (ātman); cf. SN IV, 400 sq.; Udāna, 67. See below, 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavādins'.
400 Srā, 10a 14: Ch'ü iien wāng 新聊 (新聊). These characters cannot be reconstructed in Sanskrit. It may be that they are a wrong transcription of the name of a king — Sunetra, who appears in several works concerning the former lives of the Buddha. Cf. Kośa IX, §§ 271, 272, and the long note on Sunetra in Traité I, pp.319-21.
401 Srā, 10a 16: wu shēng 无勝 ; these characters can be reconstructed in Sanskrit as Ajīva, another name of Maitreyya, the future Buddha, as the Buddha predicted: 'At the time, monks, when humans will live to the age of eighty thousand years, there will appear in the world the Perfect One, the Fully Enlightened One, the Blessed One named Maitreyya . . . ( . . . just as I appeared in the present, Perfect, Fully Enlightened . . . ) . . . That man, through his superior knowledge, will understand and make known this world with its devas, Māras, Brahmās, this world with its monks and brahmans, with its devas and humans, just as I at present I, through my superior knowledge, have understood and made them known. He will teach the Dhamma, he will proclaim the pure life (brahmacārīya), lovely in the beginning, lovely in the middle, lovely at the end, with its aim and its meaning, full and realisable in an absolutely pure way, as I do at present. He will lead a community of several thousand monks, just as I at present head a community of several thousand monks' (D III, 76).
402 Srā, 10a 16: kung shih ta 工師達, these characters are probably a mistransliteration of the Sanskrit words Gautama Siddhārtha, the name of the Buddha.
convention, this designation (is established) in order to (cure opinions) on annihilation (*uccheda*) and eternity (*śāsvata*). If (King) Sunetra had been annihilated, how would I exist (now)? If he had not been, how could I exist? Based on conventional truth (*samvrtisatyā*), this designation of means is spoken of:

**Question:** What does the designation of cessation mean?

**Answer:** ‘It is the designation of cessation in which appropriation is exhausted and where nothing further is appropriated’ (Sātra).

‘Appropriation has been explained above. That appropriation is exhausted: nothing further is appropriated, no other (life) is assumed; having ceased, nothing further remains, the other shore has been reached; that is the designation of cessation (by means of which false) views of annihilation and eternity are cured. Hence, it is certainly nothing but the synonym of the designation of *Parinirvāṇa* (?) which is also the ineffable (*avaktavya*). If (the ineffable) is different (from the body), there is no *Parinirvāṇa*. If it is not different, there is equally no *Parinirvāṇa*. Hence, having understood the suffering of birth and the ineffable (*avaktavya*), one inevitably attains *Parinirvāṇa* which is like a lamp which goes out. Internal appropriation undergoes no further suffering.

The designation of means (*upāyaprajñāpatti*) concerns the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātu) and domains (*āyatana*) of the past; as the Buddha said above: ‘I was King Sunetra’. It is the same for (the designation of means, of the future). ‘The designation of cessation signifies, in the first place, the cessation of appropriation (*upādāṇa*) (as when it is said): ‘The Blessed Lord attains *Parinirvāṇa*’. The designation of means (teaches us) that life (*jīva*) is not annihilated. The designation of cessation (teaches us) that life is (both) continuous and changed. The designation of appropriation eliminates the opinion according to which life exists or does not exist.

Amongst the three designations of the ineffable (*avaktavya*), what is written on the designation of appropriation and the designation of cessation in the *Sū* is no different from what is said in *Tds*, 24b 2-3, 4-5. Only, the designation of means has a very particular import, since it signifies the designation not only associated with the past, but also with the present and future (*Sū*, 10a 12-19); this designation expresses the continuity of life (*jīva*) or of the Living Being (*sattva*) in relation to the three time-periods, whilst the *Tds*, 24a 29 and 24b 1 sq., speaks of the designation of the past (*atitaprajñāpatti* ?) which only presents the link between the past and the present.

**THESIS XI — ‘Only one absolute truth exists: *Nirvāṇa*’**

This thesis is explained in *Sū*, 10 e 9-10:

‘Conventional truth (*samvrtisatyā*), characteristic truth (*laksanasya* ?) and

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403 These phrases are obscure. The translation is based on the three designations of *pudgala*. Cf. *Sū*, 10a 17-19.

404 *Sū*, 10a 24-26: 如是見生死已不說已，應般涅槃如燈滅，內受一苦若不苦受

The propositions should be modified in order to have the meaning conform to the text.

405 See below, ‘The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins: thesis No.8’.
reasoning. (The stage) which eliminates reasoning (is the stage) devoid of reasoning. (The stage devoid of) joy (prīti) is the same (?). Hence, by classing it with the absorptions (dhyāna); (the stage) endowed with reasoning is the first (absorption), the stage devoid of investigation is the second one, (the stage) devoid of reasoning (but endowed with investigation) is placed between the first and second (absorptions)\[408\]. (If one) practises those absorptions, one is reborn in the world of subtle form'.

Generally speaking, the doctrinal elements of this thesis are similar in the two texts. However, the translation, or rather the doctrinal terms of both texts are not identical. For example, the Ssū uses the expression 'endowed with thought' (chih ni en ə 9) to indicate the stage which consists of the three other levels, namely:

- the level endowed with reasoning (savārāka),
- the level devoid of reasoning (avārāka) and
- the level endowed (only) with investigation (savīcāra),

whilst Tds, 28b 23, uses the term 'endowed with joy' (yu hsi ə 9, prīti) to indicate them. The latter is more precise than the former. Nonetheless, further on at Ssū, 14a 8, there is the term 'happiness', or rather 'joy' (lo ə 9) which perhaps indicates the joy (prīti) which characterises the three stages mentioned and which is often found in the canonical texts.

VI — THE ORIGINAL SCHOOL

Because the Ssū contains nearly all the doctrinal points — especially the theses of the Vātsiputriyas or Pudgalavādins — contained in the Tds, and because the Tds, through its indications, is attributed to the Vātsiputriya school, it is permissible to believe that the Ssū is equally a Vātsiputriya work.

III. THE SAN-MI-TI PU LUN

I — THE TITLE

San-mi-ti pu lun 三密成無 9 9 , the Sanskrit equivalent of which is Sāmmiśyānikāyaśāstra (abbrev. Sns — The Treatise of the Sāmmiśyā School, found in Taishō, volume XXXII, No.1649, pp.462a - 473a). This new title, very general in meaning, scarcely conveys the particular contents of the treatise which has another name, given at the end of the text, i-shuo lun 依著 9 9 (Sns, 473a 14), and which corresponds to the Sanskrit Āśraya-praśnaptisāstra. This designation probably concerns the contents of the work, the largest part of which attempts to explain the theory of the pudgala as a designated person.

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\[408\] Modifications and additions in the translation are needed in order to make the meaning conform to the doctrine concerning the absorptions, particularly the intermediate absorption (dhyānāntara) which comes between the first and second absorptions.
II — THE AUTHOR AND TRANSLATOR

In the Chinese translation, we find no trace of the names of the author and translator of the treatise. It seems this silence over the name of the author of a literary work was very common in India in early times. In some cases, the author was either a well-known personality whose name it was unnecessary to indicate, or a person advanced on the Path whose humility prevented him from quoting his name in a description of the Noble Truths. Another possibility cannot be excluded: this is that the treatise was a joint composition, compiled by several persons — masters or co-disciples — belonging to the same — Sāmittiya — school after studies and discussions which lasted for a long time. In consequence, the completed book was considered as a joint work and could not be attributed to a particular person.

The absence of the name of the translator in this treatise is equally a fact quite often noted in Chinese Buddhist translations.

III — THE DATE

The date of composition of the Sns is not indicated in the treatise. However, it is evident that it was composed after the schism which separated the Sāmittiyas from the Vātsiputriyas, possibly at the beginning of the Common Era. Since place-names, Pañccha-Mathura, Mathura, are found in the text (Sns, 471a 1) in connection with an illustration of the doctrine, it might be asked whether this treatise was written in that area of India. Furthermore, the Sns was probably composed after the Tridharmakaśstra, as arguments in defence of the pudgala doctrine are more profound and detailed in the Sns than in the Tds. Moreover, the supposed date of the Chinese translation, in the period of the Western Chin (Hsi Ch'in, 385-431 CE) dynasty, informs us that the Sns must have been composed in the very early years of the fifth century, and possibly even some time before.

VI — THE TRANSLATION

The author of the K'ai-yüan shih-chiao lun (T LV, 2059, 518c - 621b) supposes that this translation was made under the Ch'in dynasty (265-313 CE). Until now, we have found no proof of this date. However, it seems certain that this translation belonged to the early period of the history of the translation of Buddhist texts in China, because the technical terms are similar to those of translations from the same period, for example: yin (skandha, 462b 4); tung (vedanā, 463a 2), sheng yin (upādānakandha, 464a 24), etc. In any case, it is certain that this translation was made before the time of Hsüan-tsang (602-664).

With regard to the language of the original Sns text, it appears to have been in Prākrit or Āpabhramśa rather than Sanskrit or hybrid Sanskrit. In fact, the expression and syntax in this work differ from those of the other treatises.

The translation is somewhat obscure. Furthermore, the join between phrases and

409 This date is deduced from the contents of the work, in which are found extracts from the Buddha's discourses, and doctrinal divergencies of the schools.
propositions is found with difficulty because the necessary propositions are missing. Chih-hsü criticised it: 'The style has little continuity'.

V — THE CONTENTS

Whilst the Tds and Ssu describe all the doctrinal elements which encompass the specific theses of the Vatsiputriya school, the Sns, in contrast, deals only with theses characteristic of the Sāṃśkritiya school, namely: the indestructible thing (avipraṇāśa ?), the pudgala, the intermediate existence (antarābhava), etc., which formerly caused strong controversy.

The Sns occupies more than ten pages of the Taishō edition and consists of three fascicles which do not correspond to any discernible logical division. That is why we can divide the text into four parts according to the subjects.

FIRST PART

The first part (462a 6 - 466a 27) deals with major subjects such as the thesis of the indestructible (avipraṇāśa ?), the seven opinions concerning the person and its relationship with the aggregates (skandha), and the Sāṃśkritiya position in relation to these seven opinions.

I — The introduction and thesis of the indestructible (avipraṇāśa ?)

The treatise begins with an introduction (462a 6 - b 5) explaining the existence of a thing (dharma), called 'the increase' (śṛṅgā, upacaya) or 'the indestructible' (pu-miek = avipraṇāśa ?). This is the thing which preserves actions (karma) by means of which results are produced in future existences; the intermediate existences (antarābhava) of the holy ones (ārya) can notably be explained in this way.

II — The seven adverse opinions

After the introduction, the Sns (462b 6 - 464a 15) presents seven contradictory opinions concerning the person, its nature identical with or different from the aggregates (skandha) and its permanence or impermanence. It is noteworthy that all these opinions are based on the words of the Buddha contained in the Sūtras. Here are these seven differing opinions:

1. There is no person, since:
   a. only aggregates (skandha) and domains (ayatana) exist, and only suffering (duhkha) exists; but no person that suffers exists;

410 Chih-hsü 释智旭Yueh tsang chih chia 闻藏智旭，op. cit., vol.IV. p89 久不甚聯絡.
411 The translation sometimes mentions the word jen , and sometimes wo 我. In order to facilitate the distinction from the word self, translated from the Sanskrit ātman, the meaning of which is totally heretical in Buddhism, we always translate by person (pudgala) the words jen, wo 我 which, in this text, indicates a designated individual (pudgala) rather than that of an absolute self (ātman).
412 See below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins, thesis No.1.'
413 The same idea is found in SN 1, 135.

There is only suffering which appears.

101
b. the person does not exist\textsuperscript{414};

c. only the ignorant consider the body as the person;

d. the reality of the person and what pertains to it is not proved;

e. the person is unreal.

2. \textit{It is impossible to say that the person exists or does not exist, since:}

a. the character of the person cannot be defined in relation to compounded things (\textit{samskṛta}) and the uncompounded (\textit{asam skṛta})\textsuperscript{415};

b. the existence or non-existence of the person is a question which the Buddha avoided (\textit{avyākṛta})\textsuperscript{416};

c. the fact of the indetermination of the person with regard to compounded things (\textit{sam skṛta}) and the uncompounded (\textit{asam skṛta});

d. the confusion between permanence (\textit{nirya}) and impermanence (\textit{anirya});

e. the fact of not pertaining to existence, nor to non-existence\textsuperscript{417}.

3. \textit{The person really exists, since:}

a. it is the person bound to the five aggregates who wanders from one life to another;

b. it is because the vision of the person is right view (\textit{samyaṇḍrṣṭi}) just as the vision of spontaneously born beings (\textit{aupapātika}) is right view\textsuperscript{418};

c. the teaching on the four applications of mindfulness (\textit{smṛtyupasthāna}) indicates that there is a person who contemplates the body (\textit{kāya}), feelings

\texttt{that suffering remains and disappears}

\texttt{This is no other thing, only suffering which appears.}

\texttt{When it ceases, there is no further thing.}

\texttt{(dukkhaṃ upa hi sambhoti / dakkhaṃ tiṣṭhīta vetti ca / nānātra dakkha sambhoti / nānānaṃ dakkha

\texttt{niryaṭhati iti), Vism XVI, 90: dakkhaṃ upa hi, na koci dakkhaio}.

\textsuperscript{414} This refutation of the existence of the self is based on arguments which are often found in the canonical texts, for example: the Chañchakasutta (MN, No.148/III, 280–7); Natamhiṃkasutta (SN XXII, 33/III, 33–4).

\textsuperscript{415} It seems this position is similar to that of the \textit{pudgala} thesis. However, it is refuted by the Pudgalavādins themselves, as it does not affirm the existence of the person, while the Pudgalavādins admit it. See below, 'The Sāṁmāṇḍya position in relation to the seven opinions'.

\textsuperscript{416} On the questions to be rejected, see above, 'The theses of the Pudgalavādins: the original teaching of the Buddha'. Cf. SN IV, 393; MN I, 484; Ud VI, 4. According to DN III, p.229, there are four types of conversation, namely: 1) the questioner's doubt is dispelled by answers (\textit{pattucaḥvyākaraṇa}); 2) direct answers are given to questions without discussion with the questioner (\textit{ekamṣayaśyakaraṇa}); 3) answers are given in part, that is, one aspect of the question is taken up, then another (\textit{vibhujyaśyakaraṇa}); 4) the indeterminate nature of the problem leads to infinity; that is why all discussion (\textit{kapana}) should be avoided. \textit{The order of questions to be rejected} corresponds to the fourth category above.

\textsuperscript{417} This position is based on two extremist ideas, existence and non-existence, in order to deny the existence of the self. Cf. SN II, 13.

\textsuperscript{418} The canonical texts recognise the existence of living beings 'born spontaneously' (\textit{aupapātika}, Pāli: \textit{opapātika}), that is, born without the intervention of parents. These are heavenly beings and infernal beings. MN I, 34 . . . After having eliminated the five lesser fetters, I shall be reborn spontaneously (in such and such a world), there I shall immediately attain Parinirvāṇa and shall not return to this world (. \textit{pañcannamb orambhāgiyānamb samyajānamb parikkhāyopapātika aśam tathaparinibbāyī anāvattidhammo tasām lokā it . . . ).
(vedanā), the mind (citta) and mental objects (dharma)\(^\text{419}\);  
d. the word of the Buddha to the disciples (śrāvakas) on fire worship causes a 
belief that there is a person who directs the action of burning the body and 
who accepts the order to burn;  
e. the term ‘person’ used by the Buddha in the sentence: ‘a virtuous person 
(pudgala) who appears in the world brings happiness to many men’\(^\text{420}\).

4. **The person is identical with the aggregates (skandha), since the Buddha said 
that:**  
a. the six sense organs and six objects constitute the person\(^\text{421}\);  
b. these are form, character, etc. (the aggregates) of a person which constitute 
the person, there is nothing beyond that\(^\text{422}\).

5. **The person is different from the aggregates, since:**  
a. the Buddha said that the burden — the five aggregates — differs from the 
bearer of the burden — the person\(^\text{423}\);  
b. the Buddha said that the person appropriates thirst (irṣṇā) as second nature 
in the cycle of birth and death (samsāra)\(^\text{424}\).

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\(^\text{419}\) The Satipaṭṭhānasutta (MN, No.10/1, 55–63) deals with the fixing of attention on four objects: the 
body, feelings, the mind and mental objects, for example saying: ... and furthermore, monks, a monk 
going, knows: ‘I am going; standing, he knows: ‘I am standing’; etc. (pāca ca parām bhikkhave bhikkhu 
gacchanto vā: gacchānti pajanāti, thito vā: thito‘nhibi pajanāti ... — MN I, 56).

\(^\text{420}\) This sentence is certainly invested with the same contents as the Pāli phrase in AN I, 22: Monks, 
there is a person whose appearance in the world is for the welfare of many, for the happiness of many, 
through compassion for the world, for the benefit, welfare and happiness of gods and mankind. Which is 
that person? It is the Tathāgata, the Arhat, the Perfectly Enlightened One (ekapaggala bhikkhave loke 
uppațjamāna bahujanahitiya bahujanaskhāya lokāya sukhāya devamanassānam katamo ekapaggalo? 

\(^\text{421}\) See below, n.437.

\(^\text{422}\) This idea conforms with what the Buddha said about the identification of the person and the five 
aggregates. This is the first of the following four attachments to the self: Monks, all recluse and brah-
min who admit the self in different ways consider the five aggregates, or one or another of them, 
as being the self. Which are those five? Monks, an uneducated worldling who does not discern the holy 
ones considers form ... feeling, perception, the formations and consciousness as being the self, or else 
the self as being the possessor of one of those groups, or else those aggregates are included in, or else 
the self is included in those aggregates. Hence the view: it occurs to him to think ‘I am’ (ye hi 
keci bhikkhave samanāvā brāhmaṇā vā arekavitiham attānam samanupassānam samanupassanti, sabbe te 
pañcupādānakkhande samanupassanti etesam vā aññatarāṇā katame pañca? idha bhikkhave asutta 
puphājano ariyānam adassāvi, la, sappurisadhamme avinito rūpam atato samanupassati, rūpavātam vā 
attānam attāni vā rūpam rūpasmin vā attānas; vedanām; suhnām; sankhāre; viññānam attato 
samanupassati; viññānavatānam vā attānam attāni vinnānam viññānasmin vā attānam; iti ayam ceva sama-
nupassuṇā asmi tāttha cassa adhigatam hoti — SN III, 46). The translation is slightly modified by abbreviation.

\(^\text{423}\) Cf. the Bhārāhārasutta (SN III, 25). It is noteworthy that there is another opinion also based on this 
discourse in order to show that the person and the aggregates differ from each other.

\(^\text{424}\) This is an opinion resulting from a misunderstanding of the Buddha’s words on the importance of 
thirst. For example, Itivuttaka, p.8. Monks, I do not see any other fetter which fetters (beings) and 
through which beings wander for a very long time and hasten through the cycle of existences as this 
fetter of thirst. Evidently, monks, being fettered by that fetter of thirst, beings wander and hasten 
through the cycle of existences (ānāma bhikkhave ānāma ekasamyojanāma pi samanupassāmi geneva
c. the rebirth of a person in another life in order to undergo or enjoy the results of actions (karman) in this life; 
d. the identity of the person in different lives; for example, the identity of the Buddha and personages in his former lives under the names of Sunetra, Mahâdeva, etc;
e. the Buddha does not affirm that the nature of the person is impermanent or permanent, whilst he does affirm the impermanent nature of the aggregates.

6. The person is eternal
   a. since it has no beginning, as the origin of the cycle of birth and death is inconceivable. (In consequence, the person is eternal);
   b. the knowledge of the recollection of former lives;
   c. because of the existence of an eternal plane where suffering and regression no longer exist;
   d. and the existence of imperturbable joy which can be enjoyed.

7. The person is impermanent, since:
   a. it has an origin, for example, the birth of the Buddha which brings happiness to so many people;
   b. this life is transformed into a heavenly existence;
   c. conditions of life change in different lives;
   d. living beings appear and disappear;
   e. the states of birth (jati), old-age (jarâ), disease (vyâdhi) and death (marana) are manifestations of impermanence.

III — The Sûmmitiya position in relation to the seven opinions.

Next, the Sûs (464a 16 - 466a 27) explains the Sûmmitiya position in relation to the preceding seven opinions.

1. The person exists since:
   a. the Buddha does not deny the person, but he wishes to illustrate the nature of suffering, the arising and cessation of suffering, by emphasising the

samyojanena samyutâ sattâ digharatam sandhâvanti samsaranti yathayidam bhikkhave tanhâsamyojanam tanhâsamyojanena hi bhikkhave samyutâ sattâ digharatam sandhâvanti samsarantiitii).
425 This proposition rests on the false opinion according to which the person having produced actions in a former life is different from the person receiving the fruits in a later life.
426 On the impossibility of conceiving the origin of the cycle of birth and death, see earlier. The literature of the Pudgalavâdins' and notes 99, 100, 101.
427 On the knowledge of the recollection of former lives, see below. 'The secondary theses of the
Pudgalavâdins, thesis No.5'. Cf. DN i. 81; AN III. 99.
428 This is Nirvana or Parinirvâna. See below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavâdins, thesis No.10'.
429 See below, 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavâdins: the pudgala designated by cessation'.
430 See above, n.420. Here, it is the argument concerning the impermanence of the person which is manifested in this world for a certain time.
existence of suffering\textsuperscript{431} ;
\begin{itemize}
  \item b. the Buddha declares to the sectaries that there is a person as a designation which rests on compounded things (sāṃskāra)\textsuperscript{432} ;
  \item c. (consequently), the opinion on the substantiality of the five aggregates is a false view\textsuperscript{433} ;
  \item d. the Buddha does not deny the person but, in order to dispel attachment to another, he teaches the insubstantiality of the person and what pertains to it;
  \item e. certainly, the person is unreal but, in order to dispel attachment to existence, the Buddha responds with non-existence; that does not mean that he denies the person.
\end{itemize}

2. It is possible to say that the person exists, since:
\begin{itemize}
  \item a. although it is impossible to say that the person is permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya), it is possible to say that the person exists since the Buddha said: ‘There are persons who burn their bodies, etc.’ or ‘the ignorant take bad actions (akūśalakarman) as their nature, the intelligent take good actions (kusūralakarman) as theirs’;
  \item b. the questions to be rejected (avyākṛta) are those which are not correctly asked, since the Buddha never rejects propositions such as this: the ignorant are bad and the intelligent are good;
  \item c. the fact of indetermination forms part of the person because the person is equally non-identical with compounded things not different from compounded things\textsuperscript{434} ;
  \item d. to admit that the person does not exist is to express a wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi), because the Buddha declares that attachment to the two ideas, existence and non-existence, is wrong, since this pertains to a question to be rejected (avyākṛta) and leads to ideas of permanence and impermanence. It is right view (samyagdṛṣṭi) if it is admitted that the person exists unconditionally and does not belong to either impermanent compounded things nor the permanent compounded thing\textsuperscript{435} ;
  \item e. it is possible to say that the person exists (conditionally) because the Buddha
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 431 This is a defence of the Saṃmitiya thesis of the pudgala in relation to the Theravādins who categorically deny the existence of a person undergoing suffering. See above, n.413.
  \item 432 Here the Sns. 644b 6–7, asserts that the Buddha taught that a designated person exists which rests on the impure aggregates, or person designated by the support (i.śūko-jēn 依託人 ａśrayaprajinānapudgala).
  \item 433 This is clear proof that the Pudgalavādins themselves also rejected the concept of a substantial self (atman). This is why the definitions of pudgala as a real and permanent substance are unfounded.
  \item 434 Sns. 644c 10–11: 我今說：若我輩者應是行業異行，如是正說為是行業異行應說：we declare that: if the person is examined [in order to know] if it is identical with compounded things or different from them, it should correctly be stated that it is neither identical with compounded things nor different from them. —
  \item 435 These are also the main arguments with which the Pudgalavādins established the pudgala thesis, the position of which lies between two extremist ideas: existence (permanence) and non-existence (impermanence). Cf. Sns. 644c 15–24 and the translation below, 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavādins'.
\end{itemize}
The person does not exist as a reality, since:

a. although there is no chained person, the chain exists just as there are chains in prisons even when there are no prisoners;

b. an opinion on the existence of the person is a right view (samyagdrṣṭi) because the Buddha, relying on the defiled aggregates (sāravakandha), declares that the person exists; since it a man who sees the person;537

c. in reality, only the mind (cittā) exists which intervenes in the practice of the four applications of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), and nothing else;538
d. the Buddha said to the disciples (sūravaka) that it is things (dharma) which are based on the elements (āyatana), and that there is nothing else;539

e. the Buddha declares that the person exists as a designation (prajñapitī). The refutation of the person entails the refutation of morality (śīla), the four Noble Truths (āryasatya) taught by the Buddha, etc.540

4. It is impossible to say that the person is identical with the aggregates or that the aggregates are identical with the person, since the person is ineffable (avaktavya) but the aggregates are not. Moreover, if the person were identical with the aggregates, when the aggregates disappear or appear, the person should also disappear or appear.541

5. It is impossible to say the person is different from the aggregates, since:

a. the discourse never teaches the separation between the life of man542 and the

\[\text{The words } i-chih \text{ 依止 are translated by 'the basis' with the meaning of the basic elements, i.e., the aggregates.}\]

\[\text{Sns.} 464c \text{ 27-28 若都無我, 佛不應說有依止, 佛說有依止故, 是故有我可說。}\]

\[\text{Sns.} 465a \text{ 仏依有無, 佛說有人, 以人見有人名正見: basing himself on the defiled aggregates, the Buddha spoke of the existence of the person. Because of the fact that a man perceives the existence of the person, that is called right view. This translation is more of an interpretation, since the text makes no distinction between the two words jén 人.}\]

\[\text{Sns.} 465a 仏依有無, 佛說有人, 以人見有人名正見: basing himself on the defiled aggregates, the Buddha spoke of the existence of the person. Because of the fact that a man perceives the existence of the person, that is called right view. This translation is more of an interpretation, since the text makes no distinction between the two words jén 人.}\]

\[\text{SN IV, 15. What is the totality of things? It is the eye and visible; the ear and sounds, the nose and odour, the tongue and taste, the body and the tangible, the mind and mental objects. These things, monks, are called the totality. — Monks, if someone says 'Rejecting that totality, I shall make known another totality', that is mere speculation on his part and, when questioned, he cannot give an explanation; furthermore, he is in a dilemma. Why? Because, monks, that is beyond his capacity (sabbam vo bhikkhave desissāmi, tam sanātha). kiṁca bhikkhave sabbam? cañca ca eva rāpa ca satanassa sadda ca ghānāca pundhā ca sāvāca ka ṭīyā ca phutthābba ca mano ca dhammā ca, idam vacca bhikkhave sabbam, yo bhikkhave evam vaḍeyya, idam etam sabbam pacchikkhāya anānubhā pamāṇeppassānī, tassa vacchāvatār evassa, puttho ca na sampāpissva, utāhā āghābha āgajeyya, tam kissa hetu, yathā tam bhikkhave aṭṭha avasamudinī). Cf. Kesā 1x, p.218 and n.1 [Prudden, pp132, 136].}\]

\[\text{It is obvious that the Sns is promoting vigorous and convincing arguments in favour of the existence of the pūḍgala; cf. Sns. 465a 17 - b 1, or below, 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavādins'.}\]

\[\text{These too are arguments on which the essential position of the pūḍgala thesis is based.}\]

\[\text{This translates the words jén ming 人命 ( = jīva?) (Sns. 465b 5).}\]
person, but it says that there is a person who bears the burden; that is why the burden exists;
b. when thirst (ṭṛṣṇa) is eliminated, there is no further transmigration in the cycle of birth and death; this means that the person and the aggregates are not separate;
c. it is by being based on the aggregates that this life and the future life receive the results of actions (karmaṇa); this means that the person and the aggregates are not separate;
d. the ‘I’ of which the Buddha speaks is a designation marking transmigration between the different existences of a person443;
e. the characteristic of things (dharmalaksana) cannot be defined as permanent or impermanent. It is the same for the person444. If the person were different from the aggregates:
   a) the person would either be found in the body, or enclose the whole;
   b) when the sense organs are destroyed, the five objects should still be known;
   c) the person could go from this body to another, then return to the first body;
   d) the person should not be reborn in different destinies; otherwise it would be reborn in all the destinies at a given moment; consequently, it should not always reside in the body; hence, liberation would be difficult to obtain; if the person were to pass from one destiny to another, it should not create actions (karmaṇa); if there were no actions or results, neither would there be any merit (punya); equally, there would be no detachment from the bonds, nor the practice of meditation; it is thus that liberation should operate.

6. The person is not eternal, since:
a. it cannot be said that the cycle of birth and death is eternal because its origin is inconceivable. Equally, it is impossible to maintain that the person is eternal because it has no origin;
b. the knowledge of the recollection of former lives does not allow a conclusion that the person is eternal, since the person is different from the aggregates; when the aggregates disappear, the person would not disappear. Thus the recollection of the past does not concern this life and does not extend to other lives, whilst the cycle of life and death is unceasing.

443 It is with this idea that the Pudgalavādins established the pudgala designated by transmigration (ku-shaw-jen 辭說人, sankramaprajñāaptipudgala).
444 Sns. 465b 29: 我等今說陰我異不異不可說，是故法相以常無常為首不可說

we declare that it is impossible to say that the aggregates and the person are either different or identical. That is why it is impossible to say, in the first place, that the characteristic of things is either permanence or impermanence. Thesis lie of the Vatsiputriyas by Vasumitra: ‘Compounded things (samskṛta) either endure temporarily or disappear in a single instant (ekakṣanika). According to their doctrine, this is a specific property not only of compounded things in general but also of the Pudgala in particular. See below, ‘The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins, thesis No.8'.

c. certainly, the Buddha spoke of Nirvāṇa with a remainder (sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa) and of Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa), but he did not speak of an eternal person;
d. imperturbable joy exists in Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa), but, for the eternal person, there is no imperturbable joy because, for it, joy and sorrow are not important.

7. The person is not (absolutely) impermanent, since:
a. the person is designated on the basis of the appearance of the aggregates. This does not mean that the aggregates are different from the person. Hence, it is impossible to speak of the appearance of a person, only its designation can be spoken of;
b. if the person were totally impermanent, then there would be no relationship between the former life and the later life. Consequently, there would be no results of actions, merit, recollection, etc. The impermanence of the person is based on the disappearance of the aggregates of one destiny and their appearance in another destiny.

SECOND PART

In the second part (466a 28 - 469a 28), the Sūtras deals with the pudgala thesis, questions concerning life after death and the origin of the course of existence.

1. The Pudgala

The theory of the pudgala is presented from 466a 28 to 466c 28. The pudgala is a conditioned person whose nature, connection with the elements, rôle in the round of rebirth (samsāra) and cessation (nirvāṇa) are progressively defined in conformity to the Buddhadharma.

The thesis of the pudgala is based on the following three kinds of designations (prajñāpāli):

1. The pudgala designated by the support (śhuo-jēn । । , āśrayaprajñāpāli-pudgala?). The support here consists of compounded things (samskāra). This relationship is similar to that of fire in relation to fuel, or to milk in relation to its colour. In this sense, the person and form (rūpa) are two things which are neither identical nor different. They exist and perish together.

2. The pudgala designated by transmigration (śhuo-jēn । । )

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445 On the imperturbable joy in Nirvāṇa without a remainder, cf. below, 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavādins: the pudgala designated by cessation' and a.692.
446 This position is certainly consistent with the preceding thesis concerning compounded things: it is impossible to say that the characteristic of things is either permanence or impermanence (Sns, 465b 29).
447 The relationship between fire and fuel is difficult to explain, cf. Kośa IX, 234, or above, 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavādins, the position of the pudgala'.
448 It is impossible to say that milk is identical with colour or different from colour. Cf. Kośa IX, 239, or above, 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavādins, the position of the pudgala'.
sankramaprajānapitipudgala?). Transmigration is the continuity of a living being in the three time-periods: past, present and future. Without this designation, there are no means of recognising the identity of living beings from one existence to another;

3. The pudgala designated by cessation (mieh-shuo-jên, nirodhaprajānapitipudgala?). Cessation is the extinction of the five aggregates or defilements (āśrava). In other words, this designation shows that the cessation of the cycle of birth and death does not signify annihilation.

The pudgala is therefore only a designation (prajānapitī), the existence of which is based on the first idea. The second explains the continuity of the process of the life of a person. With the third, it is intended to demonstrate that a ‘state’ exists after Parinirvāna in which the five aggregates are no longer present.

II — The problem of life after death

From 466c 28 to 467c 14, the Sns deals with questions and answers on the subject of what happens after death. There are divergent opinions which are opposed by the affirmations of the Sāmmitiyas in relation to the doctrine of the pudgala and the intermediate existence (antarābhava).

1. Who transmigrates? The pudgala in the intermediate existence (antarābhava).

With regard to the different opinions on the subject of the question of what transmigrates and the answer of the Sāmmitiyas, the Sns (467a 1 - b 18) explains:

a. The three adverse opinions:
   1 — Only the five aggregates pass from one existence to another. They are consciousness (vijñāna) and actions (karman) which determine rebirth;
   2 — It is the person (alone) who goes from one life to another, and not the aggregates.
   3 — There is no person which transmigrates because, according to the Buddha, new divine persons exists, the name one receives depends on actions accomplished here and there; when virtuous persons appear in the world, many people delight in the happiness they have brought. Hence, those who are born are not reborn again.

b. The Sāmmitiyas’ answer.
   1 — When the aggregates disappear, the pudgala, by means of the intermediate existence (antarābhava), passes on and is reborn in another destiny. The divine eye alone is capable of perceiving the intermediate existence.
   2 — It is impossible to say that the person alone goes to the other destiny, since the opinion according to which there is a real person separate (from the aggregates), whether it be eternal or non-eternal, is a wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi).

2. How does the intermediate existence (antarābhava) appear?

The Sns (467b 19 - c 14) explains the manner in which the intermediate existence appears as follows: at the moment when a man is about to die, the
intermediate existence is on the point of manifesting itself. That person consisting of the intermediate aggregates cannot be considered as the same as the one which is designated by the support (āśrayaprajñātipudgala?). It is not true that a person first assumes the five intermediate aggregates then abandons the human aggregates, since a person cannot have two existences at the same time. Neither is it to the contrary, because, if a person were first to abandon the human aggregates, then assume the five aggregates of the intermediate existence, there would be a void between two destinies. Hence, the actions are taken simultaneously. This means that the very instant when the mind (citto) of the last moment of that human existence has just expired, the mind of the intermediate existence begins to exist. That state is called the state of the appearance of the mind. It is thus that one abandons the five human aggregates and receives the five aggregates of the intermediate existence.

III — Is there an origin to the series of existences?

From 467c 15 to 469a 28, the Sns describes opinions concerning the question: Basing themselves on the teaching of the Buddha, the Sāmmitiyas affirm that the absolute origin of the cycle of birth and death is inconceivable. It is impossible to say that it exists or that it does not exist because, if there were a real origin, it would be inconceivable. It is, however, impossible to say that it is absolutely real or unreal. The Buddha declares that the question of the origin of the cycle of birth and death is a question to be rejected (avyākṛta) since, if one says that existences have no origin, one falls into the false view of nihilism and, if one says that existences do have an origin, one then falls into the false view of eternalism. Here are the reasons for which the origin of the series of existences is inconceivable:

1. The beginning of thirst (ṛṣṇā) in relation to existences is inconceivable;
2. If there were no cycle of birth and death, there would be no Nirvāṇa. Although Nirvāṇa has a beginning, the origin of the cycle of birth and death is inconceivable;
3. It is the evolution of causes which constitutes the cycle of birth and death. It is not men who are provided with original persons; if they were so provided, the cycle of birth and death would be infinite;
4. The lives of the past which can be remembered are innumerable; that is why the origin of the cycle of birth and death is inconceivable;
5. If an origin of the cycle of birth and death were to exist, the origin of one life in the past would also have to exist;
6. Due to the evolution of thirst (ṛṣṇā), the Buddha declares that the origin of lives in the past is inconceivable. It is because the origin of the cycle of birth and death does not exist that there is no name for that origin.

It is thus that the absolute origin of the cycle of birth and death is inconceivable. Nonetheless, that does not mean that no origin exists at all, since the cycle is conditioned; consequently, it is not eternal. As conditions evolve, consequences also evolve. The inconceivable fact of the origin, middle and end of the cycle of birth and death does not mean that cycle does not exist. For example, the
Sāmmitiya always affirm: 'The *pudgala* exists in relation to the aggregates and transmigration'.

It is noteworthy that, according to the school's doctrine, the Sāmmitiya distinguished between the elements (*dharma*) of the person (*pudgala*). From the point of view of the elements, they say that the origin of the cycle of birth and death is inconceivable, but that does not encompass the point of view of the person. The person is veiled by ignorance (*avidyā*), consequently, it transmigrates. In other words, 'when the elements reach the mind (*citta*), rely on it and (then) transmigrate, the Buddha calls that the person (*pudgala*). The *pudgala* is thus something 'separate' from the elements, then it is possible to say that the elements are impermanent, but it is impossible to say whether the *pudgala* is permanent or impermanent. Hence, we can understand the expressible or inexpressible nature of the origin of life. The cycle of birth and death therefore does not possess any origin.

**THIRD PART**

The third part of the work is very long (469b - 471c 3). In this section, the Sns first presents ten of the adversaries' arguments aimed at denying the intermediate existence; it then affirms the intermediate existence by refuting the adverse arguments and by reinforcing its own.

1 — **Ten opposing arguments**

From 469b 5 to 469c 26, the Sns describes the arguments of different schools, based on the words of the Buddha and which are opposed to the intermediate existence:

1. The absence of any mention by the Buddha of the intermediate existence, of the being who goes to the intermediate existence and the path leading to the intermediate existence.
2. The Buddha does not speak of the intermediate existence in the context of the destinies of birth (the five destinies) or the categories of living beings.
3. The Buddha does not speak of actions (*karma*) leading to the intermediate existence when he speaks of actions in the five destinies.
4. The Buddha clearly specifies the number of the five destinies but he does not mention the intermediate existence.
5. The Buddha says that rebirth in the Avici hell, after death, is immediate.
6. If there were an intermediate state between death and birth, there would be another intermediate state between the intermediate existence and birth, etc.
7. Due to the uselessness of the intermediate existence which does not possess any of the specific characteristics of life.
8. Due to the impossibility of conceiving the birth of the elements which are both identical with and different from those of the birth existence (*upapattibhava*).
9. The Buddha does not speak of the characteristics of the intermediate existence whilst he does describe the characteristics of the five destinies.
10. The Buddha says that birth takes place an instant after the decease of the present body.
II — Ten answers from the Sāṃsumitaya

By answering the ten preceding arguments, the Sns (469b 27 - 470b 15) justifies its support of the thesis of the intermediate existence with the following reasons:

1. The intermediate existence is like the vehicle of the five destinies. That is why the Buddha does not speak of it in the context of the five destinies.
2. The intermediate existence is not a destiny in which one stays, but it is a stage for the transfer of the faculty of life (jīvitendriya). That is why the Buddha does not speak of it in the context of the five destinies.
3. A man receives the results of his actions and undergoes rebirth in the six destinies, but not in the intermediate existence. That is why the Buddha does not speak of actions in the intermediate existence.
4. What is not mentioned by the Buddha nonetheless exists. The Buddha himself says that there are many things to be taught but that he cannot speak of them all.
5. It is in order to reject the opinion according to which there is no intervening destiny in the course of rebirth that the Buddha speaks of immediate rebirth in the Avīci hell. That means that there is no intermediate existence.
6. The intermediate existence cannot be demonstrated in a conclusive manner by the existence, for example, of intermediate meditation (dhyānāntara).
7. The intermediate existence enables a person to reach and be reborn in another destiny.
8. After having passed into the intermediate existence, one receives the birth existence (upapattibhāva). These two existences are similar because the former is the vehicle and the latter the destination. That is why the intermediate existence exists.
9. It is because the Buddha wishes to avoid disputes on the existence or non-existence of that intermediate stage that he does not speak of it.
10. It is because the birth existence has not yet appeared that the body must pass through the intermediate existence to reach the other existence.

III — Ten arguments used to demonstrate the intermediate existence

Further on, the Sns (470b 16 - 471a 5) again cites the words of the Buddha aimed at demonstrating the intermediate existence. Here are the basic ideas:

1. The Buddha teaches that attachment to the intervening stage (which, according to the Sāṃsumitaya, is the intermediate existence) should be abandoned.
2. The Buddha affirms that there exists an individual composed of a mind-made...
body (manomayakāya), of thirst (trsṇa) and of appropriation (upādāna). 
3. The intermediate existence from which one attains Parinirvāna, among the five categories of the non-returner (anāgāmin).
4. The fact that the body cannot reach the other existence; it is therefore necessary to have another subtle body so that consciousness (vijñāna) can reach the other existence.
5. The supernormal power of the divine eye (divyacakṣus) can see the disappearance and appearance of living beings. (That is why there is an intermediate existence.)
6. The Buddha speaks of the existence of the gandharva, one of the three elements which constitute the embryo. That is an affirmation of the intermediate existence.
7. Because of mutual relations, the intermediate existence is necessary for a transitional domain to exist (between death and rebirth).
8. The example of the seeds and seedlings: seeds give rise to seedlings and seedlings yield seeds. The seed corresponds to the previous existence, the seedling corresponds to the intermediate existence and the seed produced by the seedling corresponds to the birth existence.
9. The illumination of the world by the Bodhisattva (the Buddha before his last birth), when he descended from the Tusita heaven and entered his mother's womb.
10. The existence of the changing of the mind (citta) which occurs at the moment when one is on the point of receiving the new birth. Without the intermediate existence, this changing cannot be accomplished.

