THE BUDDHIST PATH TO AWAKENING

R. M. L. GETHIN
THE BUDDHIST PATH TO AWAKENING
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For my mother and father
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PREFACE

The present work was originally submitted, in substantially the present form, as a doctoral dissertation to the Department of Comparative Religion at the University of Manchester in 1987. A constant theme of Buddhist thought is that things do not exist by virtue of their own inherent power, but rather owe their existence to numerous and diverse conditions; in fact on close examination the things in themselves vanish, and the various contributory conditions are seen to be the only true reality anything has. The particular focus of the present work is the bodhipakkhiyā dhammā—the conditions that contribute to awakening. While the book itself may fall somewhat short of its subject matter, at least its genesis aptly illustrates the principle of dependence upon conditions. However, it is said that it takes the mind of an all-knowing Buddha to encompass fully the complex of supporting conditions; I can indicate only rather inadequately what is owed and to whom.

The University of Manchester, where I was an undergraduate and postgraduate student, nurtured my interest in the study of Buddhism and Pali in a tradition established there by T.W. Rhys Davids, the first Professor of Comparative Religion. For that I am grateful, and I should like to express my gratitude especially to Lance Cousins, my supervisor, a true pandita, who first opened my eyes to many things—whatever is of merit in the present study is the result of his guidance. I am also grateful to K.R. Norman (of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, Cambridge), who introduced me to some of the intricacies of Middle Indo-Aryan philology and provided advice and criticism on a number of points; to Professor John Hinnells (of the Department of Comparative Religion, Manchester), who also provided advice and criticism; to Dr Stuart McFarlane (of the Department of Religious Studies, Lancaster), who advised on the Chinese rendering of ekāyana/eka-yāna; to Venerable Ānanda Maitreya and Venerable Dr Rewatadhamma, who discussed a number of Abhidhamma points with me; to all those involved with the Samatha Association and Trust, who all contributed however unwittingly; to Dr Steven Collins (then of the University of Bristol, now of the University of Chicago) for his advice and criticism in the role of external examiner for the original thesis. The initial financial support for my research was provided by the Department of Education and Science; later the Pāli Text Society came to my rescue and supported me with a studentship for a further year, which allowed me to finish what I had begun.

I should also like to thank the following: Doreen Boardman, who initially typed a difficult manuscript; Gillian Binks for her generosity and tolerance in the course of providing an environment suited to writing; John Gittins for the use of his typewriter and help with photocopying; Candida Sturdy for help with proofreading; and finally my mother, father and sister, who over the years never failed to provide support and encouragement.

The book was prepared for publication after I had taken up a post as a
lecturer in religious studies at the University of Bristol. I am grateful to the University for financial assistance with the preparation of camera-ready copy; to Ann French (of the Computing Service), who initiated me into the mysteries of the PC, Unix, VMS, and the Lasercomp; to the Oxford University Computing Service where the book was typeset; to the British Academy for a grant contributing towards publication costs; and to Dr F. Th. Dijkema, E.J. Brill’s Oriental Editor, who waited patiently.

siddhir astu
śubham astu

Bristol 26 September 1991
The nine years since the first edition of *The Buddhist Path to Awakening* was published have seen the publication of many articles and books in the field of Buddhist studies. Not a few of these have some bearing on the general topic of the present study, namely the theory of early Buddhist “meditation” and the stages of the Buddhist spiritual path. However, to my knowledge there has been no other work specifically devoted to the ‘dhammas that contribute to awakening’ (*bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*). Nor does it seem to me that in the intervening years scholarly discussions of the relationship between the various elements of early Buddhist meditation—the *jhānas*, the formless attainments, calm and insight, concentration and wisdom, the ‘immeasurables’ or ‘divine abidings’, etc.—have reached definite or generally accepted conclusions.

One of the things I suggested in my conclusion was that before we throw away the Abhidhamma and the commentaries, we need to be very sure we have understood what it is they are saying, and how it is they are actually interpreting the earlier texts (p. 344). What prompted that suggestion then was a sense that in dealing with the theory of the Buddhist path in the Nikāyas scholars had tended to dismiss the views of the Abhidhamma and commentaries without fully understanding them. Yet my own investigation of the treatment of the *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā* in the Nikāyas and *abhidhamma/abhidharma* texts had led me to the conclusion that in fact, while the understanding of the later texts might not be precisely the same in all matters of detail, it was, when worked out and carefully considered, broadly consistent with that found in the Nikāyas.

So let me take this opportunity to restate what I think to be the main import of the present study for the scholarly investigation of early Buddhist meditation theory. While my study of the *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā* does not address directly all the specific points raised by those following in the footsteps of La Vallée Poussin and Frauwallner, it does at least, I think, place a question mark against some of the claims of ‘contradiction’ and ‘inconsistency’ in the way the texts (the Pali Nikāyas, the Abhidhamma, and the commentaries) present the theory of Buddhist meditation. What I want to suggest is that a close reading of the material concerned with the *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā* with attention to the subtleties and nuances of the presentation reveals a basically coherent and consistent understanding of the process whereby the ‘ordinary’ (*lokiya*), unawakened mind transforms itself into the ‘world transcending’ (*lokuttara*), awakened mind.

More specifically my suggestion is that the treatment of the *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā* in general and ‘the factors of awakening’ (*bojjhangā*) in particular provides something of a key to understanding the relationship between calm and insight, between concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*) in early Buddhist meditation theory. The very list of the *bojjhangas* is precisely intended to bring together the practice of *jhāna* with the development of wisdom (see Chapter Five). The summary statement of the path as consisting of the abandoning of the five hindrances, practice of the four establishings of mindfulness, and development of
the awakening factors points towards the way in which discourses such as the (Mahā-)Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta and Ānāpānasati-sutta are intended to show how calm and insight are in practice combined (see pp. 57–9, 172, 258).

My conclusion is then that, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, there are not two radically different conceptions of the Buddhist path vying with each other: there is no great struggle going on between the advocates of the way of ‘calm’ (samatha) and ‘meditation’ (jhāna) on the one hand, and the advocates of the way of ‘insight’ (vipassanā) and understanding (paññā) on the other. In fact it turns out that the characteristically early Buddhist conception of the path leading to the cessation of suffering is that it consists precisely in the combining of calm and insight. It is not surprising then to find that the texts are concerned to explore the precise relationship between these. The development of the early Buddhist theory of the path does not then consist so much in the worsting of one side in a debate, as in the providing of more refined, sophisticated, and varied accounts of how understanding is related to and emerges from the stillness of mind developed in the practice of jhāna. Put another way, Indian Buddhist meditation theory was always precisely concerned with articulating the relationship between the process of stilling the emotions associated with ‘craving’ (tanhā) and the process of ridding the mind of the distorted view of the world that comes from ‘delusion’ (moha) or ‘ignorance’ (avijjā). The relationship between these processes was seen as crucial because of the way in which in actual experience (as opposed to logical abstraction) craving and delusion are confused: in craving we also have a distorted view of the world, and in having a distorted view of the world we also crave. Of course, I do not wish to claim an absolute freedom from contradiction and inconsistency for the textual accounts of the Buddhist path, but I do want to suggest that the texts (from the early Nikāyas, through the early Abhidhamma to the commentaries) do provide a broadly consistent and coherent understanding of how stilling the mind is to be in some way combined with investigating the process of conditionality (patīcchasamuppāda)—the rise and fall of things—as the effective way of bringing the mind to the point of awakening.

The text of this second edition is the text of the first edition with minor corrections. In addition to the reviewers (listed at the end of this preface), who drew my attention to various errors, I would like to thank Bhikkhu Bodhi and Costel Harasz for pointing out others. I would also like to draw the reader’s attention to several points in the first edition where I would make more substantial changes or additions if I were to revise this material fully.


I have altered my note on the commentarial interpretation of samudaya-dhamma and vaya-dhamma (p. 55, n. 111) in the light of the full discussion of the issue in

The one to one correspondence between the seven factors of awakening (bojjhanga/bodhy-anga) and the seven treasures of the wheel-turning king (see pp. 182–3) is not confined to the Pali texts, but is also found in the Mahāyānasūtraṃkāra (XVII 57–63).


In Chapter Ten and in my Conclusion (pp. 340–42, 352) I draw attention to two different abhidhamma/abhidharma perspectives on the bodhi-pakkhiya dharmā/bodhi-pāksīkā dharmāḥ: the Theravādin perspective which emphasises how all thirty-seven dhammas are present in a single moment with the final attainment of the path, and the Sarvāstivādin-Yogācārin perspective which sees each of the seven sets as characterizing a successive stage of the path. I suggest, however, that these two perspectives should not be seen as mutually exclusive and that elements of each are present in both. In this context I would add two references to the Mahāyānasūtraṃkāra which show more clearly how the idea of the thirty-seven dhammas’ being in a single moment is also found in the northern tradition: at XIV 36 (S. Lévi, Paris, 1995, p. 95; S. Bagchi, Dharbhanga, 1970, pp. 92–3) it is stated that ‘with the path of seeing, the Son of the Conquerors always gains knowledge of all the various dhammas contributing to awakening’ (tena darśana-mārgena saha sadā mataḥ / sarveṣāṁ bodhipakṣānāṁ vicitrānāṁ jinātmahe // tena darśana-mārgena saha bodhisattvasya sarveṣāṁ bodhi-pakṣānāṁ dharmānāṁ labho veditavyah śrty-upasthānānāṁ); while the exposition of XX–XXI 16 (Lévi, p. 178; Bagchi, p. 170) states that at the seventh stage the bodhisattva has an understanding acquired in a single moment of consciousness through developing the thirty-seven bodhi-pakṣas in each moment (saptamāyām eka-citta-kṣaṇa-labdha-buddhir ... pratikṣaṇ anām sapta-trimśad bodhi-pakṣa-bhāvanātah).

An additional non-Pāli source for the seven sets or bodhipakṣyas (pp. 357–58) is Dieter Schlingloff, *Ein Buddhistisches Yogalehrbuch* (Textband), Berlin 1964, 180–81.


Finally I would like to express my gratitude to Novin Doostdar and Victoria Warner of Oneworld, the former for taking the initial interest in my book, and the latter for seeing it through to its republication.

Rupert Gethin
Bristol
26 May 2001
INTRODUCTION

1. The academic study of religion: some reflections on methodology

That I should find myself, a European, towards the end of the twentieth century of the 'Christian' era writing about matters relating to a body of ancient Indian literature should perhaps give pause for thought. For what follows is intended as a scholarly study of certain aspects of Buddhism, and was originally submitted (in substantially the present form) as a doctoral dissertation to a department of 'comparative religion' within a 'faculty of theology' at a British university. Behind these facts lies a specific story—the story of the development of a particular cultural and intellectual tradition, namely that of the West. The story concerns, in part, the evolution of the modern academic study of religion. This part of the story, although full of complex characters, exotic locations and numerous subplots, can be told clearly enough in broad outline. Its ending, however, is rather inconclusive. I mean by this that the modern academic study of religion can often appear a rather messy and untidy affair where no one is exactly sure of what they are or should be doing. Varying measures of traditional theology, philosophy, the history of ideas, sociology and social anthropology, the psychology of religious experience, historical and literary criticism, textual and philological analysis are shaken together to produce an always heady and sometimes unpalatable cocktail. The reactions of those who take of this elixir are not exactly consistent.

I do not wish to enter into the methodological debate in any major way. This is simply not the place; my concerns are elsewhere. This disinclination to stray too far into the methodological maze has one immediate and fortuitous consequence: it apparently places me in some rather distinguished company. In a recent literature review R.J.Z. Werblowsky spoke of the 'almost unbearable verbiage and pretentious bombast characteristic of the floodtide of methodological literature that is sweeping over us' and suggested that this has the effect of turning many serious scholars off the subject. He goes on to conclude, however, that 'it is surely right and proper that historians of religion ask themselves, from time to time, what exactly it is that they are actually doing (or that their predecessors have been doing)'.

At the risk of touching on a number of issues, each of which has an enormous literature attaching to it, I shall, then, attempt to state briefly what it is I take it I am doing in the present study. As I indicated above, the academic study of religion is a product of the intellectual history of the West; its field of enquiry, on the other hand, ranges far beyond the confines of western culture. However, the terms of the methodological debate remain those dictated by the modern western intellectual tradition—it is a debate that is largely only

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intelligible in the context of that tradition. This is, of course, neither a good nor bad thing in itself. It is not that one ought to demand of the modern academic study of religion that it should become free of its cultural roots—it cannot. But it is, perhaps, appropriate to ask that in the context of the methodological debate it should become more self-aware. Thus one of the more serious shortcomings of the current methodological debate is surely its failure to take on board the full significance of the fact that someone brought up in the classical intellectual tradition of, say, India would inevitably conceive of and analyze the whole matter in rather different terms.

To be sure, the problem is generally recognized, but the full extent of its implications has yet to be explored. Frank Whaling comments as follows in his introductory essay to *Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religion*:

> Although this book traces in detail the contributions of scholars of different western nationalities to different approaches, the wider question that is emerging is whether the study of religion has not been too much dominated by western categories. What is the significance of the fact that religions outside the West have been studied in a western way ... To what extent has this pre-1945 attitude of often unconscious superiority been superseded in the contemporary situation? To what degree, in spite of the concern for *epoché* and *Einfühlung* fostered by the phenomenological approach, do western scholars feel that it is they who must research and interpret the religion of others for these latter? ... One suspects that we are only just beginning to reflect seriously upon such matters.

It is not difficult to see why these questions remain largely unanswered. Any real understanding of them requires an insight into the nature of both western culture and non-western cultures that is not easily acquired, and the easterner may misinterpret western culture just as much as the westerner may misinterpret eastern culture. It is, perhaps, almost commonplace now to point out that there is no precise word for (and hence no concept of) 'religion' in Sanskrit and other Indian languages, or that many of the difficulties associated with a term such as *nirvāṇa* simply disappear when we cease to try to force it into one neat

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3 Ursula King suggests (*Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religion*, Volume I, *The Humanities*, ed. F. Whaling, Berlin, 1983, pp. 44-7) that, although the methodological debate has been dominated by the Europeans and Americans, in the last 20 years or so participants from other areas have entered the debate: 'Eastern developments in the study of religion have been influenced by earlier work done in Europe and even more the USA, but these influences have been blended with strong indigenous elements, especially in India and Japan. Unfortunately, far too little is generally known about these important eastern developments.' But this blending, perhaps, has the effect of adding further complications; cf. E. Conze's comments on the question of contemporary cultural confusion in *Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Mélanges offerts à Mgr Etienne Lamotte*, Louvain, 1980, p. 51.

4 Those such as, for example, N. Smart (*Secular Education and the Logic of Religion*, London, 1968) and E.J. Sharpe (*Understanding Religion*, London, 1983), who respectively draw up lists of the dimensions (doctrinal, mythological, ethical, ritual, experiential, social) and modes (existential, intellectual, institutional, ethical) of religion, fail to consider in any depth the extent to which the categories of their schemata might be rooted in the western intellectual tradition. As Whaling asks (*CASR*, p. 433): 'to what extent is the western framework for the study of religion western rather than universal?'

5 Whaling, *CASR*, pp. 11-2; see also Whaling's whole essay 'The study of religion in a global context', id., pp. 391-443.

western metaphysical pigeonhole. But such examples are (to use an old cliché) only the tip of an iceberg, the submerged mass of which is always there to tear a nasty hole in the hull of any understanding we formulate in our attempts to sail from one culture to another. Thus it is not enough to identify isolated concepts and think the problem solved. The whole conceptual pattern of the relevant systems of thought is involved here, and not only this; systems of thought evolve and operate in particular cultural settings and contexts—these too need to be taken into account. To give a very general illustration, Buddhism has often tended to be presented in the West as a rather depressing and negative affair: it teaches that life is suffering and that all desire is to be given up. But even the most casual of observers must conclude that the ordinary Buddhist practice of the Sinhalese does not appear especially depressing. Of course, there may be various explanations and ways of understanding this apparent discrepancy, but it often seems that the scholarly world has, at least until recently, been readier to countenance the fact that the Sinhalese have got it wrong, than that there is something awry with their own scholarly presentation of Buddhist thought. One of the reasons underlying this is, perhaps, that at precisely this point the western academic tradition tends artificially to polarize the study of other cultures: the orientalist studies texts, and the anthropologist goes into the field. In any event, it remains clear, I think, that in the general context of the modern academic study of religion there is not only room but a need for further detailed study of and reflection on the intellectual and spiritual traditions of India. In the first place, then, the present study endeavours to make some contribution to this.

My work is based primarily on the ancient Pāli literary sources. This is largely a matter of convenience and of circumstances, and not because the study of the literary sources in general or the Pāli sources in particular is taken as necessarily bringing us closer to the true essence of Buddhism (whatever that might be) than other approaches. In the context of Buddhist studies the justification for the study of the Pāli sources is simply that these texts represent an important facet of both ancient and modern Buddhist culture. Clearly any attempt at a critical study of these sources must take cognizance of historical questions, but as J.W. de Jong has suggested this alone will fail to determine what the texts actually mean or are trying to say:

Educated in the historical tradition of the nineteenth century, scholars believed they could learn all about Buddhism by studying its history. In the first place they tried to obtain a knowledge of the facts and data in order to form a picture of the development of Buddhist ideas. This method is doomed to failure because in the spiritual life of India the historical dimension is of much less importance than it is in Western civilisation. The most important task for the student of Buddhism is the study of Buddhist mentality. That is why contact with present day Buddhism is so important, for this will guard us against seeing the texts purely as philological

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material and forgetting that for the Buddhist they are sacred texts which proclaim a message of salvation.\(^9\)

The aspect of the literary sources that primarily interests me in this study is that which concerns what might be variously termed 'religious experience', 'the psychology of meditation experience', 'the psychology of spiritual growth' or 'mysticism'. This aspect is to the fore in the texts; in one way or another it is largely what they are about; it appears to have been of central concern to those who first compiled and used the texts. But dealing with this aspect of the texts in an academic context is not entirely straightforward. If there are already difficulties in entering into the minds of men and women culturally removed by time and space from the interpreter, then there can only be further difficulties in attempting to enter into the minds of those who understand themselves to have had experiences that transcend the ordinary. If we cannot share the world view of ordinary men and women, how can we hope to share that of mystics? How can we understand mystics without ourselves being mystics?\(^{10}\)

This and related questions have been the subject of considerable reflection.\(^{11}\) In practice researchers have assumed that even without direct experience of mystical states it remains possible and valid to compare and evaluate what mystics have to say about their experiences. (Just as one might compare and evaluate reports on a foreign country that one has not oneself visited.) But, as S.T. Katz has pointed out,\(^{12}\) researchers often appear to have been over confident in their ability to distinguish between a mystic's own interpretation and the essential mystical experience. In their eagerness to get at this essential and pure experience, and discard what they see as the unnecessary interpretations of the mystics, they have passed over the subtle question of how a mystical experience itself may be subject to prior conditioning. Katz, who calls into question the very notion of 'raw experience', suggests that a mystic's experience is shaped and formed from the very start by the tradition within which he works. According to Katz the particular similarities that researchers identify in mystics' descriptions of their experience are abstracted only at the expense of the real differences in their accounts. In treating mystics' own descriptions in this way, researchers effectively deny that these descriptions carry any literal meaning. But:

If none of the mystic's utterances carry any literal meaning then they cannot serve as the data for any position, not mine, and certainly not the view that all mystical

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\(^{11}\) For a useful anthology and full bibliography see Understanding Mysticism, ed. R. Woods, London, 1981.

experiences are the same, or reducible to a small class of phenomenological categories.\[13\]

Frits Staal has sought to solve the problems associated with the academic study of mysticism by arguing that mysticism might be explored 'scientifically' and 'rationally' by some form of critical personal involvement.\[14\] He has been criticized by among others Edward Conze, who calls into question not so much his premise that mysticism cannot be understood apart from actual experience of mystical states, but the idea that mystical states might be available to researchers \textit{qua} researchers. The Indian documents, says Conze, 'employ a terminology derived from the specific experiences of \textit{yoga}' and 'these must remain a closed book to someone who has not had them'.\[15\] But that academic researchers should seek to have them, Conze regards as a nonsense:

(a) their motives are suspect, (b) their training and essential position blind them to the values of solitaries, and (c) they are rarely strong on religious experience. How can you judge the efficacy of prayer if you cannot pray effectively?\[16\]

Presumably Dr Conze would have regarded himself as something of an exception that proves the rule. But what seems to lie at the heart of Conze's objection to Staal's programme is the implication that there is a 'truth' about mystical experience apart from the mystic's own truth that is somehow open to collective human understanding and that can be got at by 'scientific' and 'rational' research.\[17\]

Essentially the same problem that Staal and Conze address in the context of the study of mysticism has recently been stated more generally by Martin Southwold.\[18\] He argues that in matters of religion it is 'practice' that should be seen as having primacy over 'belief'. Thus it is only when we begin to behave and act like Buddhist villagers in Sri Lanka, that we can begin to understand village Buddhism. Here, then, the principles of the phenomenological approach to the study of religion break down. One can only have sympathy

\[13\] Id., p. 40. While the logic of Katz's critique of the universalist position is, I think, sound, the logic by which he establishes his own pluralist position is not quite so clear: may he not be over literal in his understanding of mystics' own descriptions? does a different description always and necessarily entail a different experience? do not mystics sometimes describe what they see as the same experience in different terms? The problem for the pluralist position is where to draw the line.

The Jewish experience of \textit{devekuth} is different from the Buddhist experience of \textit{nirv\(\text{\(\ddot{a}\)}\)na}, but to what extent are we to regard the Therav\(\text{\(\ddot{a}\)}\)din experience of \textit{nibb\(\text{\(\ddot{a}\)}\)na} as different from the Sarv\(\text{\(\ddot{a}\)}\)stiv\(\text{\(\ddot{a}\)}\)din experience of \textit{nirv\(\text{\(\ddot{a}\)}\)na}, or from the M\(\text{\(\ddot{a}\)}\)hyamika, Yogi\(\text{\(\ddot{a}\)}\)c\(\text{\(\ddot{a}\)}\)rin or Hua Yen experience? Cf. Conze's comment: 'It is absurd to base an appraisal of the "mystics" on their utterances which are a very slight by-product of their doings.' (\textit{M\(\text{\(\ddot{e}\)}\)langes Lamotte}, p. 51.)


\[15\] \textit{M\(\text{\(\ddot{e}\)}\)langes Lamotte}, p. 51.

\[16\] Id., p. 52.

\[17\] Certainly this appears to be the underlying tone of the concluding section of Staal's book ('How to Study Mysticism'); at one point (pp. 136-7) he actually compares the investigator of mysticism to an astronaut: 'We may have to prepare an investigator of mysticism by means of an appropriate course of fasting, just as we may prepare an astronaut by an appropriate course of eating.'

by active participation, but does not such active participation demand something more positive than a mere suspension of judgement?\textsuperscript{19}

I have come full circle: the way we think and what we experience is conditioned by the particular world we live in. The modern student of religion lives in a world quite removed from those of both the Buddhist villager and the Buddhist arahant. How can he possibly hope to enter into them and understand them? The answer must be quite simple. Unless there is some common ground he cannot. The real question is whether there is sufficient common ground, and to this there is probably no easy or final answer. The gap of understanding between two cultures may be of a different order but it is not logically different from the gap of understanding that exists between two individuals of the same culture. They too will occupy their own particular worlds, they too may sometimes have difficulties entering into and understanding the other's world. Logically, then, we are left with the question of whether anyone can ever communicate with anyone else. At this point, rather than pursue this question further into the realms of philosophical analysis, it is perhaps appropriate to appeal directly to the texts that form the subject of this study. For, as Katz has remarked, in addition to the need for refining and rethinking philosophical issues in the study of mysticism, 'there is a great deal more "technical" work to be done on the mystical material itself' by way of understanding texts and so on.\textsuperscript{20}

In the first place, then, it is worth remembering that the Pāli literary sources themselves do not appear to regard 'the path to awakening' as something essentially culture-bound. The fact of Buddhism's spread across much of Asia in ancient times perhaps bears witness to the fact that in this they were not entirely mistaken.\textsuperscript{21} Secondly and more importantly, one of the arguments of the present study is that the 'spiritual psychology' of the thirty-seven dhammas that contribute to awakening (as presented in the Nikāyas and the Abhidhamma) is concerned to show that, while the meditation experience of the 'noble person' (ariya-puggala) is of a different order, it nevertheless bears some kind of resemblance to certain of the experiences of the ordinary man (puthujjana). Indeed, the whole purpose of 'the path to awakening' is precisely to show how 'ordinary' (lokiya) experiences are related to 'world-transcending' (lokuttara) experiences, and thus how we are to get from one kind of experience to the other. This outlook of the texts means that the experiences they describe are perhaps not quite the closed book Conze suggests.

2. Some perspectives on the early Buddhist tradition and Pāli literature

The historical and critical study of Buddhist literature has grown up to some extent in the shadow of the historical and critical study of biblical


\textsuperscript{20} Katz, op. cit., p. 2.

\textsuperscript{21} The sceptic, of course, might see this only as illustrating the extent to which different cultures can misunderstand each other, adapting alien cultural traditions to their own norms.
literature, especially the New Testament, and in some respects should probably be regarded as something of an immature younger sister. Perhaps the most elementary lesson to be learnt here concerns our basic attitude and approach to ancient religious literatures. It is clear that neither the Gospels nor early Buddhist literature is particularly concerned to record straight history, and in attempting to use either set of literature as a means of access to historical events and persons the historian faces considerable problems. Any given event, incident, circumstance or person described in the literature is there primarily to illustrate and further the literature's own 'truth'; at the same time it may coincide with, overlap with or bear some kind of relationship to what the historian might judge to be historical truth. What he must assess is how far it is possible or appropriate to attempt to push that coincidence. This does not mean that the historian concludes: 'This and this are historical, but this and this are not.' Rather he concludes: 'Of this and this I have the means as a historian to ask the question "Is it historical or not?" but of this and this I have not.' In other words he must determine the proper limits of historical enquiry according to the nature and availability of his sources. The delicacy of the historian's task here is well illustrated by the attempt to give an account of the historical Jesus and historical Buddha. In persisting rather too long with the question 'Did this happen?' and not paying proper attention to the nature of ancient literatures, one is in danger of being too literal and even rather unsophisticated in one's handling of them.

The problems associated with the assessment of early Buddhist literature are further compounded by the difficulty of establishing even the most basic date in early Buddhist history—namely the date of the Buddha. Certainly we have no real reason to doubt that underlying early Buddhist literature there must indeed be a historical personality. However, in a recent and persuasive article Professor Heinz Bechert has reminded the world of Indological studies that the reasons in favour of following the Ceylonese tradition that dates the Buddha's *parinibbāna* 218 years before the accession of Aśoka are certainly no more, and may be rather less, convincing than the reasons for following the traditions of north India which date the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* just 100 years before Aśoka. Bechert himself suggests anything between 105

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23 It seems to me that, in spite of their undeniable scholarship, A. Bareau's *Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans les Sūtrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens* (3 vols, Paris, 1963, 1970, 1971) suffer precisely in this respect. Of some pertinence here is E.E. Evans-Pritchard's observation that 'myth and history are in important respects different in character, not just in the degree to which they can be substantiated by appeal to evidence or to the laws of natural science' and that 'hence a story may be true yet mythical in character, and a story may be false yet historical in character' (*Essays in Social Anthropology*, London, 1962, p. 53).

and 85 years before Aśoka as reasonable. This may bring the date of the Buddha's parinirvāṇa forward from 486 or 483 BCE to as late as 350 BCE.

The Pāli canon that the Buddhist tradition of Ceylon and South East Asia presents us with appears to be basically the Tipiṭaka that the compilers of the commentaries had before them in the fifth and sixth centuries CE.25 The Pāli tradition itself records that the texts of the canon at first existed only orally and were committed to writing at a relatively late date, some time during the first century BCE.26 On the basis of this tradition—and scholars have generally looked upon it quite favourably—we may be justified in concluding that the Pāli canon as we have it is substantially as it was written down at that time. Presumably this canon was brought to Ceylon from India at some earlier date, possibly by Mahinda, who, according to the Pāli tradition, came to Ceylon some time during the reign of Aśoka. This tradition may have a kind of corroboration in the form of Aśoka's thirteenth rock edict.27 Certainly the language of the canon appears to be entirely consonant with a north Indian provenance, and any evidence for significant additions to the canon after its arrival in Ceylon is at best inconclusive.28

The oral origin of the literature is evident enough from the style of the texts themselves. Reference to a system of 'reciters' or 'chanters' (bhānakas) is found in post-canonical Pāli literature29 and is borne out by inscriptive evidence on the Indian mainland that may date from the middle of the second century BCE.30 Inscriptive evidence of a similar date also bears independent witness to the classification of early Buddhist literature into 'three baskets'.31 However, when we take into account the literary evidence of the Buddhist tradition as a whole it becomes quite clear that it is no easy matter to know what exactly went into those 'baskets'.

The oral nature of early Buddhist literature and the diffusion of Buddhism across the Indian subcontinent means that we must think in terms of different recensions of the same or similar material gradually coming to embody more or less distinct traditions. The Pāli canon is one such recension and no doubt represents the traditions of particular schools of reciters. It is the only

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25 This may need some qualification. While we seem to have commentaries to all texts we possess, and no commentaries for anything we do not possess, the commentaries do seem to quote as canonical a number of passages that cannot be traced in the canon as we have it (such passages are indicated by some editors of PTS editions, e.g. Ps II 11, 27, 35-6). How far these passages are untraced because they are actually not in the canon, and how far because individual editors have been unable to trace them is unclear. Cf. Mil Trsl I xv-xvi.
26 Dip XX 20-1; Mhv XXXIII 100-1; cf. K.R. Norman, Pāli Literature, Wiesbaden, 1983, pp. 10-1.
27 This speaks of Aśoka's dhamma-vijaya as far as Tambaparni (see J. Bloch, Les Inscriptions d'Aśoka, Paris, 1955, pp. 129-30), but R. Thapar (Aśoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, Oxford, 1961, pp. 48-9) prefers to see any Buddhist 'missions' as distinct from Aśoka's own 'conquest by dhamma'.
29 On the system of bhānakas in general see Norman, PL, pp. 8-9.
31 Id., p. 165.
recension of the early Tripiṭaka that survives complete in an Indic language. Exactly how many other distinct recensions and traditions there were we do not know. Our knowledge of them must be built up piecemeal: on the basis of isolated texts and fragments of texts that happen to have survived in Buddhist Sanskrit and other Middle Indo-Aryan dialects; on the basis of Chinese and Tibetan translations; on the basis of quotations from Sūtra and the traditions about the contents of different recensions that can be gleaned from later exegetical works. Although the evidence is incomplete when we think in terms of what might have survived, it does seem that we have enough to come to certain conclusions.

The work of detailed comparison and assessment of even this evidence is hardly complete, but it is evident that among the various ancient traditions and schools of Buddhism there appears to be a general agreement concerning the nature and core contents of the Vinaya- and Sūtra-piṭakas; concerning the Abhidharma-piṭaka considerable divergence is observable. With reference to the Sūtra-piṭaka all schools, as far as we can tell, appear to have agreed upon the primacy of the four great nikāyas (collections) or āgamas (traditions). Two of these classify texts according to their length—long (digha/ dīrgha) or middling (majjhima/madhyaṃa); the third according to topic (saṃyutta/samyukta), and the fourth by a system of numerical progression (āṅguttara/ekottarika) from one to eleven based on the number of points or items

32 The traditional number of schools in the texts is eighteen, but collation of all the available sources gives rather more than this (see A. Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Paris, 1955). It is not necessary that each one of these formed a distinct school with its own peculiar and distinctive textual tradition. The Vinaya traditions might suggest that we should think in terms of six or more distinct canonical traditions apart from the Pāli; these are the Mahāsāṃghika, the Vātsiputriya/Sammatiya, the Sarvāstivāda, the Kāśyapiya, the Dharmaguptaka and the Mahīśāsaka; cf. E. Frauwallner, The Earliest Viniyoga and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature, Rome, 1956, pp. 7-10.

33 Lamotte, HBI, pp. 155-210; L. Renou and J. Filliozat, L’Inde classique: manuel des études indiennes (2 vols, Paris, 1947, 1953) II 361-6, 393-4, 417-9, 431-2. For an up to date indication of what is available in Indian languages see Norman, PL, passim.


35 Lamotte, HBI, pp. 165-97; Frauwallner, EVBBL; Anesaki, op. cit.; Akanuma, op. cit.

36 Lamotte, HBI, pp. 197-210; Norman, PL, pp. 95-8, 107.

37 In what follows I follow the practice of using the term nikāya to refer to Pāli sources, and the term āgama to refer to non-Pāli sources and Chinese translations in particular. This is in some respects simply a matter of practical convenience since the term āgama is not unknown to Pāli sources, and the term nikāya not unknown to non-Pāli sources; see the relevant entries in PED, CPD, BHSD.
discussed in a given text. As far as the contents of these four primary
collections of *sūtras* are concerned, all the indications are that there was a
remarkable consensus and degree of correspondence among the various recen-
sions. The following statement made by Étienne Lamotte with reference to the
comparison of the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese translations of the Āgamas is
of some importance:

Cependant, exception faite pour les interpolations mahāyānistes de l'Ekottara,
interpolations aisément décelables, les variations en question n'affectent guère que
le mode d'expression ou la disposition des matières. Le fonds doctrinal commun
aux āgama et aux nikāya est remarquablement uniforme. Conservés et transmis
par les écoles, les sūtra ne constituent pas autant des documents d'école, mais
l'héritage commun à toutes les sectes ... Tout essai de reconstruction d'un
bouddhisme «précanonique» s'écartant du consensus entre āgama et nikāya ne
peut aboutir qu'à des hypothèses subjectives.\(^{38}\)

There appears to have been both some agreement and some disagreement
among the schools concerning a number of other 'lesser' (khuddaka/kṣudraka)
texts associated with the *Sūtra-piṭaka*.\(^{39}\)

All this suggests a preliminary relative chronology for our sources. We have
good reasons, then, for taking as our earliest sources for the study of
Buddhism the *Vinaya-piṭaka* texts and the four primary Nikāyas or Āgamas
along with certain other smaller texts associated with them; the *Abhidharma-
piṭaka* literature and again certain other canonical texts, such as the *Patisam-
hidāmagga* and *Nidēsa* in the Pāli tradition,\(^{40}\) need to be seen as somewhat
later—exactly how much later is not clear.

In trying to come to a proper assessment of early Buddhist thought the Pāli
material has certain advantages over other sources for two simple but incon-
clusive reasons. In the first place it seems to represent a relatively full recension
of the appropriate material—certainly fuller than anything else we possess.
This makes the use of the Pāli canon a matter of practical convenience, and
means that for the most part in assessing a particular passage we do not have
to speculate about what might have been said elsewhere in the canon. Second-
ly, it is written in a Middle Indo-Aryan language that shows only limited signs
of sanskritization.\(^{41}\) Certainly it appears that the earliest Buddhist tradition
preferred a Middle Indo-Aryan vernacular as its medium and only gradually
gave way to the progressive sanskritization that is a feature of most Buddhist
texts in an Indian language that have come down to us apart from the Pāli
tradition. Yet we do not appear to have any reason for regarding the Middle
Indo-Aryan of the Pāli canon as a more authentic vehicle for the Buddhist
tradition than any other comparable Middle Indo-Aryan dialect; the precise

38 Lamotte, *HBI*, p. 171
39 É. Lamotte, 'Problems concerning the Minor Canonical Texts' in *Buddhist Studies in Honour
40 Cf. Norman, *PL*, pp. 84-9
nature of the language the Buddha might have used remains obscure. Yet the Pāli tradition’s reluctance to sanskritize may be indicative of a more general conservatism. If we are right in thinking that the Pāli Nikāyas were closed rather earlier than the Chinese Āgamas, then we may be justified in regarding the Pāli tradition as among the more conservative of early Buddhist traditions. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Pāli canon cannot simply be taken as the last authority on questions of early Buddhism; quite clearly the traditions found in other sources may be of a similar or even earlier date.

A number of attempts have been made at providing a detailed chronology of the evolution of the Pāli Nikāyas. While they have certainly provided useful insights into the texts, they have not really succeeded in their aim of satisfactorily distinguishing earlier material from later with any degree of certainty. Many of the criteria employed by Winternitz, Law and Pande only work if one is already prejudiced as to the nature of early Buddhism. If one feels at the outset that the Buddha, being, as it were, a reasonable sort of chap, taught a simple ethical doctrine uncluttered by myth, legend and magic, then it is a fairly straightforward matter to stratify the Nikāyas accordingly. But in fact, given what is known of Indian thought from, say, the early Upaniṣads, there is no a priori reason why the earliest Buddhist thought should not have contained mythical, magical or ‘unscientific’ elements, or—if we need to go back one stage further—why the Buddha himself should not have employed such elements in his own teaching. In fact there seems every reason to suppose that he would have. To press the point home in a slightly different way, the positivist minded nineteenth or twentieth century scholar has no historical grounds for supposing that the Buddha did not genuinely believe that he had once been the great king Mahāsudassana; all he can do, if he happens to find some of the things put into the mouth of the Buddha more congenial to his way of thinking, is hope that he did not.

It is perhaps worth pursuing this a little further by way of concrete example. The Sakkapāṇha-sutta depicts the Buddha in conversation with the deva

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42 For a selection of articles indicating the current state of research on this and related matters see The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition, ed. H. Bechert, Göttingen, 1980.
43 M. Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, Volume II, Calcutta, 1933; B.C. Law, History of Pāli Literature, 2 vols., London, 1933; G.C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, Allahabad, 1957. These works by Winternitz, Law and Pande represent more or less systematic and comprehensive attempts at chronological stratification of the Nikāya corpus largely based on criteria internal to the Pāli texts. More recently a number of scholars have attempted a systematic study of the chronological evolution of specific texts using Pāli, Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan parallels; see especially works by Barea and Meisig cited in note 34 above. Recent works by J. Bronkhorst, L. Schmithausen and T. Vetter (see works by these authors cited in the bibliography below) also argue, in a more general way, that it is possible to distinguish with some degree of certainty between earlier and later stages of the development of certain doctrines expounded in the Nikāyas; I shall have occasion to refer to their work later in the main body of my study.
44 For a general critique of the method see L.S. Cousins' comments in Dhammapala, BSHS, p. 67. R.F. Gombrich, ‘Recovering the Buddha’s Message’ (The Buddhist Forum, Volume 1, Seminar Papers 1987-88, ed. T. Skorupski, London, 1990, pp. 5-20) is also critical of some of the principles employed in the chronological stratification of the Pāli texts.
45 D II 196: aham tena samayena rājā Mahāsudassano ahosim.
46 D II 276-89.
Sakka—magical, mythical and 'unscientific' stuff surely. Yet in the *Samyutta-nikāya* the *sutta* is mentioned by name which is equally surely an indication that it is early. Again, there seem to be quite good reasons for thinking that some mythological elements are indeed early. The notion of the universal monarch (*cakra-vartin*) common to Buddhist, Jaina and brahmanical sources would seem to be a case in point. It seems likely that such a notion was inherited from a common source not specifically Buddhist or Jaina. This, at any rate, is what seems to have happened in the case of certain *jātaka* stories and verses. In other words, it is reasonable to think of a common stock of material, some of which was undoubtedly mythological in character, that was taken over, reworked and developed by both the Buddhist and Jaina tradition. Indeed this is quite clearly what has happened in the case of Buddhist cosmology. Finally, K.R. Norman refers to verses in *ārya* metre, usually taken as a sure sign of earliness, which on the other hand exhibit features such as a developed Buddha-legend that are sometimes regarded as indicative of lateness. Once more we have no real reason for thinking that the so-called sign of lateness is such at all. All this is not to deny that certain mythical features—especially those associated with 'buddhology'—become more marked in the course of the history of Buddhist literature. It is merely to point out that we in fact have no historical grounds for supposing that this process could only have begun after the death of the historical Buddha. It may in some respects even antedate him.

Some of these considerations must apply to the thought world of the Nikāyas as a whole. It seems unlikely that what we call 'Buddhist' thought should be conceived of as beginning with a *tabula rasa* at the moment of the Buddha's awakening. All the indications are that Buddhism must be understood as growing out of an existing tradition. By the time of the Buddha the *śramaṇa* (striver) or *parivṛṭaka* (wanderer) tradition may well have been several centuries old. Just how much the Buddhist tradition owes to it we cannot know. Some idea of a common yogic heritage might be formed on the basis of a detailed comparison with the Upaniṣads, Jaina sources and the *Yoga-sūtras*, but it would probably be difficult to come to definite conclusions. What is clear, however, is that we cannot assume that the earliest forms of Buddhist thought must necessarily exhibit the traits of simplicity and lack of

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47 S III 13.  
INTRODUCTION

sophistication; the earliest portions of the Nikāyas or Āgamas may already represent a quite developed synthesis of the early Indian yogic tradition.

The other great problem that needs to be addressed in any attempt to stratify the Nikāyas into early and late is the question of the oral nature of the literature. Since Pande published what is probably the most thoroughgoing attempt at a chronological stratification of the Nikāya material in 1957 a considerable amount of research has been devoted to the nature of oral literature. This research has drawn attention to the way in which an oral literature is built up around and by means of stock formulaic phrases and passages. Certainly this feature is much in evidence in the Pāli canon. Once we have recognized such a characteristic it is obvious that important criteria of stratification, such as Pande's principle of interpolation, become in many instances almost impossible to use. Again, those who have espoused the cause of chronological stratification have tended to regard the proliferation of lists (mātikā) in the texts as a criterion pointing towards the lateness of a text. While it may be correct that the number and variety of lists tended to increase as time went on, we are probably once more faced with a feature that is at the same time very old. The use of lists is an integral part of the literature and directly related to its oral nature. The lists can perhaps be seen as a counterpart in a prose oral literature to the metrical formulas in a verse literature. Both provide a vehicle for the reciter and inform the literature with a structure and, in the case of the lists, what is almost a system of cross-referencing that prevents the reciter from losing his way. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that in general attempts at stratification have suffered from envisaging the problem too much in the terms of a tradition of fixed literary texts.

The difficulties associated with the assessment of the earliest phase of Buddhist literature as represented by the Vinaya, Nikāyas and Āgamas do not automatically disappear when it comes to the later phases of Buddhist literature. The second broad phase of Buddhist literature can be represented by the canonical Abhidharma literature and, in the field of Pāli literature, such texts as the Paṭisambhidāmāgga and Niddesa, and also, perhaps, by such para-canonical texts as the Paṭakopadesa, Netippakaraṇa and Milindapaṇha. It may be quite clear that the Nikāyas and Āgamas represent the common heritage of early Buddhism; it is equally clear that while these later works contain much that is apparently new and distinctive to a particular tradition, they also contain a certain amount that appears new yet at the same time is manifestly

54 According to Pande (op. cit., pp. 33-5) many suttas reveal 'patchwork'; but surely all we are doing here is identifying the basic formulaic units of the tradition and then seeing them being fitted together.  
57 Chinese versions of Mil suggest that books I-III are part of the common Buddhist heritage; books IV-VII were probably added in Ceylon (Lamotte, HBI, p. 465).
still part of the common heritage. To anticipate the future course of this study, a simple example is provided by the expression ‘thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dharmā’. This complete expression is not met with in the Pāli canon at all; we have either the numerically non-committal plural bodhi-pakkhiyā dharmā or the expression ‘seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dharmā’.

Even the commentary embedded in the text of the Vibhaṅga, the second book of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, seems not to know the number thirty-seven and prefers to understand bodhi-pakkhiyā dharmā as simply referring to the seven factors of awakening (bojjhāṅga). Yet the expression ‘thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dharmā/bodhi-pāksikā dharmāḥ’, seems common to all traditions of Buddhism. We find it in the Petakopadesa, the Milindapañha and Pāli commentaries; in the prajñā-pāramitā literature, Mahāyāna sūtras and the Abhidharma traditions of the Sarvāstivādins. The point is that we cannot simply regard the transition from Nikāya or Āgama to Abhidharma as a convenient cut-off point in the history of Buddhist literature; we cannot simply say that what precedes the Abhidharma literature is common heritage and early, and that everything else is the peculiar development of a particular tradition and later.

Even when we come to the later commentarial and exegetical literature of the different schools, the position is by no means cut and dried. The Pāli tradition, for example, understands its commentaries not as the original compositions of the authors whose names appear in the colophons but rather as preserving a traditional exegesis of the canon that goes back hundreds of years and which ultimately has a north Indian provenance. There are good reasons for thinking that this transition has some basis in fact. Some of the material preserved in the commentaries may well be very old and may represent traditions of exegesis that are again the common heritage of the Buddhist tradition as a whole rather than the peculiar traditions of a school.

Two rather general points seems to follow from this: first, that certain elements in apparently later literature may in some cases represent very early traditions—traditions that antedate the divisions in the Samgha; secondly, that while it is apparent that there were divisions in the Samgha, it seems that the various distinct traditions must have remained in communion with each other,
and that geographical dispersal as much as doctrinal divergence tended towards the formation of particular traditions. Our difficulties here are compounded by the fact that the various traditions concerning the first Buddhist councils and splits in the Samgha are full of problems. These have hardly been finally resolved, despite the undoubted scholarship that has been devoted to them.62 The lack of any hard dates for the Buddha, for the texts and for the splits in the Samgha means that we are left with only the vaguest of ideas concerning the timescale for the evolution and development of early Buddhist thought and literature.

In this sea of uncertainty the one island of relatively hard facts is formed by Aśoka’s edicts. Their references to various rulers in the wider Hellenic world beyond the Indian subcontinent allow Aśoka’s accession to be dated with some accuracy to around 265 BCE,63 give or take, say, five years. They would also seem to indicate that by this time Buddhism represented a movement of some significance, that the Samgha was becoming widely dispersed across the subcontinent, and that division within the Samgha was by this time a real issue—a matter of public concern and not just of interest to the Samgha itself.64 The Buddhist discourses (dhamma-pāliyānī) referred to in the Bhārā edict65 seem to correspond to particular texts in the Pāli canon,66 and it seems reasonable to assume that by the time of Aśoka at least the Vinaya and Nikāyas or Āgamas must have existed in a form that would be readily recognizable to us. If we do not make this assumption it is difficult to understand how they come to make no allusion to Aśoka, and to represent the common heritage of the Buddhist tradition in quite the way they do.

What conclusions should one draw from this brief survey of what we know of the early history of Buddhist literature? If the task one has set oneself is broadly speaking the exposition of Buddhist thought according to the traditional literary sources, then clearly one needs to maintain some kind of awareness of the historical dimension of that literature. In practical terms this entails some kind of chronological stratification. Even if this were a more straightforward matter than it is, one would still need to ensure that any exposition of Buddhist thought was based on a representative and meaningful selection from the literary tradition. In other words, even if we think we know that certain passages and certain suttas are definitely older than certain others, it would be unsound simply to isolate these. Why? Because we do not know whether the Buddhist tradition ever regarded precisely these texts as embodying a proper or meaningful expression of ‘Buddhism’. In general, if the contemporary scholar seeks to make sense of the earliest Buddhist thought

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63 The thirteenth rock edict; see Bloch, op. cit., pp. 129-30.
64 The so-called ‘schism’ edict, see Bloch, op. cit., pp. 152-3.
65 See Bloch, op. cit., pp. 154-5.
66 Lamotte, *HBI*, pp. 256-8. Titles of suttas seem to have been very secondary and not always fixed; see D I 46; Mil Trsl xvi; M Trsl I xvi; Ancesaki, op. cit., passim.
embodied in the Nikāyas, he would be wise to take heed of the sense the subsequent tradition has already made of the earliest tradition.

Thus in my approach to the Nikāya material I have endeavoured to take seriously what might be called an Abhidhamma point of view. This does not mean, I hope, that the viewpoint of the Abhidhamma-pitaka is crudely pushed back and imposed unhistorically on the thought-world of the Nikāyas. It means rather that the concerns of the Abhidhamma are taken as real concerns that arise directly out of the concerns of the Nikāyas. Clearly there is a danger of introducing anachronisms into the thought-world of the Nikāyas, but I think this can be to some extent guarded against by having an eye for the consensus of the wider Buddhist tradition. Obviously if someone wished to press the charge of unhistorically interpreting the Nikāyas in the light of the later tradition it would not always be easy to prove innocence. But I would point out in my defence that we are not simply interested in history here; we are concerned also to come to grips with what actually interested the minds of those who compiled the literature. In such circumstances and in the light of what is really known with any certainty about the history of early Buddhist literature, I suggest that the burden of proof lies with those who might wish to say that the subsequent tradition has got it fundamentally wrong. However, in order to do so they would first have to demonstrate that they had properly appreciated what the subsequent tradition—the abhidhammikas and commentators—has to say, and this, the world of Buddhist scholarship is not yet, I think, in a position to do.67

3. What does the Buddhism of the Nikāyas teach?

The processes involved in understanding an ancient literary text68 can be considered by way of three logically distinct stages. First we need to engage in textual criticism in order to get as close as possible to the original text of the author or authors. Next we need to engage in philological analysis; we need to be sure that we have as complete a knowledge as possible of the language in which the text is written. Finally we can attempt to consider what might have been in the mind of the author or authors and ask whether we have properly understood and appreciated what the author or authors wanted to communicate. From what I have already said in the previous section it is apparent that the carrying out of these three tasks in the case of Pāli literature is no straightforward matter. Apart from difficulties connected with the Pāli manu-

67 Cf. Professor Gombrich's comments (The Buddhist Forum, Volume I, Seminar Papers 1987-88, ed. T. Skorupski, London, 1990, p. 11): '[S]ome of my colleagues are finding inconsistencies in the canonical texts which they assert to be such without telling us how the Buddhist tradition itself regards the texts as consistent—as if that were not important. My own view is not, I repeat, that we have to accept the Buddhist tradition uncritically, but that if it interprets texts as coherent, that interpretation deserves the most serious consideration.'

script tradition, when we are dealing with a literature that has been composed orally and evolved orally what exactly do we mean by the original text of the author or authors? If, in the case of the Nikāyas, we take as our original text the text as it was written down possibly in the first century BCE, then we must acknowledge that this is hardly the text of the authors. On the other hand, what Ānanda might have recited at the first Buddhist council is rather too far back in the realms of conjecture and hypothesis for us to realistically conceive of it as our original. The processes by which the ‘text’ of the Nikāyas evolved also complicate the philological analysis. When we come to the point of appreciating what the author or authors of the texts actually wanted to say, we are confronted with the full force of the question of authorship.

The considerations I outlined in the previous section suggest that in addressing the question of what the Nikāyas teach, we should not primarily conceive of ourselves as trying to answer the question of what the historical Buddha was trying to say. It is within the realms of possibility, of course, that the Nikāyas, either as a whole or in part, represent quite accurately what the historical Buddha actually said, but we really have no means of knowing with any certainty whether this is so or which parts are the more authentic and which the less. In such circumstances it seems more realistic and safer to think of the Nikāyas as having a collective authorship. This is to some extent reflected in what the texts themselves tell us. Some suttas are represented as the work of individual disciples, while the whole, the tradition tells us, is the product of what might be seen as the editorial work of Ānanda and the subsequent schools of bhānakas who no doubt improvised, added and embellished as they saw fit. What we must ask, then, is what the Nikāya texts meant to those who compiled and used them probably sometime between the beginning of the fourth century BCE and the middle of the third century BCE.

Even if the problems of authorship, and of textual and philological analysis were less complicated than they are, the task facing the modern exegete would be no easy one. To anyone who has read more than a few pages of the Nikāyas it must be apparent that the Nikāyas are not immediately self-explanatory. Much is taken for granted and left unexplained. The repeated use of stock phrases and descriptions results in a rather stylized literary form that can be laconic and cryptic. The rationality and modernity of some of the sentiments that seem to find expression in the Nikāyas have often been emphasized at the expense of the apparent strangeness—to the modern mind—of much of the Nikāya thought-world. And so, as I have already pointed out, in seeking to come to know what sparked the imagination of those who compiled the Nikāyas we cannot afford to ignore the clues afforded by the wider Buddhist tradition. More particularly, in practice one cannot entirely separate the question of what the Nikāyas taught from the question of what the Abhidhamma and commentaries taught.

But how does one begin to answer the question: ‘What does the Buddhism of the Nikāyas teach?’ One way is to ask why the Nikāyas were written at all. Why do they regard what they have to say as significant? What is their raison d’être? The answer is surely not hard to find. The Nikāyas understand themselves as pointing towards the solution of a problem. This problem is stated in the texts in a variety of ways. Suffering, the ultimately unsatisfactory nature of life; dukkha (the first of the noble truths) is perhaps the most familiar. A rather more informal statement of the matter can perhaps better bring out what dukkha is to the Nikāyas: the problem is that many people find in life a problem. But the significance of even this basic premise of the Nikāya thought-world is, I think, sometimes misconstrued or not adequately set forth. For the Nikāyas are not seeking to persuade a world of otherwise perfectly content beings that life is in fact unpleasant; rather they address something that is, as the Nikāyas see it, universally found to exist and will sooner or later confront us all. In other words, understanding the first noble truth involves not so much the revelation that dukkha exists, as the realization of what dukkha is, or the knowledge of the true nature of dukkha. In their own terms, the Nikāyas teach but two things: dukkha and the cessation of dukkha. In other words, they postulate a situation where there is a problem and a situation where there is no longer a problem, and are concerned with the processes and means involved in passing from the former to the latter. If this is the Nikāyas’ ultimate concern, then everything in them might be viewed as at least intended to be subordinate to that aim.

In the Nikāyas the processes and means that bring about the cessation of dukkha are conceived of primarily in terms of spiritual practice and development. What in particular seems to interest the compilers of the Nikāyas is the nature of spiritual practice and development, how spiritual practice affects spiritual development, how what one does, says and thinks might be related to progress towards the cessation of dukkha. In other words, we might say that Buddhist thought is about the Buddhist path—a path that is seen as leading gradually away from dukkha towards its cessation, and as culminating in the awakening from a restless and troubled sleep.

Although the notion of the path is central to Buddhist thought, it seems to be a fact that the scholarly world has been rather slow in coming forth with attempts at straightforward exposition of the notion of the spiritual path and practice especially as presented in the Pāli Nikāyas and Abhidhamma. Indeed a plain and descriptive scholarly account of just what the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma have to say on so many of the fundamental topics of ancient Buddhism is simply not to be found. In part there are no doubt good reasons for this. Buddhist studies represents a new field with relatively few workers. Those who devoted their energies to the exposition of the Pāli sources initially felt that in them they had the means of rediscovering an original unadulterated

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70 Terms such as bhāvanā (bringing into being), brahma-cārīya (the holy life), magga (path), paṭipadā (way) and yoga (striving) are all terms which seem to entail a notion that is loosely covered by the English 'spiritual practice'.
Buddhism. Inspired by the fashions and concerns of New Testament scholarship they tended to paint a picture of Nikāya Buddhism as beginning with a simple ethical doctrine that was gradually distorted by the Buddhist 'church' and complicated by the pedantry of the abhidhammika 'scholastics'. This heritage has not been entirely shaken off and still can colour our attitude to the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma, despite the fact that it is based on a quite arbitrary selection and reading of the sources.

Certainly the last twenty-five years have seen the publication of an increasing number of monographs concerned with Buddhist thought primarily as revealed in the Pāli sources. These represent valuable and useful contributions to our appreciation of the Nikāyas, and in the main approach their subject with sensitivity and open mindedness. However, by far the majority gravitate towards those aspects of the Nikāya thought-world that immediately capture the imagination of the mind nurtured in the traditions of modern western philosophy: conditioned arising (paticca-samuppāda), the absence of a substantial self (anattā), and nibbāna. In these scholars have seen reflections of some of the classic preoccupations of western philosophy such as causality, the logical contradictions of difference and identity involved in the notion of change, the concept of the person and personal identity, and the metaphysics of the absolute. I do not wish to suggest that one is mistaken in seeing such reflections, but only that reflections can be misleading. The point is that in Buddhist thought discussion of paticca-samuppāda, anattā and nibbāna is not pursued as an end in itself but subordinated to the notion of the spiritual path, which is hardly true of the discussion of causality, change and metaphysics in western thought. The danger is that we rather too hastily translate the Nikāyas into terms that are more congenial to us without having first understood the original language.