IV — Criticism of the adversaries

Once again, the Sns, 47la 6 - b 20, presents the counter-attacks of the adversaries of the thesis of the intermediate existence:

1. The intervening state (in argument No.1) consists of the six consciousnesses

452 This idea is found in the Vātsyāyana-sūtra, which is mentioned by the Sns, 47la 12 sq. This person is considered to be that of the intermediate existence provided with attachment to the taste of meditation at the moment of leaving the world of desire, but who is not yet reborn in the world of subtle form.
453 On the five categories of the non-returner (anāgāmin), see below, 'The Pudgalavādin Lists of Śrāvaka-s'. As for the idea of attaining Parinirvāṇa in the intermediate existence, cf. below, 'The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins, thesis No.14'.
454 See below, notes 640-2.
455 Clearly, this proposition is based on a paragraph in the Acchariyabhūtadharmasūtra (MN III, 120): Ānanda, when the Bodhisatta, having left the Tusita heaven, descends into his mother's womb, an immense and marvellous radiance, surpassing even the power of the gods, appears in the whole universe, including the world of the gods, the world of Māra and of Brahmā and the world of the redeuses, Brahmins, gods and mankind . . . (yadā, ānanda, bodhisatta tusitā kāya caviṇā, mātā kucchim okkami, atta sadevakē leke samārake sabrahmaka sasaramabrahmaṇiyā pājīya sadevananussāya appamāno utāro obhāso pārthubbhavai atikkam'eva devānām devanabhāvam), Cf. Romantic Legend of Sākya Buddha (佛本行集经), tr. S. Beal, pp.36-7.
(vijñāna), but not of the intermediate existence.\(^{456}\)

2. The combination of the mind-made body (manomayakāya), thirst (trsṇā) and appropriation (upādāna) means the combination of attachment to the taste of meditation (dhyāna) and thirst, but not to the intermediate existence.

3. Attaining Parinirvāṇa in the intervening state\(^{457}\) does not mean attaining Parinirvāṇa in the intermediate existence.

4. The fact of reaching the other existence is comparable to the appearance of a shadow or of an impression of being lightly touched. This is the manner in which the death existence (marañabhava) precedes the birth existence (upapattihavā). That is why the intermediate existence is not necessary.

5. The supernormal power of the divine eye (divyacakṣus) enables it to perceive subtle destinies\(^{458}\), but not the intermediate existence.

6. The Buddha speaks of the gandharva by giving that word the meaning of a being which aims at its destiny or is guided by the power of good or bad actions. The gandharva does not imply the intermediate existence.

7. Mutual relations can be manifested from the death existence (marañabhava) to the birth existence (upapattihavā), but not from the death existence to the intermediate existence.

8. The example of the seeds and seedlings is dangerous (for your position) because, according to that example, on leaving a human existence, if one were reborn in the intermediate existence, one would not be able to be reborn in another human existence.

9. The citation is wrong. The illumination of the Bodhisattva takes place while he is in the process of becoming a Buddha, that is, during the time which separates the Bodhisattva state from that of Buddhahood, but not in the intermediate existence.\(^{459}\)

10. The changing of the mind (citta) which occurs at the moment of rebirth is similar to the following example: One dreams of Pañca-Mathurā and one perceives Mathurā: there is no intervening country.\(^{460}\) That proves that there is no intermediate existence.

V — The confirmation by the Sāmmitiys

After having described the criticisms, the Sns, 471b 21 - c 3, also deals with the confirmation of the intermediate existence by the Sāmmitiys:

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\(^{456}\) According to Vasumitra, the Mahāśāṃghikas, Ekavyāvakārikas, Lokottaravādins, Kukkutikas and (early) Mahāsāhasakas denied the existence of the intermediate existence. Cf. Kośa III, p.32, n.1 [Pruden, p372].

\(^{457}\) Cf. below, "The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins, thesis №14."

\(^{458}\) Sns, 471a 26-27: kši tao (pe道) or yu tao kši 有道加強

\(^{459}\) On consulting the proposition in the Acchāriyabbhutadhammasutta (MN III, 120), we can conclude that the citation is not wrong; only the illustration of the intermediate existence could be criticized from the doctrinal point of view.

\(^{460}\) Mathurā was a town in which medieval Buddhism flourished. It neighboured on Pañca-Mathurā or Panchala. On Pañcāla, see B.M. Law, Geography of Early Buddhism, London 1932, pp.18-19.
1. According to the discourse, the intermediate existence certainly exists. It is the Buddha who, with his divine eye, sees living beings who come and go with their actions (karman) in the cycle of birth and death.

2. Leaving the human destiny, after death, one is reborn in other destinies.

**FOURTH PART**

The last part (471c 4 - 473a 13) deals with the different destinies of life, including the various states of evolution of persons, from the ordinary man to the arhat. This section is very obscure, not only because of its language, but also because of its ideas. However, we can grasp the following classification of the two kinds of person:

The first, that of the worldling (prthagjana) is divided into three categories:

1. He who is not yet disgusted with the world of desire (kāmādhātu nirvedita) and who possesses the ninety-eight tendencies (anuṣaya) and all the passions (kleśa) in connection with the three worlds (dharma).
2. He who is disgusted with the world of desire (kāmādhātu) and who is reborn in the destiny of the non-perceptive gods (asamjñādeva).
3. He who is disgusted with the world of subtle form (rūpadhātu nirvedita) and who is reborn in the world of desire (kāmādhātu) after having fallen from the world of subtle form (rūpadhātu).

The second, that of the holy one (ārya), is divided into ten or twelve categories:

1. He who undergoes seven deaths and seven births (saptakṛtabhavaparāma);
2. He who is a once returner (sākṛdāgāmin);
3. He who is a once returner (attains Parinirvāṇa) by being reborn into several families (kulakulasākṛdāgāmin);
4. He who is a once returner (separate from Parinirvāṇa) by the interval of one birth (ekavicikāsākṛdāgāmin);
5. He who is a once returner (attains Parinirvāṇa) by being disgusted with the world of desire and by being reborn in the higher stages (kāmādhātunirvedha ārdhvasrotasākṛdāgāmin);
6. The category which includes three categories:
   a — He who attains Parinirvāṇa in rebirth (upapadyaparinirvāyin);
   b — He who attains Parinirvāṇa through compounded things (sābhīsamskāra-parinirvāyin);
   c — He who attains Parinirvāṇa through the uncompounded (anabhīsamskāra-parinirvāyin);
7. He who attains Parinirvāṇa in the intermediate existence (antarāparinirvāyin);
8. He who is disgusted with the world of subtle form and is reborn in the higher

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461 The number 98 of the anuṣayas agrees with that of the Tds, cf. above, n.307.
462 Sns. 472a 17: i-chien hsi-lo-han — 阿斯陀含 (ekavicikasākṛdāgāmin?); whereas Tds 21a 13 has i-chung — 種 (ekabījīn), See above, n.235.
stages (rūpadhātu nirvedha ārḍhvasrota);

9. He who attains Parinirvāṇa through compounded things in rebirth (upapadya- samśkaraparinirvāya?)

10. The arhat.

The majority of passages in this part are devoted to a detailed explanation of these categories of persons. Nonetheless, the obscure style and doctrinal points, or rather, incoherent ideas contained in these passages, prevent us from citing the continuation of the series of these categories.

The Sns concludes the treatise with a stock phrase aimed at encouraging the practice of the Buddha's teaching.

VI — THE ORIGINAL SCHOOL

The important element which first makes us think that the Sns belongs to the Sāmmitiya school is the title of the treatise itself. Nonetheless, we might wonder if this title was given by the author himself or attributed to it later by the translator. However it may be, by examining the characteristic doctrinal points of the treatise, the conclusion can be reached that it is a work of the Pudgalavādins in general and the Sāmmitiyas in particular for the following reasons:

Firstly, the Sns defends their specific theses, namely:

1. The pudgala;
2. The indestructible thing (avipraṇāsa?);
3. The intermediate existence (antarābhava);
4. The six destinies (gati);
5. The characteristic of things (dharmaḷaksana) which is both permanent and impermanent;
6. An intermediate meditation (dhyānāntara) exists.

Secondly, among the above theses, only No. 2 and No.4 are theses specific to the Sāmmitiya school, the others are common to various other Pudgalavādin schools and are also found in the Tds. It is noteworthy that the common theses are better formulated and better explained in the Sns than in the Tds. For example, the thesis of the pudgala is dealt with, in the Sns, with the refutation of adverse arguments and described in vigorous style. It is the same for the thesis of the intermediate existence. Conversely, these theses are described in a general way, but not in detail, in the Tds. This tends to prove that the Sns was composed late in the period when the Pudgalavādin school was flourishing and the Sāmmitiyas were eclipsing the Vātsiputriyas.

Thirdly, it is impossible to attribute the Sns to the Vātsiputriyas or other sub-schools, such as the Dharmottariyas, Bhadrayāniyas and Sannāgārikas, because:

1. The title of the work indicates that it is of Sāmmitiya origin;
2. The work contains theses specific to the latter, namely: the indestructible thing

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463 On the fruits, cf. above, the Tds, third section: the fruits (phala) (Vol.II, 20b 2 – 21b 25).
and the six destinies (gati);

3. The list of the ten or twelve categories of fruits is totally different from that of the Vatsiputriyas in the Tds and those of the other sub-schools.

In conclusion, we have every right to believe that the Sns is indeed a work of the Sâmmitiya school.

IV. THE LÜ ÉRH-SHIH-ÉRH MING-LIAO LUN

I - TITLE

The Lü erh-shih-érh ming-liao lun (Treatise dealing with twenty-two stanzas explaining the Vinaya) is a treatise concerning the Vinaya. This work is so-entitled because it consists of twenty-two stanzas encompassing all the essential ideas disseminated in the canonical books of the Basket of the Vinaya and the unrecorded disciplinary traditions of the Sâmmitiya school. The meaning of the title is quite clear, as the text itself confirms: 'The reason for entitling the text Lü ming-liao lun is because it can analyse and explain the Vinaya'. The treatise which we have to hand is published in the Taishô edition, Vol.XXIV, No.1461, pp.665b - 673a.

II - THE AUTHOR

All that we know of the author of the Lü ming-liao lun is his name transcribed in Chinese, Fu-t'o-to-lo-to or Fo-t'o-to-lo-to, the Sanskrit reconstruction of which is Buddhatieta. He was certainly an Indian monk who was well-versed in the Tripitaka in general, as is indicated by the title 'Dharma-master' (fa-shih) which accompanies his name; furthermore, he was also a Vinaya master whose knowledge of the discipline is illustrated by the present very succinct and learned treatise. No biography of him seems to have been preserved.

III - THE TRANSLATOR

The translator of this treatise is Paramärtha (Chen-ti or Kulanātha (kou-lo-na-t'ou) (500-569). He was born in a brahmin family in Ujjayini (Ujjain, central India) where he did his studies. Once proficient in Buddhist literature, he went to northern India and probably settled in Pataliputra. He went to China as a cultural and religious messenger for the king of Magadha at the request of a Chinese mission. He was welcomed in Nanking in the year 548 of the

464 See below, 'The Pudgalavāda List of Śrāvakas'.
465 Lü ming-liao lun, 665b 17: 如本二十二明了論，能分別解釋律所立名
emperor Wu (502-550) who wished to name him head of the programme of translating Buddhist books. Unfortunately, this programme was not realised because of internal dissenters. Paramārtha went to southern China where he led a wandering life while translating Buddhist texts in those regions. Dissatisfied with his mission in China, he aimed to return to India. In 562, he embarked on a boat for India but a typhoon obliged him to return to Canton.

From then on he remained in China and continued to translate Buddhist texts. He died at the age of 71.

Paramārtha was the most cultivated and erudite of all the Indian missionaries in China. He was the only master of Buddhism to whom Hsüan-tsang bowed. Half of the seventy works which he translated have survived. Of them, only this treatise pertains to the Vinaya, the other major translations are basic works of the Yogācāra school, namely:

1. Ta-ch'êng mei-shih lun (T XXXI, 1589);
2. Shê ta-ch'êng lun (Mahāyānasamgraha) (T XXXI, 1593);
3. Chuan-shih lun (T XXXI, 1587);
4. Hsien-shih lun (T XXXI, 1618);
5. San wu-hsing lun (T XXXI, 1617).

Two other translations concerning the history of the Buddhist schools deserve notice:

6. Shih pa pu lun (Samayabhedoparacanakrama) (T XLIX, 2032);
7. I pu tsung lun (Samayabhedaoparacanakrama) (T XLIX, 2031).

IV - THE DATE

The date of composition of the treatise is unknown, as is the history of its author. The contents of the treatise prove that it was not composed until after the compilation of the three Vinaya, Sūtra and Abhidharma collections of the Śāṁ forgotten school, that is, between the second century BCE and the fifth century CE. This hypothesis on the date of composition of the treatise can be reinforced by the fact that it was probably composed at the time when the Śāṁ forgotten school was flourishing.

V - THE LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION

It is difficult to discover the language of the original text of the Lù ming-liao lun through the Chinese translation. Nonetheless, it can be assumed that it was Sanskrit or hybrid Sanskrit for the following reasons:

Firstly, the language of the treatise, throughout the translation, is clear and precise. Even the stanzas give us condensed and clear ideas, and the prose is elegant.

Secondly, Paramārtha, the translator, was a scholar with a perfect mastery of Sanskrit and well-versed in Sanskrit Buddhist literature, as his translations demonstrate.

The translation was made by Paramārtha, one of the four great translators of Buddhist texts in China. That is why the translation is marked by its clarity, not only from the point of view of language, but also of doctrine.
As to the history of the translation, the colophon says: 'In the second Kuang-ta year of Ch'en ch'ien 天大 17, on the twentieth day of the first month of the year Mou tsê 鳳 (568 CE), the Vinaya master Fa-t'ai 法泰 of the Ting-lin 定林 temple in the capital, who was to be found at the Nanhai 南海 command post in the prefecture of Kuang-chu 廣州, asked the Tripiṭaka master Chü-na-lo-t'ornwsm or t'a hie to translate the treatise. (The monk) Hui-k'ai 昇 of the Aśoka temple in the capital respectfully held the brush. The translation of this treatise is in one scroll. The notes and explanations are in five scrolls' (Lù ming-liao lun, 672c 5-9).

VI - THE CONTENTS

The treatise consists of twenty-two stanzas with commentary. Basing ourselves on the stanzas and their meaning, we summarise the essential ideas here:

Stanzas I-II are devoted to part of the introduction which explains:

1. The agreement between the Vinaya and Abhidharma of the Sāmmitiyas on the two numbers which explain the correspondence of defiled thoughts and the observances.  
2. The Buddhas' praise of the practice of the three trainings (śikṣā).
3. The basis of morality (śīla), consisting of knowledge of the eight precepts and the obtaining of ninety-six merits.
4. The purification engendered by the merits of the observance.

Stanzas III-XXI constitute the main part of the treatise. With their commentary, they mention and clarify all the elements of the disciplinary code of the Sāmmitiya community without any special classification. Consequently, we can do no more than summarise the essential points, paragraph by paragraph.

1. Five characteristics of a precept (666a 16-27).

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467 See above, n.106.
468 According to the Lù ming-liao lun, 665c 19-24, 8 precepts: 4 wrong bodily actions (abstaining from taking life, theft, sexual misconduct and other wrong actions), and 4 wrong vocal actions (abstaining from false speech, slander, harsh speech, useless speech). These eight are not the same as the 8 precepts advocated in MN I, 360: abstaining from (1) taking life, (2) theft, (3) falsehood, (4) slander, (5) avarice, (6) acrimonious blame, (7) anger, and (8) vanity. Cf. Traité II, p.771 and n.2.
469 Lù ming-liao lun, 665c 25 - 666a 1-5: 96 merits which can be counted in two ways:
1. (24 merits: 8 precepts x 3 bodily, vocal and mental observances). Due to the observance of oneself, the teachings of others, the delight in observance of others, and the practice of 8 precepts before receiving them, one obtains 96 merits in all; (8 x 3) x 4 = 96.
2. (24 merits = 8 merits obtained through abstention from 8 wrong bodily actions in the absence of hatred and delusion, 8 through abstention from 4 wrong vocal actions in the absence of the same two roots, 8 through abstention from 8 wrong bodily and vocal actions in the absence of craving). By multiplying these 24 merits by the four preceding methods, there are, in all, 96; (4 x 2) + (4 x 2) + (8 x 1) x 4 = 96.
470 Here the merits number 42,000 (420 x 10 x 10). Cf. Lù ming-liao lun, 666a 5-15. See above, n.117.
4. Eight kinds of transgression (666b 18 - 666c 21).
5. Seven groups of offences (666c 4-12).
6. Five methods of प्राचीनक क्षण recitation in the bi-monthly ceremonies of confession (पोषाधा) (666c 13-17).
7. Four defeats and four gains (666c 18-26).
8. Undefined (अंतियत) offences (666c 27 - 667a 6).
10. Natural offences described in the विनय (667a 20-28).
11. Judicial acts (कर्मवाचन) of the two communities (667b 1-9).
14. Correct conduct for entering lay people’s houses (667c 4-11).
15. Three ways of making amends for faults (667c 12-24).
17. Precepts established on these three bases: diminution, development and equilibrium (667a 2-5).
22. Four kinds of offences (667c 2-6).
23. Among the thirty परसार्मिक, six precepts requiring the forfeiture of objects before confession (667c 7-13).
24. Four kinds of relationship authorised by the precepts concerning the category of परसार्मिक (667c 13-16).
25. Seven methods for receiving full ordination (उपसांपदा) due to others: four for monks, three for nuns (667c 17-22).
26. Two methods of creating merit: that of the Pratyekabuddhas is limited, while that of the Buddha is unlimited and perfect (667c 22-23).

471 The inadequacies of the commentary impede clarification of these terms. However, it is possible to make a provisional translation of the passage in the commentary as follows: 'In the विनय, the precepts are established on three different notions: the establishment of the precepts rests on the basis (1) of development (of purification), (2) on equilibrium (in the monastic life) and (3) on the diminution (of wrong actions)' Cf. Lū ming-liao lun, 668a 2-4.

472 These are modalities of the forfeiture of objects, such as clothing and bowls, obtained improperly.

473 Lū ming-liao lun, 668c 2-6: According to the विनय there are four kinds of offences encompassing all offences; they are: (1) offences the same in origin but different in character; (2) offences the same in character but different in origin; (3) offences the same in character and origin; (4) offences not the same in character and origin.

474 They are: (1) the maternal relatives of the mother; (2) the paternal relatives of the mother; (3) the paternal relatives of the father; (4) the maternal relatives of the father. Cf. Lū ming-liao lun, 668c 13-15.
27. Five kinds of falsehood⁴⁷⁵ (668c 24-28).

28. Natural things and things produced by the practice of the Path (668c 29 - 669a 16).

29. Four manners of receiving nourishment (669a 16-24).

30. Three conditions for receiving alms (669a 26 - 669b 6).

31. Ten kinds of food kept after nightfall (669b 7-11).

32. Seven causes of loss of assistance (669b 13-26).

33. Three ways of touching and moving (an alms-bowl) before eating (669b 26-29).

34. Five cases when not seeking alms from door to door is allowed (669b 29 - 669c 3).

35. Five cases of offences destroying probation⁴⁷⁶ (669c 3-14).

36. Nine cases of interruption of the retreat during the rainy season (varṣa) which can be summarised in three cases: leaving for seven days, the existence of dangers and voluntary interruption (669c 14-24).

37. Five conditions for accomplishing the retreat during the rainy season (669c 25-29).

38. Eight cases of danger in the retreat during the rainy season (669c 29 - 670a 5).

39. Merits and demerits of the five judicial acts (karma) (670a 5-18).

40. Through four kinds of prohibition concerning the precepts, the intention of the Buddha in establishing the precepts can be understood (670a 18 - 670b 1).

41. Three categories of alms-bowls and clothing to be transmitted, retained at will, the places and prescribed times (670b 2-15).

42. Constituents of offences of forfeiture (nisargika): place, means, ownership and object (670b 15- 670c 4).

43. Eight manifestations of respect of nuns (670c 4-16).

44. Relationship between the two communities concerning the teachings by monks on a mission to nuns (670c 16-29).

45. Four kinds of dwelling (671a 1-2).

46. Five judicial acts based on five cases (671a 2-12).

47. Five categories of acquisitions (671a 12-17).

48. Five groups of persons who transgress the Vinaya (671a 17-20).

49. Judgements particular to offences engendered by the domains (āyatana) and elements (dhātu) (671a 20-27).

50. Eight deeds of destruction of the efficacy of the kathina robe (671a 27 - 671b 2).

51. Five merits for whoever observes the kathina robe (671b 2-6).

52. Two methods of preserving the kathina robe (671b 6-8).

53. Twenty categories of persons who cannot receive ordination (Upasampada) (671b 9-13).

54. Ten ways of leaving the monkhood (671b 13-19).

55. Two methods of preserving things (671b 19-26).

56. Four judicial acts (karman) concerning the seven methods of calming disputes.

⁴⁷⁵ Since circumstances and intentions differ, there are five kinds of falsehood: those leading to pārajika, saṅghādiśeṣa, sthūlāyaya, parasārṇika, duṣṭri. The nature of these offences can be ascertained from the Vinaya. Cf. Lā ming-liao lun, 668c 24-28.

⁴⁷⁶ These are circumstances which cause the inefficacy of the 17 kinds of probation practised by the monks.
(adhikaranāsamatha) (671b 26 - 671c 13).
57. Four judicial acts concerning confession in the bi-monthly ceremony (poṣadha) (671c 13-20).
58. Five judicial acts concerning the celebration at the conclusion of the retreat (pravāraṇā) (671c 20-25).
59. Transmission of the alms-bowl and three monastic robes (671c 25-25).
60. Five kinds of fruit which are purified" (671c 25-29).
61. The purification of vegetables is feasible by oneself, others or both (671c 29 - 672a 6).
62. The preceptor (upādhyāya) and teacher (ācārya) qualified from the viewpoint of the Vinaya should be chosen from among those who possess five merits in the five groups of fifty merits (672a 6 - 672b 20).

The last stanza (XXII) is the conclusion affirming that clear comprehension, recitation and practice of the preceding disciplinary codes enable us to grasp all the significations of the Vinaya and to explain them easily without consulting others.

VI — THE ORIGINAL SCHOOL

The text concerning the disciplinary codes in the treatise gives us no positive proof enabling us to identify its original school. Nonetheless, we have found many clear indications confirming that the Lū ming-liao lun pertained to the Śāṃmitīya school, apart from the assertion, mentioned with the name of the author in the first lines of the text, in particular that the author of this work belonged to that school.

Here are the doctrinal indications due to which it can be confirmed that this treatise is a work of the Śāṃmitīya school in particular, and of the Pudgalavādīn school in general:

The four stages of "entry into the predestination of rightness (samyaktvaniyāma), namely: patience (jñā, kṣānti), the name (ming ṡ, nāma), the characteristic mark (hsiang ṡ, laksana)" and the supreme worldly dharma (shih ti i ONSE, laukikāgradharmā) (Lū ming-liao lun, 665c 13).

It is certainly difficult to rediscover the origin of the school in the Vinaya treatises but, owing to these indications, it can be concluded that the Lū ming-liao lun is a work of the Śāṃmitīyas or, more generally, of the Pudgalavādīns.

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477 These are methods of purifying fruit which the monks should observe before eating them.
478 Instead of using the word hsiang Montserrat (samyāka perception), as in other Pudgalavādīn works, the Lū ming-liao lun, 665c 13, mentions the word hsiang Montserrat (laksana: characteristic).
CHAPTER THREE

THE THESIS OF THE PUDGALAVĀDINS

A - THE ORIGINAL TEACHING OF THE BUDDHA

Before embarking on the Pudgalavādin theses themselves, we should recall some of the main doctrines of Buddhism with regard to the reality of a man or a being in relation to his fetters and liberation. We need to refer to the original teaching propounded by the Buddha in order to grasp and judge the doctrinal ideas presented by the Pudgalavādins.

To this end, we will briefly describe some doctrines considered to be the essence of Buddhism from the point of view of knowledge and its applications.

I - Essential doctrines

1. The doctrine of dependent origination

Among the doctrinal principles (dharma) advocated by the Buddha, the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is essential. Overall, this doctrine explains that everything is both conditioned (pratītyasamutpāda) and conditioning (pratītyasamutpattana) and therefore it is relative and interdependent. Being endowed with non-determinist characteristics, this doctrine opposes theories of determinism through past actions or an all-powerful deity and

479 Vin. I, 40: Of things which are engendered by a cause, the Tathāgata explains the cause. As regards their cessation, the Great Recluse speaks (ye dhāmā hetupabhava, tesaṁ hetum tathāgato āha. tesañca yo nirodho, evamvādi mahāsāmano, Cf. MN II, 32; SN II, 28; Sanskrit: ye dharmā hetuprabhavah hetum tesaṁ tathāgatāya hyavatā. tesaṁ ca yo nirodha evam vādi mahāsāmanah). As this stanza says, the essence of the Buddha’s teaching is summarised in the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). This law was discovered by the Buddha on his attainment of perfect enlightenment (cf. Vin.I, I. 2; Udāna I, 2). The Buddha discerned that ‘whosoever sees the law of dependent origination sees the teaching; whoousever sees the teaching sees the law of dependent origination’ (yo paṭiccasamuppādam dhamnam passati so paṭiccasamuppannā dhamnam’ passatiti — MN I, 190-1). The following verse to a certain degree summarises the principle of this doctrine:

When this is, that is,
This arising, that arises;
When this is not, that is not,
This ceasing, that ceases.

(imasmin, sati idam hoti / unassupādā idam uppaññati / imasmin asati idam na hoti / imassa nirodham idam nirujjhati // — MN III, 63; SN II, 23, 70, 95, Ud 2).

This law is manifested everywhere and in everything, as SN III, 103, writes: I have taught you, monks, to see dependent origination everywhere and in everything (paṭicca viññā kho me tumhe, bhikkhave, tatra tesu tesu dhammesu). MN II, 197: In truth my teaching is analytical, it does not support a single thesis (vibhajjavo kho oham etthu, mānava, nāhun ettha ekamsavado). Hence, the law of dependent origination is supplied with the characteristics of ‘objectivity, necessity, invariability and conditionality’ (satthā avitathā anaññathatā idappaccayatā ayaṁ vuccati ... paṭiccasamuppado — SN II, 26).
theories of non-determinism.

2. The two corollary doctrines

In order to develop the doctrine of dependent origination, particularly at the level of a man or a being, the Buddha advocated the doctrine of insubstantiality (anāṃsavaḍa) and that of impermanence (anityavāda).

The first rejects the concept of a soul endowed with a permanent substance (ātman) and maintains that a man is merely a psycho-physical complex which, like everything else, is insubstantial. This doctrine is an analysis of phenomena in space: "All compounded things are impermanent." Compared to form or the body, the mind is even more impermanent.

Being endowed with non-determinate characteristics, the doctrine of dependent origination opposes theories of determinism through past actions (pabhokatahū), through an all-powerful deity (issara-nimmaṇavāda), and the theory of non-determinism (āhata-apaccaya-vāda). Cf. AN I, 173 sq.

This doctrine constitutes the special teaching of the Buddhas (buddhamam ściukamśikā desana — MN I, 380) which rejects the concept of a soul with permanent substance (ātman). Similarly, this doctrine analyses what is conventionally called a 'man' or 'person' in their different physical and mental aspects. To show that a man is merely a composite of psycho-physical elements, the Buddha, basing himself on these two foundations: name-and-form (nāmarūpa) (cf. SN II, 109; IV, 124), used several systems of analysis, namely:

1. the five aggregates (skandha) (cf. SN III, 59-61);
2. the six elements (dhātu) (cf. MN I, 140; III, 239);
3. the twelve bases (āyatana) (cf. DN II, 302);
4. the eighteen elements (dhātu) (cf. SN II, 72);
5. the five nourishments (āhāra) (cf. MN I, 48), etc.

Of these analyses, that of the five aggregates appears frequently in the canonical texts. It emphasizes the insubstantiality of the mental aspect, particularly that of a man. These constituents are unreal, empty and insubstantial (cf. SN IV, 54). That is why a man or a being is only a conventional designation. If there were a permanent absolute self, the ideal life leading to the cessation of suffering could not be established (cf. SN III, 143).

This doctrine demonstrates that the world is like a mountain stream which flows fast and is forever changing (cf. AN IV, 137). There is no existence, there is only becoming (bhava). The arising (upadā) and disappearance (vaya) of what exists (āññatathā) are the three signs of compounded things (cf. AN I, 152). Things appear and disappear from instant to instant (cf. SN II, 49). The five aggregates which constitute a man or a being are impermanent (cf. SN III, 143), but they are not transformed and they do not totally dissolve, that is why there is continuity (cf. MN I, 40). Nonetheless, it is because things are impermanent and life changeable that the ideal life leading to the cessation of suffering can be established (cf. SN III, 143).

Generally, the belief in the permanence of phenomena is based on the view that the mind is something lasting which does not change. In reality, the mind is less permanent than form or the body, as the Buddha said in AN I, 10: Monks, I know no other thing that changes as rapidly as the mind; truly, monks, it is not easy to find a thing which can be compared to the mind in the rapidity of change.

By means of dialectical analysis, the Buddha demonstrated the impermanence of the six kinds of consciousness, of contact (sparśa), of feeling (vedanā), of mental factors (saṃskāra), of perception (saṃjñā), by explaining that even their conditions are impermanent.

"Owing to the eye and the visible, visual consciousness arises. The eye is impermanent, changeable,
II — The Application of these doctrines.

The three preceding doctrines explain what is the reality of the world in general and of a person in particular.

1. The denial of a soul.

With regard to the person, these doctrines accept that that which we conventionally call a person or a being is no other than a simple psycho-physical process of five aggregates without a substantial subject and which changes perpetually. In this sense, nothing exists except consciousness, feeling, etc., but never anyone that is conscious, feels, etc.484

2. Rebirth without a person

As long as a person clings to existence, despite the cessation of conditions of existence in the present, his continuity is manifested in the next life. In this process there is no person which transmigrates, but only name-and-form (nāma-rūpa)485, linked indissolubly to craving (trṣnā) as vital force486, continues to exist unstable. Thus, that duality is ephemeral and transitory. That cause, that condition which gives rise to visual consciousness is also impermanent, changeable, unstable; and how, monks, is it possible that visual consciousness, having arisen in dependence on impermanent conditions, could become permanent? Hence, the meeting, the convergence, the coming together of these three things, — that, monks, is called eye contact. Eye contact is also impermanent, changeable, unstable. That cause, that condition which gives rise to eye contact, that is also impermanent, changeable, unstable, and how, monks, could eye contact, having arisen in dependence on impermanent conditions, become permanent? Experiencing contact, monks, one feels. Experiencing contact, one perceives. Those states are ephemeral and transitory — impermanent, changeable, unstable. The other six kinds of consciousness are examined in the same way (SN III, 67–9).

On the other hand, the Buddha used impermanence, along with the other two signs, as a basis of argument for rejecting belief in a permanent soul or self:

‘What do you think, monks, is the body (or other psycho-physical phenomena), permanent or impermanent? — Impermanent, Lord. — But what is permanent, is that suffering or joy? — Suffering, Lord. — Then what is impermanent, full of suffering, subject to change, can one, when considering it, say: this is mine, I am this, this is my self? — One cannot, Lord. — Consequently, monks, with regard to body (and other phenomena), everything that never has been, will be nor is, whether it be in us or in the external world... whether it be weak or strong, high or low, far or near, all that is not mine, I am not it, it is not my self: this is what should be seen by whomever possesses true knowledge’ (SN III, 67–8; Vin. I, 14).

484 SN II, 13: I (the Buddha) do not speak of anyone who suffers (phusatīti aham na vadam). I do not speak of anyone who feels (vediyatīti aham na vadam). Cf. MN 1, 293; Visn., 460.

485 In this context, name-and-form (nāma-rūpa) indicates the five aggregates, since name is a collective term for the four mental aggregates, that is: feeling, perception, mental factors and consciousness, whilst form indicates the body. It is this phenomenon of name-and-form which reappears in another existence, but the self does not transmigrate.

486 Craving (trṣnā) is the vital force of the cycle of birth and death; consequently, it is the cause of suffering in its three aspects. DN II, 308: Monks, what is the Noble Truth of the origin of suffering? It is craving which always incurs new births and which, attached to pleasure and covetousness, sometimes here, sometimes there, always finds new joy. It is craving for sensuality, craving for existence and craving for annihilation (yāyam tanāh ponabhavikā nandi-rāga-saḥgaṁ tatra tairāhinandani. seyyathidam kāmatanāḥ bhavatānāḥ vibhavatānāḥ)
in one of the five destinies. Because the life of a person is unique, he who is born in the later existence and he who died in the preceding existence are not the same, nor another\(^{487}\). Hence there is continuity but not identity.

3. **The responsibility for actions**

‘Beings are the possessors of their actions, inheritors of their actions, action is the womb from which they are born, action is their friend, their refuge. Whatever action they accomplish, good or bad, they are the inheritors of it\(^{488}\). The manifestation of actions and their results (karmavipāka) is not limited to the present life or to humanity, but extends over the five destinies and three times: past, present and future\(^{489}\). Here, a problem arises: the identification of him who performs the actions and the identification of him who receives their fruit. Are they identical or different? — The person who performs the actions and the one who experiences their results are neither the same nor different\(^{490}\).

Hence, a person is responsible for his actions and will inherit their consequences, even though he is neither the same nor other than himself in relation to the earlier existence.

4. **Liberation without anyone to be liberated**

Beings are attached to the wheel of existence by fetters (samyojana). Due to practice in accordance with the Path (mārga), liberation (nirvāṇa) is attained. If

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\(^{487}\) During the process of existence across different times, only the person composed of the five aggregates appears and disappears successively, but there is no fixed being; consequently, the identity or difference between two existences cannot be affirmed. It is said in Mila, p.40:

— Venerable Nāgasena, is he who is reborn the same as he who died or another?

— Neither the same, nor another (na ca so na ca anā).

\(^{488}\) MN III, 203: kammassakā sattā kammadāyādā kammayoni kammabandhā kammapaṭisaranā. kammam satte vibhajati yaddhaṃ hinappapatiyati.

\(^{489}\) AN III, 415: There exists an action, monks, which ripens in the hells, an action which ripens in the womb of animals, an action which ripens in humanity... an action which ripens in the heavenly world... Monks, I declare that the result of action is threefold: ripening during this life, ripening during the next rebirth and ripening during successive births (aṭṭhi bhikkhave kammam nirayaavedaniyam, aṭṭhi kammam tiracchāṇayonivedaniyam, aṭṭhi kammam pittivisoṭaavedaniyam, aṭṭhi kammam marasaloṭaavedaniyam, aṭṭhi kammam devalokavedaniyam)...

\(^{490}\) SN II, 20: He who performs (the actions) experiences (the results) — that, Kassapa, which you first called ‘suffering caused by oneself constituting eternalism. One performs (actions), the other experiences (the results): that, Kassapa, for what is affected by feelings, expressed by ‘suffering caused by another person’, constitutes nihilism (so karoti so pattasaṃvediyati kho Kassapa idāto sato sayamkataṁ dukkhati iti vadaṁ sassataṁ etan pareti, aṅno karoti aṅno pattasaṃvediyati kho Kassapa vedanābhītāyissa sato paramkataṁ dukkhati iti vadaṁ ucchedaṁ etan pareti).
the defilements (kleśa) are eliminated, Nirvāṇa is realised, even in this life. Nirvāṇa pertains to the uncompounded (asamskṛta); it is ultimate reality. That is why it is immeasurable, unknowable by ordinary people and only the holy ones actualise it. Nirvāṇa realised by a holy one who is still alive with his old aggregates is Nirvāṇa with a remainder (sopadhiśesanirvāṇa). Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiśesya) is Nirvāṇa without the psycho-physical process which occurs on the death of the holy ones. It is also called Parinirvāṇa. What happens to an Arhat or a Tathāgata after Parinirvāna? That is a question which the Buddha refused to answer (avyākṛta). To prevent his disciples from engaging in interminable polemics and harmful speculations, the Buddha spoke very little of Nirvāṇa, especially of Parinirvāṇa. On this avoided subject, the Buddha said: ‘This teaching is profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, calm, excellent, beyond the domain of reason, subtle, intelligible to the wise.

Nevertheless, it is certain that there is no person who accedes to Nirvāṇa, since the remainder of the aggregates which form the existence of a being is totally extinguished after the death of an Arhat or a Tathāgata; it is like a fire or a lamp which goes out after the fuel is consumed.

III — The Characteristics and Efficacy of these Doctrines

1. Pragmatic teaching

What we have seen constitutes the main points of the truth taught by the Buddha concerning the person or being with its fetters and its liberation. The Buddha only taught: ‘truths which are profitable, fundamentally linked to the pure life, leading to aversion, to detachment, to cessation, to tranquillity, to supernormal knowledge, to perfect enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa’.

In this sense, original Buddhism is a pragmatic doctrine, which never

491 Cf AN I, 58.
492 On this subject, see below and n. 499.
493 MN I, 48: Gambhīra hāyaṃ . . . dhammo duddaso duranubodho santo puṇito atakāra vacaro nipuno paññāvedaniyo . . .
494 See below, ‘The main thesis of the Pudgalavādin: Pudgala—designated—by—cessation’.
495 MN I, 431: Etaṃ hi mālāhēkāputta atthasamhitam, etaṃ ādībrahmacaryyakaṃ, etaṃ nibbidāya virāgīya nirodhāya upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya samvatsati, tasmā taṃ mayā byūkataṃ.
496 The pragmatic nature of Buddhism is clearly summed up in the simile of the poisoned arrow (cf. MN I, 429) by the fact that the Buddha did not reply to insoluble problems (avyākaro) because they are not profitable, not being fundamentally linked to the pure life, nor leading to aversion, to detachment, to cessation, to tranquillity, to supernormal knowledge, to perfect enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa (na hetaṃ atthasamhitam nādībrahmacaryyakaṃ, na nibbidāya na virāgīya na nirodhīya na upasamāya na abhiññāya na sambodhīya na nibbānīya - MN I, 431); and in the simile of the raft serving to reach the other shore (cf. MN I, 134), the conclusion of which is as follows: Equally, monks, I have taught a doctrine resembling a raft — it is made for crossing, and not for relying on. You, monks, who understand the doctrine resembling a raft, you should abandon good things and, even more so, bad ones (avam-evam).
touches on metaphysical and non-profitable problems such as those of a Creator, or a Primal Cause or other questions to be avoided (avyākta), namely:

1. Is the universe eternal, or
2. Is it non-eternal;
3. Is the universe finite, or
4. Is it infinite;
5. Is the soul the same thing as the body, or
6. Is the soul one thing and the body another;
7. Does the Tathāgata exist after death, or
8. Does he not exist after death, or
9. Does he (both) exist and not exist after death, or
10. Does he (both) neither exist nor not exist after death?

These are questions engendered by false views about the concept of an absolute self to which the Buddha never replied. His silence was very often misinterpreted. However, when we re-examine these questions, opinions become much less opposed to each other. In particular, the discussion of these points has nothing to do with the search for truth. In other words, the Buddha was concerned only with the profitable, immediate and urgent problem which is directed at the happiness and liberation of mankind, and knowledge of which is the most important point.

koh bhikkhave kuttāpamo mayā dhammo desito nītharanaatthāya no gahanatthāya kuttāpamam vo bhikkhave ājanantehi dharmām pi vo pahātābba, pañeva adhammā — MN I, 135). In fact, Buddhism is only preoccupied with the problem of 'suffering and the cessation of suffering'. On the other hand, Buddhism itself should be considered as a means of application and not as a thing to which one should cling. There is no metaphysical problem concerning a Creator and creation in Buddhism. The Buddha considered belief in an almighty God (āsavannānūmapāda) as a false view. Cf. AN I, 173 sq.

The doctrine of dependent origination renders void the search for a primal cause, since in reality a primal cause never existed. The origin of the existence of a being and the universe is inconceivable (anamataggā) (cf. SN II, 179). Furthermore, speculation on a primal cause can lead to mental trouble (cf. AN IV, 77).

MN I, 426: 1. sassato loko 2. asassato loko 3. antava loko 4. anantavā loko 5. tam jīvam tam sariram 6. anānam jīvam anānam sariram 7. hoti tathāgato param maraṇā 8. na hoti tathāgato param maraṇā 9. hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato param maraṇā 10. n'evo hoti na na hoti, tathāgato param maraṇā. Cf. DN I, 191; II, 68, 133; MN I, 484-5; SN III, 257; IV, 393; AN I, 41. The Pāli texts only mention ten questions, whereas the Buddhist literature in Sanskrit, such as Kosā V, 22, refer to fourteen avyāktaavastus: 1) the world is eternal, 2) non-eternal, 3) eternal and non-eternal, 4) neither eternal nor non-eternal, 5) the world is finite, 6) infinite, 7) finite and infinite, 8) neither finite nor infinite, 9) the Tathāgata exists after death, 10) does not exist after death, 11) exists and does not exist after death, 12) neither exists nor does not exist after death, 13) the life principle is the same as the body, 14) different from the body. Cf. T.R.V. McRae, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.36, n.2.

On the reasons for which the Buddha did not answer the questions to be avoided, see below. 'The main thesis of the Pudgalavadins: Position of the pudgala'. Also cf. SN IV, 391-7; MN I, 484; Udāna VI, 4.
2. The middle way

Alongside the pragmatic aspect of the teaching, the doctrinal points mentioned above are characterized as being the middle way (madhyamaprātipad) which avoids all extreme notions both from the point of view of knowledge⁵⁰¹ as that of practice⁵⁰².

It is right view (samyagdṛṣṭī), according to the doctrine of dependent origination, of insubstantiality and of impermanence, which dispels false views (mithyādṛṣṭī) of the reality of the being such as the belief in a substantial and permanent soul that gives rise to non-profitable things (akuśaladharma): 'sorrow, grief, suffering, lamentation and despair'⁵⁰³. Furthermore, he who, with right view, sees that the five aggregates are not a self, do not pertain to a self, is he who is detached, freed by the absence of the acquisition of impurities⁵⁰⁴.

In consequence, knowledge in conformity with the reality of a being constitutes 'the pure life (brahmacaryya), for the total cessation of suffering'⁵⁰⁵.

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⁵⁰¹ MN I, 65: There are, monks, two theories — the theory of existence and that of non-existence. Monks and brahmanas who adhere to the theory of existence are intimate with it, clinging to it and strongly oppose the theory of non-existence; monks and brahmanas who adhere to the theory of non-existence are intimate with it, clinging to it and are strongly opposed to the theory of existence (Dve'ī ma bhikkhave dhīthiyo bhavadiṭṭhi ca vibhavadiṭṭhi ca. ye hi keci bhikkhave samanā vā brahmacā ca bhavadiṭṭhim allīna bhavadiṭṭhim upagaṭaṁ bhavadiṭṭhim a[jjhosiya, vibhavadiṭṭhiyā te pājīrvedaḥ, ye hi keci bhikkhave samanā vā brahmacā ca vibhavadiṭṭhim allīna bhavadiṭṭhim upagaṭaṁ bhavadiṭṭhim a[jjhosiya, bhavadiṭṭhiyā te pājīrvedaḥ). In the canonical texts, the following pairs of extremist theories are found:

1. The theory admitting that everything exists (sabbhaṇi atti) ti) and the theory admitting that nothing exists (sabbhaṇi natthi ti). Cf. SN II, 76, III, 134.

2. Eternism (sussatadiṭṭhi) admitting that the life of beings is eternal, and annihilation (ucchedadiṭṭhi) (cf. SN II, 20) admitting that the life of beings ends after death (III, 98). Eternism admits that he who performs actions is the same as he who experiences the results, and annihilation admits that he who performs actions is different from him who experiences the results (cf. SN II, 20).

3. The materialist concept saying that the body and the life principle are identical (tāma jivaṁ tāma sarītā). Cf. SN II, 61.

4. Determinism admitting that the happiness and suffering of beings are determined by actions from the previous life (sabbhaṇi puddekaṭṭhena), and non-determinism admitting that things never relate to causes and conditions (sabbhaṇi aheru apaccaya). Cf. AN I, 173.

⁵⁰² In the introduction to the first discourse (Dhammacakkavatattvavatta), addressed to his five former companions in Baranās, the Buddha said: There are, monks, two extremes with which a monk should not be associated. Which are they? Clinging to sense pleasures, which is base, vulgar, common, ignoble and associated with disadvantage, and devoting oneself to self-mortification, which is painful, ignoble and associated with disadvantage (Dve'ī me bhikkhuve antaṁ pabbajitena na sevitabbā. Katame dve? Yo cāyaṁ kāmesa kāmasukkhalikānāyo, hiyo, yamano, puthujjaniko, anariyo, anathasamihito, yo cāyaṁ atta-kilamāthanāyo dakkho, anariyo, anathasamihito — SN V, 421).

⁵⁰³ MN II, 138: Well now, monks! So I do not see, monks, any theory of the self in which attachment does not give rise to sorrow, grief, suffering, lamentation and despair (Sadhu bhikkhuve, aham pi kho tām bhikkhuve attāvādpādānaṁ na samanupassāmi yāṁ sa attāvādpādānaṁ upādīyato na upajjeyyam sakāparidevadukkhamano aparipūyyevād). ⁵⁰⁴ SN III, 45: For him who sees (things as they are) with perfect wisdom, his mind is detached, freed by the absence of the acquisition of impurities (...) evam etam samappāññahāya pāsato cittam vīrajjati vinuccati anupādāyā āveçethi.

⁵⁰⁵ SN III, 147: ... tasmaṁ brahmacaryavāso paṭṭhāyati sammādakkhaṭṭhayāya.
B — THE THESES OF THE PUDGALAVĀDINS

Due to the absence of any Pudgalavādin canonical literature, nearly all the interpretations of their doctrinal position are badly defined or have been exaggerated. By considering the Pudgalavadins as heretics\textsuperscript{506}, their theses, which are doctrinal solutions to explain ever-outstanding problems, have not been properly appreciated.

Nonetheless, due to the four works accessible in Chinese, we have attempted to indicate the main thesis, that of the pudgala, fifteen secondary theses and two lists of śrāvakas of the Pudgalavādins.

1 - The main thesis: the pudgala

We intend to explain here the main thesis of the Pudgalavādins — the pudgala — in detail, since it is the main thesis of the school. In Pudgalavādin literary works, the thesis is presented as a characteristic doctrine of the school. The author of the Tds emphasises that non-comprehension of that ineffable thing (avaktavya) constitutes an aspect of non-knowledge (ajñāna) which, in turn, is one of the three elements of non-higher-knowledge (avidyā). (Cf. Tds, 24a 29, 24b 8). In the same work, the explanation of this thesis is repeated frequently in varying ways. Equally, the Sns devotes a considerable number of passages to refuting adverse arguments before establishing the existence of the pudgala (cf. Sns, 462b 5 - 466c 29).

Moreover, indirect sources such as the Samayabhedaoparacanaacakra (1 pu tsung lun luna sū ș ș sū T XLIX, 2031, by Vasumitra, the Shih-pa pu lun + sū š T XLIX, 2033, translated by Paramārtha, and the Mahāvibhāṣā (Ta-p'ı-p'ı'o-sha luna sū ș sū T XXVIII, 1545, also present the existence of the pudgala as the main thesis of the Vātsiputriyas. The Kathavatthu attributes to the latter two theses, namely: the pudgala and the downfall of the arhat\textsuperscript{507}; this last is also accepted by the Sarvāstivādins\textsuperscript{508}. Furthermore, only the pudgala thesis is subjected to refutation in a large part of the Kathavatthu\textsuperscript{509} and the whole of Chapter Nine of the Abhidharmakośa\textsuperscript{510}. It is therefore evident that the existence of the pudgala is the main thesis of the Vātsiputriya doctrine, the mother school of the Pudgalavādins.

1. Definitions of the pudgala

The etymology and meaning of the word pudgala are not clear from the philological and philosophical points of view.

1. The Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary defines it: 'pudgala, often written pumgala . . . = Skt. puruṣa, person, man, creature, soul (often in the latter sense

\textsuperscript{506} Kośa IX, p.273 and n.1. The Pudgalavādins are heretics and do not win deliverance. According to Kośa IX, p.273. Preliminary Notes, Lcean-skya hu-thug-tu (Wassilief, p.270), Śāntideva (Bodhicaryavatāra VI, 60) and Candrakīrti (Madhyamakāvatāra VI, 86) condemn the Pudgalavādins as infidels, outside the Saddharma.

\textsuperscript{507} Cf. Kathavatthu I, I, 2; Baraue, Sectes, p.115 n.4 and p.118, n.1.

\textsuperscript{508} Cf. Kośa VI, 58, Kathavatthu I, 2.

\textsuperscript{509} Kathavatthu, pp.8-63.

\textsuperscript{510} Kośa V, pp.227-79.
2. The explanation by H. Kern [tr.]: 'pudgala (sanskrit): sometimes an atom, a monad, an individual; sometimes an assemblage of atoms, considered as a unity. In the ordinary sense of 'a person, an individual', the word is used by Nāgasena, for example, in the Milindapañha. In metaphysics, it is less profound yet useful to leave several meanings to a single word, especially without a more precise definition of the meaning used in a given case. It is therefore easy to juggle with words."

3. According to L. de La Vallée Poussin, pudgala is an obscure term because, among the Jains, pudgala or pudgalāstikāya is matter, part of things which constitute a non-living being (ajīva), whereas among the Buddhists it designates a self with a soul (ātman), a man (purusa), the life principle (jīva), a living being (sattva), etc.

4. A. Bareau, in 'La notion de la personne dans le Bouddhisme indien', clarifies it as follows [tr.]: 'The term which designates (the notion of a person) is pudgala, a word of which the origin is obscure but of which the traditional Buddhist definition and etymology, which identify it with or have it derive from the names purusa and pums, both meaning «man» in the two senses of «a human being» and «a person of the masculine sex», are clear. We should note in passing that the word purusa also serves to designate the three persons in the language of Indian grammarians. In non-Buddhist Sanskrit, the term pudgala often designates the human body and even, in the doctrine of the Jains, matter in general, a meaning which it has never had in Buddhism but which may be older than that of «person» with which the latter always uses it.'

In consequence, in order to understand the notion of the pudgala of the Pudgalavādins, it is first of all necessary to differentiate it from the concepts of the metaphysical self (ātman) of a man such as the universal ātman of Vedānta or the purusa of the Śaṅkhya.

'The ātman represents the «self» in a physical and psychic sense, the centre of the personality which makes an individual what he is and, moreover, designates a reality, such a breath, eyes, etc., which pertains to a man by nature, an element of psysophysical personality which has a determined function in his life. The ātman persists and passes through different existences (under the appearance of an animal or, more generally, a human being) as a function of kārmaṇa which is attached to it. In this sense, the ātman is the creator of actions, it receives their results and constitutes the agent in rebirth. Furthermore, the ātman is Reality "

513 La Vallee Poussin, Nirvāṇa, p.35, n.3.
514 A. Bareau, 'La notion de la personne dans le Bouddhisme indien', pp.83–97.
516 Ibid., p.249.
identical to the Absolute, the Brahmaṅṇa. 

With regard to the notion of a self (ātman) in Vaiśeṣika philosophy, this is expressed by J. Filiozat as follows: 'He (the Vaiśeṣika: one realism, and dualist) in fact admits, on the one hand, combined material atoms for composing all things; on the other hand, multiple ārmans which, associated with compounds of atoms, are engaged in the phenomenal world and led into the circle of Samsāra. However, these ārmans are freed by the knowledge of the true nature of things which causes them to see their own essence, distinct from that of the compound of atoms and other realities. More simply, the Vaiśeṣika offers the exact determination of the ātman through the exclusion of the rest (viśeṣa); hence, it is isolated and frees itself.

As for the puruṣa, this is a notion implying the domain of beings in the Śāmkhya system. The Rg Veda describes this cosmic, primordial, archetypal being as follows:

'The puruṣa is all that,
All that has been, all that will be,
The Lord of Immortality.'

In fact, the puruṣa is to prakṛti what the being is to becoming (Oltramare), immobility to movement. Pure spirituality (cintāmaṇi), a torch (prakāśa) which lights the activity of Nature, it is on contact with it that the tattvas develop, that the gunas function, that life is formed and everywhere suffering. However, it is merely a spectator: unqualified, unqualifiable, it neither acts nor thinks, has neither volition nor perception.

Single in essence, it is innumerable in its manifestations: there are as many souls as there are bodies, all the same, omnipresent. Indeed, 'That being is a gigantic man who, in the beginning, completely covered the earth, even surpassing it. That man was the world, the world of the past as well as the world to come; he was also the master of immortality.

According to Rādhakrishnan, the puruṣa of the Śāmkhya is not a person but a subtle body which is the essence of rebirth as well as the principle of individual identity across various existences. Furthermore, S. Dasgupta, in A History of Indian Philosophy, gives his idea on the notions of ātman, puruṣa and jiva in the

517 'You are that' (tattvam asī): the Ātman and the Brahmaṅṇa are the same thing; the Brahman manifests itself in all selves. It is the essential spirit of the Upaniṣads (700–600 BCE). 'The sum and substance of Upaniṣad teaching is involved in the equation Ātman = Brahmaṅṇa' — S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy I, p.45. On this subject, G.P. Malalasekera wrote: Every human being had in him a part of Brahman, called ātman or the little self. Brahman and Ātman were one, and of the same 'substance'. — The Truth of Anātī, Kandy 1966, p.4; cf. K. Bhattacharya, L'Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme ancien, pp.7–9 and notes.
518 L'Inde classique II, § 1481.
519 Rg Veda, 10, 90.
520 L'Inde classique I, § 1434.
521 Gonda, Védisme et Hindouisme ancien, pp.225–6.
522 Cf. S Rādhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, p.284.
THE LITERATURE OF THE PERSONALISTS -- CHAPTER THREE

context of Indian philosophy as follows:

'All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence of a permanent entity variously called ātman, purusa or jiva. As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed divergences of view. Thus while the Nyāya calls it absolutely qualityless and characterless, an indeterminate unconscious entity, Sāmkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness, the Vedānta says that it is that fundamental point of unity implied in pure consciousness (cit), pure bliss (ananda), and pure being (sat). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not form a real part of it. The summum bonum of life is attained when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous connections with it are absolutely dissociated'.

Furthermore, from several discourses attributed to the Buddha, we know in a general way the various speculations concerning the opinion of a self at the time of the Buddha. For example:

1. The Alagaddūpamasutta points out concepts of self to which an illiterate and ordinary man may adhere, namely: the life principle of an individual identified with the five aggregates, and the points of view concerning a persisting self, unchanged at death. There are six points of speculation which the text describes as follows:
   1. '... (he) considers his body (and says to himself): this is mine, I am that, that is my self'.
   2. considers his feelings ...
   3. his perception ...
   4. his mental factors ...
   5. whatever is seen, heard, thought, known, apprehended, desired and followed by his mind (and says to himself): 'that is mine, I am that, that is my self', and
   6. whatever point of speculation, saying: 'that is the world, that the self; after death I shall become permanent, stable, eternal, I shall not be subjected to change, I shall always remain thus', (and says to himself): 'that is mine, I am that, that is my self'.

2. The Potthapādasutta gives a summary of concepts which admit the existence of an entity, a real ego forming the permanent substance behind the activities of a person, be it subtle or gross, that is, three aspects of the self:
   1. the gross self (olāriko attapatiḷābhā), endowed with form, made of the four elements of nature, nourished by material food;
   2. the self based on the assemblage of an incorporated mind-being (manomaya attapatiḷābhā), endowed with all its senses directed by the mind; and

523 Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy 1, p.75.
524 Cf. MN I, 555-6.
3. The formless self (arūpa attapaññilābho), made of feelings, a purely psychic nature in itself corresponding to the consciousness of the formless world

Thus, the concepts of self (ātman), according to the systems of non-Buddhist Indian thought, are considered to be principles, more or less vital and cosmic, identified with the consciousness of a man who, in turn, constitutes part of the brahman. Whereas, the pudgala or Being (sattva) of the Pudgalavādin school is quite another thing than the self (ātman) of the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśesikas and other later brahmanical systems.

Furthermore, it is evident that the thesis of the pudgala must be different from the sixty-two views concerning the self and the universe taught by monks and brahmins contemporary with the Buddha in the Brahmagālāsutta.

It is clear that pudgala and sattva are not terms invented by the Pudgalavādins. They are terms which are found in the canonical texts, but with the meaning (individual, person, being) of mere designations and simple conventional means of expression (vohāravacana), but not of absolute truth (paramārtha-
satya). For example:

- ‘A person (puggala), monks, who is born in the world, is born for the welfare of many people, for the happiness of gods and mankind in the world. Who is that person? It is the Tathāgata, Arhat, Sammāsambuddha.

- ‘The Order of disciples of the Blessed One consisting of the four pairs of men, eight persons (puggala)...

- ‘All living beings (satta) will come to be; and all living beings will travel on, after having abandoned their bodies.

- ‘If all the bones that a person had during his existences in the course of an aeon were assembled, they would make a mountain.

By relying on the three texts of Indian origin preserved in their Chinese translation, the Tds, Sā and Sns, we can understand how the pudgala is conceived as a designation of a person, more or less synonymous with the terms designating an individual principle such as sativa (being), nara (man), manuja (born of Manu), mānava (youth), poṣa (who feeds himself), jīva (life principle), jantu (who is born), etc., and yakkha or yaksā, an interesting term found in the Suttanipāta.

2. The pudgala according to extant Pudgalavādin works

However it may be, when the Pudgalavādins wished to make known the real existence of the pudgala by enhancing the principle of individualisation in the constituent impersonal elements, they did not fail to raise all kinds of questions and restart debate on basic doctrines. This is indicated in the following passages. For example:

1. The Tds, when describing the concentration on emptiness (śūnyatāsamādhi), implies that the Pudgalavādins clearly understood the Buddha’s teaching on the nature of the five aggregates in conformity with conventional truth and absolute truth: ‘Emptiness (śūnyatā) is the absence of Me, of Mine (ahamkāra-mamamkāra) and of both, the absence of these three things is what is called emptiness (śūnyatā)’. . . How can Me and Mine not exist (when) the Blessed One has said: «At the time, I was the brahmin Sunetra»? He also said: «Monk, my hand appears in space». It cannot be thus (since) Me and Mine are conventional designations (chia-hsao mū, prajñāpi). However if the five aggregates (skandha) are considered, the self (ātman) would be Me (ahamkāra).

528 On the two truths, cf. DN I, 202; MN I, 181; SN IV, 273, AN I, 222; III, 213; Udāna, 48; Nānananda, Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought, Kandy 1971, pp.40-1.
529 See above, n.420.
530 AN III 212: Bhavavati sāvakasaṅgho, yad idam catārī purisayugāni apiha purisapuggalā . . .
531 Udāna 48: Ye teci bhūtā bhavissani ye cūpi sabbe gamissani pūhiya dhāma . . .
532 Itivuttaka, § 24: Ekasa-etkena kappena puggalassa — aṭṭhissucayo siyā pabbatassamo rāsi iti vutthan mahesinā.
533 Cf. Sn 875–6. The questioner and the Buddha used the term yakkha to indicate the empirical person.
That the Blessed One never admitted. If the objects (ching-ch'ieh⁸, viśaya?) are considered as possessions, that would be Mine (mamamkāra). That the Buddha did not admit either. As it is said in the Shēng tā yin ching (Āryadharma-muḍrāsūtra): «Emptiness (śūnyatā) is contemplation of the empty (śūnya).»

Hence, emptiness (śūnyatā) and Me and Mine (ahamkāramamamkāra) can be established together. That is why there is no error. That is, what is named emptiness’ (Tds, 19a 13-20).

2. The same ideas are expressed in another Pudgalavādin work, the Sns: ‘The characteristics (hsiang⁸, laksana) of the self (ātman), etc., are accepted through faith. As the Buddha said to the sectaries (tīrtha): «Although a Me exists, it is only a designation, it is not a reality. It is based on defiled aggregates (āsrava-skandha).» In seeing (impermanent) things which come and go, the Buddha calls that the self, (but) it is not a real self. As the Buddha said: «(The self) relies on compounded things (samskāra). The term (of self) is derived from compounded things». That is why the Buddha speaks (of a self). Such is the explanation of the term self’ (Sns, 464b 5-10).

‘Being blinded by ignorance (avidyā), one considers the five aggregates (skandha) which are not the self as being the self. (It is like) an uncomprehending baby which sees the mother of others and calls her its mother. It is the same for those who call self the five aggregates which are not the self. Such is the teaching of the Buddha’ (Sns, 464b 12-16).

These ideas are confirmed by an extract by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharma-kośa devoted to the argument in defence of the Vātsiputriyas when they are attacked over the concept of attachment to the Me and Mine and affection for the Me and Mine:

‘When one recognises a self in what is not a self, as do the sectaries, one feels affection for that supposed self; however, when one sees the self in the ineffable pudgala, as do the Buddhas, no affection is aroused regarding the self”⁵³⁴.

Thus, the Pudgalavādins had understood the fundamental teachings of the Buddha, particularly the doctrine of insubstantiality which vigorously rejects belief in a substantial, permanent self (ātman). Indeed, the Buddha is specifically called ‘the master of the doctrine of insubstantiality’ (anātmavādī). Only the doctrine of insubstantiality, not being found in other systems of Indian thought, constitutes the fundamental teaching of the Buddha. Consequently, without a correct understanding of this doctrinal notion, it is impossible to have knowledge and practice in conformity with Buddhism.

In the Samyuttanikāya III, 147, the Buddha, having taught that there is no substantial entity by means of an analysis of the five impermanent aggregates, takes a small quantity of dust on the tip of his nail and says to a monk:

‘... Even if this small quantity of matter, monk, were permanent, stable, eternal, unchangeable by nature, then the pure life for the total destruction of suffering

⁵³⁴ Kośa IX, p.273
could not be established (by me)\textsuperscript{335}.

Similarly, in the Samyuttanikāya III, 103, the Buddha reproached a monk for doubting the denial of an absolute self by saying:

'It is possible, monks, that someone senseless, sunk in ignorance, led astray by craving, thinks that he surpasses the teaching of the master (by questioning) thus: Since you say that the body is not the self, that feelings . . ., perception . . ., mental factors. . . and consciousness are not the self, what, then, is affected by the actions which the non-self has done?'\textsuperscript{336}

Although the Pudgalavādins have clearly understood the essence and importance of the doctrine of insubstantiality, they established the thesis of the pudgala. This doctrinal invention probably had two aims, namely:

a — to reintroduce the existence of a person in order to modify the dogmatic interpretation of the doctrine of insubstantiality by categorically denying the existence of the life principle of an individual.

In this sense, G.P. Malalasekera, having understood the necessity for this notion, wrote in \textit{The Truth of Anattā}: ‘... the Sāṃmitiyas and the Vajjī-puttakas (?) held the conception of a person (puggala) which for all practical purposes may be regarded as an effective self\textsuperscript{337}.

Furthermore, T.R.V. Murti demonstrated the Pudgalavādins’ motive in their adherence to the theory of the pudgala as follows:

‘Universally condemned by all the other Buddhist schools as heretical, the Vātsiputriya held tenaciously to the doctrine of the pudgalātman (the individual) as a quasi-permanent entity, neither completely identical with the mental states, nor different from them. However halting this conception may be, it is evidence of the awareness of the inadequacy of a stream of elements to account for the basic facts of experience, memory, moral responsibility, spiritual life etc. The Vātsiputriyas showed the hollowness, at least the inadequacy, of the doctrine of elements; the states (skandhas) cannot completely substitute the ātman; a permanent synthetic unity must be accepted\textsuperscript{338}.

b — to respond to attacks by non-Buddhists who affirmed the existence of a self (ātman). With regard to the first aim, Th. Stcherbatsky held the same opinion, and he goes even further by saying: ‘Had not the denial of the ātman been so categorical, the Vātsiputriya would have certainly invented another . . .’\textsuperscript{339}.  

In this respect, A. Baranau explains [tr.]: ‘In order to answer attacks by

\begin{flushright}
535 SN III, 147. \textit{Ettakaṁ ce pi bhikkhu rūpaṁ abhavissā niccāṁ dhuvam sussatān aviparināma-
dhamman, na yiṁam brahmaśaraṇaṁ paṁhāyetha sammādakkākkhatthāya.}

536 SN III, 103-4: \textit{Thānāṁ kho panemaṁ bhikkhave vijjati yam idhecacco mophapiraśa avidvā avijjāgato
tanákhipatayyena cetasa saṁlāsāsonam atidhāvitaṁ bhāyāya, iti kira bho rūpaṁ anātā, vedanā,
soññā, saññhārā, viññānam anattā anattakutto kammāni katamaṁ bhūsattani.}


539 Th. Stcherbatsky, \textit{The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa}, p.31, n.1.
\end{flushright}
non-Buddhist schools and calm intellectual anxiety which engendered in them a consciousness of that contradiction, certain Buddhist scholars were not slow to seek an explanation for it which, while remaining in conformity with the original doctrine, was able to satisfy logic. Thus it was that, about two centuries after the Parinirvāṇa, the Vātsiputriya school appeared, the basic thesis of which was the recognition of a personal principle and, so as not to fall into flagrant heresy which would have been an affirmation of the existence of the ātman or the jīva, the Vātsiputriyas called it pudgala. This was not sufficient to win them an assurance of orthodoxy; they developed a whole theory round this notion, declaring that the pudgala was neither identical to the various constituent elements of an individual, which would have identified them as materialists, nor different from them, which would have assimilated them with Brahmanic and Jaina spiritualists. Pressed by their adversaries to supply clarification, they added that this pudgala, which transmigrates and subsists even in the eternal bliss of Nirvāṇa, was neither permanent nor impermanent, neither relative nor absolute, in a word inexpressible, which served somewhat badly in hiding the embarrassment into which this halting solution plunged them, which various others did not fail to demonstrate to them. None of this, however, prevented the Vātsiputriyas and others from developing and prospering for nearly a thousand years, as is confirmed by the narratives of the travels of Hsuan-tsang and I-ching⁵⁴⁰.

Furthermore, A. Berriedale Keith, in Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, also appreciated the thesis of the pudgala: ‘Its merits, however; are obvious; it mediates, in the best Buddhist manner, between phenomena with a basis and the permanent unchanging self of the Brahmanic tradition’⁵⁴¹.

These appreciations seem to be reinforced by the fact that the Vātsiputriya school was one of the western schools in Kauśāmbi and Mathurā which developed in a society dominated by Brahminism, since ‘the doab between the Ganges and the Yamunā is the territory of choice of the Brahmarṣi’, whilst the eastern schools were not subjected to the same confrontation as the brahminal influence in the eastern lands was not so old⁵⁴².

Other schools were based on similar ideas, themselves also attempting to resolve the problem to which the Pudgalavādins claimed to give a solution. For example:

1. The Sarvāstivādins, instead of establishing an ego-entity, upheld the theory that ‘everything exists’ (sarvamasti), that is, phenomena from the past and the future as well as phenomena from the present. This thesis was intended to explain the continuity of a phenomenon across the three times: in consequence, problems concerning a being, a person, consciousness, memory, rebirth, the fruition of actions, etc., were similarly resolved⁵⁴³.

2. The Abhidhamma masters of the Theravādin school maintained a sort of consciousness as an element of existence (bhavanga) constituted of ignorance (avidyā) and the power of actions (karman), which subsisted across various existences and which Nyanatiloka described as follows:

'Bhavanga (bhava-angā) which, in the canonical works, is mentioned twice or thrice in the Paṭṭhāna, is explained in the Abhidhamma-commentaries as the foundation or condition (kārāṇa) of existence (bhava), as the sine qua non of life, having the nature of a process, lit. a flux or stream (sota). Herein, since time immemorial, all impressions and experiences are, as it were, stored up, or better still said, are functioning, but concealed as such to full consciousness. from where however they occasionally emerge as subconscious phenomena and approach the threshold of full consciousness, or crossing it become fully conscious. This so-called «subconscious life-stream» or undercurrent of life is that by which might be explained the faculty of memory, paranormal psychic phenomena, mental and physical growth, Karma and Rebirth, etc."544.

3. The Sautrāntikas affirmed that there were two aggregates, the basic aggregate and the functional aggregate: the former is permanent, the latter impermanent. According to their interpretation, these two aggregates, despite their differentiation, purportedly join and constitute a living being. Hence, one can remember past experiences because what is done by the functional aggregate is memorised by the basic aggregate545.

4. The Mahāsāṃghikas admitted that basic consciousness (mūlavijñāna) constitutes the essence of life by serving as a foundation for the six sense-consciousnesses546.

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544 Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, p.33. Nāgamoli translates bhavanga as 'life-continuum' in The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), p.515. According to P.S. Jaini, the Theravādins interpreted the luminous mind (prabhāsvara-citta) as bhavanga-citta (AN-atthakathā 1, 60); i.e. the patissandhi-citta is thought which links the previous life to the later life; cf. Abhidhammathasanagaha, Ch.III, § 10. Cf. P.S. Jaini, 'The Sautrāntika theory of Bījā' (Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies XXII, part 2, 1959), p.249.

545 Mahāvibhāṣa, XI, T XXVII, 1545, 556 23-26:

The definition of these two aggregates by J. Masuda is not the same; in his Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools... of Vasavatta's Treatise, p.68, n.1, he writes: '... The ekārasaṃkhaṇḍha (or the skandha of one taste) continues to exist (lit. turn) from time to time, without changing its nature (lit. in one taste): it is the «subtle consciousness» (知意識) which is intermittent and which possesses the four skandhas... The mūla (or original) of the mūlaṃkhaṇḍha means the aforementioned subtle consciousness. (This) is the origin (of a sentient being who) transmigrates (lit. abides) in the saṃsāra. Therefore it is called mūla. From this origin there arise the five skandhas, which are also spoken of by (other) schools. Now the ekārasaṃkhaṇḍha, being the origin, is not called antika (or end). The other five skandhas which are intermittent spring out of this origin: hence the name mūlaṃkhaṇḍha.'

546. Baresu, Secter, p.111; Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya (Shē ta ch'ēng lun shih 撥大乘論釋 ) II. T XXXI, i595, 160c 7-8: "根本識"
5. The Mahāsāskas maintained that there is an aggregate which continues until the end of births and deaths\(^{547}\).

6. Alongside doctrinal deviations and the schools of Early Buddhism or the Small Vehicle (hinayāna), the Mahāyānists established the doctrines of the ālayavijñāna\(^{548}\),

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547 Mahāyānasamgrahahārasya, op. cit., 160c 1-4 and 8: ‘Since these impressions impregnate, always exist and never perish in the aggregate which continues until the end of births and deaths’, later, form-and-mind (name-and-form) reappear because of that (由此業習種子於窮生死, 陰垢在不盡故, 時時色心因此還生) .

And ‘Before Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiṇaṁanirvāṇa), that aggregate does not disappear; that is why it is called the aggregate which continues until the end of birth and death’ (於無餘涅槃前此陰不盡故名窮生死) .

548 On this subject, J. Masuda gives his point of view in his Origin and Doctrines of Early Buddhist Schools, pp.53-4, n.1: ‘Though the Vātsiputiya Jaina tries to refute the Vātsiputiya view, yet it seems to me that the Yogācāra Theory is much indebted to the idea of the Vātsiputiya’ .

The concept of ālayavijñāna, which is capable of retaining the bijas (these have always existed naturally (prakṛiti) but are created and impressed anew by pure or defiled actions (Siddhi, p.103) and the fact that they do not perish reveals that the ālayavijñāna is a ‘substratum’ which exists from one life to another. Cf. Siddhi of Huśin-īsang, §§ 1 and 2. Theory of the Bijas, pp.100-23.

On this subject, the Hōbōgiri in writes:

‘... The ālayavijñāna constitutes the cohesion in each autonomous series of conditioned instants through the development of the same causality, it thus gives us the illusion of an individual, of a personality; it is therefore both a safeguard against absolute nihilism as proposed by the Mādhyamika school, and it is also a trap into which a common adherent of the Self risks falling.’

The idea of ālaya has its very origin in a Sanskrit text (the Ekottarāgama) as well as in the corresponding Pāli text (Anguttara, Cukkunāpiṣa, p.128) and was widely developed in Mahāyānist literature, i.e. Abhidhammamahāyānasūtra, Lankāvatārasūtra, Sandhinirmocanasūtra, Mahāyānasuddhāpādāsāstra, etc. (cf. Hōbōgiri, fasc. 1, pp.35-37.

Although the Theravādins did not recognize the theory of the bijas as maintained by the Saṃmatīnikas and developed by the Mahāyānists, there exists in the Anguttara a long discourse concerning this idea:

Ananda, there is a person who possesses wholesome and unwholesome qualities. In the course of time, his wholesome qualities disappear and unwholesome qualities appear. Nonetheless, since his wholesome roots are not completely eliminated, new wholesome qualities grow from the wholesome (roots). Thus, that person becomes one who (in the future life) will not fall (from the pure life). His wholesome qualities are like good seeds sown in cultivated and fertile ground, and which are able to bear abundant fruit (dhamma pājñāmi: imassā kho puggalassa vijjñānāna kusalā pī dhammā akusalā pī dhammā tām evam aparena samayena evam ... pājñāmi imassā kho puggalassa kusalā dhamma antarīti, akusalā dhamma samukhiḥbhūtā, atthicā khvāsa kusalā-mūlām asamucchinnam, tathā tassa kusalā kusalām pātubhavissati. evam ayam puggalo ayatīna aparikkhāna-dhammo bhavissati. sappattā pī bijāṇi akhāṇāni . . . sukhetā supariprakammakoṭiyā bhūmiya nikkhittāni . . . vepullām apajīṣvantā — AN III, p.404).

Here is the verse on the ādānavijñāna (= ālayavijñāna) often cited in the Sanskrit texts: Appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle like a rushing stream, proceeds with all the seeds. Fearing that they imagine it is the Self I have not revealed this to fools (Ādānavijñāna gambhirasadāksaṁ ogho yathā varati sarvābhino bālāna eso mayi na pūkkhī mā haiva ātma pārkalpayuḥ). Translated after L. de La Vallée Poussin, Vijnānamātrasiddhi (La Siddhi de l'Hūsan-īsang) I. Paris 1928, pl173.
All these theories were aimed at answering non-Buddhists who affirmed the existence of the Self (ātman) and drew them to Buddhism

Th. Stcherbatsky remarks: ‘The Vātsīputrīyas and others assume a kind of surviving pudgala; this tendency is the forerunner of Mahāyāna’.

Already at the time of the Buddha, there were various beliefs about the self, the most important of which are the six false views which are as many radical errors over the self:

1. ‘I have a self.’
2. ‘I do not have a self.’
3. ‘Through the self, I know the self.’
4. ‘Through the self, I know the non-self.’
5. ‘Through the non-self, I know the self.’
6. ‘It is my self which speaks, feels, and which sometimes here, sometimes there.’

The arguments in the Lankāvātārāvātra (Fa-ch'êng jao-t'êng-ch'ieh ching 大乘入禪陀軫經 ), T XII, 672, p.15–28. The Buddha said: Mahāmātī, my teaching on the Tathāgatagarbha is not comparable to the doctrine of Self (ātman) as professed by the sectaries. Mahāmātī, the Tathāgata, the Arhat, the Perfectly Enlightened One teaches the Tathāgatagarbha in the sense of emptiness (śūnyatā), reality (tathatā), Nirvāṇa, non-arising (anutpāda), signlessness (anāmitta), wishlessness (apranīhita). It is in order to avoid the terror inspired in ignorant people (bāla) by the doctrine of insubstantiality (anātmanavāda) that (the Tathāgata) teaches the doctrine of the Tathāgatagarbha, the domain of which transcends discrimination and imagination. The Bodhisattvas-Mahāsattvas, in the present and the future, should not be attached to it as a self (ātman). It is like a potter who makes different pots from a single mass of clay, using means such as manual skill, water, a stick, wheel and cord. Similarly, the Tathāgata applies various kinds of wisdom, skilful means, by relying on the doctrine of insubstantiality which is free from all signs of discrimination, and sometimes teaches the Tathāgatagarbha, sometimes insubstantiality, with different and varied terms. Mahāmātī, I teach the Tathāgatagarbha in order to attract the groups of sectaries attached to the Self (ātman) and help them to avoid false views, to penetrate the three deliverances (vīmokṣa) and rapidly attain supreme and perfect Enlightenment. (This translation is based on the Chinese text, which is why it differs slightly from K. Bhattacharya's tr. from the Sanskrit in L'Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme ancien, pp.131–2.)

Going even further, the Mahāyānists even used the term sectary — ātman, and identified the Tathāgatagarbha with the ātman. The ātman is the tathāgatagarbha. All beings possess the Buddha Nature: this is what the ātman is. This ātman, from the start, is always covered by innumerable passions (kleśa): this is why beings are unable to see it. It is as if, in a poor woman’s hut, there was a treasure of pure gold without absolutely anyone in her family knowing anything about it . . . The Tathāgata, today, reveals to beings that precious treasure, that is, the Buddha Nature. When all beings have seen it, they experience great joy and take refuge in the Tathāgata. The Tathāgata is he who exceeds in skilful means (upayā); the poor woman represents the innumerable beings; the treasure of pure gold is the Buddha Nature. Translation after É. Lamotte of the Ta-pan-niēh-pān ching （大方廣佛頂boseon Enterinenrivaasatra）, T XII, 375, ch.8, 648b, in The Teaching of Vimalakīrti, pp.xxvii–xxviii.

The arguments in the Lankāvātārā: ‘Mahāmātī, I teach the Tathāgatagarbha in order to attract the groups of sectaries attached to the Self (ātman) and help them to avoid false views . . .’ (above, n.549) could also be used by the Pudgalavādins who tried to attract others through the designation of the pudgala. On the need to invent such a concept in order to modify or clarify the Buddhist teaching concerning the existence of an individual, cf. E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp.132–4; Kimura Taikan Zenshu. 木村泰賢全集 V, pp.385–90.

there, experiences the fruit of good or bad actions; this self is permanent, stable, eternal, unchanging, and it remains so forever\textsuperscript{553}.

All concepts of the self can be summarised in twenty kinds of belief in individuality (\textit{satkāyadrsti}), that is, for each of the five aggregates:

I — (1-5) the aggregates are identical to the self,
II — (6-10) the self is the possessor of the aggregates,
III — (11-15) the aggregates are in the self,
IV — (16-20) the self is in the aggregates\textsuperscript{554}.

These four propositions only represent two main notions: the first is that the self is identical to the aggregates (I), the second, that the self is different from the aggregates (II, III, IV). Obviously, the last three propositions are the various possibilities of the notion expressing the self as being different from the aggregates.

It is probable that the adherents of these philosophical views had met the Buddha who refused to recognise the existence of a central and permanent personal element. The Buddha taught: 'the abolition of false ideas, stubborness, prejudice, tendencies, addictions, the appeasing of all actions, the rejection of all the elements of rebirth, the destruction of craving, the absence of passion, cessation, Nirvāṇa\textsuperscript{555}. Such a teaching could but elicit a painful reaction in those who were attached to a belief in the self: 'Assuredly I shall be annihilated, I shall be destroyed and shall no longer exist'\textsuperscript{556}.

They reproached the Buddha for demolishing the existence of a being. Protesting against this accusation, the Buddha explained that adherence to the theory of a permanent self was an absolutely false belief, that the five impermanent and painful aggregates did not constitute a self, that he who understands that is freed from the world, and that the consciousness of a monk thus freed could not be accessible to Indra, Brahmā and Prajāpati in his present life\textsuperscript{557} nor after his death:

'Māra cannot find the path of those who are perfect in morality, who dwell in diligence and free themselves through perfect knowledge'\textsuperscript{558}.

This is how the Buddha clarified this subject:

'... Although I speak and teach in this way, some monks and brahmins accuse me

\textsuperscript{553} MN I, 8: 1) attā me attā ti... 2) nathi me attā ti... 3) attāna va attanam sahjānāmīti... 4) attanā va anatānam sahjānāmīti... 5) anatāna va attanam sahjānāmīti... 6) yo me ayam attā vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalānāpāpakānān kammānān vipākam pājīsamvedeti, so kho pana me ayam attā nice dhuro sasso aviparītadhammu sassaiyamjañatēva thāssuttātītī.

\textsuperscript{554} SN III, 3-4, 46; MN I, 300: ... rūpam attaro santonappasati, rāpaṇanta vā attanam attani vā rūpam ṛpaṁniṁ vā attanam. The other aggregates are illustrated in the same way.

\textsuperscript{555} MN I, 136: ... sabbasam diṭṭhitthānādiṭṭiktigānā pariyoṭṭhānābhivināsayaṇam samugghataya sabbasakāhārasamathāya sabbāpadhipajīnasāyāya taṅkhakkhava virāgāya nirodhiya nibbāṇāya ... 556 MN I, 136: ... Ucchijjīsāmi nāma su, vinassissāni nāma su, na su nāma bhavissāmi.

\textsuperscript{557} MN I, 140: ... Ēvaṁ vinutacitānām kho bhikkhave bhikkhun 'su-Indā deva sa Brahmakā sa Pajāpatikā unvessā apahārānihitvāc: idam niṣīthām taññāgatassa viññānam ti.

\textsuperscript{558} Dhp 57: Tesāṁ sampannasaññāno uppannādihitārino / sammādiññāvimutthānam Māra maggam na vindati //.
wrongly, falsely and without motivation, saying that the monk Gotama is a nihilist and preaches the annihilation, destruction and non-existence of a being. This I do not do, this I do not affirm. As I have done before, monks, so do I do today: I teach suffering and the cessation of suffering. It is obvious that after the Parinirvāna of the Buddha and the disappearance of his disciples such as Śāriputra, Kakṣīyā, Ānanda, etc., the teaching of the Buddha, especially that on insubstantiality in relation to the problems of rebirth and liberation, were attacked by the brahmmins. Nāyāyika Udyotakara even profited from the Bhāraharasuttra in order to accuse the Buddhists of contradicting their master by their negation of the self (atman).

However, let us leave all these indirect data, erroneous interpretations and accusations concerning the pudgala. In order the better to understand the latter as it appears in their own explanations by the Pudgalavādins, it is advisable to examine the details of their theory of the pudgala, with its three designations.

**PUDGALA-DESIGNATED-BY-THE-SUPPORTS (āśrayaprajñapatappudgala)**

a. This is expressed by the Sns thus:

‘What is the pudgala-designated-by-the-supports? — As the Buddha said to Pāpaka: “By relying on such-and-such compounded things (samskāra), we call (pudgala) that-which-is-designated-by-the-supports”. What is called (pudgala)-designated-by-the-supports is fire (in relation to fuel). The Buddha said to Śāriputra: Someone is named Nāgā (because his shape is) brilliant, pure and beneficial. (Similarly), what is formed by the four great elements is called the person. It is the same for everything. So take the example of milk. Such is the explanation based on the sūtras. This is why that is called the (pudgala)-designated-by-the-supports.

For example, (with regard to) form and the person acquiring form, that person cannot be declared to be different from form, nor can form be declared to be different from the person. By relying on form, there is a designation of the person supported by form. If we say that it is form that is the person (or that the person) is accomplished by form, that is a belief in the self (atmadṛṣti). If we say that form is the person, we are in error (by affirming) that the five aggregates (skandha)
constitute the person. Hence, what we said earlier on accomplishment is wrong. Moreover, if we say that the person acquiring form is different from form, this is a view maintaining that the person is different from the aggregates. If we say that the person is different (from the aggregates), we are in error (by affirming that) the pudgala is different from the five aggregates, which is wrong.