Those looking for a scholarly account of the Buddhist path as understood in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma are still almost entirely dependent on the summary accounts contained in general works on Buddhism and Buddhist meditation. Apart from their introductory character many of the former are rather dated, while the latter tend to rely heavily on the classic systematization of the Visuddhimagga, and give little indication of what is actually contained in the canonical sources. A proper examination of the notion of the Buddhist path and spiritual practice as contained in the Nikāyas and canonical Abhidhamma texts is thus overdue. It is in the hope of contributing to this examination that the present study is undertaken.

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72 Even as well considered a work as Collins' *Selfless Persons* shows traces of it. Chapter 8, which considers the Abhidhamma theory of momentariness, opens with a quotation from the *Oxford English Dictionary*: 'Scholasticism. 2. Servile adherence to the methods and teaching of the schools; narrow or unenlightened insistence on traditional doctrines and forms of exposition.' P. Masefield's *Divine Revelation in Pāli Buddhism* (Colombo, 1986) is a recent attempt to show how the Abhidhamma and commentaries basically misrepresent the Nikāyas: 'the scholastic analysis of the Abhidhamma' is the province of the 'puthujjana monk' (as opposed to the 'sāvaka monk') who has 'lost contact with the Dhamma as the Deathless' (op. cit., p. 162).
But how and where should one begin? I have suggested that in a sense all Buddhist thought is about the Buddhist path, but plainly we do not have in the Nikāyas and canonical Abhidhamma a single systematic account in the manner of later manuals such as the *Visuddhimagga*. We are faced not so much with a single finished canvas as with a bewildering array of sketches and detailed studies which it is impossible to take in at once. Their subject is seen from different angles and in various aspects; it is viewed from near and afar. Our problem is how to arrange the different pictures in order to begin to see how they might relate to each other. In other words, we need a method of sorting and arranging our sources that does not rely simply on what catches our eye, or dissolve into a rather arbitrary scheme of chronological stratification. One option is to follow the lead given in the literature itself.

I have already drawn attention to a characteristic feature of canonical Buddhist literature, namely the way it likes to formulate teachings by way of lists. Two such lists that immediately spring to mind are the four noble truths (*ariya-sacca*) and the noble eight-factored path (*ariyo atthangiko maggo*). But these are only two amongst literally hundreds of similar lists covering the whole range of the theory and practice of ancient Buddhism. It may be initially tempting to discuss these lists as a quaint but tedious vestige of an oral culture which forms something of an obstacle to our understanding of the real essentials of Buddhist thought. Yet they are so fundamental to the literature that it seems we must resist the temptation. Indeed, it is obvious that many Nikāya discourses can be readily resolved into an elaboration of one or more of these lists. In fact this is precisely the source of our familiarity with the noble eight-factored path and the four noble truths—these two lists happen to form the basis of what the tradition tells us was the Buddha's first discourse. Examples of less familiar combinations of lists that are no less the bases for complete descriptions of the path are not hard to find.

Clearly the collation of these lists in order to provide more complete yet succinct compendia of the full range of Buddhist teaching was a practice undertaken quite early on in the history of Buddhist literature. Two important and relatively early examples of such collations are the *Samgiti*- and *Dasuttara-suttas*. Furthermore, two of the great Nikāyas, the *Samyutta- and Ānguttara-nikāyas*, are really in essence only more ambitious extended improvisations on the fundamental Nikāya lists. The former takes a particular list and attempts to assemble all the significant treatments and discussions of it from the available stock of material, while the latter, by means of a system of numerical progression from one to eleven, arranges its material according to the number of items or divisions involved. As soon as one begins to peruse the *Samyutta- and Ānguttara-nikāyas* it is quite obvious that they do not provide a uniform and even treatment of their material, but instead handle it in a fashion that enhances particular themes and emphases. These two collections thus seem to

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73 How many lists there are in the Nikāyas would be difficult to say; I counted 229 in the *Samgiti-sutta*.
74 E.g. the *Cetokhila-sutta* (M I 101-4) resolves into the five ceto-khilas, five vinibandhas, and four iddhi-pādas.
provide a convenient basis on which to begin to gauge what most interested their compilers at what is a relatively early point in the history of Buddhist thought. What then does an initial review of the contents of the *Samyutta-nikāya* reveal?

The first major division (*vagga*) is entitled ‘accompanied by verses’ (*sagāthā*) which seems to mean precisely what it says. It is a miscellaneous collection of verses each of which is usually associated with a prose piece in the normal Sutta format. The next *vagga* is entitled ‘connections’ (*nīdana*) and consists of ten groups (*samyutta*) of suttas. Each of these groups is devoted to a particular theme. However, about one half of the whole is taken up by just one *samyutta*, namely the *nīdana-samyutta*. This is a collection devoted to the exposition of the twelve—in all—‘connections’ or ‘links’ that constitute the theory of causation or, more properly, conditioned arising (*paticca-samuppāda*). The third *vagga* is entitled ‘aggregates’ (*khandha*). There are thirteen *samyuttas* in all, but as with the *nīdana-vagga* one dominates the rest. This time over half the *vagga* is devoted to an exposition of the five aggregates or groups into which the sum total of conditioned existence can be resolved. The fourth *vagga*, entitled ‘six spheres’ (*salāyatana*), contains ten *samyuttas*. The *samyutta* of the title is concerned with an analysis of the way in which the whole of experience is potentially encompassed by the six spheres of sense (the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind); once more it takes up around half the *vagga*.

The arrangement of the fifth and final *vagga* is slightly different. It is entitled simply the ‘great division’ (*mahā-vagga*) and consists of twelve *samyuttas*. The *mahā-vagga* is probably the largest of the five, and the treatment of the component *samyuttas* is rather more even than in the other *vaggas*. This becomes especially clear when the extensive abridgements (*peyyāla*) of the *mahā-vagga* are taken into account. The names of the twelve *samyuttas* are as follows: ‘path’ (*magga*), ‘factors of awakening’ (*bojjhanga*), ‘establishments of mindfulness’ (*satipaṭṭhāna*), ‘faculties’ (*indriya*), ‘right endeavours’ (*sammā-paadhāna*), ‘powers’ (*bala*), ‘bases of success’ (*iddhi-pāda*), ‘Anuruddha’, ‘meditation’ (*jhana*), ‘in-breathing and out-breathing’ (*ānāpāna*), ‘stream attainment’ (*sotāpatti*) and ‘truths’ (*sacca*). An immediate point of interest is that the first seven *samyuttas* reflect a grouping that is found in a number of Nikāya passages in the following sequence: four *satipaṭṭhānas*, four *sammā-paadhānas*, four *iddhi-pādas*, five *indriyas*, five *bala*, seven *bojjhāngas*, the noble eight-factoried *magga* (these are hereafter referred to collectively as ‘the seven sets’). Furthermore, in post-canonical Pāli literature this composite list is given the collective designation ‘thirty-seven dhammas that contribute to awakening (*bodhi-pakkhiyd dhamma*)’. I referred to this expression above and noted that precisely the same designation (thirty-seven *bodhi-pāksikā dharmāḥ*) is found in a variety of Buddhist Sanskrit sources.

In general and as far as can be known, other recensions of the *samyukta* type seem to have followed a similar pattern to the one followed by the Pāli,

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75 But cf. L.Feer at S II vii-xi on the difficulties in determining the precise extent of some *samyuttas*. 
giving weight to the same themes: conditioned arising, the aggregates, the sense spheres and the seven sets.76 These same themes continue to feature prominently in the later literature, both Pāli and non-Pāli. Certainly we have here the basic framework of contents for a number of important canonical Abhidharma works such as the Vibhaṅga, Dhātukathā (of the Theravāda) and the Dhammasaṅkhanda (of the Sarvāstivāda),77 while later works and manuals witness in a variety of ways to the continuing influence of what might be called the basic samyukta table of contents.

Turning now to the Āṅguttara-nikāya, when we look under the appropriate numerical headings for those lists that are so clearly singled out in the Samyutta-nikāya we find that they hardly feature at all and in some cases are simply not there. The obvious reason for this is because they are treated so fully in the Samyutta-nikāya; the Āṅguttara-nikāya's method and purpose is rather different. On closer inspection all the principal samyutta headings are in fact to be found in the Āṅguttara-nikāya, but they feature, as it were, secondarily. While they are generally not found as primary lists under the appropriate numerical headings, they do occur in the course of the exposition of other material.78

Thus it seems that the samyutta and āṅguttara systems are essentially complementary; although there is some overlap, there is not extensive repetition. It seems reasonable to understand the samyutta method as intended to bring to the fore what were felt to be the more fundamental themes of ancient Buddhist thought. In that case it represents what might be viewed as a fairly coarse net being drawn through the pool of available material. The āṅguttara method in contrast represents a somewhat finer net. With its system of eleven numerical sections it is able to catch what has slipped through the samyutta net, and incidentally anything that has overflowed from it when it was drawn from the pool. So we have in the Samyutta-nikāya especially a simple means of access to the themes and concerns of Buddhist thought at a relatively early date in its history. The lists that dominate the Samyutta-nikāya are of course scattered throughout the other Nikāyas, but the samyutta arrangement delineates something that the dīgha, majjhima and āṅguttara arrangements leave rather less well defined. In so far as what is delineated by the samyutta arrangement also serves as a framework for parts of the Abhidhamma literature, we can perhaps use it as a bridge to cross from the suttas to the Abhidhamma.

4. The thirty-seven dhammas that contribute to awakening: preliminary remarks

I stated above that my concern in this study is to contribute to our understanding of the notion of spiritual practice and the path to awakening in

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77 Cf. Chapter 8.2.
the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma. If I am to follow the lead suggested by the arrangement of the Saṃyutta-nikāya, then it is the mahā-vagga or ‘great division’ that seems to offer the obvious point of departure. The reasons for this are six. (i) The mahā-vagga seems to be intended as something of a culmination in the samyutta scheme; this is suggested both by its title and by the position it occupies in the scheme. (ii) Some non-Pāli recensions of the material corresponding to what is contained in the mahā-vagga seem to have given it the title ‘path’ (mārga) or ‘noble path’ (ārya-mārga).79 (iii) The mahā-vagga opens with the collection of suttas on the eight-factored path (magga-samyutta). (iv) The greater part of the mahā-vagga concerns a group of seven sets that is found elsewhere in the Nikāyas in a sequence culminating in the noble eight-factored path. (v) The same stock sequence is taken up in a variety of later sources, both Pāli and non-Pāli, and given the name ‘thirty-seven dharmas that contribute to awakening’. (vi) The Abhidharma traditions of both the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins understand these same thirty-seven dharmas as in some sense equivalent to the ‘path’ (mārga).

This last point requires a little elaboration. For the moment I am content to follow what Buddhaghosa says in the Visuddhimagga for the Theravādins, and for the Sarvāstivādins what Vasubandhu says in the Abhidharmakośa. According to Buddhaghosa, then, all thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā are found in a single moment of consciousness (eka-citta) at the time of the arising of the four knowledges concerned with the paths to stream-attainment, once-return, non-return and arahant-ship respectively.80 According to Vasubandhu the path (mārga) can be termed ‘that which contributes to awakening’ (bodhi-pāksīka); this consists of the thirty-seven dharmas.81 He then goes on to indicate how the classic sequence of the seven sets describes the successive stages of the complete path. We thus have two basic emphases. The first sees the thirty-seven dharmas collectively as a description of the final culmination of the path to awakening; the second sees the thirty-seven collectively as a description of the successive stages of the path. For the time being this will suffice, but I shall need to return to this difference in approach in chapter ten below.

I am now in a position to indicate rather more definitely the course I wish this investigation to follow. Its specific starting point consists in three basic facts. First, details of the seven sets individually are scattered throughout the Nikāyas, but without any firm indication that the seven are associated. Secondly, in a number of Nikāya and Abhidhamma contexts the seven sets are found brought together in a bare sequence, yet without any definite statement as to why. Finally, in the post-canonical literature the seven sets receive the collective appellation ‘thirty-seven dharmas that contribute to awakening’ and

are in some sense explicitly identified with the path. What I want to do is trace the logic behind this state of affairs. What, if any, is the relationship between the treatment of the seven sets individually in the Nikāyas and their final collective designation as ‘thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā’ equivalent to the path to awakening? What I hope will emerge from this exercise is a clearer understanding not only of how early Buddhist thought actually conceived of the spiritual path, but also of the forces and concerns that governed the development of Buddhist thought.

My study of these questions falls into two main parts. In Part One I have tried to give a detailed account of how the seven sets are individually treated and defined. This account concentrates in the first place on the Nikāya material but is complemented by reference to both canonical Abhidhamma and post-canonical texts. The treatment of the seven sets individually in the Nikāyas must be regarded as constituting what is assumed in those contexts in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma literature where the seven sets are brought together. Thus Part One provides the necessary background to Part Two of the study in which I turn my attention to the seven sets collectively and as the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā.

My study is intended primarily as an enquiry into the Pāli sources. Accordingly I have endeavoured to take into account every passage in the Pāli canon (and also in the para-canonical Petakopadesa, Nettippakarana and Milindapañña) where the seven sets are discussed either individually or collectively. It has proved impractical to discuss explicitly all canonical passages dealing with the individual sets. What I have tried to do is to identify and draw attention to what is distinctive and characteristic in the treatment of each of the seven sets, while at the same time noting anything that seems peculiar or worthy of mention in its own right. In the case of passages concerning the seven sets collectively and the expression bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā I have been able to be more comprehensive.

It is perhaps useful at this stage to indicate very generally the sections of the Pāli canon most relevant to my study. Not surprisingly the Vinaya-pitaka, apart from one or two (still important) passages, is largely irrelevant. All four of the primary Nikāyas, on the other hand, provide a variety of texts dealing with the seven sets both individually and collectively. These are supplemented by various passages in certain Khuddaka-nikāya texts: the Khuddakapāṭha, the Dhammapada, the Udāna, the Itivuttaka, the Theragāthā the Therīgāthā and Apadāna. This material can be considered as more or less of a piece with the four primary Nikāyas. The remaining Khuddaka texts are largely irrelevant, the Niddesa and Paṭisambhidāmagga being two important exceptions. Both these texts refer regularly to the seven sets, but their material is best considered

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82 See below, Appendix (Summary of Textual References).
83 One should note here that the seven sets are absent from the Suttanipāta. This cannot be explained entirely by reference to the fact that Sn is largely in verse and therefore likely not always to conform to the set patterns of Sutta prose; after all references to the seven sets are found in Dhp, Th, Thī and Ap. However, as I shall point out, the basic terminology relevant to the seven sets is to be found in Sn.
alongside the canonical Abhidhamma material. Of the seven works of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, the Dhammasaṅgani and Vibhaṅga are the basic texts as far as the seven sets are concerned. While the Dhatukathā’s method encompasses the seven sets, it does so in a way that is largely self-contained and thus only incidentally impinges on the themes of the present study. The seven sets are absent from the Puggalapaññatti. The Kathavatthu contains a number of discussions that have some bearing on the seven sets, while the Yamaka deals directly only with the twenty-two indriyas. Finally, the Paṭṭhāna’s method, like the Dhatukathā’s, is largely self contained; while the seven sets do not feature explicitly, it would be misleading to regard them as entirely irrelevant, but I have been content to indicate in rather general terms how this is so. In the Petakopadesa, Nettipakarana and Milindapañha the seven sets and thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā feature sporadically.

My approach to the later literature has as a matter of practical necessity been rather less systematic. For the most part I have been content to concentrate on those āṭṭhakathā passages that bear directly on the relevant parts of the canonical literature. I have in addition made use of the Visuddhamagga and Visuttimagga. Throughout this study I have also made selective use of non-Pāli sources. These sources assist in two ways: either they confirm and underline something that is already apparent in the Pāli sources themselves, or by suggesting a different perspective they throw the Pāli sources into relief. As a result of this there emerges a rather clearer picture of just what is distinctive and peculiar in the Pāli tradition and of what constitutes the consensus of ancient Buddhist thought.

The importance of the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā has not, of course, escaped the notice of modern scholars. They frequently mention it in passing, and A.K. Warder, for example, has taken the seven sets as a basis for an account of the Buddha’s own teaching. The fullest treatments of the subject appear to be a chapter in Har Dayal’s The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature and an essay incorporated in Étienne Lamotte’s Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna. The former, although dated and seriously misleading in a number of respects, is still cited. The latter certainly provides a clear indication of the extent to which the seven sets and thirty-seven dhammas feature in Buddhist literature, but hardly amounts to a systematic study. In certain respects, though, I have taken Lamotte’s essay as something of a starting point.

84 A.K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, 2nd ed., Delhi, 1980, pp. 81-105.
85 London, 1932, pp. 80-164.
PART ONE

THE SEVEN SETS INDIVIDUALLY
CHAPTER ONE

THE ESTABLISHING OF MINDFULNESS

1. What are the satipaṭṭhānas?

The Nikāyas answer the question ‘what are the satipaṭṭhānas?’ with the following basic formula:


The four establishings of mindfulness. What four? Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu [i] with regard to the body dwells watching body; he is ardent, he comprehends clearly, is possessed of mindfulness and overcomes both desire for and discontent with the world. [ii] With regard to feelings he dwells watching feeling ... [iii] With regard to the mind he dwells watching mind ... [iv] With regard to dhammas he dwells watching dhamma; he is ardent, he comprehends clearly, is possessed of mindfulness and overcomes both desire for and discontent with the world.

Buddhist Sanskrit sources also speak of four smṛty-upasthānas, but I have been unable to find a Sanskrit version of precisely this bare formula in any source available to me. However, a fuller expanded version of the formula—to which a Pāli parallel also exists—appears to be fairly common in Buddhist Sanskrit sources.2 I shall return to this expanded version of the satipaṭṭhāna formula in section five of this chapter. A basic statement of the matter found in the Chinese Āgamas would seem to correspond to a Sanskrit form that enumerates the four smṛty-upasthānas as the smṛty-upasthāna of watching the body (kāyānapasyanā-smṛty-upasthāna), the smṛty-upasthāna of watching feeling (vedanānapasyanā-smṛty-upasthāna), the smṛty-upasthāna of watching mind (citte-pasyanā-smṛty-upasthāna), and the smṛty-upasthāna of watching dhamma(s) (dhammānapasyanā-smṛty-upasthāna).3

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1 D II 290 = M I 55 (Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna- and Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas); see also D III 58, 141, 221, 276; M I 339-40; S V 141-92 passim, 294-306 passim, A IV 457-8. For the basic formula with no explicit allusion to satipaṭṭhāna see D II 94-5, 100; M III 136, 251; S IV 211; A II 256; IV 300-1. Outside the four primary Nikāyas see Nidd I 9, 19, 244, 347, 399, 475; Paṭis I 41; II 15, 18; Vibh 105, 236.

2 For the record, I give the text as found in the Mūlasarvastivādin Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (Waldschmidt, MPS 200; parallel to D II 100): iha bhikṣur adhyātmanām kāye kāyānapasyī viharaty atāpi samprajñānā smṛtimā vinīyābhidyāya loke daurmanasyam bahirdhā kāye’dhyātma-bahirdhā kāye’dhyātma-bahirdhā vedanāsu bahirdhā vedanāsvadhyātma-bahirdhā vedanāsvadhyātmanām citte bahirdhā citte’dhyātma-bahirdhā citte’dhyātmanām dhammesu bahirdhā dhammesu adhyātma-bahirdhā dhammesu dhammānapasyī viharaty atāpi samprajñānā smṛtimā vinīyābhidyāya loke daurmanasyam. Cf. Lamotte, Traité, III 1121-2.

CHAPTER ONE

The Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna- and Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas of the Dīgha- and Majjhima-nikāyas respectively consist of a detailed and full exposition of what I have dubbed the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula. Before turning my attention to this, I wish to give some initial consideration to the elementary questions of what exactly a satipaṭṭhāna is, and what exactly sati is. I have translated satipaṭṭhāna above as 'establishing of mindfulness'. This seems to me to be a convenient and acceptable translation that conveys generally the import of the term satipaṭṭhāna in Pāli literature as a whole. However, 'establishing of mindfulness' is not an immediately intelligible English expression and requires further explanation. The term satipaṭṭhāna has been variously commented upon by scholars, yet their comments add up to a slightly confused presentation of the basic facts, and of the traditional exegesis of the Pāli commentaries. Basically there are two areas of confusion. First, should Buddhist Sanskrit smyty-upasthiinā be taken as a correct or incorrect back-formation of Middle Indo-Aryan satipaṭṭhāna? Secondly, does the term satipaṭṭhāna refer primarily to the body, feelings, mind and dhammas as the objects of observation and mindfulness (i.e. it is the body, etc. that are satipaṭṭhānas), or does it rather refer to the actual activity of observing the body, feelings, mind and dhammas (i.e. it is the act of watching that is a satipaṭṭhāna)?

To begin with the second point, it seems to me that the basic formula and the succinct statement of the smṛty-upasthānas as found in the Chinese Āgamas make it quite clear that in the first place the four satipaṭṭhānas are taken to consist in four varieties of anupassanā. In other words, the term satipaṭṭhāna refers primarily to the activity of observing or watching the body, feelings, mind and dhammas. The question is what is meant by terming these four varieties of anupassanā 'four satipaṭṭhānas’. What exactly does satipaṭṭhāna mean?

Prima facie the term satipaṭṭhāna might represent a combination of sati (= Skt smṛti) and paṭṭhāna (= Skt prasthāna). But this resolution of the compound is not without difficulties. In the first place, if we except satipaṭṭhāna, the term paṭṭhāna appears to be unknown to the Nikāyas; it becomes current only rather later in the canonical Abhidhamma literature; even here the term is rare and of slightly obscure significance. The Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin canons both contain Abhidharma works that employ the term in their titles, namely the Paṭṭhāna and Jñānapaṭṭhāna. In classical Sanskrit literature prasthā means basically ‘to stand forth’ and hence ‘to set out’, ‘to depart’; a
prasthāna is thus a 'setting forth', a 'departure' or a 'course'. In the context of the title of the seventh book of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, paṭṭhāna appears to mean something like 'point of departure' and hence 'basis', 'origin' or 'cause', or possibly it might be taken as signifying a 'course' or 'sequence (of conditions)'. A paṭṭhāna of sati ought to mean, then, 'the setting out of mindfulness', 'the departure of mindfulness' in the sense of 'the beginning of mindfulness'. Clearly, one might begin to make sense of the term on this basis, but there are other factors that would seem to suggest that this might not be the most straightforward course to follow.

As C.A.F. Rhys Davids has pointed out, it is nearly always derivatives from upa-sthā that are found associated with sati in the Nikāyas, and never derivatives from pra-sthā. This fact alone would seem to weigh rather heavily against taking satipaṭṭhāna to represent the combination of sati and paṭṭhāna, and suggests that what we ought to have is sati combined with upaṭṭhāna. The form we might most readily expect from the combination of sati and upaṭṭhāna is *saccupaṭṭhāna. But the possibility of confusion with sacca (= Skt satya) inherent in such a form might well have counted against its adoption in a context where sati is all important. If satipaṭṭhāna is not what we might normally expect from the combination of sati and upaṭṭhāna, then strictly neither is it what we might expect from the combination of sati and (p)paṭṭhāna; the form we would expect to find at least somewhere is *sati-paṭṭhāna rather than sati-paṭṭhāna. So PED and C.A.F. Rhys Davids seem to be slightly hesitant and even confused about whether we have sati and paṭṭhāna, or sati and upaṭṭhāna, and others such as Har Dayal state unequivocally that Buddhist Sanskrit smṛty-upasthāna is a wrong backformation. Both Childers and Geiger, however, suggest that Middle Indo-Aryan satipaṭṭhāna does indeed represent a sandhi of sati and upaṭṭhāna; Childers even provides an example of a similar sandhi, namely bhikkhunipassaya from bhikkhunī and upassaya.
If we take satipaṭṭhāna to represent sati and upaṭṭhāna, what would it mean? The verb upatīṣṭhāti means primarily ‘to stand near’ and hence ‘to be present’, ‘to manifest’ and ‘to serve’. The regular Nikāya expression satiṁ upaṭṭhāpetvā means, then, ‘causing mindfulness to stand near’, ‘causing mindfulness to be present’ or even ‘causing mindfulness to come into service’. According to the Paṭisambhidāmagga the sense of satipaṭṭhāna, of the faculty of mindfulness, of the mindfulness awakening-factor and of right mindfulness is to be directly known as ‘standing near’ or ‘serving’ (upaṭṭhāna). What is meant, I think, is that sati is understood as a quality of mind that ‘stands near’ or ‘serves’ the mind; it watches over the mind. One might say that it is a form of ‘presence of mind’. In general this would seem to tie in with the emphasis in Buddhist literature on sati as a quality that the bhikkhu needs to develop at all times, and with the notion that sati manifests as ‘guarding’. The four satipaṭṭhānas are, then, four anupassanās, four activities the purpose of which is to bring sati into ‘service’. That is, in the process of watching the body, feelings, mind and dhammas, sati stands near, manifests and is established.

To sum up, derivatives from upa-sthā are regularly associated with sati in the Nikāyas; there appears to be no real reason why the form satipaṭṭhāna should not be taken as the product of the combination of sati and upaṭṭhāna; the notion of the upaṭṭhāna of sati seems to be quite intelligible. I take it, then, that satipaṭṭhāna is primarily a term that is used to qualify four varieties of anupassanā as four practices of watching or contemplation that are ‘causes for the standing near of mindfulness’; the texts thus go on to speak of (translating rather literally and clumsily) ‘four mindfulness-manifestings’.

This may be the primary significance of the term satipaṭṭhāna, but already in the Nikāya period the term is obviously well established enough to be the subject of a certain amount of play. In the satipaṭṭhāna-sāmyutta we find the following:

I shall teach you, bhikkhus, the arising and disappearance of the four satipaṭṭhānas, listen. And what, bhikkhus, is the arising of the body? Due to the arising of food, there is the arising of the body; due to the disappearance of food, there is the disappearance of the body. Due to the arising of contact, there is the arising of feelings; due to the disappearance of contact there is the disappearance of feelings. Due to the arising of name and form, there is the arising of mind; due to the disappearance of name and form, there is the disappearance of mind. Due to the arising of bringing to mind, there is the arising of dhammas; due to the disappearance of bringing to mind, there is the disappearance of dhammas.

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101, Spk I 191); bhikkhunupassaya (v.l. bhikkhunipassaya) (Mil 124); bhikkhunupassaya (S II 215); bhikkhunupassaya (I I 147, 428); bhikkhunipassaya (v.l. bhikkhunupassaya) (A II 144, 145). Cf. K.R. Norman, JPTS 10 (1985), pp. 31-2.

15 MW, s.v. upa-sthā.

16 Patis I 16-17: satipaṭṭhānam upaṭṭhānaṁ abhihiññeyyo ... satindriyassu ... sati-sambojha-angassu ... samā-satīyā upaṭṭhānaṁ abhihiññeyyo. Cf. Patis I 20-2. This seems to me a fairly clear indication that Paṭis at least took satipaṭṭhāna as sati and upaṭṭhāna; cf. kāyo upaṭṭhānam no sati, sati upaṭṭhānaṁ ceva sati ca (Patis I 177, 183; II 232-3) (see below, p. 33).

17 See below, p. 40.

This passage quite clearly only makes sense if *satipaṭṭhāna* is taken as directly describing the body and so forth. In other words, it must be assumed that *satipaṭṭhāna* means ‘the basis of sati’, ‘the foundation of sati’, ‘that which is the support of sati’. The term here refers to the body, feelings, mind and dhammas as four objective fields of sati. This kind of meaning can probably be reached on the basis of a derivation from either *upa-sṭhā* or *pra-sṭhā*, though as far as classical Sanskrit is concerned it would seem to fit better with *prati-ṣṭhā*, ‘to stand upon’. Certainly in the explanations of the Pāli commentaries, to which I shall now turn, there seems to be a tendency to assimilate *pra-sṭhā* and *prati-ṣṭhā*. The play on the term *satipaṭṭhāna*, which becomes more evident in the exegetical writings, should probably be regarded as arising directly out of an ambiguity inherent in Middle Indo-Aryan *satipaṭṭhāna*.

I take the interpretation of *satipaṭṭhāna* as referring to the body and so on as the ‘supports of sati’ as secondary, but it is not to be viewed as particularly late or even peculiar to the Pāli sources. Both Buddhaghosa and Vasubandhu in fact refer to a canonical source equivalent to the one quoted above. Taking the Pāli sources first, Buddhaghosa states that there are three basic uses of the term *satipaṭṭhāna*: there is *satipaṭṭhāna* that is the field or pasture of mindfulness (sati-gocara); there is *satipaṭṭhāna* that consists in the teacher’s having gone beyond dislike and favouritism (@a.tīghānunaya-vitivattatā) concerning his disciples’ achievements; and there is *satipaṭṭhāna* that is simply sati. Buddhaghosa then proceeds to illustrate these different uses by quotation from Sutta. He begins with the *satipaṭṭhāna-samyutta* passage I have already quoted:

For with regard to ‘I shall teach you, bhikkhus, the arising and the disappearance of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. Listen, pay careful attention ... And what, bhikkhus, is the arising of body? Due to the arising of food there is the arising of body ...’ and so on, it is the pasture of mindfulness that is spoken of as *satipaṭṭhāna*. Likewise with regard to ‘Body is a support, it is not mindfulness; mindfulness is both a support and it is mindfulness ...’ and so on [= *Paṭis* I 177, 183; II 232-3]. The meaning of this is that it is a resting place (*paṭṭhāna*) because [something] rests (*paṭṭhāhi*) there. What rests? Mindfulness. A *satipaṭṭhāna* is a resting-place of mindfulness. Alternatively *paṭṭhāna* is ‘a special place’; a *satipaṭṭhāna* is a special-place for mindfulness like a place for elephants or a place for horses, etc.
Buddhaghosa next refers to a passage detailing three satipaṭṭhānas that are the peculiar domain of the teacher. These three satipaṭṭhānas concern the teacher’s ability to maintain mindfulness regardless of whether his disciples fail to understand the teaching, whether some understand and some do not, whether they all understand:23

‘There are three satipaṭṭhānas which the noble one practises and when he practises these he is a teacher worthy to instruct the multitude’—here the teacher’s threefold state of having passed beyond dislike and favouritism with regard to disciples who have entered upon the way is spoken of as satipaṭṭhāna. The meaning of this is that it is a paṭṭhāna from the point of view of what is to be established (paṭṭhāpetabbato); ‘from the point of view of what is to be made to occur’ is the meaning. From the point of view of what is to be established by what? By mindfulness. A satipaṭṭhāna is an establishing by mindfulness.24

Finally Buddhaghosa turns to the more usual and general use of satipaṭṭhāna in the Nikāyas:

But with regard to ‘The four satipaṭṭhānas when developed and made great bring to fulfilment the seven factors of awakening’ and so on, it is just mindfulness that is spoken of as satipaṭṭhāna. The meaning is that it is ‘a standing forth’ (paṭṭhāna) because [something] stands forth (patisṭhāti); it stands near (upatthāti); ‘coming forth and leaping forward it proceeds’ is the meaning. A satipaṭṭhāna is just mindfulness in the sense of standing forth (paṭṭhāna). Alternatively sati is in the sense of remembering and paṭṭhāna is in the sense of standing near (upatthāna). So satipaṭṭhāna means simply ‘mindfulness and the standing forth which that [i.e. mindfulness] is’. This is what is intended here.25

The ‘here’ in ‘This is what is intended here’ refers to the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula which I quoted at the beginning of this chapter, and which opens the (Mahā-)Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta. This formula is the basis of nearly the whole of the Nikāya treatment of the satipaṭṭhānas and it seems to be quite clear that Buddhaghosa sees his third explanation as the normative one. It is, then, hardly correct to say, as C.A.F. Rhys Davids does,26 that Buddhaghosa rejects the interpretation of satipaṭṭhāna as sati-upatthāna; whether we have paṭṭhāna or upatthāna is in fact of little consequence to his exegesis, and he allows both.

This final explanation takes satipaṭṭhāna not as a tatpurusa compound (‘the standing forth of mindfulness’) but as a karmadhāraya: ‘the standing forth that is mindfulness’. Yet it seems to correspond in practice to what I have suggested is the primary import of the term satipaṭṭhāna. Essentially a satipaṭṭhāna is nothing but sati itself; it is simply the ‘standing near’ of mindfulness. But as I

23 MIII 216, 221.
24 Sv III 753 = Ps I 238 = Vibha-214: tayo satipaṭṭhāna yad ariyo sevati, tad ariyo sevamāno satthā gaṇam anusāsitum arahati ti ettha tidhā paṭipannesa savakesa satthuno paṭighānunaya-vitti-vattata satipaṭṭhānan ti vutta. tass’atto paṭṭhāpetabbato paṭṭhānam; pavattayitabbatto ti attho. kena paṭṭhāpetabbato ti. satiyā satiya paṭṭhānam satipaṭṭhānam.
25 Sv III 753 = Ps I 238 = Vibha-214-5: cattāro satipaṭṭhāna bhāvitā baḥuliñcā satta bojjhange paṇipaṭṭhāni ti ādusu pana sati yeva satipaṭṭhānan ti vuccati. tass’atto paṭṭhāti ti paṭṭhānam; upatthāti; okkantiva pakkhādibbā pavattati ti attho. sati yeva paṭṭhānato satipaṭṭhānam. atha vā saranaṭṭhena sati upaṭṭhānato paṭṭhānam. iti sati ca sā paṭṭhānam cā ti pi satipaṭṭhānam. idam idha adhippetam.
26 STΧlv V xv.
have already suggested underlying both the canonical and commentarial understanding is a certain play on the term _satipañña_. This is, I think, rather evident in the passage Buddhaghosa quotes from the _Paṭisambhidāmagga_. The notion is that watching the body, etc. is what supports mindfulness, is what causes mindfulness ‘to stand near’, but at the same time the very nature of mindfulness is ‘to stand near’ or ‘to support’. Mindfulness is that which stands near, supports and guards the mind. Vasubandhu’s comments on _smṛty-upasthāna_ in the _Abhidhammakośa-bhāṣya_ provide an interesting parallel to the Pāli commentarial material:

Why is it that, from the point of view of essential nature, _smṛty-upasthāna_ is wisdom? Because it is said [in the Sūtra] that _smṛty-upasthāna_ is watching the body with regard to the body. Now what is ‘watching’? It is wisdom ... Why is wisdom spoken of by the Blessed One as _smṛty-upasthāna_? The Vaibhāsikas say that it is because of the predominance of mindfulness, which means ‘because of the occurrence of forceful application of mindfulness’; it is like the support of a wedge when splitting wood. It works as follows. On account of it [i.e. wisdom] mindfulness stands near (upatiṣṭhatate), therefore wisdom is the standing near of mindfulness (_smṛty-upasthāna_)—because of designating (abhilapana) what has been seen [by wisdom]. Accordingly it was said by the venerable Aniruddha, ‘For one who dwells watching body with regard to the body, recollection which has the body as object stands near, is established ...’ and so on. Also it was said by the Blessed One, ‘For one who dwells watching body with regard to the body, mindfulness that is unmuddled stands near.’ But then this is said, ‘How, bhikkus, is there the arising and disappearance of the four _smṛty-upasthānas_? Due to the arising of food, there is the arising of the body; due to the ceasing of food, there is the ceasing of body.’ Here _smṛty-upasthāna_ is spoken of just as the object. Stating that mindfulness stands near there, they are named according to the object.

Vasubandhu here gives two basic explanations of _smṛty-upasthāna_ which parallel quite closely what is said of _satipañña_ in the Pāli commentaries. His first explanation focuses on the actual activity of watching which constitutes _smṛty-upasthāna_, the second focuses on the actual support, objective field or basis of that activity. There are two points of particular interest in Vasubandhu’s account. The first is the direct identification of _smṛty-upasthāna_ with

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27 Essential the discussion of the view that all _dhammas_ are establishings of mindfulness (sabbe _dhamma_ _satipañña_) at _Kv_ 155-9 relies on the ambiguity of the term _satipañña_. According to _Kv-a_ 52-3 the Andhakas arrived at their conclusion on the basis of the Sutta passage dealing with the _samudaya_ and _atthagama_ of the _satipaññas_: if the _satipaññas_ are simply the four classes of object (body, feelings, mind and _dhammas_) for mindfulness then, since all _dhammas_ (a term which in its widest sense embraces body, feelings and mind) can be objects of mindfulness, all _dhammas_ are _satipaññas_; but such a conclusion is not allowed by _Kv_ because (taking _satipañña_ as a term for mindfulness rather than its objects) not all _dhammas_ are mindfulness.

28 _Abhidh-k_ 342: svabhāva-smṛty-upasthānam prayīti kuta eva tat. kāye kāyaṁupāśayāṁ _smṛty-upasthānam_ iti vacanit, kāye vajjanaṁ prajtieti kuta eva tat. smṛty-upasthāṇaṁ anavaṁvat. evam tu yujyate. smṛtrī ānyaṁpratīṣṭhata iti _smṛty-upasthānam_ prayīṇaḥ, yathā _dṛṣṭaṁvihiṇaṇāt_. tad yathā hy uktam āyuṣmatā Aniruddhena tasya kāye kāyaṁupāśayino viharataḥ kāyaṁlambanāṁsmṛtrī ānyaṁpratīṣṭhata iti vistarāḥ. bhavāvātipi coktam tasya kāye kāyaṁupāśayino viharataḥ upaṭhiṣṭhī _smṛtrī bhavaty āsanāṁdhiḥ. yatra tūktaṁ kathāṁ bhikkavaḥ catunāṁ _smṛty-upasthāṇāṁ_ āsanāṁ bhavati ca bhavaty āsanāṁdhiḥ ca. āhāra-samudayaṁ kāyaṁsamudayaṁ bhavati ūnāhāra-nirodham kāyaṁsthitam bhayaṁ asti bhayaṁ adharam, bhavāvātipi coktam tasya kāye kāyaṁ upāśayino viharata _upaṭhiṣṭhī_ _smṛtrī bhavaty āsanāṁdhiḥ._
prajñā or ‘wisdom’. This, of course, follows from the understanding of smṛty-upasthāna as essentially anupaśyanā or ‘watching’. While this might appear to stand in direct contrast to the tradition of the Pāli texts that states that satipaṭṭhāna is just sati, closer consideration indicates that the difference between the two conceptions here is rather subtle. Certainly in the Pāli texts the close association of sati and paññā is brought out in a number of places, and the Vibhaṅga also makes an explicit identification of anupassanā with paññā.\(^{29}\) The second point of some interest is the use of the term abhilapana (designating, elucidation, full expression)\(^{30}\) in connection with smṛty-upasthāna. I shall return to these matters below.

2. What is sati?

What exactly is sati? So far I have been content to translate it as ‘mindfulness’, and something of its particular quality is perhaps already apparent from the preceding discussion of the term satipaṭṭhāna. The Sanskrit root smṛ seems to connote two basic ideas, namely ‘to remember’ and more simply, perhaps, ‘to have in mind’. Both these uses seem to be witnessed from the Rgveda onwards.\(^{31}\) Sanskrit smṛti can be both an act of ‘remembering’ or ‘bearing in mind’, and also what is remembered—hence the brahmanical use of smṛti to characterize the body of received tradition as what has been remembered, as opposed to what has been directly heard (śruti) from the vedic seers.\(^{32}\) In Buddhist literature, however, it is the bare aspect of ‘remembering’ or ‘having in mind’ that is focused upon to the exclusion of other meanings: memory as the act of remembering, not what is remembered, or, as the commentaries put it, ‘memory’ in the sense of remembering (saraṇaṭṭhena sati).\(^{33}\) The Nikāyas put it as follows:

And what, bhikkhus, is the faculty of sati? Here, bhikkhus, the noble disciple has sati, he is endowed with perfect sati and intellect, he is one who remembers, who recollects what was done and said long before.\(^{34}\)

But it is clear from the notion of satipaṭṭhāna that what the Nikāyas mean by ‘remembering’ is rather more than simply the ability to recall information from the distant past. Yet in terms of plain definition of sati, the four primary Nikāyas add very little to the definition I have just quoted. On the whole the Nikāyas prefer to proceed by way of description of the actual practice of satipaṭṭhāna, which is seen as the method by which sati naturally comes into its own. But rather than turning to the canonical account of satipaṭṭhāna cold, as it were, it is perhaps worth considering briefly how the later Buddhist tradition saw fit to describe what sati is. The early Abhidhamma literature provides a

\(^{29}\) Vibh 194.

\(^{30}\) BHSD, s.v. abhilapana.

\(^{31}\) MW, s.v. smṛ.

\(^{32}\) See J. Gonda, Vedic Literature, Wiesbaden, 1975, pp. 33-4.

\(^{33}\) Sv III 753 = Ps I 238.

\(^{34}\) S V 197-8: katamañ ca bhikkhave satindriyam. idha bhikkhave ariya-sāvako satimā hoti paramena sati-nepakkena samannāgato cīra-katam cīra-bhāṣītam pi saritā anuscaritā.
number of terms that are intended to illustrate the nature of sati, and which are of some interest. As I have already pointed out, thePaṭisambhidāmagga makes a certain amount out of the actual term upaṭṭhāna or ‘standing near’, and seems to see this as characterizing the actual nature of sati.35 The Dhammasan-gani gives the following register of terms for sati: sati anussati paṭissati sati saranatā dhāranatā apilāpanatā asammussanatā sati satindriyam sati-balān sammā-sati.36 A number of these terms would appear to key into the various aspects under which sati is considered in the suttas: as a faculty (satindriya), as a power (sati-bala), as a factor of the path (sammā-sati);37 the derivatives from the root smr echo different Nikāya contexts,38 and reiterate the general notion of sati as ‘remembering’. The three remaining terms are ‘bearing [in mind]’ (dhāranatā), ‘the state of not forgetting’ or ‘the state of not being distracted’ (asammussanatā),39 and finally apilāpanatā. The last of these is perhaps the most interesting, and I shall comment on it presently.

First I should like to turn to the Milindapañha. The Milindapañha contains what is perhaps the earliest attempt in Buddhist literature to state fully just what sati is. Questioned by king Milinda as to the characteristic (lakkhana) of sati, the monk Nāgasena replies that it has both the characteristic of calling to mind (apilāpana) and the characteristic of taking hold (upagānaha). Nāgasena proceeds to explain:

Just as, Your Majesty, the treasurer of a king who is a cakka-vattin causes the cakka-vattin king to remember his glory evening and morning [saying], ‘So many, lord, are your elephants, so many your horses, so many your chariots, so many your foot soldiers, so much your gold, so much your wealth, so much your property; may my lord remember.’ Thus he calls to mind the king’s property. Even so, your Majesty, sati, when it arises, calls to mind dhammas that are skilful and unskilful, with faults and faultless, inferior and refined, dark and pure, together with their counterparts: these are the four establishings of mindfulness, these are the four right endeavours, these are the four bases of success, these are the five faculties, these are the five powers, these are the seven awakening-factors, this is the noble eight-factored path, this is calm, this is insight, this is knowledge, this is freedom. Thus the one who practises yoga resorts to dhammas that should be resorted to and does not resort to dhammas that should not be resorted to; he embraces dhammas that should be embraced and does not embrace dhammas that should not be embraced. Just so, Your Majesty, does sati have the characteristic of calling to mind …

Just as, Your Majesty, the adviser-treasurer of the king who is a cakka-vattin

35 It is important to note here that upaṭṭhāna stands in the same relationship to sati as does adhimokkha to saddhā, paggaha to viriya, avikkhepa to samādhi, dassana to paññā, etc. Cf. below, Table 10, p. 309.
37 Cf. the lokuttara register, e.g. Dhs 62, which adds sati-sambojhaṅga.
38 Such as the practice of ‘recollection’ (anussati) of Buddha, Dhamma, Samgha, morality (sīla), generosity (cāga) and devatās (e.g. D III 250, 280); the association is explicit at Nidd I 10-11.
39 Pāli asammussanatā probably shows semantic confusion of Skt mus (‘to steal’) and mṛṣ (‘not to heed’). However, the Nikāya expression mṛṣṭha-satti (e.g. D III 252, 287; M I 20; III 6,84; S V 269, 324; A IV 229, 232), despite PED (s.v. mṛṣṭha), probably represents Skt muṣṭa- (= muṣita) and not mṛṣita, and should be rendered ‘lost mindfulness’ or ‘with mindfulness lost’; cf. Skt musita-cetas (q.v. MW). Cf. CPD, s.vv. asammuttha, asammussanatā, asammosa, asammosana-rasa, BHSD, s.vv. asammosa, asammosanatā, muṣita-mṛṣṭi.
knows those things that are beneficial and unbeneficial to the king [and thinks], 'These things are beneficial, these unbeneficial; these things are helpful, these unhelpful.' He thus removes the unbeneficial things and takes hold of the beneficial. Even so, Your Majesty, sati, when it arises, follows the courses of beneficial and unbeneficial dhammas: these dhammas are beneficial, these unbeneficial; these dhammas are helpful, these unhelpful. Thus the one who practises yoga removes unbeneficial dhammas and takes hold of beneficial dhammas; he removes unhelpful dhammas and takes hold of helpful dhammas. Just so, Your Majesty, does sati have the characteristic of taking hold.40

This account is clearly of some importance and is quoted, though not in full, by Buddhaghosa in the Atthasālīni.41 Curiously one of the key terms here, namely apilāpana, seems to have been misunderstood—or at least reinterpreted—by the Pāli Abhidhamma tradition. It is not clear what the original source is for the association of the term apilāpana (tā) with sati.42 Presumably the use in the Milindapañha post-dates the use in the Dhammasaṅgani, yet it seems to me that it is the Milindapañha account that preserves the original significance of the term.

The Dhammasaṅgani creates a pair of opposites, apilāpanatā and pilāpanatā, which are used to explain sati and muttha-sati (‘lost mindfulness’) respectively.43 Now apilāpanatā would seem to mean ‘not floating [on the object of the mind]’ and pilāpanatā ‘floating [on the object of the mind].’44 This, at least, is evidently how the commentarial Abhidhamma tradition took the terms.45 Accordingly, apilāpeti in the Milindapañha passage is taken by the Pāli tradition as ‘it does not allow any floating’, or ‘it plunges into’.46 While it is not impossible


41 As 121-2; the version of Mil that Buddhaghosa had before him probably differed from ours; see Norman, PL, pp.110-1.

42 The term apilāpanatā is also used in association with sati at Nidd I 10 347; II 262; Dhs 11-2, 16, 62, 64; Vibh 124, 250, Pugg 25; Nett 15, 28, 54. But cf. p. 78 n.1, below on A II 185.

43 Dhs 11, 232; at Dhs 232 apilāpanatā is to be corrected to pilāpanatā; cf. As 405; Vibh 360.

44 Cf. Skt plava (plu).

45 As 147: ‘Aplāpanatā is the state of not floating in the sense of plunging into, a term for entering into.’ (anupavasana-saṁkhāraṇa ogānaṁñāṇa apilāpana-bhāvo apilāpanatā.) As 405: ‘Pilāpanatā means it floats on the object [of the mind] like a gourd-bowl in water.’ (udake alābu-katāham viyā ārammame pilavati ti pilāpanatā.)

46 Mil-1 10: apilāpeti ti upapavasanaṁñāṇa ogāhaṁti. The Mahāpiñcha (Be 1960, p. 89) to As 121 explains apilāpeti as ‘it makes for non-floating’ (apilāpe karoti). CPD (s.vv. apilāpa, apilāpeti) and I.B. Horner (Mil Trsl I 50-1) follow this interpretation.
that a- is a negative prefix here, it is, perhaps, rather unlikely. The sense of 'not floating' could possibly be preserved by taking apilapeti as equivalent to Sanskrit āplāvayati, which might be rendered 'it immerses itself in'. Yet such a meaning seems not to fit the context particularly well. It seems more reasonable to follow PED and assume that we have apilapati (= abhilapati), 'to recite'; the causative apilāpeti then means 'to cause to be recited, to enumerate', and then 'to remind someone of something by enumerating it to them'. This in fact seems to fit the Milindapañha use rather well.

What the Milindapañha account is suggesting, I think, is that sati should be understood as what allows awareness of the full range and extent of dhammas; sati is an awareness of things in relation to things, and hence an awareness of their relative value. Applied to the satipatthanas presumably what this means is that sati is what causes the practitioner of yoga to 'remember' that any feeling he may experience exists in relation to a whole variety or world of feelings that may be skilful or unskilful, with faults or faultless, relatively inferior or refined, dark or pure. The idea is probably clearest with regard to feeling (vedanā) but, of course, should be extended to cover body (kāya), mind (citta) and dhammas. To talk of 'remembering' one 'body' in relation to a world of different 'bodies' sounds rather strange in English, but such language is perhaps not so alien to the Nikāya thought-world: 'Among bodies, bhikkhus, I declare this, namely breathing in and out, to be a particular body.' Thus it is only by in some sense 'remembering' the full range and extent of dhammas that the practitioner of yoga can come to know: 'These are the four establishings of mindfulness, these the four right endeavours, these the four bases of success, these the five faculties, these the five powers, these the seven awakening-factors, this the noble eight-factored path.'

Interestingly, in Buddhist Sanskrit sources there does not appear to be any talk of plavana or aplavana in connection with smṛti, there is, however, talk of abhilapana. As I have already noted, Vasubandhu states that the smṛty-upadhiṇās are wisdom 'because of designating what has been seen [by wisdom]' (yathā-drṣṭasyābhilapanā). Similarly the author of the Abhidharmadīpa says:

The faculty of smṛti is a name for which is appropriate designation (aviparitābhī-
lapana) with regard to the body and so on as observed by wisdom; it is recognition.
In the mind that has made itself familiar with it there is no loss of the object; this absence of loss is the faculty of smrta.53

The term abhilapana apart, Vasubandhu defines smrta succinctly as 'not losing the object [of the mind]' (smrta álambanāsāmpramoṣaḥ).54

Returning to the Abhidhamma treatment of sati, its formal definition by way of characteristic (lakkhana), property (rasa), manifestation (paccupaṭṭhāna) and basis (pada-ṭṭhāna) is as follows:

By means of it they [= other dhammas] remember, or it itself remembers, or it is simply just remembering, thus it is sati. Its characteristic is not floating; its property is not losing; its manifestation is guarding or the state of being face to face with an object; its basis is strong noting or the satipaṭṭhānas of the body and so on. It should be seen as like a post due to its state of being firmly set in the object, and as like a gatekeeper because it guards the gate of the eye and so on.55

As I have already suggested, the characteristic of api-lapana must, I think, be explained here with reference to the pair of opposities api-lapati and pilap-anatā. It seems that because the commentaries fail to recognize api-lapati (= abhi-lapati) they therefore make use of a rather different image: sati is the mental quality that submerges itself in the objects of the mind; when there is no sati the mind floats or drifts on the objects of the mind. An echo of the same kind of thinking is, I think, apparent in the statement that sati's manifestation is the state of being face to face with an object, and that it is like a post because it is set firmly in the object.

At this point the consideration of sati can perhaps be taken a little further by addressing the question of the relative understanding of sati/smrta in the traditions of the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins respectively. According to the system of Abhidhamma embodied in the Pāli Abhidhamma-piṭaka and commentaries, sati is only ever present as a mental factor (cetasika) in skilful states of mind (kusala-citta): if there is sati, there is skilful consciousness; and since sati is in fact always present in skilful states of mind, if there is skilful consciousness, there is sati. However, according to the Sarvāstivādin system of Abhidharma smrta is a mental factor (caitta) that is universal to all states of mind (citta-mahā-bhūmika) skilful or unskilful.56

Nyanaponika has taken this matter up in a section of his Abhidhamma Studies.57 Briefly, he pursues a question raised in the Atthasālinī concerning the absence of sati in unskilful states of mind: 'Do those of wrong views not

53 Abhidh-dī 360: smṛtindriyaṁ nāma kāyādiṣu pariñayopalakṣiteṣu vā khalv aviparitābhilapanā pratyabhijñānaṁ yenavādhārite viññā-sammoṣaḥ cetasi na bhavati sa khalv asammoṣaḥ smṛtindriyaṁ. Cf. Abhidh-dī 69 where smṛta is explained as 'designation of the object of the mind' (cittasyārthābhilapanā).
54 Abhidh-k 34.
55 Vism XIV 141: saranti tāya sayam vā sarati saraṇa-mattam eva vā esā ti sati. api-lapana-lakkhanā sati asammosa-rasā ārakkha-paccupaṭṭhāna viññā-bhāva-paccupaṭṭhāna vā thira-sāḥna-pada-ṭṭhānā kāyādi-sati-paccupaṭṭhāna pada-ṭṭhānā vā. ārammaṇe dhaṁmaṃ pāṭipādoṇṭṭhāta pana esikā viyā cakkhu-dvārādī-rakkhaṇato dovārīko viya ca daṭṭhābā. (Cf. As 121-2; Abhidh-av 18.)
56 Abhidh-k 54.
remember actions done by them? They do. But that is not called sati, it is merely the occurrence of unskilful consciousness in that aspect.\textsuperscript{58} As Nyanaponika points out, as an explanation this is not entirely helpful. However, the Mūlaṭīkā makes a reference at this point to the association of such unskilful states with ‘clear noting’ (patu-saññā). Following this up, Nyanaponika concludes that it is in fact saññā that should be regarded as playing the crucial role in the psychology of remembering as far as the Theravādin Abhidhamma is concerned. The Sarvāstivādins, he suggests, failed to appreciate this and in their system ‘corrected’ the omission of smrṭi from unskilful consciousness.\textsuperscript{59}

This assumes without justification that the traditions embodied in the Dhamma-saṅgaṇī are necessarily more ancient than those preserved in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma system, and also that the Sarvāstivādin account of saṃjñā is rather different from that of the Theravādins. This apart, however, Nyanaponika’s comments are of some interest. The formal Abhidhamma definition of saññā is as follows:

\begin{quote}
All [saññā] has the characteristic of noting (sañjānana); its property is the making of a sign that is a condition for noting again, ‘this is the very same thing’—as carpenters and so on do with wood, etc.; its manifestation is the producing of conviction by virtue of a sign that has been accordingly learnt—like the blind perceiving the elephant [Ud 68-9]; its basis is whatever object that has come near—like the idea (saññā) ‘people’ that arises for young animals in respect of scarecrows.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

Now it is clear from this account that in its capacity of labelling or marking (which seems to be what is intended here) saññā must be understood as playing a major role in the psychology of memory, at least as far as this is conceived of as a simple matter of recognition and recall. But there is little reason to think that the Sarvāstivādins would have wished to quarrel with this understanding of saññā/saṃjñā: ‘saṃjñā is noting, the taking up of the sign of the object’ (saṃjñā saṃjānāṃ viṣaya-nimittodgrah).\textsuperscript{61} So far, then, it is clear that both systems refer to sati/smrṭi as ‘not-losing’, ‘unforgetfulness’ or ‘non-confusion’ (asammosa/asammoṣa); both systems have more or less the same conception of saññā/saṃjñā. The Abhidhamma definition of saññā also suggests that it has a significantly close relationship to sati—strong saññā is in fact the basis of sati.

Clearly when we talk of ‘memory’ and ‘remembering’ in the context of Buddhist psychology we are dealing with quite subtle questions. From the point of view of Abhidhamma analysis it is apparent that many of one’s so called ‘memories’ are simply conceptions or ideas based on a particular

\textsuperscript{58} As 250: kim diṭṭhi-gatikā attāna katu-kammāna sarantī ti. sarantī. sā pana sati nāma na hoti kevalam tenākāreṇa akusala-citta-ppavatti. Quoted Nyanaponika, AS, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{59} Nyanaponika, AS, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{60} Vism XIV 130: sabbbā va sañjānana-lakkhaṇaḥ; tad ev’etan ti puna sañjānana-paccaya-nimitta-karaṇa-rāsa dāru-ādissu taccakādayo viyā; yathā-gaḥita-nimitta-vasena abhinivesakaraṇa-paccupaṭṭhānā, haṭṭhi-dassaka-anṭhā viyā; yathā-upaṭṭhita-visaya-pada-ṭṭhānā, tiṇa-purisakesu miga-potakkānaṃ purisā ti uppanna-saññā viyā ti. (Cf. As 110; Abhidh-av 18.)