‘Form and the person acquiring form inevitably depend on each other’; that is not the word of truth. If we say that form and the person acquiring form inevitably depend on each other, we are expressing a false view. If, (through) false view, we say that no person exists, then that is wrong, as was said earlier. That constitutes an error. This why those are the three errors (?).

Consequently, (a view upholding) the absolute difference (between form and the person acquiring form) is a false view (mithyādrṣṭī). Not to follow (a view upholding) the absolute difference is not to fall into false view. It is possible to say that, based on form, there is a person acquiring form. That is why, in truth, it is possible to say that the person acquiring form and form (exist) together. Thus, at the instant that form comes to exist, the person acquiring form also comes to exist, and at the instant that form disappears, the person acquiring form also disappears. It cannot be said that it is not so. This is the case for the five aggregates (skandha), twelve domains (āyatana), five destinies (gati), which are seven destinies by adding the destiny of demons (asura) and the intermediate existence (antarābhava); (it is the case for) the domain of birth-existence (upapattibhava), (which includes) kalala, arbuda, ghanā, the cellular mass (peṣi), the embryo with its limbs (prasākhā); the new-born child, infancy, adolescence, mature age and old-age; (it is the case for) determinate thoughts such as good or bad, virtuous or transgressing morality (śīla). It is thus for all the elements cited above, whether or not they agree or do not agree (with each other). Being supported on the preceding things (dharma), know that the pudgala-designated-by-the-supports is established’ (Sns, 466b 3-26).

b. On the same subject, the Sāṅgī expresses it thus: ‘the designation of appropriation (upādānaprajeṇāpi) is the designation of life (jīva) [the Sanskrit word for life (jīva) is synonymous with the word for living being (śātva)] (which is) internal appropriation (upādana) in the present and is composed of the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātu) and domains (āyatana) (?); that is to say that the phenomena of appropriation concerning the internal life in the present (?), which is formed by compounded things (saṃskāra) and the fetters (saṃyojana), is what is called the designation of appropriation (?); it does not pertain to the past or to the future’.

‘(With regard to) the designation of appropriation relating to life (jīva = śātva = pudgala) that it is not the same as (the body; that) cannot be confirmed (?). If life and the body are the same, (life is) impermanent (anītya) and suffering (duḥkha). If it is different, it is eternal (sāśvata) and (not) suffering. If (life is) eternal, the pure life (brahmacārya) could not be practised. In eternity, a pure life is not necessary; the harvesting of the fruit, receiving and giving, have no meaning. (If life is) im-

566 These are the five stages of embryonic development, according to early Indian knowledge. Cf. Traité I, p.270, n.3.
permanent, that makes no sense. Since in either case, whether eternity (śāsvata) or annihilation (uccheda), neither suffering nor happiness exist’ (Śśū, 10a 5-1).

c. The Tds speaks of the same designation as does the Śśū: ‘The designation of appropriation (upādānaprajñāpiti) designates the being (sattva) which (in relation) to its appropriation (upādāna) of the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātu) and domains (āyatana), is considered as (both) identical and different’ (Tds, 24b 2-3).

Throughout the three preceding passages, we can see as we go along some notions of the first designation of the pudgala or pudgala-designated-by-the-supports. This designation indicates the pudgala itself. The pudgala-designated-by-the-supports (āśrayaprajñātrapudgala?) of the Śśū is none other than the designation of appropriation (upādānaprajñāpiti) of the Śśū and the Tds, and these two designations concern the relationship between the pudgala and the aggregates which are its support.

It is certain that the pudgala is not an absolute reality totally separated from compounded things in the past, present and future times. In fact, the designation of a conditioned person in relation to the elements is a special theory. The Vātsiputryās’ affirmation of this thesis, presented by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośa, is as follows:

‘I say that the pudgala is; I do not say that it exists merely as a designation of the skandhas; for me, the designation pudgala occurs in relation to the present, internal, assumed skandhas (skandhan upādāya)’567

Hence the interpretations according to which the pudgala is an absolute reality or a single, substantial and permanent entity are not in conformity with Pudgalavādin doctrine. Among the erroneous interpretations of the pudgala in indirect or adverse sources, the following are models and well-known:

1 — The Vijñānakāyapādaśāstra II, T XVII, 1539, 527b 2-3, describes the pudgala as follows: ‘In truth, the pudgala is acknowledged, is known, is, exists. Therefore, there is certainly a pudgala’.  

2 — The Kathāvatthu and its Commentary define it thus: ‘The pudgala is known in the sense of a reality and an ultimate fact’; — ‘pudgala’ signifies soul, being, vital principle; ‘is known’: is approached and got at by the understanding, is cognized; ‘is real’: not taken as an effect of magic or mirage, actual; ‘ultimate’: highest sense, not taken from tradition or hearsay; ‘it is known’ as one of the fifty-seven ultimates of our conscious experience568.

3 — The refutation of the pudgala in the Tattvasaṅgraha by Śāntarakṣita is as follows: ‘Some people who regard themselves as Buddhists describe the ‘soul’ (ātman) by the name of pudgala and declare it to be neither the same as, nor different from the aggregates’.

568 Trans. by S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy, p.8. According to n. 4, the 57 ultimates consist of the 5 aggregates, 12 sense-organs and objects, 18 elements, 22 controlling powers.
Kamalaśila’s Commentary has: ‘some people’ — the Vātsiputriyas. Those people who regard themselves as Saugaras (sons of the Sugata, Buddha); yet, under the pretended name of pudgala, they postulate the ‘soul’ (ātman) which cannot be said to be either ‘the same as’, or ‘different from’ the aggregates. The question arises as to how persons who admit their being ‘Sons’ of the Blessed Buddha who has taught the doctrine of ‘no-soul’ (anātmavāda), have wedded themselves to a false view of ‘soul’, — the author answers it in a joking spirit, by the term ‘who regard themselves as Buddhists’.

The character of the ‘soul’ is held [by them] to be as follows: (a) He who is the doer of the diverse good and bad deeds, (b) the enjoyer of the agreeable and disagreeable fruits of his deeds, and (c) who moves from the point of the abandonment of the preceding aggregates to the point of the assuming of other aggregates, and is also the experiencer, — is the ‘soul’. — All this is held to be true (by the Vātsiputriyas) of their pudgala also; the only difference (between the ātman and the pudgala) is in regard to the name.569

It is likely that the founder of the Pudgalavādīn school had to base his establishment of the designation of the pudgala on the interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching.

Although the Buddha had denounced the concept of an absolute self (ātman) as the internal or external entity or ‘being’, he never denied the empirical, functional self as a designation. In the Saṁyutta Nikāya (III, 189-90), the Buddha gave the definition of a being while answering a relevant question from the monk Rādhā:

‘A being! A being! — it is called. Why, Blessed One, is it called a being?’

‘Because the desire, attachment, pleasure and craving which are attached to the body ( . . . feeling, perception, mental factors and consciousness) and which intermingle with them, that is called a being’.570

In the Pūṭhapādasutta, although the Buddha refuted the blind attachment of Pūṭhapāda to the concept of a self in relation to the three times, he did not oppose the designated self (attapatilābha). He approved the use of the word ‘I’ or ‘self’ as long as there was no attachment to it, as it is said: ‘designated selves (attapatilābha) are expressions, figures of speech, designations of common worldly usage which the Tathāgata uses without avoiding them’571.

Furthermore, the Pudgalavādīns were probably not satisfied with the interpretation according to which a man is merely the result of a combination of psycho-physical factors. For a man is something different from a chariot; the latter is only an


570 SN III, 190: Satto satto ti vacca, kistavādāta na kho bhante satti ti vacca. — Rūpe (vedanāya, saññāya, saññāresu, viññāne) kho Rādhā ya chando yo rāgo yā nandī yā taṅka tatra satto tatra visutto tasmā satto ti vacca. Satto ti a synonym of pudgala in the sense of a designation of a person.

571 DN I, 202: tittamā kho Citta loka-samāhā loka-niruṭṭhiko loka-vohāra loka-passatiyo yahi tathāgato voharati aparāmasun ti.
assemblage of parts and separate pieces, whereas the former is essentially a being with its totality of which the psycho-physical parts develop after conception and birth. A new-born child is not an empty structure but contains a primordial programme through its attitude, such as emotional disposition, indispensible needs, physiology, sexuality, hatred, etc., as the Buddha said:

"Mālunīkyāputta, if an innocent new-born child lying on its back has no lusts (kāma), why should desire (kāmachanda) in relation to sensual pleasures (kāmesu) arise in it? Truly, the tendency to attachment to sexual pleasures (kāmarāgānusaya) persists potentially in it."

Thus it is that there exists, through essence, something that persists for the regularisation of all organic functions.

Moreover, in a positive sense, the discourse whose contents are similar to the Bhārahārasutta is one which is favourable to the Pudgalavādins' interpretation since it speaks of the burden as the basis of the bearer of the burden. Here is a significant excerpt from the Bhārahārasutta:

'I teach you, monks, the burden, the bearer of the burden, the taking up and laying down of the burden. Listen attentively.

— What is, monks, the burden?
— It is the five aggregates of grasping (upādānakāndha), is the reply.
— What are they?
— They are the five aggregates of grasping form, feeling, perception, mental factors, consciousness. This, monks is what is called the burden.
— What, monks, is the bearer of the burden?
— It is the person (pudgala), is the reply. For example, such-and-such a venerable one with such-and-such a name, such-and-such a clan. This, monks, is what is called the bearer of the burden.
— And what, monks, is the taking up of the burden?
— It is the craving that leads to rebirth, accompanied by delight in attachment which seeks pleasure sometimes here, sometimes there, namely: craving for sensuality (kāmatānāhā), craving for existence (bhavatanāhā) and craving for annihilation (viḥavatanāhā). That, monks, is what is called taking up the burden.
— And what, monks, is the laying down of the burden?
— It is the destruction of craving, the total cessation of attachment, abandoning, relinquishment, liberation, repugnance. That, monks, is what is called the laying down of the burden."
On the other hand, the Buddha certainly used the terms consciousness (vījñāna) and mind (citta). They designate not only the conscious part but also the subconscious part of mentality. In fact, these two mental factors are nearly identical, at least in their function which produces the autonomy and continuity of beings. To a certain degree, consciousness (vījñāna) is more often designated for activities engaged in rebirth, while mind (citta) is more often designated for the realisation of Nirvāṇa. They rest on the other four aggregates (skandha) as if on a base.

According to the canonical texts, consciousness is one of the six great elements which constitute the universe and mankind. The material elements constitute the body, whilst the mental element, as much dichotomising intellect as consciousness, constitutes the mind:

'Monks, when it is said that this person possesses six elements, what conditions are being spoken of? The earth-element, the water-element, the fire-element, the wind-element, the space-element, the consciousness-element? Monks, it is because of those conditions that it is said: that person possesses six elements. Although consciousness is only an element like the other five, it is infinitely superior to the others through its basic and spiritual qualities, be it in the latent or virtual state:

'Consciousness is unmanifested, infinite and luminous everywhere.

In it neither water, nor earth, nor fire, nor air can find a place.

In it, length, shortness, subtely, coarseness, beauty, ugliness and name and form cease completely.

When consciousness ceases, all things vanish.

Consciousness is also considered as the recorder of experiences, the accumulator

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vuccati bhikkhave bhāranikkhepananat iti

574 SN II, 95: Monks, that which is called thought is also called mind and consciousness (yam ca kho bhikkhave vuccati cittha iti pi mano, iti pi vināgam). Cf. Kosā II, 34. Vis. p.383.

575 SN III, 53: Monks, if someone were to declare. 'Outside the body, feeling, perception, mental factors. I demonstrate the coming, going, disappearance. appearance, growth, augmentation and abundance of consciousness', that is impossible (āv ḫikkhave evam vadeyya: akum uannah rūpā annatra vedanāya annatra saññāya annatra sankheke vimānāyasa sādhatā va sattā va upanāya va uddhāva va virāja vijñātā).

576 MN III, 238: Chadhāsunu ayam, bhikkhu, purisa iti iti kho pun etuṁ vuttaṁ, kīm etam patiṣcica vuttaṁ? paṭṭhaviṇāha āyodhāha tejodhāha viyodhāha nākādhaṁ vināgunaṁ, chadhāsunu ayam, bhikkhu purisa iti iti yam tām vuttaṁ idam etam patiṣcica vuttaṁ. Cf. AN III, 6, 61.

577 DN I, 223: Vinānāyam antaṁ saṁsāram anantaṁ saṁsāraṁ saṁbhavati paṭṭhānaṁ / etthā āpo ca patihavi ca tejā vyāto na-gādhati / etthā diggū ca rassan ca uṭham thālaṁ sābhāṣbhāhaṁ / etthā nāmaṁ ca rūpaṁ ca aśesam uparujjhati / vimānāyam nirodhena etthātiṁ uparujjhati.

According to Buddhaghosa, the first of these consciousnesses (vijñāna) is a name for Nirvāṇa (nibbānasa nimmaṁ), whilst the second is compounded consciousness (abhipaññkhāvāvijñānaṁ). Cf. MN-A II, p.413.

E. Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p.10: How otherwise could one account for the numerous references to a "person" (pudgala) or the assumption of an eternal "consciousness" in the Saddhātukāṭa, or the identification of the Absolute of Nirvāṇa, with an "invisible infinite consciousness", which shines everywhere (vinānāyam antaṁ saṁsāram anantaṁ saṁbhavati pāṭhānaṁ) in Dīghānīkāya, XI, 85? Side by side with the oft-repeated negation of an uṣmas there are traces of a belief in the consciousness as the non-impermanent centre of the personality which constitutes an absolute element in this contingent world'.
of ripening actions (karman), whether meritorious or demeritorious, throughout successive existences:

If a person, even an ignorant one, accomplishes a meritorious action, consciousness increases in merit. It is, furthermore, considered as an essential mental factor always associated with two other factors, vitality and heat, in order to have and maintain the functions of life. However consciousness, under another aspect, is considered as a seed (bija) which, associated with the power of action (karman) and thirst (trsna), causes a new life to be born.

It is interesting to note that consciousness sometimes exists independently of corporeality. Consciousness, in the case of the conception of a new being, is a very clear example. It is consciousness which constitutes the pint of association of the mental factors (samskāra) of previous lives and appears at the moment of the beginning of the formation of an embryo. It establishes the basis so that name-and-form (nāmarūpa) develop; without it, the life of a new being would not come about:

"Ananda, if consciousness were not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form exist in the mother's womb?"

"No, Lord."  

Although the other aggregates, being compounded, disappear, consciousness stops only its functions but is never lost. Taking the positive sense of the last phrase of the following passage, it could be interpreted that consciousness is purified, transformed, and transcends or always remains in bliss:

578  SN II, p.82: Avijjāgato yam bhikkhave purisapuggalato puññham ce saṅkikkāram avhisamparotāti, puññāpago hoti viññānam. 

Udāna, p.85: When one gives, merit will augment.

No hatred can accumulate in the control of the self.

Good conquers bad; Nibbāna is attained

Through the exhaustion of craving, hatred and delusion.

(Dadato puññham pavaddhahi, sañyamato veram na ciyati.

Kusalo ca jahati pāpakum rūgadosamohakkhayā purimbatu).

579  DN II, 338: Friends, when the conch is associated with man, effort, breath, the sound of the conch is heard. Equally, Prince, when this body is associated with vitality, heat and consciousness, it can perform the action of walking, standing, sitting, lying down, seeing, hearing sounds with its ear, smelling odours with its nose, tasting flavours with its tongue, touching tangible with its body and knowing objects with its mind (yadā kira bho ayam sākkho nāma purisasaḥagato ca hoti vāyāma-saḥagato ca vayo-saḥagato ca, taddā sākkho saḍdham karoti . . . evam eva kha Rajānā yaḍāya kāya ayu-sahagato ca hoti asmāsa-sahagato ca viññāna-sahagato ca, taddā abhiḥkamati pi purikkamati ti tiṭṭhāti) pi nissido pi seyyam pi kapetāti, cakkhumā pi rāpam pusaṭi, sotena pi saḍdam suṇāti, ghānena pi gandham ghaṇāti, jīvāya pi rasam sati, kāyena pi phoṭhabbam phassati, manuṣā pi dhammam vijānatāti. Cf. also SN III, 142.

580  AN III, 76: That is why, Ananda, action is the rice-field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture. The consciousnesses of beings, hindered by ignorance and fettered by thirst are dulled in inferior spheres (the world of desire) (lit kha Ananda kammad hetum viññānam bījam taṅkhā sineho avijjāvarāunanam sattānaṁ taṁkharāyanojanam hināya dhātu viññānam paṭākhatāṁ). 

581  DN II, 63: Viññānam va hi Ananda mātā kucchaṁ na okkāmiṇnātha, api na kha nāmarūpa mātā kucchāsmin samuccchīsavāhāti? No khetuṁ bhante.
"The body is burnt, perceptions cease, all feeling is frozen, the mental factors are stilled, consciousness goes to rest (or goes home)"^582.

With regard to the mind (citta), it is always luminous and purified, and only minor defilements blemish it. When the defilements are eliminated, the mind again becomes luminous and purified:

"That mind, monks, is luminous, but it becomes blemished by adventitious defilements. However, uneducated worldlings do not understand it for what it is. That is why I declare that, for learned disciples, there is cultivation of the mind"^583.

Consequently, the methods of purification taught by the Buddha have the sole aim of eliminating defilements, but no effect can be exercised on the nature of the mind, since:

"If the mind of a monk is detached from the elements of form, etc., he is freed from them for he is detached from defilements; and through his freedom he is stable; because of his stability, he is content; because of his contentment, he is unperturbed; being unperturbed, he himself attains Parinirvāṇa"^584.

Thus, consciousness and mind are the two key terms of Buddhist psychology which designate all the activities of the conscious in their aspects, from the dichotomising function at its fullest extent to a lasting and refined subconscious. Both terms gave the scholars of the Pudgalavadin school (as well as later Maññhāñist scholars) the idea of a psychological principle the function of which is similar to the notions covered by those two terms.

THE POSITION OF THE PUDGA

We will attempt to clarify as far as possible the reasons for which the position of the pudgala in relation to the aggregates is established. It is probable that this very specific, and difficult to express, position was established after the Pudgalavādins had fully studied the attitude and findings of the Buddha and his disciples on false views concerning the world and the self.

It is certain that the Pudgalavādins wished to avoid the extremist ideas which the

^582 Udāna, 93: abhādi kāyā, niruddha saññā, vedanā pi tīdahamsu sabbhā, vāpasasmiṃsa saṅkhārā, viññānān attham ugamā.

^583 AN 1.10: Pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittaṃ taṇā ca kho āgantakehi upakkilesehi upakkilītham. tam assutāvā pathajjano yathābhātum nappajjānāti. tasma assutavā pathajjanassu cittabhāvanā n’āthi ti vadamī ti. pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittaṃ taṇā ca kho āgantukeli upakkilesehi ariyasāvakassa cittabhāvanā athi ti vadamī ti.

^584 SN III.45: Rūpadhārayā ce bhikkhave bhikkhuno cittaṃ viruttaṃ vimuttaṃ hoti anupādāya āsavehi . . vimuttaṭṭha hi tam, dhitattā santussitam, santussitatta na paritassati, aparitassam paccattanakeh paniṇībhāyai.
Buddha denounced:

'The world, Kaccayana, is generally based on these two notions: existence and non-existence. However, whoever correctly sees the appearance of the world as such does not admit the non-existence of the world, and whoever correctly sees the disappearance of things as such does not admit the existence of the world . . . Kaccayana, «everything exists» is an extreme, and «nothing exists» is another extreme. By avoiding those two extremes, Kaccayana, the Tathagata teaches the doctrine of the middle . . .''B'.

These two opposing notions constitute, on the other hand, the origin of the extremist views (antarāgahādrstī) which consist in the false view of eternity (sāsvatadṛṣṭī) and the false view of annihilation (uccchedadṛṣṭī)586. The former is a belief in a permanent substance or person which exists independently of the physical and mental elements which constitute life and which continue even after death. The latter, on the other hand, affirms the existence of an ego-entity or personality which is more or less identical to the physical and mental elements and which, consequently, is destroyed or dissolved after death. These points of view are false opinions since, not only do they not conform to reality, they are also sources of wrong aspirations and conduct and sometimes capable of leading beings to undesirable, displeasing and disagreeable states, unhappiness and suffering587.

Furthermore, before establishing the pudgala thesis, such as the ineffable (avaktavya), the founder of the Vatsiputriya school was probably familiar with the conversation between the Buddha and the wandering reclus Vacchagotta:

'. . . the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta addressed the Blessed One:
— Venerable Gotama, does a self exist?
When he had spoken thus, the Blessed One remained silent.
— How then, Venerable Gotama, does a self not exist?
For the second time, the Blessed One remained silent.

Then the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta rose and went away. Shortly after the departure of the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta, Venerable Ananda said to the Blessed One:
— Why did the Blessed One not answer the question of the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta?
— Ananda, if, to the question of the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta ‘Does a self exist?’, I had answered that a self exists, then, Ananda, that would have aligned me with the monks and brahmins who are eternalists.

585 SN II. 17: Dvayaniccitto kha'ayam Kaccayana loko yebhuyyena atitita ceva nattitit ca.
lokasamudayam kho Kaccayana yathābhūtam samappāña'ya passato yā loke nattita su na hoti,
lokanirodham kho Kaccayana yathābhūtam samappāña'ya passato yāloke athīha sā na hoti . . . sabbam
attitam kho Kaccayana ayam eko ante sabbam nattitam ayam duttīya ante ete te Kaccayana ubho ante
anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammanum dassati
586 On the two extreme views, see above, n.501
587 Koša V. 7: Belief in the eternity, belief in the annihilation (abhava, ucceda) of what one believes to
be the self is antarāgahādrstī, belief in extremes, since it is to believe falsely in the extreme (anta)
theories of eternity or of annihilation.
587 AN I. 32: . . . te dhammad anitiyā va anāntayya uma'napaya atitāyā dakkhāyā samvattanti.
If, to the question of the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta, ‘does a self not exist?’, I had answered that a self does not exist, then, Ānanda, that would have aligned me with the monks and brahmans who are nihilists.

Ānanda, if, to the question of the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta, ‘does a self exist?’, I had answered that a self exists, then, Ānanda, would my answer have been consistent with my knowledge that all things are insubstantial?
— Certainly not, Venerable Sir.
— Ānanda, if, to the question of the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta, ‘Does a self not exist?’, I had answered that a self does not exist, Ānanda, the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta, who was already confused, would have been even more so: he would have said to himself: ‘Formerly, I really had a self, but now I no longer have one’.

The Buddha’s silence over questions on the existence or non-existence of the self asked by Vacchagotta could constitute a significant basis for the pudgala thesis, the position of which is in the very middle between the two extreme notions — existentialism or non-existentialism — refuted by the Buddha.

With regard to the formulation of the very specific proposition of the pudgala in relation to the supports, it seems that the scholars of the Pudgalavadin school, on establishing this doctrinal point, had indeed adopted the Buddha’s attitude towards the questions to be avoided (avayākta); just as the Buddha refused several times to answer the following question in front of the ascetics Mandissa and Jāliya:

‘Venerable Gotama, is the life principle (jiva) the same thing as the body or is the life principle one thing and the body another?’

‘I know thus and I see thus, friend, and yet I do not say «the life principle and the body are identical»; or «the life principle and the body are different»’.

The Buddha did not express himself in the same way when the ascetic Potthapāda asked him to explain things which had not been definitively explained because they did not receive a response from the Buddha, whilst doctrinal points concerning the four Noble Truths, those which pertain to salvation or lead to Nirvāṇa, are things which have been definitively explained by the Buddha. Cf. also DN I, 159–60; SN IV, 392.

589 The things which have not been definitively explained are the questions to be avoided (avayākta) because they did not receive a response from the Buddha, whilst doctrinal points concerning the four Noble Truths, those which pertain to salvation or lead to Nirvāṇa, are things which have been definitively explained by the Buddha. Cf. DN I, 159–60; SN V, 418.

590 The things which have not been definitively explained are the questions to be avoided (avayākta) because they did not receive a response from the Buddha, whilst doctrinal points concerning the four Noble Truths, those which pertain to salvation or lead to Nirvāṇa, are things which have been definitively explained by the Buddha. Cf. DN I, 159–60; SN V, 418.

591 SN II, 61: ‘Tām jīvam tām sarīram vā bhikkhu dītthiyā sati brahmacariyavāso na hoti; ahaṃ jīvam ahaṃ sarīram vā bhikkhu dītthiyā sati brahmacariyavāso na hoti.’
those psycho-physical phenomena. In other words, the Tathāgata or a liberated monk is not the same as the aggregates, nor different from them.\textsuperscript{592}

In this respect it is interesting to note the identification of the word Tathāgata with the word sattva (living being) by Buddhaghosa in his commentaries.\textsuperscript{593} If it is certain that the word Tathāgata has the same sense as sattva as Buddhaghosa so precisely described it without confusing the meaning of the term,\textsuperscript{594} that would give a significant relationship between the notion and the proposition according to which the Tathāgata is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates. Furthermore, it is certain that, in the eyes of the Pudgalavādins, there is no total differentiation or rather discontinuity between the successive existences of a living being (sattva = pudgala) and the supreme person (= uttamapurus, paramapurus). Since in the Nikāyas, the words ‘supreme person’ (uttamapurus), ‘excellent person’ (paramapurus) are synonyms of the word Tathāgata.\textsuperscript{595} This supposition could be confirmed by the establishment of the three Pudgalavādin designations, namely:

1) pudgala — designated-by-the-supports,
2) pudgala — designated-by-transmigration,
3) pudgala — designated-by-cessation.

These three designations are none other than the three aspects of a person designated

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\textsuperscript{592} SN III, 118-19: How do you conceive this, Anurādhā: do you think that form is the Tathāgata? — No, Blessed One. — Do you think that feeling, perception, the mental factors, consciousness are the Tathāgata? — No, Blessed One. — How do you conceive this, Anurādhā: do you think that the Tathāgata is in form? — No, Blessed One. — Do you think that the Tathāgata is different from form? — No, Blessed One. — Do you think that the Tathāgata is in feeling, . . . different from feeling, . . . in perception, . . . different from perception, . . . in the mental factors, . . . different from the mental factors, . . . in consciousness, . . . different from consciousness? — No, Blessed One. — How do you conceive this, Anurādhā: you think that the Tathāgata is in a feeling, the mental factors and consciousness? — No, Blessed One. — Anurādhā, if the Tathāgata, even in the present, should not be considered as existing in the present, can it in truth be said that the Tathāgata, supreme man, excellent being, he who obtains the highest fruit, should be designated in a manner other than those four ways: the Tathāgata exists after death, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, neither exists nor does not exist, after death? — No, Blessed One. — That is right, Anurādhā! Formerly as today, Anurādhā, I always teach suffering and the cessation of suffering.

\textsuperscript{593} Udāna—A, 340: The Tathāgata is the self (tathāgato ti atā). DN—A I, 118: in the statement hoti tathāgato etc., by tathāgata — is defined as being (hoti tathāgato ti ādīsa, sato tathāgato ti adhipeto. We translate atā by self in the more or less conventional sense, as (hoti hi attano nātha — Dhp. 160; attanā va katam pāparn — Dhp. 161). Cf. also MN—A II, 117; K. Eubelharchy, L’Arman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme ancien, p.123 and n.5; K.N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp.244, 291-2.

\textsuperscript{594} We believe that Buddhaghosa, having explained the word Tathāgata by the word sattva, made no confusion in doctrine or language. Obviously, this is the fruit of his profound doctrinal reflection, whereas Jayatilleke, in Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp.291, 292, thinks that Buddhaghosa was wrong in identifying Tathāgata with sattva.

\textsuperscript{595} SN III, 118-19, gives the synonyms of the word Tathāgata by writing: ‘. . . the Tathāgata, supreme man, excellent being, he who has attained the highest fruit . . . ’ (. . . Tathāgato uttamapurus, paramappatipatto . . . ).
Furthermore we find, in discussions between the Buddha and his disciples with respect to the concept of self, arguments concerning the two main notions (1) the identification and (2) differentiation of the self in relation to the aggregates. With regard to the concept saying that the self is identical to the aggregates, the criticism often states that if the self were identical to the aggregates, it would be like the identification of fire with fuel; in other words, the actor and the action would be one and the same thing. Moreover, if the self were identical to the aggregates, it would be subject to appearance and disappearance at the same time as the aggregates. This is unacceptable for the self as it has been designated.

With regard to the concept saying that the self is different from the aggregates, the criticism is that, if the self were different from the aggregates, it would be as if fire did not depend on fuel. If the fire were separated from fuel, there would be no need to make the effort to induce fire by burning fuel. Similarly, if the self were different from the aggregates, it would have nothing to do with the life of a being. That is why the concept saying that the self is different from the aggregates is an unfounded opinion.

The argument of the criticism, in fact, developed in parallel with the increase of 'semi-heretical' opinions of 'internal unbelievers', notably those of the Pudgalavādins, in the course of the history of Buddhist thought. Here is a significant extract on the preceding subject from the Hsien yang shēng-chiao lunn, T XXXI, 1602, 553c 20-554a 16:

"Why should one know the unreality of the pudgala as a person? — Because, if the person exists, is it identical to the aggregates? Does it dwell in the aggregates? Does it dwell somewhere else? Is it different from the aggregates? 'If you admit that the person is identical to the aggregates, (it) should be a hypothesis; that is contrary to your doctrine; that is why that is an error. The reason is because you presuppose a person by basing yourself on the aggregates themselves. If (the person) is separated from the aggregates and dwells elsewhere, it has no relation to the aggregates; that also is an error. The reason is because, in the aggregates, no person exists.'

'(In short), these three hypotheses do not conform to the truth . . . 'Moreover, if you admit that the real person dwells in the aggregates, that also is not correct! Why? 'Because the real person dwelling in the aggregates which you admit, is it like the owner of a house dwelling in his house? Fire in relation to wood? Light depending on a lamp? Space sheltering things? If it is so, everything is incorrect! Why? Because there are five kinds of errors. Which are they?

1. 'If (the person) is like the owner of a house dwelling in his house, its shape should be different (from the aggregates), since the owner of the house and the form of the house are different'.

2. 'If (the person) is like fire in relation to wood, there is an error in the dependence on others (the person depends on the aggregates); since fire depends on the power

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596 See below, n.599.
of the wood and has no freedom'.

3. 'If (the person) is like light depending on a lamp, there is a fault of impermanence; since, in depending on the existence or non-existence of the lamp, light appears or disappears'.

'Furthermore, the first two examples are equally an error in impermanence: the owner of a house who dwells permanently (in his house) does not exist; since, although the house exists for a long time, its owner either stays in another place or else disappears. Fire exists in relation to the power of wood, its existence and non-existence are indefinable since its nature is impermanent'.

4. 'If (the person) were like space, that would be an error of evident function. Space has a patent nature, which means that one can come and go in it unobstructed. The person is the same. That is why there is an error... It is thus that the hypothesis according to which the person dwells in the aggregates does not conform to the truth'.

It is evident that, not neglecting such severe criticism, the Pudgalavādins had taken the position of the very middle for the thesis of the pudgala which is neither identical to the aggregates nor different from them. The Pudgalavādins, by supporting this position, wished that the pudgala thesis would not fall into this dilemma: if the pudgala is different from the aggregates, it must be a permanent substance and have no relation to life; if the pudgala is identical to the aggregates, it must be impermanent like the aggregates.

According to Kuei-chi, the Pudgalavādins, by attributing a specific nature to the pudgula, wished to avoid the two propositions admitted by the Yoga masters:

1. The first is that the person is identical to the aggregates; that is, a belief according to which the person is identical to form (rupa), feeling (vedanā), perception (samjñā), the mental factors (sanskāra) and consciousness (viññāna);
2. the second is that the person is different from the aggregates; that is, that substance entirely escapes the elements. This proposition includes the other three contemporary beliefs:
   a) the person is contained in the five aggregates;
   b) the person is outside the five aggregates;
   c) the person is neither inside nor outside (or the possessor of) the five aggregates.

It is thus that the preceding data enable us to conclude that the position of the pudgala in relation to the aggregates is well thought out and established, outside propositions concerning the twenty kinds of belief in individuality.

In order fully to understand the position of the pudgala, it is advisable to read the arguments on this subject, taken from works of the Pudgalavādin school:

The Tds writes: 'It is impossible to say that the being (satva = pudgala) is different from the characteristics. If it were different from the characteristics, it would (in consequence) be eternal (āśvata); and if it were identical to the characteristics, it

597 K'uei-chi, Ch'eng-wei-shih lun shu-chi 成唯識論述記 , I, T XLIII, 1830, 248c sq.
would be non-eternal (asāśvata). These two errors cannot be made' (Tds, 19c 3-5).

This idea is described in another way in the Sūtra: '... is the pudgala different or is it not different from the characteristics (lakṣana)? The pudgala is the ineffable (avaktavya); (that is why), if it is different, it is permanent (nirya); if it does not differ, it is impermanent (anirya). Both are errors in regard to the ineffable' (Sūtra, 5a 28 sq.)

The same argument is treated in a more profound and detailed manner in the Sns. Before presenting the pudgala thesis, the Sns describes and refutes the seven adverse opinions concerning the person. These opinions are:

1. There is no person, but only aggregates;
2. It is impossible to say whether the person exists or does not exist;
3. The person really exists;
4. The person is identical to the aggregates;
5. The person is different from the aggregates;
6. The person is eternal;
7. The person is impermanent.

Among these seven opinions, the fourth and fifth are important, since they concern the two theories which oppose the Pudgalavādins' theory of the pudgala according to which the pudgala is neither identical to the aggregates nor different from them. The last two are opinions subordinate to the two preceding opinions. This is the refutation by the Sns of the thesis maintaining that the person is identical to the aggregates:

"(Certain people maintain that) the person exists by admitting that the aggregates are identical to the person or that the person is identical to the aggregates. If the aggregates were identical to the person, the aggregates would be ineffable, (since) the person is ineffable. If the person were identical to the aggregates, the person would be expressible, (since) the aggregates are expressible. (If) both were describable, the aggregates would cease to be identical to the person" (Sns, 465b 4-7).

"If the person were identical to the aggregates, when (the aggregates) disappear or appear, the person would also disappear or appear. When part of the body is cut off, a part of the person would also have to be cut off. Hence, one part would form several parts, one part and several parts would combine in a (single) part. Depending on the existence of the body, life (jīva) exists. When life exists, the body also exists. That is why the thesis according to which «the person is identical to the aggregates» should be refuted" (Sns, 645b 10-13).

As for the refutation of the opinion maintaining that the person is different from the aggregates, the Sns divides it into several arguments as follows:

1. To those who admit that the person is different from the aggregates by basing themselves on the example of the person who bears a heavy burden, it objects:

'Do the person, life and the self differ? That is not illustrated by the Sūtra since, by basing himself on the burden, (the Buddha) said that (the bearer of) the burden exists' (Sns, 465b 4 sq.).

2. To those who admit that the person is different from the aggregates because a
man acquires craving (itrṣṇā) as his second (person), it objects that:

If one possesses right view (samyagdarśita), one does not doubt that a man, bound by craving, transmigrates in the cycle of birth and death (samsāra). This is what the Buddha wished to make evident by saying that a man acquires craving as his second (person) and remains for a long time in birth and death. When craving is eliminated, there is no further transmigration. It is thus that the person is not different from the aggregates.

3. To those who admit that the person and the aggregates are separate because the former collects the results (vipāka) of its actions (karman), it objects that:

Being founded on impure birth and death, in this life or in a future life, one collects the results (of actions). That is why the person and the aggregates are not separate.

4. To those who admit that the person and the aggregates are separate because the Buddha spoke of an 'I', it objects that:

By being based on the theory of transmigration (of different existences), the Buddha said: «In the past, in the course of innumerable and incalculable cosmic eras (asamkhyeyakalpa), I was the supreme king of living beings». That is why the person and the aggregates are not separate.

5. To those who admit that the person and the aggregates are separate because (the nature of the person) is classed among the questions to be avoided (avyākṛta), it objects that:

It is impossible to affirm that the aggregates and the person are different or are not different. That is why the characteristic of things (dharma-laksana) cannot be described under the aspect of either permanence (niyata) or impermanence (anityata). It is the same with regard to the person. You presuppose a person different from the aggregates; however, the Buddha said:

«The person is different from the body (kāya) and the body is different from the person, this is not what is taught by the Buddha and illustrated by the Sūtra». If the person were different from the aggregates, it would either be found in the aggregates, or be spread everywhere. If it were to be found in the aggregates, when the body is cut or opened, the person would be visible, just like a mosquito found in an udumbara fruit. When an udumbara fruit is opened, the mosquito is visible. It would be the same for the person differing from the body: should cold or heat reach the body, the person would not feel it. Moreover, should the ocular globe come out (of its socket), an object would be seen more clearly; even if the sense organs were destroyed, sound, odour, taste, the tangible, etc., would equally be known.

Furthermore, if the person were different from the body, (it) would go from this body to another one, then it would return to this body, just as one moves from one house to another, then returns to the first one. It would be thus for the person if it were different (from the aggregates) . . . That is why the thesis according to which the person is different from the body should be refuted' (Sns, 465b 3-c 17).

598 The udumbara is a fig tree, ficus glomerata, with edible fruit and very light wood.
In a condensed manner, the Sns affirms that the thesis of the pudgala is right view since it conforms to the Buddha’s doctrine of the middle:

‘If the pudgala could be described in terms of existence or non-existence, one would fall into nihilism (ucchedadṛśī) or eternalism (sāśvadṛśī), but the Buddha does not allow us to uphold these two opinions. If one says that the pudgala does not exist, that is committing a fault in the order of the questions to be avoided. That expression is not justified. Why? If one affirms that no pudgala exists, that is a false view (mithyādṛśī). If (on the contrary), one affirms that the pudgala exists (conditionally), that is a right view (samyagdṛśī). That is why it is possible to say that the pudgala exists’ (Sns, 464c 15-19).

It is certainly difficult to find a satisfactory and logical explanation of the position of the pudgala. The relationship of this ineffable with the supports is so vague that it cannot be described in a precise way. That is why the scholars of the Pudgalavādin school often illustrate it with the following popular examples:

a. The example of fire and fuel of which the Abhidharmakośa gives the following explanation: ‘The world conceives fire in relation to fuel’ (indhanam upādāya): it does not conceive fire independently of fuel; it believes that fire is neither identical to fuel, nor other than fuel. If fire were other than fuel, the fuel would not be hot; if fire were identical to fuel, the kindling (fuel) would be the kindled (fire). Equally, we do not conceive the pudgala as independent of the elements, we claim that the pudgala is neither identical to the elements, nor other than the elements, since it would be eternal (sāśvata) and therefore uncompounded (asamskrta); if it were identical to the elements, it would be subject to annihilation (uccheda).

b. The example of milk and the colour of milk, the explanation of which is also found in the Abhidharmakośa: ‘... It ensues from this very explanation that the pudgala, just like milk, exists only as a designation. When visual consciousness knows the colour of milk, it discerns, in the second place, milk; milk is therefore known by visual consciousness and it cannot be said that milk is the same thing as colour or different from colour.

Because of the incomprehensibility of the nature of the pudgala, notably its position, there are many incorrect interpretations of the main thesis of the Pudgalavādin school to be found in several indirect or adverse sources. Even so, information of this subject can progressively be found on this subject in conformity with what is set out in the literature of the school. For example:

1. The Samyabhedoparacanacakra by Vasumitra, accompanied by K’uei-chi’s commentary, describes the pudgala as follows: ‘The general sense of the essential doctrine upheld by the Vatsiputriyas is that the pudgala is neither identical to the aggregates, nor separate from the aggregates’. That is to say, a person really exists

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599 Kôsa IX, p.234
600 Ibid., p.239, n.1
which pertains neither to compounded things (samskṛta) nor to the uncompounded (asamskṛta), but which, in relation to the aggregates, is neither identical nor separate. The Buddha advocated the absence of self; this implies that the self admitted by the heretics, identical to the aggregates or separate from the aggregates, does not exist; this does not imply that the ineffable (avakṛtya), the person which is neither identical to the aggregates nor separate from the aggregates, categorically does not exist. Being ineffable, it cannot be described by shape, size, bigness, smallness, etc. Until the day of attaining perfect Enlightenment (Buddhahood), that person permanently exists.

'It is by relying on the aggregates, spheres and elements that the designation (prajñāpti) is presupposed'.

'... it is the same meaning with the person which is neither identical to nor separate from the aggregates. Thus, when it is said that form (rūpa) is the self, and that the thing (dharma) is also the self, all that is nothing but the person as a designation based on the aggregates. That person is truly the person which does not pertain to the aggregates, etc.\(^{601}\).

2. In the Pu chih i lun by Paramārtha, T XLIX, 2033, 21c 22-23: 'The pudgala is that which is neither identical to the aggregates (skandha) nor different from the aggregates. It is because one bases oneself on the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātu) and spheres (āyatana) that one establishes the designation of pudgala'.

3. The Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra), Vol.I, p.43, presents the pudgala as follows:

'In the Buddhist system also, there are Tu tzū (Vātsiputriya) bhikṣus who say: 'Just as, through the reunion of the four great elements (caturmahābhūtasamyoja), there is a dharma «eye» (caksus), so, through the reunion of the five aggregates (pañca-skandhasamyoja), there is a dharma «individual» (pudgala)'. In the Tu-tzū a-pi-t'an (Vātsiputriyābhīdhṛdharma), it is said: 'The five aggregates (skandha) are not separate from the pudgala and the pudgala is not separate from the five aggregates. It cannot be said that the five aggregates are the pudgala or that, separate from the five aggregates, there is a pudgala. The pudgala is a fifth category, an ineffable (avaktavya) dharma, contained in the basket of texts (piṭaka)'.

4. Candrakirti, in the Madhyamakavṛtti, also comments on the pudgala: '... they (the Vātsiputriyas) maintain (that there is ...) a pudgala which migrates (out of one existence into another). It escapes definition (avācyā). It is neither eternal nor momentary (anitya). Its coming and going dependent every time on a changing substratum (upādānam āṣṛitya). It then evolves obeying the law of causality. This very (principle) which evolves on the basis of changing elements, when the time comes for it to assume no new substratum, its evolution stops, it is said (to have entered) Nirvāṇa\(^{602}\).

\(^{601}\) K'uei-chhi, Iplibe, 230a.

\(^{602}\) From the translation by Th. Sächerbasky in The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p.197.
All the preceding arguments concerning the position of the *pudgala* explain why the *pudgala* does not pertain to either compounded things (*samskṛta*) or the un-compounded (*asamskṛta*). It constitutes one of the five things susceptible to being known (*pañca-dhamma-neyam*): 1-3. things of the three times: past, present, future; 4. the un-compounded (Nirvāṇa); and 5. the *pudgala*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Samskṛta</th>
<th>Asamskṛta</th>
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<tr>
<td>1-3. Things of the three times</td>
<td>4. the <em>pudgala</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Nirvāṇa</td>
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This particular classification of the *pudgala* is denoted precisely in the *Tds* by the


To understand fully this Pudgalavadin classification into five things, it is advisable to compare it with the following two classifications:

i. the Sarvāstivādin classification of the 75 elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>compounded things (<em>samskṛta</em>)</th>
<th>the un-compounded (<em>asamskṛta</em>)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72 elements = sārava + anāsārava</td>
<td>3 elements of extinction: anāsārava</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


ii. the Theravādin classification of the four ultimate elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>compounded things (<em>samskṛta</em>)</th>
<th>the un-compounded (<em>asamskṛta</em>)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citta Cetasika Rūpa</td>
<td>Nibbāna</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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repetition of the sentence:

'Whether the pudgala is separated from the three times or not, it is impossible to say' (Tds, 19a 26).

In short, the pudgala is something more than the reunion of its constituent elements. It is the essential factor which unifies the process of the life of a person, the longest and most eventful. In other words, it is the pudgala which assumes and supports a body for a certain time and which constitutes the same person, from conception in the womb until death, and even spreads across other lives. The pudgala is certainly an autonomous person underlying phenomenal investments. The continuity of a person indicates the link between cause and effect which exist between the consecutive states of a life. The specific relationship between the pudgala and the supports is explained by the continuity of a single individual independent of others. There is continuity (santāna), there is therefore a possessor of continuity (santānin). According to the Pudgalavādins, to deny the possessor of continuity is to deny continuity.

It is the pudgala which constitutes a person that bears a certain name, lives a certain time, suffers and enjoys the consequences of its actions; this explains that a person has no link with the feelings and thoughts of others. The continual persistence of the person supplies the essence of memory and knowledge. If there were not this essence or centre, how could a thought, the disappearance of which is instantaneous, recur, just like memory? It is explained that the appearance of memory results from impressions (vāsanā) formed by the aggregate of mental factors (samskāra) and retained in the consciousness (vijñāna). This would be impossible if there were no continuity in a person, since the aggregate of mental factors and the aggregate of consciousness are instantaneous. Memory therefore can only occur if there is something that remembers.

With regard to knowledge, according to the Pudgalavādins, there must be a constant subject in cognitive actions which undergo and accumulate experiences. Similarly, there must be a Devadatta for Devadatta to appropriate some money. If there were no pudgala to be the 'receiver' of experiences, how could knowledge even be formed?

Hence, the pudgala is not only the agent of memory — a part of the mental factors (sāmskāra) and consciousness (vijñāna) — but also the agent of feelings (vedanā) and perceptions (samjñā).

Thus it is that to deny the existence of the pudgala would be to deprive human

604 Sn. 1099 = vāsanā, or pubbavāsanā: the impression or impression of the past from a former life; pubbavāsanāvāsita = he who recalls (to mind) impressions of the past or of a former life. Sn–A, 583; pubbavāsanāvāsita: vāsanāya vāsita.

605 Devadatta, the son of Suppabuddha, was a first cousin and disciple of the Buddha. He was jealous of the Buddha and sought all means to harm him. In several discourses, the Buddha spoke of the offences committed by Devadatta, after the latter had left the Order. Cf. A II, 73; IV, 160; S I, 153; G.P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, p.1106 sq. The Kośa IX, pp.279–80, uses the name of Devacandra to illustrate the existence of non-existence of the self or pudgala. The same presentation is also found in the Candrakīrti Prasannapada Mahyamakavrtti, trans. by Jacques May, pp.158–9.
action of any meaning. In contrast, the designation of the *pudgala*, according to the Pudgalavādins, offers possibilities of resolving the problems of the person, of rebirth of the fruition of actions and of liberation.

**PUDGALA-DESIGNATED-BY-TRANSMIGRATION (samkramaprajñāpatapudgala? )**

Different explanations are found in the Pudgalavādin works.

a. The Snān writes thus on this subject:

'What is (*pudgala*)-designated by transmigration?
— When, at a given moment, a being passes to another existence, then the Buddha called that "*pudgala*-in-transmigration".

Why is it called *pudgala*-designated-by-transmigration?
— Because of the designation of the past, future and present.

What does designation of the past (*aṭitaprajñāpti*) mean?
— As in the discourse on 'The Messenger of the Gods' (*T'ien-shih ching*

天使經, Devadātasastra) Yama declared loudly: «That person did not recognise his father, or his mother, or his brothers, etc.; he did not recognise merit, or good, or bad, etc. (I) wish that (Your Majesty) would teach him». As the Buddha said: «In a past life, I was the supreme king of living beings».

That is what is called designation of the past.

What does designation of the future (*anāgataprajñāpti*) mean?
— As the Buddha said: «When a Cakravartin is in the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*), he first enters the maternal womb as if he were entering a royal palace. Furthermore, as the Buddha said to Maitreya, "Ajita, later, when you become the Buddha, you will be named Maitreya". That is what is called designation of the future.

What does designation of the present (*pratyutpamaprajñāpti*) mean?
— As the Buddha said: «The man of Anga (adorns himself) with earrings and puts numerous precious ornaments on his arms». (Furthermore), as the Buddha said: «The master of great wealth has an abundance of goods and great satisfactions at his disposal». That is what is called designation of the present.

It should also be understood that the Buddha, basing himself on the compounded things (*samskāra*) of the three times, established these three designations. That is why the designation of the transmigration of compounded things (*samskāra*) is called...
(pudgala)-designated-by-transmigration' (Sns, 466b 27-c 17).

b. The Ssū explains the same subject as follows:

'The designation of means (upāyaprajñāpatti) signifies the designation based on the past (arita), future (anāgata) and present (pratiyutpanna). It is associated with the three times. As (the Buddha said): «In the past I was the king Sunetra. In the future there will be (a man) named Ajita. In the present there is Gautama Siddhartha, etc. . . . Through convention, this designation (is established) in order to (correct opinions) on annihilation (uccheda) and eternity (sāsvata). If the king were annihilated, how could I exist (now)? If he had not been, how could I exist?» Based on conventional truth (samvrtisatyā), this designation of means (upāyaprajñāpatti) is spoken of’ (Ssū, 10a 13-19).

c. Description of the same subject by the Tds:

'The designation of the past (aritaprajñāpatti ?) is information concerning the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātu) and spheres (āyatana) of the past (arita), such as when (the Buddha) said: «I existed in a certain era, with the name of Chū-hsun-t'ao» (चुहसुन्ताओ Kuddāla or Kuddālaka?)81 (Tds, 25b 3-4).

A comparison of the three preceding passages leads us to think that the pudgala-designated-by-transmigration of the Sns and the designation of means (upāyaprajñāpatti ?) of the Ssū are wider in meaning than the designation-of-the-past of the Tds. Since the word transmigration (sarpkratna ?) indicates the whole cycle of birth and death (samsāra), the word means (upāya) indicates what serves to explain the continuity of life, whilst the word past (arita) of the Tds only designates part of the time in which the aggregates (skandha), spheres (āyatana) and elements (dhātu) are found. Thus, the Tds insists on the past, whereas the Sns mentions what is designated-by-transmigration, the Ssū, designation-of-means; these two ideas place the emphasis on the passage from one life to another: from the past life to the present life, from the present life to the future life. This means that the Sns considers the pudgala in the light of the three times.

In fact, the existence of an individual consists of a series of lives of which births and deaths are merely phases of the same process, and consequently birth precedes death but, on the other hand, death precedes life. Birth and death correlate; one being abandoned, the other appears. Thus, a being is none other than a becoming (bhava), which at every moment, destroys and recreates itself. Death consists of birth. Birth in turn leads to old age and death. However, death itself is only a phase of becoming: the transition to another life, the state immediately preceding rebirth. It represents an
interruption in appearance which marks the end of a short human life but not the total cessation of the life-stream of a being. Since all these phenomena which end inevitably provoke the arising of new phenomena.

It is noteworthy that man, according to Buddhism, is merely one of manifold forms of being. Human beings, like certain beings superior or inferior to man, form a category of beings which differ from other categories through their body and mind. Other beings differ through their body, but not through their mind; yet others, through their mind, but not through their body; certain beings are identical both through their body and through their mind. Finally, there are four categories of formless beings\(^6\textsuperscript{12}\). In another classification, man is placed in one of the following categories: beings without feet, beings with two feet, beings with four feet, beings with many feet (possessing or not a material form), conscious beings, unconscious beings and superconscious beings\(^6\textsuperscript{13}\). The human worlds are always located half-way in the hierarchy of the universe. The life of man is a mixture of pleasure and suffering, good and bad.

After death, man, through the power of actions (\textit{karman}), can be reborn in one or another of the various preceding categories by four means of birth, namely:

1) birth from an egg (\textit{andaja}), such as that of birds;
2) birth from the mother’s womb (\textit{jarāyujya}), such as that of humankind;
3) Birth arising from moisture (\textit{samsvedaja}), such as that of insects;
4) birth by metamorphoses (\textit{upapāduka})\(^6\textsuperscript{14}\), such as that of heavenly beings and the hell-bound, etc.,

and in the five kinds of existence which are called ‘destinies (\textit{gati})’\(^6\textsuperscript{15}\):

1) (Beings in) the hells (\textit{niraya, naraka}),
2) Hungry ghosts (\textit{preta}),
3) Animals (\textit{tiryak}),
4) Humankind (\textit{manuṣya}), and
5) Heavenly beings (\textit{deva}).

\(^{6\textsuperscript{12}}\) Cf. AN IV, 39-40; 410.
\(^{6\textsuperscript{13}}\) Cf. AN III, 35.
\(^{6\textsuperscript{14}}\) DN III, 230: \textit{catasso yoniso, andaja, jalabhujayoni, samsedjayoni, oppātikayoni}; cf. MN I, 73.
\(^{6\textsuperscript{15}}\) Cf. MN I, 73; below, ‘The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins: thesis No.I’. 
It is thus that man is only a category of beings endowed with sensibility which inhabit the immensity of space. Man will never reach the limits of the universe even if he were to travel all his life at the speed of an arrow in the same direction. That cosmic space shelters innumerable worlds which are not static or enduring, but constantly in the course of development or dissolution; this process occupies immensely long periods of time which are measured in aeons (kalpa) until a cosmic catastrophe puts an end to them.

In such a large space and long time, a person whose origin is inconceivable appears and disappears sometimes in the form of a man, sometimes in the form of an animal or heavenly being. This cycle of life and death (samsāra) is never interrupted, unless complete appeasing (parinirvāna) or the attainment of Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiśesanirvāna) intervenes. In the latter case, the person no longer pertains to compounded things (śamskṛta) but to the uncompounded (unasmskṛta).

As long as a person is subject to the sphere of compounded things, it perpetually undergoes change like other things. Moreover, in reality, there is no frontier between the three times: past, present and future, since the existence of a person, as well as of a thing, are manifested and transformed continually in accordance with the law of cause and effect (karmavipāka). For the length of a being's life, whatever is past is not past and finished, whatever is present influences whatever will be in the future. A being is its very actions. Actions from a being's past follow it as closely as wheels follow the ox's feet or like a shadow which is never separated from what projects it

At the moment, Vaccha, when a being abandons this body and reappears in

616 Cf. AN IV, 426.
617 An aeon or cosmic period (kalpa) is inconceivably long. It is divided into four sections: the destruction of the world, the continuation of chaos, the formation of the world and the continuation of the formed world. Of such things it cannot be said that they last 'so many years, or so many centuries, or millennia, or so many hundred million years'. Cf. AN II, 142. SN II, 181, contains a parable illustrating the inconceivable length of an aeon: 'Imagine, monks, a gigantic rock, a monolith a yojana in width, a yojana in height, without any crevice or fault, and a man comes to rub it with some Kāśi fabric once every hundred years. Well, that gigantic rock would be worn down and disappear more quickly than an aeon. So long, monks, is an aeon. Thus, monks, of such long aeons, several have already past, more than an hundred, a thousand, hundreds of thousands have passed'. Cf. Kosā III, 89-93, on a detailed explanation of the concept of various kinds of aeons: aeon of destruction (śamvaratikalpa), aeon of creation (vivarati kalpa) and intermediate aeon (antar kalpa).
618 Cf. AN IV, 100-3.
619 Dhp. 1 and 2:

'. . . If one speaks or acts with an impure mind, suffering follows as wheels follow the ox's feet' (Manasa ca padusthena bhāsati vā karoit vā, tato numdakkhamanvete cakram va vahato podam).

'. . . If one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness follows like a shadow which is never separated (from what projects it)' (Manasa ca pasannena bhāsati vā karoit vā, tato nam sukkhamanvete chāyā 'va anapāyini).
another body, for that I declare that craving is the fuel. Truly, Vaccha, in this case craving is the fuel.\textsuperscript{620}

Whereas, the Skandhavādins\textsuperscript{621} asserted that the continuity of existences is only that of the aggregates: the old ones are abandoned, the new are spontaneously acquired; in this process of perpetual transformation of the psycho-physical elements, there is no person that passes from one life to another, that is a sower, a reaper outside the five aggregates. In consequence, it is incorrect to speak of the suffering or happiness of 'a person', since it is not a matter of a person but of a psycho-physical process which is subjected to suffering or happiness:

'Suffering exists, but there is no sufferer.
There is no agent, only action is found.\textsuperscript{622}

Nevertheless, what constitutes an enigma for the Pudgalavādins is that, if there is no person, what is born and reborn? It is impossible for them to accept the doctrine of rebirth without an agent which wanders here and there. Craving (\textit{tr.\text{"s}nā}), not being an impersonal mental factor, cannot cause a being to be reborn. It is due to these reasons that the Pudgalavādins established the \textit{pudgala}, of which the second designation or \textit{pudgala-designated-by-transmigration} (\textit{samkramaprajātapapudgala?}) is the corollary. Since \textit{pudgala-designated-by-transformation} is classed in the same category as the \textit{pudgala} (that is, it does not pertain to the eternal uncompounded, nor to impermanent compounded things), it is distinct from an eternal self (\textit{atman}) which is transmitted from life to life after death. Neither is it 'the subtle body which remains intact and establishes communication between two lives', as the Sankhyas maintain.\textsuperscript{623} This ineffable (\textit{avaktavya}), at the moment of death, is transformed into an intermediate being (\textit{antarābhavika}) which appears immediately and which, at the same time, links the two consecutive lives. From the present existence it receives the intermediate existence, and from that intermediate existence (\textit{antarābhava}) it receives the future existence. In other words, the \textit{pudgala} never dies with the body, any more than do the consequences of actions (\textit{karmavipāka}), as Th. Stcherbatsky wrote: 'This \textit{pudgala} was also regarded as surviving, since it is maintained that it assumes new elements at birth and throws them off at death'.\textsuperscript{624}

Although the psycho-physical elements appear and disappear, the \textit{pudgala}, because of its relationship with them, is not limited to one life but extends to other lives. It plays the part of an agent in rebirths and continues to wander from life to life. It is therefore possible to say that \textit{pudgala-designated-by-transmigration} is a designation indicating the conscious of personified rebirth which appears in the mother's womb, in the case of a man with the conditions of actions (\textit{karman}) comprised in the

\textsuperscript{620} SN IV, 400: \textit{Yaśmi\text{"n}ca kho Vaccha samaye ima\text{"n} ca kāyam nikkhipati satto ca aṅkataram kāyam anuppamo hoti, tam aham tanhupādānam vadāmi, tanhā hissa Vaccha taṃśim samaye upādānam hoti ti.}

\textsuperscript{621} This term generally indicates the Buddhist schools or sub-schools which admit that the five aggregates 'transmigrate' (\textit{samkramanti}) from this world to the other world.

\textsuperscript{622} Cf. Vism XVI, 90.

\textsuperscript{623} Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, \textit{Indian Philosophy II}, London 1929, p.234.

\textsuperscript{624} Stcherbatsky, \textit{The Central Conception of Buddhism}, p.71 and n.2.
preceding existence.

This doctrinal point in the Pudgalavidin works accords with what is expressed in the Sāmyuktāgama, T II, 99, 246-305b:

"It is thus that a person from this world arrives in another"623.

As well as what is mentioned in the Samayabhedoparacanakakra by Vasumitra and its commentary by K‘uei-chi:

‘Phenomena (dharma), except for the pudgala, do not transmigrate (samkranti) from the previous life to the later life. Based on the pudgala, it could be said that there is transmigration’... ‘That means that if phenomena do not transmigrate, it can be said that when the life faculty (jīvitendriya) has ceased, phenomena have also ceased. But, since the pudgala has not ceased, it can transmigrate from the former life to the later life. Phenomena not being separate from the pudgala, it can be said that there is transmigration"624.

The explanations used by the Pudgalavādins to describe the autonomy and continuation of the pudgala are found in the canonical texts. Here are some examples:

— Description of the case of ‘he who has no more than seven rebirths at the most’ (saptakrhdhavaparama):

‘After having abandoned the three fetters (samyojana)627, he becomes one of those who will be reborn seven times at the most; it is only by wandering and transmigrating seven times, among mankind and heavenly beings, that he will put an end to suffering628.

or:

‘This person, having transmigrated seven times at the most, becomes ‘he who puts an end to suffering through the destruction of all the fetters’629.

— Affirmation of the Buddha concerning the existence of a living being that wanders through the cycle of rebirth:

‘The bones of a single person, monks, who continues to wander and transmigrate for an aeon would constitute a mountain, a heap, a pile, as high as Mount Vepulla, if there were a collector of those bones and the collection were not destroyed630.

625 SĀ, T II, 99, 246-305b (Shou tien hua sheng ching 受天化生經): 如是等士夫從此至他天
626 K‘uei-chi, Iptlasc, 230b.
627 They are: i. belief in individuality (satkāyadeśi), ii. doubt (vicikitsā), iii. attachment to rules and rituals (āśīlavatarpāmarśa). Cf. DN II, 107; AN I, 233; III, 87; Kosā V, 44; VI, p.117, n.3.
628 AN I, 233: Sa tiṇḍan samyojanānām parikkhyā satākhatuparamaṅ hoti satākhatuparamaṅ deve ca mānaše ca sandhāvītva samśarita đukkhasa antaṁ karoti.
629 Itivuttaka, § 24: Sa satākhatum paramaṁ sandhāvītvāna puggalo, dukkhasaṅkatāro hoti sabbasamyogjanakkhāyā.
630 SN II, 185: Ekapuggalassa bhikkhave kappam sandhāvato samśarato siy evam mahā aṭṭikkakalo aṭṭhipuṇjo aṭṭhirāsi; yathāyaṃ veppoḷo pabbato sake samharako assa sambhathāca na vinasseya.
It is certain that the Buddha never taught that consciousness transmigrated as Sāti claimed. The Mahâtântâhâkayasutta (MN I, 258) tells how the monk Sāti maintained that, according to the teaching of the Buddha, it is consciousness itself that transmigrates, that wanders without losing its identity (anâñña). The Buddha asked him to explain what he meant by 'consciousness'. The monk Sāti's answer is stereotyped:

'That consciousness wanders and transmigrates but is unchangeable'... 'It is that which expresses, feels, experiences the results of good and bad actions, here and there'.

The Buddha reproached him for his false opinion and explained:

'To whom, foolish man, have you heard me teach the Dhamma in such a fashion? Foolish man! Have I not, in many ways, explained consciousness as arising from conditions? There is no arising of consciousness without conditions'.

However, the Buddha clearly recognised a kind of consciousness, one of the six elements, as being the concrete seed of life, the principle of growth, the very condition of the development of a being:

'... Ânanda, action is the rice-field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture. Being hindered by ignorance and fettered by attachment, their consciousness takes up residence in the lower world. Hence there will, in the future, be rebirth. And indeed, Ânanda, there is becoming'.

Being changeable but continuous, consciousness is a means of rebirth, it provokes the formation of a new being after death and before conception, and it links two successive existences, as it is said:

'If consciousness, Ânanda, were not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form (nâmarûpa) form in the mother's womb?'

— 'No, Lord'.

'If consciousness, Ânanda, after having descended into the mother's womb, were then to abandon its place, would name-and-form form this or that?'

— 'No, Lord'.

'And if consciousness, Ânanda, in a boy or girl while they are still small again came to be lost, would name-and-form grow, develop, progress?'

— 'No, Lord'.

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631 MN I, 258: ... idam viññâñam sañnihâvati samasrati, anâñña ti ... yvâyam bhante vado vedeyyo tatra kalvânapâpakânam kammanam vipâkum païsamvedati ... kassa nu kho nàma ivam mokhapurisamaya evam dhammaññi desti amajjâsà, naàmu mayâ mohapurisà anekapariyâsita païcâcasamuppânam viññâñam vuttam udaita paccaya nattik viññâñassa sombhavo ili.

632 The six elements are: i. earth element (pitrividhârû), ii. water element (abdhârû), iii. fire element (tejodhârû), iv. wind element (vâyudhârû), v. space element (âkâsadhârû), and vi. consciousness element (viññânadhârû). Cf. Kosâ I, 27. The Dhâtuvilâhanâsutta (MN, No140) gives a long explanation of the six elements. Cf. also the Chabbisodhânasutta (MN, No112).

633 It is the same for the middle world (majjhimâya dhâtuyà) and the higher world (pariññâya dhâtuyà).

634 AN I, 223-4. Ici kho Ânanda kammanâ khotam viññâñam bhijam tanâh sineho avijjâvâraçânam satiannon tanâhâsamo jhâsavam âdhiyàm anâñna viññâñam patijhâsam, evam âyatim punabhâvabhînhibatti hoti, evam kho Ânanda bhavo hoti iti.

635 DN II, 63. Viññâñam vâ hi Ânanda mâtû vakkâmisa, ahi nu kho nàmarûpa mâtà kucchîsim samucchîsimathâhi? — No k'êtem bhante. — Viññâñam vâ hi Ânanda mâtû kucchim ekkamiteva.
At the same time, consciousness is the conditioner of name-and-form. It is always an ‘established consciousness’, which means that it is established in name-and-form, and goes no further than name-and-form:

‘If consciousness, Ānanda, were not established in name-and-form, in the future would birth, old age, death, suffering, the origin of suffering form?’
— ‘No, Lord’.

‘It is thus that, Ānanda, the cause, the circumstance, the origin, the condition of consciousness constitute name-and-form’.

Hence consciousness and name-and-form are interdependent and form a vortex (consciousness) (name-and-form) for the conditions of existence:

‘It is thus, Ānanda, that, conditioned by name-and-form, consciousness arises; conditioned by consciousness, name-and-form arises; conditioned by name-and-form, contact arises; conditioned by contact, feeling arises; conditioned by feeling, craving arises; conditioned by craving, attachment arises; conditioned by attachment becoming arises; conditioned by becoming, birth arises; conditioned by birth, old age and death arise; conditioned by old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow and despair arise. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering’.

It is interesting to note that this consciousness is considered, in the Sampasā-danyayasutta of Dīgha Nikāya, as the uninterrupted ‘stream of consciousness’ (viṁśa-sota) in successive lives. In the Anāñjasappāyasyutta of Majjhima Nikāya, it is called ‘evolved consciousness’ (samvattanikaviṁśa).

This is a kind of consciousness, resulting from actions in the previous life, which appears at the moment of conception, that is, with the formation of a new life in the mother’s womb. This consciousness, in fact, along with the other material elements, constitutes a new existence.

Furthermore, the Buddha demonstrated that the process of gestation or conception of an individual would be inconceivable without the presence of a third vital factor:

vokkami{s}sathā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṁ itthatiya abhinibbatissathāti? — No ketāṁ bhante. — Viṁśaṁ vā hi Ānanda dharastēva sato vocchijisatthā na māraśsā vā māraśkīyā vā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṁ vaddhim viṁśhitam vepullām āpajjisathāti? — No ketāṁ bhante.


638 DN III, 105: . . . it includes the stream of consciousness of a man who is established without interruption as much in this life as in the other (...) purissassa ca viṁśaṇa-sotari peyānati ubhayato abbochhānam idha-loke patiṣṭhitam ca para-loke patiṣṭhitam ca).

639 MN II, 262: After death, the dissolution of the body, this event occurs the evolved consciousness, according to this condition, attains impermanence (Kāyasā bheda paraṁ maranā thānam etam vijjati yam taṁ samvattanikām viṁśiṁ, asa ānunāyupagom).
the being-to-be-born (gandharva). This gandharva, the bearer of mentality, profits from the occasion of the union of a male and a female to incorporate itself in the embryo which results from that union. It is drawn by amorous desire to the male or female depending on whether it is itself female or male and it has a feeling of dislike for the other partner. In other words, a foetus cannot be produced by the simple combination of spermatic and ovular cells. Unless the being-to-be-born survives and joins them, there is no formation of a being. As it is said:

Wherever, monks, the three elements are found together, a seed of life is planted. Thus, if the father and mother unite, but it is not the right time for the mother and the 'being-to-be-born' is absent, then no seed of life will be planted. Monks, if the father and mother unite, and it is the right time for the mother, but the 'being-to-be-born' is absent, then again no seed of life will be planted. But, if the father and mother unite, it is the right time for the mother and the 'being-to-be-born' is present, then, through the conjunction of those three elements, a seed of life will be planted.

The Pudgalavādins' proposition on the relationship between the pudgala and the supports is also significant in the interpretation of the pudgala-designated-by-transmigration. Certainly, if the pudgala were identical to the supports, when the supports disappear at death, it would disappear: as the Sns explains: If the pudgala were identical to the aggregates, then when (the aggregates) disappear or appear, the pudgala would disappear or appear too (Sns, 465b 10-11); if the pudgala is different from the supports, then the pudgala has no connection with life from which it is totally freed. If this were so, the problem of rebirth would make no sense. The Sns explains:

'... (if) the person were different from the aggregates, the person would not be reborn in the various destinies. If we consider rebirth in the various destinies, the person would be reborn in all the destinies at the same time. Hence it could not always reside in the body, and deliverance would then be difficult to achieve. If the person passed from destiny to destiny, it could not create action (karma). If there were no action or result, there would equally be no work, attachment, detachment and practice of meditation. That would indeed be deliverance!' (Sns, 465c 13-16).

Moreover, the Pudgalavādins, by maintaining that the pudgala is neither impermanent nor permanent, were free not to specify its nature; if the pudgala is neither impermanent nor permanent, the earlier existence is neither identical to nor different from the later existence. This doctrinal point accords with the words of the
Buddha in this respect:

‘He who has acted and he who undergoes the consequence are the same — that, brahmin, is an extreme’... ‘He who acts and he who undergoes the consequences are not the same — that, brahmin, is another extreme. The Tathāgata, in not affirming either of those extremes, teaches you the doctrine of the middle’.

Further on, in order to simplify the aspects of the stream of life in the three times, the Pudgalavādins established three other categories under the designation of pudgala-designated-by-transmigration. These are the designation-of-the-past (atitaprajñāpti), designation-of-the-future (anāgaprajñāpti) and designation-of-the-present (pratyutpānaprajñāpti).

It seems that the Pudgalavādins based these designations on the affirmation by the Buddha to Cittā Hatthisāruputta, concerning the real empirical person in the past, present and future:

‘I existed in the past, it is not (true) that I did not exist; I shall exist in the future, it is not (true) that I shall not exist; I exist in the present, it is not (true) that I do not exist’.

Existences in relation to the three times are only designations. They are similar to the designations of milk products: milk which is transformed into cream, yoghurt, curds and butter; when milk is transformed into one of those states, it cannot be called by any other name than the name which is appropriate to describe it. These designations can be used conventionally on condition that there is no attachment to them. Furthermore, it is probable that the Pudgalavādins, in establishing the three designations, had the intention of appeasing worries engendered by the belief in a self and questions concerning existences in the three times, namely:

The designation-of-the-past (atitaprajñāpti) is information concerning the existence of one or more previous lives. The best proof given by the Sns as well as the Tds in favour of this postulation are the words of the Buddha or holy ones who had acquired knowledge which permitted them to perceive past existences. Whoever possesses that supernormal penetration (abhijñā) or higher knowledge (vidyā) can:

‘... recall his manifold former existences, a particular birth, two, three, four, five births... or an hundred thousand such births; he recalls manifold formations and dissolutions of worlds: «I was there, I had such-and-such a name... and, disappearing from there, I again reappeared here...». Thus, he recalls many former existences, always with their characteristic signs and particularities’.

643 SN II. 76: So karaṇī so paññāsāvadiyyati kho brāhmaṇāya ayaṃ eko anto... Aṁha karoti aṁha paññāsāvadiyyati kho brāhmaṇāya ayaṃ duṭṭho anto. Ete te brāhmaṇa ubho ante anupagama majjheṇa tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti.
645 Cf. DN I. 201.
646 Cf. MN i. 8.
647 Cf. AN III. 18; MN I. 35.
In several discourses, the Buddha affirmed his former existences\(^648\). He also spoke of the former lives of others. It was at Nādika that the Buddha, having announced the rebirths of disciples in the higher worlds, taught Ānanda the mirror of the Dhamma (dhammādāsa) by means of which one can know one's future life\(^649\). Without the hypothesis of former existences, it is impossible to explain rebirth and the law of actions and their effects, particularly the accumulation of merit throughout successive lives.

The main point is that the Pudgalavādins speak of the pudgala but categorically refute the belief in an absolute origin of life (cf. Sns, 467c 15-469a 28). This means that the Pudgalavādins, like all Buddhists, never tackled the question of a Primal Cause of the cycle of rebirths. This is because, the incessant process of appearing and disappearing being considered in the complex sense of conditions relating one to the other — of the pudgala and its relationship with the aggregates, the aggregates themselves, the former aggregates and the later aggregates, etc. — a first cause is not necessary. In the logic of causality, no absolute beginning nor any single cause can be found.

The designation-of-the-future (anāgataprajñānāpi) is information concerning the existence of one or more former and later lives. This designation is based solely on the words of the Buddha and the holy ones:

> '... All beings will become, will travel, after the relinquishment of the body ...'\(^650\),

> 'The uneducated worldling creates and recreates his body'\(^651\).

> 'Even if his body is torn by crows, vultures, hawks, wolves, and gnawed by various insects, his mind (citta), having long and well practised trust (saddhā), morality (śīla), study (śūla) and renunciation (cāga), rises up and attains excellence.'\(^652\)

According to the canonical texts, whoever obtains the divine eye (divyacakṣus) can perceive what will happen to beings in the cycle of existence:

> 'He who is pure, endowed with the divine eye (dibbacakkhu), sees beings disappearing and reappearing, the lowly and the noble, the lovely and the ugly, the happy and the wretched; he sees how beings reappear in accordance with their actions (kamma): «Those beings, in truth, have followed wrong ways in actions, words and thoughts, they have insulted nobles, held false views and they have acted in

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649 Cf. DN II, 93-4; I, 82; AN I, 183.

650 Udāna, p.48: ye keci bhūtā bhavissanti ye cāpi sabbe gamissanti pahāya deham ...

651 SN III, 152: asassavā pathujjano rūpānaheva ... vedanaṇāheva, saññahāneva, viññānaṃ yeva abhinibbattento abhininnavante.

652 SN V, 370: tam (kāyo rūpi) idheva kāka vā khādani gijjhā vā khādani kulāla vā khādani sunakkhā vā khādani sigāla vā khādani vīvidhā vā pānakajjātā khādani, yahca kho vassa cittaṃ digharataram Saddhāparahāvītaṃ sīla-sura-cāga-parahāvītaṃ tam uddhagami hoi visesagāmi.
accordance with their false views. On the dissolution of their body after death, they will reappear in the lower destinies, in painful states of existence, in the world of suffering, in hell. Whereas the others endowed with good actions... will appear in a happy state of existence, in a heavenly world...

The Buddha also predicted events which were to happen in the future lives of others. For example:

'The worldly (people), infatuated with their youth, health, life, follow a wrong course of actions, words and thoughts; because of that, on the dissolution of the body after death, they pass to a lower world, to a painful course of existence, to a state of suffering and to hell".

With regard to the designation-of-the-present (pratyutpannaprajñāpatti), the Pudgalavādins illustrate this with the words of the Buddha affirming the existence of a man and his self nature. In practice, there is no divergence between Buddhists on the existence of a designated person. The difference is the doctrinal point accepted by the Pudgalavādins beyond the designated person. For man and his activities in the present are only, according to the Pudgalavādins, the manifestation of pudgala. As and when required, this designation is identical to the pudgala. Consequently, everything that is written under the heading of pudgala-designated-by-the-supports (āśrayaprajñāpapatapudgala) also implies the designation. It is probable that the establishment of these three designations in the Sūtras merely has the aim of clarifying the continuity of the pudgala in the three times. For that, simply the designation-of-the-past (atitaprajñāpatti) suffices in the Tds.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the establishment of the pudgala-designated-by-transmigration, with its three designations, is directed towards responsibility for actions (karman) since, if there were no pudgala, who would be the actor and enjoyer? If there were no-one to create meritorious and demeritorious actions and to enjoy their good and bad fruit, there would be no more good and bad (Sūtras, 465a 17-b 1); whereas the law of action (karman) incurring reaction (vipāka) is a basic doctrine aimed at establishing the ideal life for Buddhists.

This point of views conforms to the thesis attributed by the author of the Vījñānakāyasāstra. According to this treatise, it is the pudgala which is the subject in the creation of actions and the reception of pleasant or unpleasant fruition.

On the doctrine of actions, the Buddha declared:

'Deeds are the assets of beings, deeds are their inheritance, deeds are the womb that bears them. Deeds are their kin, deeds are their resort".

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653 Cf. AN III. 19; MN I. 35.
654 Cf. AN I. 146.
655 Cf. Vījñānakāyasāstra II, T XXVI, 1539b, or the translation by La Vallée Poussin, 'Notes Bouddhiques' (Bulletin de la classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et politiques de l'Académie Royale de Belgique, 6 Nov. 1922, pp.515-26), pp.519-20.
The law of action and reaction is continually manifested in the process of the cycle of births throughout the three times:

'In truth, actions of a person are never lost; they return to him and their master rediscovers them.'

'The foolish man who does wrong knows the suffering by himself in the other world'\(^{657}\).

or,

'He who sees in accordance with the Dhamma enjoys happiness
In this world and the future world'\(^{658}\).

or,

'Monks, an action done through greed, born of greed, produced by greed, arising from greed, such an action will ripen when one's own existence appears and when the action is ripe; there will be a person who will experience the fruit of that action, either in the present life, or in the future life, or in some other life'\(^{659}\).

It is with this meaning that the Sūtras declare that, without the puṇḍgala, there is no responsibility for actions. The Buddha said:

'The puṇḍgala exists as a designation (prajñāpāti). This is why that is opposed to (the opinion on) the non-existence of the person. If it is true that a person does not exist, then there is nothing-that-kills, nor anything-that-is-killed. It is the same for theft, illicit sensuality, falsehood and the absorption of intoxicants. This is (a lacuna in the opinion on) the non-existence of a person. If a person were not to exist, neither would there be the five major misdeeds; (if) the sense faculties were not to arouse good and bad actions, there would be no bonds; if there were nothing that detaches the bonds, there would be nothing that is attached; equally, there would be no actor, no action, no result (of action). If there were no action, there would be no result' (Sūtras, 465a 17-22).

Briefly, the establishment of the puṇḍgala-designated-by-transmigration, for the Puṇḍgalavādins, is necessary in order to explain:

1. The continuity of a person which is like a flux interrupted by psycho-physical phenomena, flowing not only in the present, but having its source in the past and ever continuing to flow in the future;

2. The responsibility for actions (karman), in order to answer the accusation according to which Buddhism is a nihilistic and immoral doctrine, since the existence of the puṇḍgala, the bearer of a force which travels through the flux of existences, and which acts and gathers its fruition, responds to an ideal of justice in the universe and to the justification of good actions.

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657 Cf. Dhp, 127, Sn, 666.
658 Dhp, 168-9: Dhammacāoti sukhaṃ seti j asmin loke paramhi ca //
659 AN I, 134: Yen bhikkhave lobhapakatam kammam lobhajam lobhanidānam lobhasamudayam yath'assa attahāvo nibhattati tathā tamaṃ kammam vipaccati, yathā tamaṃ kammam vipaccati tathā tassa kammassa vipākam phatisamvedati dātth'eva dhamme upajje vā apare vā pariyojye.
PUDGALA-DESIGNATED-BY-CESSATION (nirodhaprajñapnapudgala)

1. On this subject, the Sns explains:

   ‘What does (pudgala)-designated-by-cessation (nirodhaprajñapnapudgala) mean? — After pudgala-designated-by-the-supports and pudgala-designated-by-transmigration, the Buddha speaks of pudgala-designated-by-cessation. When the body from the past is destroyed, that is what is called the designation of cessation. As the Buddha said:

   The ceasing of the five impermanent aggregates of monks whose defilements (āśrava) are exhausted is called the designation of cessation (nirodhaprajñapiti). (Furthermore, as the Buddha said in this stanza:

   «The sage cannot be measured as he has attained unshakeable joy».

   That is what is called (pudgala)-designated-by-cessation’ (Sns, 466c 19-24).

2. The Sūḍa explains the same ideas clearly:

   ‘What does the designation of cessation (nirodhaprajñapiti) mean? — It is the designation of cessation in which appropriation is exhausted, and where one no longer appropriates anything’ (Sūtra).

   ‘Appropriation is as it has been explained above. That appropriation is exhausted; one no longer appropriates anything, one no longer takes hold of another (life). Individuality having ceased because nothing remains, one reaches the other shore. It is through the designation of cessation that the views of annihilation and eternity are remedied. Thus, it is certainly merely a synonym of the designation of Parinirvāṇa (?) which is equally ineffable (avaktavya). If (the ineffable) is different (from the body), there is no Parinirvāṇa. If it is not different, there is (equally) no Parinirvāṇa. If this, the ineffable, is understood in this way, it is inevitably understood that Parinirvāna is like a lamp that goes out . . . The designation of cessation (nirodhaprajñapiti) means, in the first place, the cessation of appropriation (upādāna) (as when it is said): «The Blessed One (has attained) Parinirvāṇa»’ (Sūḍa, 10a 19-28).

3. On the same subject, the Tds briefly explains:

   ‘The designation of cessation (nirodhaprajñapiti) is information concerning appropriation (upādāna) which has ceased, as when it is said that the Buddha (attains) Parinirvāṇa’ (Tds, 24b 45).

The pudgala-designated-by-cessation of the Sns is no different from the designation of cessation (nirodhaprajñapiti) of the Sūḍa and Tds, because all three designate the ceasing of the five aggregates, or the Parinirvāṇa of the Arhat or Tathāgata.

In order to grasp fully this designation, it is useful to recall the notion of Nirvāṇa, according to the Pudgalavādins’ interpretation: Nirvāṇa is absolute truth (paramārtha) (Tds, 25a 5), unique (Tds 25a 12), consisting of two aspects: Nirvāṇa with a remainder (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa) and Nirvāṇa without a remainder (niyupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa).

With regard to Nirvāṇa and its two aspects, the Pudgalavādins wisely retained the oldest interpretation, since they admitted that Nirvāṇa was an ultimate and unique reality and did not divide it into several types as did other schools. This means that
they held to the notion of Nirvāṇa as the uncompounded (asamskṛta), the transcendental reality in contrast to compounded things (samskṛta). Thus the Buddha said:

‘What is the uncompounded thing? — The definitive exhaustion of craving, hatred and delusion, the definitive exhaustion of all the passion, such is the uncompounded thing’... ‘What has been said is valid for the difficult to see, the unshakeable, the unbowed, the immortal, the pure, the refuge, the ford, the support, the protection, the omnipresent, the most pure, the subtle, the peaceful, the unafflicted, the not-come to existence, Nirvāṇa’.

As for the two aspects of Nirvāṇa, they constitute two stages of liberation: that which consists of the total destruction of impurities, that is, that of the Arhat or Tathāgata who, having obtained this, continues to live in the world with his old psycho-physical elements, and that which is acquired later, when those holy ones reach the end of their life with the definitive cessation of the elements of existence. This was explained by the Buddha as follows:

‘There are, O monks, two elements of Nibbāna. Which are those two elements? The element of Nibbāna with a remainder of conditioning and the element of Nibbāna without a remainder of conditioning. What, O monks, is the element of Nibbāna with a remainder of conditioning? Here, O monks, the monk who becomes an Arahant, having destroyed his impurities, practised the ascetic life, accomplished his task, laid down his burden, attained the supreme goal, completely destroyed the fetters of existence, acquired right knowledge and so is delivered; five faculties remain to him and, due to the fact that they are not destroyed, he experiences the agreeable and the disagreeable, he feels pleasure and pain; that which is the exhaustion of craving in him, the exhaustion of his hatred, the exhaustion of his delusion, is called, O monks, the element of Nibbāna with a remainder of conditioning. What, O monks, is the element of Nibbāna without a remainder of conditioning? Here, O monks, the monk who becomes an Arahant... (as above)... is delivered; in him, O monks, here, all feelings which will not have been experienced with pleasure will cool; that is what is called, O monks, the element of Nibbāna without a remainder of conditioning. Such are, O monks, the two elements of Nibbāna.