\textsuperscript{61} Abhidh-k 54. See also A. Wayman, ‘Regarding the translation of the Buddhist technical terms saññā/saṃjñā, viññāṇa/vijñāṇa’ in Malalasekera Commemoration Volume, ed. O.H. de A. Wijesekera, Colombo, 1976, pp. 325-35.
perspective of what occurred in the past. In short, they are misconceptions, the product of saññā associated with unskilful consciousness. The point is that as far as Abhidhamma is concerned our ‘remembering’ fails to reflect properly the way things truly are. This point is not particularly hard to appreciate, even conventional wisdom tells me that if I am brooding on some wrong done to me, my view of the world is likely to be coloured as a result.

What is important about sati/smṛti in Buddhist thought is that it is seen as a particular kind of ‘remembering’—when developed it ‘remembers’, as it were, properly. The Abhidharmadīpa’s explanation of the faculty of smṛti as aviparitābhilapanā or ‘unperverted designating’ would seem to be an allusion to the four viparyāsas or ‘perversions’.

Rather interestingly the Nettippakarana states:

One who dwells watching body with regard to body abandons the perversion [that sees] the beautiful in the ugly ... One who dwells watching feeling with regard to feelings abandons the perversion [that sees] happiness in suffering ... One who dwells watching mind with regard to mind abandons the perversion [that sees] the permanent in the impermanent ... One who dwells watching dhamma with regard to dharmas abandons the perversion [that sees] the self in what is not-self.

The point is clear, I think, in the Milindapañha account. Because sati ‘remembers’, it knows the full variety of dharmas, skilful and unskilful, and so on; because sati ‘remembers’ it knows how things stand in relation to one another; it, as it were, opens up one’s view. In this way it tends towards a seeing of things that reflects what the Abhidhamma considers to be the way things truly are. This is the reason why sati/smṛti is so intimately bound up with wisdom in the texts. Thus in the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula, Nikāya usage alone would suggest that such terms as anupassī and sampajāna technically connote insight and wisdom. This becomes quite explicit in the Vibhaṅga exposition, while those following the traditions of the Sarvāstivādins straightforwardly state that the essential nature of smṛty-upasthāna is wisdom.

At the beginning of this section I quoted an explanation of the faculty of sati that states that the noble disciple is endowed with perfect sati and intellect (paramena sati-nepakkena samannāgato) and is one who remembers and recollects what was done and said long before. With regard to this explanation the commentaries state that nepakka is a term for wisdom (pāññā). But why, they ask, is wisdom included in the section on sati? The answer is:

In order to indicate a strong state of sati. For sati arises both with and without wisdom. When it arises with wisdom it is strong, when it arises without it is weak ...

Similarly two ministers of the king may serve in two [different] districts; one of

\[\text{\footnotesize 62} \quad \text{It is important to note that this explanation is given of smṛtyānubhāya in the context of the account of the development of those dharmas that contribute directly to progress along the path. Presumably then only smṛti associated with skilful consciousness is referred to here.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 63} \quad \text{Nett 83-4 : kāye kāyānubhāya viharanto asubhe subhan ti vipallāsām pajahati ... vedanānubhāya viharanto dukkhe sukhan ti vipallāsām pajahati ... citta cittānubhāya viharanto anicce nīcan ti vipallāsām pajahati ... dharmesu dhammānubhāya anattani attā ti vipallāsām pajahati. Cf. Pet 103; Vism XXII 34. Abhidh-k 342 gives the four smṛty-upasthānas as the opposite (vipakṣa) of the viparyāsas; cf. Wayman, Śrāvakabhūmi MS, p. 98.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 64} \quad \text{Spk III 234; Vibh-a 311.}\]
them may serve along with a prince, the other just by himself means of his own ability; the one serving along with a prince has authority both because of his own authority and also because of the prince's authority; the one serving by means of his own ability cannot match this authority. Thus the minister serving along with a prince is like sati that has arisen with wisdom; the one serving by means of his own ability is like sati that has arisen without wisdom. 65

What all this perhaps suggests is that as far as Abhidhamma is concerned, the extent to which even unwholesome actions and states of mind are 'remembered', corresponds in some measure to a degree of sati and skilful consciousness. This need not count against the Abhidhamma view that sati is exclusive to skilful consciousness; the Theravādin conception of thought processes is such that it is quite possible to conceive of the mixing of skilful and unskilful consciousness in quick succession. In effect this conception of sati suggests that the stronger the quality of mind called sati becomes, the weaker unwholesome states of mind become, and the harder it is for these to take over and dominate thought, word and deed. The more nearly what in Abhidhamma is defined as an unwholesome course of action is properly 'remembered', the less likely it is that that course of action will be followed through.

Looked at in this way the difference between the Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin conception of sati/smṛti becomes rather finely balanced. For the Sarvāstivādins a lack of proper remembering of the object of the mind is not conceived of as an absolute absence of smṛti, but rather as smṛti in a weak and attenuated form such that it cannot operate as it should, and is even perhaps 'perverted' in some way. In this they preserve a straightforward understanding of the ancient canonical notion of 'wrong mindfulness' (micchā-sati/mithyā-smṛti), which the Theravādin Abhidhamma chose to understand as the result of the absence of sati. 66

Finally in this discussion of the notion of sati/smṛti in ancient Abhidharma literature, mention should be made of the important term appamāda/apramāda or 'heedfulness'. The Sarvāstivādins include this in their list of mental factors (caittas) exclusive to skilful consciousness (kuśala-mahābhūmika). 67 Significantly where the term appamāda is found in the Nikāyas the commentaries take it as a term for sati. 68 Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośa defines apramāda as follows:

Appamāda is the development of skilful dharmas. But what kind of development is

65 Vibh-a 312: satiyā balava-bhāva-dīpanatthām. sati hi paññāya saddhiṃ pi uppaṭjati vinā pi. paññāya saddhiṃ uppijamānā balavaṅī hoti, vinā uppijamānā dubbalaḥ ... yathā hi dvīṣa disāsu dve rāja-mahāmattā itthēvām; tesu eko rāja-puttam gahevā, eko attāno dharmatāya ekako va; tesu rāja-puttam gahevā ētho attāno pi tejena rāja-puttassa pi tejena tejavā hoti; attāno dharmatāya ētho na teṇa sama-tejo hoti. evam eva rāja-puttam gahevā ētho mahāmatto viya paññāya saddhiṃ uppannā sati; attāno dharmatāya ētho viya vinā paññāya saddhiṃ uppannā.

66 As 250.

67 Abhidh-k 55.

68 Cf. Sv I 104 which glosses appamāda as 'non-absence' (avippavāsa) of sati; It-a I 80 gives the same explanation but adds: 'It is a name for permanence of established sati; but some say that when they occur by means of the application of sati and sampajāññā, the four immaterial aggregates are appamāda.' (niccam upaṭṭhitāya satiyā eva c'etam nāmaṃ. apare pana sati-sampajāññā-yogena pavaṭṭā cattāro arūpino khandhā appamādo ti vadanti.)
something different from these skilful dharmas? That which is attention to them. The followers of other schools take Sutra as saying that apramāda is guarding in respect of the mind.69

It is not hard to see in this definition a certain overlap with the full definition of sati found in the Milindapañha and Pāli commentaries. The Milindapañha’s notion of sati as ‘taking hold’ (upagāhnā) of what is helpful and beneficial seems quite close here, while the alternative notion of apramāda as ‘guarding’ corresponds exactly to an idea expressed in the formal Abhidhamma definition of sati.

It is no doubt out of place to try to resolve all the various points raised in this. The tensions and dynamics of each system are balanced slightly differently, and each, it might be argued, has its own merits. There is not a radical difference in the conception of sati/smṛti in the Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin systems, and much the same themes recur. To sum up, it seems to me that there are basically four elements to the notion of sati in the literature: (i) sati remembers or does not lose what is before the mind; (ii) sati is, as it were, a natural ‘presence of mind’; it stands near and hence serves and guards the mind; (iii) sati ‘calls to mind’, that is, it remembers things in relationship to things and thus tends to know their value and widen the view; (iv) sati is thus closely related to wisdom; it naturally tends to seeing things as they truly are.

3. The Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna- and Satipaṭṭhāna-suttas70

What distinguishes the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-sutta from the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta is the addition in the former of a detailed exposition of the four noble truths.71 In other respects the two suttas appear identical. Both are said to have been delivered by the Buddha while dwelling among the Kurus, and prima facie there appears to be no reason not to take the two suttas as two versions of one and the same discourse; the commentaries seem to make no attempt to distinguish the occasion of their delivery. In view of the sutta’s—or suttas’—importance it is worth here giving a brief account of the basic structure and contents,72 before moving on to discuss the various elements.

After the initial setting of the scene the discourse opens with what I call ‘the ekāyana formula’:

Ekāyana, bhikkhus, is this path for the purification of beings, for passing beyond sorrow and grief, for the disappearance of pain and discontent, for the attainment of nibbāna—that is the four satipaṭṭhas.

The establishment of mindfulness

This is immediately followed by the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula as stated at the opening of this chapter. The remainder of the sutta consists basically of a detailed description of the practice of kāyānupassanā, vedanānupassanā, cittānupassanā and dhammānupassanā; in other words each of the four parts of the basic formula is explained by way of example and subsequently expanded.

In the account of kāyānupassanā there are fourteen basic sections. Each of these sections opens with a description of an activity that illustrates the practice of kāyānupassanā: the bhikkhu (i) is mindful when breathing in and out (so sato va assasati sato passasati); (ii) he knows (pajānāti) when he is walking, standing, sitting or lying down; (iii) he acts with clear comprehension (sampajāna-kārīn) when walking up and down, looking at and around, in bending and stretching his limbs, in handling his robes and bowl, in eating, drinking, chewing and tasting, in walking, standing, sitting, lying down, sleeping, waking, speaking and remaining silent; (iv) he reflects on the body as full of different kinds of impurity (kāyaṃ ... puraṃ nāna-ppakārassa asucino paccavekkhati) (thirty-one parts of the body are listed); (v) he reflects on the body by way of the elements of earth (paṭhavi), water (āpo), fire (tejo) and wind (vāyo); (vi-xiv) he compares his body to a corpse in nine different states of putrefaction, thinking, ‘This body too is of such a nature, it will be such, it has not passed beyond this.’ These fourteen practices that can form the basis of kāyānupassanā draw on themes and stock passages that are found scattered throughout the Nikāyas. In effect, then, the various Nikāya elements that might constitute kāyānupassanā are brought together to give something of a summary account. Appended to the description of each of these fourteen practices is what might be called the expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula for kāyānupassanā. This falls into four parts:

[i] Thus with regard to the body he dwells watching body within; or he dwells watching body without; or he dwells watching body within and without. [ii] Or with regard to the body he dwells watching the nature of arising; or he dwells watching the nature of fall; or he dwells watching the nature of arising and fall. [iii] Or again, his mindfulness that there is body is established just for the sake of a degree of knowledge and a degree of recollection. [iv] And he dwells independent; he does not grasp anything in the world.73

This expanded formula is thus repeated a total of fourteen times in the course of the explanation of kāyānupassanā (though it is lost in the abbreviations of the text in sections vii-xiii above). This completes the description of kāyānupassanā.

The practice of vedanānupassanā is dealt with in just one section. Whatever kind of feeling the bhikkhu feels or experiences, he knows that he feels it (vedanam vediyāmi ... vedanam vediyāmi ti pajānāti). Examples of nine types of feeling are given. These are the basic three pleasant (sukha), unpleasant

(dukkha) and neither unpleasant nor pleasant (adukkha-m-asukha), along with the same three considered by way of association with sensuality (sāmīsa) and dissociation from sensuality (nirāmīsa). There then follow the four parts of the expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula for vedanānupassanā; that is, where before there was mention of ‘body’, there is now mention of ‘feeling’.

Like vedanānupassanā, cittānupassanā is dealt with in one section; it consists in the bhikkhu knowing (pajāṇāti) various kinds of mind (citta). Sixteen kinds in eight pairs are distinguished by way of example: the mind with passion (sārāga) and the mind without it (vīta-rāga); the mind with hatred (sadosa) and the mind without it (vīta-dosa); the mind with delusion (samoha) and the mind without it (vīta-moha); the mind that is composed (samkhīta) and the mind that is scattered (vikkhīta); the mind that has become great (mahaggata) and the mind that has not (amahaggata); the mind that is surpassable (sa-uttara) and the mind that is not (anuttara); the mind that is concentrated (samdhīta) and the mind that is not (asamdhīta); the mind that is freed (vimutta) and the mind that is not (avimutta). The four parts of the expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula for cittānupassanā follow.

Lastly dhammaṇupassanā is dealt with in five sections. The bhikkhu dwells watching dhamma(s) with regard to the five hindrances (nāvāraṇa), the five aggregates of grasping (upādāna-kkhandha), the six internal (ajjhātika) and external (bahira) spheres of sense (āyatana), the seven factors of awakening (bojjhāṅga), and the four noble truths (ariya-sacca). Each of these five categories of items is enumerated in full in the text, and to conclude each section the four parts of the expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula for dhammaṇupassanā are given in full.

The expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula thus occurs a total of twenty-one times: fourteen times for kāyānupassanā, once each for vedanānupassanā and cittānupassanā, and five times for dhammaṇupassanā. The (Mahā-)Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta then concludes with the following statement:

Now if anyone, bhikkhus, should develop these four establishments of mindfulness in this way for seven years, one of two fruits is to be expected for him: knowledge in the here and now, or, if there be a remainder of grasping, the state of non-return. Let alone seven years, bhikkhus, if anyone should develop these four establishments of mindfulness in this way for six years ... five years ... four years ... three years ... two years ... one year ... seven months ... six months ... five months ... four months ... three months ... two months ... one month ... half a month ... seven days, one of two fruits is to be expected for him: knowledge in the here and now, or, if there be a remainder of grasping, the state of non-return.

The sutta closes with a repetition of the opening ekāyana formula.

74 yo hi koci bhikkhave ime cattāro satipaṭṭhāne evam bhāveyya satta vassāni tassa dvinnam phālānaṃ aṇātaraṃ phalaṃ pāṭikānkhaṃ: diṭṭhe va dhamme aṇā sati va upādīsesa anāgāmitā. titṭhatu bhikkhave satta vassāni yo hi koci bhikkhave ime cattāro satipaṭṭhāne evam bhāveyya cha vassāni ... paṇca vassāni ... cattāri vassāni ... tīṇi vassāni ... dvē vassāni ... ekāṃ vassāṃ ... satta māsāni ... cha māsāni ... paṇca māsāni ... cattāri māsāni ... tīṇi māsāni ... dvē māsāni ... ekāṃ māsāṃ ... aṭṭha-māsāṃ ... sattahāṃ tassa dvinnam phālānaṃ aṇātaraṃ phalaṃ pāṭikānkhaṃ: diṭṭhe va dhamme aṇā sati va upādīsesa anāgāmitā.
4. The exegesis of the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula

The basic formula, then, describes a bhikkhu as dwelling watching (anupassīn) body, feeling, mind and dhammas; in each case he is said to be ardent (ātāpin), to comprehend clearly (sampajāna) and to possess mindfulness (sati-mant), having overcome desire and discontent for the world (vineyya loke abhijjhd-domanassam). What does this mean? It seems reasonable to see the progression from watching body to watching dhamma(s) as intended to indicate a movement from clear awareness of the more immediately accessible realms of experience to an awareness of what the Nikāyas see as subtler and deeper realms. Such a hierarchial conception of the universe and consciousness alike is, of course, a consistent theme of the Upaniṣads and Buddhist literature,75 and it seems that in the four satipaṭṭhānas we have another expression of it. Certainly they appear to be understood in this kind of way in later writings.76 With regard to the notion of the four satipaṭṭhānas representing a progressive refining of mindfulness, it should be noted that the Nikāyas also devote a certain amount of space to the discussion of mindfulness concerned with the body (kāya-gatā sati) quite apart from the explicit discussion of the first establishing of mindfulness. Thus the Kāyagatāsati-sutta consists basically of an alternative treatment of precisely the same set of fourteen activities that are given in the (Mahā-)Satipatthāna-sutta under the heading kāyānupassanā.77 The reason why kāya-gatā sati is singled out for extra treatment would seem to be that it is considered the common basis for the subsequent development of all mindfulness.

The basic satipaṭṭhāna formula attributed four qualities to the bhikkhu engaged in the practice of satipaṭṭhāna: he is one who watches (anupassin); he is ardent (ātāpin); he is one who comprehends clearly (sampajāna); he possesses mindfulness (sati-mant). The Vibhaṅga’s ‘analysis according to the principles of Sutta’ (suttanta-bhājaniya) of the satipaṭṭhāna formula spells out the more or less technical association these terms had acquired by the time of the emergent Abhidhamma. The terms anupassin and sampajāna connote ‘wisdom’, thus in explanation of each the Vibhaṅga gives the appropriate Dhammasangani register of associated terms.80 The implications of satimant are obvious enough; the Vibhaṅga gives the standard register of terms for sati in full.79 The term ātāpin is taken by the Vibhaṅga to connote ‘strength’ or ‘vigour’ (viriya); once again it gives the appropriate Dhammasaṅgāni register of associated terms.80

75 Cf. Przyluski and Lamotte, op. cit. pp. 148-54 where the Upaniṣad conception of a universe of three levels corresponding to the waking state, sleep accompanied by dreams and deep sleep is compared to the Buddhist notion of three realms or dhātus. On the waking state (jāgaritā-sthāna), dream state (svapna-sthāna) and deep sleep (sūsupti) in Vedānta see K. Werner, Yoga and Indian Philosophy, Delhi, 1977, pp. 68-70.

76 E.g. Abhidh-k 342 states that the order of their arising results from seeing what is gross (audārika) first.

77 M III 88-99.

78 Vibh 194-5; cf. Dhs 9-17.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.
The early para-canonical exegetical work, the *Nettippakarana*, carries out a similar exercise in the analysis of the *satipaṭṭhāna* formula—but rather more succinctly:

*Tasmāt iha tam bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassin viharati atāpi sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhā-domanassam: atāpi, that is to say, the faculty of strength; sampajāno, that is to say, the faculty of wisdom; satimā, that is to say, the faculty of mindfulness ...*  

In their analysis of these terms in the *satipaṭṭhāna* formula the later *aṭṭha-kathās* follow the lead of the *Vibhaṅga* and *Nettippakarana*. Clearly what the *Vibhaṅga*, *Nettippakarana* and commentaries wish to do here is make connections; they wish to link the *satipaṭṭhāna* formula to the broader scheme of the Nikāya outlook. It would not, I think, be strictly correct to describe their method here as ‘innovation’, rather they formalize something that is looser but already present in the Nikāyas. It would be hard, for example, not to recognize in the four primary Nikāyas the special association of probably all terms derived from the roots jñā, ‘to know’, and dhā and paś, ‘to see’. From the point of view of the present study it is worth bearing in mind that the *Vibhaṅga* analysis of anupassin, atāpin, sampajāna and satimant associates these terms directly with the faculties and powers of wisdom, strength and mindfulness; with right view, right strength and right mindfulness. As I hope will emerge in the course of this study, the kind of interweaving of the elements of the seven sets involved here lies at the very heart of the treatment of the seven sets in the Nikāyas.

The concluding phrase of the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula, vineyya loke abhijjhā-domanassam, is of some interest. The *Vibhaṅga* states that the ‘world’ referred to here is either simply the body or the five aggregates of grasping (upādāna-ikkhandha), presumably on the grounds that, apart from the unconditioned, there is no world other than the five aggregates. As for abhijjhā and domanassa, the *Vibhaṅga* explains these terms by reference to registers of associated terms for desire (rāga) and unpleasant feeling (dukkha) respectively. According to the *Vibhaṅga*, then, the whole phrase means that this desire for and discontent with the world are repeatedly dispelled (vinīta, paṭivinīta), stilled (santa, samita, viśanta), ended (appita, vyappita), dried up (sosita, viśosita); an end is put to them (vyantikata). The *Nettippakarana*’s brief

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81 Nett 82-3.  
82 Vibh 195.  
84 Vibh 195. The register for abhijjhā here is rāgo sārāgo amunayo amurodho nandi nandi-rāgo cittaśa sārāgo (see Vibh 145 where the same set of terms explains tanhā); this is not the same as the register used for abhijjhā at Dhs 79, though it does form the opening of the explanation of lobha as akusala-hetu at Dhs 189. The register for dukkha at Vibh 195 is cetasikam asātām cetasikam dukkham cetosamphassajam asātām dukkham vedayitam ceto-samphassaṁ asātā dukkhabhāvān; cf. Dhs 84.  
85 Vibh 195.
comment here is perhaps rather more suggestive: ‘*Vineyya loke abhijjhā-domanassam*, that is to say, the faculty of concentration (*samādhindriyā*).’

What the *aṭṭha-kathās* have to say on this phrase makes clear the import of the *Nettipakaraṇa*’s comment. According to Buddhaghosa the term *vineyya* refers either to *tad-āṅga-vinaya* or *vikkhambhana-vinaya*, which are presumably the same as *tad-āṅga-ppahāna* or ‘abandoning by substitution of opposites’ and *vikkhambhana-ppahāna* or ‘abandoning by suppression’. According to the *Paṭissambhidāmagga*, ‘for one who develops the first *jhāna* there is abandoning of the hindrances by suppression’, while ‘for one developing concentration that partakes of penetration there is abandoning of views by substitution of opposites’. The *Visuddhimagga* gives two similar but rather more general definitions: *vikkhambhana-ppahāna* is ‘the suppressing of adverse *dhammas* such as the hindrances by any kind of ordinary concentration*; *tad-āṅga-ppahāna* is ‘the abandoning of any *dhamma* that is to be abandoned by means of whatever factor of knowledge and of insight that is its opposite’.

These two types of abandoning are principally contrasted with *samuccheda-ppahāna* or ‘abandoning by cutting off’. This operates ‘for one who develops the transcendent path that leads to the destruction of the *āsavas*’ and consists in ‘the abandoning of *dhammas* that are fetters etc. by means of the knowledge of the noble path, such that they do not occur again’. Thus the basic point of contrast is that this last form of abandoning abandons defilements finally and absolutely, for once and for all, while the two preceding kinds of abandoning abandon defilements only temporarily—principally in meditation, be it calm (*samatha*) or insight (*vipassanā*).

Returning to the terms *abhijjhā* and *domanassa*, Buddhaghosa says that since these terms imply the two principal hindrances, namely sensual desire (*kāma-cchanda*) and aversion (*vyāpāda*), they in fact stand in for tiredness and lethargy (*thīna-middha*), excitement and depression (*uddhacca-kukkucca*) and doubt (*vicikiccha*) as well, so that all five hindrances are included:

But here since taking *abhijjhā* includes *kāma-cchanda*, and taking *domanassa* includes *vyāpāda*, therefore it should be understood that the abandoning of the hindrances is spoken of by indicating the pair that is strong among those items that make up the hindrances. 

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86 Nett 83.

87 Sv III 758 = Ps I 243 = Vibh-a 220: *tattha vineyyā ti tad-āṅga-vinayena vā vikkhambhana-vinayena vā vinayītyā*.

88 Paṭīs I 27: *vikkhambhana-ppahānañca nivaranāṇam paṭhama-jhāhanno bhāvayato, tad-āṅga-ppahānañca diṭṭhi-gatānañca nibbidha-bhāgīyam samādhiṃ bhāvayato*.

89 Vism XXII 111: *tena tena lokiya-samādhiṃ nivaranāṇanāṃ paccañika-dhammaṃ vikkhambhamaṃ*.

90 Vism XXII 112: *tena tena vipassanāya avayava-bhūtānaṃ nāṇaṅgena paṭiṭṭhakka-vaseneva tassa tassa pahātatta-dhammaṃ pahānāṃ*.

91 Vism XXII 110.

92 Paṭīs I 27: *samuccheda-ppahānañca lokuttara-khaya-gāmi-maggam bhāvayato*.

93 Vism XXII 122: *ariya-magga-nāṇena samyojanañāṇam dhammanāṃ yathā na puna pavattanti*.

Paṭīs I 27 also mentions a variety of subsidiary types of abandoning.

94 Sv III 759 = Ps I 244 = Vibh-a 220: *yasāma paṭīṭha abhijjhā-ppahānena kāma-cchando domanassa-ppahānena vyāpāda saṅgahe ācchati tasmai nivarana-pariyāpanna-balava-dhamma-
At first sight the commentarial explanation of \textit{vineya loke abhijjhā-domānassāṁ} might seem rather complicated and involved, yet with its technical edge dulled the commentarial viewpoint is in effect simply that the \textit{satipaṭṭhānas} are only properly practised when the mind is at least temporarily free from the five hindrances; that is to say, it is only when the mind has been made still, calm, happy and lucid that the body, feelings, the mind itself and \textit{dhamma(s)} can be truly ‘watched’. It seems to me that as much is already quite explicit in a number of Nikāya treatments of the basic \textit{satipaṭṭhāna} formula; at the very least these treatments make it clear why the commentaries give the explanations they do.

The following \textit{Majjhima-nikāya} passage quite plainly sees the abandoning of the five hindrances as the prelude to the practice of the four \textit{satipaṭṭhānas}:

He sits down, bending his legs into a crosslegged position; holding his body straight he causes mindfulness to stand near around the face. Abandoning desire for the world he dwells with a mind from which desire has been removed; he purifies his mind from desire. Abandoning the stain of aversion he dwells with a mind without aversion, compassionate and friendly towards all creatures and beings; he purifies his mind from the stain of aversion and hatred. Abandoning tiredness and lethargy he dwells with tiredness and lethargy removed, observing brightness, mindful and comprehending clearly; he purifies his mind from tiredness and lethargy. Abandoning agitation and depression he dwells unagitated with his mind stilled within; he purifies his mind from agitation and depression. Abandoning doubt he dwells as one who has crossed over doubt, not wondering about skilful \textit{dhammas}; he purifies his mind from doubt. Abandoning these five hindrances which are defilements of the mind and weaken wisdom, with regard to the body he dwells watching body, ardent, comprehending clearly, with mindfulness, having overcome desire for and discontent with the world; with regard to feelings ... with regard to the mind ... with regard to \textit{dhamma}s he dwells watching \textit{dhamma}, ardent, comprehending clearly, with mindfulness, having overcome desire for and discontent with the world.

Just as, Aggivessana, an elephant tamer plants a great stake in the earth and tethers a wild elephant to it by the neck in order to subdue [in him] the ways and thoughts of the wild, the distress, strain and discomforts of the wild; in order to make him pleasing to villagers; in order that he should adopt ways that are agreeable to men. Just so, Aggivessana, these four \textit{satipaṭṭhānas} are tethers for the mind for the abandoning of the ways and thoughts of the world, for the abandoning of the distress, strain and discomforts of the world, for the obtaining of \textit{nibbānā}.\footnote{dvaya-dassanena nīvarana-ppahānām vuttaṃ hoti ti veditabbām. (The taking of dūmanna includes \textit{vyāpāda} because all \textit{citta} rooted in aversion is accompanied by unpleasant mental feeling.)}

\textit{M} III 135-6: so \textit{abhijjhām loke paḥāya vigatābhijjhena cetassā viharati abhijjhāya cittām pariṣodhethi. byāpāda-padosā paḥāya abyāpāna-citto viharati sabba-pāṇa-bhūta-hitānukampī byāpāda-padosā cittām pariṣodhethi. thīna-middham paḥāya vigata-thīna-middhī viharati aloka-saḥnī sato sampajjāno thīna-middhā cittām pariṣodhethi. uddhacca-kukkuccā paḥāya anuddhato viharati ajhhattam vūpasanta-citto uddhacca-kukkuccā cittām pariṣodhethi. vīcīkechham paḥāya tīma-vīcīkecho viharati akathān-kathā kusaleṣu dhammesu vīcīkechāya cittām pariṣodhethi. so ime paṭca nīvarānā paḥāya cetaso upakkileṣe paḥāya dubbālīkaraṇe kāye kāyānapassī viharati uṭāpi sampajjāno satimā vineyā loke abhijjha-domānassām. vedanāsu ... citte ... dhammesu ... sāyathāpi Aggivessana haṭṭhi-damako mahantam thambham pathaviyam nikhaṇṭvā āraṃkhaṇaṃ no gassass gīvāya upanibandhāti āraṃkhaṇānī c’eva sūtanām abhinimmadanāya āraṃkhaṇānī c’eva sānkappanām abhinimmadanāya āraṃkhaṇānī c’eva daratha-kilanathā-parifāhānānī abhinimmadanāya gāmane abhiramāpanāya manussa-kantese sīlesu saṃādapanāya. evam eva kho Aggivessana arīya-sāvēkassa...}
It is clear that as far as this passage is concerned the activity of kāyānupassanā, vedanānupassanā, cittānupassanā and dhammānupassanā is seen as associated initially with the first jhāna. The account continues with the instruction to the bhikkhu that as he dwells watching body, feeling, mind and dhamma he should not ‘think thoughts’ that are connected with body, and the rest (mā ca kāyāpasamhiṭṭam ... vedanāpasamhiṭṭam ... cittāpasamhiṭṭam ... dhammāpasamhiṭṭam vitakkaṃ vitakkesti). So ‘as a result of the stilling of initial and sustained thought he dwells having attained the second jhāna [which is] inward composition, a state of unification of mind, without initial and sustained thought, born of concentration, having joy and happiness’ (so vitakka-vicārānaṃ vūpasamā ajjhattaṃ sampāsādanaṃ cetaso ekodhi-bhāvam avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhijānaṃ pīti-sukhān duṭiya-jhānāṃ ... upasampajja viharati). The bhikkhu thus proceeds to the third and fourth jhānas and finally knows dukkha, its arising, its cessation and the way leading to its cessation; he knows that his mind is finally free of the āsavas.

The following Samyutta-nikāya passage again deals with the calming of the mind by the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas and the subsequent stilling of vitakka and vicāra or ‘initial and sustained thought’:

Here, Ānanda, with regard to the body a bhikkhu dwells watching body, ardent, comprehending clearly, with mindfulness, having overcome desire for and discontent with the world. As he dwells watching body with regard to the body, discomfort arises in the body taking the body as its object, or the mind is depressed, or the mind is scattered without. Then, Ānanda, the bhikkhu should apply his mind to some sign that brings about composure. As he applies his mind to a sign that brings about composure, gladness is born; for one who is gladdened joy is born; the body of one whose mind is joyful becomes tranquil; one whose body is tranquil feels happiness; the mind of one who is happy becomes concentrated. Thus he reflects: ‘The purpose for which I applied my mind is accomplished in me; now let me withhold [my mind].’ He withholds and has neither initial nor sustained thought. He knows: ‘I am without initial and sustained thought; mindful within, I am at ease.’

Once again, then, the terminology used is elsewhere in the Nikāyas associated with the description of the attainment jhāna. As I shall have occasion to remark again, the sequence ‘gladness is born ... the mind of one who is happy becomes concentrated’ is of considerable importance in Nikāya spiritual psychology, and is classically used in the Silakkhandha-vagga of the Dīgha-nikāya to introduce the attainment of the first jhāna.

\[\text{ime cattāro satipaṭṭhānaṃ cetāso uponibbādhānaṃ honti gehasiṭṭānaṃ c'eva sīlānaṃ abhinimmedanāya gehasiṭṭānaṃ c'eva saṃkappānaṃ abhinimmedanāya gehasiṭṭānaṃ c'eva daraṇa-kilamathā-parijhānaṃ abhinimmedanāya nāyassā adhibbādhānāya nibbhānaṃ sa-cakkhikiriyāya.}\]


97 See below, pp. 169-70.
An extended simile in the satipaṭṭhāna-sāmañjutta states in more general terms the principle that the successful practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas depends more or less on calming and concentrating the mind:

Suppose, bhikkhus, that an immature, unaccomplished and unskilful cook were to serve a king or king’s minister with various kinds of sauce—sour, bitter, spicy, sweet, hot and salty. Now the immature, unaccomplished and unskilful cook does not take note of his master’s signals: ‘Today this sauce pleases my master, or he reaches out for this one, or he takes a lot of this one, or he speaks in praise of this one ...’ The immature, unaccomplished and unskilful cook gains no clothing, no payment, no gratuities. What is the reason? Because, bhikkhus, the immature, unaccomplished and unskilful cook does not take note of his master’s signals.

Just so, bhikkhus, some immature, unaccomplished and unskilful bhikkhu with regard to the body dwells watching body, ardent, comprehending clearly, with mindfulness, having overcome desire for and discontent with the world. While he dwells watching body with regard to the body, his mind does not become concentrated, the defilements are not abandoned, he does not take up the sign...

With regard to feelings ...

With regard to mind ...

With regard to dhammas ...

The immature, unaccomplished and unskilful bhikkhu gains no happy-dwelling in the here and now, no mindfulness and clear comprehension. What is the reason? Because, bhikkhus, he does not take up the sign of his own mind.98

The passage continues by describing the case of the masterful, accomplished and skilful (panḍito vyutto kusalo) cook and the masterful, accomplished and skilful bhikkhu. Such a cook does take note of his master’s signals, and as a result does receive clothing, wages and gratuities. Similarly such a bhikkhu’s mind does become concentrated, the defilements are abandoned, and he does take up the sign of his own mind. As a result he does gain ‘happy dwelling’ in the here and now, he does gain mindfulness and clear comprehension.

Other passages might be cited that underline the general point.99 The Kāyagatāsati-sutta, for example, has the following refrain in the fourteen places where the (Mahā-)Satipatthāna-sutta gives the expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula for kāyānupassanā:

For one who dwells thus heedful, ardent, with application, worldly memories and thoughts are abandoned; as a result of their abandoning the mind becomes stilled

98 S V 149-50: seyyathāpi bhikkhave bālo avyatto akusalo sūdo rājānam vā rāja-mahāmattrānam vā nānaccayeyi sūpehi paccupaṭṭhito assa ambilaggehi pi ittakaggehi pi katukaggehi pi madhuraggehi pi khāṛikehi pi akhārīkehi pi lonikehi pi aloṇikehi pi. sa kā bhikkhave bālo avyatto akusalo sūdo sakassa bhattussa nimittam na uggahāti: idam vā me aja bhattu sūpeyyam rucaiti, imassa vā abbhiharati, imassa vā bāhum gahāti, imassa vā vāpnaṃ bhāsati ... ti. sa kā bhikkhave bālo avyatto akusalo sūdo na c’eva labhi hoti acchādānassa na ābhīṣhetassa na ābhīṣhetānaṃ. tam kissa hetu. tathā hi so bhikkhave bālo avyatto akusalo sūdo sakassa bhattussa nimittam na uggahāti. evam eva kā bhikkhave idh’ekacco bālo avyatto akusalo bālīkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati ... tassa kāye kāyānupassino viharato cittam na samādhiyaiti upakkūlesa na pahiyyanti. sa tam nimittam na uggahāti ... sa kā bālo avyatto akusalo bālīkhu na ābhīṣheti ājīhe vā dhamme suka-viharānam, na ābhīṣhetānaṃ. tam kissa hetu. tathā hi sa kā bālo avyatto akusalo bālīkhu sakassa cittassā nimittam na uggahāti. (Quoted in part at Vism IV 122.)

99 Cf. S V 145-6 which contrasts the five nivaranas as an accumulation of non-skill (akusala-rāśi) with the four satipaṭṭhānas as an accumulation of skill (kusala-rāśi). At M I 301 (Cūḷavedalla-sutta) the four satipaṭṭhānas are termed ‘sign of concentration’ (samādhi-nimitta). See also S V 144-5.
within, composed, unified and concentrated. In this way, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu develops mindfulness concerned with the body.\footnote{M III 89-94 (passim): tassa evam appamattassa atāpino pahitattassa viharato ye gehasi tā sara-saṃkkappā te pahiyanti, tesam pahānā ajjhattam eva cittam saṃtiṣṭhāti samisiddhī ekodihi samādiyati, evam pī bhikkhove bhikkhu kāya-gataṃ satim hāveti.}

The Nikāyas and later tradition appear to be agreed, then, that the successful practice of the four establishings of mindfulness is dependent on the stilling of the mind by the abandoning of the five hindrances. Of course, for the commentaries the mind that is without the five hindrances is of two basic types—it is either stilled in ‘access’ concentration (upacāra-samādhi) or in full ‘absorption’ (appanā) equivalent to full jhāna; any such distinction would seem to be lacking in the Nikāyas.\footnote{See L.S. Cousins, ‘Buddhist Jhāna’, Religion 3 (1973) p. 118; Vism IV 32-3.} With this proviso, it seems to me that the substance of the commentarial understanding of the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula is already contained in the above Nikāya passages.

To sum up, the point I wish to make is no doubt simple enough, but it can be overlooked. For the Nikāyas and later tradition the effective practice of the establishings of mindfulness is seen as presupposing a certain degree of concentration (samādhi) or calm (samatha). Of course, what is clear is that this concentration or calm is itself the outcome of the preparatory practice of the establishings of mindfulness—especially of the various exercises associated with watching the body. It might be said, then, that in order to practice the satipaṭṭhānas the bhikkhu requires concentration; in order to acquire concentration he practises the satipaṭṭhānas. Stated without paradox, this means that the texts distinguish between the initial stages of the establishing of mindfulness, which are preparatory in nature, and the establishing of mindfulness proper.

5. The expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula

The first part of the expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula describes a bhikkhu as watching body, feelings, mind and dhammas initially ‘within’ (ajjhattam) then ‘without’ (bahiddhā) and finally ‘within and without’ (ajjhatta-bahiddhā).\footnote{Occasionally the triad ajjhattam/bahiddhā/ajjhatta-bahiddhā is added straight to the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula (e.g. Vibh 193); the addition of adhyātmaṃ/bahirdhā is standard in Buddhist Sanskrit sources, see above, p. 29, n. 2.} The significance of the terms ajjhattam and bahiddhā is clear enough from the Abhidhamma texts onwards: that which refers to oneself is ‘within’ and that which refers to other beings and persons (para-satta, para-puggala) is ‘without’.\footnote{E.g. Dhs 187-8.} There seems to be little reason to suppose that their significance is any different in the Nikāyas. The bhikkhu, then, first watches his own body, feelings, mind and dhammas, next those of others, and finally his own and those of others together. This is of some interest.

The idea of watching another’s body is no doubt clear enough if we are talking of the parts of a body or a corpse, but when we are talking of the breath the idea is perhaps a little harder to grasp. The subcommentary here
makes the point that watching another’s breath concerns the development of insight and not the development of full jhāna or absorption (appanā). The idea of watching another’s feelings, mind and dhammas is perhaps even more curious. The commentary is of little help here except to confirm that this is indeed the meaning intended. Interestingly, though, some ancient authors give alternative explanations. Although it appears that he too had before him the terms adhyātma/bahirddha, the author of the *Mahāprajāpāramitā-sāstra gives an explanation in terms of feeling that is ādhyātmika or bāhya: feeling that is directly associated with the five [sense-] consciousnesses (pañca-vijnāna-samprayukta-vedanā) is bāhya; feeling directly associated with bare mind-consciousness (mano-vijnāna-samprayukta-vedanā) ādhyātmika. However, this is not the only explanation given by the author of the *Mahāprajāpāramitā-sāstra; the rest of his discussion of this point with regard to vedanā-, citta- and dharma-smṛty-upapātha suggests that he too envisaged that the yogin progressed by watching the feelings, mind and dhammas of others.

It might be suggested that the way the sutta formulation includes the progression ajihhatam/bahirddha/ajihatta-bahirddha for all four sati-paññās is simply mechanical, and that the later exegetical works are thus left with the job of making sense of an accident. But this is much too convenient. Elsewhere the Nikāyas can be quite definite in leaving out of consideration what should be left out of consideration. If this whole matter is to be given an explanation on the theoretical level, then it must be understood, I think, as to do with the blurring of distinctions between self and other—something which is, of course, entirely consistent with the notion of not-self in Buddhist thought. Thus as the bhikkhu watches body, feelings, mind and dhammas within, without, within and without, rather than seeing a world made up of distinct ‘persons’ or ‘selves’, he becomes progressively aware of a world of dhamma made up entirely of dhammas all of which are ‘not-self’. Of some interest in this connection is a passage from the *Dīgha-nikāya which tends to confirm that something of this nature is envisaged:

Here a bhikkhu with regard to the body dwells watching body within, ardent, comprehending clearly, with mindfulness, having overcome desire for and discontent with the world. As he dwells watching body within with regard to the body, he

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105 E.g. Vibh-a 268; Sv III 775, 777, 782; Ps I 279, 280, 286, 287, 289, 300, 301.
106 Cf. Pāli arijhatika and bāhira, usually applied to the six internal āyatanas (cakkhu, sota, ghāna, jivhā, kāya, mano) and six external āyatanas (rūpa, sadda, Gandha, rasa, phoṭhabba, dhamma) respectively (see Dhs 211, 255). See also Vibh 67: viññāna-kkhandha is arijhatika; vedanā, saññā- and samkhāra-kkhandhas are bāhira; rūpa-kkhandha may be either.
107 Traité, III 1173-4.
108 Id., 1174-5.
109 Cf. S III 167: The bhikkhu in the four jhānas sees rūpa, vedanā, saññā, samkhāras and viññāna as not self, etc.; in the first three arūpa attainments rūpa is left out because there is no rūpa there to be seen as not self, etc.; the fourth arūpa attainment is left out of consideration altogether not because here vedanā, etc. are self, but presumably because in the sphere of ‘neither saññā nor not saññā’ vedanā, etc. are so subtle as to make it impossible to achieve consciously the vision of not-self, etc.
becomes rightly concentrated thereon, rightly settled. Being rightly concentrated thereon, rightly settled, he brings about knowledge and vision with regard to the body of another without... With regard to feelings... With regard to mind... With regard to dharmas... Being rightly concentrated thereon, rightly settled, he brings about knowledge and vision with regard to dharmas of another without.\textsuperscript{110}

The second and fourth parts of the expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula are best dealt with together. I do not wish to comment further on the third part; suffice to say that it underlines what has already been said about the relationship between mindfulness and wisdom.

So in the course of watching body, feelings, mind and dhamma the bhikkhu goes on to watch the nature of arising (samudaya-dhamma), the nature of fall (vaya-dhamma), and the nature of arising and fall (samudaya-vaya-dhamma).\textsuperscript{111} Finally he dwells 'independent' or 'unattached' (anissita) and does not grasp anything in the world (na ca kīci loke upādiyati). Possibly this last remark should be taken as merely a variation on 'having overcome desire for and discontent with the world', but the commentary appears to read rather more into it than this. The expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula describes 'the way of release as far as arahant-ship' (yāva arahattā niyyāna-mukhaṁ),\textsuperscript{112} and referring to that twenty-one occurrences of the expanded formula in the sutta, the (Mahā-)Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta is described as 'the teaching that is taught culminating in arahantship in twenty-one places' (ekavisati thānesu arahatta-nikūṭena desītā desanā).\textsuperscript{113} Why are these things said in the commentaries?

The language of the second and fourth parts of the expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula seems to echo other Nikāya passages with particular connotations:

And then, bhikkhus, after some time the bodhisatta Vipassin dwelt watching rise and fall with regard to the five aggregates of grasping: thus is form, thus is the arising of form, thus is the disappearance of form; thus is feeling... perception... formations... consciousness, thus is the arising of consciousness, thus is the disappearance of consciousness. And as he dwelt watching rise and fall with regard to the five aggregates of grasping his mind was soon freed from the āsavas through not grasping.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{110} D II 216: idha kho bhikkhu ajjhanna käye käyanupassī viharati atāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhīa-domanassam. ajjhanna käye käyanupassī viharantī tathā samām samādhiyati samām vipassadati. so iatteha samām samāhiito samām vipassanno bahiddhā para-kāye nāga-dassanam abhinibbatte... ajjhanna dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati atāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhīa-domanassam. ajjhanna dhammesu dhammānupassī viharantī tathā samām samādhiyati samām vipassadati. so iatteha samām samāhiito samām vipassanno bahiddhā para-dhammesu nāga-dassanam abhinibbattte.

\textsuperscript{111} As is usual in the translation of this passage, I have taken sānudaya-dhamma and vaya-dhamma as meaning 'having the nature of rise/fall'; cf. A.K. Warder, JIP 1 (1971), pp. 282–3 on this usage of dhamma in the Nikāyas. The commentaries (āṭṭhakathā), however, take dhamma as indicating the conditions for the arising and the fall of body, etc. (see Sv III 765, 768, 769; Ps I 249–50), although the subcommentaries also allow that dhamma can have the sense of 'nature' here (DAT II 381; Ps-pt (Be) I 350: pakatti-vatē vā dhamma-saddo). In the end the point would seem to make little difference to the general purport of the expression: the bhikkhu sees how body, etc., arise and fall away.

\textsuperscript{112} Sv III 766; Ps I 250, 270, 274, 280.

\textsuperscript{113} Sv III 806; Ps I 302.

\textsuperscript{114} D II 35: atha kho bhikkhave Vipassī bodhisatto apareṇa samayena paccas' upādana-kkhandesu udaya-vyayānupassī vihāsi: iti rūpaṃ iti rūpassa samudayo iti rūpassa atthagamo, iti vedanā... iti

\textsuperscript{116} D II 216: idha kho bhikkhu ajjhanna käye käyanupassī viharati atāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhīa-domanassam. ajjhanna käye käyanupassī viharantī tathā samām samādhiyati samām vipassadati. so iatteha samām samāhiito samām vipassanno bahiddhā para-kāye nāga-dassanam abhinibbatte... ajjhanna dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati atāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhīa-domanassam. ajjhanna dhammesu dhammānupassī viharantī tathā samām samādhiyati samām vipassadati. so iatteha samām samāhiito samām vipassanno bahiddhā para-dhammesu nāga-dassanam abhinibbattte.

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As I have commented elsewhere, the practice of watching rise and fall with regard to the five aggregates of grasping seems to be particularly associated with the gaining of the insight that leads directly to the destruction of the āsavas, directly to awakening. That the Nikāyas also take it that kāyānupassanā, vedanānupassanā, cittānupassanā and dhammānupassanā each lead directly to the destruction of the āsavas seems to be stated in the following:

Here, Śāriputta, a bhikkhu with regard to the body dwells watching body, ardent, clearly comprehending, with mindfulness, having overcome desire for and discontent with the world. As he dwells watching body with regard to the body his mind becomes free from passion, is freed from the āsavas through not grasping ... With regard to feelings ... With regard to mind ... With regard to dhammas ...

Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu with regard to the body dwells watching body ... As he dwells watching body with regard to the body, the body is fully known; due to full knowledge of the body the deathless is realized ... With regard to feelings ... With regard to the mind ... With regard to dhammas ...

In a rather similar way, for the bhikkhu who develops mindfulness concerned with the body ten benefits (ānissamsā) are to be expected; the last of these is the destruction of the āsavas.

The implications of all this are rather interesting when considered in relationship to the notion of the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas. Certainly as far as the commentaries are concerned it is clear that although there may be thirty-seven dhammas that contribute to awakening, the very first of these, namely the first satipaṭṭhāna, is capable of taking the bhikkhu all the way to final awakening, to arahant-ship. What of the other thirty-six? For the moment I raise the question without attempting to offer a full answer. It is something to be borne in mind as this study proceeds.

A slightly different but perhaps complementary perspective is to be gained from the full Nikāya treatment of mindfulness of breathing in and out (ānāpāna-sati). Consider the following:

[i] When a bhikkhu breathing in long, knows: ‘I breathe in long’; breathing out long ... breathing in short ... breathing out short ... When he trains himself: ‘I shall breathe in experiencing the whole body ... I shall breathe out ... I shall breathe in tranquillizing the forces of the body ... I shall breathe out ... ’—at that time with regard to the body he dwells watching the body ...

[ii] When a bhikkhu trains himself: ‘I shall breathe in experiencing joy ... I shall breathe out ... I shall breathe in experiencing happiness ... I shall breathe out ... I shall breathe in experiencing the forces of the mind ... I shall breathe out ... I shall
breathe in tranquillizing the forces of the mind ... I shall breathe out ... ’—at that
time with regard to feelings he dwells watching feeling ...

[iii] When a bhikkhu trains himself: ‘I shall breathe in experiencing the mind ... I
shall breathe out ... I shall breathe in gladdening the mind ... I shall breathe out ...
I shall breathe in concentrating the mind ... I shall breathe out ... I shall breathe in freeing the mind ... I shall breathe out ... ’—at that time with regard to mind he
dwells watching mind ...

 [iv] When a bhikkhu trains himself: ‘I shall breathe in watching impermanence ...
I shall breathe out ... I shall breathe in watching dispassion ... I shall breathe out ...
I shall breathe in watching cessation ... I shall breathe out ... I shall breathe in
watching letting-go ... I shall breathe out ... ’—at that time with regard to
 dhammas he dwells watching dhamma ...

Developed in this way, made great in this way, mindfulness of breathing in and
out brings the four establishings of mindfulness to fulfilment.119

From this it seems that the first sati paṭṭhāna or kāyānupassanā is in itself
strictly insufficient to bring the bhikkhu to the conclusion of the path to
awakening. The treatment of mindfulness of breathing in and out in the
(Mahā-)Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta rather pointedly breaks off after the first ‘tet-
rad’120—the tetrad that in the full ānāpāna-sati treatment is explicitly identi-
fied with the first sati paṭṭhāna. This leaves three more tetrads which in the full
treatment are associated with the second, third and fourth sati paṭṭhānas
respectively. What is interesting in the full treatment is the way in which
ānāpāna-sati begins as the vehicle for the first sati paṭṭhāna and finishes up as a
vehicle for all four. Thus by starting with the watching of the breath as ‘body’
the bhikkhu naturally progresses to the watching of feeling, mind and dhammas
through the medium of the breath. Finally this brings to fulfilment not only
the four sati paṭṭhānas, but also the seven factors of awakening, and knowledge
and freedom (vījā-vimuttī).121

The essential unity of the four sati paṭṭhānas is perhaps suggested by the
following:

Suppose, Ānanda, there were a great pile of dirt at [the junction of] four highways.

119 M III 83-5 = S V 329-31 = 336-7: [i] yasmīm samaye bhikkhu dihanā vā assasanto dihanā
assissāmi ti pajānāti; dihanā vā passasanto ... rassām vā assasanto ... rassām vā passasanto ...
sabba-kāya-pātaśanvedi assissassāmi ti sikkhati ... passissassāmi ... passambhayam kāya-samkhrām
assissassāmi ... passissassāmi ... kāye kâyānupassī bhikkhave tasmin samaye viharati ... [ii] yasmīm
samaye bhikkhave bhikkhu pūti-pātaśanvedi assissassāmi ti sikkhati ... passissassāmi ... sukhā-pātaśan-
vedi assissassāmi ... passissassāmi ... citta-samkhrāma-pātaśanvedi assissassāmi ... passissassāmi ...
passambhayam citta-samkhrāma assissassāmi ... passissassāmi ... vedānasū vedaṇānupassī bhikkhave
tasmin samaye viharati ... [iii] yasmīm samaye bhikkhave bhikkhu citta-pātaśanvedi assissassāmi ti
sikkhati ... passissassāmi ... abhippamodayaṁ cittām assissassāmi ... passissassāmi ... samadāhām
cittām assissassāmi ... passissassāmi ... vimocayaṁ cittām assissassāmi ... passissassāmi ... citta
cittānupassī bhikkhave tasmin samaye bhikkhu viharati ... [iv] yasmīm samaye bhikkhave bhikkhu
anīcchānupassī assissassāmi ti sikkhati ... passissassāmi ... virāgānupassī assissassāmi ... passissassāmi ...
nirodhānupassī assissassāmi ... passissassāmi ... paṭinissagānupassī assissassāmi ... passissassāmi ...
dhammesu dhammānupassī bhikkhave tasmin samaye bhikkhu viharati ... evam bhāvitā kho bhikkh-
ave ānāpāna-sati evam bahullikatā cattāro satipaṭṭhāne paripāreti.

120 Catukka, the term used in the commentary. Each catukka gives four ways in which the
bhikkhu experiences the breath.

121 M III 82 (see also S V 329-40, passim): ānāpāna-sati bhikkhave bhāvitā bahullikatā cattāro
sati paṭṭhāne paripāreti. cattāro satipaṭṭhāna bhāvitā ... satta bojhange paripārenti. satta bojhaṅga
bhāvitā ... vījā-vimuttīm paripārenti.
A cart or chariot coming from the eastern direction would destroy that pile of dirt; a cart or chariot coming from the western direction ... the northern direction ... the southern direction would destroy that pile of dirt. Just so, Ananda, when a bhikkhu with regard to the body dwells watching body he too destroys bad unskilful dhammas ... with regard to feelings ... the mind ... dhammas ... \[122\]

In all this we appear to have two perspectives on the same thing. On the one hand, the whole of the path to awakening is subsumed within the first establishing of mindfulness without reference to the other three. On the other hand, the first establishing of mindfulness taken to its own conclusion actually subsumes the other three establishments of mindfulness.

Finally, returning briefly to the question of the relationship of the four satipaṭṭhānas to the seven bojjhāgas, the notion that the development of the four satipaṭṭhānas leads directly to the fulfilment of the seven bojjhāgas and knowledge and freedom reflects the overall structure of the (Mahā-)Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta itself, which culminates in the watching of the seven bojjhāgas and the four noble truths.\[123\] Perhaps not surprisingly, then, a statement to the effect that the Buddhist path consists essentially in the abandoning of the five hindrances, the development of the establishments of mindfulness and subsequent development of the awakening-factors is found several times in the Nikāyas:

All those who escaped from the world [in the past], or escape [now], or will escape [in the future], did so, do so and will [continue] to do so by abandoning the five hindrances which are defilements of the mind that weaken wisdom, and, with minds well established in the four establishments of mindfulness, by developing the seven awakening-factors thus present.\[124\]

This summary of the Buddhist path in terms of abandoning the five nīvarānas, establishing the four satipaṭṭhānas and developing the seven bojjhāugas is of some interest. First, in opposing the four satipaṭṭhānas to the five nīvarānas, it once more associates the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas with the practice of jhāna. Further, it seems to have some bearing on the way the practices that constitute the first and fourth satipaṭṭhānas/smṛty-upasthānas are specified in ancient Buddhist literature. For example, while the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta gives six basic methods for kāyānupassanā (taking the nine corpse-contemplations as one) and five methods of dhammānupassanā, the Vibhaṅga refers only to watching the different parts of the body under kāyānupassanā,

\[122\] S V 325: seyyathāpi Ānanda catu-mahā-pathe mahā-pamsu-puñjo puratthimāya ce pi disāya āgaccheyya sakatām vā ratho vā upahanat eva tām pamsu-puñjo, pacchimāya ce pi disāya ... uttarāya ... dakkhināya ce pi disāya ... evam eva kho Ānanda bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassati viharanto pi upahanat eva pāpake akusale dhamme, vedanāsu ... citte ... dhammesu ...

\[123\] It is worth noting in this connection that the Chinese version apparently omits the upādana-skandhas and āyatanas under dharmānupāsyanā, giving only the nīvarānas and bodhyāngas (see Warder, IB, pp. 86-7).

\[124\] A V 194-5 (cf. D II 83 = III 101 = S V 161; A III 387; Nett 94) : ye kho keci lokamā niyāyana vā niyāyanti vā niyyissanti vā sabbe te paṭca niyavaṇa paṭhaya ceto upakkile paṭhaya dubbalikaraṇa catu satipaṭṭhānena supatīṭhita-cittā satta bojjhange yathā-bhūtam bhāvevā evam ete lokamā niyāyasu vā niyāyanti vā niyyissanti vā. (In this context yathā-bhūtams surely does not mean 'as they really are' in some kind of absolute sense, but more simply 'as they are, as existing' consequent on the mind's being established in the four satipaṭṭhānas.) (Cf. below, p. 258)
and only to watching the nīvaraṇas and bojjhaṅgas under dhammpānupassanā.¹²⁵ In non-Pāli sources other variations are found. This has led scholars such as Schmithausen and Bronkhorst to speculate on the nature of the ‘original’ specification of the first and fourth satipāṭṭhānas/smṛty-upaṭṭhānas:¹²⁶ the former suggests that watching the body originally consisted only of watching the different postures of the body, and the latter (following the Vibhaṅga) suggests that it consisted only of watching the different parts of the body. Much of their discussion is at best highly speculative, and at worst misconceived.

Schmithausen, for example, suggests that the redactors of the Pāli canon have put the watching of breath first because in some canonical texts, such as the Ānāpānasati-sutta, it is presented as the preliminary stage (Vorstufe) of the four satipāṭṭhānas.¹²⁷ This is a misunderstanding. As we have seen, in the Ānāpānasati-sutta watching the breathing is not a preliminary of the satipāṭṭhānas, it actually is the satipāṭṭhānas. One must ask why ānāpāna-sati is singled out for treatment in this way. One reason might be because it is taken as the normative (not ‘original’ or ‘only’) basis on which to abandon the five nīvaraṇas, establish the satipāṭṭhānas and develop the bojjhaṅgas. In many ways, then, the Ānāpānasati-sutta is simply an expanded and full illustration of just how the Buddhist path consists in the abandoning of the nīvaraṇas, establishing the satipāṭṭhānas, and developing the bojjhaṅgas.

6. The ekāyana formula

The (Mahā-)Satipāṭṭhāna-sutta introduces the four satipāṭṭhānas with the following formula:

Ekāyana, bhikkhus, is this path for the purification of beings, for passing beyond sorrow and grief, for the disappearance of pain and discontent, for the attainment of the right way, for the realization of nībanna—that is the four satipāṭṭhānas.¹²⁸

Two ideas are, then, coupled here. First, the path for the purification of beings, and so on, is termed ekāyana; secondly, the path so termed is said to consist of the four satipāṭṭhānas. The latter point is of some interest since it appears that in the four primary Nikāyas this formula is only applied to the satipāṭṭhānas. This must be of some significance, since with many of the formulas used in the mahā-vagga of the Saṃyutta-nikāya, for example, the seven sets are interchangeable. Not so with the ekāyana formula. Interestingly though, the late canonical Niddesa does extend the application of the term ekāyana-magga to all seven sets. The Niddesa comments that the Blessed One is

¹²⁶ See works cited above, p. 44, n. 72.
¹²⁷ Schmithausen, KA, p. 250.
¹²⁸ D II 290 = M 155; ekāyano ayam bhikkhave maggo sattānām visuddhiyā soka-pariddavānam samatikkanāyā dukkhā-domanassānām utthāgamaṇyā hāyassā adhigamaṇyā nībhaṇassā sacchikirtiyā yadidam cattāro satipāṭṭhānā. The formula also occurs at S V 141, 167-8, 185; K 158. It does not seem to occur in full in any extant Sanskrit sources (cf. Lamotte, Traité, III 1121) but is found in the Chinese translations of the Āgamas (see below, p. 64, n. 154); cf. Abhidh-k-vy 529: ekāyano 'yam bhiksavo mārgo yad uta catvāri smṛty-upaṭṭhānāni.
eka because he has travelled the ekāyana-path (bhagavā ekāyana-maggam gato ti eko) and then goes on to explain the ekāyana-path as ‘the four establishings of mindfulness, the four right endeavours, the four bases of success, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven awakening-factors, the noble eightfold path’. The Niddesa then quotes the following verse:

Seeing the end and destruction of birth, he knows the ekāyana-path in friendliness and compassion; by this path they crossed the flood in the past, they will cross in the future and now. So it is, says the Niddesa, that the Blessed One is eka because he has travelled the ekāyana-path (evaṁ bhagavā ekāyana-maggaṁ gato ti eko). At the same time as extending the term ekāyana-magga to all seven sets, the Niddesa also preserves a tradition of the term’s special association with sati or ‘mindfulness’: ‘that which is mindfulness, recollection ... the awakening-factor of mindfulness, the ekāyana-path—this is called mindfulness’. The problem is simple: what does ekāyana magga actually mean, and what is the significance of the expression’s special association with the satipaṭṭhānas in the four primary Nikāyas? Translators of the ekāyana formula seem largely to have passed over the difficulties involved here and assumed that we can straightforwardly render ekāyana along the lines of ‘the one (i.e. only) way’. The Pāli commentaries, in contrast, provide five basic ways of taking ekāyana in the present context:

(i) Ayana is simply one of the many words for magga; ekāyana ayam maggo means, then, that this path (the path for the purification of beings) is a single path, and not a forked path (eka-magga ayam bhikkhave maggo na dvedhā-patha-bhūto ti evam attho daṭṭhabbo).

(ii) A path that is ekāyana is one that is to be travelled alone (ekena ayitabbo); one who is ‘alone’ is one who has left behind the crowd and withdrawn with a mind secluded from the objects of the senses (ekena ti gana-samanga-ikam pahāya vūpakatthena pavivitta-citṭena).

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129 Nidd I 455-6: kathāṁ bhagavā ekāyana-maggaṁ gato ti eko. ekāyana-maggo vuccati cattāro satipaṭṭhānā cattāro samma-ppadhānā cattāro iddhi-paddā paric īndriyāni paṭeća balāni satta bojhāngā arivo aṭṭhāṅgiko maggo. (Cf. Nidd I 457; Nidd II 112-4, 262; Paṭis I 174.)

130 This verse is also found at S V 168, 186, and is quoted at Sv III 745, Ps I 230.

131 Nidd I 10, 347, 506: yā sati amussati ... sati-sambojhāṅko ekāyana-maggo ayam vuccati sati. (Cf. Dhs register of terms for sati, e.g. Dhs 11.)

132 See Rhys Davids, D Trsl II 327 (‘The one and only path, Bhikkhus, leading to the purification of beings ... is that of the Fourfold Setting up of Mindfulness.’); Horner, M Trsl II 71 (‘There is this one way, monks, for the purification of beings ... that is to say the four applications of mindfulness.’); Lamotte, Traité, III 1122 (‘Il n’y a qu’une voie pour la purification des êtres ... ce sont les quatre fixations-de-l’attention.’).

133 See Sv III 743-4; Ps I 229-30; there are a number of different readings. For the first four explanations cf. Aggavamsa’s summary (Sadd 918): atthi padam catur-ādhippayikam ... yathā: eko ayano ekāyano ekena ayitabbo ekāyano kassa ayano ekāyano ekasmin ayano ekāyano iccevam-ādī atrāyam pāḷi: ekāyano ayam bhikkhave maggo ... yadidam cattāro satipaṭṭhānā ti. A sixth explanation, taking ekāyana to signify that one goes to nibbāna only once (yasmaṁ eka-vāram nibbānam gacchati tasmaṁ ekāyano), is not allowed by Buddhaghosa.
(iii) The *ekāyana* path is the path of ‘the one’ in the sense of ‘the best’, which means ‘the best of all beings’, namely the Buddha (*ekassa ayaṇo ekāyano; ekassā ti seṭṭhassa; sabba-satta-seṭṭho va bhagavā*).

(iv) An *ekāyano* path is a path that occurs or is found in just one place (*ayati ti va ayaṇo; gacchati pavattati ti attho; ekasmim ayaṇo ti ekāyano*); in the present context that is in the dhama-vinaya of the Buddha (*imasmim yeva dhamma-vinaye pavattati na aṇṇathā ti vuttam hoti*).

(v) Finally, a path that is *ekāyana* is one that goes to one place only (*ekam ayaṇi ti ekāyano*), namely nibbāna (*ekam nibbiinam eva gacchati ti vuttam hoti*).

Here, then, are five different grammatical resolutions of the compound *ekāyana*. Leaving this aside for the moment, what of the term *ekāyana* in other contexts both outside Buddhist literature and elsewhere in the Nikāyas? Böhlingk and Roth distinguish what are really two basic ideas in the usage of *ekāyana* in the Upanisads and Epic.134 In principle they correspond to the second and fifth explanations respectively of those offered in the Pāli commentaries. As a noun, *ekāyana* is first of all a lonely place—a place where only one person goes.135 A second group of usages stems from the notion of ‘going to one’. An *ekāyana* is a meeting place, a place where people or things become one;136 an assembly, or gathering together as one.137 Finally the word is understood to indicate some kind of spiritual unification—‘going to the one’—or the practice that brings this about.138 It is perhaps worth quoting some examples of this second group of usages:

As the ocean is the meeting place (*ekāyana*) of all waters, as the skin is the meeting place of all kinds of touch, as the nose is the meeting place of all smells ... as speech is the meeting place of all *Vedas*.139

Now all these have *citta* as their meeting place, *citta* as their *ātman*, they are based in *citta* ... so indeed is *citta* the meeting place of all these, *citta* the *ātman*, *citta* the basis.140

Thus do men who know the *Vedas* declare the dharma of going to the one (*ekāyanam dharman*); all those who attain to the appropriate knowledge pass to the way beyond.141

He who would be devoted to going to the one (*ekāyane īnah*), in silence, not

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134 BR, s.v. *ekāyana*.
135 Ein einsamer, abseits gelegener Ort; e.g.: *tad ekāyanam āsādyā viṣamaṃ bhūma-darśanam/ bahu-tālocchrayam śriyām āruroha mahā-balāḥ*/* (MBh 3.157.33)—‘And he reached a rugged, terrible looking desolate place, [and] the peak, many palms in height, the mighty man climber.’
136 Vereinigungspunkt.
137 Sammelpunkt aller Gedanken, Gedankenheit; BR cite only the lexicographers.
138 Das Aufgehen in Einem, Einheitslehre, Monotheismus.
139 Brh-Up 2.4.11; 4.5.12: *sa yathā sarvaśām apām samudra ekāyanam evam sarveśām sparśāṇām tyag ekāyanam evam sarveśām gandhānām nāsike ekāyanam ... evam sarveśāṃ vedānanāṃ vāg ekāyanam.
140 Ch-Up 7.5.2: *tāni ha vā etāni cittākāyānāni cittāmānāni cittān pratiśhitānī ... cittān hy evaśāṃ ekāyanam cittān āmā cittān pratiṣthā. Cf. Ch-Up 7.4.2.
141 MBh 12.210.28: *evam ekāyanam dharmam dhur vedā-vido janāḥ/ yathā jhānam upāsantah sarve yānti parām gatim*
thinking on anything, having previously practised renunciation would be one who has crossed over and is free from obstacles.\footnote{MBh 14.19.1: \(\text{yathā \ ekāyane līnas tūśnim kimcid acintayan/ pūrvaṃ pūrvam parityajya sa tīrno nirārambhako bhāvet/} \) (v.l. nirālambano; tīrṇo bandhanād = (?) tīrṇo'bandhanād). Ch-Up 7.1.2 is also cited by BR in this connection. Translators have usually rendered this on the basis of Śaṅkara’s explanation as ‘ethics’ or ‘politics’ (niti-Sdstra); cf. B. Faddegon, ‘The Catalogue of Sciences in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad’, AO 4 (1926) pp. 42-54. Faddegon considers all the meanings suggested by BR as inappropriate here: ‘So the word in our passage stands isolated in its meaning. If I may guess, I should take the word in antithesis with vākṣyā and explain: “the going by oneself, monologue, uninterrupted recital or exposition”.’ (Id., p.52.)} 

Böhtlingk and Roth also list ekāyana as an adjective and cite by way of example ekāyano mārgaḥ in the sense of a footpath that is only wide enough for one. \textit{Prima facie} this would seem to correspond most readily with the Pāli usage in connection with the satipaṭṭhānas—but obviously to be understood metaphorically.

Apart from the ekāyana formula PTC lists only one other occurrence of the expression ekāyana maggo in the four primary Nikāyas. This is the Mahāśīha-nāda-sutta, which uses a series of similes to depict the way in which someone comes to each of the five destinies (gāti).

The passage dealing with the first of these, niraya, runs as follows:

Now I, Śāriputta, perceiving with my mind the mind of some person understand as follows: ‘This person has set out thus (tathā), he goes along thus, and he has entered upon that path (tāth ca maggam). Accordingly (yathā) at the breaking up of the body, after death he will arise in a descent, an unhappy destiny, a place of ruin, niraya.’ After some time I see him, by means of the divine eye that is purified and superhuman, at the breaking up of the body ... arisen in niraya, experiencing feelings that are constantly painful, burning, acute. It is as if, Śāriputta, there were a pit of coals more than the height of a man in depth—full of coals without flames and without smoke. And a man might come along scorched by the hot weather, overcome by the hot weather, exhausted, parched, thirsty, heading for that pit of coals by a path that leads to that one place (ekāyanena maggena tam eva āngāra-kāsām panidhāya). A man with sight seeing him would say as follows: ‘That good man has set out thus, he goes along thus and has entered upon that path; accordingly he will come right to this pit of coals.’ After a time he would see him fallen into that pit of coals experiencing feelings that were constantly painful, burning, acute.\footnote{M I 74: idhāhām Śāriputta ekaccaṃ puggalam evam cetasa ceto paricca paṭijānāmi: tathāyam puggalo paṭipanno tathā ca iriyati taḥ ca maggam samārūlo yathā kāyassa bhедā param marunā apāyam duggaitim vinīpālam nirayaṃ upaṭajissati ti, tam evam paṭijāmi apareṇa samayena dibhena caṅkhamu visuddhena atikākṣa-māṇusakena kāyassa bhede ... nirayaṃ upapannam ekanta-dukkhā tippā katukā vedanaṃ vediyamāṇaṃ. Seyyathāpi Śāriputta āngāra-kāsāva sādhika-porisā pāraṅgaraṇam viṭācikānaṃ viṭā-duḥkānaṃ, atha puriṣo āgaccheva ghammbhāhitato ghamma-pareto kilanto tastito pipāsito ekāyanena maggena tam eva āngāra-kāsāṃ panidhāya. tam evam caṅkhamu puriṣo dīvā evam vadeyya: tathāyam bhavaṃ puriṣo paṭipanno tathā ca iriyati taḥ ca maggam samārūlo yathā imam yeva āngāra-kāsāṃ āgammātii ti, tam evam passaṃya apareṇa samayena tassā āṅgāra-kāsuyā patiṭaṃ ekanta-dukkhā tippā kaṭukā vedanā vediyamāṇaṃ.}

Now one might translate ekāyanena maggena in the above passage as ‘by a narrow path’, yet this would seem to me to lose the force of the image. Miss Horner translates the complete phrase: ‘heading direct for that pit of charcoal
itself by the one sole way'. This interpretation of ekāyanena maggena seems again to be inappropriate in the present context. The point of the image seems to be that someone is seen to be following a particular path that leads to a particular place—and that place only. If one sets out along a particular road, one will inevitably arrive at the place at the end of that road.

Three occurrences of the term ekāyana in Jātaka verses are of some interest here:

sūkarehi samaggehi vyaggho ekāyane hato ti 

The meaning 'going to one' clearly does not fit here, and the commentarial exegesis (tattha ekāyane hato ti eka-gamasmim yeva hato) is surely correct: 'The tiger was killed at one charge by the pigs en masse.'

ekāyane tam pathe addasāsim balena vannena upeta-rūpaṁ

Here the meaning of 'narrow' or possibly 'lonely' seems to fit most naturally: 'I saw stretched on that narrow path a form of strength and beauty.'

ekāyano eka-patho sarā sobhā ca passato/ aṭṭha maggam na passāmi yena gaccheyya assamāṁ/

Here one might take ekāyana in the sense of 'only path', reiterated by eka-patho and bringing out the force of 'I see no other path'. On the other hand the fact of the lake and pit on either side of the path means that 'narrow' is no less appropriate and this interpretation is suggested by the commentary: 'There is a single narrow path with the lake on one side and the pit on the other; I see no other path by which I might reach the hermitage.'

It seems to me on the basis of this brief survey of the usage of ekāyana in Sanskrit and Pāli literature, that the term most commonly expresses two basic ideas. First, a place where only one goes, giving the senses of 'lonely' or 'narrow'; secondly the 'going to one'. Given that nowhere is the sense 'one and one only' clearly and definitely the proper sense, and in most cases definitely not, it seems rather perverse to adopt this sense in the satipaṭṭhāna context.

At this point it is worth returning to the commentarial exegesis of the ekāyana formula, and one should note that even the commentarial explanation of ekāyana as a single path as opposed to a forked path (eka-maggo ... na dvedhā-patha-bhūto) is not to be interpreted as meaning the 'sole, exclusive' path. The image of the forked path is clearly and unambiguously associated in

145 M Trsl I 99.
146 Ja IV 349.
147 Ja V 172-3.
148 Ja VI 557.
150 Ja VI 558.
151 This is the sense Edgerton regards as primary (BHSD, s.v. ekāyana).
152 Conze (BTI, pp. 51-2) rejects the 'exclusive' sense, but fails to acknowledge that it is also given in the commentaries.
the texts with doubt (vicikicchā).\textsuperscript{153} What is being said here is, I think, that the path is unified, clear, well defined and single—not confusing and difficult to follow as the result of forks, and side roads. The notion of exclusivity is in fact associated with what is the rather more contrived explanation of ekāyana as that which occurs in just one place; an explanation which, I think, need not be taken seriously for the earlier texts.\textsuperscript{154}

In the examples I have given of the usage of ekāyana there is evident both an ordinary literal application, and also a quite specific spiritual and mystical application. Accordingly the commentaries feel it appropriate to delve deep into it for hidden meaning. And this is really where our problems start. Once we have identified ekāyana as a spiritual and mystical term, it seems to me that it is perhaps inappropiate to look for a single straightforward meaning; the ambiguity of the term may well be relevant already in the Nikāyas. Thus ekāyana might be placed alongside such terms as kevalin, tathāgata and nibbāna; that is, it should be included among those terms which embrace a certain range of ideas, and convey certain nuances that would have evoked something of an emotional response in those listening. In short, the term ekāyana is untranslatable.

This, of course, is not entirely helpful. However, one of the terms I have just mentioned, namely kevalin, is perhaps rather helpful here. In Buddhist and Jaina texts kevalin is used of one who has reached the end of spiritual endeavour, and seems to convey some kind of paradoxical notion or ‘isolation’ or ‘separateness’ on the one hand, and ‘wholeness’ or ‘unity’ on the other.\textsuperscript{155} This is rather similar to ekāyana as the ‘going alone’ and the ‘going to one’. These, I take it, are the principal notions expressed by ekāyana in the satipatthāna context, though the nuance of the path as single and not forked should perhaps also be considered as inherent. One might thus translate the ekāyana formula: ‘Going straight to the one is this path for the purification of beings ... namely the four establishings of mindfulness.’ It might be objected that ‘the one’ has rather inappropriate overtones of the Upaniṣads, but it is not necessary to attach any absolute metaphysical or ontological significance to such a term in a Nikāya context. What is basically being said is that the four

\textsuperscript{153} S III 108-9: dvedā-patho Tissa vicikicchāya etām adhivacanam. Dhs 85: yā tasmiṁ samaye kaṅkhā ... dvedā-patho ... ayām tasmiṁ samaye vicikicchā hoti. As 259: patipatti-nīvaranena dvedā-patho viyā ti dvedā-patho—‘It is a forked path because it prevents arriving [at one’s goal], as a forked path does.’

\textsuperscript{154} Gunabhadra’s Chinese rendering of the ekāyana formula in his translation of the Samyuktāgama (see Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo II 171) suggests confusion or a deliberate equating of ekāyana and eka-yāna (yi ch’eng) and thus introduces a further range of associations from later Buddhist literature (I am grateful to Dr Stuart MacFarlane for this information); cf. L. Hurvitz, ‘Fa-Sheng’s Observations on the Four Stations of Mindfulness’ in Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, ed. Minoru Kyota, Honolulu, 1978. p. 212. D. Seyfort Ruegg has raised the question of a relationship between ekāyana and eka-yāna: ‘Si la doctrine de l’ekayana proprement dit est surtout mahāyānistie, la notion de l’unicité de la voie n’est pas entièrement inconnue aux Nikāya/Agama. Quelques-unes de ces sources scripturaires emploient le terme d’ekayana pour désigner la seule voie menant directement et sûrement au but unique autrement dit au nirvāna; c’est ainsi que les quatre satipaṭṭhāna constituent la voie unique de la purification des êtres animés.’ (La Théorie du Tathāgatagarba et du Gotra, Paris, 1969, p. 178, n. 1).

\textsuperscript{155} See MW, PED, s.vv. kevala, kevalin.
satipatthānas represent a path that leads straight and directly all the way to the final goal. As the opening formula of the (Mahā-)Satipatthāna-sutta, this balances rather nicely with the concluding formula that states that what issues from the practice of the satipatthānas is one of two fruits, knowledge or the state of non-return.

Why is it, then, that in the four primary Nikāyas the four satipatthānas, alone of the seven sets, are given the epithet ekāyano maggo? Possibly it should be viewed as an accident that is put right in the Niddesa. But given that so much of the Nikāya treatment of the seven sets is held in common, the restriction of the epithet to the satipatthānas seems rather too pointed. So what is the peculiar and special quality of the satipatthānas?

According to the commentary, the (Mahā-)Satipatthāna-sutta's account concerns the repeated practice of the satipatthānas during the stages of ordinary (lokiya) calm and insight meditation prior to the arising of the transcendent path (lokuttara-magga), which endures for only one moment before giving way to the transcendent 'fruit' consciousness (phala-citta). In this connection the commentary recalls a discussion that arose between two elders, a certain Tipitaka-Cūlanāga and his teacher, Tipitaka-Cūlasumma. According to the former in the (Mahā-)Satipatthāna-sutta only 'the path of prior-stage satipatthāna' (pubba-bhāga-satipatthāna-magga, i.e. the ordinary path prior to the arising of the transcendent path) is indicated; according to the latter 'the mixed path' (missaka-magga, i.e. both ordinary and transcendent) is indicated. Cūlasumma apparently then recited the sutta from the beginning. When he reached the part which states 'whoever, bhikkhus, develops these four satipatthānas in this way for seven years ...' he realized, the story goes, that it could only be the path of the prior-stage (pubba-bhāga-magga) that was intended, since 'the transcendent path having arisen certainly does not last for seven years' (lokuttara-magga uppajitvā satta vassāni tiṁhamāno nāma natthi).

Although I am unsure how this is to be reconciled with characterization of the sutta as the teaching that culminates in arahant-ship in twenty-one places, it is of some interest in the present context. I noted above the way in which the commentary sees ekāyana as indicating the clear decisiveness and directness of the 'single way' as opposed to the doubt and wavering of the 'forked path'. Appropriately enough, it would seem that the stages prior to the arising of the transcendent path are precisely the domain of doubt. So for the commentaries at least, the satipatthānas are what especially make for the crossing over of doubt, and proceeding directly to the conclusion of the path.

As for the Nikāyas, there is a sense in which, of the seven sets, the four

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156 See Vism XXII 15.
157 Sutta 744-5; Ps I 230.1.
158 On the pubba-bhāga-magga see below, pp. 331-4.
159 Cf. Ps IV 39 which comments on a statement concerning the possibility of dispute about the path and way that 'there is no dispute amongst those who have attained the path, but this is said in connection with the way and path of the prior stage' (natthi adhiṣṭhita-maggānaṁ vivādo, pubba-bhāga-maggam pana pubba-bhāga-ariyapadā ca sandhāy etama vutto). Note also that one who has gained the path of stream attainment is said to abandon the fetter of doubt.
satipatha\n\nas are the most versatile and universally applicable, a sense in which they are more completely at once an account of the path at its most basic and most advanced. The way in which this is so anticipates my discussion of the remaining sets, but if one supposes for a moment that all one knew of Buddhism was the account of the seven sets in the four primary Nik\\yas, the point becomes more or less clear. It is really only with the material associated with the full description of the satipath\nas that any concrete idea of the basic practice of the bhikkhu might be obtained; it is really only from this material that one might form an idea of how the bhikkhu might be expected to set about beginning his progress along the path. In other words, with the four satipath\nas we have the nearest thing in the four Nik\\yas to basic general instruction in Buddhist \"meditation\" practice or yoga. As I hope will become clear, the remaining sets concern rather more exclusively what actually issues from that meditation practice and how it progresses—not that these elements are absent from the account of the four satipath\nas.

The reason for this peculiarity of the four satipath\nas would seem to be concerned with the way in which sati or \textquoteleft mindfullness\textquoteright itself is fundamental and central to the Nik\\yas approach to \textquoteleft yoga\textquoteright. Edward Conze commented on mindfulness as follows:

\begin{quote}
Although traces of it are not altogether absent in other religious and philosophical disciplines, in Buddhism alone mindfulness occupies a central position. If one were asked what distinguishes Buddhism from all other systems of thought, one would have to answer that it is the Dharma-theory and the stress laid on mindfulness ... On occasions it is almost identified with Buddhism itself.\footnote{Conze, BTI, p. 51.}
\end{quote}

Whether or not one agrees that \textquoteleft mindfullness\textquoteright is the peculiar domain of Buddhism in quite the way suggested by Conze, its position of central importance in the Nik\\yas can hardly be disputed: \textquoteleft And mindfulness, bhikkhus, I declare to be beneficial always.\textquoteright\footnote{S V 115: sati\textasciinobreakspace\textasciitilde ca khv\textasciitilde ha\textasciimacron buhkkhave sah\textasciitilde thhik\textasciimacron am vad\textasciitilde ni.}

From one perspective the culmination of the Buddhist path is \textquoteleft awakening\textquoteright (bodhi) which consists in full wisdom or knowledge. Yet the key to unlock this liberating knowledge is, according to the Nik\\yas, something rather simple: \textquoteleft mindfullness\textquoteright or a certain quality of \textquoteleft presence of mind\textquoteright with regard to body, feelings, mind and dhammas. For this reason, then, the four satipath\nas embrace a conception of the essentials of Buddhist practice that is clear and direct. In this sense, more than any of the remaining sets, the four satipath\nas provide a description of the path right from basics direct to the final goal and are, it seems, deserving of the epithet ek\\yan\textasciitilde maggo.

7. Conclusion

Finally I should draw attention to a number of miscellaneous treatments of the four satipath\nas. What underlies the first of these is the notion that the satipath\nas always constitute the bhikkhu\textquoteleft s refuge—they guard and protect
him. This is a theme already noted. Thus the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula is several times found in explanation of the following:

Therefore, Ānanda, you should dwell with yourselves as lamp, with yourselves as refuge, not with some other refuge; with dhamma as lamp, with dhamma as refuge, not with some other refuge. And how, Ānanda, does a bhikkhu dwell with himself as lamp? In this connection a bhikkhu with regard to the body dwells watching body ... 162

If this should seem to stand in contrast with what was said above concerning the blurring of self and other in connection with the expanded satipaṭṭhāna formula, it is perhaps worth citing the following:

[Thinking,] 'I shall protect myself,' establishing of mindfulness is to be practised; [thinking,] 'I shall protect others,' establishing of mindfulness is to be practised. Protecting oneself, bhikkhus, one protects others; protecting others, one protects oneself. How, bhikkhus, does one protect others by protecting oneself? By continued practice, by development, by making great ... How, bhikkhus, does one protect oneself by protecting others? By patience, by absence of cruelty, by friendliness, by kindness. 163

Two similes continue the theme of the four satipaṭṭhānas as the protection and refuge of the bhikkhu. These similes oppose the satipaṭṭhānas as the proper ‘pasture and own home ground’ (gacarī sako pettiko visayo) of the bhikkhu, to the five classes of sense-desire-object (kāma-guṇa) as not the bhikkhu’s pasture and the ground of others (agocaro para-visayo). Thus the fowl that wanders away from the refuge of the clods of earth in a ploughed field is prey to the hawk, just as the bhikkhu who wanders from the refuge of the satipaṭṭhānas into the domain of the objects of sense-desire is prey to Māra, 164 or as the monkey who is held by the monkey trap by his four limbs and head is at the mercy of the hunter, so the bhikkhu captivated by the objects of sense desire is at the mercy of Māra. 165 It is this way of looking at the satipaṭṭhānas that underlies Buddhaghosa’s explanation of satipaṭṭhāna as the field or pasture of mindfulness (sati-gacara). In conclusion two short statements concerning the satipaṭṭhānas are worth quoting:

As a result of the development and making great of the four satipaṭṭhānas, when the Tathāgata attains parinibbāna, the good dhamma is long lasting. 166

Those for whom you have compassion, bhikkhus, those who judge that there is something to be heard—whether friends, companions, relatives or kinsmen—they

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162 D II 100 = S V 154; D III 58, 77; S V 163, 164: tasamā th’Ānanda atta-dīpā viharatha atta-saranā anānā-saranā dhamma-dīpā dhamma-saranā anānā-saranā ... kathātī c’Ānanda bhikkhu atta-dīpo viharati ... idh’Ānanda bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati ...  
163 S V 169: attānaṁ bhikkhave rakkhissamī ti satipaṭṭhānam sevitabbam, param rakkhissamī ti satipaṭṭhānam sevitabbam. attānaṁ bhikkhave rakkhanto param rakkhhti, param rakkhanto attānaṁ rakkhati, kathātī ca ... āsavanāya bhāvanāya bahullikammaṁ ... kathātī ca ... khantiyā avihimsāya mettattāya anudayaṁatāya ...  
164 S V 146-8.  
165 S V 148-7.  
should be caused to undertake, directed towards, established in the development of the four satipaṭṭhānas.\textsuperscript{167}

The first echoes something that is in fact said of the seven sets collectively in another context,\textsuperscript{168} while the second appears to be peculiar to the satipaṭṭhānas. Together they seem to underline the point that if any one of the seven sets can be characterized as setting down the basic prescription for practice of the Buddhist path, it is the four satipaṭṭhānas.

\textsuperscript{167} S V 189: ye bhikkhave anukampeyyātha ye ca sotabbam maññeyyām mittā vā amaccā vā ṇātī vā sālohitā vā te yo bhikkhave imesaṁ catunnaṁ satipaṭṭhānānaṁ bhāvanāya samādapatābā nivesetābā paṭṭhāpatābā.

\textsuperscript{168} See Chapter 7.2.
CHAPTER TWO

THE RIGHT ENDEAVOURS

1. The basic formula: samma-ppadhāna and samyak-prahāna

In a number of places in the Nikāyas and canonical Abhidhamma the four samma-ppadhānas are explained by the following formula:

idha bhikkhu [i] anuppānānaṁ pāpakānaṁ akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ anuppādāya chandaṁ janeti vāyamati viriyam ārabbhati cittam paggahāti padahati; [ii] uppannānaṁ pāpakānaṁ akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ pahānāya chandaṁ janeti vāyamati viriyam ārabbhati cittam paggahāti padahati; [iii] anuppānānaṁ kusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ uppādāya chandaṁ janeti vāyamati viriyam ārabbhati cittam paggahāti padahati; [iv] uppannānaṁ kusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ tthityā asammosāya bhāvyabhāvāya vepullāya bhāvanāya pāripūriya chandaṁ janeti vāyamati viriyam ārabbhati cittam paggahāti padahati.¹

In this connection a bhikkhu [i] generates purpose, strives, initiates strength, takes hold of his mind, endeavours for the sake of the non-arising of bad, unskilful dhammas that have not arisen; [ii] he generates the purpose, strives, initiates strength, takes hold of his mind, endeavours for the sake of abandoning bad unskilful dhammas that have arisen; [iii] he generates purpose, strives, initiates strength, takes hold of his mind, endeavours for the sake of the arising of skilful dhammas that have not (yet) arisen; [iv] he generates purpose, strives, initiates strength takes hold of his mind, endeavours for the sake of establishing, of not losing, of increase, of abundance, of development, of fulfilment of skilful dhammas that have arisen.

Buddhist Sanskrit sources evidence an almost exactly parallel formula explaining four samyak-prahānas:


As in the case of satipaṭṭhāna and smṛty-upasthāna, Pāli and Sanskrit

¹ D III 221; M II 11; S V 244; A II 15; IV 462; Vibh 208.
² E.g. Mahāyuttapatti 16; Lamotte (Traité, III 1123) quotes a version from the Pañcaviṃśati that parallels the Pāli more closely; the form of the final verb is sometimes given as pranidāhāti (cf. my comments below). The order of the four parts of this formula is not always the same in Buddhist Sanskrit literature (a fact not noted by Lamotte); parts [i] and [ii] are sometimes inverted (e.g. Artha 29); this also seems to be the order followed by Abhidhā-3 358 and assumed by Abhidh-k 328, which comments: 'For certain things, like the smṛty-upasthānas, the dhyānas, etc., the [order of] teaching conforms with arising; for certain things, like the samyak-prahānas, it conforms with explanation, for it is not a fixed rule that one first generates desire for the abandoning of arisen things and afterwards for the non-arising of unarisen things.' (kēsamcid utpattiy-anukūlā deśanā, yathā smṛty-upasthāna-dhyānādānā. keśamci pratiūpānānukūlā deśanā yathā samyak-prahānānām, na hy eṣa niyamo yat pūrvam utpānānaṁ prahānāya echandaṁ janayati, paścād anutpānānaṁ anutpadāyeti.)
sources reveal a discrepancy in the form of a term designating a parallel formula. The Pāli form is, then, samma-ppadhāna or 'right endeavour', while the Sanskrit equivalent appears to be samyak-pradhāna or 'right abandoning'. Certainly 'four right endeavours' would appear to fit better as a general description of the formula than 'four right abandonings', since all four parts of the formula speak of one who endeavours (padahati/pradadhiti) while only the second part explicitly mentions abandoning (pahanāya/prahānāya). The Sanskrit version even says 'rightly endeavours' (samyak pradadhātī/pranīdadhātī).

A further factor that seems to count against samyak-pradhāna as being a correct interpretation of an underlying original term, is that Sanskrit sources do in fact in one or two instances cite four samyak-pradhānas. Thus, for example, the Mahāvastu has the phrase, 'the four samyak-pradhānas are my horses'.3 Yaśomitra's Kośa-vyākhyā also glosses samyak-pradhāna by samyak-pradhāna,4 while Vasubandhu seems to offer an explanation of samyak-pradhāna (or -pradhāna)5 in terms of pra-dhā and not pra-hā when he says that vīrya is called samyak-pradhāna (or -pradhāna) because 'by means of it body, speech and mind are properly applied' (tena hi samyak kāya-vāg-manāms pradhiyante).6 Chinese translations of Buddhist texts witness both 'endeavour' and 'abandoning'.7 Furthermore the Buddhist Sanskrit exegetical tradition is apparently unanimous in identifying four samyak-pradhānas/pradhānas with 'strength' (vīrya), in exactly the same way as the Pāli tradition does samma-ppadhāna.8

In the light of all this, the most straightforward explanation of the discrepancy between the Pāli and Sanskrit forms seems to be to consider samyak-pradhāna as an incorrect back-formation based on a Middle Indo-Aryan form such as samma-ppadhāna which might equally correspond to Sanskrit samyak-pradhāna or samyak-pradhāna.9

Although this largely explains how the discrepancy might have arisen, it leaves the question of why it arose unanswered. After all, the notion of endeavour and application is given considerable prominence in the formula, not just with the verb padahati/pradadhāti, but also with the whole recurring

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4 See Lamotte, Traité III 1123.
5 Abhidh-k 384. Pradhan's text in fact reads -pradhāna, but is emended by the compilers of the index to -pradhāna (Abhidh-k Index 435); the general authority for their corrigenda are the Tibetan and Chinese versions and Yaśomitra (id., p. 427); cf. Abhidh-k Trsl IV 281, n. 2.
6 Cf. Arthan-n 214, which gives -prahān and then comments on -pradhāna in very similar terms to the Kośa: katamāni catvāri samyak-prahānāni. samyak kāya-vāg-manānsi dhārayantī pradhānāni. Abhidh-di 358 also gives both -prahāna and -pradhāna.
7 Lamotte, Traité, III 1123: 'Dans les sources pāli, sammappadhāna, “efforts corrects”; dans les sources sanskrītes, samyakpradhāna, “destructions correctes”, traduit en tibétain par yan dag par sponba [ = abandoning] ... Les traductions chinoises donnent le choix entre tcheng cheng ou tcheng k' in [ = endeavour] d'une part, et tcheng touan [ = abandoning] d'autre part.'
8 E.g. Abhidh-h Trsl 194; Abhidh-k 384; Abhidh-sam Trsl 120; Abhidh-di 358. On identification in Pāli literature, see below.
9 Cf. Dayal, op. cit., pp. 82-3. Turner (s.v. pradhānaka) notes Prakrit pāhāna (chief) corresponding to Pāli padhāna, and (s.v. pradhāna) Prakrit pāhāna (abandoning) corresponding to Pāli pahāna.
refrain: chandam janeti vayamati viriyam arabhati cittaṃ pagānahati padahati/chandam janayati vayavaccate viriyam arabhate cittaṃ prāṛhnāti samyak pradadhāti. Why, in a context that seems so obviously to point towards the notion of four ‘endeavours’, should a Middle Indo-Aryan form, albeit ambiguous out of context, have been construed in such a way as to give samyak-prahāṇa or ‘right abandoning’? Is it simply a question of misunderstanding on the part of a rather obtuse ancient monk or group of monks? Such an explanation would appear to be historically inadequate.

As I have already indicated, an understanding in terms of right endeavour was not entirely lost to the northern Buddhist tradition. Curiously, embedded in the exegesis of the term samma-ppadhāna found in the Pāli commentaries is an explanation that reflects the notion of abandoning. I shall consider this commentarial treatment fully below; for the moment it will suffice to note that one explanation that Buddhaghosa offers for samma in samma-ppadhāna is that it indicates that it is ‘something beautiful by virtue of its forsaking the ugliness of the defilements’. This explanation occurs within the context of a discussion of the four samma-ppadhānas as constituents of the transcendent mind (lokuttara-citta). The point seems to be that in this context samma-ppadhāna is to be understood as in some sense the strength or application of the mind that forms the basis which actually enables the mind to give up the kilesas.

The treatises of the northern tradition generally understand the samyak-prahāṇas as characterizing a stage on the path somewhat prior to the arising of the transcendent path, namely the stage of usma-gata, or ‘sparks’. Asaṅga states that the fruit of the development (bhāvanā-phala) of the samyak-prahāṇas/pradhānas is the complete abandoning of dharmanas opposed (vipakṣa) to skilful dharmanas, and the obtaining and growth of dharmanas that counteract (pratipakṣa) unskilful dharmanas. The stage of usma-gata is the first of the four states partaking of penetration (nirvedha-bhāgya) and signals the entrance into the path of application (prayoga-mārga). Clearly it is seen as marking a significant shift in level for the practitioner. The characterization of this stage as abandoning—though not in the absolute sense of the transcendent path—the grosser obstacles and impediments to the development of full wisdom is not entirely inappropriate.

Another reason for the form samyak-prahāṇa might be that the usual Sanskrit usage of pradadhāti and pradhāna hardly agrees with that of padahati and padhāna in the Nikāyas. Thus samyak-pradhāna according to normal Sanskrit usage does not appear to signify right endeavour or application at all, but rather something along the lines of right or proper chief or principal (thing or person). It is in fact, out of context, a not very clear or sensible Sanskrit word. The uncertainty in the Sanskrit version of the formula concerning the

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10 Vism XXII 35: sobhanam vā taṃ kilesa-virūpatta-vijahanato.
11 See below, p. 338.
12 Abhidh-sam Trsl 120
13 However, Buddhaghosa does make an effective play on this alternative sense of padhāna; see below, p. 79.
form of the closing verb—pradāhāti or pranidadhāti—underlines this point; pra-ni-dhā is found regularly in Sanskrit literature, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, in senses similar to padahati and padhāna in the Nikayas.\textsuperscript{14}

In the light of all this, it seems to me that the characterization of this fourfold formula as samyak-prahāna or 'right abandoning' becomes somewhat more intelligible. The point is that one cannot exclude the possibility that the Buddhist tradition deliberately capitalized on the ambiguity of a Middle Indo-Aryan form from an early date—prior to any schism between the Sarvāstivāda and the Theravāda. After all, the Pāli commentaries provide other examples of word-play that works in Pāli but not in Sanskrit.\textsuperscript{15} One cannot, then, simply characterize samyak-prahāna as an 'incorrect' backformation. Although samma-ppadhāna must, I think, take precedence over samyak-prahāna as reflecting the correct primary exegesis, it does seem that the Buddhist tradition as a whole preserves an explanation of the term which focuses on the notion of abandoning. In terms of Buddhist spiritual psychology, one of the significant aspects of samma-ppadhāna or samyak-prahāna was that it was understood as directly facilitating the abandoning of unskilful states either at the moment of attaining the transcendent path or during the prior stages.

2. The samma-ppadhāna formula in the Nikayas

The samma-ppadhāna formula is given as a straightforward explanation of the 'four samma-ppadhānas' on some eight occasions in the four primary Nikayas.\textsuperscript{16} The formula is in fact found as frequently in some other context.\textsuperscript{17} On several occasions the formula is given in explanation of sammā-vāyāma or 'right striving', the sixth factor of the noble eight-factored path.\textsuperscript{18} Similarly the formula is also used to explain the faculty of strength (viriyindriya).\textsuperscript{19} It is perhaps significant that this formula appears to be the standard way of explaining right striving as a factor of the noble eight-factored path—in fact there seems to be no instance where this sixth factor is explained differently. On the other hand, the faculty of strength (viriyindriya) and the power of strength (viriya-balā) are explained in a variety of ways.\textsuperscript{20}

At any rate, one can see in this usage of the formula the beginnings of the procedure whereby the later Abhidhamma works draw up more formal correspondences between the various members of the seven sets. Thus the

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. BR and MW, s.vv. pra-duḥā and pra-ni-duḥā.
\textsuperscript{15} Cf. the play on satthar/sattha as 'teacher'/caravan (leader)' at Vism VII 49; such a play is hardly appropriate to Sanskrit śāstra/sṛṭtha. At As 49 there is a play on citta as 'mind' (= Skt citta) and citta as 'varigated' (= Skt citra); of course, Pāli also records the sanskritized form citra; (PED, s.v. citta (1)). An example of such a play in the Nikayas themselves is sattva as a 'being' (= Skt sattva) and satta as 'attached' (= Skt sakta) at S III 190.
\textsuperscript{16} D II 221; M I 11; S V 244; A II 15; IV 462; at S IV 364; A I 39, 295-7, where the seven sets are treated in turn, 'four samma-ppadhānas' is implicit in the text; cf. Vibh 208.
\textsuperscript{17} D Ill 312; M II 26-8; III 251; S V 9, 198, 268-9; A I 74, 256.
\textsuperscript{18} D II 312; M III 251; S V 9; cf. Vibh 105, 235.
\textsuperscript{19} S V 198.
\textsuperscript{20} See below, pp. 116-7; 140.
summa-ppadhānas, sammā-vāyāma, viryindriya, viriya-bala, viriya-sambojhaṅga are essentially one, namely viriya or 'strength'. Of course the seeds of this are also to be seen in the very wording of the summa-ppadhāna formula, where the various recurring phrases characterize endeavour: vāyamati corresponds to sammā-vāyāma; viriyām ārabhati to viriya as an indriya, bala and bojhaṅga; padahati to summa-ppadhāna itself. Accordingly, in the sammappadhāna-vibhaṅga definitions for all these recurring phrases of the summa-ppadhāna formula are found; vāyamati, viriya and padahati are all defined in identical terms, corresponding to the Dhammasaṅgaṇī register for viriya. For chanda there is a distinct definition: kattukamyatā or 'desire to act'. This constitutes the first Abhidhamma definition of chanda, since there is no register for chanda in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī. I shall return to this general theme with reference to all seven sets later.

In one Aṅguttara-nikāya passage, the four parts of the formula act as explanations of four endeavours (padhānas) without the qualification summa. The four parts here represent the endeavour of restraint (samvara-ppadhāna), the endeavour of abandoning (pahāna-ppadhāna), the endeavour of development (bhīvana-ppadhāna), and the endeavour of protecting (anurakkhaṇa-ppadhāna) respectively. These same four padhānas of samvara, pahāna, bhīvana and anurakkhaṇa are elsewhere explained rather differently:

[i] And what is the restraint of endeavour? In this connection a bhikkhu, when he sees a visible form with the eye, is not one who seizes upon the particular characteristic, is not one who seizes upon the details, since dwelling with the eye-faculty unrestrained might cause longing and dejection, bad unskilful dharmas, to overwhelm him; he therefore engages in restraint, he protects the eye-faculty, he achieves restraint of the eye-faculty. When he hears a sound with the ear ... smells a smell with the nose ... tastes a taste with the tongue ... feels a physical sensation with the body ... experiences a dhamma with the mind ... he achieves restraint of the mind-faculty.

[ii] And what is the endeavour of abandoning? In this connection a bhikkhu does not harbour thoughts of sensual desire when they have arisen, he abandons them, dispels them, makes an end of them, brings them to a state of destruction. He does not harbour thoughts of hatred ... thoughts of cruelty ... bad unskilful dharmas ... he brings them to a state of destruction.

[iii] And what is the endeavour of development? In this connection a bhikkhu develops the awakening-factor of mindfulness based on seclusion, based on dispas-sion, based on cessation, ripening in release. He develops the awakening-factor of dhamma-discrimination ... of strength ... of joy ... of tranquillization ... of concentration ... of equipoise.

[iv] And what is the endeavour of protecting? In this connection a bhikkhu protects the auspicious sign of concentration when it has arisen—the image of the skeleton, the image of the worm-infested [corpse], the image of the discoloured

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21 viriyārambhō nikkamo parakkamo uyyāmo vāyāmo ussāho ussajhi thāmo dhiti asithila-parakkamatā anikkhita-chandatā anikkhita-dhuratā dhura-sampaggāho viriyam viriyindriyam viriya-balaṃ sammā-vāyāmo. (See Vibh 208-9, and, e.g. Dhs 22.)
22 Vibh 208. Chanda is one of what the commentaries, referring to Dhs 9, call yevāpanaka-dhammas; see As 132; Vism XIV 133. I shall discuss chanda in connection with the iddhi-pādas.
23 A II 74.
[corpse], the image of the rotting [corpse], the image of the decayed [corpse], the image of the bloated [corpse].

Essentially this schema of the four padhānas provides each part of the samma-ppadhāna formula with a specific and positive content; the difference is of the kind between a general statement of a matter and a specific and particularized statement. Thus, in order to illustrate the practice of the four aspects of samma-ppadhāna various themes that feature repeatedly in the Nikāyas are brought together. The endeavour of restraint is characterized by the set formula concerning the guarding of the sense-doors; the endeavour of abandoning focuses on the abandoning of thoughts to do with sensual desire, hatred and cruelty—again a standard theme of the Nikāyas; the endeavour of development is characterized by the development of the factors of awakening (of which more presently); finally the endeavour of protecting is illustrated by the practice of concentration based on the contemplation of ugliness (asubha), another sporadic theme of the Nikāyas. The result is that in effect the whole of the Buddhist path is shown as being embraced by the four aspects of (samma-)ppadhāna; that is, the four padhānas provide an example of a course of practice complete in itself.

A passage from the Nettippakarana, on the other hand, gives a different specific content to the samma-ppadhāna formula—a specific content that appears to be more particular in its application. Unarisen bad unskilful dhammas are thoughts (vitakka) concerned with sensual desire (kama), hatred (vyāpāda) and cruelty (vihimsa); arisen bad unskilful dhammas are the tendencies (anusaya) that constitute the roots of unskilfulness (akusala-māta); unarisen skilful dhammas are the spiritual faculties (indriya) of the stream-attainer;

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24 A II 16-7 (= D III 225): [i] katama ca bhikkhave saṁvara-ppadhānam. idha bhikkhave bhikkhuh ca cakkhumā rāpaṁ dīsā na nimitta-gāhī hoti nānūvyañāna-gāhī hoti yatvādhikaranān enaṁ cakkhundriyāṁ asaṁvutaṁ viharantam abhiñjā-domanassā pāpākā akusālā dhammā anvassavēyam; tassa saṁvarāyā paṭipajjati rakkhati cakkhundriyam cakkaḥundriye saṁvaram āpajjati. sotena sadāṁ suṭvā... ghnāna gandham ghāyitvā... jīvāya rasam sayitvā... kāyena potoṭhabbaṁ phusitvā... manasā dhammaṁ viñāya... manindriyam manindriye samvaram āpajjati... [ii] katama ca bhikkhave pahāna-ppadhānam. idha bhikkhave bhikkhu uppannam kāma-vitakkam nādhīvasei pajahati vinodeti vyantikaroī anabhāvaṁ gameti. uppannam vyāpāda-vitakkan... uppannam vihimsā-vitakkan... uppannam pāpākā akusale dhamme... [iii] katama ca bhikkhave bhikkhu vahāna-ppadhānam. idha bhikkhave bhikkhuh ca bhikkhave bhikkhe vahāna-ppadhānam. idha bhikkhave bhikkhu sati-sambojhaṁ bhāveṭi viveka-nissitam virāga-nissitam samvucca-parināmaṁ. dhamma-vicaya-sambojhaṁ... viriyasambojhaṁ... piti-sambojhaṁ... saddāhi-sambojhaṁ... samādāhi-sambojhaṁ... upakekkha-sambojhaṁ... [iv] katama ca bhikkhave anurakkhane-ppadhānam. idha bhikkhave bhikkhu upannam bhaddakam samādhi-nimittam anurakkhati atthika-saṅham pulavaka-saṅham viñāla-saṅham vippabhaka-saṅham viçchiddaka-saṅham uddhunātaka-saṅham...
finally arisen skilful dhāmas are the spiritual faculties of the person who is standing on the path (āṭṭhamaka).  

Another variation on the theme of the four aspects of the samma-ppaṭhāṇa formula is found in a Samyutta-nikāya passage:

In this connection, thinking that the arising in him of unarisen bad unskilful dhāmas might lead to what is disadvantageous, a bhikkhu makes an effort; thinking that his non-abandoning of arisen bad unskilful dhāmas might lead to what is disadvantageous, he makes an effort; thinking that the non-arising in him of unarisen skilful dhāmas might lead to what is disadvantageous, he makes an effort; thinking that the ceasing in him of arisen skilful dhāmas might lead to what is disadvantageous, he makes an effort.

Here, what is essentially the same structure as the samma-ppaṭhāṇa formula is couched in the most general of terms. An extended commentarial account of samma-ppaṭhāṇa, found in several places in the aṭṭhakathās, quotes this passage, stating that it concerns only the ordinary non-transcendent lokiya path in the stages prior to the arising of the transcendent path (lokkuttara-magga). This is, in effect, a way of saying that this treatment is generally applicable to the processes of spiritual attainment, but cannot be applied to the specific attainment of the transcendent path.

Accordingly unarisen skilful dhāmas here include not just the transcendent path but also ordinary calm and insight (samatha-vipassanā), while ‘arisen skilful dhāmas’ here refers only to ordinary calm and insight. Why only to ordinary calm and insight and not also to the transcendent path? Simply because the statement ‘the ceasing in him of arisen skilful dhāmas might lead to what is disadvantageous’ cannot apply in the case of transcendent skilful dhāmas. For ceasing—the non-arising or non-occurrence (anuppatti)—of ordinary skilful dhāmas, such as calm and insight, once arisen may well result in the decline and loss (parihāni) of calm and insight. On the other hand, the
ceasing of the transcendent path once arisen does not entail loss of calm and insight; there is no falling away from the calm and insight established by transcendent dhamma.\textsuperscript{34} The commentarial account then proceeds to recount a number of stories illustrating how ordinary calm and insight is lost and how this leads to disadvantage. In general, the commentarial interpretation of all this is really rather convincing.

So far, then, what stands out particularly clearly here, is the way in which the Nikāya use of the samma-ppadhāna formula can—and, I think, must—be seen as reflecting both different scales and different levels of the spiritual path. This is a feature I have already drawn attention to with regard to the satipatthānas, and, as I shall repeatedly try to demonstrate, is of central importance in understanding the Nikāyas’ and later Buddhist literature’s conception of the seven sets both collectively and individually.

3. The Samanamandikā-sutta

Perhaps the most striking of the Nikāya treatments of the samma-ppadhāna formula is that found in the Samanamandikā-sutta.\textsuperscript{35} This treatment quite explicitly uses the samma-ppadhāna formula at four successive spiritual levels. The sutta opens with the Buddha stating that a person endowed with ten dhāmas is one who has ‘accomplished what is skilful, who has perfect skilfulness, an unconquerable samana, attained to the utmost attainment’ (purisa-puggalam sampanna-kusalam parama-kusalam uttama-patti-pattam sam-anām ayojjham). The Buddha then begins his exposition of this statement by listing sixteen items in four groups of four that he declares need to be understood (veditabba). One needs to understand unskilful moral habits (akusala-sila), from what they originate (ito-satipaṭṭhāna), where they completely cease (upaṁsasā nirujāhanti), and how one practises in order to be practising for their cessation (nirodhiya pappanno). In the same way, one should understand skilful moral habits (kusala-sila), unskilful thoughts (akusala-samkappa), and skilful thoughts (kusala-samkappa). The details of the exposition of these matters are set out in the adjoining table (p. 77). What is interesting from the present point of view is the overall pattern and the part the samma-ppadhāna formula plays in this. In fact the pattern of each of the four groups parallels exactly the structure of the four noble truths: an item is given, next its

\textsuperscript{34} Spk II 165: ‘Nirujjhamānā anatthāya samvatteyyum: they should be understood as dhāmas such as sīla, etc. which because of non-arising by virtue of decline cease and might lead to disadvantage. And herein lokīya [dhāmas] can decline; there is certainly no decline of lokuttara [dhāmas].’ (te silādi-dhammā parihāni-vasena puna anupattiyā nirujjhamānā anatthāya samvatteyyum ti veditabba. ettha ca lokiyā parihāyanti, lokuttarānaṁ parihāṇi natthi it.) Vibh-a 292: ‘Now the [transcendent] path having arisen just once ceases, certainly not as something leading to disadvantage; for it ceases only having provided the condition for the [transcendent] fruit.’ (maggo pana sakāṁ uppajjītā nirujjhamānā anatthāya samvatteyyam datvā va nirujjhathi.) Cf. Ps III 244; Mp II 45.