Hence, the Pudgalavādin doctrinal point on Nirvāṇa in relation to the characteristics, by comparing it with the ideas expressed in the preceding passage, is a special interpretation. Since, with regard to Nirvāṇa, the Pudgalavādins held the same view as on the position of the pudgala in relation to the supports; that is, the Pudgalavādins admitted that the pudgala and Nirvāṇa were not identical to the characteristics (laksana) nor different from the characteristics. It is said in the Tds:

‘With respect to the living being (saṅkriya = pudgala) and Nirvāṇa, we have a doubt: do the living being and Nirvāṇa also possess those characteristics (laksana)?

660 SÀ, T II, 99, 224a (Sutta No.890). Translation after A. Baréau in Le Bouddha, p.141.
they possess them, there is a serious error, since they are impermanent (anītya). If that is not the case, then it must be admitted that this book contains faults (or then) it should be said that arising (utpāda), enduring (sthiti) and degeneration (vyāya) are characteristics of the compounded (samskrta-laksana). It is impossible to say that the living being is other than the characteristics (since), if it were different from the characteristics, it would (in consequence) be eternal (śāśvata); if it were identical to the characteristics, it would be non-eternal (aśāśvata). Those two errors cannot be uttered. It is the same for Nirvāṇa. That is why it must be said that the characteristics (laksana) are exclusively characteristics of the compounded (samskrta-laksana)’ (Tds, 19b 29-c 6).

This doctrinal point conforms to what was said in thesis No.6 in Bhavya’s treatise on the schools:

‘It should not be said that Extinction (Nirvāṇa) is truly identical to all things (dharma), nor that it is truly distinct’662.

One might wonder whether there exists any connection between this thesis and the notion according to which the Tathāgata is not identical to the aggregates nor separate from them663. This question would be reasonable if the identification of the word Tathāgata with the word sattva (living being) by Buddhaghosa were understood as based on profound doctrinal reflection. In fact, if it were certain that the word Tathāgata has the same meaning as the word sattva, as Buddhaghosa indeed said, that would give a positive meaning to the pre-eminent person, that is, the Tathāgata, after the Parinirvāṇa which the Pudgalavādins designated by the expression ‘pudgala-designated-by-cessation’ (nirodha-prajñānapat-pudgala)664. If one reasons with logic based on the doctrine of insubstantiality (anatmavāda), there is no person who attains Nirvāṇa or Parinirvāṇa:

‘Nibbāna exists, but no-one attains it’665. Apart from the Pudgalavādins, nearly all the Buddhist schools or sub-schools are faithful to this doctrinal point. Furthermore, Parinirvāṇa or Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa) is defined as the total cessation of becoming: ‘Cessation of becoming is Nibbāna’666.

For the continuity of a being only appears when there is a vital process animated by thirst (troṣṇā). With the extinction of thirst, the process stops; equally, when the kernels are removed, empty seeds no longer germinate: ‘when the oil and wick are exhausted, the flame goes out: The old arising is exhausted without a new one appearing,

The thought of becoming is destroyed, it is like empty seeds which no longer germinate.”

662 Trans. after Bareau, Sectes, p.117.
663 See above, n. 592.
664 See above, nn. 593, 594, 595.
665 Vism XVI, 90 : Atthi nibbuti, na nibbuto puna.
666 SN II, 117. Bhavanirodho nibbānam. ii.
The wise who attain Nibbāna are like a lamp that goes out\textsuperscript{667}.

or,

'\textit{To him who attains the liberation of the exhaustion of thirst, through the cessation of consciousness, deliverance of mind is like the going out of a lamp.}\\textsuperscript{668}

The Buddha refused all discussions on the nature of Nirvāṇa or Parinirvāṇa which, in reality, is a real although ineffable thing (\textit{dharma}). In several texts, the Buddha demonstrated that Nirvāṇa or Parinirvāṇa as the supreme goal can be attained by practice according to the path but not intellectually by speculation. On being questioned by Rādhā:

— 'But, Blessed One, to what does Nibbāna lead?'

The Buddha said:

— 'That question goes too far and oversteps the bounds of a question. The aim of the pure life, Rādhā, is to plunge into Nibbāna, to attain Nibbāna, to end in Nibbāna.\\textsuperscript{669}

It is obvious that questions concerning the problem of what happens after the death of an Arhat or Tathāgata are always considered as questions to be rejected by the Buddha. These questions, in fact, spring from a false view in relation to the five aggregates. It is incomprehension of the insubstantiality and impermanence of the supports of life which gives rise to a mistaken concept of the Tathāgata after death. In other words, the false view maintaining that a substantial and permanent self exists leads to false views on the Tathāgata after death which are expressed in four ways:

'Friend, by not knowing, not seeing form (and the other four aggregates) as such, the origin, cessation and the path leading to the cessation of form as such, one provokes the questions: the Tathāgata exists after death, the Tathāgata does not exist after death, the Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death, the Tathāgata neither exists not does not exist after death.\\textsuperscript{670}

Equally, it is incomprehension of the reality of the Tathāgata, who is neither identical to the five aggregates nor different from them, that gives rise to mistaken opinions on the Tathāgata after death. For example, the opinion maintaining that the Tathāgata is identical to the five aggregates probably gives rise to aberrations on the

\textsuperscript{667} Sn, 235. Khinām purānam, nāvam nātthi sambhavām, virattacitā yāsīte bhavasmin te khinabijā avirātahichchhadā, nibbanti dhīrā yathāyam padīpo . . .

\textsuperscript{668} AN I, 236: Viṁśānassa nirodhena tanhakkhaya-vimutino i pujjotass’eva nibbānān vimokkha hoti cetato ti // Cf. DN II. 157.

\textsuperscript{669} SN III. 189: Nibbānam pana bhante kimatthiyanti, assa Rādha pañca na sakhi pahassa pariyanantam gahetum, nibbānagodham hi Rādha brahmmacariyam vussati nibbānaparāyanam nibbānaparīyosanam ti. Cf, SN V, 217.

\textsuperscript{670} SN IV, 386: Rūpan khe āvuso ajanato apassato yathabhātām, rūpasamudāyām ajjanato apassato yathabhātām, rūpaneirodham ajjanato apassato yathabhātām, rūpanirodhamajjanato apassato yathabhātām. hoti tathāgato param marañā ti pissa hoti, na hoti tathāgato param marañā ti pissa hoti. hoti ca na hoti tathāgato param marañā ti pissa hoti. neva hoti’na na hoti tathāgato param marañā ti pissa hoti.
Tathāgata after death. As it is said:

'Friend, the view that the Tathāgata exists after death (and the other three possibilities) is engendered by the view that the Tathāgata is identical to form (and the other four aggregates)' \(^{671}\).

The passages of the preceding text enable us to understand why the Buddha attempted to dissuade his disciples from forming any precise idea on the Parinirvāna of an Arhat and the Tathāgata; in particular, he refused categorically to answer the following four, most characteristic questions:

'Does the Tathāgata exist after death? Not exist after death? Both exist and not exist after death? Neither exist nor not exist after death?' \(^{672}\).

This is the Buddha's opinion of badly worded questions from the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta:

'... The Tathāgata exists after death' ... 'The Tathāgata does not exist after death' ... 'The Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death' ... 'The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death' ... O Vaccha, this is a false view, a thicket of views, a jungle of views, a conflict of view, a battle of views, a bondage of views; it is linked to suffering, distress, torment, feverishness; it does not lead to disgust, detachment, cessation, appeasing, supernormal knowledge, complete enlightenment, Nibbāna. Such is, O Vaccha, the danger which I see and because of which I completely avoid those views' \(^{673}\).

After having also rejected questions of the same nature but differently expressed, such as: 'Is he reborn? Is he not reborn? Is he both reborn and not reborn? Is he neither reborn nor not reborn?', the Buddha, knowing that Vaccha, with his different philosophical and religious training, could not understand his teaching, illustrated the depth and subtlety of the total disappearance of all the existences of a liberated monk with this example: It is just as inexpressible as the extinction of a fire resulting from the exhaustion of fuel. The Buddha then specified what he had said by explaining it as follows: the cessation of the five aggregates of the Tathāgata and the ineffability of Parinirvāna.

' ... Similarly, in truth, O Vaccha, the form by which the Tathāgata can be recognised, that form of the Tathāgata is abandoned, its roots severed, it is uprooted, deprived of existence [This obviously only means existence in this world of suffering, in the form of a man, god, animal, ghost or hell-bound being], subject to the law of non-arising in the future. He is freed from the denomination 'form', in truth, O Vaccha, the Tathāgata is deep, immense, unfathomable as the ocean, and it cannot be said: «he is reborn», or «he is not reborn», or «he is both reborn and not reborn», or «he is neither reborn nor not reborn». Feeling ... Perception ... Mental factors ...

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671 SN V, 385. Īhoti tathāgato param maranā ti kho āvuso rūpāvatām etat. For the other three ways, the same expression is used in relation to the other four aggregates.
672 Cf. AN IV, 68.
673 MN I, 484–5. Trans, after A. Barenu, Le Bouddha, p.147.
Consciousness by which the Tathāgata can be recognised is abandoned, its roots are severed, it is uprooted, deprived of existence, subject to the law of non-arising in the future. He is freed from the denomination ‘consciousness’, in truth, O Vaccha, the Tathāgata is deep, immense, unfathomable as the ocean, and it cannot be said: «he is reborn», or «he is not reborn», or «he is both reborn and not reborn», or «he is neither reborn nor not reborn»674.

The Buddha’s own words concerning the Tathāgata after death with respect to the four unexplained questions in the preceding dialogue enable us to specify that the Tathāgata after death is a pre-eminent person who is deep, immense and unfathomable as the ocean. In consequence, all the characteristics pertaining to compounded things, and attributed to the Buddha after death, are not in conformity with reality.

THE BEING OF THE BEYOND

It is certain that the scholars of the Pudgalavādin school were monks well versed in the teaching of the Buddha, particularly the doctrine of the insubstantiality of the self (anātmavāda). All the same, they were troubled by questions concerning the Tathāgata after death or Parinirvāna. Is there a person who attains Nirvāṇa without a remainder (nirupadhisesanirvāna) after the total disappearance of the aggregates? After death, does the Tathāgata accede to eternity without happiness or does he enjoy the bliss of Parinirvāṇa?

In admitting the pudgalā-designated-by-cessation, they tried to explain the continuity of the person, even after the Parinirvāṇa of an Arhat or the Tathāgata. In other words, the Pudgalavādins, by establishing the designation of cessation (nirrodhaprajñapti), wished to denounce the wrong interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching on the problem of what happens after the death of an Arhat or the Tathāgata. The heretical view of the annihilation of the liberated person who attains Nirvāṇa without a remainder existed in the community of monks even at the time of the Buddha. For example, Yamāka declared:

‘As I understand the doctrine taught by the Blessed One, as a monk whose impurities are exhausted, on the dissolution of the body, he becomes annihilated, destroyed and no longer exists after death”675.

According to the Pudgalavādins, the holy one who attains Parinirvāṇa is the pre-eminent person, having achieved the destruction of the fetters (samyojana) in his lifetime. However, the total disappearance of the impure aggregates does not imply the extinction of the life of a being or of the liberated person.

This interpretation of the Pudgalavādins is not entirely without basis since, if the

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Buddha certainly did not use the expression *pudgala-designated by cessation* which the Pudgalavādins attributed to him, he nonetheless used similar terms, such as: unmanifested consciousness (*anidassanaviññāna*)676, unestablished consciousness (*appatiṭṭhaviññāna*)677, mind come to the state of dissolution (*visākhpāraṇaṃ cittaṃ*)678, luminous mind (*pabhassaramidaçicita*)679, etc. It is possible to say that the Arhat or Tathāgata attains Nirvāṇa or Parinirvāṇa with his consciousness or mind freed from any connection with past supports:

‘Monks, if the mind of a monk is not attached to the elements of form (feeling, perception, mental factors, consciousness) and is freed from impurities by the absence of supports then, as a consequence of freedom from impurities, he is immovable; as a consequence of immobility, he is satisfied; as a consequence of satisfaction, he is not perturbed; not being perturbed, he himself attains Nibbāna’680.

The story of Godhika equally authorises us to draw the same conclusion, that is to say, the continuity of consciousness, the identity and responsibility of a person. Having been weakened by illness, Godhika was unable to remain in a state of meditation. In order not to fall into a wretched existence, this holy one decided to put an end to his life by cutting his throat. On achieving this suicide, he obtained the Arhat fruit, and Māra was unable to find Godhika’s consciousness. He came in disguise to ask the Buddha where Godhika’s consciousness had gone. The Buddha answered him that the place of birth of that consciousness could not be found since it had not established itself anywhere.681

Similarly, the story of Vakkali is another illustration of this idea. Suffering from an incurable illness, Vakkali killed himself. The Buddha, having seen Māra searching for Vakkali’s consciousness, said: ‘Monks, with an unestablished consciousness Vakkali, the son of good family, has attained Parinibbāna’.682

Monks such as Godhika and Vakkali, who achieved deliverance, as well as the Tathāgata are among those who have attained transcendental liberation. Their old supports totally cease functioning, but their consciousnesses become unestablished and ineffable. They leave the triple world and no longer pertain to any category of worldly beings. That is why they are undiscoverable by beings still imprisoned in the cycle of birth and death:

‘Monks, when the mind of a monk is thus delivered, the gods — those with Indra, those with Brahma, those with Pajāpati — do not succeed in their search, if they think thus: «This is the support of the Tathāgata’s consciousness». Why is that? Monks,
I declare that the Tathāgata, even at present, is undiscoverable. They are undiscoverable and ineffable because no criterion exists which can measure them and no word exists which can make them known:

For him who has attained the goal, there is no measure. Of words with which one might speak Of him, there are none either. When all things are removed, Removed also are all means of expression.

In fact, the Arhat and the Tathāgata, in life and after death, are undiscoverable only by worldlings. However, among themselves they can always recognise each other, since they still possess their minds (citta) as personal identity. For example, Mahāmoggallāna, accompanied by five hundred Arhats, could perceive that they were true Arhats; as it is said:

Venerable Mahāmoggallāna then noted intuitively that their minds were delivered, unconditioned by rebirth.

Moreover, the Buddha, on proclaiming that he was not a nihilist (venayika), declared that his teaching was aimed at eliminating suffering but not the existence of a being. In this sense, he presented a significant simile:

—in this Jeta grove, if a man were to take away grasses, twigs, branches and leaves and burn them or deal with them in some other way, do you then think: It is us that that man carries away, or burns, or deals with in some other way?
—No, Lord. Why? Because that, Lord, is not our self or what pertains to our self.
—Equally, monks, you renounce what does not belong to you. That renunciation leads you to prolonged welfare and happiness.

The extracts from the canonical collections which follow also illustrate the significance of the preceding simile:

‘I (the Buddha) become cool and attain Nibbāna.’

‘He who attains Nibbāna is as cool as water in the lake.’

683 MN 1, 140: Evam vimutatittho kho bhikkhave bhikkhu sa — indā devā sa-Brahmā sa-Pajāpatīkā avase suñjhagacchanti; idam nissitam tathāgatassa viññānānti, taṁ kissa hetu? ditthe vihāram bhikkhave dhamme tathāgatam ananuvejyo to vedami. Cf. SN III, 118, IV, 384.

684 Sn. 1076: Athisa gatassu na pamānam atthi. upasiva ti bhagavā yena nām viśju, taṁ tassa n'atthi, sabbesu dhammesu samākhassu samākhata vādapihā pi sabbe ti.

685 SN 1, 194: Tesaṁ sudam ūyasāni Mahāmoggallāna cetassā vīthām samanna-sati vippamuttam nirupadhin.

686 MN 1, 141: ... Yam imasmin jetavane tīnakathā-sākhā palāsam taṁ jano hareyya vā daheyya vā yathāpaccayam vā kareyya, api na tumhākam evam-assyā: anhe jano karati vā dāhanti vā yathāpaccayam vā karati — na h etam bhante, taṁ kissa hetu: na hi na tum bhante atta vā attaniyam vā ti — evam-eva kho bhikkhave yam na tumhākaṁ taṁ pujahatha, taṁ vo puhinam digharattam hitāya sakkāya bhavissati.

687 MN 1, 172: ... Sitthāto 'sni nibbuto.

688 Sn. 487: Parinibbuto udakarabode va sito.
'The holy one, having crossed (the stream), reaches the other shore and stands on firm ground.889.

'H having crossed, he does not retrace his steps.890.

'He does not reach the other shore twice.891.

'Bliss, friend, is Nibbana, bliss, friend, is Nibbana. How can there be bliss, friend Sariputta, where there is no feeling? — That there is no feeling, friend, is precisely bliss.892.

It is in this way that the Buddha did not categorically reject the 'existence' of a liberated person who, having eliminated suffering and its origin, enjoys the bliss of Nirvana or Parinirvana.

Furthermore, in several discourses the Buddha affirmed that the Tathāgata was a superior person, an excellent being, he who obtains the supreme fruit. During his lifetime, he transcends what is in the world, and consequently he cannot be known by the forms of existence. After death, he is beyond all categories of beings and has no equal, consequently the four means of common expression cannot be applied to him.893.

Thus, the Tathāgata, whether during his lifetime or after his death, is a person freed from the world. He has left the cycle of birth and death. That is why the dissolution of the psycho-physical process and the remainder of old actions do not affect the Tathāgata whose knowledge is perfect and whose bliss is constant:

'The destruction of the body is considered as happiness by the holy ones, in contrast to how it is seen by all the world.894.

With regard to this subject, A. Bareau wrote: 'Only the Pudgalavādin schools could claim that the person, because it is not truly identical to the elements that compose it, subsists in Nirvāna. Also, the state in which it dwelt would, after the definitive cessation of all its mental and biological functions, seem like deep and dreamless sleep, complete unconsciousness.895.

Going even further, Th. Stcherbatsky affirmed that the invention of the pudgala has the most positive significance from the point of view of the Absolute. This is what he said on the existence of an Arhat or Tathāgata after Parinirvāna:

'It is also clear that the Vatsiputriyas (Vajjiputtakas) established their pudgalavāda with no other aim than that of supporting the doctrine of a supernatural, surviving Buddha from the philosophical side, and :
'The pudgala of a Buddha seems to be an Omniscient Eternal Spirit'697.

To summarise, the preceding interpretation, in fact, is not in conformity with Buddhist orthodoxy, but it has a meaning for the Pudgalavadin who had admitted the pudgala-designated-by-cessation in order to denounce a nihilistic view of the liberated person after Parinirvāṇa.

**EXISTENCE IN THE BEYOND**

If the pre-eminent person enjoys the bliss of Nirvāṇa, Nirvāṇa is certainly the abode of supreme bliss698. Under its two aspects — Nirvāṇa with a remainder and Nirvāṇa without a remainder — Nirvāṇa constitutes the sole uncompounded (asamskṛta) domain, beyond all contingency and without any connection to anything whatever other than itself. In consequence, the speech and thought of a man pertaining to the compounded domain cannot speak or have any idea of it.

From the philosophical and mental point of view, the Buddha and his disciples often defined Nirvāṇa in negative terms. For example, Nirvāṇa means the destruction of thirst699, of bad roots700, the cessation of suffering701, the end of birth and death702 etc.

This is easy to understand, since any positive definition of Nirvāṇa can lead to philosophical speculation and sensory attachment. That does not mean that the Buddha never spoke of Nirvāṇa in its positive aspects. He declared that a domain exists in the beyond, far from this terrestrial world full of suffering:

'There where there is nothing, where no attachment subsists, the island, the only; it is that which I call Nībbāṇa, the end of old age and death703.

or,

'There is, monks, a domain where there is no earth, or water, or fire, or air, or infinity of space, or infinity of perception, or non-perception. It is not of this world, or of the other world, neither of one nor the other, not of the sun, or of the moon. That state, monks, I call neither coming nor going, neither appearing nor disappearing. It has no origin, no evolution, no stopping: this, in truth, is the end of suffering':

'Difficult to see is the infinite, difficult to see is the truth. Attachment is severed by him who knows. For him who sees, nothing remains.

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698 Dhp. 203: "nībbānāṃ paramam sukhām.
699 SN III, 190: *Tanakkhayo hi Rādha nībbānān ti; SN I, 39: . . . tanhāyā vipparāhanena, nībbānāṃ iti vuccati.
700 SN IV, 251: *Yo kho āvuso rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhato idāṃ vuccati nībbānam. Cf. AN V, 332; Sn, 1093-4.
701 Udāna, 80: . . . es' ev' anto dukkhasā 'ti.
702 Sn, 467: *He who abandons pleasures, as the vanquisher enjoys the end of birth and of death (Yo kāme hitā abhihassyaḥ / yo vedi jāti-maranassā antum).
703 Sn, 1094: *Akiñcanam anādānam ātāṃ dipam anāparam ēti nībbānām iti nam brūmi, jātāmaccuparikkhayam.
‘There is, monks, an unborn, unarisen, uncreated, unformed. If, monks, an unborn, unarisen, uncreated, unformed, were not to exist, there would be no deliverance for what is born, arisen, created, formed. But, monks, since there is an unborn, unarisen, uncreated, unformed, so what is born, arisen, created, formed, can be liberated.  

Noteworthy is the affirmative expression ‘there is’ through which Nirvāṇa cannot be conceived as pure extinction, nor as camouflaging an absolute zero. In another discourse, the Buddha compared Nirvāṇa to a gain or an asset which the wise man should win through a vigorous fight. Therefore, Nirvāṇa is described not only as a negative state but also a a positive recompense of the efforts of a person on the Path:

‘Penetrating in meditation,  
being valiant in perseverance,  
the wise attain  
supreme security’.  

In the Saṃyutta Nikāya IV, 368-72, there is a description of the nature of Nirvāṇa by various synonyms. The following synonyms are the most significant in the positive meaning of Nirvāṇa; purity, peace, happiness, security, kindness, excellence, freedom, well-being, etc.

Despite everything, we should consider that the ‘existence of Nirvāna’ is outside two notions: existence and non-existence of the world. That is why Nirvāṇa is invisible to people who do not have the noble eye. Conversely, Nirvāṇa is only perceived by the clear-sighted, and comprehensible to the wise. Thus, Nirvāṇa is a transcendent domain, the island where there is no other existence.

It is probable that it is with the same meaning that the Pudgalavādins wished to demonstrate that the pudgala-designated-by-cessation was the pre-eminent person who, having reached the end of his last existence, attains Nirvāṇa without a remainder or Parinirvāṇa and abides there in bliss.

Obviously, what is admitted by the Pudgalavādins with regard to the problem of

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704 Udāna, 81. Cf. also Itivuttaka II. 6, and the translation by A. Bureau in Le Bouddha, pp.139-40.  
705 Dhp. 23: Te jhāyino sātātikā nivāram dathopurakkamā / phusani dhīrā nibbānam, yogakkhamam anuvitaram.  
707 MN I, 510: Equally, Māgāndiya, the monks of other religions being blind, having no eye, not knowing well-being, do not see Nibbāna. . . (Evam-eva kho Māgāndiya aññatīthiyo paribhājakā andhā acakkhukā, ajananta ārogyam apassani nibbānam . . .). MN II, 202: the same expression, andho acakkhuko, addressed to Pokkhaṅnakī.  
708 Itivuttaka, p.38: These two kinds of (Nibbāna) are declared by the Clear-sighted One. . . (Duve ime cakkhumattā pakāṣṭha, nibbānañadhātu . . .).  
709 AN I. 159: Thus, brahmī. Nibbāna is visible in this life, immediate, engaging, attractive and comprehensible to the wise man (Evam kho brāhmaṇa saṇdiṭṭhikam nibbānam hosī akālikam ehipassikkam apanaṇikam paccattam veditabbo viññāhi iii).  
710 Cf. Udāna, p.80  
711 Sn. 1092: . . . me dipam akkhūhi, yathā-y-idam nāparam siyā.
existence after the death of an Arhat or Tathāgata, despite the designation (prajñāpatti), constitutes a new and remarkable doctrinal notion with regard to the unexplained domain in the teaching of the Buddha.

In connection with the establishment of the three designations, the Tds, 24a 29-b 8, explains that the three designations have the aim of remediing false views:

The first designation is twofold: the designation of the underlying conditioning (upādānaprajñāpatti) and the designation of the absence of underlying conditioning (anupādānaprajñāpatti). The former remedies nihilism (nāstidrṣṭi), which maintains that 'nothing exists', since, if the existence of a person is understood in relation to the underlying conditioning, nihilism is not admitted. The latter remedies realism (astidrṣṭi) which claims that 'everything exists', since, if it is understood that nothing exists, that there is no underlying conditioning, realism is not admitted.

The second designation is the designation of the past (atitaprajñāpatti). This remedies annihilation (after death) (uccheda-drṣṭi) which denies rebirth and the ripening of actions, since, if it is understood that former lives exist, it is also believed that later lives exist. Therefore the doctrine of rebirth is admitted.

The third designation is the designation of cessation (nirudhaprajñāpatti). It Remedies eternalism (śāsva-drṣṭi) which considers that nothing has changed after death, since, if it is understood that a pre-eminent person exists after Parinirvāṇa, there is no attachment to eternalism.

On the other hand, according to the Sns, the Sāṃmitiyas consolidated the thesis of the pudgala with vigorous arguments relating to all the important doctrinal ideas of Buddhism, with strong refutations and even unreserved condemnations with regard to people who denied the theory of the pudgala, as this text testifies:

'The Buddha said: The pudgala exists as a designation (prajñāpatti). This is why that is opposed to (the opinion on) the existence of the person. If it is true that a person does not exist, then there is nothing-that-kills, nor anything-that-is-killed. It is the same for theft, illicit sensuality, falsehood and the absorption of intoxicants. This is (a lacuna in the opinion on) the non-existence of a person.

If the person were not to exist, neither would the five major misdeeds; (if) the sense faculties were not to arouse good and bad actions, there would be no bonds, there would be nothing that is attached; equally, there would be no actor, or action, or result (of action). If there were no action, there would be no result. (If) there were no action or result, there would be no birth or death. However, living beings, because of actions and their results, transmigrate in the cycle of birth and death (samsāra). If there were no birth or death, there would be no cause (hetu) of birth and death. If there were no cause, there would be no cessation of the cause. If there were no cessation of the cause, there would be no directing towards the Path (mārga). Hence, there would be no four Noble Truths (āryasārya). If there were no four Noble Truths, there would be no Buddha teaching the four Noble Truths. If there were no Buddha teaching the four Noble Truths, there would be no Community (sangha) of monks. Thus the refutation of the pudgala incurs the refutation of the Three Jewels (triratna) and four Noble Truths. Such is the refutation of all those opinions. That is why the refutation of the pudgala gives rise to the errors mentioned above, and other errors would also occur.
If it is admitted that a person (pudgala), a self, exists, the above-mentioned errors would not occur. As the Buddha said in the Sūtra, it is necessary to know exactly. That is why the person truly exists' (Sns, 465a 17-b 1).

In conclusion the pudgala, according to the Pudgalavādins, is a designation (prajñāpatti) but not an absolute reality. Its nature is totally different, on the one hand, from the concept of a metaphysical self (ātman) in the brahmanical philosophical system, and on the other, from the concept of a conventional self according to the majority of Buddhist schools.

It is thus that the pudgala, with its three designations, is an effable (avakta vyāṣya) which, through its unlimited perpetuity, constitutes the agent of knowledge, memory, the processes of rebirth, the ripening of actions (karman) and which, after having passed through the multiplicity of different lives, plunges into bliss.

In other words, by establishing the pudgala, the Pudgalavādins wished to make known the real existence of a being and, at the same time, respond to fundamental problems, namely, knowledge, memory, rebirth, the fruition of actions and liberation.

The diagram given below summarises the preceding ideas112.

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112 See also E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 25
II — The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādins

Alongside the main thesis are also found fifteen secondary theses in the four works.113 These theses, which are connected with the Pudgalavādins, are as follows:

I — Existence of an imperishable thing (aviprāṇaśadharma) which plays an important rôle in the process of action and fruition.

This thesis, established a little later by the Śāṃmītiyas, completes that of the pudgala, in the sense of transmigration which links two successive existences. Since rebirth, according to Buddhism, means the continuity of existences as well as the fruition of actions (karmavipāka). Although good or bad actions perish as soon as they arise,

713 Account is taken here only of secondary theses found in the extant Pudgalavādin works. For the complete list of the theses of the Vātsiputriya school and the stanzas, different interpretations of which created schisms in the school. This is a translation from The Samayabhodopacanacakra of Vāsumitra gives us a summary of the theses of the Vātsiputriya school, cf. A. Barenk, Sectes, pp.114-30; Kathāvatthu (Points of Controversy), p.XVIII.

The Samayabhodopacanacakra of Vāsumitra gives us a summary of the theses of the Vātsiputriya school and the stanzas, different interpretations of which created schisms in the school. This is a translation from The Samayabhodopacanacakra, T XLIX, 2031, lcc 14-16: The general idea of the main doctrine upheld by the school of the Vātsiputriyas: the pudgala is neither identical (sāma) to the aggregates (skandha) nor different (visama) from them. Based on the aggregates, elements (dhatu) and domains (āyatana), this name is a designation (prajñātī).

A mong compounded things (samskṛta), some endure for a while, others disappear instantaneously (kṣanika).

If things (dharma) are different from the pudgala, they cannot transmigrate (sāmkṛantu) from this world to a future world. It is possible to speak of transmigration by basing oneself on the pudgala.

Even heretics (tirthika) can acquire the five superknowledges (abājā). The five kinds of consciousness (vijñāna) are neither supplied with passions (sārāga) nor without passions (vīrāga).

The abandoning of the fetters (samyogāna) of the world of desire (kamadhatu) which should be abandoned through cultivation (bhāvanāprahāśaya) is what is called dispassion (vīrāga). This is not the abandoning (of the fetters) which should be abandoned through vision (dṛṣṭanāprahāśaya).

Patience (ksanti), the name (nāma), the characteristic (laksana) and the supreme worldly dharma (laukkāgradkarma) are called the entry into the predestination to the Good (chēng-hsing-li-shēng). If one has already acquired entry into the predestination to the Good, at the moment of twelve thoughts, one is called 'initiated' (pratiṣṭhāna). At the thirteenth thought, one is called 'dweller in the fruit' (phalavastha).

Thus there are different notions. Due to differing opinions in the interpretation of a stanza, this school is divided into four sub-schools:

1) the Dharmottariya sub-school,
2) the Bhudrayāniya sub-school,
3) the Śāṃmītiya sub-school, and
4) the Saṃnāṅgārīka sub-school.

the stanza in question being:

Being delivered, one fails back again,
Falling back comes from covetousness, where one can return.
The acquisition of security and joy is happiness.

Pursuing the practices of happiness, one reaches happiness.

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their impressions or seeds should be deposited and accumulated in an imperishable thing, dissociated from the mind, neutral from the moral point of view, and affecting all living beings including the holy ones. This imperishable thing, continuing to exist through the flux of existences, is the essential basis for the mechanism of the fruition of actions. This point of view is described in several propositions in the Snas:

"What is acting in oneself? It is 'the reception (of the fruits of action)'. What is the action (karman) of oneself? It is the differentiation of one’s own action and those of others. Why? Because the results of the action do not go to another. This is the accumulation (Shêng, upacaya) (of the fruit of action). What? It is the means. It is the domain of compounded things (hsing, samskrt). Why? Because they are conditioned by others. It is an imperishable thing (pu-nie, avipranâsadharma). Why? It is receptivity. That thing is a manifestation: actions (karman) accomplished in this life are not perishable' (Sns, 462a 13-16).

This doctrinal point is clearly expressed in Bareau, Sectes: [tr.] ‘There is an imperishable (avipranâsa) thing which is dissociated from the mind (citaviprayukta)’14. According to Bareau, this thing is identical to that which is defined by Candrakirti: ‘When action arises, there also arises in the series a thing dissociated from the mind, undefined (avyâkta), destroyed by cultivation (bhâvanâ), which is called imperishable, which yields the fruit of action’15.

In fact, we can further grasp the meaning of this imperishable thing from the definition by Vasubandhu:

‘It should be admitted that the two actions of body and speech, good or bad, deposit in the psycho-physical series (skandhasamâna) a separate dharma, existing in itself (dravyasat) and classed among things dissociated from the mind (citaviprayuktasamâkâra). For some, this dharma is called accumulation (upacaya); for others, ‘without perishing’ (avipranâsa). By reason of this dharma, one realises (abhinirvrti) the future agreeable or disagreeable fruit. As for mental action (manâhkarma) also, the existence of this dharma should be admitted. Otherwise (anyatra), when a thought arises and mental action disappears (nivrtta), if this particular dharma had not been deposited in the mental series (citta-samâtana), how would one realise the future fruit? Therefore, the existence of such a dharma must necessarily (niyatam) be admitted’16.

2 — There are twelve knowledges in the path of vision (darsanamârtha)

This thesis is set out in the Tds as follows:

‘It is necessary to have an extensive understanding of twelve knowledges in the

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14 A. Bareau, Sectes, p.126.
Cf. Lamotte, History, p.609 and n. 133.
According to that treatise, from the status of a worlding (prthagjana) to that of an Arhat, the practitioner must traverse three stages:

a) the stage of vision (darśanabhūmi);

b) the stage of cultivation (bhāvavāikhūmi); and

c) the stage of him who has no more to train in (asaiksabhūmi).

It is at the stage of vision that the practitioner begins to see what was not seen before, that is, he acquires twelve knowledges concerning the four Truths in relation to the three worlds. Hence, the Tds writes:

'The stage of vision (darśanabhūmi) consists of the knowledge of things (dharmañjana), the knowledge of deliberation (vicārajñana ?) and the knowledge of what-is-not-yet-known (ajñātajñāna ?). These three knowledges constitute the knowledges of the stage of vision (darśanabhūmi). Among those three, the knowledge of things has the meaning of direct comprehension of the truth (abhisamaya). For example, a good surgeon who, having seen an abscess, (decides to) open it with a cutting lancet. Then he presses it with his fingers in order to empty (the humour) without harming the vessels. It is only after that that he really opens the abscess. It is the same for the practitioner who, with correct reflection (yonisomanaskāra), by examining suffering (duḥkha) in relation to the world of desire (kāmadhātu), eliminates (the category of) passions to be destroyed by the vision of suffering (duḥkhadhāgheyakleśa); it is after that that the second knowledges arises. Since the world of desire is subject to suffering and impermanence (anityatā), it is the same for the world of form (rūpadhātu) and the formless world (ārūpyadhātu): through that knowledge, the passions (kleśa) of the world of form and the formless world are abandoned. That is what is called the three knowledges relating to suffering (duḥkha-jñāna): 'Understanding thirst (irsanā) to be the cause of suffering (duḥkhasamudaya) is the knowledge of things; it is also the knowledge of deliberation. It is the same for the knowledge of what-is-not-yet-known of the world of form and the formless world. These are what are known as the three knowledges relating to the path (mārgajñāna)' (Tds, 19b 14-27).

This doctrinal point is wholly identical to that which is mentioned in the Samaya-bheda-paracanacakra of Vasumitra: 'Having entered the predestination to the Good (samyaktvaniyāna) and in the moment of the twelve thoughts, one is called 'orientated' (pratipannaka). At the thirteenth thought, one is called 'dwelling in the fruit' (phalastha). The Pudgalavādins discovered this experience of meditation and they also indicated for themselves the results obtained. According to the Pudgalavādins, when the practitioner enters the truth of suffering relating to the world of desire, he acquires the first knowledge which is called the knowledge of things (dharmañjana). The perfection of clear comprehension of each Truth requires very profound de-
liberation, the result of which is called the knowledge of deliberation (vicārajñāna?). After having attained those two knowledges, the practitioner acquires the third knowledge of the Truth of suffering in relation to the two other worlds, namely, the world of form and the formless world. This knowledge is called knowledge of what-is-not-yet-known (ajñātajñāna?). The same process is applied to the other three Truths. Thus, in total, there are twelve knowledges. The diagram below can summarise the preceding passage.

According to the opinion of the Vātsiputriyas, meditation should be practised twice in reference to the world of desire. The first time, correct reflection (yoniśomanaskāra) examines suffering. The second time, there takes place the elimination of the passions to be destroyed by the vision of suffering (dukkhadṛghṣeyakleśa). The third time, one refers to the two higher worlds (rūpadhātu and ārūpyadhātu) in order to abandon the passions relating to those two worlds. These are the three knowledges concerning the first Truth (duhkhasatyā).

It is the same for the other nine knowledges concerning the other three Truths, namely: the cause of suffering (duhkhasamudaya), the cessation of suffering (duhkhaniruddha) and the Path (mārga).

A passage extracted from Bareau’s Sectes can illustrate this process although the names of the thoughts or knowledges are slightly different.

‘Three thoughts are devoted to each Truth (satya). Thus, with regard to the Truth of suffering (duhkhasatyā):

1 — Knowledge of painful things (dukkhadharmajñāna), by means of which one examines the suffering of the world of desire (kāmadhātu);

2 — Patience with regard to painful things (dukkhadharmaksānti): after having examined the Truth of suffering in the kāmadhātu, one abandons (prajñātīti) delusion (mohā) which was as yet not yet abandoned (aprahīna) [in the kāmadhātu] (since there is still delusion in the higher worlds (dhātu)), by means of repeated examination;
3 — Knowledge of the different kinds of suffering (*duḥkhānvayājanāna*), by examining together the suffering of the world of form (*rupadhatu*) and the formless world (*arūpyadhatu*), one thus exhausts the Truth of suffering in the three worlds. The third thought is either a thought in contiguity (*santuri*) with general knowledge of the Path (*mārgānvayājanāna*) or a thought of clear comprehension of the four Truths together. After having successively gone beyond the first twelve thoughts, one obtains the first fruit (*phala*), then, also successively, the second and third fruits.

718 Trans. from A. Baren, *Sectes*, p.117. It is advisable to make a comparison between this stage of vision and the gradual order of the comprehension of the Truth consisting of sixteen thoughts (evam *ṣaḍaracito 'yam sāyākhisamayah* — *Kosa VI*, p.185, n.1) the essential of which can be summarised in the following diagram (cf. *Kosa VI*, 27):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Duḥkhe</th>
<th>dharma<em>jñānakṣānti</em></th>
<th>dharma<em>jñāna</em></th>
<th><em>Kāmadhātu</em></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>anvaya</em>jñānakṣānti*</td>
<td><em>anvaya</em>jñāna*</td>
<td><em>Rūpadhātu</em> and <em>Arūpyadhātu</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Samudaye</td>
<td>dharma<em>jñānakṣānti</em></td>
<td>dharma<em>jñāna</em></td>
<td><em>Kāmadhātu</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>anvaya</em>jñānakṣānti*</td>
<td><em>anvaya</em>jñāna*</td>
<td><em>Rūpadhātu</em> and <em>Arūpyadhātu</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>III. Nirodhe</td>
<td>dharma<em>jñānakṣānti</em></td>
<td>dharma<em>jñāna</em></td>
<td><em>Kāmadhātu</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>anvaya</em>jñānakṣānti*</td>
<td><em>anvaya</em>jñāna*</td>
<td><em>Rūpadhātu</em> and <em>Arūpyadhātu</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>IV. Marge</td>
<td>dharma<em>jñānakṣānti</em></td>
<td>dharma<em>jñāna</em></td>
<td><em>Kāmadhātu</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>anvaya</em>dharma<em>nakṣānti</em></td>
<td><em>anvaya</em>jñāna*</td>
<td><em>Rūpadhātu</em> and <em>Arūpyadhātu</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Kosa VI*, 28: 'Fifteen moments from the duḥkhe dharma*jñānakṣānti* to the marge *anvaya*jñānakṣānti, constitute the darsanamārga — Why? — Because the vision of what was not seen continues."

A. Baren, *Sectes*, p.139 (tr.): When one enters the predestination to the Good (*samyaktivānīyāma*), at the moment of the first fifteen arnaudas of thought (*cittotpāda*), one is called 'orientated' (*pratipanna*), at the sixteenth one is called 'fruit of dwelling' (*shitiṣṭhāphala*).


According to the Sarvāstivādins, meditation is practised four times for each of the four Truths: twice with reference to the world of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and twice with reference to the two higher worlds (*rūpadhātu* and *arūpyadhātu*).

By comparing the two preceding processes of the stage of vision (*darsanabhāma*), we find that that of the Vātsiputriyas is different from that of the Sarvāstivādins with regard not only to the number, but also the names of the thoughts or knowledges. By comparing the process of the twelve knowledges with that of the sixteen thoughts, some people have concluded that the course of vision of the Vātsiputriyas is weaker than that of the Sarvāstivādins. (Cf. Masuda, *op. cit.* p.56, n.2). With regard to the difference of names in the two processes, this is illustrated in brief by the following diagram:
3 — The adjoining concentration includes four stages; patience (ksānti), name (nāma), perception (samjñā) and the supreme worldly dharma (laukikāgradharma)

With regard to this thesis, the Tds writes:

'The adjoining concentration (chin hsing ch'ān 欄 鬱, upacārasamādhi) includes patience (ksānti), name (nāma), and perception (samjñā). Adjacency to reflection (manaskāra) is what is named adjoining concentration' (Tds 18b 7-8).