\textsuperscript{35} M II 22-9.
TABLE 1. THE SCHEMA OF THE SAMĀṆAMAṆDIKĀ-SUTTA

| A | ime akusala-sīlā | akusala-kāya-, vāci-, mano-kamma; pāpaka-ājīva |
| B | ime kusala-sīlā | kusala-kāya-, vāci-, mano-kamma; ājīva-parisuddhi |
| C | ime akusala-samkappā | kāma-, vyāpāda-, vihiṃsā-samkappā |
| D | ime kusala-samkappā | nekkhamma-, avyāpāda-, avihimsā-samkappā |

| 1. ito-samuṭṭhāna | cītta: sarāga, samoha, sadosa |
| 2. idha aparisesā nirujjhanti | kāya-duccaritaṁ...pahāya, kāya-sucaritaṁ...bhāveti |
| 3. idha aparisesā nirujjhanti | sīlāvā hoti...taṁ ca ceto-vimuttīṁ...pajānāti |
| 4. evam paṭipanno akusalānāṁ sīlānāṁ nirodhāya paṭipanno | samma-ppādhāna formula |
| 4. evam paṭipanno kusalānāṁ sīlānāṁ nirodhāya paṭipanno | samma-ppādhāna formula |
| 4. evam paṭipanno kusalānāṁ sīlānāṁ nirodhāya paṭipanno | samma-ppādhāna formula |
| 4. evam paṭipanno kusalānāṁ sīlānāṁ nirodhāya paṭipanno | samma-ppādhāna formula |
| 1. ito-samuṭṭhāna | first jhāna |
| 3. idha aparisesā nirujjhanti | samma-ppādhāna formula |
| 3. idha aparisesā nirujjhanti | second jhāna |
| 4. evam paṭipanno kusalānāṁ samkappānāṁ nirodhāya paṭipanno | |
origination is considered, followed by the question of its ceasing, and the practice that brings this about.\textsuperscript{36}

So what is the significance of the repetition of the \textit{samma-ppadhāna} formula as the exposition of the fourth part (the part, if one is to think in terms of the four noble truths, that is usually explained by reference to the noble eight-factored path)? As will be seen later, in the light of the treatment of the seven sets in the \textit{Sānuyutta-nikāya} it is tempting to think that an exposition of any one of the seven sets might have been appropriate here, and that the substitution of another of the sets for the \textit{samma-ppadhāna} formula would not do serious damage to the main purpose of this \textit{sutta}. However, the repeated use of the \textit{samma-ppadhāna} formula in this context is not, it seems to me, without a particular character and quality of its own. If one considers the details of each of the four sections a little more closely, one sees that coming to understand the origination of a particular set of items is said to lead on to a particular achievement—an achievement which constitutes the cessation of the set of items in question. In the first section the \textit{bhikkhu} succeeds in abandoning bad conduct and developing good conduct; in the second he becomes endowed with good moral habit (\textit{sīlavant}) and knows the subsequent freedom of mind (\textit{ceto-vimutti}); in the third he attains the first \textit{jhāna}; finally, in the fourth, he attains the second \textit{jhāna}. In each instance what brings about and supports the ceasing of the given set of items, what facilitates the particular achievement, is the practice of the four aspects of \textit{samma-ppadhāna} (not, however, referred to by name). This use of the formula, then, seems to fit in well with a general picture of the \textit{samma-ppadhānas}—and indeed \textit{viriya} itself—as essentially that which supports and sustains any particular achievement. This notion of \textit{viriya} as that which supports is vividly taken up in the \textit{Milinda-pañha}:

\begin{quote}
Just as, Your Majesty, a man might shore up a house that was falling down with an extra piece of wood, and being thus shored up that house would not fall down. Even so, your majesty, \textit{viriya} has the characteristic of shoring up; shored up by \textit{viriya} no skilful \textit{dhammas} are lost.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

\subsection*{4. Commentarial definitions of \textit{viriya} and \textit{samma-ppadhāna}}

The above exposition of the \textit{samma-ppadhāna} formula in the Nikāyas is consistent with the explanations of \textit{samma-ppadhāna} and \textit{viriya} offered by the commentaries. These explanations are best viewed as drawing out and further developing the implications of the Nikāya treatment. The standard definition of \textit{viriya} in the \textit{Visuddhimagga} reads as follows:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Viriya} is the state of a hero. Its characteristic is exertion, its function is the supporting of conascent [\textit{dhammas}], its manifestation is a state of non-collapse. Since it is said [by the Blessed One] that one who is stirred endeavours properly, its proximate cause is what stirs; alternatively its proximate cause is any ground for
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{36} Cf. the verbal parallels between the truths and the \textit{Samanamaṇḍikā-sutta} treatment: \textit{samudaya}/\textit{samujjhāna}; \textit{nirodha}/\textit{nirujjhanti}; \textit{niruddha-gāminī-pātipadā}/\textit{niruddhāya pātipanno}.

\textsuperscript{37} Mīl 36: \textit{yathā mahā-rāja puriso gehe patante arūha dūrāna upathamhēyya upathamhhitam santam evam tam geham na paṭeyya, evam eva kho mahā-rāja upathamhēna-lakkhanam viriyam viriyupatthambhitā sabbe kusala dhammā na pariḥayantī ti.}
the instigation of viriya. Rightly instigated it should be seen as the root of all attainments.38

Here, then, viriya is seen as the strength and mental resolve that supports and maintains various kinds of spiritual achievement—at least in its skilful manifestations.

Buddhaghosa also provides the following exegesis of the term samma-ppadhana:

It is padhāna in that by means of it they endeavour (padahanti); samma-ppadhāna is beautiful padhāna; either it is samma-ppadhāna in that by means of it they endeavour rightly, or it is samma-ppadhāna in that it is beautiful because of forsaking the ugliness of the defilements, and padhāna because of producing (nipphadakatta) welfare and happiness due to bringing about the state of being best and causing the state of being chief (padhāna). It is a term for strength. It is fourfold in that it accomplishes the functions of abandoning and non-arising for arisen and unarisen unskilful [dhammas] [respectively], and the functions of arising and maintenance of unarisen and arisen skilful [dhammas] [respectively]. Therefore ‘four sammappadhānas’ are spoken of.39

The explanation here plays upon the diverse meanings of padhāna. To begin with, padhāna can be understood simply as indicating endeavour; this is its usual and normal meaning in Pāli literature. However, as has already been noted, padhāna corresponding to Sanskrit pradhāna can have another range of meanings—the normal meanings in Sanskrit literature. A pradhāna is, then, the chief or principal thing or person; as an adjective it signifies chief or most important. Furthermore, in Sāmkhya theory pradhāna is used as a term for prakṛti or the primary ground from which the world of experience originates.40

Buddhaghosa’s explanation seems to reflect these kinds of usage: samma-ppadhāna is beautiful; it is the originator of welfare and happiness, and it brings about the state of a chief. In this Buddhaghosa echoes the understanding of viriya as the state of a hero and as the root of all attainments: samma-ppadhāna forms the basis for the abandoning of the defilements which are detrimental to welfare and happiness, and as a result one achieves the best state, one is a chief. Dhammapāla gives essentially the same explanation, although worded slightly differently:

It is samma-ppadhāna in that they endeavour rightly by means of it, or it itself endevours rightly; it is commendably or beautifully endevouring. Alternatively,

38 Vism XIV 137: vira-bhāvo viriyam tām uṣāhāna-lakkhanam, sahajāṭānam upathambhanna-raṣam, asamsiddha-bhāva-paccupattihānaṃ, samviggaya yoṣiso padahati ti [A II 115] vacanato samvega-pada-ṭhānam viriyāṅbhva-vattih-pada-ṭhānam vā, samma āraddham sabba-sampattihāṃ mūlam hōti ti datṭhabhānaṃ. (Cf. As 120-1, which also quotes similes found at Mil 36-7.)

39 Vism XXII 35: padahāna etenā ti padhānam; so bhānas padhānam samma-ppadhānam; samma vā padahāna etenā ti samma-ppadhānam; so bhānas vā tām kileṣa-virupatta-vijahanato padhānaḥ ca hita-sukha-nipphadakattena setṭha-bhāvāvahānato padhāna-bhāva-karaṇato cā ti samma-ppadhānam. viriyasya etam adhivacanam, tāyādham uppannānappannānaṃ okusalānaṃ pahānāmuppatti-kiccam anuppannānappannānaḥ ca kusalānaṃ uppatthi-thiti-kiccam sādhaṇatī ti catubbhidham hōti, tasmā cattāro samma-ppadhānaḥ ti vuccati. (The correct reading of this passage is difficult to determine, it occurs with variations at Paṭis-a I 97; III 618; Nidd-a I 66.)

40 BR and MW, s.v. pra-ddhāna.
it is *samma-ppadhāna* because it correctly causes a state of being chief for a person. It is a term for *viriya*.\(^{41}\)

The material dealt with in this chapter more or less exhausts the Nikāya treatment of the four *samma-ppadhānas* and the *samma-ppadhāna* formula outside the context of the seven sets; *samma-ppadhāna* in the context of the seven sets will be dealt with later. For the sake of completeness at this point one should also note the following. Along with the four *satipaṭṭhānas* and four *iddhi-pādas*, the four *samma-ppadhānas*, or rather the four parts of the formula, are said to constitute four *dhammas* to be developed (*bhāvetabba*) in an *Āṅguttara-nikāya* passage of the *catun-nipāta*.\(^{42}\) The formula is also employed in a Nikāya passage explaining the *iddhi-pāda* formula; this will be considered in the next chapter.\(^{43}\)

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\(^{41}\) Ud-a 304: *sammā padahanti etena sayaṃ va sammā padahati; pasatthā sundaraṃ va padahanan ti sammā-ppadhanam. puggalassa va samma-d-eva padhāna-bhāva-karaṇato sammā-ppadhanam. viriyass’etam adhivacanam.*

\(^{42}\) A II 256.

\(^{43}\) The following summarizes the uses of the *samma-ppadhāna* formula in the four primary Nikāyas: four *samma-ppadhānas* (D III 221; M II 11; S V 244; IV 364; A I 39, II 15, IV 462); *sammā-vāyama* (= *maggaṅga*) (D II 312; M III 251; S V 9); *viriyaṇḍriya* (S V 198); others (M II 26-8; S V 268-9; A II 256, 74); variations (D III 221; S II 195-7; A II 16-7).
CHAPTER THREE
THE BASES OF SUCCESS

1. The basic formula

In the Pāli canon four *iddhi-pādas* are frequently cited by means of the following stock formula:


This formula is not immediately intelligible or self-explanatory, but fortunately the Nikāyas preserve an analysis of it in the *iddhi-pāda-samyutta.* The passage in question begins by defining *chanda-samādhi*:

If a *bhikkhu* gains concentration, gains one-pointedness of mind depending on desire [to act], this is called *chanda-samādhi.*

The analysis continues by citing the four parts of the *samma-ppadhāna* formula in full, with the concluding comment that 'these are called forces of endeavour' (*ime vuccanti padhāna-samkhārā*). Finally the nature of the first *iddhi-pāda* is summed up as follows:

There is thus this *chanda,* this *chanda-samādhi* and these *padhāna-samkhāras;* this, *bhikkhus,* is called the *iddhi-pāda* that is furnished with *chanda-samādhi-padhāna-samkhāra.*

Each of the remaining three *iddhi-pādas* is analyzed in an exactly parallel fashion. This allows us to translate the basic *iddhi-pāda* formula as follows:

Here a *bhikkhu* develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of desire to act, and with forces of endeavour; he develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of strength, and with forces of endeavour; he develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of mind, and with forces of endeavour; he develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of investigation, and with forces of endeavour.

This may remain rather obscure, but the *iddhi-pāda-samyutta* analysis makes it clear that a 'basis of success' or 'basis of growth' is here conceived of

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1. D II 213-4; III 77, 221; M I 103; II 11; S IV 365; V 254-93 passim; A I 39, 297; II 256. III 81-2; IV 464; Vibh 216; Pati I 111, 113; II 205. (For the 'bases of success' formula in Buddhist Sanskrit sources see section six of this chapter.)
3. *chandaṃ ce bhikkhu nissāya labhati samādhīṃ labhati cittassa ekaggatam, ayam vuccati chanda-samādhi.* (On *chanda* as the 'desire to act', see section five of this chapter.)
as consisting in an interplay of three basic things: meditative concentration, forces of endeavour (identified with the four right endeavours or, more simply, strength) and the particular means by which meditative concentration is gained, namely the desire to act, strength, mind, or investigation. An iddhi-pāda is not so much any one of these three things in particular as the interaction between them.

2. The iddhi-pāda-samyutta

The basic analysis of the iddhi-pāda formula that has just been considered provides some idea of the conception of the iddhi-pādas in the Nikāyas. But what precisely is the place of the iddhi-pādas in Buddhist spiritual practice as a whole? How are they to be understood in the context of the path to awakening? As far as the four primary Nikāyas are concerned, the treatment of the iddhi-pādas is certainly concentrated in the iddhi-pāda-samyutta, and this is the most convenient place to pursue such an enquiry into their nature.

Several times in the iddhi-pāda-samyutta we find a set explanation of the following: iddhi, iddhi-pāda, iddhi-pāda-bhāvanā and iddhi-pāda-bhāvanā-gāmini patipadā.∴ Thus iddhi is explained by the following stock description of eightfold iddhi:

A bhikkhu enjoys various kinds of iddhi: [i] being one he becomes many, being many he becomes one; [ii] unhindered he passes into a visible state, into an invisible state, [iii] through house-walls, through city-walls and through mountains, as if through space; [iv] he goes down into the earth and comes up, as if through water; [v] he goes over firm water, as though over earth; [vi] he travels through the sky cross-legged, as if he were a bird with wings; [vii] he touches and strokes with his hand the sun and moon, [things] of such great iddhi and such great power; [viii] he holds mastery with his body as far as the world of Brahmā.○

Next, iddhi-pāda is explained as ‘that path or way that conduces to the gaining of iddhi, the repeated gaining of iddhi’ (yo maggo yā paṭipadā iddhi-lābhaya iddhi-paṭilābhaya samvattati); iddhi-pāda-bhāvanā or ‘the development of iddhi-pāda’ is explained by the basic iddhi-pāda formula; finally iddhi-pāda-bhāvanā-gāmini patipadā or ‘the way leading to the development of iddhi-pāda’ is explained as the noble eight-folded path (ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo).

This explanation of these four expressions is significant in two ways. First, it is clear that the notion of the iddhi-pādas is consistently and directly linked to the stock description of eightfold iddhi in the Nikāyas—in fact this stock

6 The passages in question abbreviate this stock formula; for the full text see, e.g., S V 264: bhikkhu ... anekavihītam iddhi-viđham paccanubhoti. eko pi hutvā bahudhā hoti, bahudhā pi hutvā eko hoti; avibbāvam tiro-bhāvam tiro-kudām tiro-pākāram tiro-pabbataṁ asajjamāno gacchati seyyathā pi ākāse; paṭavīyā pi ummujja-nimmujja karoti seyyathā pi udāke; udāke pi abhijjamāne gacchati seyyathā pi paṭavīyā; ākāse pi pallaṅkena kamati seyyathā pi pakkhi sakuno; ime pi candima-suriye evam mahiddhike evam mahānubhāve pāninā parimāsati parimajjati, yāva brahma-lokā pi kāyena va samvatteti. (Vism XII 69 takes avibbāvam tiro-bhāvam as involving a distinct iddhi which gives a list of eight iddhis; the syntax of the Nikāya formula might be read as suggesting only seven distinct iddhis.)
description occurs on no less than fifteen occasions in the *iddhi-pāda-samyutta.* Secondly, the linking of the development of the *iddhi-pādas* to the noble eight-factored path brings the *iddhi-pādas* right into the main stream of spiritual practice as understood in the Nikāyas. In this connection one must note that, in addition to being frequently linked to eightfold *iddhi,* the *iddhi-pādas* are also linked on some sixteen occasions to the destruction of the *āsava*s, or of *dukkha.* Thus it is said that Moggallāna and the Tathāgata enjoy eightfold *iddhi* as a result of developing and making great the four *iddhi-pādas;* but at the same time it is also said that as a result of making great and developing the four *iddhi-pādas* they attain and dwell in the liberation of mind that is without *āsava*s. Of course, an understanding of the *iddhi-pādas* as something fundamental to the path to awakening would appear to be already inherent in their being included in the list of the seven sets. What is of interest, then, is the relationship in the Nikāyas between the specific notion of eightfold *iddhi* and the more general notion of *iddhi* as ‘success’ or ‘spiritual growth’.

A considerable proportion of the *iddhi-pāda-samyutta* appears to be concerned with the analysis of the *iddhi-pādas* as skill in meditation technique; that is to say, what is emphasized is ‘the gaining of success, the repeated gaining of success’ and the particular skills that are needed if this is to be accomplished. In this connection we find an extended *iddhi-pāda* formula:

Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu develops the *iddhi-pāda* that is furnished both with *chanda-samādhi* and *padhāna-samākhāra:* ‘The desire to act in me will not be too slack; it will not be dispersed without.’ He dwells conscious of after and before; as before, so after; as after, so before; as below, so above; as above, so below; as by day, so by night; as by night, so by day. Thus by means of an open and untrammelled mind he develops a shining consciousness.

This is then repeated three more times for the remaining *iddhi-pādas,* substituting ‘strength’ (*viriya*), ‘mind’ (*citta*) and ‘investigation’ (*vīmānasā*) in turn for the desire to act (*chanda*).

One version of this extended formula adds some further explanations in a form similar to the ‘word analysis’ (*pada-bhājaniya*) found in the *Vinaya-piṭaka,* the Niddesa and Vibhaṅga. *Chanda* that is too slack is *chanda* associated with idleness (*kosājja;* *chanda* that is too vigorous is *chanda* associated with restlessness (*uddhacca;* *chanda* that is withdrawn within is *chanda* associated with sleepiness and drowsiness (*thīna-middha;* *chanda* that is dispersed without is *chanda* dispersed after the five kinds of object of sense-desire (*pañca-kāma-guce ārabba* *anuvikkhito anuvisațo,* ‘Dwelling conscious of after and before’ is said to mean that one’s *saññā* or ‘idea’ of after and before is well grasped,
brought to mind well, well remembered, well penetrated by wisdom (pacchā-
pure saññā suggahīthā hoti sumanasikatā sudhāritā supta śividdhā paññāya).

‘Dwelling as below so above’ is explained with reference to contemplation of
the various parts of the body from the toes to the crown of the head (described
in the same terms as the relevant aspect of kāyānupassanā). With regard to ‘as
by day, so by night’ it is explained that by whatever aspects, marks and signs
the bhikkhu develops the iddhi-pāda furnished with chanda-samādhi-padhāna-
samkhāra during the day, he develops it by those same aspects, marks and
signs during the night (yehi ākārehi yehi lingehi yehi nimittehi divā chanda-sam-
ādhi-padhāna-samkhāra-samannāgataṁ iddhi-pādam bhāveti, so tehi ākārehi tehi
lingehi tehi nimittehi rattīṁ ... bhāveti). Finally developing a shining conscious-
ness is further explained: the bhikkhu’s awareness of light is well learnt, his
awareness of radiance is well established (bhikkhuno āloka-saññā suggahīthā hoti
divā-saññā svādhīnāṭhitā).

The terminology involved here is in part reminiscent of the description of
the preparations for meditation practice and the abandoning of the five
hindrances elsewhere in the Nikāyas. The general tenor of the extended
formula and its detailed analysis suggest that what we are concerned with is the
acquiring of skill and facility in meditation attainment. It is worth noting the
particular incidents and circumstances associated with the extended formula in
the iddhi-pāda-saṃyutta.

In the first place it is given as descriptive of the practice of the Bodhisatta
himself prior to his awakening. As a result of developing the iddhi-pādas in this
way, he develops what are elsewhere called the six abhiññās or ‘direct knowl-
dedges’: eightfold iddhi, the divine ear (dibba-sota), knowledge encompassing
the mind [of others] (ceto-pariyājana), knowledge of the recollection of former
lives (pubbe-nivāsānussati-ñāna), knowledge of the rise and fall of beings
(acutupapatti-ñāna), knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas (āsavānaṁ
khaya-ñāna).

Another sutta tells how the Buddha requests Moggallāna to stir and

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12 I have taken divā in divā-saññā as a feminine substantive corresponding to Skt div, which is
usually masculine but which does occur as a feminine in the Vedas and later Skt in the sense of
‘heaven’ or ‘sky’ (see MW, s.v. 3. div, dyu); MW cites the sense of ‘brightness’ for the masculine in
the RV. It is more usual to take divā as an adverb, ‘by day’ (cf. PED, s.v. divā, which cites further
examples of the expression divā-saññā), but this seems to make little sense in the present context.

13 This is discussed fully in Chapter 5.

14 S V 269-71.

15 This is discussed fully in Chapter 5.

16 S V 263-6; cf. A III 82, which also associates the iddhi-pādas with the practice of the
bodhisatta. Th 233 also links the realization of the six abhiññās to the development of the
iddhi-pādas.
arouse (saṃvejeti) a group of bhikkhus who are described as ‘excited, complacent, unsteady, noisy, talking freely, of lost mindfulness, without clear comprehension, unconcentrated, with wandering minds and faculties uncontrolled’ (uddhatā unmaḷā capāla mukharā vikīma-vācā maṭṭha-ssatino asampajānā asamāhitā vibbhata-cittā pākatindriyā). Moggallāna then contrives an iddhi (iddhābhisaṃkhāram abhisāṃkhāresi) such that with his big toe he causes the house in which the bhikkhus are staying to shake and tremble. Suitably stirred, the bhikkhus then question the Buddha about the incident, who explains that it is through developing the iddhi-pādas in the manner described that Moggallāna is of such great power, and dwells in the liberation of mind that is without āsavas. The implication is that the development of the iddhi-pādas is also the remedy for the bhikkhus’ lack of mindfulness and concentration.

3. The suttanta-bhājaniya of the Vibhaṅga

The suttanta-bhājaniya or ‘analysis according to Suttanta’ of the iddhi-pāda-vibhaṅga16 gives an exposition of the basic iddhi-pāda formula that is more or less the same as that given in the iddhi-pāda-samyutta. It differs in only one or two respects, and adds a basic commentary defining some of the key terms. Where the Saṃyutta-nikāya defines chanda-samādhi as concentration gained depending on the desire to act (chandaṁ nissāya), the Vibhaṅga describes it as concentration or one-pointedness of mind gained by making the desire to act the ‘overlord’ or ‘dominant’ (chandaṁ adhipatiṁ karitvā). The technical notion of chanda, viṇīva, citta and vīmamsā as ‘dominant’ is found developed in the early Abhidhamma literature, but appears to be lacking from the four primary Nikāyas.17 According to the Dhammasaṅgani one of chanda, viṇīva, citta or vīmamsā may act as dominant in certain kinds of consciousness.18 This notion is then found in the Paṭṭhāna as the third of the twenty-four conditions (paccayas), namely adhipati-paccaya.19 Rather little can be gleaned from the canonical texts concerning the notion of adhipati; the Visuddhimagga makes the following general comment:

A dhamma that is contributory in the sense of being most powerful is an adhipati-paccaya ... The four dhāmas termed chanda, viṇīva, citta, vīmamsā should be understood as adhipati-paccaya, but not [all] at once, for when citta occurs having made chanda the chief, the most powerful, then just chanda is the adhipati not the others. The method is the same for the others.20

To return to the iddhi-pāda-vibhaṅga, padhāna-saṃkhāras are once more elucidated by reference to the samma-padhāna formula. The final statement

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16 Vibh 216-20.
17 Such expressions as attādhipateyya, lokādhipateyya, dharmādhipateyya (A I 147-9) and saṭṭhadhipateyya sabbe dhammā (A IV 338-9; V 106-7) are found in the Nikāyas.
18 See below, p. 320.
19 See Dukap 2.
20 Vism XVII 72: jetthakaṭṭhena upakārako dhammo adhipati-paccayo ... chanda-viṇīva-citta-vīmamsā-saṃkhāta caitāro dhammā adhipati-paccayo ti veditabba, no ca kho ekato, yadā hi chandaṁ dhuroṇi chandaṁ jetthakoṁ katvā cittaṁ patatī, tadā chando va adhipati, na itore. esa nayo sesesu.
summing up the iddhi-pāda as a whole is slightly different from the Samyutta version, but does not seem to diverge in intent:

There is thus this chanda-samādhi, these padhāna-samkhāras; collecting and grouping this together, it is termed chanda-samādhi-padhāna-samkhāra.21

The whole of this initial analysis is given in full for each of the four iddhi-pādas (substituting viriya, citta or vimānsā as appropriate). Further definitions of key terms are then appended: of chanda, viriya, citta or vimānsā; of samādhi, padhāna-samkhāras, iddhi and iddhi-pāda. For the most part these consist in simply applying the appropriate Dhammasaṅgani register of terms; thus viriya and padhāna-samkhāra are both defined by the full register of terms for viriya, vimānsā by that for pañña, citta by that for citta, samādhi by that for one-pointedness of mind (cittass’ekaggatā). Chanda is the one term not defined in the Dhammasaṅgani and is here glossed as 'purpose, purposiveness, the desire to act, skilful wholesome purpose'.22 The explanations of ‘success’ (iddhi) and ‘basis of success’ (iddhi-pāda) are worth quoting in full:

‘Success’ is that which of these dhammas is success, thorough success, succeeding, thorough succeeding, gaining, regaining, attainment, thorough attainment, experiencing, realization, accomplishment.23

What is interesting about this is that iddhi is here taken in rather general terms. If we are to take seriously the Nikāya background to this, where the iddhi-pādas are at once associated with eightfold iddhi and the ultimate spiritual goal, then the implications of the Vibhaṅga definition must be, I think, that eightfold iddhi should be seen as nothing different from meditational success in general. That is to say, both eightfold iddhi and the liberation of mind that is without āsavas are simply two aspects of what is basically one skill or facility of mind. Precisely the same ‘success’ that allows the bhikkhu to develop eightfold iddhi allows him to develop the liberation of mind that is without āsavas. As for ‘basis of success’ itself, it is explained as:

The aggregate of feeling, the aggregate of conception, the aggregate of formations, the aggregate of consciousness of one who is thus [i.e. has ‘success’].24

In other words the totality of mental dhammas associated with some form of meditational success is to be regarded as the basis for that success. To sum up, we can say that a ‘basis of success’ consists of the aggregate of dhammas

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21 Vibh 216: iti ayañ ca chanda-samādhi ime ca padhāna-samkhāra, tad ekajjham abhisamyūhitvā abhisamkhāpitvā chanda-samādhi-padhāna-samkhāra tveva samkhāram gagchati.

22 Ibid.: chanda chantikatā kattu-kamyatā kusalo dhamma-cchando. The northern tradition also defines chanda as the desire to act (kartr-kāmatā); see Abhidh-k 54; Abhidh-dī 69; Abhidh-sam Trsl 7. In expressions such as kāma-cchanda and chanda-rāga in the Nikāyas, chanda seems to connote ‘desire’ in an unskilful sense; clearly this is not so in the early Abhidhamma texts. In the later Abhidhamma chanda is classed as a neutral cetasika that may be either skilful or unskilful depending on associated cetasikas (e.g. Vism XIV 133-84); cf. the use of chanda in the samma-ppa-dhāna formula.

23 Vibh 217: iddhi ti yā tesaṃ dhammānam iddhi samīdhi ijjhatā samījjanā labho partīlabho patti sampatti phussā sacchikiriyā upassampādā.

contributing to a ‘success’, but of particular importance in establishing and promoting that success is the interaction of concentration (gained by one of four ways) and forces of endeavour.

4. The commentarial analysis

The commentarial analysis, in the first place, reiterates the basic analysis of the Samyutta-nikāya and suttanta-bhājaniya: chanda-samādhī is concentration motivated by chanda (chanda-hetuṇa), or headed by chanda (chandâdhiṇa); it is a term for samādhī that has been achieved by making chanda, which is the desire to act the adhipati; padhāna-samkhāras are samkhāras that constitute padhāna, and is an expression for viriya that accomplishes the four functions of right endeavour.²⁵ The commentaries then go on to define iddhi and iddhi-pāda in terms rather more precise than those so far encountered:

\[ \text{iddhi-pāda, i.e. ... that which constitutes a basis in the sense of a foundation for chanda-samādhī-padhāna-samkhāras associated with skilful citta, such as access, jhāna and so on, which are [collectively] designated ‘success’; the sum of remaining citta and cetasika is the meaning.}^{26} \]

In other words, ‘success’ is seen in terms of either access concentration (upacāra) or jhāna, and is constituted by chanda-samādhī (or viriya-samādhī, etc.) and padhāna-samkhāras; the remaining consciousness and consciousness factors are the basis for that success. This position appears to be subsequently summed up in the following:

Here, then, the three dhammas termed chanda-samādhī-padhāna-samkhāras [i.e. chanda, samādhī and viriya] are both successes and bases of success, while the remaining associated four aggregates are just bases of success.²⁷

The Samyutta commentary spells this out:

Now, in the iddhi-pāda-vibhaṅga according to the method beginning [with the words] ‘the aggregate of feeling of one who is thus’, the remaining immaterial dhammas that are furnished with these [three] dhammas are said to be ‘bases of success’. Moreover these three dhammas are both successes and bases of success. How? Because for one who is developing chanda, chanda is called the success, samādhī and padhāna-samkhāras are called the basis for the success of chanda; for one developing samādhī, samādhī is called the success, chanda and padhāna-samkhāras are called the basis for the success of samādhī; for one developing padhāna-samkhāras, padhāna-samkhāras are called the success, chanda and samādhī are called the basis for the success of padhāna-samkhāras. For in the case of associated dhammas, when one succeeds, the remaining succeed too.²⁸

²⁵ Sv II 641 = Vibh-a 303.
²⁸ Spk III 255-6: iddhi-pāda-vibhaṅge pana yo tathā-bhūtassa vedanā-kkhandho ti ādīnā nayena imehi dhāmmehi samanaddhatā sesa-arūpino dhāmman iddhi-pādaṁ ti vutta, api ca ime p tayo dhāmman iddhi pi honti iddhi-pāda pi. kathām. chandaṁ hi bhāvayato chanda iddhi nāma hoti, samādhī-padhāna-saṁkhārā chandaiddhi-pādaṁ nāma. saṁmahān bhāvaṁtassa samādhī iddhi nāma hoti, chanda-padhāna-
Both the *Samyutta* and *Vibhaṅga* commentaries devote some considerable space to an analysis of the details of all this for each of the four *iddhi-pādas*. From the point of view of present concerns the above suffices. What has been presented of the commentarial analysis so far considers the notion of *iddhi-pāda* by way of the internal relationships that exist between various mental factors at the time the bhikkhu achieves access concentration or *jhāna*. But this does not exhaust the matter, the full significance of the notion of *iddhi-pāda* has yet to be brought out:

It should be understood that the prior stage is also called the basis of success and that [subsequent] acquisition of *jhāna*, etc. is called the success. The meaning of this should be explained in terms of either access or insight: the preparation for first *jhāna* is called the basis of success, first *jhāna* is the success ... the insight for the path of stream-attainment is called the basis of success, the path of stream-attainment is called the success ... It can also be explained just in terms of acquisition: the first *jhāna* is called the basis of success, the second *jhāna* the success; the second *jhāna* is called the basis of success, the third *jhāna* success ...  

The significance of this is that it shifts the scale. From considering the dynamic of 'success' at a given moment within a particular variety of consciousness, we move to a consideration of it from the point of view of a series of successes: how one success leads to another. This notion of *iddhi-pāda* is, then, a relative one. What is to be regarded as *iddhi* and what as *iddhi-pāda* depends on the particular perspective adopted. In particular, however, the notion of *iddhi-pāda* points to the significance of the interplay between *samādhi* and *padhāna-saṃkhāras* along with *chandha*, *vīriyā*, *citta* and *vīnasā* in consolidating and furthering the process of meditational attainment:

The *iddhi-pādas*: here *iddhi* [means] ‘it succeeds’; ‘it succeeds fully, it is accomplished’. According to the first meaning an *iddhi-pāda* is ‘a pāda that is just *iddhi*’; an item of *iddhi* is the meaning. According to the second meaning an *iddhi-pāda* is ‘a pāda for *iddhi*’; pāda, i.e. foundation; ‘the means of acquiring’ is the meaning. For, since by means of it they [beings/dhammas?] reach and obtain success in the sense of progressively higher attainments, therefore it is called a pāda.

In summing up, the *Vibhaṅga* commentary reiterates that neither *iddhi* nor
The notion of iddhi-pāda simply provides one way of looking at the relationships that exist between the dhammas that make up the aggregates. But the commentary continues:

But while this is said, they say that it [i.e. iddhi-pāda] would be an expression just for the four aggregates had not the Teacher further on given what is called the uttara-cūla-bhājaniya, because in the uttara-cūla-bhājaniya it is said that just chanda is chandiddhi-pāda, just viriya ... just citta ... just viṃsāsā is viṃsāsidddeni-pāda.32

The uttara-cūla-bhājaniya appears to refer to the final section of the abhidhamma-bhājaniya of the iddhi-pāda-vibhaṅga.33 According to the method of the uttara-cūla-bhājaniya, at the time of lokuttara or ‘transcendent’ skilful consciousness, chanda alone (or viriya, citta or viṃsāsā) is to be viewed as the ‘basis of success’ and remaining dhammas are associated with the basis of success, chanda.34 In other words the four iddhi-pādas are simply chanda, viriya, citta and viṃsāsā in association with lokuttara-kusala-citta.

This brings us to the question of the iddhi-pādas as nipphanna and anippipanna. The precise significance of this pair of terms is not entirely clear; their application to the list of twenty-eight varieties of materiality or ‘form’ (rūpa) is perhaps most easily intelligible. According to this classification the ten nipphanna-rūpas are simply terms for different modes or aspects of the eighteen nipphanna-rūpas in combination; anippipanna-rūpas are not separate realities in their own right.35 Rather similarly, then, it might be argued that iddhi and iddhi-pāda simply describe different relations and aspects of the four mental aggregates in combination, they do not designate particular really existing dhammas.36 The view that either iddhi or iddhi-pāda is anippipanna is rejected, however, in the atṭhakathās.37 The Vibhaṅga commentary does not say why

31 Vibh-a 308: evamo idhāpi iddhi ti vā pado ti vā na aṭṭhassa kassaccadhi vacanam sampayuttakāno catunnaṃ khandhānāṃ yeva adhi vacanam ti.
32 Ibid.: evam vutte pana idamsah aṭṭhassa kassaccatunnaṃ khandhānāmos eva adhi vacanam bhāveyya yadi satthā parato uttara-cūla-bhājaniyam nāma na āhuveyya; uttara-cūla-bhājaniye pana chando yeva chandiddhi-pādo, viriyam eva, cittam eva, viṃsāsā va viṃsāsidddeni-pādo ti kathitam ti.33 Vibh 223.18-224.16.
33 This is discussed more fully in Chapter 10; see pp. 326-7, 337.
34 Cf. Y. Karunadasa, The Buddhist Analysis of Matter, Colombo, 1967, pp. 67-8. The distinguishing of the different classes of rūpa (upāda/nu upāda; nipphanna/anippipanna) seems to concern distinctions of the relative order of things. From the point of view of the primary order there are only the four mahā-bhūtas (paṭhavi, āpo, tejo, vāyo). Dependent on these arises the body of a being: cakkhu, sota, ghāna, jīvha, kāya, rūpa, sadda, gandha, rasa, phoṭhabba (not distinguishing from paṭhavi, tejo and vāyo), itthindriya, purisindriya, jīvindriya, hadyaya-vatthu, kahaṇnikārā-āhāra. All the preceding are nipphanna or conditioned ‘realities’, but there is a further order: the two viṭṭhittis; lāhutā, mudutā, kammaḥhitā; upacaya, santati, jaraññā, aniccatā; ākāsa. These last ten items are anippipanna, they have no separate existence.
35 DAT II 268 defines anippipanna in the present context as ‘unsubstantiated from the point of ultimate meaning; “it does not exist” is the meaning’ (paramamathato asiddo, natthi ti attho).
36 There is some confusion in the MSS and editions concerning the precise nature of the view to be rejected. Sv II 642 has keci pana nipphanna iddhi anippipanna iddhi-pādo ti vadanti (though all Sinhalese MSS apparently omit the words nipphanna iddhi); Spk III 256 has just keci pana anippipanna iddhi-pādo ti vadanti (no variants recorded); Vibh-a 308 has keci pana iddhi nāma anippipanna iddhi-pādo nipphanna ti vadamsu (no variants recorded). DAT II 268 attributes the view to the Abhayagiri Viśāns, commenting that some among them were of the view that iddhi is anippipanna, but iddhi-pāda nipphanna, while others that iddhi-pāda also is anippipanna (keci ti
exactly,\textsuperscript{38} but the \textit{Dīgha} and \textit{Samyutta} commentaries regard the view as refuted by the \textit{uttara-cūla-bhājaniya}.\textsuperscript{39} Presumably the point is that in the \textit{uttara-cūla-bhājaniya} the terms \textit{iddhi} and \textit{iddhi-pāda} do refer to distinct really existing \textit{dhammas}, namely \textit{chanda/viriya/citta/vīmamsā} and \textit{lokuttara-citta} respectively.

5. The desire to act, strength, mind and investigation

The Nikāyas and Abhidhamma talk of gaining \textit{samādhi} or ‘concentration’ depending on or by making dominant the desire to act (\textit{chanda}), strength (\textit{viriya}), mind (\textit{citta}) or investigation (\textit{vīmamsā}). How is this understood? Nothing more is said in the canonical texts, but the commentarial tradition preserves a full and vivid simile that is of some interest:

It is like the case of four ministers who, aspiring to a position, lived in close association with the king. One was energetic in waiting upon [the king]; knowing the king’s wishes and desires, he waited upon him night and day; he pleased the king and obtained a position. The one who produces transcendent \textit{dhamma} with \textit{chanda} as chief should be understood as like him. Another, however, thought: ‘I cannot wait upon the king daily; when a task needs to be done I shall please him by my valour.’ When there was trouble on the borders he was posted by the king, and having crushed the enemy by means of his valour he obtained a position. The one who produces transcendent \textit{dhamma} with \textit{viriya} as chief should be understood as like him. Another thought: ‘Waiting upon the king daily, taking swords and arrows on the chest is burdensome. I shall please the king by the power of my counsel.’ Having pleased the king by providing counsel by means of his grasp of state craft, he obtained a position. The one who produces transcendent \textit{dhamma} with \textit{citta} as chief should be understood as like him. Another thought: ‘What need of waiting upon [the king], and so on? Surely kings grant positions to those of [good] birth. When the king grants [a position] to such a one he will grant it to me.’ So relying solely on his possession of [good] birth, he obtained a position. The one who produces transcendent \textit{dhamma} with \textit{vīmamsā} as chief, relying on thoroughly purified \textit{vīmamsā} should be understood as like him.\textsuperscript{40}
The above version is taken from the Dīgha and Saṁyutta commentaries. Its basic import is plain enough. What we have are four different means by which one achieves one's purpose. The illustrations for chanda and viriya are in keeping with the way these two terms are explained elsewhere in the literature, but when it comes to citta and vimāṇsā there are problems. The Vibhaṅga commentary's version of this simile inverts the illustrations for citta and vimāṇsā, so we have citta illustrated by good birth, and vimāṇsā by the power of counsel.41 Are we to assume that one version is simply a mistake? Or does each version have its own logic? The reasoning behind the Dīgha and Saṁyutta commentaries version would seem to be that chanda, viriya, citta and vimāṇsā represent progressively easier means of achieving one's purpose: the one who most easily achieves his purpose spiritually is the one in whom vimāṇsā (identified with pañña or 'wisdom' in the Vibhaṅga) is thoroughly purified; he is therefore likened to someone easily obtaining a desired position simply on account of his good birth.

On the other hand, it would seem more natural to associate manta ('counsel') with vimāṇsā ('investigation', 'inspection', 'reflection' and, like manta, a derivative from the root man) than with citta ('mind', 'consciousness'). It is easy to see why vimāṇsā's nature should be illustrated as giving wise counsel, but not so easy to see why citta's should. Why might citta's nature be likened to good birth? One function of the notion of citta in the Abhidhamma literature is to indicate a hierarchy of 'minds' or 'consciousnesses'. Citta may be of many different kinds and of different levels. For example it may belong to the sphere of sense-desire (kāmāvacara), to the sphere of form (rūpāvacara), to the sphere of the formless (arūpāvacara) or it may transcend these (lokuttara). Thus the lengthy account of the term citta in the Atthasālīṇī lays great emphasis on the variegated nature of citta, and citta is sometimes expressly said to be of different 'births' or 'classes' (jāti)42 it is mind that ultimately distinguishes beings. This conception of citta would seem to fit rather well with its being likened to good birth. One who achieves his purposes by citta, achieves it by his own nature, his own natural level of mind, like one who gets what he wants by virtue of his good birth. But this may not always be enough:

'Although of good birth someone might not be a counsellor; when some matter arises that must be dealt with by counsel, I shall gain a position.' Thinking this the fourth relied on counsel.43

On balance, it seems to me that the Vibhaṅga commentary's assignation of the four illustrations works rather better than the Saṁyutta commentary's.

41 Vibh-a 305-6; cf. Moh 160. DAT II 269 notes the discrepancy, but offers no explanation (sammohavinodaniyam pana cittiddhi-pādassa jāti-sampatti-sadisatā vimāṇsiddhi-pādassa manta-bala-sadisatā ca yojitā).

42 As 63-6; a considerable amount is made of the play on citta/citra meaning 'variegated' (As 63). Vism XIV 82 (cf. Abhidhav-av 2): jāti-vasena tividham kusalam akusalatān avyakatāna ca.

43 Vibh-a 305-6: catutho jātimi pi eko amantaniyo hoti, manienna kattabba-kicce uppanne āhārapessām etañh thānantarān ti mantām avassayi.
6. The northern tradition and the Nettipakaraṇa

Buddhist Sanskrit sources preserve a slightly different version of the ‘bases of success’ formula; I quote from the *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra* as a representative source:

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The differences between this and the Pāli version are in many ways minor, but nevertheless rather interesting. An obvious difference is the addition of the *viveka-nīśrīta* formula (‘dependent on seclusion, dependent on dispassion, dependent on cessation and ripening in release’). The *viveka-nīśrīta* formula is certainly common in the Nikāyas, and I shall have occasion to discuss it some detail in connection with the seven *bojjaṅgas*, but I have been unable to find any canonical source that applies it to the four *iddhi-pādas*. One passage of the paracanonical *Nettipakaraṇa*, however, does do so. I shall consider this presently. It is difficult to believe that the Chinese Āgamas do not preserve a version of the *ṛddhi-pāda* formula without the *viveka-nīśrīta* formula, but in extant Buddhist Sanskrit sources the inclusion of the *viveka-nīśrīta* formula appears to be the rule.\(^45\) In the *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra*’s version we also have the addition of the refrain ‘chanda (vīrya, citta, mūmānsā) will not be too slack in me, [it will not be] too vigorous in me’. This is not included in other Buddhist Sanskrit sources, but is of some interest since it parallels the extended *iddhi-pāda* formula of the *iddhi-pāda-saṃyutta*.

The basic way of taking the *ṛddhi-pāda* formula in Buddhist Sanskrit sources closely parallels that of the Pāli sources. Thus the four *ṛddhi-pādas* as ‘bases of success’ are closely associated with the general notion of meditation attainment. Where the Pāli commentators talk of access and *jhāna*, Buddhist Sanskrit sources talk of the particular nature of the *ṛddhi-pādas* as *samādhi*.\(^46\) The first *ṛddhi-pāda* is taken as furnished with *chanda-saṃādhi* and *praḥaṇa-saṃskāra*;\(^47\) *chanda-saṃādhi*, and so on, is *samādhi* gained by making *chanda*,

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\(^{44}\) Artha 30-1.

\(^{45}\) I have been unable to find any exception to this rule apart from Konow’s reconstruction of the Skt text of the *Daśasāhasrīkā* (pp. 96-7) which does not have the *viveka-nīśrīta* formula for any of the sets. Lamotte (Traité, III 1124) cites *Pañcavimśati, Sataśāhasrīkā, Daśabhūmika* and *Mahāvyutpatti* as all including *viveka-nīśrīta*, etc., and was also apparently unable to find an exception to the rule. The Chinese Āgama version of the *Cetokhila-sutta* appears to include the *viveka-nīśrīta* formula where the Pāli does not (see M I 103, Thich Minh Chau, op. cit., p. 95).

\(^{46}\) *Bhāṣya* at Abhidh-k 385 gives two basic methods: either *pāda* is *samādhi* which is the basis for cumulative success (*ṛddhi*) i.e. the accomplishment of all excellent qualities (saṃ-patti); alternatively *ṛddhi* itself is *samādhi*, and *chanda*, etc., are the *pādas* (cf. *uttara-cūla-bhājaniya* method, and see below, p. 337). Cf. Abhidh-h Trsl 117-9; Abhidh-sam Trsl 121; Satya Trsl 448; Artha-n 219.

\(^{47}\) Artha-n 221: *chanda-saṃādhi ca praḥaṇa-saṃskāraś ceti chanda-saṃādhi-praḥaṇa-saṃskārau. tābhāyaṁ saṃvanvāgatāṁ sahitam yuktaṁ ṛddhi-pādaṁ bhāvayātīti.*
and so on, dominant (adhipati). However, prahāṇa-sanskāras are, of course, ‘forces of abandoning’ rather than ‘forces of endeavour’. Much of what has already been said concerning samyak-prahāṇa is relevant here, though one should note that the literature does not identify prahāṇa-sanskāras with vīrya, as it does the four samyak-praḥāṇas. Instead the northern literature provides a list detailing just what forces of abandoning are intended: desire to act (chanda), striving (vyāyāma), confidence (śraddhā), tranquillity (praśrabdhī), mindfulness (smṛti), clear comprehension (samprajanya), volition (cetanā), equipoise (upekṣā).

This, then, constitutes a rather more definite difference in interpretation between the Pāli tradition and the northern tradition, than does the case of samma-ppadhāna/samyak-prahāṇa. This makes all the more interesting the following treatment of the āddhi-pādas preserved in the Nettippakarana:

Therein, one-pointedness of mind that has confidence as dominant—this is chanda-samādhi. When consciousness is concentrated due to suppression of the defilements either by the power of reflection or by the power of development—this is abandoning (pāhāṇa). Therein, breathing in and out, initial and sustained thought, ideas and feelings, mindfulness and thought—these are forces. Thus there is the initial chanda-samādhi, there is abandoning due to suppression of the defilements, and there are these forces; [taking] both he develops the āddhi-pāda furnished with chanda-samādhi-padhāna [sic]-samkhāra, dependent on seclusion, dependent on dispassion, dependent on cessation, ripening in release.

One-pointedness of mind that has vīrya, citta and vīmaṃsā as dominant is then treated in precisely the same way. Both the notion of pāhāṇa (-samkhāra) and the association of the āddhi-pādas with the viveka-nissita formula are

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48 Abhidh-k vy 601-2 quotes a Sūtra source: sūtra: uktam hi chandam cāpi bhāṣaṇa adhipatis krṣvā labhate samādhim so'sya bhavati chanda-samādhih. cittam [sic] vīryam mīmāṃsām cāpi adhipatis krṣvā labhate samādhim so'sya bhavati mīmāṃsā-samādhir iti. Cf. Abhidh-di 359; Artha-n 220. Abhidh-sam Tsl 121 defines chanda-, vīrya-, citta- and mīmāṃsā-samādhi respective-ly as one-pointedness of mind attained by means of proper application of chanda, constant application of vīrya, the power of concentration previously cultivated, hearing dharma and insight respectively. The technical notion of adhipati does not appear to be developed in quite the same way in northern Abhidharmic treatises. Adhidh-h and Abhidh-k know the concept of adhipati-pratyaya but it is not specifically related to chanda, vīrya, citta and mīmāṃsā; it is rather an alternative term for kārama-hetu (productive cause) which is hetu in its most general aspect; see Abhidh-h Tsl 24; Abhidh-k 82-3, 98-100.

49 Satya Tsl 42; Abhidh-sam Tsl 121; Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya IV 4 (Anacker, op. cit., pp. 247-8, 447); Abhidh-di 359 gives the same eight items substituting buddhi for samprajanya; Amṛta Tsl 205 gives a slightly different list of five: chanda, vīrya, smṛti, samprajanya, prātīti, prāśrabdhī.

50 Nett 15: tattha yā saddhādhipatyeṣā cittekağgattā ayaṁ chanda-samādhi. samādhite citte kilesāṃ antaṃ vikkhambhanatāya pañjarṣaṁkhāra-balena vai bhāvanā-balena vai idam pahānam. tattha ye assāsa-ātikka-vicāra-saṅghā-vedayita-sara-saṅkhāpa ime saṅkhāra. iti purimako ca chanda-samādhi kilesa-vikkhambhanatā ca pahānam ime ca saṅkhāra. tad-ubhayam chanda-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samāndgatam āddhi-pādam bhāvati viveka-nissitam virāga-nissitam nirodha-nissitam vosagga-parināmin. Nett-a (216) comments: “This is abandoning”—concentration that achieves abandoning by suppression is “abandoning” is what is said, denoting that one abandons by means of it; padhānam is also a reading; “the pinnacle” is the meaning, ’idam pahānam ti vikkhambhana-pahāna-sādhaka samādhi pahānam ti vutto; pahāhati etenā ti katvā. padhānam ti pi pāḥho; aggo ti attho); padhāna (as an alternative reading) is thus taken in the sense of ‘principal’ and not ‘endeavour’. For the association of chanda and Saddhā see below, pp. 114-5.
characteristic of the northern tradition, and apart from this Netti passage seem to be absent from the Pāli tradition.\textsuperscript{51}

However, the Netti interpretation still differs from that offered by Buddhist Sanskrit texts; pahāna-saṁkhāra seems to be taken as a dvandva (‘abandoning’ and ‘forces’) rather than a tatpuruṣa (‘forces of abandoning’), and the list of saṁkhāras bears little resemblance to the one found in the northern texts. But the fact that the Nettippakarana’s treatment of the īddhi-pādas diverges from the usual treatment in Pāli texts constitutes further evidence that at least portions of the Netti ‘were composed in North India at some time prior to the introduction of the text into Ceylon’.\textsuperscript{52}

In conclusion one might suggest that pahāna (abandoning) perhaps makes better sense than pahdhāna (endeavour) as the original intention of the īddhi-pāda formula, in that it avoids the overlap with viriya in the second īddhi-pāda. It would be interesting to know whether the Chinese Agamas preserve a parallel to the īddhi-pāda-sāmyutta passage that associates the samma-ppahāna formula with pahāna-saṁkhāra.

7. The īddhi-pādas and the prolongation of life

The Mahāparinibbāna-sutta in the lead up to the Buddha’s announcement of his imminent parinibbāna represents the Buddha as declaring that ‘anyone who has developed and made great the four īddhi-pādas can, if he should so wish, live on for a kappa or what remains of a kappa’.\textsuperscript{53} It is apparent from the Pāli atthakathās and from Buddhist Sanskrit sources that the proper interpretation of this statement was already the subject of some controversy in ancient times. Some of the views and issues involved in that controversy have been discussed by P.S. Jaini, though his treatment is by no means exhaustive, and remains rather inconclusive.\textsuperscript{54} The problems posed by the notion of the prolongation of life by means of the īddhi-pādas seem to have been seen as basically two in number. First, given that the maximum potential lifespan of a given individual is understood in Buddhist thought to be determined by past kamma already at the time of conception, how precisely does a life-span come

\textsuperscript{51} The general equivalence of the īddhi-pādas to ‘abandoning by suppression’ and hence to meditative absorption, however, is stated; e.g. Ps II 69: imehi catuhi īddhi-pādehi vikkambhāna-pahānam.

\textsuperscript{52} Norman, PL, p. 110. Cf. Warder, IB, p. 342.

\textsuperscript{53} D II 103: yassa kassaci cattāro īddhi-pādā bhāvīti bahūlikatā yānikatā vatthu-katā anuṣṭhitā paricitā susamāraddhā, so ākānkhamāno kappam vā tiṣṭhēya kappavāsam vā. The Buddha then goes on to say that the Tathāgata is one who has so developed the īddhi-pādas. Ānanda fails to respond to the hint, whereupon the Buddha resolves to pass away in three months. When Ānanda subsequently exhorts him to live on for a kappa, the Buddha reprimands him and relates how on fifteen previous occasions (which are listed) he also told Ānanda how one who developed the īddhi-pādas might live on for a kappa. This whole incident is related at D II 102-9; S V 258-62; A IV 308-12; Ud 62-4; it is also found in all extant versions of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, see Barea, RBB II 147-94; for Barea’s discussion of the present īddhi-pāda formula, see id., pp. 151-6. The formula concerning the īddhi-pādas and the prolongation of life is also found in the Cakkavattisīhanāda-sutta at D III 77; this does not appear to count as one of the fifteen occasions referred to in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta.

to be subsequently extended by the development of the *iddhi-pādas* without violating the laws of *kamma-vipāka*? Secondly, does *kappa* in this passage refer to a *mahā-kappa* (i.e. cosmic aeon) or an *āyu-kappa* (i.e. normal maximum potential lifespan of a human being, namely one hundred years)? With regard to the first point, a full exposition of the various moot points of Abhidhamma raised here would, I think, need to be more extended and searching than Jaini’s introductory account, which seems to me to pass over some of the subtleties. I do not wish to embark on a full comparative Abhidharma study on this question here, but shall confine myself to a few comments on what I take to be the basic Theravādin Abhidhamma conception of the issue.

The *Visuddhimagga* states that there are two kinds of death, namely timely (*kāla-marāṇa*)—of which there are three varieties—and untimely (*akāla-marāṇa*). The *Visuddhimagga*’s discussion here suggests that there are three factors involved: the maximum potential lifespan of the human being in general; the particular potential lifespan of a given individual; any adventitious circumstances that might interfere with this and bring about untimely death. The particular potential lifespan of a given individual will vary according to the merit (*puñña*) acquired as a result of previous *janaka* or ‘productive’ *kamma*. What I have termed ‘adventitious circumstances’ are, of course, understood to work within the law of *kamma-vipāka*, and are determined in principle by what is called ‘destructive’ (*upaghātaka*) or ‘intervening’ (*upacchēdaka*) *kamma*. This kind of *kamma* overrides and supplants weaker *kamma*, and may be both skilful and unskilful. Presumably then, whether or not an individual’s potential lifespan is fulfilled depends on any unskilful destructive *kamma*. When these principles are applied to the question of the *iddhi-pādas* and the prolongation of life, what seems to be envisaged—at least as far as the Pāli commentaries are concerned—is that anyone in whom the *iddhi-pādas* are fully developed will have complete mastery over any untimely death and live out his full potential lifespan. In other words, the development of the *iddhi-pādas* constitutes a skilful ‘destructive’ *kamma* of a kind that overrides any unskilful ‘destructive’ *kamma*.

How might this operate in the case of a Buddha? Presumably his merit would be such that his potential lifespan would be more or less equivalent to the maximum potential for a human being. Or perhaps, strictly speaking, a Buddha’s merit should be properly considered as infinite. In this case his potential lifespan might in fact correspond to the duration of a great aeon. Bareau gives the following as the outlook of the Mahāsāṃghikas:

Puisque le corps de rétribution du Buddha a été obtenu par lui pour avoir cultivé les mérites pendant beaucoup d’ères cosmiques (*kalpa*) infinies, sa vie est vraiment

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55 Cf. Vibh 422: *manussānaṁ kittakāṁ āyu-ppamāṇāṁ. vassa-satam appam vā bhīvyo vā.*
56 Specifically on the present passage see Sv II 554-5; Mil 141-2; Kv 456-8; Kv-a 131-2; Abhidh-k 43-4.
57 Vism VIII 2-3.
Certainly it seems that the understanding of kappa in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta to mean maha-kappa is consistent with certain trends in Buddhist thought. Even if the above was not actually the view of the Mahāsāṃghikas, one might speculate that anyone or any school that interpreted kappa here to mean maha-kappa would be basing their view on exactly this kind of thinking. This would include a certain Mahāsīva-thera, whose views are rejected by Buddhaghosa. For Buddhaghosa kappa here means not maha-kappa but āyu-kappa.

So which is the correct interpretation of kappa in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta formula—maha-kappa or āyu-kappa? I think on balance the text of the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta as we have it, in its various recensions, points towards maha-kappa as being the correct interpretation. A significant factor here is the word kappāvāsesa. The most likely meaning of this is surely ‘the remainder of a kappa’. For someone to say that he can live on ‘for his lifespan or the remainder of his lifespan’ seems not to make very good sense; ‘remainder of his lifespan’ in fact becomes redundant. However, if one is thinking of an incalculable aeon, and envisaging someone speaking at some point during that aeon, for him to say that he might live ‘for an aeon or [at least] the remainder of the aeon’ makes rather better sense. Accordingly, in order to give kappa the value he thinks it ought to have, Buddhaghosa must ignore the more natural way of taking kappāvāsesa. So, he says, kappāvāsesa does not mean ‘the remainder of a kappa’, it means ‘a little bit more than a kappa’, that is, more than a man’s normal lifespan of a hundred years.

Textual and philological considerations aside, Buddhaghosa’s interpretation would seem—at least to the twentieth century mind—to be the more reasonable and realistic. And perhaps not only to the twentieth century mind. Since Buddhaghosa’s explanation goes against the natural way of taking the text he had before him, he, or the tradition he was following, was clearly rather unhappy with the notion of a Buddha living for a whole cosmic aeon. In fact, the tradition certainly goes back as far as the Kathavatthu which states that ‘it should not be said that one possessing the power of iddhi might live on for a kappa’. The Milindapañha also states that kappa means āyu-kappa in the

59 Bareau, SBPV, p. 59. (Bareau’s source is K’OUÉI-KI, II pp.18b-19a = Oyama, Yi pou tsong louen louen chou ki fa jen, Kyoto, 1891.)
61 Cf. Bareau, RBB II 152.
62 See CPD, s.v. avasesa; MW, s.v. avāsesa. I fail to see that Edgerton (BHSD, s.v. kalpāvāsesa) has shown that kappāvāsesa probably means ‘more than a kappa’ as Jaini suggests (BSOAS 21 (1958), p. 547).
63 Sv II 555: kappāvāsesam vā ti appam vā bhīyyo ti vutta-vassa-satato atirekam vā. See also Spk III 251; Mp IV 149; Ud-a 322; Mp-t (Be 1961) III 252. K.R. Norman has suggested to me that what Buddhaghosa may be doing is taking kappāvāsesa as a bahuvrihi in the sense of ‘[a period of time] having a lifespan as remainder’ (cf. adjectival usage of artha-śesa and ardhāvāsesa, q.v. MW).
64 Kv 458: tena hi na vattabham iddhi-balena samannāgato kappam tiṣṭheyā ti. (The kappa under discussion here is a maha-kappa; cf. Kv-a 131-2.)
Given the existence of the two ways of taking kappa, one would, however, expect Buddhaghosa's to be the earlier, on the grounds that the mahā-kappa interpretation ought to reflect the continued process of the elaboration of the notion of Buddhahood which we find evidenced in the history of Buddhist thought. But once again we seem to have an example of a line of thinking, sometimes assumed to be later, being found latent in the text of the Pāli canon. Nevertheless one might speculate that the Kathāvatthu and Milindapañha here preserve a tradition that antedates the text of the Pāli canon, and that the statement concerning the iddhi-pādas and the prolongation of life, as it is now preserved, rests on an earlier version which corresponded in intent to the āyu-kappa interpretation.

What does all this signify for the understanding of the iddhi-pādas? Ignoring the question of āyu-kappa and mahā-kappa, the answer is, I think, quite straightforward. One who develops fully the iddhi-pādas is clearly understood to have at least some power to extend his life; he has at least some control over the particular factors that determine the time of death. This, in fact, accords quite well with the treatment of the iddhi-pādas elsewhere in the texts. As I have tried to illustrate, the iddhi-pādas are primarily concerned with the development of skill and facility in samādhi or types of meditative attainment, and they are frequently explicitly associated with various meditative powers that are linked to the development of jhāna. That an aspect or by-product of this kind of mastery of the forces of the mind is seen as the ability to have some measure of control over the factors that determine the moment of death, is not a notion peculiar to the Nikāyas, but entirely consistent with the wider Indian yogic tradition.

8. The notion of iddhi in the Nikāyas

So far I have pointed out that the iddhi-pādas are associated in the Nikāyas especially with the practice of eightfold iddhi, and at the same time frequently linked to the ultimate goal of the spiritual life, namely the destruction of the āsavas. In addition to eightfold iddhi, the iddhi-pādas are associated with other feats of meditational power: the ability to prolong one's life, the ability to create a kingdom by dhamma, without slaughter, or to make Himavant a mountain of gold. Alongside this we have the less specific characterization of iddhi as general 'success' or 'repeated success' in meditation.

65 Mil 141; Bareau comments (RBB II 152) that the relevant portion is missing from the two Chinese versions of Milindapañha.
67 Outside the iddhi-pāda-samyutta the association of the iddhi-pādas with general spiritual attainment is evident in a number of places. They are linked to sambodha and the 'attainment of the unsurpassable escape from bonds' (anuttarassa yoga-kkhemassa adhipamo) (M I 103-4); to 'knowledge' (ajñā), non-return (anāgāmi), eightfold iddhi, and anāsava-ceto-vimutti (A III 81-3); to the six abhiññās (Th 233).
68 S I 116-7.
69 One should note here the less technical usage of iddhi in Pāli literature to denote any kind of natural facility or acquired skill from the good looks of a king to the hunter's skill in trapping animals (see PED, CPD, s.v. iddhi). For an account of the various iddhis distinguished in Pāli...
The *Patisambhidāmagga*’s list of ten categories of *iddhi* embraces the full range of the notion of *iddhi* in early Buddhist literature: *iddhi* by resolve (*adhiṭṭhāna*), *iddhi* by transformation (*vikūbbaṇa*), mind-made (*mano-mayā*), *iddhi* by expansion of knowledge (*nāṇa-vipphāra*), *iddhi* by expansion of concentration (*samādhi-vipphāra*), noble (*ariyā*), that is the result of past actions (*kamma-vipāka*), the *iddhi* that consists in crafts (*vijjā-mayā*), *iddhi* in the sense of succeeding by right application to various tasks (*samma-ppayoga-paccayā ijjhanay*).

Here *iddhi* includes virtually the whole of Buddhist spiritual practice: *adhiṭṭhāna* is *iddhi* (which corresponds to eightfold *iddhi*), *vikūbbaṇa* and *vijjā-mayā* are all aspects of what might be called ‘miraculous’ *iddhi*; *nāṇa-vipphāra* and *samādhi-vipphāra* are illustrated by insight into impermanence and so on, and the practice of the *jhānas* respectively; *ariyā* is characterized by the contemplation of the unloathsome in the loathsome, etc.; *kamma-vipāka* *iddhi* consists of innate skills such as the ability of a bird to fly; *puñña* *iddhi* is exemplified especially by the rājā *cakka-vatti* or ‘universal monarch’; the final category concerns skill in various attainments of *jhāna* and insight.

But, one might ask, is not such an integrated account of the notion of *iddhi* at odds with what is said in some parts of the *Pāli* canon? Surely the practice of eightfold *iddhi* and other varieties of miraculous *iddhi* is roundly condemned in certain passages? The principal passages that might convey this impression are the Vinaya ruling on the display of miraculous *iddhi* (*iddhi-piṭihāya*) and a section of the *Kevaddha-sutta* devoted to a discussion of three kinds of ‘wonder’ (*piṭihāya*). These deserve rather careful consideration.

The intellectual climate at the beginning of this century was such that it tended to demand that the ‘rational’ ethical and spiritual elements of religion be seen as distinct from the ‘irrational’ supernatural and miraculous elements. In an article entitled ‘The Bodhisattva as Wonderworker’, Luis O. Gomez no doubt rightly points to Edward Conze as breaking the spell of ‘Buddhist rationalism’ in scholarly circles. Yet T.W. Rhys Davids’ introduction to and translation of the *Kevaddha-sutta*, along with the PED entry for *iddhi*, still exercise some influence—indeed it is largely due to Rhys Davids, I think, that Gomez himself styles the opening of the *Kevaddha-sutta* as ‘perhaps one of the most “rationalistic”’ of the *Nikāya* passages on wonder-working. But is it as ‘rational’ as Rhys Davids and PED suggest?

The *Kevaddha-sutta* begins with the householder Kevaddha requesting three times that the Buddha should invite some bhikkhu to undertake a display of miraculous *iddhi* (*iddhi-piṭihāriya*) beyond the capacity of ordinary men (*uttari-manussa-dhamma*). One should note straightforward that *uttari-manussa-dhamma*
is elsewhere taken to signify any kind of meditational attainment, and is not restricted to eightfold iddhi. The Buddha twice repeats that it is not his custom to teach dhamma to bhikkhus by asking them to perform miraculous iddhi for householders. On the third occasion the Buddha explains precisely why. There are, he says, three kinds of pāṭihāriya or 'wondrous display': the wondrous display of iddhi, the wondrous display of showing [the thoughts of others] (ādesanā), and the wondrous display of instruction (anusāsanī). He then comments on each of these pāṭihāriyas in turn. Of iddhi-pāṭihāriya, he comments that a person of confidence and trust (saddho pasanno) might witness a bhikkhu enjoying eightfold iddhi and subsequently relate the matter to someone lacking in confidence and trust (asaddho apasanno). The former is inspired with trust: 'Wonderful! Marvellous! This samāṇa has great iddhi, great power.' But the latter remains singularly unimpressed: 'There is a [magical] art called gandhāri; it is by means of this that this bhikkhu enjoys various kinds of iddhi.' The Buddha then asks Kevaddha whether he agrees that a person lacking in confidence and trust might react in this way. Kevaddha replies that he does. The Rhys Davids translation of the Buddha's response is as follows:

Well, Kevaddha! It is because I perceive danger in the practice of mystic wonders that I loathe, and abhor, and am ashamed thereof.

Before stating exactly why I think this misrepresents the meaning, I wish briefly to turn to some of the comments Rhys Davids makes in his introduction to the sutta. With regard to the notion of 'miracles' in Buddhist literature, he remarks quite rightly; I think, that:

They were not, however, miracles in our Western sense. There was no interference by an outside power with the laws of nature. It was supposed that certain people by reason of special (but quite natural) powers could accomplish certain special acts beyond the power of ordinary men.

Yet he seems rather to forget the implications of this when he immediately says: 'These acts are eight in number.' This straightaway marks off eightfold iddhi from other attainments 'beyond the capacity of ordinary men' (uttarimana-samādhi) in a way that is not quite faithful to the spirit of the texts. For as Rhys Davids himself points out the eight miraculous iddhis are quite 'natural' according to the Nikāya outlook. They are the result of meditation success in exactly the same way as, for example, the jhānas. True, as Rhys Davids again points out, they are termed pathujānaka-iddhi or iddhi that may

75 E.g. at Vin III 87 it refers to the four jhānas, stream-attainment, once return, non-return, arahant-ship and the six abhiññas; at Vin III 91 it is defined as jhāna, liberation (vinokkha), samādhi, attainment (samāpatti), knowledge and vision (jhāna-dassana), development of the path (magga-bhāvanā), realization of the fruit (phala-sacchikiriyā), absence of the hindrances from the mind (vinivaranatā cittassa), delight in empty dwellings (suññāgāre abhiratī).

76 D I 213: acechariyam vata bho abhutto vata bho. samanassa mahiddhikā mahānubhavatā.

77 Ibid.: athi kho bho gandhārī nāma vijjā tāya so bhikkhu aneka-vihiham iddhi-vidham paccamubhoti.

78 D Trsl I 278.

79 Id., p. 272.

80 Ibid.

81 D Trsl I 272-3.
belong to ordinary men as opposed to the ariyas or ‘noble ones’ (stream-attainers, once-returners, non-returners and arahants). But then this is also true of the four jhānas in general and does not constitute any kind of condemnation per se as Rhys Davids seems to want to imply.

So why, then, is eightfold iddhi singled out by the Buddha in the Kevaddha-sutta? Is it really simply that the Buddha ‘loathes the practice of them’ as Rhys Davids suggests? I think not. The reason is actually quite straightforward. It is not because eightfold iddhi is in a category of its own, fundamentally removed from other attainments; nor because the Buddha loathes its practice; nor because it is ‘not the exclusive property of the enlightened’ which is how Gomez views the Kevaddha-sutta (presumably following Rhys Davids’ lead). The point, it seems to me, is this. The passage concerns the request for a bhikkhu to undertake a display of miraculous iddhi for the benefit of householders or layfollowers. Eightfold iddhi constitutes iddhi-pāṭihāriya precisely because what is at issue is the question of display. Eightfold iddhi can constitute display in a way that the plain attainment of jhāna or arahant-ship cannot: the saint is somehow less impressive than the wonder-worker flying through the air. So what is the point that the Buddha is here depicted as wishing to make about iddhi-pāṭihāriya? Simply this: the display of miraculous iddhi as a rule achieves nothing worthwhile. The man already of confidence and trust sees it as wonderful (and is perhaps impressed for the wrong reasons), while the man without such confidence mistrusts it and sees it as a trick with no deeper significance.

What of the sentence Rhys Davids’ rendering of which I called into question? The Pāli reads:

\[ \text{imam kho aham Kevaddha iddhi-pāṭihāriye ādinavam samanupassamāno iddhi-pāṭihāriyena āṭṭiyāmi harayāmi jigucchāmi.} \]

It is immediately apparent that Rhys Davids has left an emphasized and significant word untranslated: imam. I translate as follows:

Perceiving this danger, Kevaddha, in [the display of] miraculous iddhi, I am troubled by, ashamed of, and shun [the display of] miraculous iddhi.

As soon as imam is translated the particularity rather than the generality of the condemnation of eightfold iddhi becomes obvious. The Buddha is condemning the display of miraculous eightfold iddhi to householders because he views it as unhelpful and dangerous for precisely the reasons I have just outlined. He is not making a general judgement about the practice of eightfold iddhi at all. The interpretation I have just offered of the Kevaddha-sutta is in fact borne out by the Vinaya rulings on iddhi-pāṭihāriya and uttari-manussa-dhamma. The

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82 Id., p. 272.
83 Gomez, op.cit., p. 221-2.
84 The notion of ‘display’ or ‘spectacle’ is really inherent in the word pāṭihāriya/prātihārya; cf. MW, BHSD, s.v. causative prātihārayati; both record the meaning ‘to have oneself announced’.
85 The twentieth century reaction to the ‘paranormal’ is not very different: the faithful tend to point enthusiastically to various people and incidents, while the sceptics, maintaining that trickery or self-deceit has been involved, doggedly seek out ‘rational’ explanations.
principal ruling is preceded by the story of Pindola Bhāradvāja’s performance of a miracle before the citizens of Rājagaha in response to a challenge. This incident is said to have prompted the Buddha to make the following rule: Bhikkhus, a display of miraculous iddhi beyond the capacity of ordinary man is not to be exhibited to householders. If someone exhibits [such], there is dukkata offence. The reason for the ruling is precisely that those lacking in faith and trust will fail to be impressed, and the exhibition of miraculous iddhi is likened to a woman exposing herself for a few coins. Once again it is clear that it is the display of miraculous iddhi that is condemned, and not its practice per se.

The Vinaya ruling on iddhi-pāṭihāriya can be usefully compared with the rulings concerning the fourth pārājika and eighth pācittiya offences. The fourth pārājika involves laying false claim to any kind of uttari-manussa-dhamma; this concerns any false claim, though the incident leading up to the ruling concerns a bhikkhu who makes a false claim in front of householders. The eighth pācittiya involves announcing the possession of an uttari-manussa-dhamma that one does genuinely possess to one who has not received higher ordination (upasampāda); the introductory incident concerns bhikkhus announcing their genuine attainments to householders once more. While these last two Vinaya rulings concern wider issues than just the display of miraculous iddhi, they serve to reiterate how it is display or boasting outside the confines of the Samgha that is considered detrimental to all concerned.

9. The method of developing iddhi

That iddhi is understood to be nothing different from skill or facility in meditative concentration is again brought out by the instructions given for the development of the various kinds of iddhi in the later literature. The preparation for iddhi is considered in the Paṭisambhidāmagga by way of four ‘levels of success’ (iddhiyā bhūmiyo), the four iddhi-pādas, eight ‘footings of success’ (iddhiyā padāni), and sixteen ‘roots of success’ (iddhiyā mūlāni). The four levels are in fact the four jhānas. The eight footings are the iddhi-pādas again, each

86 The account of Pindola Bhāradvāja’s iddhi-pāṭihāriya is found in all extant Vinayas (with some variations); see J.S. Strong, ‘The Legend of the Lion-Roarer: A study of the Buddhist Arahat Pindola Bhāradvāja’, Numen 26 (1979), pp. 71-2, and S. Lévi and E. Chavannes, ‘Les seize arhat protecteurs de la loi’, JA 7 (1916), pp. 233-47. For the account in the Pāli sources see Vin II 110-2; in post-canonical sources the Pindola Bhāradvāja incident forms the prelude to the Buddha’s performance of the ‘twin miracle’ (yamaka-pāṭihāriya); see Sv I 57; Dh-a III 204; Sn-a 570; J IV 263.
87 Vin II 112: na bhikkhave gihīṇam uttari-manussa-dhamman iddhi-pāṭihāriyaṃ dassetabbam. yo dasseyya āpatti dukkatajassa.
88 Ibid. A stock Vinaya formula is employed (cf. Vin II 2; PTC, s.v. appasiddati): ‘It is neither [conducive] to trust for those without trust, nor to growth for those with trust; indeed, bhikkhus, it is [conducive] to lack of trust for those without trust, and to loss [of trust] for some of those with trust.’ (ν’εταμ bhikkhave appasādāya pasanānaṃ vā bhikhve-passanānaṃ vā bhiyovē-bhāvēva, atha kho tam bhikkhave appasādāya pasanānaṃ ca ekaccōnaṃ aṇātha-yathātī ti.)
89 Vin III 87-109; the ruling is qualified to exempt those who make a false claim mistakenly because of over estimation of themselves.
90 Vin IV 23-30.
91 Paṭis II 205-6; quoted Vism XII 49-50, 54-5.
one considered as two footings: concentration and its basis (chanda, viriya, citta, vimamsā). The sixteen roots concern counteracting various obstacles to unperturbed (anejīja) consciousness.

According to the Visuddhimagga the bhikkhu who wishes to develop eightfold iddhi must have complete mastery and control of the four jhānas and four formless attainments. This mastery adds up to the ability to attain all eight attainments on the basis of all eight kasiṇas at will.\(^9^2\) According to Buddhagosa such mastery of jhāna is very difficult and only to be accomplished by very few.\(^9^3\) However, Buddhas, Paccekabuddhas and chief disciples, because of their endeavour in past lives, can achieve the various iddhis spontaneously as a result of attaining arahant-ship.\(^9^4\) Others who have developed the necessary conditions in previous lives are said to need only mastery of the fourth jhāna in the kasiṇas.\(^9^5\) The Vimuttimagga, however, states that all who attain to the fourth jhāna with facility develop iddhi.\(^9^6\)

In sum, it can be said that in general the iddhi-pādas are seen as concerned with the development of facility and mastery in samādhi or ‘meditative’ concentration. More particularly this facility and mastery is directly linked to the development of various ‘miraculous’ iddhis. Precisely the same facility and mastery is also linked to furthering the bhikkhu’s progress along the path to awakening.\(^9^7\) There is understood to be no opposition between the development of iddhi and the development of samatha and vipassanā conducive to the final goal; they are of a piece.

In conclusion it is worth drawing attention to an important treatment found in the Patisambhiddamagga. The passage in question concerns how the meaning (aṭṭha) of chanda, viriya, citta and vimamsā is to be directly known (abhiññeyya):

The meaning of chanda is to be directly known as root; it is to be directly known as basis; it is to be directly known as endeavour; it is to be directly known as succeeding; it is to be directly known as commitment; it is to be directly known as taking hold; it is to be directly known as standing near; it is to be directly known as non-distraction; it is to be directly known as seeing.\(^9^8\)

The meaning of viriya, citta and vimamsā is to be directly known in precisely the same nine ways. The first four of these meanings (root, basis, endeavour, succeeding) clearly relate to the basic iddhi-pāda formula. The five further ‘meanings’ in fact relate to the five spiritual indriyas: the Patisambhidamagga throughout defines saddhā as ‘commitment’ (adhimokkha), sati as ‘standing

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\(^9^2\) Vism XII 2-7.
\(^9^3\) Id., XII 9.
\(^9^4\) Id., XII 11.
\(^9^5\) Id., XII 12.
\(^9^6\) Vimutt Trsl 212.
\(^9^7\) In Japanese the four iddhi-pādas are apparently understood as the four ‘at-will-nesses’ (shijinsoku) (K. Mizuno, Primitive Buddhism, Yamaguchi-ken, 1969, p. 178), an understanding that seems to bring out this aspect of the iddhi-pādas rather well.
\(^9^8\) Paṭis I 19; II 123: chandattaḥ abhiññeyyo, chandassa mūlattaḥ abhiññeyyo, chandassa pādaattha abhiññeyyo, chandassa padhānaattha abhiññeyyo, chandassa ijhanattā abhiññeyyo, chandassa adhimokkhattha abhiññeyyo, chandassa paggahaṭṭha abhiññeyyo, chandassa upaṭṭhānaṭṭha abhiññeyyo, chandassa avikkhayaṭṭha abhiññeyyo, chandassa dassanaṭṭha abhiññeyyo.
near' (upāṭṭhāna), viriya as 'taking on' (paggaha), samādhi as 'non-distraction' (avikkhepa) and pañña as 'seeing' (dassana). The choice of the indriyas here is perhaps not without significance. As I shall argue in the next chapter, the indriyas represent the most generally applicable category of the seven sets. So this passage neatly integrates the development of the iddhi-pādas and general spiritual practice.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE FACULTIES AND POWERS

1. The notion of indriya: the twenty-two indriyas

With the five indriyas, five balas, seven bojjanagas and the aṭṭhaṅgika-magga the lists of the seven sets take on a slightly different character. As has been seen, the four satipaṭṭhānas are explained by describing four different aspects of developing what is essentially one, namely sati or ‘mindfulness’. Similarly the four samma-ppadānas are seen as four functions of viriya or ‘strength’. While each of the iddī-padas introduces a particular dhamma—chanda, viriya, citta or vīmaṇsā—as a whole, what is important in each case is the interaction of these with samādhi and padhāna-saṅkhāras; the iddhi-pādas seem ultimately to be understood as focusing on one particular thing, namely success in samādhi. In contrast the next four of the seven sets present four more or less bald lists of different dhammas characterized as faculties (indriya), powers (bala), factors of awakening (bojjhanagas), factors of the noble path (ariya-magg-angā) respectively. In the case of the indriyas, then, these five different items are confidence (saddhi), strength (viriya), mindfulness (sati), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (paññā). The first point to consider is the significance of these items being collectively termed indriyas. What is an indriya?

The concept of indriya is one that is common to Indian thought in its generality and not something peculiar to the Buddhist tradition. The word indriya is, of course, derived from the name of the chief of the Vedic gods, Indra,1 bearer of the thunderbolt (vajra-dhara) and counting among his mighty deeds the slaying of the dragon Vṛtra. An indriya, then, might be basically thought of as anything that has something of the quality of the mighty god Indra. Thus, in its application to a variety of categories in different systems of Indian thought, an indriya should be understood as an item or faculty that is seen as exercising some kind of power, force, influence or control over whatever is its domain; ‘controlling’ faculty’ seems a more or less apt translation. The word indriya in Indian literature as a whole most commonly refers to the five sense organs of the eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, often—though not always—with the mind as the sixth. But the various schools of Indian thought, including Buddhism, also compiled elaborate lists of items considered as indriyas alongside these basic six which were held in common.2

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1 Mayrhofer, s.vv. indraḥ, indriyaṃ.
2 Cf. the list of five jhōna-indriyas and five karma-indriyas in Sāṃkhya.
The classic complete list of indriyas, probably common to all ancient Buddhist schools, contains twenty-two items:

1. eye-faculty (cakkhundriya)
2. ear-faculty (sotindriya)
3. nose-faculty (ghānindriya)
4. tongue-faculty (jihvindriya)
5. body-faculty (kāyindriya)
6. mind-faculty (manindriya)
7. female-faculty (itthindriya)
8. male-faculty (purisindriya)
9. life-faculty (jīvindriya)
10. pleasure-faculty (sukhindriya)
11. pain-faculty (dukkhindriya)
12. happiness-faculty (somanassindriya)
13. unhappiness-faculty (domanassindriya)
14. neutral-feeling-faculty (upekkhindriya)
15. confidence-faculty (saddhindriya)
16. strength-faculty (viriyindriya)
17. mindfulness-faculty (satindriya)
18. concentration-faculty (samādhindriya)
19. wisdom-faculty (parinindriya)
20. faculty of coming to know the unknown (ananantānassāmīndriya)
21. faculty of knowing (aṇṇindriya)
22. faculty of having known (aṇṇatāvindriya)

From this list of twenty-two indriyas it can be seen that they fall into various groupings. The three groups most commonly treated in the Nikāyas are the six sense indriyas (1-6), the five 'spiritual' indriyas, with which we are principally concerned (15-19), and the five feeling indriyas (10-14).

The canonical literature tells us little more than that these twenty-two items can all be considered indriyas, so it is worth pausing for a moment to consider how the commentarial tradition views the common characteristic possessed by these twenty-two indriyas. Principally the commentaries reiterate what has already been said concerning the derivation of the word indriya. According to the Vibhaṅga commentary each indriya 'carries out the purpose of a ruler' (indaṭṭham kāreti) with regard to its particular realm. Thus in the case of the five spiritual indriyas, saddhindriya carries out the purpose of a ruler in the manner (lakkhane) of adhimokkha or 'commitment'; viriyindriya in the manner

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3 The twenty-two indriyas are first explicitly mentioned at Vibh 122, though all twenty-two are in fact found scattered throughout the indriya-samyutta: e.g. S V 203-7; eighteen are explicit in the Samgiti-sutta (D III 219, 239)—missing are manindriya, jīvindriya, itthindriya and purisindriya. For the twenty-two in the literature emanating from the north of India see, e.g. Mahāvyutpati 33, Abhidh-h Trsl 146-7 Abhidh-k 38-40 (bhāya); Abhidh-sam Trsl 48, Satya Trsl 41.

4 Vibh-a 125.
of paggaha or ‘taking on’; satindriya in the manner of upaṭṭhāna or ‘standing near’; samādhindriya in the manner of avikkhepa or ‘non-distraction’; paññindriya in the manner of dassana or ‘seeing’. In addition all twenty-two indriyas are indriyas in the sense of lordship (issariya) understood as a term for overlordship or predominance (ādhipaccā). This last explanation corresponds exactly to what Vasubandhu says of the indriyas in the Abhidharmakośa:

What is the meaning of indriya? [The root] idi [is used] with regard to supreme lordship. They are indriyas in that they exercise control over something. Thus the meaning of indriya is overlordship.⁶

Thus although we are primarily concerned with the five spiritual indriyas of saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and paññā, the wider perspective of all twenty-two indriyas is of some importance and significance, especially in the Samyutta-nikāya and Abhidhamma texts.

2. Faith, truth and knowledge

The word saddhā is most often translated as ‘faith’. Even a brief perusal of the fairly extensive scholarly discussion of the notion of saddhā in Buddhist thought, however, serves to indicate the potential confusion inherent in such a translation.⁷ Although the notion of ‘faith’ may possibly embrace the notion of saddhā at least as well as any other English word, the trouble is that it embraces so much more besides. The word ‘faith’ brings in its train a host of theological and philosophical connotations from the traditions of western thought inappropriate to the discussion of saddhā and which can only serve to obscure the nature of its understanding in Buddhist literature. Yet scholars often seem to have been unaware of the extent to which these inappropriate associations have coloured their treatment; a case in point would seem to be Jayatilleke’s account in his Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, of which more

⁵ Vibh-a 126: ādhipaccā-samkhātena issariyaṭṭhena etāni indriyāni. Vibh-a 125-6 in addition states that either the Bhagavant or kusalākusala-kamma may be considered the ruler or master (inda). Accordingly, the indriyas that are produced by kamma (kamma-saṁjanita) are indriyas in the sense of bearing the mark of the ruler (inda-līṅga) and being the outcome of the ruler (inda-sīṭha) where the ruler is kamma. All twenty-two have been declared (pakāsita) and awakened to (abhisambuddha) by the Bhagavant and so are indriyas in the sense of having been taught by the master (inda-desita) and seen by the master (inda-dīthā); they are also all indriyas in the sense of having been enjoyed by the master (inda-jaṭṭha) since they are practised as pasture (gocara) or development (bhadvand)

⁶ Abhidh-k 38: kaḥ punar indriyārthah. idi paramāśavare. tasya idantīti indriyāṇi. ata ādhipatyārtha indriyārthah.(Cf. La Vallée Poussin, Abhidh-k Trsl I 103.)

below. J.R. Carter, on the other hand, draws attention to the problem in the following:

In an attempt to catch the force of "faith" (saddhā) one should avoid a pitfall presented by Western categories, especially as in the so-called faith and reason problems.8

To trace the vicissitudes of the notion of ‘faith’ in the history of western thought—religious and philosophical—would be a task of some considerable magnitude, and I shall not attempt it. One or two comments are, though, in order. Two dimensions of the notion of faith are often distinguished, namely the cognitive and affective.9 Faith in its cognitive dimension is seen as concerning belief in propositions or statements of which one does not—or perhaps cannot—have knowledge proper (however that should be defined); cognitive faith is a mode of knowing in a different category from that knowledge. Faith in its affective dimension is a more straightforward positive response of trust or confidence towards something or somebody. Contemporary religious and philosophical discussion of faith is almost entirely concerned with faith in its cognitive aspect.10 This preoccupation with the cognitive aspect of faith appears to be the particular legacy of post-Cartesian philosophy and Lutheran theology. The understanding of faith in Christian theology as a whole is obviously of great complexity and depth: the concerns of the Greek and Latin medieval writers were perhaps not always the same as those of their modern counterparts. Thus the question of whether or not such famous dicta as credo ut intellegam and fides quaerens intellectum operate with the same notions of faith and knowledge that the modern philosopher or religious thinker has, becomes another problem that in the present context only further compounds the difficulties of our understanding saddhā as ‘faith’.11

In contrast to this, the conception of saddhā in Buddhist writings appears almost, if not entirely affective; the cognitive element is completely secondary; as Jan T. Ergardt says:

To sum up: faith in these texts [Majjhima-nikāya] is mainly an affective and conative faculty that functions in the disciple’s good decisions on the way to the goal. Its cognitive aspect is secondary and derived from the dhamma, of which the utmost knowledge is the knowledge and experience of release and nibbāna.12

I shall consider the affective nature of saddhā in Buddhist literature in more detail below. For the moment it will suffice to note that its affective nature is

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8 Carter, Dhamma, p. 104; both Conze’s and Ergardt’s discussion also show some appreciation of the problem.
9 E.g. ERE, s.v. Faith (Christian); Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 387.
10 E.g. see J. Hick, Faith and Knowledge, New York, 1957, p. ix: ‘Whether or not there be a God, great numbers of people have reported an experience which they describe as “knowing God” or “being aware of God”. We are to be concerned with the mode of this putative knowledge or awareness, a mode which has long been accorded the special name of “faith”. We wish to know in what it consists and how it is related to knowing and believing in general.’
11 Cf. the following comment of Conze’s, BTI, p. 48: ‘This sceptical age dwells anyway far too much on the intellectual side of faith. Šraddhā, the word we render as “faith”, is etymologically akin to Latin cor, “the heart”, and faith is much more a matter of the heart than the intellect.’
12 J.T. Ergardt, op. cit., p. 145.
more or less implicit in the fact that in the Nikāyas the objects of sadhā and the related term pasāda (trust) are not beliefs but, most commonly, the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha. The affective nature of sadhā becomes explicit in the psychology of the Abhidhamma, where it is understood as having an affinity with greed or attraction to things (rāga).13

Significantly, some modern thinkers would not allow faith qua belief any cognitive status at all, and so effectively reduce faith to its affective dimension: to express belief in God is merely to expose a positive emotional response to the statement 'God exists'—a response, however, that may have quite definite consequences for the way one lives one's life.14 Now this would seem to have something in common with Abhidhamma analysis, where the affirmation of mere 'beliefs' is seen as 'view' (diṭṭhi) that is rooted in attachment (lobha); but sadhā, although possessing a certain psychological kinship to lobha, is seen as a distinct and skilful positive emotional response of confidence.

What is sadhā's relationship to knowledge and truth? Jayatilleke finds elements of correspondence, consistency and pragmatist theories of truth in the Nikāyas, although he argues against any one theory being considered as the 'Buddhist' theory of truth.15 It seems to me, however, that the evidence he presents clearly favours the conclusion that a pragmatist theory of truth comes closer to the Nikāya conception of truth than the others.16 More recently K.H.

13 Vism III 75: 'In one of greed temperament, when skilful [consciousness] occurs, sadhā is strong because its quality is close to that of greed, therefore one of sadhā-temperament has an affinity with one of greed-temperament. For, just as greed is affectionate and not mean on the unskilful side, so is sadhā on the skilful; just as greed seeks out the objects of sense desire, so sadhā seeks out the qualities of virtue, etc.; just as greed does not give up what is unhelpful, so sadhā does not give up what is helpful.' (tuttha yasmā rāgā-caritassa kusala-pakkattā-samaye sadhā balavati hot; rāgassa āsanna-gunattā—yathā hi akusala-pakkhe rāgo siniddho nātiḷkāho evam kusala-pakkhe sadhā, yathā rāgo vaṭṭhu-kāme pariyesati evam sadhā silādi-gune, yathā rāgo ahitam na paricayati evam sadhā hitam na pariceyati—tasmā rāgā-caritassa sadhā-carito sa-bhāgo.)


15 Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 351-68.

16 Jayatilleke's denial of this is rather curious. Commenting on the absence at M I 395 of a category of statements that can be 'false' (abhātam, ataccham) and at the same time useful or beneficial (attha-samhitam), he says that this might be 'either because it was considered self-contradictory to say of a statement that it was false but useful or because such statements did not in fact exist' (op. cit., p. 358) but, he continues, this is 'not because of any pragmatic theory of truth but because of the peculiarly Buddhist use of the term "useless" (na aththa-samhitam).' He then comments that this last term connotes 'what is useful for the attainment of the goal Nirvāṇa' and concludes that since a false statement is considered a 'moral evil' it is logically or causally impossible that it should result in what is 'morally advantageous or good (aththa-samhitam)' (p. 359). But surely this is to get things the wrong way round: a 'false statement' is a 'moral evil' precisely because it is not helpful for the attainment of nibbāna—it conduces to suffering rather than its cessation. More relevant to Jayatilleke's case is the possibility of statements that are at once 'true' and 'unhelpful'. The question then arises as to whether statements that are 'true' but 'unhelpful' and statements that are 'true' and also 'helpful' are necessarily absolutely distinct classes, or whether it may not be simply circumstances and occasion that determines whether or not a given statement is helpful or unhelpful; the Nikāya passage under discussion notes that the Tathāgata is 'one who knows the right occasion' (kālamīna) for the uttering of helpful speech.
Potter has argued that all Indian schools of philosophy work with what is essentially a pragmatist theory of knowledge; that is, to know something as true is to be aware of its ‘workability’ (prāmāṇya), its effectiveness in accomplishing whatever is the aim or purpose (artha). While a number of scholars have taken issue with Potter on various points, what is clear from the debate is how careful we must be when we translate various Sanskrit or Pāli terms as ‘knowledge’, ‘truth’, ‘belief’ or ‘faith’. Although such translations may be innocent enough in many contexts, when we engage in technical and philosophical discussion of the concepts behind them, we cannot silently or inadvertently assume that the terms of the discussion will be straightforwardly equivalent to those of modern western philosophical debate.

In order to illustrate the extent to which saddhā is of a purely affective nature in the Nikāyas, I wish now to consider a passage that treats saddhā and nāṇa together. In such a case it is all too easy to assume, as does Jayatilleke, that in fact saddhā must have a simple cognitive dimension. I give Jayatilleke’s rendering of the passage in question:

Nigantha Nātaputta: Do you believe in the statement of the recluse Gotama that there is a jhānic state (trance) in which there is no discursive or reflective thought and there is a cessation of discursive thought and reflection?
Citta: I do not accept this as a belief.
Nigantha Nātaputta: See what an honest, straightforward and upright person the householder Citta is ... Citta: What do you think? Which is better—knowledge or belief?
Nigantha Nātaputta: Surely knowledge is better than belief.
Citta: (I can attain up to the fourth jhāna) ... Knowing and seeing thus, why should I accept this on the ground of faith in any recluse or brahmin, that there is a trance in which there is no discursive or reflective thought ...

This in places is more of a paraphrase than a translation. Jayatilleke takes the passage as contrasting an inferior mode of knowing, namely ‘belief’, with a superior one, namely ‘knowledge’. The passage is, I think, doing something rather different. If one translates saddahati and saddhā by means of the notions of trust and confidence, the effect is rather different from the one Jayatilleke’s translation produces:

Do you trust the samāna Gotama [when he says] that there is a state of concentra-

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19 S IV 298-9: saddahasi tvam gahapati samanassa Gotamassa: atti avitakko avicāro samādhi, atthi vitakka-vicārānām nirodho ti. na khvāhām ettha bhante bhagavato saddhāya gacchāmi: atthi ... ti. evam vutte Nigantho Nātaputto sakām parisām ulloketvā etad avoca: idam bhavanto passantu yāva ujuko cāyaṃ Citto gahapati yāva asaṭṭho ... yāva amāyāvi cāyaṃ Citto gahapati. vātam vā so jalena bhadetabbam maṇīheyya yo vitakka-vicāre nirodhetabbam maṇīheyya, saka-muṭṭhamā vā Gaṅgāya sotam avabettabbam maṇīheyya yo vitakka-vicāre nirodhetabbam maṇīheyya ti. tam kim maṇīhā saddhante, katamam nu kho panittaram nāṇaṃ vā saddhā vā v. ti. saddhāya kho gahapati nāṇaṃ eva panittaram. aham kho bhante yavadd eva ākāṅkhāmi ... catuttham jhānaṃ upasampajja viharāmi. so khvāhām bhante evam jānanto evam passanto kassānissassa samanassa vā brāhmaṇassassa vā saddhāya gamissāmi: atthi ... ti.
20 Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 398; Jayatilleke’s emphasis.
tion without initial and sustained thinking, that there is cessation of initial and sustained thinking?

Note that it is samanassa Gotamassa that is the indirect object of saddahasi; Jayatilleke's introduction of the word 'statement' is really rather misleading. To continue:

In this matter I do not have trust in the Blessed One [when he says] that there is a state of concentration without initial and sustained thinking ...

The ambiguity of Citta's reply is rather awkward to convey in translation. It is clear from Nigantha Nātāputta's response that he understands Citta as having said that he does not trust the Buddha, and that therefore Citta does not think that there is a state of concentration without initial and sustained thinking:

When this had been said, Nigantha Nātāputta surveyed his own assembly and said: 'See what an honest man Citta the householder is ... Anyone who could think that initial and sustained thinking might be stopped would think the wind could be caught in a net ... or that the flow of the Gangā could be obstructed with his own fist.'

Citta is then able to come back at Nigantha Nātāputta for assuming that the only grounds he might have for thinking that there is a state of concentration without initial and sustained thinking is because the Buddha had said so:

What this passage is doing, then, is contrasting the grounds for thinking or believing (maññati) something exists (atthi). One possible ground is the positive feeling of confidence or trust (saddha) that one might have in someone who states that such and such exists, but however justified one's confidence is, a more subtle and refined reason or ground for thinking that something exists, is direct and personal knowing and seeing that something exists.21

Thus there seems to be no need to impart saddha with the meaning 'belief', and understand it as directly cognitive in nature, an inferior kind of 'knowledge'. It seems to me that even in contexts such as the above, saddha is still best understood as a positive mental attitude of trust or confidence.22 Obviously from the point of view of translation having a positive mental attitude towards something—when, for example, that something is a proposition—can be very little different from 'believing' it. But from the point of view of the technical philosophical understanding of the Nikāyas, the point is of some importance:

21 Cf. M I 294: dve ... paccayā sammā-diṭṭhiyā uppādāya: parato ca ghsoso yonāso ca manasikāro. (See below, pp. 221-3.)

22 The nearest one gets to saddhā as 'belief' and having cognitive value is perhaps M II 211: there are some samanās and brāhmaṇas who affirm (paṭijñātī) a basis for the holy life (brahma-cariya) solely on account of saddhā, such as those who reason (takkti) and speculate (vimamsī). Here those who place confidence or trust in their own reason as grounds for belief are contrasted with those whose ground is the authority of the Vedas; cf. Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 170-1.
saddhā is always essentially affective in nature. Terms such as pema (‘affection’) and bhatti (‘devotion’), which are often juxtaposed and associated with saddhā in the Nikāyas, only serve to reiterate this essentially affective nature.23

Jayatilleke’s assumption that one can understand saddhā as having a straightforward cognitive value like ‘belief’ leads him to some serious misunderstandings. Thus he talks in terms of the ‘belief’ with which the bhikkhu or ariya-sāvaka starts with, being ‘replaced by direct personal knowledge’.24 But this is to ignore much of the treatment of the five indriyas in the Nikāyas.25

The relationship between saddhā and niṇa or paññā is in fact more in the nature of that between two different but complementary factors. Saddhā is seen primarily as important as initiating spiritual practice, but although it may not be as crucial in the higher stages of the Buddhist path, it is certainly misleading to talk of it as being replaced by niṇa. The reciprocal relationship that exists between saddhā and paññā is well illustrated by the following passage:

The confident (saddha) ariya-sāvaka having repeatedly endeavoured so, having repeatedly been mindful so, having repeatedly practised concentration so, having repeatedly known so, thus becomes fully confident (abhisaddhāti): ‘Those dhammas which were previously only heard of by me—I now dwell having experienced them with my own body; having penetrated them by wisdom, I see them.’26

Thus saddhā is the instigator of a process which culminates in paññā which in turn reinforces saddhā. As J. R. Carter expresses it:

Saddhā and paññā when taken together do not fit into “faith and reason”. Rather, they express a dynamic process where saddhā is active in one wanting to know, coming to know in part and paññā becomes more pervasive in one coming to know and knowing fully, in truth.27

This basic conception of saddhā as initiating and providing a continuing support for a process that culminates in knowledge (niṇa) has been well traced and commented upon by a number of scholars,28 and I shall not dwell on it.

In conclusion it is worth drawing attention to some of the findings of Köhler’s study, Šrad-dhā in der vedischen und altbuddhistischen Literatur.29 Köhler argues that in Vedic literature šradhā should be understood primarily as denoting generosity (Spendefreudigkeit). As for saddhā in the Nikāyas, despite its title, Köhler’s work proves rather disappointing. Just over four

24 Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 399; my emphasis.
25 In fact Jayatilleke can maintain his thesis only by dismissing certain passages as later and so reflecting an entirely different conception of saddhā; op. cit., pp. 399-400.
26 S V 226: saddho so bhante ariya-sāvako evam padahitvā padahitvā evam sarivā sarivā evam samādahitvā samādahitvā evam pājānitvā pājānitvā evam abhisaddhāti: ime kho te dhammā te me pubbe sutavā ahesuṇ, te dānāhām etarāh käyena ca plusivā viharāmi, paññāya ca ativijjha passāmi ti.
27 J.R. Carter, Dhamma, p.104.
Significantly, however, he does suggest here that the meaning of 'generosity' is once more relevant in certain contexts. Otherwise, where saddhā is directed towards Buddha, Dhamma and Samgha, Köhler seems rather uncritically to accept that it means 'belief (Glaube) and can be straightforwardly understood as 'das buddhistische Credo'. Yet, if Köhler is right about āraṇḍhā meaning 'generosity' in Vedic literature—and Minoru Hara has brought forward additional material that tends to support this conclusion—then it seems to me that it also lends support to the view that the notion of saddhā, at least in the Nikāyas, must primarily be affective. What I wish to turn to now is a consideration of the particular psychological features of saddhā that Buddhist literature has focused upon.

3. Saddhā, pasāda and sotāpatti

In the Nikāyas saddhā is most frequently explicitly directed towards the Buddha or his awakening: having heard dhamma, one acquires confidence (saddhā) in the Tathāgata, the ariyā-sāvaka is described as confident (saddhā), he has confidence (saddhahati) in the awakening of the Tathāgata. A word closely related to saddhā in meaning is pasāda. Pasāda conveys at the same time notions of a state of mental composure, serenity, clarity or purity, and trust; it is almost impossible to translate effectively. As I shall indicate below, the term pasāda is of particular significance in pointing towards a psychology of saddhā or 'confidence' which is elaborated upon in the later literature. The object of pasāda is once more the Buddha—along with the Dhamma and the Samgha. Thus a bhikkhu has trust in the Teacher (saṭṭhāri pasidati) thinking that the Blessed One is fully awakened; Dhamma is well declared by the Blessed One; the Samgha is well entered upon the way. Similarly there are the four kinds of trust in that which is reckoned chief or highest, the four agga-pasādas:

[i] In so far as there are beings without feet, or with two feet or with four feet or with many feet, with form or formless, conscious or unconscious, or neither-conscious-nor-unconscious—of these the Tathāgata is called the highest, an arahant, a fully awakened one. Whoever has trust in the Buddha, has trust in what is highest, and for those who have trust in the highest, the highest is the result.

[ii] In so far as there are conditioned dhammā, the noble eight-factor path is

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30 These are pp. 59-63.
31 He cites S I 22, 32, 42; A III 34. Cf. also the expression saddhā-deyyāni bhojanāni (D I 9-12); food given out of 'generosity' rather than out of 'faith'?
34 This is in contrast to Jayatilleke, who seems to see saddhā as 'belief' as primary and the affective, more emotional notion of saddhā as indicative of a later stratum of literature, op. cit., p. 400.
35 D I 63; M I 179; etc.
36 D III 237; M I 356; II 95; S V 197; A III 65; cf. Jayatilleke, op. cit., p. 389; Conze, BTI, p. 48.
37 MW s.v. pra-sāda; PED, s.v. pasāda.
38 M I 320.
called the highest of these. Whoever has trust in the noble eight-factored path ... the highest is the result.

[iii] In so far as there are dharmas either conditioned or unconditioned, dispassion is called the highest of these dharmas, that is ... nibbāna. Whoever has trust in Dhamma ... the highest is the result.

[iv] In so far as there are communities or groups, the community of the disciples of the Tathāgata is called the highest of these, that is ... an unsurpassed field of merit. Whoever has trust in the Samgha ... the highest is the result.39

There is some reason for thinking that pasāda is often thought of as denoting a more refined and developed stage of saddhā; it is used especially in contexts where this seems appropriate. In this case pasāda is especially aveccapassāda, that is full-trust, trust that results from a certain degree of understanding.40 Certainly this seems to accord with the comments made by Harivarman in the *Satyasiddhiśāstra. Referring to a well known riddle41 he describes the arhat as without confidence or trust (aśraddha). But he continues:

When one perceives dhamma for oneself, one’s mind becomes clarified. This is also termed śraddhā. Having first heard dhamma one perceives it face to face in one’s own body; one thinks that the Dharma is absolutely true and not false. On account of this one’s mind becomes pure (prasādīti); śraddhā is included in the four avetya-prasādas.

At this point I wish to consider further the way in which the post-Nikāya literature highlights two reciprocal aspects of saddhā—two aspects that are already implicit in the Nikāyas’ use of the two terms saddhā and pasāda. In the first place, then, saddhā is the confidence at the heart of what motivates and spurs on spiritual activity; at the same time this confidence involves and is characterized by a mental clarity or purity. These two complementary aspects of saddhā are brought out especially clearly in a passage from the *Milindapañha. Nāgasena explains:

Saddhā, your majesty, when it arises averts the hindrances; a mind that is without confidence is prevented. (Cf. buddhe, dhamme, samghe aveccapassādo at DII 217; M I 37, etc.)

39 A II 34: yāvatā bhikkhave sattā apadā vā dipadā vā catup-padā vā bahupadā vā rūpino vā arūpino saññino vā asaññino neva-saññi-nāsaññino vā tathāgato tesam aggam akkhāyati araham sammāsambuddho, ye bhikkhave buddhe pasannā agge te pasannā, agge kho pasannānaṃ aggo vipāko hoti. [iī] yāvatā bhikkhave dhāmmanā samkhātā ariyo āṭṭhangiko maggo tesam aggam akkhāyati, ye bhikkhave ariye āṭṭhangike magge pasannā ... aggo vipāko hoti. [ii] yāvatā bhikkhave dhāmmanā samkhātā vā samakkhatā vā virāgo tesam dhāmmanānaṃ aggam akkhāyati yaddidam ... nibbānam, ye bhikkhave dhamme pasannā ... aggo vipāko hoti. [iv] yāvatā bhikkhave sammā vā gānā tathāgata-sāvaka-samgho tesam aggam akkhāyati yaddidam ... puññā-kkhettam lokassa, ye bhikkhave sammhe pasannā ... aggo vipāko hoti. (Cf. buddhe, dhamme, sammhe aveccapassado at DII 217; M I 37, etc.)

41 Cf. Dhp 97: assaddho akataññu ca sancicchedo ca yo naro/ hatāvakāso vanto sa ve uttama-poriso/ A similar play is perhaps also intended by the phrase with which Buddhās declare their intention to teach: ‘May those who have ears release their faith, the gates of the deathless are open to them.’ (DII 39 = M I 169 = S I 138 = Vin I 7: apārutā tesam amatassa dvārāy ye sotavanto pamucanṭu saddham) A number of scholars have deliberated over the verb pamucanṭu (does it mean ‘give up’ or ‘put forth’?) apparently unable to countenance the idea that it might be deliberately ambiguous (see Lamotte, Traité, I 60-2; P. Masefield, Divine Revelation in Pāli Buddhism, Colombo, 1986, pp. 76-9). The association of saddhā and adhimokkha in the Pāli tradition is also surely relevant here. (Quotation adapted from Satya Trsl 182.)
hindrances is clear, composed (vippasanna), undisturbed; just so, Your Majesty, sādū has the characteristic of composure (sampsūdana).\(^{42}\)

In an extended simile sādū’s operation is likened to the throwing of a cakkavattin’s water-clearing jewel (udaka-ppasādakam mani) into water that is stirred up, disturbed, agitated and muddy (khubhitam āvilaṃ lulitaṃ kalali-bhūtam), and which as a consequence immediately becomes clear and undisturbed (vippasanam anāvilaṃ) and fit for drinking. Nāgasena then goes on to explain how sādū also has the characteristic of leaping forward:

When the practitioner sees that the minds of others are freed, he leaps forward after the fruit of stream-attainment, of once-return, of never-return or of arahant-ship. He makes an effort for the attaining of the unattained, for the obtaining of the unobtained, for the realization of the unrealized. So, your majesty, sādū has the characteristic of leaping forward.\(^{43}\)

This aspect of sādū is likened to the way in which a crowd of people might be inspired to cross a swollen river after having first seen a strong man leap over (pakkhandati).

The two aspects of sādū referred to in these similes are reiterated again and again not just in Pāli sources, but also in the treatises of the northern tradition.\(^{44}\) The sequence of terms offered by the Dhammasaṅgāṇi in explanation of sādhindriya perhaps further suggests the particular dynamic that exists between confidence as spurring on and clarifying the mind: sādū sādahānā okappana abhippasado sādū sādhindriyam sādū-balām.\(^{45}\) The sequence might be interpreted as indicating a process beginning with straightforward trust (saddhānā) which leads to making ready and mental composure (okappana), followed by complete clarity of mind (abhippasāda) which in turn is a strengthening of sādū.

The way in which sādū is seen as active in initiating spiritual activity is also brought out in the exegetical literature by the way sādū is related to chanda (purpose, intention, the desire to act), adhimokkha (decision, commitment) and also viriya (strength). Thus Asaṅga in the Abhidharmasamuccaya states that the function of sāraddha is to provide a base for chanda which in turn serves as a base for vīrya.\(^{46}\) I have already pointed out that the Nettippakarana

\(^{42}\) MiI 34-5: sādū kho mahārāja uppajjanā nivaraṇe vikkhambeti vinivaraṇam cittaṃ hoti accehaṃ vippasaṇanam anāvilaṃ. evam kho mahārāja sampasadana-lakkhanaṃ sādū ha.

\(^{43}\) MiI 35: yathā mahārāja yogacarero ahoṣeṣam cittaṃ vimuttaṃ passitvā sotāpatti-phale vā sakadāgāmi-phale vā anāgāmi-phale vā arhatte vā sampakkhandati. yogam karoti appattassa pattiyā anadhigatassa adhigamāya asacchikatassa sacchikiriyāya. evam kho mahārāja sampakkhandana-lakkhanaṃ sādū ha.

\(^{44}\) Cf. H.V. Guenther, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma, pp. 63-4. The image of the water-cleaning gem is also found in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, cf. Abhidh-di 71; Vyākhyā to Abhidh-k II 25. The term prasāda and an indication of sāraddha’s initiating capacity are almost universal in definitions of sāraddha, see Abhidh-k 66; Abhidh-di 71; Abhidh-sam Trsl 8.

\(^{45}\) Dhs 10-11

\(^{46}\) Abhidh-sam Trsl 7, 8. Interestingly the list of the eighteen āvenika-dhammas peculiar to Buddhas in the Mahāvastu (1 160) and Mahāvyutpatti (No. 9, p. 3) has chanda and not sāraddha followed by vīrya, smṛti, samādhi and prajñā; Dayal’s conclusion (op. cit. p. 141) that we can see in this an early state of affairs before chanda gave way to ‘faith’ is surely based on a misunderstanding of the nature of sāraddha. The āvenika-dhammas are mentioned in Pāli sources but are not
defines chanda-samādhi in the context of the iddhi-pādas as one-pointedness of mind that has saddhā as its overlord or dominant factor. The Pāli commentaries appear to focus more on adhimokkha: saddhindriya performs the purpose or aim (atttha) of a ruler in the manner of commitment; or as the Visuddhimagga and Atthasālinī put it, the manifestation of saddhā is commitment (adhimutti-paccupāṭṭhāna). The Pāli commentaries also understand a direct relationship between saddhā and viriya: for one whose trust in the Buddha, etc., is strong, endeavour and strength increase.

This understanding of the psychology of saddhā can be summed up in the following way. The arising of confidence provides the motivation to act; this involves decision and commitment. The combined effect of this is that the muddy water of the mind becomes clear and bright; free from disturbances the mind is strong and effective in applying itself. To play on the image: strength of purpose naturally crystallizes in the clear water of confidence. In conclusion I quote the standard definition of saddhā given in the Visuddhimagga:

It is trust in that by its means they trust, or it itself trusts, or it is just trusting. Its characteristic is trusting or making ready; its function is clearing like the water-clearing gem, or leaping forward like crossing a flood; its manifestation is the absence of impurity, or commitment; its proximate cause is any ground for trust, or the factors of stream-attainment such as hearing the good dhamma. It should be seen as a hand, property and seed.

Saddhā and sotāpatti

The passage just quoted from the Visuddhimagga states that saddhā should be understood as having its proximate cause (pada-ṭṭhāna) in the factors of stream-attainment (sotāpatti-anga). A passage of the indriya-samyutta similarly says that saddhindriya should be seen in terms of the four sotāpattiyaṅgas. The four sotāpattiyaṅgas are listed in the Saṃgīti-sutta and Saṃyutta-nikāya as association with good people (sappurisa-saṁseva), hearing the good dhamma (saddhamma-savana), proper attention (boniso manasikāra) and practice in...
accord with dhamma (dhammadhamma-pañña-pañña). The Samgīti-sutta also gives a different list of four limbs of the stream-attainer (sotassānaññaññā). Thus the stream-attainer is endowed with ‘trust based in understanding’ (aveca-ppasāda) in the Buddha, Dhamma and Samgha, and also has the virtues pleasing to the noble ones (ariya-kantehi sīlā hi samannāgato). In this list the direct association of saddhā with stream-attainment is once more implicit in the use of the term aveca-ppasāda.

What then is the significance of this explicit association of saddhā with stream-attainer? The answer is best sought in the way stream-attainer is defined and explained in the Nikāyas and other Buddhist literature. The sotassānaññā is said to abandon three samyojanas or ‘fetters’, namely the view of individuality (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), doubt (vicikicchā), and holding on to precept and vow (sīla-bbata-parāmāsa). The Dhammasaṅīṇi explains both sakkāya-diṭṭhi and sīla-bbata-parāmāsa as examples of wrong view (micchā-diṭṭhi) only associated with citta that has as a component greed or attachment (lobha); sakkāya-diṭṭhi and sīla-bbata-parāmāsa are particular manifestations of that attachment. Vicikicchā is explained as doubting with regard to the Teacher, Dhamma, Samgha, the training, the past, the future, the past and future, and finally one is uncertain with regard to the way in which various dhammas have arisen according to various conditions. Thus in principle vicikicchā is defined in exactly opposite terms to saddhā and pasāda. Saddhā is composed and steady clarity with regard to the Buddha, Dhamma and Samgha. While vicikicchā is wavering and uncertainty with regard to them.