... it is adjacency to the Supreme Good' (Tds, 18b 8).

... In the examination of the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātu) and domains (āyatana) which are impermanent (anitya), painful (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) and devoid of a self (anātman), if one is keen, one finds pleasure. That is what is called patience (ksānti). In correct reflection (yoniṣomanaskāra), if the mind is unshakeable (dnījīna), that is what is called name (nāma). Perception (hsiang, samjñā) in the examination of suffering is as clear as (that of) a beloved being in a dream (svapna) and an image in a mirror; that is the supreme worldly dharma (laukikāgradharma), since (it is like) the perception of the Blessed One (bhagavat) (Tds, 18b 14-18).

Whilst the Tds includes the stage of supreme worldly dharma at the stage of perception (hsiang 晟, samjñā), the Lü ming-liao lun places the supreme worldly dharma at the fourth stage (Lü ming-liao lun, 665c 13).

According to the Tds, the adjoining concentration (upacārasamādhi), the preparatory practice just preceding penetration into the stage of vision (darśanabhūmi), is divided into three stages:

1) Patience (ksānti): the stage where the practitioner deeply penetrates the reality of compounded things;
2) Name (nāma): the stage where the mind of the practitioner becomes imperturbable in correct reflection (yoniṣomanaskāra);
3) Perception (hsiang, samjñā): the stage where comprehension becomes clear;

The sixteen thoughts of the Sarvāstivādins | The twelve thoughts of the Vāsiputriyas
---|---
1. Dukkhe dharmajñānakānti | 1. Dukkhe dharmajñāna
2. Dukkhe dharmajñāna | 2. Dukkhe vijñāna?
3. Dukkhe avayavādakānti | 3. Ajñātajñāna?
5-8. Four thoughts concerning the second Truth (samadaya) | 4-6. Three knowledges concerning the second Truth (samadaya)
9-12. Four thoughts concerning the third Truth (nirodha) | 7-9. Three knowledges concerning the third Truth (nirodha)
12-16. Four thoughts concerning the fourth Truth (mūrga) | 10-12. Three knowledges concerning the fourth Truth (mūrga)

The Theravādins do not speak of knowledges or thoughts in the path of the streamwinner (sotāpannamagga) equivalent to the eighth (āṣṭamako). Athūsūlīni, p.43. The path of the Sotāpanna is called dassana because it is vision of Nibbāna for the first time ... Cf. Kośa VI, p.191, n.3 — cited and trans. by La Valée Poussin). Dassana = dukkha, samadayanirodha, maggadassana.

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it includes the stage of the supreme worldly dharma (laukikāgradharma) since it is like the perception of the Buddha.

Like the Lū ming-liao lun, the Samayabhedoparacanacakra of Vasumitra also lists all four stages or the four good roots (kuśalamāla): patience (ksānti), name (nāma), characteristic (hsiang 4n, laksana?) and the supreme worldly dharma (laukikāgradharma) are called 'entry into the predestination to the Good' (samayaktvaniyāma).

What follows defines the four good roots: 'The stage of patience is that where, at the beginning of clear comprehension, (abhisaṃyāya) of the four Truths (satyā), the latter are only examined together. The stage of the name is that where one can examine things (dharma) in the teaching (sāsana). The stage of the aspects is that where, in the clear comprehension of the Truths, one examines the essence of their principles. In the stage of the supreme worldly dharmas, which succeeds without interruption the stage of appearance, one attains the path of vision (darśanamārga).

According to the Tds, 18b 15, the levels of the three stages are not the same. Except for the first stage — ksāntī —, the second and third stages — nāma and samjñā + laukikāgradharma — are imperturbable.

719 Trans from A. Béreau, Sectes, p.117. In comparing what is described in the Tds with the above passage, it is noticeable that there are several differences in the terms as well as in their definition: for example, the stage of 'perception' (hsiang 4n, samjñā) of the Tds, 18b 7, is none other than the stage of 'aspects' in Sectes, p.117, and the Tds, 18b 17 presents it thus: 'since it is (nearly) the perception of the Blessed One', like the definition of the stage of the supreme worldly dharma (laukikāgradharma) which is included in the stage of perception. Tds, 18b 16-17: 世間第一法由世尊善， whilst the Sectes, p.117, defines it thus: 'in the stage of the supreme worldly, dharmas, which succeeds without interruption the stage of appearance, one attains the path of vision (darśanamārga).

As for the number of stages, it is probable that the author of the Tds reduced the four good roots (kuśalamāla) to three, which is the number fixed by the title of the treatise. Furthermore, the word 'name' which the author of the Tds defines as the stage in which correct reflection (yonisomanaśaktāra) becomes imperturbable, does not contradict the definition 'stage where one can examine the things of the teaching', since it is after the general examination, without discriminating between what are things and what is taught, that one attains the second phase of the examination: only things in the teaching, such as suffering (dukkha), the origin of suffering (dukkhasamādaya), etc., are considered in a more advanced stage than the first. And the third is the stage of clear perception which can be compared to him who examines the essence of their principles, since clear perception is not totally different from profound examination of the principles of the truth.

Moreover, the three or four stages of the adjoining concentration of the Tds, 18b 7, are equivalent to the four stages preceding penetration of the Path (nirvēkabhāgiya) of the Kosā VI, 17-20, i.e. heat (asamagata), summits (mārtha), patience (ksānti) and supreme dharmas (agradharma), since both lead to the Srotaprāṇa fruit.

Furthermore, the third stage — samjñā? — can be compared to the stage of the appearance of the double/similar image (patibhāgaṇimūla), the perfectly clear and immobile mental image which appears at a higher degree of meditation (Vism, p.125); the stage of the supreme worldly dharma (laukikāgradharma) corresponds to the goitrabhā, the stage of him who has attained ripeness, immediately preceding entry into the Noble Path (ariyamagga), which is found in Pug, p.12, n. 2, or what is called the ninth noble person (ariyapaggala) in AN V, 23 (cf. AN IV, 373) and the Aṭṭhakathālīka III, 508.

720 According to the Kosā IV, 17-20, among the four stages only the last two are fixed stages, that is, from which one cannot fall back again. Thus the differences in the levels of the stages between the Tds and the Kosā are not the same.
4. Clear comprehension (ahhisamaya) is progressive (anupurva)

This thesis is described in the Tds as follows:

‘In that concentration (adjoining concentration), one examines the truth (satya) progressively. For example, a man who has just crossed the desert discovers wonderful flowers (puspa), magnificent pools (hrada), streams of pure and abundant water and marvellously well-ordered flowering trees. Having seen that, he says to himself:

‘The desert cannot make such lovely things grow. They have to be near an agglomeration.

‘Similarly, the practitioner who, in the desert of life and death, is tormented by craving (kama), anger (krodha) and delusion (moha), encounters a virtuous friend (kalyanmitra), due to whom he obtains correct reflection (yonisomanaskara) .’ (Tds, 18b 10-14).

This doctrinal point is identified with the thesis of the Andhakas:

‘Clear comprehension of the fruits and Truths is gradual’[72].

The following extract and translation of texts made by A. Bareau clarify this thesis very well; it is said in the Sutras: ‘All the same. O monks, the great Ocean (mahasamudra) is progressively deeper (anubhanina), progressively sloping (anupubbapabhara), and does not fall (papata) in an abrupt manner (ayatakena), all the same, O monks, with regard to the Dhamma and discipline (dhammavinaya), there

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nirvedhakagyiya (Survasivadina)</th>
<th>Upacarasamadhi ? (Pugdalavadina)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Usmazoa</td>
<td>1. Ksanti</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Muddha</td>
<td>2. Nama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ksanti</td>
<td>3. Laksana or Samjna</td>
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<tr>
<td>imperturbable</td>
<td>imperturbable</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Laukikagradharma</td>
<td>4. Laukikagradharma</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
is progressive study (*anupubhapatipadā*), and not a sudden penetration of supreme knowledge (*āyatakena annāpativedha*), and again: 'The intelligent (*medhāvi*) goldsmith (*kammāra*) removes (*niddhamme*) impurity (*mala*) from gold (*rajata*) progressively (*anupubhena*), little by little (*thokam thokam*), from instant to instant (*khane khane*); and again: 'He, O monks, who sees suffering (*dukkha*) sees the origin itself of suffering (*dukkhasamudayaṃpi*), sees the cessation itself of suffering (*dukkhanirodhaṃpi*), sees the path itself leading to the cessation of suffering (*dukkhana-nirodhasametiṇhatipatipadāyampī*). He who sees the origin of suffering sees suffering itself, sees the cessation itself of suffering, sees the path itself leading to the cessation of suffering. He who sees the path leading to the cessation of suffering sees suffering itself, sees the origin itself of suffering, sees the path itself leading to the cessation of suffering.'

5 — The five superknowledges (*abhijñā*) can be acquired by worldlings (*prthagjana*) or heretics (*tīrthika*)

This thesis is set out in the Tds, 20a 18. The treatise also devotes lengthy passages to explaining the five superknowledges (*abhijñā*). The main points follow:

1. Supernormal power (*rddhi*) is sovereignty (*āśvāra*): of
   a — movement (*gamana*) in space (*ākāśa*), which is the power of walking on water, walking in the air, entering the earth, passing through rocks and walls, touching the sun and moon;
   b — transformation (*nirmāṇa*), which is the power of causing the appearance of a man, elephant, horse, chariot, mountain, forest, citadel, ramparts;
   c — holiness (*āryārva*), which is the power of making life longer, transforming water into butter, earth into stone and gold into silver (Tds, 20a 13-16).

2. The divine ear (*divyāśrōtra*) is hearing, engendered by the power of concentration (*samādhi*) which is fixed on a single object and develops the four pure elements (*dhātu*), by means of which one hears the voice of the gods (*deva*), mankind (*manusya*) and beings in the bad destinies (*durgati*), depending on the level [of hearing] (Tds, 20a 5-7).

3. Knowledge of the minds of others (*paracittābhijñāna*) is knowledge of such-and-such thoughts of living beings; this resembles knowledge when one sees their form and hears their voice.

4. (Knowledge of the) recollection of former lives (*pūrvanivāsānumūrtijñāna*) is recollection (*anūsmṛti*) of actions one performed in the past (Tds, 19c 21).

722 A. Béreau, Sectes, p.90. The Dhammaputtakas, Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahāśāskas, etc., admit the opposite thesis: 'There is clear comprehension (*abhisaṃaya*) of the four Noble Truths (*āryasaṅga*) at one time. When the Truth of suffering (*duḥkhasaṃga*) is seen, all the Truths can be seen' (Id., ibid., p.183). The Theravādins are of the same opinion: 'Clear comprehension (*abhisaṃaya*) of the four Paths (*magga*) and four Truths (*sacca*) is not progressive (*anupubba*) (Id., ibid., p.216). Cf. Kathāvatthu II, 7.
5. Knowledge of births and deaths (upapādaṇcyutijñāna), which corresponds to the divine eye (divyaacaksus), is knowledge of action and fruition (karmavipāka) (Tds, 19c 21-22).

These five superknowledges constitute the five superknowledges of worldlings (prthagjanapañcābhijñā) (Tds, 20a 18).

This doctrinal point conforms with thesis No.4 of the Vatsiputriya school in the Samayabhēdoparacanacakra of Vasumitra723 which A. Bareau translates thus: ‘There are also heretics (tirthika) who possess the five superknowledges (abhijñā)724.

6 — Morality (śīla) designates (actions) of body (kāyakarman) and speech (vacikarman)

The Tds presents this thesis with the following definitions and examples:

‘Morality (śīla) designates (action of) body (kāya) and (action of) speech (vāc), accomplished to lead others, not to harm others and to increase welfare. Morality (śīla) consists of three characteristics (lakṣana) which are aroused by the body (kāya) and speech (vāc). What do you mean? — Among those three characteristics, leading others means pardoning and not harming (ahimsā) living beings who cherish life (jīva) (particularly) in times of famine and drought; equally, not stealing their goods, (abstaining from relations with) their wife, this is leading others. Avoiding slander (pāiśunyavāda), harsh speech (pārusyavāda), falsehood (mṛśavāda) and frivolous talk (sambhinnooraldon), is not harming others. Moreover, the seven factors (of the body and speech) which do not oppress others constitute the deed of not harming others. When living beings are overwhelmed by suffering and do not know where to seek refuge, if they are given help, that is leading beings’ (Tds, 16b, 3-9).

This conforms to the thesis attributed to the Vatsiputriyas by the Kathāvatthu: ‘Intimation (viññatti) is virtue’725. A. Bareaux explains thus: ‘Intimation by the body (kāyaviññatti) is bodily action (kāyakamma) and intimation by the voice (vacivinānatti) is vocal action (vacikamma). In fact, virtue is bodily action and vocal action. Therefore, intimation by the body and intimation by speech are virtue. Furthermore, it cannot truly be said (nahevam vattabe) that intimation is immoral (dussīlyā)726. The explanation of morality (śīla), given by the Buddha himself, is more precise due to the qualifying adjectives, bad (akūśala) or good (kuśala), given before the terms morality (śīla), bodily action (kāyakamma), etc. He said: ‘Now, carpenter, what does good morality mean? It is good bodily action, good vocal action and also the

723 Samayabhēd., 16c 18.
724 Trans. from Bareaux, Sectes, p. 116. This thesis is also supported by the Haimavatas and Sarvāstivādins. The Theravādins are of the same opinion as the Pudgalavādins (cf. J.A, 29, vv. 210, 213). In contrast, the Mahāsākas and Dharmaguptakas maintained that non-Buddhists did not possess the superknowledges (abhijñā) (Kosa VII, p. 97, n. 4).
725 Kathāvatthu X, 9.
726 Trans. from A. Bareaux, Sectes, p. 125.
perfect purity of means of livelihood that I call morality".  
It should thus be understood that morality (śīla) is merely a method of mind and will (cetanā) which is manifested in either bodily action or words. In this sense, the definition of morality (śīla) given by the Tds is quite precise and correlates to bodily and vocal actions. In other words, according to the Pudgalavādins, abstaining from three wrong bodily actions, avoiding four wrong kinds of speech with the aim of leading beings and not harming others, constitutes morality (śīla).  

7 — Merit (punya) accumulates continually even during sleep  
With an explanation and example, the Tds presents this thesis as follows:  
'If, by receiving and practising these two (kinds of morality), merit (punya) accumulates continuously; it is the accumulation of the good. 'Henceforth, I shall abstain from killing living beings: That resolve is then augmented by an accumulation of the good, just as capital accumulates and (yields) interest each day. When the resolve to observe morality (śīla) is taken, the good (kuśala) develops continually, just as in a rotten fruit, a seed begins to germinate in the kernel and grow. If the good is not abandoned and if it is continually preserved, merit (punya) will become greater, even during sleep; that is the accumulation of the good. Such is morality (śīla)' (Tds, 16b 9-13).  

This doctrinal point conforms to what is mentioned in refutation of it in the Kathāvatthu: 'Merit (puñña) consisting of enjoyment in use (paribhogamaya) accumulates (vaddhati)' clearly the following quotations by A. Bārau illustrate this thesis: 'The Buddha said: 'For those who give (dadanā), drink (papa), fruit (adapāna) or shelter (upassaya), merit increases (pavaddhati) by day (divā) and by night (ratti), always (sadā).' In another Sutta, the Buddha said: 'For him thanks to whom a monk (bhikkhu) enjoys the use of (paribhujjamāna) a garment (cīvāra), alms-food (pindapāda), etc., there is an acquisition of merit (puññābhisaṃda), a good consequence (kuśalābhisaṃda), food of happiness (sukhasāhāra), a happy fruition (sukhavipāka), celestial (sovaṃgika), leading to heaven (saggassasamvattanika) . . .' Such gifts consisting of enjoyment in use are gifts through moral obligation (deyyudhamma)."
8—It is impossible to say whether the characteristic of things (dharmalaksana) is permanent or impermanent

In the Sns, this thesis is treated with the rejection of the differentiation of the person and the aggregates: 'It is impossible to say that the person is identical to or different from the aggregates. That is why it is impossible to say, in the first place, that the characteristic of things (dharmalaksana) is permanent or impermanent. It is the same for the person' (Sns, 465b 29—c 11).

This doctrinal expression is also found in the SamayabhedoparacanaMkra of Vasumitra as the second thesis of the Vitsiputriyas: 'Compounded things (samskriya) either endure temporarily or disappear in a single instant (ekakshanika). Bhavya tells us the same thing, as the third thesis of the Vitsiputriyas.'

According to the I pu chung lun lun shü-chi of K'uei-chi, the Sāṃmitiyas divided compounded things into two categories, the characteristics of which differ: the mind (manas) endures only for a single instant (ekakshanika), as the commentary says: 'the mind (citta) and mental functions (cittasika) are instantaneous like a lamp and the vibrations of a bell; form (rupa) can endure for a time'; as the commentary also says: 'among material things, for example, the earth endures for an aeon (kalpa) and the life faculty (jivitendriya) has a duration which depends on the longevity (of living beings)'.

This is the way the commentary by K'uei-chi describes it. Since no Pudgalavādin commentaries are extant, it is difficult to understand this thesis exactly. Nevertheless, to a certain degree the following words of the Buddha led the Pudgalavādins to establish this thesis with the aim of modifying the dogmatic interpretation of the doctrine of impermanence:

'It would be better, monks, if an illiterate worldling were to take as the self the body formed of the four great elements rather than if he were to take the mind. Why? This is because, monks, the body, formed of the four great elements, seems to persist for one or two years... or it seems to persist for an hundred years or more. But that which, monks, is called the mind or thought, that arises and disappears in a perpetual changing of day and night.'
In any case, the preceding thesis is a more or less direct interpretation of original Buddhism, since the Buddha frequently affirmed: ‘All things engendered by causes are the nature of cessation’.

9 — There is an intermediate absorption (dhyānāntara) between the first and second absorptions

This thesis is set out in the Tds, 28b 29 - c 1-2. According to that treatise, the world of form (rupadhātu) includes the sphere of joy (prīti), the sphere of joylessness (aprīti) and the sphere of equanimity (upeksā). The sphere of joy (prīti) consists of:

a) the stage with reasoning (savīrākṣa);

b) the stage without reasoning (avīrākṣa);

c) the stage with only deliberation (saviścāra) (Tds, 28b 27-28).

Of the latter, the stage with reasoning is the first absorption (prāthama-dhyāna), the stage without reasoning is the second absorption (dvītiya-dhyāna), and the stage with only deliberation (saviścāramātra) comes in the middle, between the first and second meditation (dhyānāntara).

On this intermediate absorption, A. Bareau gives this explanation: ‘In the fivefold method (pañcakanaaya), there are five distinct (vibhātta) absorptions, and three concentrations (samādhi) only (kevelam) are manifested (uddittha). The appearance (okāsa) of the concentration without reasoning but with only deliberation (avītakka-viścāramātrā), which is located between (antare) the first and second meditations, is called intermediate stage of absorption’.

It is interesting to note this remark in the Vākyāyā concerning the intermediate absorption (dhyānāntara): ‘... in the dhyānāntara, there would be no fruition in the form of feeling, from no matter what action different from action in the dhyānāntara, since it cannot be said that fruition experienced in the dhyānāntara is the fruit of an action to be felt agreeably in the sphere of the first dhyāna, or that it is the fruit of an action to be felt disagreeably in the sphere of the kāmadhātu, or that it is the fruit of an action from the sphere of the fourth dhyāna.

The Kathāvatthu confirms that the Sāṁmitiyas supported this thesis: ‘There are intermediate (antarikā) stages between the absorptions (jñāna)’.
10 — Only one absolute truth exists: Nirvāṇa

This is the description of this thesis in the Tds: 'Only one truth exists, not two' (Tds, 25a 6). According to that treatise, there are three truths, namely: conventional truth (ṣamvṛtisātya), characteristic truth (lakṣaṇasātya) and absolute truth (paramārtha-sātya). The first designates traditional manners, customs of society and rules of training (ṣiksā). The second designates the three Noble Truths (āryasātya) which are: suffering (duḥkha), the origin of suffering (samudaya), and the Path (mārga). The third is absolute truth which is identical to Nirvāṇa. Absolute truth is what is contrasted to conventional truth and it is higher than characteristic truth. It constitutes the supreme goal of Buddhists, which should be understood as 'the negation, absence, cessation of all that constitutes the world which we live, act and suffer'.

Hence, the Tds describes: 'Absolute truth is the definitive cessation of all activities, of speech (vāc) and of all thoughts (citta). Activity is bodily action (kāyakarman); speech (vāc) is that of the voice (vākkarman); thought is that of the mind (manaskarman). If these three (actions) cease definitively, that is absolute truth which is Nirvāṇa (Tds, 25a 2-5).

Nirvāṇa is absolute truth since it pertains to the uncompounded (asamāskṛta) domain, the characteristics of which are totally different from those of the domain of


Later, perhaps to facilitate the counting of the factors of the meditations, the Abhidhamma masters classed the intermediate concentration in the second absorption. The absorptions were thus raised to five in number and correspond to the order of the abandoning of their factors (cf. Dhammasaṅgāni, p.160; Aṭṭhasāliṇī, p.179; Abhidhammasaṅgāha I, § 21):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five absorptions</th>
<th>Essential factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st absorption</td>
<td>vitakka — vicāra — piti — sukha — ekaggatā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd absorption</td>
<td>vicāra — piti — sukha — ekaggatā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd absorption</td>
<td>piti — sukha — ekaggatā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th absorption</td>
<td>sukha — ekaggatā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th absorption</td>
<td>upekkhā — ekaggatā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, in the system of five absorptions, reasoning (vitarka) and deliberation (vicāra) are successively eliminated in two different absorptions, whilst in the system of four absorptions, the second absorption is attained through the elimination of reasoning (vitarka) as well as deliberation (vicāra) and only retain three factors: joy (priti), happiness (sukha) and singlemindedness (cittakāgratā):

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Four absorptions</th>
<th>Essential factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>vitarka — vicāra — priti — sukha — cittakāgratā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd absorption</td>
<td>priti — sukha — cittakāgratā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd absorption</td>
<td>sukha — cittakāgratā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th absorption</td>
<td>upekkhā — cittakāgratā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

740 After Bureau, L’Absolu, p.252.
compounded things (samskṛta) which are arising, disappearing and changeability:

‘Neither arising, nor disappearing, nor changeability are known. That, monks, constitutes the three characteristics of uncompounded things’.

Thus it is that Nirvāṇa transcends all activities based on the three modalities, namely: body, speech and mind. In consequence, Nirvāṇa, the Ultimate Truth or Reality, is beyond reasoning and expression by a being. In other words, it is the domain where no compounded things exist.

Furthermore, the Pudgalavādins, like the Sinhalese Theravādins, remained strictly faithful to the letter of the sūtras and never recognised but one asamskṛta: Nirvāṇa.

The Pudgalavādins went even further by accusing other schools which recognised several uncompounded things (asamskṛta) and they cited, in the Tds, this stanza by the Buddha:

‘There exists only one truth, not two.
From one life to another, he who is deluded
In believing to see several truths,
Then, Ananda, he cannot be called Śramaṇa’ (Tds, 25a 6-7).

A. Bareau explains thus the faithfulness of the Pudgalavādins to the singleness of Nirvāṇa: Their exodus towards western India, where they established their main residence, as is attested both by inscriptions and the testimonies of Hsiian-tsang and I-ching, enabled them, like the Theravādins, to preserve intact the thesis of singleness.

741 AN I, 152: Na uippādo paññāyati na vayo paññāyati na thīassā anāṅkhathāṁ paññāyati; imānā kho bhikkhavo tinī asaṅkhatalaṅkhaṇāni.
742 Cf. DN I, 223.
744 Bareau, L’Absolu, p.263.
745 Apart from the Pudgalavādins and Theravādins of the Vimuktimārgaśāstra school, nearly all the other schools admit a multiplicity of asamskṛtas. Bareau, in L’Absolu, pp.260-1, gives various lists of the asamskṛtas of the schools and works of early Buddhism:

A — a single term: Nirvāṇa — a) Theravādins, Vāsīputrīyas, Sāmmitiyas; b) Vimuktimārgaśāstra.
B — Three terms: two nirodhas and ākāśa — a) Śrāvastivādins, Sautrāntikas; b) Sākyasiddhiśāstras.
C — Four terms: two nirodhas, niyama and nirodhasamāpatti — Andhakas.
D — Five terms:
1) two nirodhas, ākāśa, tathatā and pratītyasamutpāda — Southern Mahāsāskas;
2) two nirodhas, tathatā, pratītyasamutpāda and niyama — Pubbaseliyas.
E — Nine terms:
1) two nirodhas, ākāśa, three tathatās, pratītyasamutpādatathatā, mārgatathāsa and āñjñya — Northern Mahāsāskas;
2) two nirodhas, tathatā, pratītyasamutpāda, mārga and four ārūpyas — Northern Mahāsāṃghikas;
3) two nirodhas, dharmaśāntiṭā, pratītyasamutpāda, niyama and four ārūpyas — a) Pubbaseliyas; b) Sāriputrābhidharmāśāstra.

Cf. also the explanation in L’Absolu, p.262 sq.
746 Bareau, L’Absolu, p.263.
The doctrinal points cited above fully confirm what was said by La Vallée Poussin [tr.]: ‘Certain philosophers, the Vātsiputriyas, say that there is a single asamskṛta, namely, Nirvāṇa’.

11 — There are five, six and seven destinies (gati)

The Pudgalavādin literature does not give us the number of destinies (gati) in the three worlds (dhatu).

1 — The five destinies found in the Tds: ‘The world of desire (kāmadhātu) includes mankind (manusya), the gods (deva) and the bad destinies (durgati)’ (Tds, 26b 29). ‘The bad destinies (durgati) are the hells (niraya, naraka), the animal kingdom (tiryagyoni) and hungry ghosts (preta)’ (Tds, 27a 14-15).

It is remarkable that, in the whole treatise, no trace is found of the idea according to which the Asuras formed a separate destiny. Even within the framework of the hungry ghosts (preta), there are found only three categories of hungry ghosts which are the wretched, the poor and the rich, but not Asuras. Hence, the Vātsiputriyas, at least in the early centuries, admit only five destinies.

2 — The six and seven destinies found in several passages of the Sns. The latter cites the arguments of various schools (cf. Sns, 469b 15 sq. and 670a 1 sq.). The Sns, in establishing its thesis of an intermediate existence (antarābhava), deals intentionally with:

a) six destinies: ‘A man, by accumulating actions (karma), receives birth in the six destinies’ (Sns, 470a 12),

b) seven destinies, by counting the intermediate existence as a seventh destiny: ‘Thus (through) the five aggregates (skandha), twelve domains (āyatana), there (exists) a person (pudgala) who may have seven destinies (gati): the five destinies, the destiny of the Asuras, the destiny of the intermediate being’ (Sns, 466b 22-23).

It is therefore evident that the Śāṃmītiyas admit six destinies. Consequently, the attribution by the Vibhāṣā to the Vātsiputriyas of six destinies may be understood as an attribution to the Vātsiputriya-Śāṃmītiyas; since, some time later, the Śāṃmītiya school eclipsed that of the Vātsiputriyas. This notion may be reinforced by the following sentence from the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra which cites the words of the Pudgalavādins: ‘Formerly, five destinies were spoken of, today, the gati of the Asuras should be added’.

As for adherence to seven destinies, this is a particular doctrinal point in the Sns stressing the intermediate existence.

747 Kośa I, p.7, n.2.
748 Cf. Tds, 28a 27 - b 22.
749 The Sarvāstivādins (cf. Kośa III, p.11, nn 2 and 3; Traité I, p.613, n.1) and early Theravādins (cf. Barel, Sectes, p.223: Kathāvatthu VIII, 1) also maintained that there are only five destinies. The later Theravādins added the destiny of the Asuras (cf. Abhidhammatthaśāstra, chapter V, § 2).
This thesis is explained clearly by the Tds:

'Knowledge (jñāna) consists of feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā) and consciousness (viññāna). These three (elements) constitute knowledge (jñāna) which are also called the factors of the Path (mārgaṅga), since the Path (mārāga) does not separate them' (Tds, 25b 27-28).

This means that feeling, perception and consciousness are the three aggregates (skandha), among the five, which constitute knowledge (jñāna), associated with wisdom (prajñā)251, which pertains to the aggregates of the mental factors (saṃskāra).

It is impossible to track down the frontier between the aggregates, particularly the three mental groups, namely, feeling, perception and consciousness, since they are associated with each other:

'Friend, feeling, perception and consciousness are associated and dissociated things; and it is impossible to demonstrate the difference of those things after having analysed them several times'752.

Also, wisdom (prajñā) cannot be separated from consciousness (viññāna) because they are interdependent:

'What is understood (by wisdom), friend, is known (by consciousness); what is known, is understood; that is why things are associated or dissociated; and it is impossible to show the difference in those things after having analysed them several times'753.

It was probably because of the association of consciousness (viññāna) and wisdom (prajñā) or knowledge (jñāna) that the Pudgalavādins admitted knowledge, the right view of the four Noble Truths, particularly the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipākṣika), and which they also call the Path (mārga). Thus it is that the first — knowledge — and the second — the Path — are not separable. In other words, knowledge in conformity to reality forms part of the Path.

This doctrinal point of the Tds confirms thesis No.16 in the Vihības indicated by A. Bāreau: 'Knowledge (jñāna) is only a limb of the Path (mārgaṅga) and consciousness (viññāna) is only a limb of existence (bhavānga)754. The explanation, also given by the Vihības, is based on the following sentence: 'The Sūtra says in fact that

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751 Genjun H. Susaki, 'jñāna, Prajñā, Prajñāpāramiśita' (Journal of the Oriental Institute XV, No.3-4, March-June 1966), pp.258-9: 'Nāna and Paññā are not distinctively differentiated from each other ... 'The distinction is not really found in the Nikāya ... 'In early Buddhism, however, this distinction was not so clear, as sometimes both terms were used as synonyms'. On the appearance and relationship of the perceptions (saṃñā), wisdom (panñā) and consciousness (ānāna), cf. DN I, 183.
752 MN I, 293: Yā cāvuso vedanā yā saññā yah ca vināṇaṃ ime dhamma samasattāḥ no visamṣatītāḥ, na ca labbha imesa dhāmmanām vinibbujitvā nānākaranam pannāpetumati.
753 MN I, 292-3: Yāṃ kāvuso pājñātī tam vijanītī, yāṃ vijanītī tam pājñātī, tasma ime dhamma samasattāḥ no visamṣatītāḥ, na ca labbha imesa dhāmmanām vinibbujitvā nānākaranam pannāpetumati.
754 Bāreau, Sectes, p.118.
right view (sanyāgdrṣṭi) is a limb of the Path, whilst the object of consciousness is compounded things (sanskāra). 755.

13 — The Arhat is susceptible to regression

It is clearly affirmed that the Pudgalavādins maintained the thesis: the Arhat is susceptible to regression; as the Tds. 21a 15, deals with the three faculties of the Arhat: the sharp (rīkṣendraṇāya), the middling (madhyendraṇāya) and the weak (mrddvendraṇāya). Each faculty consists of three categories. He-who-regresses (pariṇānadharman) belongs to that of the weak faculty; he who regresses falls either into inferior states, (but) not from (comprehension of) the Noble Truths, or to the stage of cultivation (bhāvanābhūmi) (cf. Tds. 21a 25-26). Regression does not mean falling into the worldly state of living beings (cf. Sū, 6c 14). 756.

755 Ibid; cf. Vibhāsā, T XXVII. 1545, 8h.
756 Since the texts are not clear, it is necessary to cite here, in context, the passages concerning the regression of an Arhat so that readers can check for themselves:

Tds. 21a 25-29: 近法者，或近雅法非聖諦故曰近法，或近修地退；修者
进修，說以（已）不修習是名退，如學識已不習習忘，如不修
修習退地，是故業和幼稚行觀故退，以是故名退地

Sū, 6c 14-16: 法不近生滅，分別地滅分別行行，是說如（一）所說
不滅滅，彼不行分別地失，彼減減事滅長行觀
（近觀）是五事滅，是亦分別地滅

It is evident that the two sentences: 1) 或近雅法非聖諦故曰近法 (i.e., falling to an inferior state), (but) not from (comprehension of) the Noble Truths, that is why he is called he—who—regresses? of the Tds, and 2) 法不近生滅，分別地滅分別行行， is (regression does not mean falling among living beings?) of the Sū, are not clear. With no commentary, we cannot be sure of their meaning. Nonetheless, the confirmation of the regression of the Arhat in the stage of cultivation is found in two works (Tds, 21a 27-28: 如是不修習退地， Hence, not being trained, he (the Arhat) falls into the stage of cultivation; Sū, 6c 15: 彼不行分別地失： As he (the Arhat) does not practice, he falls into the stage of cultivation', leads us to conclude that the Pudgalavādins admitted that the Arhat falls only to the stage of cultivation. He goes no further in his regression, for 'the holy one cannot fall from the Srotāpānna fruit, established by the abandoning of the passions to be abandoned through the vision of the Noble Truths' (cf. Kośa VI, 58, p.257 and n.1: above, n.392). This also means that the Arhat never again becomes a worldly being (cf. above, n.391).

The Sarvāstivādins had the same opinion as the Pudgalavādins on the regression of the Arhat. Kośa VI, 56, admits that among the six kinds of Arhat able to exist in the three worlds (dhamu), the first five (except he who is immovable — aṇopayaśadharman, since he is not susceptible to falling, cf. Kośa VI, 57) are all susceptible to regression; four (except he-who—regresses — pariṇānadharman) fall from the family (gotra), five fall from the fruit (cf. Kośa VI, 58). Nonetheless, they do not fall from the first family or the first fruit (cf. ibid.).

The Therāvādins always considered that to admit the regression of the Arhat is a false view (cf. Kathāvattav, pp.69, 398; Points of Controversy, pp.34, 228). In Pug, pp.5, 11, 12, 14, the term pariṇānadhamma is applied only to practitioners who acquire the absorptions (jhāna) of the world of form (rupadhātu) and the attainments (saṁāpatti) of the formless world (arūpyadhātu), but not in relation to the Path (magga). Furthermore, the words sekkhaussa pariṇāhi in AN III, 116, only designate the regression of those who have not as yet obtained the Arhat fruit. The Paṭukapadesa II, p.32, counts he-who—regresses (pariṇānadhamma) [one of the texts in Burmese characters contains aparipāṇadhammo]
The causes of regression are sickness, business, quarrels, arbitrations, long journeys (cf. Tds, 21a 28, and Sutta, 6c 15-16). A. Bareau affirmed that the Vāsāpiṭṭhāyas maintain that the mind of the Arhat is pure and endowed with omniscience, but recognise that he can regress and remain subject to the mechanism of the fruition of actions. This affirmation conforms to what was said by Buddhaghosa in the Kathāvatthu.

Although the Buddha did not say that the Arhat is susceptible to regression, he stated the dangers to which the Arhat is exposed:

'Monks, even for a monk who is an Arahant whose impurities are destroyed, I say that gains, honours and renown are dangers.'

Equally, in AN III, 173, the Buddha spoke of five causes of regression for an occasionally delivered (samayaviminukta) monk who, according to the Abhidharmakośa, is an Arhat or one of two categories of him-who-şs-doubly-delivered (abhaya-

\[\text{instead of } \text{parihāṅadhammo} \text{ or he-who-attains-both-aims-simultaneously (the destruction of impurities and the end of life (samāsīṣa)) as one of the nine categories of Arhat (cf. Pug, p.13; Nettipakaran, p.190). In other words, according to the Petakopadesa, he-who-regresses (parihāṅadhamma) is effectively defined in relation to the path (maggā). This doctrinal point is a peculiarity of the Pāli texts. However, the Petakopadesa II, 32, classes he-who-regresses (parihāṅadhamma) in the category of guideable persons (neyyo puggalo); thus, he who is not devoted to the pursuit of the development of cultivation (bhāvanā) and is different from other people: he-who-obtains-knowledge-through-the-condensed-teaching, and he-who-obtains-knowledge-through-the-developed-teaching (cf. Petakopadesa II, 31-2).

The agreement and disagreement of the different schools over the regression of the Arhat can be summarised in the following diagram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Disagreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pudgalaśānti</td>
<td>Theravādins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarvāśānti</td>
<td>Saivāntikas</td>
</tr>
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<td>Pāraśānti</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A section of the Mahāsāṅghikas</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vibhavādins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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"The Literature of the Personalists — Chapter Three"

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**Table footnote:**

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\[\text{Cf. A. Bareau, Sector, p.261; Kośa VI, 58 (p.255, n.4; p.264, n.2); Kathāvatthu I, 2; II, 2; I. Masuda, \textit{Origin and Doctrines of the Early Indian Buddhist Schools}, p.27; Akavim, Shizen. 赤沢智善, \textit{Indo-Buddhais \textit{Koya Meishi liten} 佛教固有名詞解典, Kyoto 1967, p.86.}\]


\[\text{758 Kathāvatthu I, 2; Points of Controversy, p.64.}\]

\[\text{759 SN II, 239: \textit{Yo bhikkhave bhikkhu araham kānāsava tassa pāhān lābhāsakārāsikom antārāyāya vadāmitī.}}\]

\[\text{Kośa VI, 58, cites thus: Undoubtedly the Bhagavat said: 'Ananda, I declare that, even for an Arhat, property and honours are causes of an obstacle'. Furthermore, an interesting case is mentioned at SN I, 120 sq., which relates the regression of an Arahant: Godhika attains the mental deliverance achieved by concentration (samādhisvetumuttis) six times and falls from that state each time, finally, he 'commits suicide' in order not to regress again. Cf. also Kośa VI, 58 (p.262).}\]

\[\text{760 Kośa VI, 56: 'Mental deliverance (cetovinukti) of those five Arhats should be understood as being occasional (samiyikā) and cherished (kānta), since it should be constantly guarded. Consequently, those}\]
bhāgavimukta)\textsuperscript{761}, or, according to the Tds, one of nine categories of Arhat, he-who-has-attained-complete-deliverance\textsuperscript{762}:

'O monks, five things (dharma) lead (samvattanti) to the regression (parihāna) of the occasionally delivered (samayavimutta) monk. Which are those five things? — The fact of delighting in action (kammārāmatā), the fact of delighting in speech (bhāsārāmatā), the fact of delighting in sleep (nīddārāmatā), the fact of delighting in society (sangānikārāmatā), the fact that, having obtained the delivered (vimutta) mind (citta), one does not observe (paccavekkhāti) them. In truth, O monks, these five things lead to the regression of the occasionally delivered monk\textsuperscript{763}.

14 — There is an intermediate existence (antarābhava) in the world of desire (kāmadhātu) and the world of form (rūpadhātu)

The Tds and Sns admit that there is an intermediate existence (antarābhava). Whilst the Tds demonstrates indirectly and in a general way the existence of this thesis:

'Being delivered from the world of desire (kāmadhātu) and the world of form (rūpadhātu), the intermediate existence is completely abandoned; there is no intermediate existence in the formless world (ārūpyadhātu)' (Tds, 20c 10-12).

The Sns devotes numerous passages to the explanation of this thesis. This is the most important passage concerning the relationship between the intermediate existence and the three aspects of pudgala:

'At the moment when a man is very near death (and) the moment when the intermediate existence is about to begin, (the pudgala) depends on the five (aggregates) of the intermediate existence. It is therefore possible to call pudgala that which is constituted by (the five aggregates of) the intermediate existence. Based on the designation of the past (atitaprajñāpti) and the designation of transmigration (samkramaprajñāpti ?), it can be given the name pudgala. In consequence, the intermediate existence does not depend on the pudgala; that is why the intermediate existence does not depend on reality (artha). It is possible to say that it is not the pudgala. Hence, things (dharma) are seen with their instantaneous disappearance. Instantaneous disappearance is not a (total) extinction of compounded things; such is the teaching of the Buddha. That should be understood. So, abandoning the body of the five aggregates once it is entirely destroyed, the pudgala passes from this life to another one. That is why it is said that a pudgala exists which abandons the five aggregates of the birth existence (upapatti bhava) and receives the five aggregates of the intermediate existence' (Sns, 467b 20-26).

\textsuperscript{761} Kōṣa VI, 65: 'The ubhayatobhāgavimukta who is samayavimukta is complete from the point of view of the faculties and attainments'.

\textsuperscript{762} See below, 'The Pudgalavādin lists of Śrāvakas'.

\textsuperscript{763} Trans. after Bureau, Sectes, p.118. Cf. Kōṣa VI, 57 (p.254, n.1).
It is interesting to note another passage concerning the birth existence and the intermediate existence:

"When a man has come near to death, while the last thought moment (citta) has just appeared, the thought of the intermediate existence (antarābhavacitta) has not yet appeared; when the last thought moment disappears, then the thought of the intermediate existence appears. At the moment of the thought of the intermediate existence, the pudgala (constituted of) the five (aggregates) of the intermediate existence is formed. That is why it is called abandoning the human aggregates and receiving (those of) the intermediate existence. But why? — The moment of the accomplishment of the appearance of the intermediate thought (is also) the moment of the formation (of the abandoning) of the human existence and death in the intermediate existence. When the thought (citta) remains in that state, that is what is called (the state of) death and birth. Therefore it should be understood that the time is the same. It is everything that concerns a man who abandons the five aggregates of the birth existence and who receives the five aggregates of the intermediate existence' (Sns, 467c 8-14)."

It is evident that the doctrine of the intermediate existence influenced the Pudgalavādins' interpretation of the category called 'he-who-attains-Parinirvāṇa-in-the-intermediate-existence' (antarāparinirvāyin) in the fruit named 'he-who-is-endowed-with-vision' (dvārādhūpa) pertaining to the stage of the abandoning of desire (vītarūgabhūmi). According to the Tds, he-who-attains-Parinirvāna-in-the-intermediate-existence is 'he who, his life having ended and whose rebirth in the other (world) has not yet occurred, obtains the Path (mārga) and attains Parinirvāṇa in the intermediate existence; this can be compared to a spark which goes out before touching the ground' (Tds, 20c 5-6). This doctrinal point is firmly reinforced by the following Sāmiṃṭīya arguments: "They (the Buddhas and śrāvakas) receive the intermediate existence from the intermediate existence"; that is not the case for worldlings (prthagjana). How is that so? The srotaśpanna, still having seven more births and seven more deaths in this world, receives the heavenly intermediate existence (devantarūbhava); dwelling in that state he attains the fruit of the once-returner (sakkābhīmī). This is in the human intermediate existence (manusyantarābhava); dwelling in that state, he attains (the fruit of) disgust for the world of desire (kāmadhūtanirvēduṭṭa). It is in the human intermediate existence that he receives the intermediate existence of the world of form. It is when he dwells in that intermediate existence that he aims towards the stage of Parinirvāṇa (parinirvānabhūmi); from there, he enters a special intermediate existence; it is in that place that he attains Parinirvāṇa. Hence, the śrāvaka passes through four intermediate existences' (Sns, 462a 24 - b 1).


765 Sns, 462a 24-25.
In fact, the Pudgalavādins also admitted that a bodhisattva could become a Buddha in the intermediate existence, as is said in thesis No.11 of Vasumitra: The bodhisattva, when he is reborn in an intermediate existence, if he had formerly engendered the knowledge of destruction (ksayajñāna) and the knowledge of non-arising (anutpāda-jñāna), can acquire the title of Buddha766.

15 — There are seventeen categories of heavenly beings in the world of form (rupadhātu).

The Tds divides the world of form into four absorptions diffused over seven categories of heavenly beings according to the five factors of absorption. They are classed into three main groups according to their present psychological states on the following levels:

A - The level of joy (priti) consists of:

1. The first absorption (prathamadhyāna), comprising:
   1. The ministers of Brahma (brahma-purohita),
   2. the beings of Brahma (brahmakāyika),
   3. the retinue of Brahma (brahma-pārisadya);

2. The intermediate absorption (dhyānāntara), comprising:
   4. the great Brahmas (mahābrāhma);

3. The second absorption (dvitiyadhyāna), comprising:
   5. those whose light is small (paritsūbha),
   6. those whose light is immense (apramāṇābha),
   7. those whose light is pure and infinite (abhāśvara);

B - The level of joylessness (apriti) consists of:

1. The third absorption (tritiyadhyāna) comprising:
   8. those whose beauty is inferior (paritvaśubha),
   9. those whose beauty is immense (apramāṇaśubha),
   10. those whose beauty is assured (subhakṛṣṇa);

C - The level of equanimity (upeksā) consists of:

1. The stage with perception (samjñā), which designates:

766 Bareau, Sectes, p.119. The Sarvāstivādins have the same interpretation: ‘he-who-attains-Parinirvāna-in-the-interval’ (antarāparinirvāya), one of the five fruits of the śrāvaka, ‘is he who attains Nirvāṇa (parinirvāna) in the intermediate existence (by entering the rupadhātu)’ (Kośa VI, 37), whilst the Theravādins gave it a different interpretation: ‘antarāparinibbāya, he who attains Nibbāna within the limits of the first half of life, that is, immediately after having appeared there, or without having passed beyond the middle of his life term, attains the path of realisation by abandoning the higher fetters’ (cf. Pug. p.42).
II. those whose fruit is true (brhatphala);  
2. the stage without perception (asamjñā), which designates:  
12. the non-perceptive (asamjñin);  
3. the stage associated with the awakened mind, which designates the three of five pure abodes (śuddhāvāsika), comprising:  
13. the magnificent (sudrīsa),  
14. the keen-sighted (sudarśana) and the pure (śuddha) which include:  
15. the unshakeable (avṛha),  
16. the serene (atapa),  
17. the superior (akaniṣṭha).  

The diagram below summarises the preceding expressions:

A. The level of joy  

B. The level of joylessness  

C. The level of equanimity  

I. Prathamadhyāna  

II. Dhyānāntara  

III. Dvitiyadhyāna  

IV. Trtiyadhyāna  

V. Caturthadhyāna  

VI. Asamjñika  

VII. Śuddhāvāsika  

1. Brahmapurohitas  

2. Brahmakāyikas  

3. Brahmapārisādyas  

4. Mahābrahmās  

5. Parītābhas  

6. Apraṇānābhas  

7. Ābhāsvuras  

8. Parītraśubhas  

9. Apramāṇaśubhas  

10. Subhakṛtsnas  

11. Brhatphalas  

12. Asamjñins  

13. Sudrīsas  

14. Sudarśanas  

Suddhas  

15. Avrhas  

16. Atapas  

17. Akaniṣṭhas  

It is interesting to note that, according to the Tds, only those whose fruit is true (brhatphala) constitute the realm in which will be reborn all those who have practised the fourth absorption (caturthadhyāna) in a weak, middling or complete manner. The other two, those who are non-perceptive (asamjñin) and from the three pure abodes (śuddhāvāsika), are categories linked to the essential factors of the fourth absorption,
namely, equanimity (upeksa) and one-pointedness of mind (cittaikagratā)⁷⁷.

767 Kosa III, 2, also admits the existence of the seventeen places of the Rupadhātu'. However, it classes them in another way: 'Dhyānas each of which have three levels. But the fourth has eight levels':

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<tr>
<th>I. Prathamadhyāna</th>
<th>1. Brahmakāyikas</th>
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<td>2. Brahmapurohitas</td>
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<td>3. Mahābrahmas</td>
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<td>II. Diviyadhyāna</td>
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<td>6. Abhāsvaras</td>
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<td>9. Subhakṛtisnas</td>
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<td>IV. Caturthadhyāna</td>
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<td>V. Sudhāvāsikās</td>
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<td>16. Sudārakas</td>
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<td>17. Akanisthas</td>
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If this is compared with the Tād, the Kosa omits:

1 — the retinue of Brahma (brahmapārśīdaya) in the first absorption at the level of joy;

2 — non-perceptive beings (asamjñāya) at the level of equanimity; and adds two other categories, i.e.: the cloudless (anabhāraka) realm, the realm where one is born through merit (puṇyapravasa) in the fourth absorption (caturthadhyāna) and classes the Brahma beings in the lowest category of the first absorption (prathamadhyāna). (Cf. Kosa III, p.2, n.5 sq.)

In their turn, the Pāli sources admit the existence of sixteen categories only in the world of form (rupadhātu): three categories for each of the first three absorptions (jhāna).

Beings of the great fruit (vekapphala) and non-perceptive beings (asantarāvatta) are in the fourth absorption and, in the five pure abodes (suddhāvāsa), only the non-returner (anāgāmi) will be reborn:

| I. Pathamajjhāna | 1. Brahmapiṭaka-jānas |
|                 | 2. Brahmapiṭaka-sūtras |
|                 | 3. Mahābrahmas |
| II. Diviyajjhāna| 4. Paritāthākas |
|                 | 5. Apramānābhās |
|                 | 6. Abhāsvaras |
| III. Triiyajjhāna| 7. Parittasubhās |
|                 | 8. Apramānās |
|                 | 9. Subhakṛtisas |
| IV. Caturthajjhāna| 10. Vekapphalas |
|                 | 11. Asañūha-suttas |

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C - THE PUDGALAVĀDIN LISTS OF ŚRĀVAKAS

There are two complete lists of śrāvakas which we find in the Pudgalavādin literature:

I. The list in the Tds consists of twenty-nine categories corresponding to three stages:

A. The stage of still unabandoned desires (avītarāgabhūmi) includes three fruits or nine categories:

a) the first fruit is the Eighth (aṣṭamaka) who acquires the twelve knowledges and consists of three categories, namely:
1. the pursuer of the truth through faith (śraddhānusārīn),
2. the pursuer of the truth through wisdom (prajñānusārīn),
3. the pursuer of the truth through faith and wisdom (śraddhāprajñānusārīn).

These three categories appear as soon as the practitioner is at the stage of maturity

A comparison of the categories of the world of form in the Pāli texts with those of the Tds shows us that there is a considerable concordance between the two lists, apart from a few differences in the first absorption. Because the majority of the Pāli canonical texts do not admit the intermediate absorption (aśīnānāta) (DN I, 73; MN I, 276; SN V, 307-8), the category of the great Brahmā (mahābrahman) is classed in the first absorption (pātha)]. Moreover, the category of Brahma beings is missing in the list in the Pāli texts since it seems that the term 'Brahmaśāyikas' is the generic name of all the gods of the first dhyāna, of all the gods of the Brahma world (cf. Kośa III, p.2, n.5 sq.), and the Pāli texts consider Brahma’s retinue (brahmāparīsāta) as the lowest category and Brahma’s ministers as the second, whilst the Tds classes them in another way: the first is that of Brahma’s ministers (brahmāpurohitā), the second that of Brahma’s beings (brahmāśāyikas) and third, that of Brahma’s retinue (brahmāparīsātā). The idea underlying this particular classification remains obscure since there is no commentary. Furthermore, there are other, different lists, for example that of the sixteen categories of the Kāśmirians which is like the list of seventeen above, but the realm of the great Brahmā (mahābrahman) is not an intermediate stage (bhūmi) but a higher abode in the realm of Brahma’s ministers (brahmāpurohitā) (Kośa III, 2, the list of eighteen categories by granting three categories to the first absorption, a special category for the great Brahmās and a special category for non-perceptive beings (asamajñātās) cf. Kośa III, p.3, n.1, the list of twenty-two categories has the following peculiarities:

I. The existence of four categories of Brahmās:
1. Brahma’s beings (brahmāśāyikas),
2. Brahma’s ministers (brahmāpurohitā),
3. Brahma’s retinue (brahmāparīsātā),
4. great Brahmās (mahābrahmās).

Categories 5-12 do not differ from those of the other lists.

II. The fourth absorption consists of ten categories:
13. majesties; 14. lesser majesties; 15. unlimited majesties; 16. majesties of great fruit; 17. the non-perceptive (asamajñātā); 18. non-creative beings; 19. the serene (atapa); 20. the keen-sighted (sudarśana); 21. the great keen-sighted (mahāsudarśana); 22. the superior (akamītā) (DA, T I, 1, 136a sq.).

See above, The secondary theses of the Pudgalavādin, Thesis No.2.

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(gotrabhūmi), in which the knowledge of things (dharmañjñāna) arises. In other words, these three faculties receive different names depending on the dominant faculty. The first category, in which faith prevails, is that of the weak faculty (mrdvindriya), the second, in which wisdom prevails, is the medium faculty (madhyendriya) and the third, in which both faculties are equally potent, is that of the sharp faculty (rikṣṇendriya)\textsuperscript{769}.

b) the second fruit is the stream-winner (srūtaāpanna). This is the fruit which one obtains after rising in the Path (mārga). Depending on which faculty dominates, when the practitioner is at the stage of vision (darśanabhūmi), this fruit is divided into three categories:

1 — he who is reborn seven times at the most (saptakṛdhabhavaparama)\textsuperscript{770},
2 — he who is reborn in several families (kulāṅkula),
3 — he who is middling (madhyama?).

The first category exhausts the three fetters, that is:

1) belief in individuality (sākāyadrsti),
2) attachment to useless rules and rituals (śilavratapārāmarśa), and
3) doubt (vīcikitsā)\textsuperscript{771};

he is of weak faculty (mrdvindriya) because faith prevails. The second, having exhausted the three fetters, lessens the passions to be destroyed by cultivation (bhāvanāheyakleśa)\textsuperscript{772}; he is of medium faculty (madhyendriya) because wisdom prevails. The third, in which both faculties — faith and wisdom — are equally potent, is of sharp faculty (rikṣṇendriya); he does not necessarily pass from one noble family to another, nor is he reborn seven times at the most\textsuperscript{773}.

\textsuperscript{769} Kośa VI, 29, only knows of two categories and the second is called dharmānusārin, not prajñānusārin, with the meaning of 'pursuit by means of dharmas', i.e. by means of the twelve-fold texts. In those moments (fifteen moments on the path of vision), the ascetics with weak or sharp faculties are respectively sraddhānusārin and dharmānusārin (mrdvāksānendriya tesu sraddhādāharmānusārinānau -- Kośa VI, p.193, n.1). The Pāli texts also admit two kinds of candidates to the sotāpanna: sādhanusārin and dhammānusārin (cf. MN I, 479; AN I, 74).

\textsuperscript{770} There is disagreement among the schools over the number of existences. For details of the subject, see Kośa VI, 34 (pp.260–2).

\textsuperscript{771} These three fetters eliminated by the saptakṛdhabhavaparama, according to the Tds, are not cited in the same order in the canonical texts; see above, n.627.

\textsuperscript{772} Here the tenacity of rāga and dveṣa pertaining to the Kāmadhātu is indicated.

\textsuperscript{773} Kośa VI, 34, numinas two categories only: (1) saptakṛdhabhavaparama, who has not yet destroyed what should be abandoned by meditation; (2) kulāṅkula, who has abandoned three or four categories of the passions of the Kāmadhātu, and which is divided into two types: devakulāṅkula and manusyakulāṅkula.

According to the Pāli texts (AN I, 233; III, 87; IV, 380–1; SN V, 205; Peṭākopadāsa II, 30, Pug, pp.16, 39), sotāpanna is divided into three categories: (1) sātākkhatuparama, (2) kulāṅkula, (3) ekābbhi (the one-seeder, the person who acquires knowledge through the condensed teaching, whose faculty is either weak or sharp, being at the stage of vision (dassana) he is reborn once again as a man, after which he will reach the end of suffering — cf. AN I, 233). The first two categories are identical to what is described in the Tds. By comparing the three lists of srotāppannas, we can conclude that he-who-is-middling (madhyama?) in the Tds list is an intermediate category between the first two, but which is not recognised in the canonical texts.
c) The third fruit is the stage of attenuation (tanūbhūmi). It is the stage of him who, having possessed all the qualities of a stream-winner (srotāpañña), has attenuated the passions of the world of desire (kāmadhātu). It consists of three categories:

1 — the once returner (sakṛdāgāmin),
2 — the one seeder: he who will be reborn once only (ekabijin),
3 — he who is middling (madhyama?).

The first category, in which faith prevails, is that of the weak faculty (mrdvindriya); it is he who, having died here, is reborn among the gods, then returns once again among mankind before attaining Parinirvāna. The second category in which both faculties, faith and wisdom, are equally potent, is that of the sharp faculty (tikṣṇendriya); it is he who will receive no more than one rebirth, before attaining Parinirvāna, in order to increase his merits. The third category, in which wisdom prevails, is that of the middling faculty (madhyendriya); it is he who is in one or other of the first two.

To summarise, the stage of still unabandoned desires (avītarāgabhūmi) includes nine categories in all. The main categories are six in number, namely:

1 — the pursuer of the truth through faith (śraddhānusārin),
2 — the pursuer of the truth through wisdom (prajñānusārin),
3 — he who will be reborn seven times at the most (saptakṛdābhavaparama),
4 — he who is reborn in several families (kulamkula),
5 — the once returner (sakṛdāgāmin),
6 — the one seeder (ekabijin).

The three other categories, namely:

1 — the pursuer of the truth through faith and wisdom (śraddhāprajñānusārin),
2 and 3 — he who is middling (madhyama?), belonging to the category of the fruit of stream winner (srotāpañña) and that of the stage of attenuation (tanūbhūmi), are only auxiliary categories. It seems that these categories were added by the author of the Tds in order to make up the number three.

774 Kośa VI, 35-6, maintains that there are only two categories: (1) sakṛdāgāmin and (2) ekaviceka. The difference between the two is that the former is destined to two births (going to the gods, returning to mankind) and the latter is destined to only one birth, and is also a candidate to the second fruit.

The Pāli tradition does not divide the category of sakādāgāmin (cf. Petakopadesa II, 31). It classes the ekabijin in the srotāpañña category, which is lower than the sakādāgāmin.

By comparing the lists of the stage of the attenuation of desire (tanūbhūmi), we find there is a similarity between the lists of two in the Kośa and that of three in the Tds, since he-who-is-middling (madhyama?) is in an intermediate category in the Tds. The Pāli texts consider the sakādāgāmin as a single category which is equivalent to the stage of attenuation (tanūbhūmi) in the Tds.

775 The following table enables us to summarise the stage of still unabandoned desires (avītarāgabhūmi) of the Tds and to compare it with the other two lists in the Kośa and the Pāli texts:

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<tr>
<th>Kośa</th>
<th>Tds</th>
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<td>sakṛdāgāmin</td>
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(see next page)
B. The stage of the abandoning of desire (vītarāgabhūmi) consists of three fruits or nine categories:

a) the first fruit is he who is delivered through faith (ṣraddhādhirukta). He is so named because faith (ṣraddhā) is the dominant factor of his deliverance. This fruit includes three categories, namely:
1 — the stream winner (ūrdhvasrotā),
2 — the attainer of Parinirvāṇa through compounded things (sābhīṣṭakāraparinirvāyaṁ),
3 — the attainer of Parinirvāṇa through the uncompounded (anābhīṣṭakāraparinirvāyaṁ).

The first is the practitioner who is on the point of attaining the higher stages. The second is he who attains Parinirvāṇa by means of compounded things (samskṛta). The third is he who attains Parinirvāṇa by means of the uncompounded (āsamskṛta) such as the knowledge of cessation (nirvāṇa)²⁷⁶.

b) the second fruit is he who is endowed with vision (drāptā).

This is the pursuer of the truth through wisdom (prajñānusārin) who rises to the stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>ABHIDHARMAKOSA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. ASTAMAṆA</strong></td>
<td>1. Śraddhānusārin</td>
<td>Śraddhānusārin</td>
<td>Sukhānusāri</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Prajñānusārin</td>
<td>Dharmaṇusārin</td>
<td>Dharmānusāri</td>
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<td>5. Kulamkula</td>
<td>Kulamkula</td>
<td>Kulamkula</td>
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<td><strong>III. TANURĪHUMI</strong></td>
<td>7. Sakrāgumīn</td>
<td>Sakrāgumīn</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. Ekaśījīn</td>
<td>Ekaśījīn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Mādhyama ?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁷⁶ Kośa VI, 37, also admits three categories: the definitions of which, attributed to the Vaiśāṅvas, are identical to those in the Tds. However, Kośa VI, 37, treats them as three of five categories of anāgāmins, and not of śraddhādhiruktas as does the Tds, whilst in the Pāli texts, these three categories found together in the group of five anāgāmins (.exclude Pug, 16-17. Petakopadesa, 31), are defined differently. According to Pug, 17, sasaukāraṇarāmabhāyī and asaukāraṇarāmabhāyī are interpreted respectively as the attainer of Parinibbāna with effort (...) with little pain and after having made great efforts: appadukkhaṇa dhīmatām akatvā — PugA, 119) and the attainer of Parinibbāna without effort (... with pain, difficulty and after having made great efforts: dukkhaṇa kāśīva dhīmatām payogam, katvā — PugA, 119). Cf. also AN II, 155-6; Kośa VI, 37 — p.212.

By comparing the three lists, it is noticed that there is an identification between the Tds list and that of the Kośa (Vaiśāṅvas' opinion) on the definition of the last two categories, and that there is a difference between the Tds list and that of the Pāli texts on the same subject.
of the abandoning of desires (vitarāgabhūmi) and who is called he who is endowed with vision (ārūpyadharma). Wisdom is the dominant element in his deliverance. The second fruit includes three categories:

1 — the attainer of Parinirvāna in the intermediate existence (antarāparinirvāyin),
2 — the attainer of Parinirvāna in rebirth (upapadyaparinirvāyin),
3 — the stream winner (ārdhvasrōta).

These three categories are those which are also found in the group of five corresponding to the non-returner (anāgāmin) and belonging to categories which reach to the world of form (rūpadhātūpaga)777.

c) The third fruit is the bodily witness (kāyasāksin). This is the supreme fruit among the fruits of the stage of the abandoning of desires (vitarāgabhūmi) and, due to it, one obtains deliverance (vimokṣa) during one’s lifetime778. This fruit includes:

1 — the attainer of Nirvāna through compounded things (sābhīsamskāraparinirvāyin),
2 — the attainer of Parinirvāna through the uncompounded (anābhisamskāraparinirvāyin),
3 — the attainer of Parinirvāna in rebirth (upapadyaparinirvāyin).

According to the Tds, there is no tautology in repeating the categories of the preceding fruits since these first three categories of the third fruit (kāyasāksin) pertain to the formless world (ārūpyadharma)779.

777 Kośa VI, 38: These five are anāgāmins because they go to the Rūpadhātu (except to transcend it); the rūpadhātūpaga is of five kinds: antarāparinirvāyin, upapadyaparinirvāyin, sābhīsamskāraparinirvāyin, anābhisamskāraparinirvāyin, ārdhvasrōtas. These categories are also found in the Pāli texts with different definitions since there is no intermediate existence in the Theravādin doctrine. Pug. 42-6, defines them thus: the antarāparinibbāyin is he who attains Parinibbāna in the first half of his life term, the upapaccaparinibbāyin is he who attains Parinibbāna after reaching the second half of his life term, the uddhamsestā (akunīthā-gāmi) is he who wins the stream up to the higher gods. Cf. Petakopadesa, 31.

778 Kośa VI, 43: The anāgāmin who has acquired nirodha is considered as a kāyasāksin.

779 Cf. AN IV, 51; Pug. 14. These three categories are identical to three of the four categories of anāgāmins who go to the formless world (ārūpyadharma). Kośa VI, 38: Another, who goes to the Ārūpya, is of four kinds. (There is no intermediate existence in the Ārūpya births, that is why the antarāparinirvāyins is separate from the group of five anāgāmins.) The Pāli texts consider that the bodily witness (kāyasakkhi) is of the seven noble disciples who has achieved deliverance by practising the eight liberations (vimokkhā) (Pug. 32; AN IV, 45). The kāyasakkhi is not mentioned in the Petakopadesa. Is he considered an arhat? A comparison of the three sources shows that the Tds attributes the bodily witness (kāyasāksin) to the formless world (ārūpyadharma) by dividing it into three categories. The Kośa maintains that the bodily witness (kāyasāksin) is the attainer of Nirvāṇa in his lifetime, and deals separately with another category, consisting of four kinds who reach the formless world (ārūpyapagā). The Pāli texts do not attribute the kāyasakkhi to any world and consider him simply as a noble disciple who has achieved deliverance from the lowest degree to the highest.

Among the three lists concerning the fruits of the stage of the abandoning of desires (vitarāgabhūmi), the list of three fruits and nine categories in the Tds is a very complete list, which includes all the
C. The Arhat.

The Pudgalavādins maintain that the Arhat is subject to regressing and on this subject deal with three faculties or nine categories:

a) the sharp faculty (śīksnendriya):
   1 — he who is stable (sthitākampya),
   2 — he who progresses (prativedhanādharman),
   3 — he who is immovable (akopyadharman),

b) the weak faculty (mṛdhvindriya):
   4 — he who regresses (parīhānaparīharman),
   5 — he who wills (cetanādharman),
   6 — he who preserves (anurakṣanādharman),

c) the middling faculty (nirodhaṇḍriya):
   7 — he who is delivered through wisdom (prajñāvimukta),
   8 — he who attains complete deliverance,
   9 — he who attains incomplete deliverance.

These last two categories are also together called the doubly delivered (ubhayatō-

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Various categories of anāgāmin, whilst the Kośa list contains seven categories including the kāyasākṣin. The list in the Pali texts consists of five categories. The kāyasakkhi is an independent category. The diagram below summarises the differences:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRIDHARMAKĀŚĀSTRA</th>
<th>ABHIDHARMakośa (Cf. Kośa VI, 215, 223, 226)</th>
<th>PĀLI TEXTS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I — Śraddhādhimukta</td>
<td>1. Rūpyapaga</td>
<td>Anāgāmi: 1. Antarāparinibbāyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Īrdhvasrota</td>
<td>1. Antarāparinīrāvin</td>
<td>2. Upādhyaparinīrāvin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II — Drsthiyapraśa</td>
<td>5. Īrdhvasrota</td>
<td>5. Uddhamsotacākanāthā-gūmi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Antarāparinīrāvin</td>
<td>6. Ārūpyapaga</td>
<td>(Kāyasakkha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Upādhyaparinīrāvin</td>
<td>6a. Upādhyaparinīrāvin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
bhāgavinukta)\(^{780}\).

780 It is likely that there is a relationship between the Tds and the Daśāṇiṣyāṣṭra of the Madhyamakāgama (T1 26, 616b 5–25) for the nine categories of Arhat since, despite the minimal differences in the terms constituting the classification, the two texts — Tds and Daśāṇiṣyāṣṭra — admit nine categories of Arhat:

These are the nine kinds of Arhat in the Daśāṇiṣyāṣṭra:

1) he who wills (cetanādharmahāt),
2) he who progresses (prativedhanādharmahāt),
3) he who is immovable (akopyadharmahāt),
4) he who regresses (parihāṇadhamma),
5) he who does not regress (aparihāṇadhamma),
6) he who preserves (anurākṣanādharmahāt),
7) he who is stable (sthitakampya),
8) he who attains deliverance through wisdom (prajñāvinukta),
9) he who is doubly delivered (ubhayatobhāgavinukta).

In comparison to the list of nine categories of Arhat in the Tds, this list additionally contains the aparihāṇadhamma, whilst the ubhayatobhāgavinukta in it is a single category and is not divided into two categories — he who attains complete deliverance and he who attains incomplete deliverance, as the Tds has.

Considering that the Arhat is perfected and that the affirmation of regression of the Arhat is an heretical opinion, the canonical texts in Pāli rarely distinguish several categories of Arhat. Exceptionally, the Pajñāpadesa, 31–2, admits there are nine categories of Arhat:

1) he who is doubly delivered (ubhayatobhāgavinukta),
2) he who attains deliverance through wisdom (prajñāvinukta),
3) he who remains for a cosmic period (sthākapāpi),
4) he who progresses (prativedhanābhava),
5) he who wills (cetanābhava),
6) he who preserves (nakkhandhābhava),
7) he who does not attain Parinibbāna if he does not preserve (sace anurakkhata na parinībbaṁ),
8) he who attains Parinibbāna if he preserves (no ce anurakkhatā pariṇībbaṁ),
9) he who regresses (parihāṇadhamma) or he who is level-headed (saṃsāra).

Of these nine categories of Arhat, the first two derive from the sharp faculty which obtains knowledge through the condensed teaching; the third and fourth, from the weak faculty which obtains knowledge through the condensed teaching; the fifth and sixth, from the sharp faculty which obtains knowledge through the developed teaching; the seventh and eighth, from the weak faculty which obtains knowledge through the developed teaching; the ninth (including the level-headed) is the guideable person who is not devoted to the pursuit of development. Cf. Pajñāpadesa, 31–2.

Compared to the list of the nine Arhat categories in the Tds, the Pajñāpadesa list contains four categories — namely: sthākapāpi (3), sacce anurakkhata na parinībbaṁ (7), no ce anurakkhatā pariṇībbaṁ (8), saṃsāra (= parihāṇadhamma) — which are lacking in the Tds; whilst the others (1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and parihāṇadhamma (9) are identical to the Tds list.

According to Kośa VI, 56 (p.251, n.2), Fug. p.12, contains a definition of saṃsāratimutta, asamasymutta, kuppadhamma, akuppadhamma, parihāṇadhamma, aparihāṇadhamma, cetanābhava and anurāk-khanābhava.

In turn, Kośa VI, 56 ‘six kinds of Arhat are recognised’ (arhatah śan matāḥ — p.251, n.1):

1) he who regresses (parihāṇadhamma),
2) he who wills (cetanādharmahāt),
3) he who preserves (anurākṣanādharmahāt),
4) he who is stable (sthātapāpi),
5) he who progresses (prativedhanādharmahāt),
6) he who is immovable (akopyadharmahāt).
In brief, the list of śrāvakas in the Tds consists of three divisions and each division contains three fruits:

1. **Avītarāgabhūmī**

   **I. ASTAMAKA**
   - 1. Śraddhānusārin
   - 2. Prajñānusārin
   - 3. Śraddhāprajñānusārin

   **II. SROTĀĀPAANNA**
   - 4. Saptakṛdhbhavaparama
   - 5. Kulamkula
   - 6. Madhyama

   **III. TANUBHŪMI**
   - 7. Sakrāgāmin
   - 8. Ekabijin
   - 9. Madhyama

2. **Vitārāgabhūmī**

   **I. ŚRADDHĀBHIMUKTA**
   - 1. Ārdhvasrota
   - 2. Sābhisamkārāparinirvāyin
   - 3. Anabhisamkārāparinirvāyin

   **II. DRŚṬIPRĀPTA**
   - 4. Antarāparinirvāyin
   - 5. Upanāparinirvāyin

Compared to the Tds list, the Kośa omits the *prajñāvimukta*, he who attains complete deliverance and who attains incomplete deliverance (*ubhayatobhāgavimukta*). Nonetheless, the Kośa, in fact, takes these three categories into account, without classing them together with the preceding six categories. According to the Kośa, he who attains deliverance through wisdom (*prajñāvimukta*) is ‘he who is delivered by prajñā’ or ‘by the power of prajñā, he is delivered from the *klesāvarana*’ (Kośa VI, 64), ‘he is delivered not occasionally (*asamayavimukta*) and he is complete from the point of view of the faculties’ (ibid., 65). This category is lower than that of him who is doubly delivered (*ubhayatobhāgavimukta*) because it obtains the fruit of wisdom (*prajñā*) only. As for the doubly delivered (*ubhayatobhāgavimukta*), this is ‘he who possesses destruction (ibid., 64) through the power of wisdom (*prajñā*) and concentration (*samādhi*), he is delivered from the *klesāvarana* and *vimokṣāvarana*. He is he who is delivered occasionally (*asamayavimukta*) and is complete from the point of view of concentration: he is both he who is delivered not occasionally (*asamayavimukta*) and he who is complete from the point of view of the faculties and concentration (ibid., 65). We do not find the second category of the doubly-delivered (*ubhayatobhāgavimukta*) of the Tds (he who attains incomplete deliverance) in the Kośa.

An examination of the three main lists of Arhats leads us to the following conclusion: the Tds list is very complete as much for the faculties as for the categories; it is unique in its discovery or its classification if it is compared to the Kośa list, which is nothing other than the list found in the sūtras. The *Petekopadesa* list appears a peculiarity if it is compared to the totality of the Pāli texts. The table below shows, in summary, the differences between these three lists.
6. Ėrdhvasrotā

III. KĀYASĀKSIN
7. Sābhīsamskāraparāpirvāyin
8. Anabhīsamskāraparāpirvāyin
9. Upapadyaparāpirvāyin

3. Arhat:

I. TIKŚNENDRIYA:
1. Śhitākampyadharmān
2. Prativedhanādharman
3. Akopyadharmān

II. MRDVINDRIYA
4. Parihānadharman
5. Cetanādharman
6. Anuraksānādharman

III. MADHYENDRIYA:
7. Prajaḥvimukta
   Ubhayatobhāgavimukta: 8. complete
   9. incomplete.

II — The Śraṇ list consists of ten or twelve categories\(^{781}\), in which that of the Arhat is not divided:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE CATEGORIES OF ARHAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRIDHARMAKĀŚĀSTRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. TIKŚNENDRIYA:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Śhitākampyadharmān</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Prativedhanādharman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Śhitākampy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Akopyadharmān</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubhayatobhāgavimukta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{781}\) In reality the Śraṇ lists contains thirteen or sixteen categories. As the first three categories: — (1) he who is not yet disgusted by the world of desire, (2) he who is disgusted by the world of desire, and (3) he who is disgusted by the world of form — are outside the list of holy ones (ārya), that is why they are set aside. It is for this reason that the list of śrāvakas given by the Śamśīliyas contains ten or twelve categories.
1 - he who has seven more deaths and seven more births (saptakṛd-bhavaparāma),
2 - the once returner (sakṛdāgāmin),
3 - the once returner (who attains Parinirvāna by being born in several families) (kulamkulasakṛdāgāmin)782,
4 - the once returner (who is separated from Parinirvāna by the interval of one birth) (ekavīcīkasakṛdāgāmin)783,
5 - the once returner (who attains Parinirvāna) through disgust for the world of desire and through rebirth in the higher stages (kāmadhūtunirvedha ārdhvasrotasakṛdāgāmin),
6 - This category is divided into three:
   a. he who attains Parinirvāna in rebirth (upapadyaparinarirvāyin)
   b. he who attains Parinirvāna through compounded things (sābhīsamkāraparinirvāyin)784,
   c. he who attains Parinirvāna through the uncompounded (anabhīsamkāraparinirvāyin)785,
7 - he who attains Parinirvāna in the intermediate existence (antarāparinarirvāyin),
8 - he who is disgusted by the world of form and who is reborn in the higher stages (rūpadhūtunirvedha ārdhvasrot),
9 - he who attains Parinirvāna through the compounded things of rebirth (upapadyasamkāraparinirvāyin)786,
10 - the Arhat (cf. Sns, 472a 15-21).

The existence of the two preceding lists of śrāvakas progressively confirms the opinion according to which the separation between the Vātiputriyas and Sāmmitiyas was caused by different interpretations of the stanza common to the Pudgalavādins787. It is clear that the fruits, according to the order of the list of twelve categories given by the Sns, are practically identical to the fruits of that of six categories indicated in the stanza common to the Pudgalavādins (according to the Sāmmitiya interpretation). The difference between the two lists is that the first considers the kulamkula as a category associated with the sakṛdāgāmin, whilst the second classes the kulamkula in

782 Sns, 472a 16: chien-chień-shē-t'a-han 家家斯陀含. Without a commentary it is difficult to explain why he who is reborn in several families (kulamkula) is classed in the fruit of the once returner (sakṛdāgāmin). It is possible that the kulamkulasakṛdāgāmin is a category specific to the Sāmmitiyas.
783 Sns, 472a 17: i-chien-shē-t'a-han 一間斯陀含. It should be noted that the Chinese translation here is i-chien 一間, whilst that of the Tds is i-chung 一種 (Tds, 21a 13).
784 Without a commentary, and as the Sns admits that there is an intermediate existence (antarābhava), the names of this and the following categories can be translated in this way.
785 See previous note.
786 Sns, 472a 20: shēng-hsing-ju-nieh-pan 生行入涅槃. The translation is based on an examination of the three preceding categories, namely: shēng-ju-nieh-pan 生已入涅槃 (he who attains Parinirvāna in rebirth — upapadyaparinarirvāyin), hsing-ju-nieh-pan 行入涅槃 (he who attains Parinirvāna through compounded things — sābhīsamkāraparinirvāyin) and pu-hsing-ju-nieh-pan 不行入涅槃 (he who attains Parinirvāna through the uncompounded — anabhīsamkāraparinirvāyin) (Sns, 472a 18-19).
the *srotāpanna* fruit.

The table below allows a comparison of these two lists:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Categories of Śrāvakas</th>
<th>According to the Śāṃmmitiya interpretation of the stanza common to the Pudgalavādins</th>
<th>According to the Śāṃmmitiyaniyāyaśāstra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 — <em>Srotāpanna</em></td>
<td>1. <em>Saptakṛdভghaparama</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 — <em>Kulamkula</em></td>
<td>2. <em>Sakṛdāgāmin</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 — <em>Sakṛdāgāmin</em></td>
<td>3. <em>Kulamkulasakṛdāgāmin</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 — <em>Ekavīcika</em></td>
<td>4. <em>Ekavīcikasakṛdāgāmin</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 — <em>Anāgāmin</em></td>
<td>(Anāgāmin includes 6 categories):</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. <em>Upapadyaparinirvāyin</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. <em>Sābhīsamkārparinirvāyin</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. <em>Anabhisamkārparinirvāyin</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. <em>Antarāparinirvāyin</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. <em>Rūpadhātunirvedha ārdhvasrotasakṛdāgāmin</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>11. <em>Upapattibhāvasam śkārparinirvāyin</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6 — <em>Arhat</em></td>
<td>12. <em>Arhat</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to compare the Vātsīputriya list of śrāvakas in the Tds with that of the Śāṃmmitiyas in the Sns. Although the list of twenty-seven categories in the Tds is more developed than that of the twelve categories in the Sns, the main categories of both lists are similar with regard to the four fruits of the śrāvakas, namely: *srotāpanna*, *sakṛdāgāmin*, *anāgāmin* and *arhat*.

The differences which separate the two lists are the following:

1. The Sns list only counts the *saptakṛdভghaparama* as a single category of *srotāpanna*, whilst the Tds list admits that the *srotāpanna* is divided into three: *saptakṛdভghaparama*, *kulamkula* and *madhyama*;

2. The Sns list counts four categories of *sakṛdāgāmin*, namely: *sakṛdāgāmin*, *kulamkulasakṛdāgāmin*, *ekavīcikasakṛdāgāmin* and *kāmadhātunirvedha ārdhvasrotasakṛdāgāmin*, whilst the Tds list only accepts three categories: *sakṛdāgāmin*, *ekabijin* and *madhyama*;
3. The Sns list counts six categories of anāgāmin, namely: upapadyapariparīnyin, sābhisanaskārapariparīnyin, anabhisanaskārapariparīnyin, antara-pariparīnyin, rūpadhātu nirvedha ārdhasrotan and upapattihavasāmskārapariparīnyin (of these six categories, the first five are essential categories found in the canonical texts. The sixth is an auxiliary category, invented by the Sāmmitiyas by combining the following three categories: upapadyapariparīnyin, sābhisanaskārapariparīnyin and anabhisanaskārapariparīnyin), whilst the Tds list admits that there are only nine categories, of which the five categories of anāgāmin, in conformity to the canonical texts, are always essential.

4. The Sns list does not divide the arhat fruit, whilst the Tds list admits that there are nine categories of arhat.

It is noteworthy that the Sns classes the kulamkula in the sakṛdāgāmin fruit, whilst the Tds list considers kulamkula as a category of srotāpanna; both lists agree on this point: the ekavicika (Sns) or ekabijin (Tds) pertains to the sakṛdāgāmin fruit. In brief, the Vātsiputriyas and Sāmmitiyas each have their own list of śrāvaka fruits. By comparing the two lists, we find that that of the Vātsiputriyas given by the Tds is richer, as much for the faculties as for the categories, than that of the Sāmmitiyas supplied by the Sns.
CONCLUSION

The study of the personalist schools of early Buddhism has enabled us to understand the doctrinal problems of the Pudgalavādins.

Although the literary documents left by the Pudgalavādins are few in number in comparison to those of other schools, Theravādin, Sarvāstivādin, etc., we have attempted to reconstruct the main thesis concerning the pudgala, the fifteen secondary theses and the two lists of śrāvakas, by basing ourselves on the four treatises which have been preserved.

The establishment of the pudgala thesis is certainly a significant, unique and courageous creation in the history of Buddhist thought. If we set aside all the exaggerations and condemnations concerning this thesis and if we understand it clearly as it was explained by the author or his disciples, we can appreciate its true value.

It answers two questions at the same time, by affirming on the one hand the existence of the individual and by refuting on the other the condemnation of nihilism and eternalism brought by Buddhism.

It is, indeed, difficult to explain the existence of a successive chain of former and later lives without designating a person defined as being something more than the sum of its constituent parts (skandha) which, for its continuing subsistence, supplies a continuing support for action (karma), memory and knowledge, and which attains deliverance through destruction of the fetters (samyojana), but not through that of an individual life.

Although the pudgala was treated by the Pudgalavādins as a designation (prajñapti) aimed at clarifying the existence of living beings (sattva), they did not fail to declare that this principle of individuality is neither identical to the aggregates nor different from them by explaining that it can exist in bliss after total stilling (parinirvāna).

Thus, the thesis of the pudgala, according to the Pudgalavādins, remains in conformity with the doctrine of the middle way (madhyamāpratīpad) and does not fall into the two extremes: nihilism (ucchedadṛṣṭi) and eternalism (saṃsvadadṛṣṭi). The Pudgalavādins were careful to show that their doctrine was not contrary to the doctrine of insubstantiality which is the essence of the teaching of the Buddha. They also insisted on the fact that adherence to the pudgala does not prevent the treading of the Path and the attaining of the result, by presenting the list of twelve knowledges (jñāna) and that of the fruits (phala) proper to their school.

In order to complete the pudgala thesis, the creation by the Vātsiputriyas and, later, the Sāṃmitiyas, consisted of admitting the existence of an imperishable thing (avipranāśadharma), destined to explain the mechanism of the fruition of actions (karmavipāka). This thing is dissociated from the mind: neutral from the point of view of morality, it can affect the ordinary as well as the liberated man. The Sāṃmitiyas upheld, with the richest and most convincing arguments, the thesis of intermediate existence (antarābhāva) illustrating the fact that, at the moment of death,
The individual changes into an intermediate being who is reborn spontaneously and who, at the same time, links the two consecutive lives.

On the other hand, with the help of the *Lù ming-liao lun*, we have shown that the Pudgalavādins also possessed an important Vinayapitaka.

In this respect, the question of the value of these various inventions or contributions arises: is it due to them that the Pudgalavādins subsisted for more than ten centuries with a great number of monasteries and monks, doctrinally influencing other schools, whether early or Mahāyānist? To a certain degree the answer is positive, since it is certain that Buddhism, after the Parinirvāna of the Buddha, developed in a climate of effervescence, and that Buddhist scholars researched all the possibilities of interpreting the doctrinal problems that might arise.

Furthermore, the doctrine of insubstantiality (*anātmavāda*), together with the concept of rebirth and deliverance of the Buddha, was a difficult idea to understand, even for Buddhists, and was the subject of many criticisms on the part of their adversaries.

This is the reason why the 'semi-heretical' concepts of the Pudgalavādins, the *pudgala*, the imperishable *śīling* (*avipraṇāśadharma*) and the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*), became important notions in early Buddhism.
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