The thinking behind the association of sotassānaññā and saddhā can perhaps be expressed in the following way. The relinquishing of attachment to individuality and precept and vow makes way for the establishing of firm confidence (regarded as having a psychological affinity with attachment); this in turn disperses doubt and uncertainty. The proper establishing of saddhā, the abandoning of sakkāya-diṭṭhi, vicikicchā and sīla-bbata-parāmāsa are, according to the logic of the dynamics of Buddhist thought, different aspects of the same process, each one involving each of the others.

4. The remaining indriyas

Viriyindriya

I have already discussed the nature of viriya in the context of the four samma-ppadhānas. In the present context it will suffice to remind ourselves of

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53 D III 227; S V 347, 404.
54 D III 227; cf. S V 357, 362; A III 12; IV 405.
55 M I 9; S V 357; Dhs 182.
56 Dhs 75-80, 182-3.
57 Dhs 183: satthari kaṅkhāti vicikicchati, dhamme kaṅkhāti vicikicchati, saṅghe kaṅkhāti vicikicchati, sikkhāya kaṅkhāti vicikicchati, pubbante kaṅkhāti vicikicchati, aparante kaṅkhāti vicikicchati; pubbantaparante kaṅkhāti vicikicchati, idapaccayatā-ya-paṭiccasamappanassu dhammesu kaṅkhāti vicikicchati.
58 Cf. M I 101 where the five cetokhilas are defined as uncertainty with regard to the Teacher, Dhamma, Samgha, training and fellow brahmañās.
how viriyindriya is explained in the two vibhaṅga or ‘analysis’ suttas of the indriya-saṁyutta. The first gives the following definition:

And what is the faculty of strength? Here the noble disciple dwells as one who has produced strength; for the sake of abandoning unskilful dharmas and arousing skilful dharmas he is firm, of steady valour, unrelinquishing in purpose with regard to skilful dharmas.\(^5^9\)

This definition echoes and is, in effect, an abbreviated version of the samma-ppadhāna formula—the four samma-ppadhānas are here reduced to two, just abandoning unskilful dharmas and arousing skilful. As if to drive this point home the second vibhaṅga-sutta, which immediately follows the first, gives exactly the same definition but appends the samma-ppadhāna formula in full, though without actually explicitly mentioning the samma-ppadhānas.\(^6^0\) Two suttas, however, one immediately preceding the vibhaṅga-suttas and the other immediately following them, simply refer to the four samma-ppadhānas to explain viriyindriya:

In respect of the four right endeavours—here is the faculty of strength to be seen.\(^6^1\)

That strength which he [= Ariya-sāvaka] acquires having produced the four right endeavours, this is called the faculty of strength.\(^6^2\)

**Satindriya**

The nature of sati too has already been discussed in some detail, so in the present context I shall simply confine myself to the definitions of satindriya in the indriya-saṁyutta. The first vibhaṅga-sutta explains satindriya like this:

Here the noble disciple has mindfulness, he is possessed of the highest mindfulness and awareness; he is one who remembers and recalls what was done and said long before.\(^6^3\)

The immediately following vibhaṅga-sutta, in a similar fashion to the procedure adopted with viriyindriya, then appends the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula to the very same definition, but without actually mentioning the satipaṭṭhānas. Further, the two other suttas mentioned in connection with viriyindriya, likewise simply refer to the four satipaṭṭhānas when explaining satindriya:

In respect of the four establishings of mindfulness—here is the faculty of mindfulness to be seen.\(^6^4\)

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\(^{5^9}\) S V 197: **katamāña ca bhikkhave viriyindriyam. idha bhikkhave arīya-sāvako āraddham-viriyo viharati akusālānaṁ dhammānaṁ pahānaya kusālānaṁ dhammānāṁ upasampadāya thamavā dajjhā-parakkamo anikkhitta-duṇuro kusālesu dhammesu.**

\(^{6^0}\) S V 198.

\(^{6^1}\) S V 196: **catusu samma-ppadhānesu, ettha viriyindriyam dāṭhabhām.**

\(^{6^2}\) S V 199: **yaṁ kho bhikkhave catāro samma-ppadhāne ārabbha viriyam paṭilabbhāti idam vuccati bhikkhave viriyindriyam.**

\(^{6^3}\) S V 197: **idha bhikkhave arīya-sāvako satimā hoti paramena satī-nepakkena samamāgato cira-katam cira-bhāsitam pi sarītā anussaritā. idam vuccati bhikkhave satindriyam.**

\(^{6^4}\) S V 196: **catusa satipaṭṭhānesu, ettha satindriyam dāṭhabhān.**
The mindfulness which he acquires having produced the four establishings of mindfulness, this is called the faculty of mindfulness.65

Samādhindriya

The sources I have just referred to in defining viriyindriya and satindriya explain samādhindriya in the following ways. To begin with the first vibhaṅga-sutta once more:

Here the noble disciple making release the object gains samādhi, gains one-pointedness of mind.66

The following sutta appends the formula of the four jhānas to this,67 while the preceding sutta simply states that samādhindriya is to be seen in respect of the four jhānas.68 So samādhi is understood as one-pointedness of the mind; it is the unifying of the mind, the collecting together and uniting of mental states or factors upon one object (ārammaṇa). As such, its characteristic is most clearly manifest in the states of jhāna.69

Once again the Milindapañha provides important similes illustrating the operation of samādhi. Its characteristic is said to be that it is ‘at the head’ or ‘takes the lead’ (pamukha-lakkhana samādhi):

As, Your Majesty, whatever rafters there are in a house with a ridge roof, they all lead to the ridgepole, incline towards the ridgepole, converge at the ridgepole and the ridge is termed their pinnacle—just so, Your Majesty, whatever skilful dhammas there are, all these are headed by concentration, incline towards concentration, lean towards concentration, tend towards concentration ... As, Your Majesty, a king might enter battle with an army of four parts, and the whole army, the elephants, horses, chariots and foot-soldiers would be headed by him, incline towards him, lean towards him, tend towards him, would follow after just him—just so ... 70

The standard commentarial definition is as follows:

It is concentration in that it places the mind evenly on the object, or it places rightly, or it is simply the collecting together of the mind. Its characteristic is absence of wandering or absence of dispersal; its function is the binding together of

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65 S V 200: yam kho bhikkhave cattāro satipaṭṭhāne ārabba satiṁ paṭilabhati idam veccati bhikkhave satindriyam.
66 S V 197: idha bhikkhave ariya-sāvako vossaggarāmmanāṁ karitvā labhati samādhūṁ labhati citassā ekaggatam. (The use of the term vossagga perhaps should be thought to imply what, in the later terminology, would be called lokuttara-jhāna; cf. below, pp. 165-6, 167).
67 S V 200.
68 S V 196: catusu jhānesu, ettha samādhindriyaṁ dañṭhabban. (The sutta following the two vibhaṅga-suttas this time does not refer to the four jhānas in defining samādhindriya, but merely repeats the definition of the first vibhaṅga-sutta at S V 197.)
69 In terms of the commentarial understanding we should perhaps understand the Nikāya use of jhāna as embracing both access concentration (upacāra-samādhi) and full absorption (appanā); cf. L.S. Cousins, Religion 3 (1973), p. 118.
70 Mil 38; yathā mahārāja kāḍāgarassa yā kāci gopānasīyo sabbā tā kūṭaṁ-gamā honti kūṭā-ninnā kūṭa-samosaranā kūṭaṁ tāsam aggama akkhayaṁ, evam eva kho mahārāja ye keci kusala dharmā sabbe te samādhi-pamukkā honti samādhi-ninnā samādhi-pABBHĀ ... yathā mahārāja koci rāja catur-ānganiyo senāya saddhūṁ samāmaṇāṁ otareyya, sabbā va senā hatthi ca assā ca rathā ca patī ca tap-pamukkā bhavayeyyaṁ tan-ninnā tap-poṇā tap-pABBHĀṁ tam yeva anupariyāveyyaṁ, evam eva kho ... (A slightly different version is quoted at As 118.)
conascent [dharmas]—as water does for bath-powder; its manifestation is calming down; its proximate cause is especially happiness. It should be seen as steadiness of mind, like the steadiness of lamp-flames in the absence of wind.71

L.S. Cousins sums up the nature of cittass’ekaggatā as a jhāna-factor as follows:

It refers specifically to a state in which the mind is absorbed in a single object. In the present context [i.e. as jhāna-factor] it is the ability to keep the attention, without wavering or trembling, aware only of the object of meditation.72

Samādhi is a state of firm concentration where the mind is completely absorbed in and content with its object. I shall consider further the nature of jhāna and samādhi in the context of my discussion of the awakening-factors in chapter five.

Paññindriya

The relevant indriya-samyutta suttas that we have been considering explain paññindriya as wisdom (pañña) concerning the rise and decay (of things) (udayattha-gāminī); wisdom that is ‘noble, penetrating and that leads to the true destruction of suffering’.73 This is then further characterized as knowing (pajānāti) the four noble truths.74

I do not wish to dwell on the nature of pañña here. Something of its nature has already come out in the discussion of saddhā, and I shall return to the subject when discussing dhamma-vicaya (chapter five) and sammā-diṭṭhi (chapter six). As the indriya-samyutta and other definitions indicate, pañña actually knows and sees the rise and decay of things; as a consequence it knows things as anicca, dukkha and anatta; it understands dukkha, its arising, its ceasing and the way leading to its ceasing; it understands how things are interdependent, conditioned by one another (paṭiccasamuppanna). What all this adds up to is that pañña knows the relationships and what governs the relationships between things; it understands how they interact. In short, it knows dhamma and dhammas. For this reason, it seems to me, Potter must be basically right, at least as far as Buddhist schools are concerned, in understanding ānāna to entail knowledge or awareness of the suitability of something for achieving the goal, which for all Buddhist schools is the ceasing of suffering for both self and others.

5. The indriya-samyutta: the samudaya, etc. formula

When considered in relation to the treatment of the other six sets in the mahā-vagga, within the indriya-samyutta75 three formulaic treatments in par-

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71 Vism XIV 139: ārammane cittāṃ samanā ādhiyati samā & adhiyati samādhāna-mattam eva & etāṃ cittassā ti samādhi. so avisāra-lakkhaṇo avikkhepa-lakkhaṇo &. sathātiṣṭāṇam sampiṇḍana-raso nāhīnayacumnāṇam udakam viya, upasama-paccupāṭṭhāno, nivāte dipaceinam ṣṭhiti viya cetaso jhiti ti daṭṭhabbo. (Cf. As 119.)
73 S V 197: ariyā nibbedhikā sammā-dukkha-kkaya-gāminī.
74 S V 196, 199, 200.
75 S V 193-43.
ticular stand out as being peculiar to the treatment of the (five spiritual) faculties. These consist of variations on (i) a formula concerning the arising (samudaya), disappearance (atthagama), delight (assāda), danger (ādīnava) and letting go (nissarana) of the faculties; ⁷⁶ (ii) a formula explaining that due to the relative strength of these five faculties one is an arahant, non-returner, once returner, stream-attainer etc.; ⁷⁷ (iii) a formula characterizing the five faculties as bodhi-pakṣhiya-dhammas. ⁷⁸ Variations on these three formulas collectively quite clearly constitute what is most important and distinctive in the Nikāya treatment of the faculties (within the indriya-samututta at least). I wish now to consider especially the first two of these three treatments; the third I shall deal with in another context (chapter nine).

Immediately after the opening sutta of the indriya-samututta (which merely lists the five spiritual faculties) we find the following:

There are, bhikkhus, these five faculties. Which five? The faculty of confidence, the faculty of strength, the faculty of mindfulness, the faculty of concentration, the faculty of wisdom. As a result of the proper understanding of the delight, the danger and the letting go of these five faculties, one is called, bhikkhus, a noble disciple, a stream-attainer, not subject to ruin, safe, destined to full awakening.⁷⁹ This constitutes the most succinct version of this samudaya, etc. formula. The principal variation, from the present point of view, is the addition to the beginning of the sequence ‘delight, danger, letting go’ of the two terms ‘arising’ (samudaya) and ‘disappearance’ (atthagama). A number of other slight variations occur combined with this; most of these do not affect the basic pattern of the formula.⁸² Of some interest, however, is a variation which talks not of the ‘(arising, disappearance,) delight, danger, and letting go’ of the five faculties, but instead of their arising (samudaya), cessation (nīrodha) and the path leading to their cessation (nīrodha-gābhiṇī-pāṭipādā):

Any samanās or brāhmaṇas, bhikkhus, who understand the faculty of confidence, who understand the arising of the faculty of confidence, who understand the cessation of the faculty of confidence, who understand the way leading to the cessation of the faculty of confidence; who understand the faculty of strength ... who understand the faculty of mindfulness ... who understand the faculty of concentration ... who understand the faculty of wisdom, who understand the arising of the faculty of wisdom, who understand the cessation of the faculty of wisdom, who understand the way leading to the cessation of the faculty of wisdom.

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⁷⁶ S V 193-5, 195-6, 203-4. ⁷⁷ S V 200-2, 204-5. ⁷⁸ S V 227-8, 231, 237-9. ⁷⁹ avinipāta-dhamma, i.e. not liable to rebirth in niraya hell, or as an asura, animal or peta; a technical term of stream-attainment. ⁸⁰ niyata, literally ‘restrained’; i.e. fixed, sure, assured of freedom. ⁸¹ S V 193: pañcimāni bhikkhave indriyāni. katamāni paśca. saddhindriyāṃ viriyindriyāṃ samādhindriyāṃ pañcindriyāṃ. yato kho bhikkhave ariya-sāvako imesam pañcannam indriyānam assaṇa ca ādīnava ca nissarana ca yathābhātām pañjānī ayam vuccati bhikkhave ariya-sāvako sotāpanno avinipāta-dhammo niyato sambodhī-parāyano ti. ⁸² E.g. the conclusion of the formula may be varied; thus instead of stream-attainment, by knowing the samudaya, etc. of the indriyas ‘one is freed through absence of grasping (anupādā vimutto) and is called an arahant, one who has destroyed the āsava’ (S V 194). For the variations in full compare S V 193-5, 203-4.
wisdom—those samanás or brāhmaṇas are considered by me as samanás among samanás, as brāhmaṇas among brāhmaṇas.83

Here, then, the terminology of the four noble truths (ariya-sacca) is applied to the five spiritual faculties. In fact the samudaya, etc. formula is clearly closely related to the four-noble-truths formula in the Nikāyas. This is perhaps clear enough from the similarities in terminology used in the two formulas, but it is also apparent from the way in which the two are juxtaposed in some contexts, and are applied to the same categories and items, or at least to categories and items that have certain features in common. In the khandha-saṃyuutta a whole cycle of suṭtas is found applying the formula of the four truths and the samudaya, etc. formula to the five aggregates of form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), ideation (saññā), volitional forces (samkhāras) and consciousness (viññāṇa); this is what the ariya-sāvaka understands.84 It seems, then, that knowing the arising, disappearance, delight, danger and letting go of something should be considered as more or less equivalent to knowing the four noble truths. Within the four primary Nikāyas the samudaya, etc. formula is found applied to the following items (in addition to the faculties and aggregates): feeling (vedanā); the seven footings of consciousness (viññāṇa-diṭṭhi); two kinds of view (diṭṭhi)—the views of existence (bhava), and non-existence (vibhava); the objects of sensual desire (kāma), forms (rūpa), and feelings (vedanā); the elements (dhātu) of earth, water, fire and wind; gain, honour and fame (lābha-sakkāra-siloka); six classes of sense-object; the world (loka).85 The four-noble-truths formula is also applied to many of these categories.86

So in the first place both formulas are characteristically applied to anything that can stand in place of dukkha as the first truth, or anything that might stand in for the ‘world’, such as the five upādāna-kkhandhas. Secondly the formulas are applied to that world especially as the potential object of attachment, such as the five classes of objects of sensual desire (kāma-guṇas), the seven footings of viññāṇa, feelings and so on. Precisely because all these things are potentially objects of attachment, the bhikkhu needs to know them as they are (yathā-bhūtam); he needs to know their arising, their cessation and the way leading to their cessation; he needs to know their arising, their disappearance, their delight, their danger and their letting go.

Now, as will become clearer in a later chapter, the seven sets are repeatedly and most characteristically considered in the Nikāyas as items or dhānamas that should be developed (bhāvetabba); the virtues of and benefits that accrue from developing them are set out and reiterated on nearly every page of the

85 See D I 17-64 passim; II 68-70; M I 65, 85, 87-8, 504; III 18; S II 170-2; IV 43, 127-8, 192-4, 200-3, 232; A I 258-60; II 10-1; cf. PTC, s.vv. assāda, ādīnava.
86 E.g. S II 237.
respective *samyuttas* in the *mahā-vagga*. So for all later Buddhism these seven sets belong above all to the truth of the path (*magga-sacca*), the fourth of the noble truths. Given this fact it is slightly curious to find being applied to the five spiritual faculties a formula that is most usually applied to that which is seen as representing the conditioned world as tending to form the object of attachment—that is, what primarily constitutes the first truth, the truth of suffering (*dukkha-sacca*).

I say slightly curious, because there is, of course, no real problem here, at least when the question is considered in terms of Abhidhamma. The *dhamma-hadaya-vibhaṅga* states that the truth of suffering is to be understood (*parinnāyya*); the truth of the arising of suffering is likewise to be understood, but, in addition, its distinctive characteristic is that it is to be abandoned (*pahāt-abba*); similarly the truth of the cessation of suffering is to be understood, but its distinctive characteristic is that it is to be realized (*sacchikātabba*); finally the truth of the path that leads to the cessation of suffering is once more to be understood, but its distinctive characteristic is that it is to be developed (*bhāvetabba*).\(^87\) So the five spiritual faculties, even when associated with the *lokuttara* mind at the time of the attainment of any of the four paths or four fruits, are ‘to be understood’ just like the truth of suffering, just like everything else. Moreover, we can also bear in mind in this connection the Abhidhamma view that the *lokuttara* mind along with its associated mental factors (*cetasika*) is of such a nature that it cannot be or subsequently become the object of any kind of unskilful *citta*, it cannot be an object of attachment. On the other hand, any other kind of skilful mind which includes among its associated mental factors *saddhā*, *viriya*, *sati*, *samādhi* and *paññā*\(^88\) can be the object of unskilful *citta*, can be an object of attachment, either where someone subsequently becomes attached to his own skilful *citta* or is attached to the skilful *citta* of someone else.\(^89\) What this means, then, is that there is not necessarily any conflict with the general outlook of ancient Buddhism involved in saying that a *bhikkhu* knows the arising, disappearance, delight, danger and letting go of *saddhindriya*, *viriyindriya*, *satiindriya*, *samadhindriya* and *paññindriya*. There is no *a priori* reason why *saddhā*, *viriya*, *sati*, *samādhi* and *paññā* should not be seen as the world that is the potential object of attachment.

Yet the fact remains that the application of the *samudaya*, etc. formula to *saddhindriya*, etc. is rather striking. Why should the formula be applied only to the faculties and to none of the other six sets? A clue to the answer would seem

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87 Vibh 426-7. That the four truths are to be fully understood, abandoned, realized and developed respectively is, of course, already stated in the *Dhammaacakappavattana-sutta* (Vin I 10-12 = SV 422-3). Of course, one should understand here that it is not so much the ‘truths’ that are to be fully understood, abandoned, realized and developed as *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *magga* themselves; cf K.R. Norman, ‘The Four Noble Truths: A Problem of Pāli Syntax’ in *Indological and Buddhist Studies*, ed. L.A. Hercus et al., Canberra, 1982, pp. 377-91.

88 All this is shown in the exposition of the *hetu*, *āsava*, *sanyojana*, *gantha*, *ogha*, *yoga*, *nīvarana*, *parāmāsa*, *upādāna* and *kilesa* couplets in the *Dhammasaṅgani*, see Dhs 190-2, 195-209, 212-21, 242-2, 245-53, 256-9.

89 According to the Theravādin system *saddhā*, *viriya*, *sati* and *samādhi* are always present in *kusala-citta*, *paññā* only sometimes; in the Sarvāstivādin system *śraddhā*, *vīra*, *smṛti*, *samādhi* and *prajñā* are all present in all *kusala-citta*. 
to lie in the fact of the extended list of twenty-two faculties. For the \textit{indriya-samyutta} is not confined to a consideration of just the five faculties of \textit{saddhā}, \textit{viriya}, \textit{sati}, \textit{samādhi} and \textit{paññā}. Accordingly the \textit{samudaya}, etc. formula is applied to the six sense faculties and to the five feeling faculties.\footnote{SV 205-9; the formula is thus applied to sixteen of the twenty-two \textit{indriyas}; \textit{ittihindriya}, \textit{purisindriya}, \textit{jīvitindriya}, along with the three special knowledge \textit{indriyas}, are listed only briefly once in the \textit{indriya-samyutta}. The first three do not feature prominently in the Nikāyas (is this their only listing?), while it would be inappropriate to apply the \textit{samudaya}, etc. formula to the three knowledge \textit{indriyas}, since in Abhidhamma they are quite definitely seen as exclusively characterizing the \textit{paññā} of \textit{lukotara-citta}.}

Once the context of the extended list of faculties is taken into account, that the \textit{samudaya}, etc. formula should be applied to the faculties of \textit{saddhā}, \textit{viriya}, \textit{sati}, \textit{samādhi} and \textit{paññā} becomes rather more intelligible. For the list of twenty-two faculties does in fact have something of the quality of lists such as that of \textit{rūpa}, \textit{vedanā}, \textit{saññā}, \textit{sañkhāras} and \textit{viññāna} or of the six kinds of sense-object. Like them, the list of the twenty-two faculties embraces a kind of totality—a world complete in itself that might form the object of attachment. Indeed, from the point of view of the Nikāyas, the extended list of faculties can be seen as singling out what are considered to be the principal motive powers in the world of experience. Thus it is no surprise to find, when one turns to the canonical Abhidhamma texts, that the faculties (all twenty-two) are not dealt with in the contexts of the seven sets, but constitute a topic in what seems a traditional sequence: \textit{khandhas}, \textit{āyatanas}, \textit{dhātus}, \textit{saccas}, \textit{indriyas}, \textit{paccayākāra} (= \textit{pañicca-samuppāda}).\footnote{Cf. the order of the eighteen vibhaṅgas and the order of topics in the \textit{dhammahadaya-vibhaṅga} in the \textit{Vibhaṅga} and also the \textit{Dhammakathā} and \textit{Yamaka}. This traditional order of topics is not, it seems, a peculiarity of Theravādin texts, but is also found in Buddhist Skt sources; e.g. \textit{Aṭṭhakathāsūtra} (this text, having dealt with the twenty-two \textit{indriyas}, subsequently goes on to deal with the five spiritual \textit{indriyas} again in the context of the seven sets). See also Warder's essay 'The Mātikā' in the \textit{Mohavicchedani}.}

Of some interest in this connection is the \textit{diṭṭhi-kathā} of the \textit{Paṭissambhidāmagg}, which quite clearly shows an extended list of faculties (nineteen in this case) being used in exactly the same way as \textit{rūpa}, \textit{vedanā}, \textit{saññā}, \textit{sañkhāras} and \textit{viññāna} and so on, in order to illustrate how the world becomes the object of attachment. The \textit{diṭṭhi-kathā} begins by defining \textit{diṭṭhi}, as \textit{abhīnivesa-parāmāsa} or 'holding on to conviction'. It then proceeds to illustrate how this takes place; it is due to having the attitude towards various items: 'this is mine, I am this, this is my self' (\textit{etam mama, eso haṃ asmi, eso me attā}). Not surprisingly, given the nature of the characterization of the attitude, the series of items subject to it begins with \textit{rūpa}, \textit{vedanā}, \textit{saññā}, \textit{sañkhāras} and \textit{viññāna}.\footnote{Paṭiss 1 135-61.} We then have six senses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind); the six kinds of sense object (visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes, bodily sensations and \textit{dhammas}); six classes each of consciousness (\textit{viññāna}), ideation (\textit{saññā}), volition (\textit{sañcetanā}), craving (\textit{tañhā}), initial and applied thinking (\textit{vitakka}, \textit{vicāra});
six elements (dhātu) of earth, fire, wind, water, consciousness and space;\textsuperscript{94} thirty-two parts of the body; twelve āyatana, eighteen dhātu, nineteen indriyas;\textsuperscript{95} the sense (kāma-), form (rūpa-) and formless (arūpa-) realms (dhātu); nine kinds of existence (bhava); four jhānas; four kinds of ceto-vimutti (loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equipoise); four formless attainments, and finally twelve links of paṭicca-samuppāda.

Is there any significance in all this for the interpretation of the five spiritual faculties? The answer, I think, is yes. The very existence of the extended list of faculties, the way the samudaya, etc. formula is applied to it, the way it features in the Abhidhamma texts and is treated in the ḍīṭhī-kathā of the Paṭisambhidā-magga—all these factors suggest that the special import of the list of the five spiritual faculties is that it characterizes saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and paññā in their most universal aspect: wherever and whenever these dhāmmas occur their characteristic is that they function in some respects as faculties. This is—to anticipate what I shall have to say about the bojjhangas and ariyo attāthikiko maggo—in contra-distinction to the more specialized and specific functions of viriya, sati, samādhi and paññā as bojjhangas and factors of the ariya-magga.\textsuperscript{96}

That saddhindriya, viriyindriya, satindriya, samādhindriya and paññindriya should be understood as representing saddhā, etc., in their general aspect seems to be corroborated by a comparison of the treatment of the faculties (the twenty-two) and the other six sets in the Vibhaṅga. What is quite clear from the treatment according to the Abhidhamma method\textsuperscript{97} is that while the satipaṭṭhānas, samma-ppadhānas, iddhi-pādas, bojjhāṅgas and ariyo attāthikiko maggo are all treated exclusively from the point of view of the lokuttara mind, saddhindriya, etc. are treated generally, as being associated with sense sphere (kāmāvacara), form sphere (rūpāvacara), formless sphere (arūpāvacara) or the lokuttara mind.\textsuperscript{98}

One should note here that the Pāli commentaries do in fact allow that there are ordinary non-transcendent (lokiya) satipaṭṭhānas, samma-ppadhānas, iddhi-pādas, balas, bojjhāṅgas and maggaṅgas. This does not, I think, imply any real difference of view between the Vibhaṅga and commentaries. The Theravādin outlook on this point can be summed up as follows. Strictly speaking, from the point of view of Abhidhamma, we can only say that the satipaṭṭhānas, samma-ppadhānas, iddhi-pādas, balas, bojjhāṅgas and maggaṅgas function truly and fully when brought to the stage of lokuttara-citta; this is their natural and proper level. However, in certain kinds of ordinary skilful citta—just what kinds I shall consider later—the satipaṭṭhānas and other sets (excepting the faculties) may function in a manner that approximates to this stage or level of

\textsuperscript{94} In the Cūḷa-rāhulovāda-sutta (M III 278-80) more or less the same series of items, to this point, is considered as anicca, dukkha, anattā.

\textsuperscript{95} Missing are the three knowledge indriyas.

\textsuperscript{96} I.e. viriya as viriya-sambojjhāṅga and samma-vāyāma; sati as sati-sambojjhāṅga and sammā-satt; samādhi as samādhi-sambojjhāṅga and sammā-samādhi; paññā as dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhāṅga and sammā-dīṭhi.

\textsuperscript{97} I.e. in the abhidhamma-bhājaniya and pañhāpucchaka sections.

\textsuperscript{98} See Chapter 10.
full development.\textsuperscript{99} When it comes to the five spiritual faculties, however, these considerations and provisos are not relevant; when there is saddhā it functions as an indriya; sometimes more, sometimes less fully perhaps, but it never loses its basic quality of being an indriya; similarly for viriya, sati, samādhi and pañña.

This, then, is the understanding of the faculties that has emerged so far, based on a consideration of the application of the samudaya, etc. formula to the five spiritual faculties, and questions raised thereby. Matters, however, are not quite as straightforward as this. As soon as one turns to the other indriya formulas, and to the Kathāvatthu and the treatises of northern India, it becomes apparent that just when saddhā, etc. should be properly called faculties is something of a moot point.

The indriya-kathā of the Kathāvatthu addresses itself to the question of whether it is proper to distinguish ‘confidence’ (saddhā), etc. from ‘the faculty of confidence’ (saddhindriya), etc. on the grounds that the former is ‘ordinary’ (lokiya) while the latter is exclusively and strictly speaking ‘transcendent’ (lokuttara).\textsuperscript{100} The position the indriya-kathā adopts is that this would not be an appropriate conclusion. On the contrary, just as it is perfectly correct to term ordinary mind (lokiyo mano) ‘the faculty of mind’ (manindriya) and so forth, so it is perfectly correct to call ordinary confidence (lokiyā saddhā) ‘the faculty of confidence’ (saddhindriya). The Kathāvatthu takes up its position by appealing to the extended list of faculties. The list is understood as attributing the common characteristic of indriya to twenty-two different items; all are termed faculties because they have a certain property in common irrespective of whether they are lokiya or lokuttara. If saddhā is called saddhindriya only when (i.e. by virtue of its being) lokuttara, then it is necessarily an indriya in a totally different sense from, for example, the eye-faculty (cakkhundriya), to which the categories of lokiya or lokuttara simply do not apply. The final appeal for the Kathāvatthu’s viewpoint is the famous passage where the Buddha, requested to teach by Brahmi Sahampati, surveys the world with his buddha-eye and sees beings of different and varying propensities, some with weak faculties (mudindriya), some with sharp or acute faculties (tikkhindriya).\textsuperscript{101} It is this general sense of indriya that the Kathāvatthu argues is relevant to the five spiritual faculties.

The Kathāvatthu commentary informs us that it was the Hetuvādins and Mahimsāsakas who held the view that lokiyā saddhā is just called saddhā and not saddhindriya and so forth for viriya, sati, samādhi and pañña.\textsuperscript{102} According to the material collated by André Bareau a number of other schools also adopted this outlook on the five faculties. They are the Vibhajyavāda, the

\textsuperscript{99} The details of all this, and the rather different way the matter is treated in other systems of Abhidharma are considered in Chapter 10.
\textsuperscript{100} Kv 589-92.
\textsuperscript{101} E.g. M'I 169.
\textsuperscript{102} Kv-a 183-4 : idāni indriya-kathā nāma hoti, tattha lokiyā saddhā saddhā yeva nāma na saddhindriyam tattha viriyaṃ ... sati ... samādhi ... paññā paññā yeva nāma na paññhindriyan ti yesam laddhi seyyathāpi Hetuvādānaṃ c'eva Mahimsāsakānaṃ ca, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paññā itarassa.
Mahāsāṃghika and the school to which the Śāriputrābhīdharmasāstra belongs.\(^{103}\)
The pudgalavādin Vātsiputriyas, on the other hand, adopted the position that the five spiritual faculties should be understood as pertaining to the stage of laukikāgra-dharma, that is the stage immediately prior to the arising of lokottara consciousness.\(^{104}\) The Sarvāstivādins seem to have been in accord with the Therāvādins on this issue, and viewed śraddhendriya, viryendriya, smṛtindriya, samādhiprājñendriya, and prajñendriya as characterizing śraddhā, virya, smṛti, samādhi and prajñā in their generality.\(^{105}\)

Bareau records that the reason for the Vibhajyavādin view that the five spiritual faculties should be regarded as exclusively lokottara is because of the śūtra ‘d’après lequel, selon le degré de culture de ces cinq facultés, on obtenant l’un ou l’autre des quatre fruits de Sainteté, alors que celui qui en est complètement dépourvu est un profane’.\(^{106}\) This śūtra in fact corresponds to one of the variations in the cycle of suttas concerning the relative strength of the faculties and the consequent fruit;\(^{107}\) this constitutes the second of the three principal indriya-saṃyutta formulas I referred to earlier, and it is this formula which I shall now consider.

6. The indriya-saṃyutta: the ‘relative strength’ formula

A total of eight suttas\(^{108}\) in the indriya-saṃyutta can be said to present a variation on the following formula:

There are these five faculties. Which five? The faculty of confidence, the faculty of strength, the faculty of mindfulness, the faculty of concentration, the faculty of wisdom. Due to the accomplishment and fulfilment of these five faculties one is an arahant; with faculties weaker than this one is a never-returner; with faculties weaker than this one is a once-returner; with faculties weaker than this one is a stream-attainer; with faculties weaker than this one is a follower by dhamma; with faculties weaker than this one is a follower by confidence.\(^{109}\)

The variations on this formula are achieved in two ways. First by varying the types of different person who correspond in descending order to the relative strength of the five spiritual faculties; the relevant different lists of persons are set out in the table on page 127. Secondly by on occasion adding different closing comments; these are three in number:

Thus difference in faculties means difference in the fruits; difference in the fruits means difference in persons.\(^{110}\)

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103 Bareau, SBPV, pp. 66-7, 172, 195, 197, 199.
104 Id., p. 118; this understanding seems to tie in with the notion of each one of the seven sets being associated with a particular stage in the Buddhist path, see Chapter 10.6.
105 Id., pp. 143, 145, 146.
106 Id., p. 172.
107 The sūtra in question is to be found at S V 202 entitled paṭipanno.
108 For all eight, see S V 220-2, 204-5.
109 S V 200: ṭīnās sa kho bhikkhave pañcannāṃ indriyānāṃ samattā pariṇāmaṃ araham hoti; tato mudutarehi anāgāmi hoti; tato mudutarehi sakadāgāmi hoti; tato mudutarehi sotāpanno hoti; tato mudutarehi dhamma-cinussāri hoti; tato mudutarehi saddhānussāri hoti.
110 S V 200, 201: ṭīnā kho bhikkhave indriya-vemattatā phala-vemattatā hoti; phala*-vemattatā puggala-vemattatā hoti. (*Reading, with Be and Cē, phala- for PTSe’s bola-.)
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<th>Table 2. Persons According to Strength of Indriyas in Descending Order</th>
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Thus the one who does the full amount achieves the full amount; the one who does part achieves part. I declare that these five faculties are not barren, bhikkhus.\(^{111}\)

The one who is in every way and everywhere wholly without these five faculties, him I declare an outsider, one who stands in the ranks of the ordinary man.\(^{112}\)

At first sight the way in which the relative strength of the faculties corresponds to a range of attainments might well seem to support the view that the five faculties should be thought of as characterizing saddhā, etc., in their generality. But what is crucial here is how the Nikāyas understand the terms ‘follower by confidence’ (saddhistusārīn), ‘follower by dhamma’ (dhammānusārīn), and ‘ordinary man’ (puthujjana).\(^{113}\) The statement to the effect that one completely without the five faculties should be considered a puthujjana seems to correspond exactly to the Sūtra passage upon which the Vibhajyavāda based its understanding of the faculties as exclusively lokottara.

Later Buddhist literature that postdates the Nikāyas or Āgamas seems agreed in understanding the term puthujjana/pythagjana as referring to anyone who has not attained one of the four paths or four fruits.\(^{114}\) Similarly there appears to be general agreement that saddhistusārīn/sradddhistusārīn and dhammānusārīn/dharmānusārīn should be understood as two varieties of persons who are standing upon or who have just gained the path of stream-attainment, and who, immediately they gain the fruit, are designated ‘freed by confidence’ (saddhist-vimutta/sradddhistādhisuttika) and ‘one who has obtained vision’ (diṭṭhipatta/dṛṣṭi-prāpta) respectively.\(^{115}\) To this extent these definitions should, it seems, be considered as belonging to the common heritage of ancient Buddhism. There were, no doubt, differences of detail between the Abhidharma systems on these points. For instance according to the Theravādin system the saddhistusārīn and dhammānusārīn will each exist for only one thought moment, while in the Sarvāstivādin system the sradddhistusārīn and dharmānusārīn will exist for fifteen thought moments. But in both systems the fruit moment follows immediately and inevitably upon the path; in both systems the essential difference between the saddhistusārīn/sradddhistusārīn and dhammānusārīn/dharmānusārīn relates to the difference between weak (mudulmydu) faculties in the case of the former, and sharp (tikkha/tikṣṇa) faculties in the case of the latter.\(^{116}\)

These facts seem to show that certain portions of the indriya-samyutta in

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111 S V 201, 202: iti kho bhikkhave paripuraka pariśūla-kāri āraṇāthet. padesaṃ padesa-kāri āraṇātheti. avaṇāhāri tv evāham bhikkhave paṭicchindriyānān vaddāmi ti.

112 S V 202: yassa kho bhikkhave imāni paṭicchindriyāni sabbena sabbān sabbathā sabbān nathitī, tasmā aham bāhiro puthujjana-pakkhe ṣhito ti vaddāmi.

113 The technicalities of the exact distinctions between the five types of person beginning with the anta-parinibbāyin, and between the three types of person beginning with the eka-bhijn need not concern us here. The later literature is in broad agreement that they refer to distinctions within the general class of anāgāmin and sotāpanna respectively; see Pugg 14-7; Vism XXIII 55-7.

114 E.g. Pugg 12; Vism XXII 5; Abhidh-h Trsl 159; Abhidh-sam Trsl 158.

115 Vism XXI 75; Abhidh-h 353; Abhidh-h Trsl 73-5.

116 Abhidh-h Trsl 75; Abhidh-h 353. The reference to indriyas as mudu or tikkha is not quite explicit in the Pāli sources, but is clearly enough indicated: see Ps III 190; Spk III 235; Pugg-a 193-4.
fact support the view that the five faculties should be understood as referring only to the *saddhā*, *viriya*, *sati*, *samādhi* and *paññā* of the *ariya-puggala*, the person who has gained one of the four paths or four fruits; the five faculties must, in other words, be exclusively *lokuttara*. Or should one conclude that the later tradition has straightforwardly imposed entirely inappropriate technical interpretations upon the terminology of the Nikāyas? Here we move into something of a problematic area. Clearly one of the reasons for the explicit interpretation and definition of the term *puthujjana* in the *Puggalapaññatti* is precisely this kind of passage that contrasts the *puthujjana* with the eight kinds of *ariya-puggala*. Similarly there are other Nikāya passages that use the term *puthujjana* which can be viewed as supporting the traditional interpretation.\footnote{A clear example is S V 397: ‘The one who is in every way and everywhere completely without the four factors of stream-attainment, him I declare to be an outsider, one who stands in the ranks of the *puthujjana*.’ Cf. S V 362-3, 381, 386.}

No doubt the tighter technical definition of terminology should be seen as the end product of a gradual and continuous process, and not as what amounts to a radical reinterpretation of earlier material.

**Saddhānusārin and dhammānusārin**

A passage in the *khandha-vagga* of the *Samyutta-nikāya* appears to provide the nearest thing to a definition of *saddhānusārin* and *dhammānusārin* in the Nikāyas:

> The eye, bhikkhus, is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise; the ear ... the nose ... the tongue ... the body ... the mind is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise ... He who is confident in, decided upon these *dhammas* thus, is called a *saddhānusārin*, one who has entered into the way of perfection, has entered into the level of good men, has passed beyond the level of the *puthujjana*; he is incapable of committing that deed whose performance would cause him to rise in Niraya, or in the womb of an animal, or in the realm of the *petas*, he is incapable of dying until he has realized the fruit of stream-attainer. One whose insight these *dhammas* thus partially satisfy by means of wisdom is called a *dhammānusārin*, one who has entered into the way of perfection ... [as for the *saddhānusārin*]. He who knows and sees these *dhammas* thus, is called a stream-attainer, not subject to ruin, safe, assured of full awakening.\footnote{S III 225: *cakkhum bhikkhave aniccam viparindmi aṇṇathābhāvi, sotaṃ ... ghnam ... jivhā ... kāya ... mano anicco viparīṇāmi aṇṇathābhāvī, yo bhikkhave ime dhamme evam saddahati adhimuccati ayam vuccati saddhānusārī okkanto sammatta-niyāmaṃ sappurisa-bhūmiṃ okkanto vittivatto puthujjana-bhūmiṃ. abhābho tam kammanā kātum yaṃ kammanā katvā nirayam vā tiracchānā-yono vā petti-visayam vā uppajjeyya. abhābho ca tāva kālam kātum yāva na sotappi-phalam sacchikaroti. yassa kho ime dhammā evam paññāya mattaso nijjhānaṃ khamanti ayam vuccati dhammānusārī okkanto sammatta-niyāmaṃ ... yo bhikkhave ime dhamme evam jānti passati ayam vuccati sotāpanno avinipāta-dhammo niyato sambodhi-parāyano ti.}

Clearly here the *saddhānusārin* and *dhammānusārin*, although distinguished from the stream-attainer proper, are certainly very close to being stream-attainers. Like the stream-attainer they cannot suffer rebirth in any of the inferior realms; and they are distinguished from the *puthujjana*—they have passed beyond his level. Finally it is said that they cannot die without realizing the
fruit of stream-attainment. It seems hardly surprising then that the later tradition views the saddhānusārin and dhammānusārin as it does.

In a number of places in the Nikāyas the terms dhammānusārin and saddhānusārin occur as the last two members of a list of seven persons: (i) one who is freed both ways (ubhatobbhāga-vimutta); (ii) one who is freed by wisdom (pañña-vimutta); (iii) one who realizes with the body (kāya-sakkhin); (iv) one who has obtained vision (diṭṭhi-patta); (v) one who is freed by confidence (saddhā-vimutta); (vi) dhammānusārin; (vii) saddhānusārin.\(^\text{119}\) The fullest discussion of these seven terms occurs in the Kīṭāgiri-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya.\(^\text{120}\) As far as the first five terms are concerned I do not wish to discuss the details of the Majjhima definitions but merely to consider how these relate to the definitions of the final two. The ‘one who is freed both ways’ and the ‘one who is freed by wisdom’ are both said to see by means of wisdom that the āsavas are destroyed (paññāya assa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti); for both of them there is nothing left to be done by heedfulness (na appamādāna karaṇīyam). The ‘one who realizes with the body’, the ‘one who has obtained vision’ and the ‘one who is freed by confidence’ see by means of wisdom that some of the āsavas are destroyed (paññāya assa disvā ekacce āsavā parikkhīṇā honti), and for them there is something to be done by heedfulness (appamādāna karaṇīyam). Both the dhammānusārin and saddhānusārin see by means of wisdom that the āsavas are not destroyed (paññāya assa disvā āsavā aparikkhīṇā honti); as with the previous three, for them there is something to be done by heedfulness.

Further the dhammānusārin is described as one whose insight the dhammas made known by the Tathāgata partially satisfy by means of wisdom (tathāgata-ppaveditā assa dhammā paññāya mattaso nijjhānaṃ khamanti). This agrees almost exactly with the Samyutta definition quoted above. The dhammānusārin is in addition here said to possess the faculties of confidence, strength, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom (api c'assa ime dhammā honti seyyath-idaṃ saddhindriyaṃ viriyindriyaṃ satindriyaṃ samādhindriyaṃ paññindriyaṃ). The saddhānusārin, however, has only a measure of confidence in and affection for the Tathāgata (tathāgate assa saddhā-mattam hoti pema-mattam), but he too possesses the faculties of saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhī and paññā. What is it that is left to be done by heedfulness?

Truly, this venerable sir while resorting to a suitable dwelling, keeping the company of good friends and balancing the faculties might, in the here and now, for himself have direct knowledge of, realize, attain and dwell in that unsurpassed goal of the spiritual life for the sake of which the sons of families rightly go forth from the home into homelessness. Perceiving this to be the fruit of heedfulness for this bhikkhu, I declare that something is to be done by heedfulness.\(^\text{121}\)

\(^{119}\) M I 439-40; 477-9; A I 73-4; IV 215.

\(^{120}\) M I 477-9.

\(^{121}\) M I 479 : app-eva nāma ayam āyasma anulomikāni senāsanāni paṭīsevamāno kalyāna-mitte bhajamāno indriyāni samamuddrayamāno yass attāhāya kula-puttā samma-d-eva agārasmā anagāriyam pabbajanti tad anuttaram brahma-carīya-partyādham dīṭṭhe va dhamme sāyo tābhinnā sačchikatvā upasampajja vihareyyā ti. imāṃ kho ahaṃ imassa bhikkhuno appamāda-phalam sampassamāno appamādēna karaṇīyam tī vadāmi.
Certainly, at first sight, it does not seem very appropriate to speak of someone who exists only momentarily as 'resorting to a suitable dwelling, keeping the company of good friends and balancing the faculties'. However, since the phrase is equally applied to all five persons for whom there is something left to be done—that is those who have not destroyed all the āsavas—it might be thought that it concerns everything that the saddhānusārin and dhammānusārin will have to do before the āsavas are all destroyed, and not just what is to be done by them in the capacity of saddhānusārin and dhammānusārin. Yet a number of Nikāya passages seem to quite clearly envisage all seven of these persons as walking about and performing tasks that would seem to involve the saddhānusārin and dhammānusārin in something rather more than momentary existence. A case in point is the following Aṅguttara-nikāya passage:

It is wonderful that when the Saṅgha has been invited by me [for a meal], devatās approach and announce, 'Householder, this bhikkhu is ubhatobhāga-vimutta, this one is paññā-vimutta, this one is kāya-sakkhin, this one is dīṭṭhi-patta, this one is saddhā-vimutta, this one is dhammānusārin, this one is unvirtuous, of bad dhamma.' Yet when I am serving food to the Saṅgha I do not find that the thought arises, 'I shall give a little to this one or I shall give a lot to this one.' Rather I give with an even mind.\textsuperscript{122}

What conclusions should one draw? It is obvious that at least in certain Nikāya passages saddhānusārin and dhammānusārin are understood to indicate persons close to or approaching stream-attainment. I have already drawn attention to the fact that the arising of clear saddhā is associated with stream-attainment in other contexts as well. This would appear to give added weight to the association of the saddhānusārin with stream-attainment. It is equally clear, I think, that the strict Abhidhamma understanding is not altogether satisfactory for the Nikāyas here. In this instance the clothes of the Abhidhamma seem to hang a little awkwardly upon the Nikāyas—though precisely where they do not fit is not so easy to determine. The Abhidhamma conception of a momentary path followed immediately by the fruit is probably the likeliest place to look. So while we must assume some kind of gap to exist

\textsuperscript{122} A IV 215: anacchāriyaṁ kho pana me bhante saṁgha nīmantite devatā upasamkāmiṁvā ārocenti asuko gahapati bhikkhu ubhatobhāga-vimutto asuko paññā-vimutto asuko dīṭṭhi-patto asuko saddhā-vimutto asuko dharmānusāriṁ asuko saddhānusāriṁ asuko sīlavā kalyāṇa-dhammo asuko dussilo pāpa-dhammo ti. saṁgham kho paṇḍhāṁ bhante parivisanto nābhiñānāṁ evam cittam uppādentu imassa vā thokam demī imassa vā bahukan ti. athā kvāṁ bhante sama-citto va demī. (Cf. M I 439-40, A I 73-4.) These passages are pointed out by Kheminda Thera, Path, Fruit and Nibbāna, Colombo, 1965, pp. 37-9. In one instance the commentary seems to acknowledge the discrepancy; Ps III 151-2 to M I 439-40 states: 'With regard to the words beginning 'one freed both ways', dhammānusārin and saddhānusārin are two types of person in possession of the path who exist for one thought moment. But then it is not possible for all seven ariya-puggalas to be so commanded by the Lord, for when the Lord has commanded it is not possible for these [two?] to act accordingly. However, assuming the impossibility of the conditions this is said in order to indicate that ariya-puggalas are easy to talk to and that Bhaddālī-thera is difficult to talk to,' (ubhatobhāga-vimutto ti ādusu dharmānusāriṁ saddhānusāriṁ ti dve eka-citta-kkhanikā magga-samāngha-puggalā, ete pana satta arīya-puggale bhaggavatā pi evam ānepaṁ na yuttam, bhaggavatā ānattat tesam hi evam kātuṁ na yuttam, atthāna-parikappa-vasena pana arīya-puggalānaṁ suvaca-bhāva-dassanatthāṁ Bhaddālī-theraṁ sa dubbaca-bhāva-dassanatthāṁ p'etam yuttam.)
between the Nikāyas' and early Abhidhamma's respective usages of the terms dhammāṇusārīn and saddhāṇusārīn along with their conceptions of path and fruit, we have no reason to presume that the gap is such that a vast and elaborate construction is needed to bridge it. On the contrary the shift in meaning appears to be of quite a subtle nature.

One is tempted to ask here what might seem rather basic questions. Why should there be any notion of path and fruit at all? What purpose is served by the moment by moment analysis of the process that leads to the arising of the transcendent path in the Abhidhamma/Abhidharma systems? What lies behind the question of whether or not the five spiritual faculties should be regarded as exclusively lokuttara as distinct from saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and pāññā? At the heart of all these questions is a concern with the nature of the relationship of the ordinary lokiya mind to the transcendent lokuttara mind: how does the transition from the lokiya to the lokuttara occur? We are not concerned here with abstruse points of scholastic theory, but with matters of a quite definite practical and experiential import to the ancient bhikkhu who understood himself as poised to make that breakthrough.

The principles at work here are similar, it seems to me, to those that later provoked the debate among Chinese Buddhists concerning gradual and sudden awakening.\footnote{123 For a brief account of this debate see K.K.S. Ch'en, \textit{Buddhism in China}, Princeton, 1972, pp. 119-20.} The debate might be characterized in the following way. From a strict and absolute standpoint it must be that one is either awakened or not, either one sees it or one does not; the awakening experience is of the nature of a sudden and instantaneous breakthrough—this is from the standpoint of sudden awakening. According to the standpoint of gradual awakening this is all very well, but in practice such absolute distinctions are not always entirely appropriate; that is, it is more useful sometimes to look at it in other ways.

A feature clearly manifest in the Abhidhamma texts—but not peculiar to them—is that of finer and finer examination of mental processes and events. This quite naturally entails a consideration of those events on ever smaller time scales, until, in absolute terms, all mental events are seen as radically momentary. In view of this, analyses in terms of Abhidhamma will tend to stress the absolute and instantaneous nature of transition: either one is a stream-attainer or not; therefore, at what precise moment does one become a stream-attainer? When exactly does a person change from one who can die without realizing the fruit of stream-attainment to one who cannot? Thus the essential features of the Abhidhamma understanding of path and fruit, of saddhāṇusārīn and dhammāṇusārīn are a perfectly natural resolution of the treatment of these matters in the Nikāyas, and, as I have already indicated, seem to be part of the common heritage of ancient Buddhism.

My point here is not that the viewpoint of gradual awakening cannot be expressed in terms of Abhidhamma—on the contrary it is, I think, in some ways enhanced by Abhidhamma—but in so far as the Abhidhamma carried to its conclusion the method of giving a final and comprehensive expression of
Buddhist teaching in absolute and universally applicable terms, it tends to focus the mind first of all on the absolute and instantaneous nature of the transition from, say, the 'ordinary' (lokiya) to the 'transcendent' (lokuttara). Yet at the same time the Abhidhamma also draws attention to a similarity or relationship that exists between the ordinary lokiya skillful mind and the lokuttara mind: in terms of bare mental states (cetasikas) that are present, the two kinds of mind may be nearly identical—this is clear in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī. In this way the Abhidhamma highlights what is involved in the sudden/gradual awakening debate.

The suttas of the Nikāyas are presented in the first place as the prescriptions of the Buddha applicable to particular occasions. They characteristically progress from their particular starting points via a particular course of practice or teaching toward the final goal of complete awakening. To this extent the Nikāyas can be seen as drawing attention to the gradual stage by stage nature of the process of awakening. Yet at the same time what one might call the Abhidhamma tendency to more final, absolute and universally valid expressions cannot be regarded as simply extraneous or alien to Nikāya Buddhism. Within the Nikāyas there is already a certain tension created by a tendency to shift between more figurative and particular applications on the one hand, and more absolute universal statements on the other.

7. The lesser stream-attainer

At this point it is perhaps useful to consider a distinction that is found both in the Nikāyas and in the commentaries between teaching that is pariyaṇena and that which is nipparaṇiyena. The commentaries appear to use the two terms to characterize the mode of teaching in the Suttanta and Abhidhamma respectively.124 Thus Rhys Davids and Stede explain the meaning of pariyaṇena as ‘ad hominem, discursively applied method, illustrated discourse, figurative language as opposed to the abstract, general statements of Abhidhamma = nipparaṇiyena’.125

According to Monier Williams pariya is, in addition to its literal meaning of ‘going round’ or ‘revolution’, acquires a number of applied meanings. A pariya is a course, succession or turn; pariyaṇena can thus mean ‘successively’ or ‘alternatively’; pariya, pariyaṭṭa, pariyaṭṭra and pariyaṇa-vacana can all

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124 See As 154, 222, 250, 289, 308 for a convenient set of examples.

125 PED, s.v. pariya. Mrs Rhys Davids’ comment at Dhs Trsl xxxiii n. 2 is confusing. She states that na nipparaṇiyena dīghan rūpaṇyanām (As 317) means ‘that which is long is only figuratively a visual object (is really a tactile object)’. But what this whole passage seems to be saying is that since what is long can also be known by touch as well as sight, which is not true of colour (yasmā dīghādīni phusitvā pi sakkā jānītaṁ, nilādīni pan’ eva na sakkā), therefore the sphere of visible objects cannot of itself be considered as long, short, etc. in any final or absolute sense (tasmā na nipparaṇiyena dīghan rūpaṇyanām tathā rassādī). But no more can the sphere of tangible objects (phoṭṭhabbāyaṇa) be so considered; rather length, etc. are relative notions or concepts that come into being as the result of comparing different sense objects known either through the sense of sight or through the sense of touch.
apparently mean 'a convertible term or synonym'; finally a paryāya is a particular 'way, manner or mode of proceeding'.

A series of suttas in the Anguttara-nikāya\textsuperscript{127} takes a number of terms and contrasts their usage paryāyena and nippariyāyena. The following is taken from the first sutta in this series:

These five kinds of object of sensual desire are called a restriction by the Blessed One. What five? Visible forms cognizable by the eye ... sounds cognizable by the ear ... smells cognizable by the nose ... tastes cognizable by the tongue ... tactile sensations cognizable by the body ... Here a bhikkhu, separated from the objects of sensual desire ... attains and dwells in the first jhāna. So far finding an opening in respect of restriction has been spoken of by the Blessed One paryāyena. But there too restriction exists. And what is the restriction there? That vitakka and vicāra that has not ceased there, that is the restriction there.\textsuperscript{128}

So the bhikkhu proceeds to the second jhāna; this is once more described as finding an opening paryāyena, for here too restriction or crowding exists in the form of pīti or joy. The bhikkhu thus progresses through the remaining two jhānas and the four formless attainments; each one is described as finding an opening paryāyena in relationship to the previous one. But even in the sphere of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness (neva-saṅgha-nīsaṅghāyatanā) there is restriction:

That consciousness of the sphere of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness that has not ceased here, that is the restriction there. So again the bhikkhu by passing completely beyond the sphere of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness attains and dwells in the cessation of consciousness and feeling, and sees by his wisdom that the āsavas are destroyed. To this extent finding an opening in respect of restriction has been spoken of by the Blessed One nippariyāyena.\textsuperscript{129}

Buddhaghosa in the Manorathapāraṇī glosses paryāyena and nippariyāyena in this context by ekena kāraṇena and na ekena kāraṇena respectively:

**Paryāyena** i.e. for one particular reason; the first jhāna is called finding-an-opening only in as much as the restriction of the objects of sensual desire is absent, it is not [one] in every respect ...

**Nippariyāyena** i.e. not for a particular reason; now the destruction of the āsavas is indeed called the one and only finding-an-opening in every respect due to abandoning all restrictions.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{126} MW, s.v. paryāya. The notion of paryāya, paryāyatra, paryāya-sūkta as 'a regular recurring series or formula' is perhaps also of some interest in relationship to Suttanta literature's use of recurring themes and formulas.

\textsuperscript{127} A IV 449-56.

\textsuperscript{128} A IV 449: pañcime āvuso kāma-gaṇā saṁbādhāho vutto bhagavāt. katame pañca. ca[kkhu-\textit{vīheyya}] rūpā ... sota-vīheyyā saddā ... [ghāna-vīheyyā] gandhā ... jivhā-vīheyyā rasā ... kāya-vīheyyā phoṭṭhabbā ... idāhūsau bhikkhu vivicc'eva kāmehi pe paṭhamañ jhānaṁ upasampajjā viharati ettāvatā pi kho āvuso saṁbādhē okāsādihgamo vutto bhagavātā paryāyena.

\textsuperscript{129} A IV 451: yad eva tattha neva-saṅgha-nīsaṅghāyataṁ-saṅghā aniruddhā hoti ayam etthā saṁbādhā. paṇa ca param āvuso bhikkhu sabbaso neva-saṅgha-nīsaṅghāyataṁ samatikamam saṅgāvada-virāgaṁ nīroddham upasampajjā viharati paññāyā cassa dsvā āsavā parikkhiṇāṁ honti, ettāvatā pi kho āvuso saṁbādhē okāsādihgamo vutto bhagavātā nippariyāyena ti.

\textsuperscript{130} Mp IV 205: paryāyenā ti ekena kāraṇena; kāma-saṁbādhāsā hi abhāva-mattena eva paṭhamā-jhānaṁ, okāsādihgamo nāma, na sabbathā sabbam ... nippariyāyenā ti na ekena kāraṇena; atha kho āsavā-kkhayo nāma saṁbādha-jhānaṁ pahinattā sabbena sabbam eko okāsādihgam
On the basis of the foregoing one can perhaps sum up the distinction between teaching that is pariyāyena and that which is nippariyāyena as follows. In the former, terms are in some sense convertible, that is the meanings are not necessarily fixed or final, rather they conform to the particular circumstances or reasons (kāraṇa) that govern or motivate the particular teaching, the particular context in which they occur. In the latter, terms are used with fixed technical meanings, universally valid and not subject to the particular circumstances of their usage.

What is interesting is that the distinction between pariyāya-desanā and nippariyāya-desanā does not seem to correspond in any neat or simple way to what we now have as the four primary Nikāyas and the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. If the distinction between pariyāya-desanā and nippariyāya-desanā is seen as operating in some degree within the Nikāyas, one possible way of looking at the various developed Abhidharma systems is as representing different versions of a final form of nippariyāya desanā. The commentaries and later treatises, then, see the Nikāyas through their version of this final nippariyāya-desanā. They thus translate the terms of a particular sutta into the particular absolute and final (nippariyāyena) terms that are considered appropriate to the particular occasion for the delivery of the sutta. There are differences of judgement and interpretation between the schools, or, and this is more significant, the Pāli commentaries sometimes record different interpretations, and the traditions of various teachers without discounting them as entirely invalid. All this is, in a sense, exactly how it should be. For once the particularity of suttas is recognized, if the particularity of any given sutta is considered somehow uncertain or variable in some degree, then it is clear that a certain freedom must exist as to how exactly it is to be interpreted in terms of nippariyāya-desanā. A single sutta can then be seen as capable of operating on different levels, of being taken in different ways that are equally valid.

Returning to the Anguttara cycle of suttas that contrasts the usage of a number of terms pariyāyena with their usage nippariyāyena, we find included among those terms kāya-sakkhin, paññā-vimutta and ubhatobhoga-vimutta. As I noted above these three terms are sometimes included in a list of seven persons that also includes the saddhānusārin and dhammānusārin. In the Theravādin Abhidhamma literature and in the exegetical literature of the Sarvāstivādins these seven persons are understood as āriya-puggala/ārya-pugdala, and each one is defined in relationship to the four paths and fruits and other traits peculiar to their particular attainments or method of attainment. The significant point is then that none of the seven is thought to be less than one who has attained the path of stream-attainment.

The present Anguttara passage, however, uses the term kāya-sakkhin

\[\text{nāmā tī. At Sv I 136 Buddhaghosa states that pariyāya can mean turn (vara), teaching (desanā) and reason or cause (kāraṇa).}^{131}\] 

\[\text{Cf. the distinction already evidenced in the Nikāyas between that in which the meaning must be drawn out (neyyattha) and that in which the meaning is already drawn out (nitattha), e.g. A I 60. The distinction between conventional truth (sammuti-sacca) and absolute truth (paramattha-sacca) is also similar in kind (see Mil 160).}^{131}\]
relatively, that is pariyāyena, to indicate anyone who attains to any of the four jhānas or four formless spheres and ‘touches that sphere with his body’. The term paññā-vimutta used pariyāyena refers to anyone attaining to any of the four jhānas or formless spheres and who ‘knows that by wisdom’; the term ubhatobhāga-vimutta used pariyāyena refers to one who attains to the four jhānas or formless spheres and both ‘touches that with his body and knows it by wisdom’.

If these three terms can be used in this relative way, is it not possible that something of the same freedom applies or can apply to saddhānusārin and dhammānusārin? Translating into more general terms the definitions of the two persons provided by the Puggalapaññatti, and ignoring the stipulation concerning the ariya-māgga, the saddhānusārin is then to be considered more loosely as one whose practice is in general characterized by or based on confidence (saddhā). He is in some respects analogous to the one who develops the iddhi-pāda that is endowed with chanda-samādhi and padhāna-saṃkhāras. The dhammānusārin is one whose practice is in general characterized by or based on wisdom (pafifiii), like the one who develops the iddhi-pāda that is endowed with vimamsā-samādhi and padhāna-saṃkhāras. I do not, in fact, think that this can be regarded as the normal meaning of the two terms in question in the Nikāyas, but it does highlight something of the significance of the two terms, and provide what might be thought of as a ‘lower limit’ for their meaning. The ‘upper limit’ is provided by the definitions in the Puggalapaññatti and later literature which stress that the two terms signify ariya-puggalas. For reasons which I have already indicated, it seems to me that the usage of the terms saddhānusārin and dhammānusārin in the Nikāyas—at least in the Samyutta-nikāya—must be regarded as being fairly close to this ‘upper limit’.

At this point it seems worth drawing attention to the commentarial notion of the ‘lesser stream-attainer’ (cāla-sotāpanna, cullako sotāpanno). This notion is mentioned both in Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga and in Buddhadatta’s Abhidhamma-paṭada at the conclusion of the exposition of ‘purification by passing beyond doubt’ (kañkhā-vitaraṇa-visuddhi); in the schema of the seven purifications, then, it marks the completion of the fourth:

Now one of insight possessed of this knowledge [of the passing beyond doubt] is

132 A IV 451-2: yathā yathā ca tad āyatanam tathā tathā nam kāyena phassivā viharati ettāvatā pi kho kāya-sakkhi vutto bhagavatā pariyāyena.
133 A IV 453: paññāya ca nam pañjānāti.
134 The nippariyāyena usage of these three terms here does not seem to accord entirely with later usage, or even with usage in the Kīṭāgiri-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya. In the Anguttara passage kāya-sakkhin used nippariyāyena refers to one who attains to the cessation of consciousness and feeling and sees that the āsavas are destroyed, in addition to touching the sphere with his body. The attainment of sañcāra-nirodha and the destruction of the āsavas, of course, entail arahant-ship. However, in the Kīṭāgiri-sutta the kāya-sakkhin is one who has only destroyed some of the āsavas, which in fact does accord with the later standard definition.
135 Other terms whose pariyāyena and nippariyāyena usage is contrasted in a parallel way in this Anguttara passage include nibbāna, amatā, passaddhi and nirodhā.
136 Pugg 15.
one who has found relief in the instruction of the Buddha, one who has found a footing, one whose destiny is sure—he is called a lesser stream-attainer.\textsuperscript{137}

I have already noted how the Nikāyas generally associate the overcoming of doubt (vicikicchā) and establishing of firm saddhā with stream-attainment. Furthermore the lesser stream-attainer is also one whose destiny is assured. All this is rather reminiscent of the Nikāya definition of the saddhānusārin, dhammānusārin and sotāpanna I referred to earlier. Yet the fact remains that in terms of strict Abhidhamma one who has completed the fourth visuddhi has not finally and absolutely abandoned the three samyojanas which include doubt (vicikicchā).\textsuperscript{138}

Therefore what seems to be envisaged with the notion of the cūla-sotāpanna is that the completion of the fourth purification marks a definite beginning of the process that culminates in the path of stream-attainment proper, the lokuttara path moment. One might then put it that, loosely speaking, the path of stream-attainment extends from the conclusion of the fourth purification (i.e. the acquisition of the knowledge that causes one to pass beyond doubt) up to the seventh purification (‘by knowledge and seeing’). This perhaps can be understood as paralleled in the relationship of access concentration (upacāra-samādhi) to full absorption (appani). Just as the distinction between access and absorption is in a sense glossed over in the Nikāya concept of and usage of the term jhāna,\textsuperscript{139} so too is the distinction between the cūla-sotāpanna (= a person who is well on the way to becoming a sotāpanna) and the full sotāpanna glossed over in the Nikāya notion of the sotāpanna, saddhānusārin and dhammānusārin.

Beginning with the question of the proper significance of the five spiritual faculties within the Nikāyas, the foregoing discussion has touched on a number of important and far-reaching issues. To sum up, according to the traditions of the Theravādins—and also the Sarvāstivādins—saddhindriya, viriyindriya, satindriya, samādhindriya and paññindriya are to be normally understood as referring to saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and pañña in their generality—these five items are universally indriyas, it is not that they may merely act as indriyas at certain times, though of course they may be weaker or sharper. Within the Nikāyas this understanding seems most appropriate in the context of the extended list of indriyas, and also of the application of the samudaya, etc. formula to the five indriyas along with the six sense indriyas and five feeling indriyas.\textsuperscript{140} Other ancient traditions understand that properly speaking śraddhendriya, viryendriya, smṛtindriya, samādhindriya and prajñendriya only apply to śraddhā, viriya, smṛti, samādhi and prajñā that is associated with the lokottara mind. This seems to be largely because of the emphasis

\textsuperscript{137} Vism XIX 27: iminā pana āgatena samannāgato vipassako buddha-sāsane laddhassāso laddha-pattiṣṭho niyata-gatiko cūla-sotāpanno nāma hoti. (Cf. Abhidh-av 119).

\textsuperscript{138} Possibly in this context kankhā should be understood as doubt in its grosser manifestations and vicikicchā as rather more subtle doubt.

\textsuperscript{139} Cf. L.S. Cousins, Religion 3 (1973), p. 118.

\textsuperscript{140} According to Anesaki the version of the indriya-samūkta preserved in the Chinese Āgamas contains equivalents to the Pāli suttas that apply the samudaya, etc. formula to the indriyas; op. cit., pp. 103-4.
placed upon certain Sūtra passages that apparently treat the five spiritual faculties as the exclusive domain of the ārya-pudgala. In fact the exegetical tradition of the Theravādins is agreed that in these particular passages saddh-indriya, etc. refer exclusively to saddhā, etc. as lokuttara but regards this as a special restricted usage that does not affect the more normal usage.\textsuperscript{141}

The difference between the two traditions of interpretation should thus be seen as something of a moot point rather than involving a fundamental clash of views. It concerns the final technical significance and value of terms in the Abhidhamma/Abhidharma systems, and the underlying concern appears to be the nature of the relationship between the lokiya/lokuika and lokuttara/lokuttara mind.

8. Conclusion: the ubiquity of the indriyas in the Nikāyas

The term indriya, then, can be seen as indicating a significant characteristic of saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and paññā—a characteristic held in common with other basic items. Yet among these basic items their peculiar characteristic is that they ‘should be developed’; they represent in general what it is the bhikkhu is aiming to cultivate. Edward Conze has quite appropriately called them ‘the five cardinal virtues’,\textsuperscript{142} and it seems true to say that one cannot look very far into the Nikāyas without coming across them. Indeed it is hardly an exaggeration to say that every sutta concerns their treatment in one way or another. In view of this it is perhaps worth considering the question of the ubiquity of saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and paññā in the Nikāyas a little further.

Already in the basic treatment of the satipaṭṭhānas we have seen how the Vibhaṅga and Nettippakarana see the phrase viharati dūpipy sampajñā satimā vineyya loke abhijjhā-domanassāṁ as implying four of the five items in question, namely viriya, paññā, sati and samādhi. That the later literature should make the particular correspondences and associations that it does depends in part on direct verbal parallels (as in the case of sampajñā and paññā), but also on the association of terms in particular contexts already in the Nikāyas. There is not space to pursue this at length here but the following passage illustrates the kind of process involved:

Exertion is to be made for the non-arising of bad unskilful dhammas that have not yet arisen, exertion is to be made for the arising of skilful dhammas that have already arisen.\textsuperscript{143}

This quite obviously echoes the samma-ppadhāna formula, thus giving a quite clear precedent for the association of ātappa, and hence ātāpin, with viriya. Thus while some of the cross-references and correspondences are

\textsuperscript{141} Cf. the passage that states that the one who is completely without the indriyas should be understood as standing in the ranks of the puthujjana; Spk III 237 states that this sutta speaks only of the transcendent indriyas (imasmin sule lokuttarāṁ eva indriyāṁ kathātāṁ).

\textsuperscript{142} Conze, BTI, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{143} A I 153: antappānam pāpakānam akusalānam dhammānam anuppādāya ātappāṁ karaṇīyaṁ, antappānam kusalānam dhammānam uppādāya ātappāṁ karaṇīyaṁ.
explicit in the Nikāyas (e.g. that samma-p paddhāna is equivalent to viriya which is equivalent to samma-vāyāna) others are implicit—(e.g. that wherever one finds padahati or vāyamati or ātāpin, one can understand that viriya is implied). Reference to another passage will serve to illustrate how the 'faculties' are often stated less implicitly but still not exactly explicitly:

For me viriya was instigated and not slack; sati was established and not lost, the body tranquil and not agitated, the mind concentrated and one-pointed.\[144\]

This common set phrase is used to introduce the attainment of jhāna or some other kind of attainment leading directly to the development of paññā.

So we can say that apart from their being mentioned explicitly, talk of the five 'faculties' or 'cardinal virtues' is scattered throughout the Nikāyas—they are repeatedly referred to either by name or by associated terminology. As a further illustration of the way in which the 'faculties' pervade the Nikāyas it is worth turning to the Suttanipāta. The ancient canonical commentary—the Niddesa—establishes at least certain portions of the Suttanipāta as among the oldest Buddhist works we possess. It has sometimes been suggested that, being uncluttered by the various 'scholastic' lists found elsewhere in the Nikāyas, the Suttanipāta preserves an older and purer 'ethical' Buddhism.\[145\] While it is true that none of the seven sets is explicitly mentioned it does not seem to follow that the Buddhism of the Suttanipāta has a radically different character from that of the four primary Nikāyas as a whole. The Buddhism of the Suttanipāta once more centres around letting go of the world of the five senses, developing jhāna and coming to the highest wisdom. The following are some Suttanipāta verses that succinctly sum up the Buddhist path in terms of the familiar 'cardinal virtues':

Confidence is the seed, perseverance is the rain, wisdom is my yoke and plough, fear of blame is the pole, mind is the (yoke-)tie, mindfulness is my ploughshare and goad.

One who is always accomplished in virtue, having wisdom, well-concentrated, thinking inwardly, mindful, crosses the flood which is hard to cross.

By confidence one crosses the flood, by heedfulness the ocean, by strength one goes beyond suffering, by wisdom one is purified.

One with the power of wisdom, accomplished in conduct and vow, concentrated, delighting in jhāna, mindful, freed from clinging, without bareness, without the influxes—him the wise understand as a sage.

There is confidence and thus strength; wisdom too is found in me. Why do you question me about life though my heart is thus intent on endeavour?

When blood dries up, bile and phlegm dry up; when flesh withers, the mind becomes more settled, mindfulness, wisdom and concentration stand more firm.

Controlling his desire for these things [i.e. the objects of the senses], mindful and

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\[144\] M 1 21, 117, 186, 243; III 85-7; S IV 125; V 68, 76, 331-2, etc. (see PTC, s.v. āraddha): āraddham kho pana me viriyam ahosi asaññan, upaṭṭhita satti asamaññātha, passaddho kāyo asāraddho, samāhitam cittan ekaggam.

well freed a bhikkhu, correctly investigating dhamma at the appropriate time, [his mind] unified [in meditation], should destroy darkness.

Know that ignorance is the head; knowledge is what splits the head when joined with confidence, mindfulness and concentration, and with purpose and strength.\(^{146}\)

9. The balas

In the context of the seven sets the balas are, it turns out, exactly the same items as the five indriyas, namely saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and pañña, only this time considered as ‘powers’ (balas) rather than indriyas. The Nikāya definitions of saddhā-bala, etc. correspond exactly to those of saddhindriya, etc.\(^{147}\) Like indriya, though, the term bala is applied to a whole series of items in addition to saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and pañña. However, a standard and fixed extended list of balas, comparable to the list of the twenty-two indriyas, does not seem to have evolved. The bala-kattā of the Paṭisambhidā-magga\(^{148}\) states that there are a total of sixty-eight balas. This list consists of various groups of balas most of which are to be found in the four primary Nikāyas, and appears to be an attempt to bring together all important items that are or can be termed bala. However, this composite list of sixty-eight balas appears to be peculiar to the Paṭisambhidā-magga, and certainly cannot be thought of as standard for ancient Buddhism in the same way as the twenty-two indriyas, although many—if not all—of the sub-groups were quite probably common to all Buddhist schools. What seems clear is that in its wider application the term bala is much less technical than indriya. Of the seven sets, the balas appear to be the least frequently mentioned in the Nikāyas, and—outside the context of the seven sets—exhibit a certain looseness. A list of seven balas adding ‘shame’ (hiri) and ‘regard for consequence’ (ottappa) is found in a number of places,\(^{149}\) while the list can also be reduced to four by the omission of pañña,\(^{150}\) or to two, leaving just sati-bala and samādhi-bala.\(^{151}\)

Other balas mentioned in the Nikāyas include such things as ‘the power of


\(^{147}\) Cf. the definition of the respective indriyas at S V 196-7, with those of the balas at A III 10-1; IV 3-4.

\(^{148}\) Paṭiś 168-76.

\(^{149}\) D III 253; A IV 3-4; cf. D III 282; the Dhammasangani seems to work with this list of seven balas as standard, see Chapter 10.3.

\(^{150}\) D III 229.

\(^{151}\) D III 213.
examination’ (*paṭisamkhāna-bala*), and ‘the power of development’ (*bhāvanā-bala*). Apart from such spiritual *balas* there are lists such as the five *balas* of womankind, namely the powers of beauty, wealth, relatives, sons and virtue. A *bala*, then, can be any kind of power, strength or strong point.

So why in the list of seven sets are the same five items given twice, first as ‘faculties’ and then as ‘powers’? Étienne Lamotte comments: ‘En effet on a toujours reconnu qu’entre *bala* et *indriya* il n’y a qu’une différence d’intensité.’ However, the *indriya-saṃyutta* passage from which he gives a brief quotation is rather obscure. The passage is worth quoting more fully along with the accompanying simile:

There is, *bhikkhus*, a method according to which the five *indriyas* are the five *balas*, and the five *balas* are the five *indriyas*. And what is that method ... ? That which is *saddhindriya* is *saddhā-bala*, that which is *saddhā-bala* is *saddhindriya* ... that which is *pañhindriya* is *pañī-bala*, that which is *pañī-bala* is *pañhindriya*. It is as if, *bhikkhus*, there were a river flowing, inclining and sliding eastwards, and in the middle an island. There is a method according to which the stream of that river is counted as just one. Then again there is a method according to which the stream of that river is counted as two. And what, *bhikkhus*, is the method according to which the stream of that river is counted as just one? In that there is both water to the eastern end of the island and water to the western end of the island ... And what, *bhikkhus*, is the method according to which the stream of that river is counted as two? In that there is both water to the northern side of the island, and water to the southern side of the island ... 

This explanation would appear to have nothing to do with degrees of intensity. The point of the image seems to be that if one stands on the island facing east, the water in front is the same as the water behind, and so from this point of view there is only one stream; on the other hand there is water flowing on either side, and so from this point of view there are two streams. In fact the Nikāyas tell us no more about the nature of the difference between *saddhā*, etc.

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152 D III 213, 244: A I 52, 94; II 142.
153 The *khīnasava-balas* will be discussed in more detail as they concern in part the seven sets; see Chapter 7.
154 E.g. M I 69; A V 32-3.
155 S IV 246-8.
156 Lamotte, *Traité*, III 1127.
157 S V 219-20: *atthi bhikkhave pariyyāyo yaṃ pariyyāyaṃ āgamaṃ yānī pañcindriyāṇā tānī pañīca-balāṇi honti yānī pañīca-balāṇā tānī pañcindriyāṇā honti. katamo ca bhikkhave pariyyāyo ... yaṃ bhikkhave saddhindriyam tam saddhā-balānam, yaṃ saddhā-balānam tam saddhindriyam ... yaṃ pañhindriyam tam pañī-balānam yaṃ pañī-balānam tam pañhindriyam. seyyathāpi bhikkhave nadi pañcina-nimā pañicā-ponā pañicā-pabbhāhā, tassā majhhe dīpo. atthi bhikkhave pariyyāyo yaṃ pariyyāyaṃ āgamaṃ tassā nadiyā eko soto tveva samkhyaṃ gacchati. atthi pana bhikkhave pariyyāyo yaṃ pariyyāyaṃ āgamaṃ tassā nadiyā dve sotāni tveva samkhyaṃ gacchanti, katamo ca bhikkhave pariyyāyo yaṃ pariyyāyaṃ āgamaṃ tassā nadiyā eko soto tveva samkhyaṃ gacchanti. yaṃ ca bhikkhave tassa dippassā purathimante udakāṃ yaṃ ca pacchimante udakāṃ ... katamo ca bhikkhave pariyyāyo yaṃ pariyyāyaṃ āgamaṃ tassā nadiyā dve sotāni tveva samkhyaṃ gacchanti. yaṃ ca bhikkhave tassa dippassā uttarante udakāṃ yaṃ ca dakkhiṇante udakāṃ. (Anesaki does not record a parallel to the sutta in the Chinese *Samyuktāgama.*)
as an indriya and a bala than can be deduced from the terms indriya and bala themselves.

Before pursuing the question of the distinction between indriya and bala in the later literature it may be as well to refer to the general significance and usage of bala and its derivatives within the Nikāyas:

Just as a strong man (balavā puriso) might stretch out his folded arm, or might fold his stretched out arm, so Brahmā Sahampati disappeared from the Brahmā World and appeared before me.158

Just as a strong man grasping a weaker man (dubbalataram purisam) by the head or shoulders might hold him down, subdue him and completely overcome him, so that bhikkhu, gritting his teeth and pressing his tongue against his palate, should mentally hold down his mind, subdue it and completely overcome it.159

Just as, Aggivessana, two strong men grasping a weak man by the arms might torture and torment him in a pit of burning coals, so when breathing in and out was completely stopped by way of mouth, nose and throat my body was in excessive pain.160

These images illustrate how something powerful (balavant) completely overcomes and overrides something that is weaker, so that the latter is powerless to resist. Put simply, a bala would seem to be anything that has this capacity. It would not seem unreasonable to view a bala as an indriya made strong.

One of the earliest statements of the distinction between indriya and bala in the Pāli sources would appear to be found in the Paṭisambhidāmagga:

The meaning of saddhindriya is to be directly known as commitment, the meaning of viriyindriya as taking on, the meaning of satindriya as standing near, the meaning of samindriya as non-distraction, the meaning of paññindriya as seeing. The meaning of saddhā-bala is to be directly known as unshakeability with regard to lack of confidence, the meaning of viriya-bala as unshakeability with regard to idleness, the meaning of sati-bala as unshakeability with regard to heedlessness, the meaning of samādhi-bala as unshakeability with regard to excitement, the meaning of paññā-bala as unshakeability with regard to ignorance. . .

The meaning of the indrias is to be directly known as overlordship. The meaning of the balas is to be directly known as unshakeability.161

Again, while this is not explicit it would seem reasonable to view the balas

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158 M I 168: aha kho bhikkhave brahmā sahampati seyyathāpi nāma balavā puriso samiñjītam vā bāham pasāreyya pasāritam vā bāham samiñjeyya evam evam brahma-loke antara-hito mama purato pāturahosi.
159 M I 121: seyyathāpi bhikkhave balavā puriso dubbalataram purisam sīse vā gahetvā khandhe vā gahetvā abhinigganheyya abhinippileyya abhisantāpeyya evam eva kho ... tena bhikkhave bhikkhu-nā danethi dantam ādhāya jivhotvā tāhuṃ āhacca cetasā cītaṃ abhinigganhitabham abhinippile-tabham abhisantāpetabham.
160 M I 244: seyyathāpi Aggivessana dve balavanto purisā dubbalataram purisam nāna-bāhāsu gahetvā angāra-kāsāya santāpeyyum samparitāpeyyum evam eva kho me Aggivessana mukhato ca nasato ca kamato ca assāsa-passāsesu uparuddhesu adhimatto kāyasmin dāho hoti.
161 Paṭis I 16-7: saddhindriyassa adhimokkaññho abhiññeyyo, viriyindriyassa paggahaññho ... satindriyassa upaṭṭhānatto ... samādhindriyassa avikkekhaññho ... paññindriyassa dassanatto ... saddhā-balassā saddadhiye akampiyaññho abhiññeyyo, viriya-balassa kosajje ... sati-balassa pamāde ... samādhi-balassa uddhace ... paññā-balassa avijjāya ... indriyanam adhipateyyaññho abhiññeyyo, balānam akampiyaññho abhiññeyyo. (Cf. Paṭis I 21; II 119-20.)
freedom from being shaken by the their opposite qualities as equivalent to a firm establishment or increased power of the indriyas.

The treatment of the indriyas and balas in the Dhammasaṅgani is also suggestive of the distinction between them being seen as a matter of relative power. We are told in the initial determination of dhammas present—the commentarial niddesa-vāra—for the first kiriya mind-consciousness element (mano-viññāna-dhātu) that there is samādhindriya and viriyindriya, but no mention is made of samādhi-bala and viriya-bala. In the subsequent explanation of each dhamma—the uddesa-vāra—samādhi-bala and viriya-bala are, however, included in the appropriate registers of terms, (i.e. for cittass'ekaggatā, samādhindriya and viriyindriya). The initial omission of the two balas would seem to mean that an item might be counted an indriya without its being counted a bala. Once again the reason would surely be because an indriya is weaker than a bala. However, the subsequent inclusion of samādhi-bala and viriya-bala is odd. It is tempting to think that the text is corrupt: either the two balas should be in both places or they should be omitted altogether. Yet the text as we have it existed already in ancient times. Buddhaghosa gives the following explanation:

Now in the niddesa-vāra, because this [citta] is stronger than the remaining cittas without motivation, cittekaggatā is obtained and stated as samādhi-bala; viriya is also obtained as viriya-bala. But because in the uddesa-vāra there is no tradition [for reading] 'there is samādhi-bala, there is viriya-bala', this pair are not called 'powers' in the full sense. Since [this citta] is neither skilful nor unskilful it is not stated saying 'power'. And since without regard for exposition there is no 'power', in the samgaha-vāra too it is not said that there are two powers.

An understanding of the balas as essentially the indriyas made strong certainly seems to underlie Buddhaghosa’s comments here. The tradition he is following is perhaps that of the Nettippakaraṇa, which in fact explicitly states that ‘these same faculties under the influence of strength become powers’. Elsewhere the attha kathās seem to base themselves on the Paṭisambhidāmagga tradition. The following three passages from the Pāli commentaries all briefly deal with the distinctive characteristics first of indriyas then of bala:

Indriya is in the sense of overlordship understood as overcoming as a result of overcoming distrust, laziness, heedlessness, distraction and confusion; bala is in the sense of unshakeability as a result of not being overcome by distrust and the rest.

162 For this in general, see Chapter 10.3.
163 This is the kiriya-mano-viññāna-dhātu accompanied by somanassa and termed 'laughter producing' (hāsayamāna) at As 294.
164 Dhs 121.
165 As 295: niddesa-vāre pa'assa sesa-ahetuka-cittehi balavatāratiyā cittekaggatā samādhi-balām pāpetvā šhapitā. [viriyaṃ pi viriya-balām pāpetvā.] uddesa-vāre pana samādhi-balām hoti viriya-balām hoṭī ti anāgatattā paripuṇṇena balaththen'etan dwayāṃ balām nāma na hoti. yasmā pana neva kulānaṁ nākusalaṁ tasmā balān ti vatvā [na] šhapitam. yasmā ca na nippariyāyena balam tasmā samgaha-vāre pi dve balāni hoṭī ti na vetum. (This does not entirely agree with Buddhaddatta’s understanding; at Abhidh-av 31 he states that there are two cittas that have two balas; if one works this out he must be referring to the two kiriya-mano-viññāna-dhātus; see below, pp. 358-60)
166 Nett 100: tāni yeva indriyāni viriya-vasena balāni bhavanti.
They are both fivefold by way of *saddhā*, etc. Therefore five *indriyas* and five *balas* are spoken of.\textsuperscript{167}

With regard to the words beginning 'he develops *saddhindriya*', *saddhindriya* means that *saddhā* itself, with *saddhā* responsible, performs the purpose of a lord. This same method applies to *viriya* and the rest ... As for *saddhā-bala*, etc., *saddhā-bala* means that just *saddhā* is a *bala* in the sense of unshakeability. This same method applies to *viriya-bala* and the rest. For here *saddhā* is not shaken by distrust, *viriya* is not shaken by laziness, *sati* is not shaken by lost mindfulness, *samādhi* is not shaken by agitation, *pañña* is not shaken by ignorance.\textsuperscript{168}

'Five *indriyas*’—the five *indriyas* beginning with *saddhā*; *saddhindriya* means that having overcome distrust it performs the purpose of a lord in the manner of commitment; [*viriyindriya*] having overcome laziness performs the task of a lord in the manner of taking on; [*satindriya*] having overcome heedlessness performs the task of a lord in the manner of standing near; [*samādhindriya*] having overcome distraction performs the task of a lord in the manner of non-distraction; *paññindriya* means that having overcome ignorance it performs the task of a lord in the manner of seeing. Just these should be understood as *balas* in the sense of unshakeability as a result of not being overcome by distrust and the rest, by virtue of their strength.\textsuperscript{169}

As in the *indriya-samyutta* passage, these explanations do not hinge on the difference of intensity between *indriya* and *bala*. A little reflection reveals that, in fact, this has to be the case. These commentarial explanations take as their ideal point of reference the transcendent (*lokuttara*) mind at the moment of path when all thirty-seven bodhipakkhiya-dhammas can be said to be present in a single arising of consciousness (*cittuppāda*). Thus it is precisely the same *saddhā* that is considered as both *indriya* and *bala*, and not two differentarisings of *saddhā*, the first of which might be weak and the second strong. Accordingly the commentaries appear to see the difference between *indriya* and *bala* essentially in terms of the former being active and the latter being passive: as an active force the *indriya* acts as a lord and overcomes or displaces its opposite force; conversely as a passive power the *bala* as a result of its strength cannot be overcome by its opposite.

Turning to the explanations provided in the north Indian treatises, however, the available sources seem agreed that the distinction between *indriya* and *bala*

\textsuperscript{167} Buddhaghosa at Vism XXII 37: *asaddhiyaka-sajas-pamāda-vikkhepa-samdhānavā appabhavato abhiphavāna-samkhātena adhipatiyaśṭhena indriyaṃ. assaddhiyādhī ca abhiphavānyātato akampiyatthena balaṃ. tad uwhāyam pi saddhādiyasena pañca-visdhita hoti tasmā pañciindriyāni pañca balaṃ ti vuccanti.*

\textsuperscript{168} Buddhaghosa at Mp II 50-1: *saddhindriyaṃ bhāveti ti ādiṣṇa saddhā va attano saddhā-dhuraṇa indattham karoti saddhindriyāṃ. viriyindriyādiṣṇa pi es'eva nayo ... saddhā-baladīṣṇa saddhā yeva akampiyatthena balan ti saddhā-balāṃ. viriya-baladīṣṇa pi es'eva nayo. ettha hi saddhā abhisuddhena na kampati viriyam kosajjena na kampati sati muṭṭha-sacceṇa na kampati samādhī uddhaccena na kampati paññā avijjāya na kampati.*

\textsuperscript{169} Dhammapāla at Ud-a 305: *pañciindriyāni ti saddhādīmi pañciindriyāni. tattha assaddhiyam abhiphavīvā adhimokkhe-lakkhane indattham karoti ti saddhindriyāṃ. kosajjaṃ abhiphavīvā paggaha-lakkhaṇa pamādaṃ abhiphavīvā upaṭṭhāna-lakkhaṇe vikkhepaṃ abhiphavīvā avikkhepa-lakkhane aṭṭhāṇam abhiphavīvā dassana-lakkhane indatthām karoti ti paññindriyāṃ. tāni yeva assadhiyādhī ca abhiphavānyātato akampiyatthena sampayutta-dhammesu thira-bhāvāna balān ti veditabbeṇī.*
is one of intensity. The following extract from the commentary to the *Arthavāniścaya-sūtra* is a clear statement of the matter:

Just the five *indriyas*, śraddhā, etc., when they are strong are called *balas* ... since, as a result of there being no attack in the interim by their opposites (distrust, laziness, lost mindfulness, distraction, and lack of clear comprehension), they are not overwhelmed, therefore they are called *balas*. But the *indriyas*, as a result of persistent attack by their five opposites, are overwhelmed, therefore they are called *indriyas* due to the fact that their opposites are undefeated.170

As in the case of the Pāli commentaries, the explanations of the distinction between *indriya* and *bala* in the north Indian texts might be seen as reflecting the particular application of the seven sets in Abhidharma. As I shall discuss in more detail below, the northern Abhidharma treatises—at least those within the broad tradition of the Sarvāstivādins—understand each of the seven sets as characteristic of successive stages of the path. So according to the *Abhidharma-kośa* the *indriyas* characterize the stage of acceptance (kṣānti), while the *balas* characterize the next stage, that which immediately precedes the *lokottara-dārśana-mārga*, namely *laukikāgra-dharma*, the highest form of ordinary non-transcendent mind.171

In practice the distinction between the explanation in the Pāli commentaries and north Indian sources would appear to be quite subtle. For while it is thought appropriate, according to the Theravāda, to apply the term *indriya* to saddhā, etc. more or less in their generality,172 it does appear from the *Dhammasaṅgani* and *Nettipakarana* that the term *bala* is not so universally applicable. Both explanations emphasize that the significance of the term *bala* lies in its indicating that an item is unshakeable or unassailable by its opposites; in practice this understanding would seem to be best interpreted as indicating that the difference between an *indriya* and *bala* is one of strength or force.

170 *Artha* 226-7: tāny eva śraddhādāni pañcendriyāni balavanti balāny ucyante ... yasmāt tad-vipakṣaṁ asraddhā-kauśidya-muṣṭā-laṁkṣaṁ-vikṣepāṁ prajāyaṁ antaraṁ samudācāraṁ bhavat tāṁ nāvanṛgyante, tasmād balāny ucyante. indriyāṁ punaṁ tad-vipakṣaṁ pañcabhir antarāntarāṁ samudācārāṁ avamṛgyante, tasmād anitṛjitam vikṣepatvāṁ indriyāṁ ucyante. (According to Abhid-h Trsl 140 the *indriyas* when they are weak (mṛdu) are called *indriyas*, but when they are sharp (tiṣṇa) they are called *balas*; Satya Trsl 43 states that the *indriyas* being further developed become strong and are therefore called *balas*; Abhidh-sam Trsl 122 states that the *balas* are to be understood as the *indriyas*, but they are *balas* because they destroy and remove the dangers which are opposed to them, and because of distinction; Amṛta Trsl 206 states that when the *indriyas* are weak (mṛdu) they are *indriyas*, when they are great (adhimātra) they are *balas*.)

171 See Chapter 10.6.

172 Certain exceptions to the rule are found in Dhs (see Chapter 10).
CHAPTER FIVE

THE FACTORS OF AWAKENING

I. The bare list

Like the five indriyas and balas, the bojjhangas or ‘factors of awakening’ are a list of seven distinct items: the awakening-factor of mindfulness (sati-sambojhaṅga), the awakening-factor of discrimination of dhamma (dhamma-vicaya-sambojhaṅga), the awakening-factor of strength (viriya-sambojhaṅga), the awakening-factor of joy (piti-sambojhaṅga), the awakening-factor of tranquillity (paccaddhi-sambojhaṅga), the awakening-factor of concentration (samaddhi-sambojhaṅga), the awakening-factor of equipoise (upekkhā-sambojhaṅga).

In the Nikāyas this bare list occurs quite regularly with or without the appellation satta bojjharigā in a number of contexts. Some of those contexts can be regarded as of a general nature and not necessarily specific to the bojjharigas; that is, they fit the kind of treatment common to the seven sets as a whole and found especially in the mahā-vagga of the Sānyutta-Nikāya. Possibly more distinctive is the citing of the seven bojjharigas in connection with the conditions that prevent decline (aparihāṇyā dhammā) and the sixteen ‘unsurpassables’ (ānuttarīyā) of the Buddha:

In so far as bhikkhus shall continue to develop sati-sambojhaṅga ... upekkhā-sambojhaṅga, growth can be expected for bhikkhus and not decline. In the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta the Buddha gives in all five sets of seven aparihāṇyā dhammā (of which the bojjharigas are the fourth), and finally a set of six. The Mulasarvāstivādin Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra gives six sets of seven aparihāṇyā dharmā (of which the bodhi-āngas are the sixth) and one set of six (see Waldschmidt, MPS 128). Bareau discusses the different lists of aparihāṇyā dharmā in the various extant versions of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra at RBB, I1 32-9; seven of the eight versions include the bodhi-āngas.

However, the singling out of the bojjhangas in this context is perhaps largely a result of their being seven of them: it seems that aparihāṇyā dhammā come in groups of seven. In the Sampasădanīya-sutta Sāriputta lists sixteen ways in which the Buddha is unsurpassable. Seventh in the list is this:

Moreover this is unsurpassable, namely how the Blessed One teaches dhamma with regard to the highest matters—these seven bojjhangas: sati-sambojhaṅga ... upekkhā-sambojhaṅga. This is what is unsurpassable with regard to the highest matters, lord.
The usage of the term *padhāna* (‘highest matter’) is rather odd here. I have taken it in the sense of ‘most important or principal item’. This is clearly a possible meaning but not one favoured by the commentary here. One should also note at this point that while the seven items are individually consistently cited as *sambojjhāgas*, collectively they are always *bojjhaṅgas*. This suggests that in general no significance should be attached to the variation *bojjhaṅga/sambojjhāga*.

Aside from the bare list of seven *bojjhaṅgas*, there are two formulaic treatments of the *bojjhaṅgas* of some importance. The first of these is the application of the ‘viveka-nissita formula’ to the list of *bojjhaṅgas*, and the second is what I term the ‘bojjhaṅga process formula’. Before turning to these, however, I wish to consider the four terms that, among the seven sets, are peculiar to the *bojjhaṅgas*: *dhamma-vicaya, piti, passaddhi, upekkhā*.

2. Dhamma, dhammas and dhamma-vicaya

The awakening-factor of *dhamma-vicaya* or ‘discrimination of dhammas’ is directly related to wisdom in the Nikāyas:

> When a bhikkhu, dwelling mindful in this way, discriminates, inspects, applies investigation by means of wisdom to that dhamma, then the awakening-factor of dhamma-discrimination is instigated for that bhikkhu.

Whatever discriminates, examines, applies investigation by means of wisdom among *dhammas* that are within, this is the awakening-factor of dhamma-discrimination. Whatever discriminates, examines, applies investigation by means of wisdom among *dhammas* that are without, this is the awakening-factor of dhamma-discrimination.

This correspondence of *pañña* and *dhamma-vicaya* is taken up in the early Abhidhamma literature. I have already pointed out that, as an indriya, *pañña* is conveniently related to the seeing of the four noble truths. But the notion of *dhamma-vicaya* raises a further issue. The issue is one that I have in fact already passed over once in dealing with *dhammesu dhammcinupassanci* or ‘watching dhamma with regard to dhammas’, which is a convenient rendering that can be paralleled with ‘watching feeling with regard to feelings’ (*vedanāsu vedanānupassanā*). What we are concerned with, then, is the relationship between the notions of *dhamma* and *dhammas*. In the first quotation above what ‘that dhamma’ (tam dhammam) refers to is not entirely clear. In the

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7 Sv III 891: ‘Here, by virtue of endeavouring, the seven bojjhaṅgas are spoken of as “endeavours”’. (idha padhāna-vasena satta bojjhaṅgā padhāna ti vuttā.)
8 A stock verse (S V 24 = A V 233 = 253 = Dhp 89), however, talks of those whose minds are well cultivated in the *sambodhiyaṅgas* (*yesam sambodhiyaṅgesu samā-cittam subhāvītām*).
9 M III 85; S V 331; cf. Vibh 227. For Pāli text see below, p. 169, n. 123.
10 S V 111: ‘yad api bhikkhave ajjhattam dhammesu paññāya pavicinatī paviccariṇī parivāmamsam āpajjati tad api dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhango, yad api bhihddhā dhammesu paññāya pavicinatī pavicarati parivāmamsam āpajjati tad api dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhango. (Cf. Vibh 228.)
11 E.g. Dhs 11.
12 Vibh-a 312 refers tam dhammad to the initial sati-sambojjhaṅga paragraph of the ‘process’ formula, the Vibhanga version of which differs slightly from the Nikāya version; cf. M III 85-6 and Vibh 227.
second quotation *dhamma-vicaya* seems to be taken unambiguously as 'discrimination of *dhammas*'. Similarly the *Petakopadesa* glosses *dhamma-vicaya-sambojhaṅga* as 'discrimination of *dhammas*' (*dhammānāṃ pavicayena*). Yet in what sense would the discrimination of *dhamma* be something different from the discrimination of *dhammas*?

The scholarly literature on the notion of *dhamma/dharma* in Buddhist thought is, not surprisingly, fairly extensive. Perhaps one of the best succinct yet still sufficiently comprehensive accounts is found in Edward Conze's *Buddhist Thought in India*. The Buddhist usage of the word 'dharma', Conze notes, is 'ambiguous and multivalent'. He goes on to distinguish seven 'philosophically important' meanings which may be summarized as: (i) (a) transcendent reality (*nirvāṇa*), (b) 'order of law of the universe', (c) a truly real event ('things as seen when Dharma is taken as norm'), (d) mental percepts (*dharmāyatana*), (e) characteristic or property (e.g. *vaya-dharma*); (ii) moral law, right behaviour; (iii) the texts of the Buddhist tradition (i.e. the preceding as interpreted in the Buddha's teaching). In conclusion Conze comments:

> Frequently it is not at all easy to determine which one of these various meanings is intended in a given case ... This applies to such terms as 'Dharma-body', 'Dharma-eye', the 'analytical knowledge of Dharma', the 'investigation *(pravīcaya)* into dharma(s)' ... And once the Mahāyāna had identified the causally interrelated dharmas with the one and only Dharma, the very distinction between 'dharma' and 'dharmas' had to be abandoned.\(^{15}\)

Conze, then, identifies various nuances of the word *dharma* and also suggests that the different nuances are by no means mutually exclusive. Conze finally points out that any difference in interpretation between the schools is 'more one of emphasis than of opinion'.\(^{16}\) Indeed, it seems to me that the identification of 'causally interrelated dharmas with the one and only Dharma' must be considered virtually complete already in the Nikāyas. It is this question that I wish to consider in relationship to *dhamma-vicaya-sambojhaṅga* (and also *dhammesu dhammaṅupassanā*).

It is probably true to say that the relationship between *dhamma* and *dhammas* in the early literature has been insufficiently examined by modern scholarship. This is in part the result of a tendency to view *dhammas* as the exclusive domain of the later Abhidhamma literature,\(^{17}\) both canonical and

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\(^{14}\) Conze, *BTI*, pp. 92-6 The early classic work on 'dhamma' is M. and W. Geiger's *Pāli Dhamma vornehmlich in der kanonischen Literatur*, Munich, 1921. The *PED* article on *dhamma* is still of considerable interest as is, of course, Th. Stecherbatsky's *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "dharma"*, London, 1923. See also A.K. Warder, 'Dharmas and Data', *JIP* 1 (1971), pp. 272-95; A. Hirakawa, 'The Meaning of "dharma" and "abhidharma"', *Mélanges Lamotte*, pp. 159-75; Nāṇamoli (Vism Trsl VII n. 1, VIII n. 68) also makes some important observations. The most comprehensive account of 'dhamma' from the point of view of the Pāli sources is J.R. Carter, *Dhamma*, Tokyo, 1978; for further bibliographical references see Carter and Conze.

\(^{15}\) Id., p. 94.

\(^{16}\) Id., p. 95.

\(^{17}\) Carter, *Dhamma*, p. 48, draws attention to the debate among modern scholars concerning
commentarial. The assumption is that the dhammas of the Abhidhamma constitute a scholastic elaboration somewhat removed in spirit and time from the ‘original’ dhamma of the Buddha. In fact, of course, the four primary Nikāyas themselves use the word dhamma in the plural quite freely. While the notion of dhammas in the later literature is clearly more developed than in the Nikāyas, it is important to take the Nikāya usage of dhamma (plural) seriously.

A.K. Warder has provided a brief survey of the Nikāya usage of dhamma (plural)\(^\text{18}\) and has commented:

> The four old Nikāyas are not as clear about dhamma meaning an “element” as is the Abhidhamma. They seem instead to offer discussion using the word a little more freely, apparently without defining it, out of which the precise concept of the Abhidhamma might have been extracted.\(^\text{19}\)

In discussing the notion of a dhamma in the Nikāyas, one ought, perhaps, to be quite clear about the ‘precise concept’ of the Abhidhamma. This is where our difficulties start, for is the Abhidhamma literature as clear about a dhamma as an ‘element’ as Warder here suggests? While Warder himself does find difficulties with ‘element’ as a translation and eventually prefers ‘principle’, he does at one point feel able to characterize the notion of dhammas as yielding:

a theory of elements in the sense of irreducibles, as in chemistry, which was propounded in the Abhidhamma and commentarial tradition of the Sthaviravāda school eventually as a theory of a finite number, less than 100, of elements which accounted for all experience in the universe.\(^\text{20}\)

As Warder freely acknowledges, this understanding of what a dhamma is, is largely based on Stcherbatsky’s pioneering study of the concept of a dharma according to the Vaibhāṣikas and as revealed in the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu. This conception focuses on a dharma as svabhāva and svālaksana, that is to say, on a dharma as that which has an essential nature and characteristic peculiar to itself making it an irreducible (dravya).\(^\text{21}\) However, it is not self-evident that this conception is simply transferable to the Pāli canonical Abhidhamma.

The Dhammasaṅgaṇī cannot really be considered an enumeration of irreducible elements. In answer to its own initial question (‘Which dhammas are skilful?’) the text goes on to list fifty-six items, commenting at the close of the list: ‘these dhammas are skilful.’\(^\text{22}\) Yet these fifty-six items are clearly not to be taken as irreducible. On the contrary the definitions of these items that the Dhammasaṅgaṇī provides show that a number of them are essentially equiva-

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\(^{18}\) JIP 1 (1971), pp. 276-86.

\(^{19}\) Id., p. 278.

\(^{20}\) Id., pp. 289-90.

\(^{21}\) A. Hirakawa, op. cit., pp. 161, 169-70. The term dravya is used, for example, in the context of the thirty-seven bodhi-pāṇḍita dhammā to indicate that they are reducible to ten dravyas (Abhidh-k 383). A Pāli equivalent to dravya does not appear to be found in this connection.

\(^{22}\) Dhs 9: katame dhammā kusalā ... ime dhammā kusalā.
In this way the list of fifty-six can be reduced to twenty-eight.23 Obviously, in indicating that certain dhāmas can be defined in terms common to others, the Dhammasaṅgani shows that it works with some notion of an essential characteristic and nature that particular dhāmas share. But it is not clear that this essential nature necessarily defines what a dhāma is. For the Dhammasaṅgani there does seem to be a sense in which saddhā-bala and saddhindriya remain distinct dhāmas. In the final analysis all this means, perhaps, is that, from the point of view of the commentarial tradition the Dhammasaṅgani, although an Abhidhamma work, uses a notion of dhāma that is still ‘by way of exposition’ (pariyāyena) rather than ‘not by way of exposition’ (nippariyāyena).

Yet this is possibly to underestimate the subtlety of the notion of a dhāma. In this regard one must guard against losing sight of the fact that a dhāma is a mental event or happening rather than an inert substance; its essential nature is dynamic rather than static. Thus in order to define a dhāma one must determine not so much what it is, as what it does. In one sense, then, dhāmas are the different capacities or capabilities of mental events. Once we begin to view dhāmas in this way, it seems to me, that the distinction between saddhindriya and saddhā-bala, say, is at once more real and intelligible.

Even when the Atthasālīṇī does explain the Dhammasaṅgani’s notion of a dhāma by way of sabhāva, it is not clear that this is precisely the same svabhāva that the northern tradition uses:

They are dhāmas because they uphold their own self-existence. They are dhāmas because they are upheld by conditions or they are upheld according to their own-nature.24

When the first of the great skilful cittas of the kāmāvacara arises, at that time the fifty-plus dhāmas that have arisen by way of factors of citta are just dhāmas in the sense of self-existents. Thus there is no other being, existence, man or person.25

As I have just pointed out, the first kind of citta analyzed in the Dhammasaṅgani precisely does not consist of fifty-plus dhāmas each having its own essential nature. Thus the force of sabhāva here appears to focus not so much on the essential nature of particular dhāmas, but rather on the fact that there is no being or person apart from dhāmas; dhāmas are what exist.26

It may well be that in the final analysis the tendency to understand a dhāma as that which has its own particular and exclusive nature is what

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23 Cf. Vism XIV 133.
24 As 39: attano pana sabhāvaṃ dhāreni ti dhāmā, dhāriyanti vā paccayehi dhāriyanti vā yathā sabhāvato ti dhāmā.
25 As 155: yasmin samaye kāmāvacaram pathhamahā-kusala-cittam uppaṭjati, tasmām samaye cittangā-vasena uppanā atireka-paññāsa dhāmā sabhāvatthena dhāmā eva honti. na añño koci satto vā bhāvo vā piso vā puggalo vā hoti ti.
26 The earliest usage of sabhāva in Pāli sources is even more problematic. Pet 104 explains hetu as the sabhāva of a dhāma (i.e. it acts as a cause for other dhāmas) and paccaya as its parabhāva (i.e. other dhāmas act as conditions for its occurrence); in fact this understanding seems to underlie the first As passage quoted above. According to Paṭis 178-9 dhāmas are ‘empty by self-existence’ (sabhāvena suññā). Cf. Warder’s comments, Paṭis Trsl xvii-xviii, xxvi-xxvii; Paṭis-a III 634-5; Paṭis Trsl 362 (n.).
prevails in Buddhist thought—this is what should define a dhamma ‘without regard for exposition’. But this important topic is rather incidental to the present study. The point I wish to make, however, is that the usage of the word dhamma (in the plural) remains in the Nikāyas, canonical Abhidhamma, and even to some extent in the commentarial tradition, a somewhat ambiguous and multivalent term. Its precise understanding continues to be elusive and defies rigid or fixed definition. Possibly this is no accident and the texts delight in the very fluidity of the term.

In the Nikāyas, the question of the relationship between dhamma and dhhammas is perhaps most easily seen with reference to paṭicca-samuppāda.27 It is stated in the Nikāyas that he who sees paṭicca-samuppāda sees dhamma, and that he who sees dhamma sees paṭicca-samuppāda.28 This is in fact a very succinct statement of the principle involved, for what is paṭicca-samuppāda apart from the interrelatedness of dhhammas? To see dhhammas is to see their interrelatedness; to see their interrelatedness is to see dhamma. One might rephrase the Nikāya saying, then, as: ‘He who sees dhhammas sees dhamma; he who sees dhamma sees dhhammas.’

A stock phrase describes the special dhamma-teaching of Buddhas (buddhānaṁ sāmakkamsikā dhamma-desanā) as suffering (dukkha), arising (sāmudaya), cessation (nirodha), path (magga).29 This is, of course, a shorthand for the four noble truths. So dhamma is the four noble truths. When the four noble truths are considered in more detail in the Nikāyas, the first is often defined as ‘in short the five aggregates of grasping’ (saṁkhittena pañc’upādāna-kkhandhā dukkha); the second is explained by reference to three kinds of craving (taṇhā)—for the objects of sensual desire (kāma), for existence (bhava) and for non-existence (vibhava); the third truth is the cessation of this craving; finally the fourth consists of the eight factors of the noble path.30 The Dasuttara-sutta takes up these various categories: the five aggregates of grasping are five dhhammas to be fully known (pariññeyya); the three kinds of craving are three dhhammas to be abandoned (pahātabba); nine successive kinds of cessation (nava amupubba-nirodha) are termed nine dhhammas to be realized (sacchikātabba); the eight factors of the path are eight dhhammas to be developed (bhāvetabba).31 This illustrates, I think, something of the way in which the Nikāyas use the notion of dhamma and dhhammas: to know dhamma is to know the four noble truths, and knowledge of the four noble truths involves knowledge of dhhammas in various ways.

When one comes to certain of the commentarial explanations of dhamma and dhhammas, there is, I think, a danger of being misled by some of the rather specialized and technical meanings identified for the word dhamma in particular

27 As recognized by Oldenberg; see Carter, Dhamma, pp. 49, 53.
28 M I 190-1: yo paṭicca-samuppādam passati so dhammanam passati, yo dhammanam passati so paṭicca-samuppādam passati.
29 E.g. D I 110; M I 380.
30 D II 305-12; M I 48-9, S V 420; Vin I 10.
31 See D III 278, 275, 290, 286 respectively.
None of the specific applications is entirely cut loose from the primary underlying notion. That is to say, the various usages of dhamma are still seen by the commentarial tradition as constituting a coherent whole. This underlying and unifying notion of dhamma seems at times to be so much second nature to the commentarial tradition that it can appear understated in certain of its explanations. But something of it is brought out in the etymological explanation of both dhamma and dhammas: dhamma is that which upholds or supports (dhdreti) those who have attained the paths and fruits; dhammas uphold their own self-existence.

As J.R. Carter has pointed out, the commentarial tradition places great emphasis on a threefold and ninefold explanation of dhamma. Thus dhamma is understood as pariyatti or āgama, that is to say, dhamma as manifested in the teaching of the Buddha and recorded in the canonical literature which is to be learnt and mastered. Secondly dhamma is patipatti, that is to say, the teaching as practised. Finally there is dhamma that is paṭivedha or adhigama, that is to say, ‘penetration’ or ‘accomplishment’ consisting of the ninefold transcendent (lokuttara-) dhamma (the four paths and four fruits together with nibbāna).

How does all this relate to dhamma-vicaya? What does the term actually mean? Strictly vi-caya might be derived either from the root ci meaning ‘to gather or accumulate’ or from ci meaning ‘to note or observe’—if indeed these two roots are ultimately separable. But Whitney here suggests that words with the prefixes vi and nis are best referred to the former root, with a meaning such as ‘to take apart’. So dhamma-vicaya would mean the ‘taking apart of dhamma’. In Buddhist thought to take dhamma apart is, I think, to be left with dhammas. Dhamma-vicaya means, then, either the ‘discrimination of dhammas’ or the ‘discernment of dhamma’; to discriminate dhammas is precisely to discern dhamma.

The Pārīḷyeya-sutta is of some interest at this point. A bhikkhu raises the question of what kind of knowing and seeing gives rise to the immediate destruction of the āsavas. The Buddha responds:

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32 At: As 38 (cf. Sv I 99) Buddhaghosa gives a four-fold explanation quoting canonical sources: dhamma as ‘learning’ (pariyatti) is equivalent to the canonical literature (cf. M I 133: ekacce mogha-purisa dhammaṁ pariyojananti suttam ... vedallam; te tam dhammaṁ pariyojanivī tesaṁ dhammīnaṁ paññāya attah na upaparikkhati); dhamma as cause (hetu) is illustrated by the phrase ‘knowledge with regard to causes is dhamma-paṭipatti (Vibh 293); dhamma can be equivalent to virtue (gutta) when contrasted with adhhamma (cf. Th 304); finally, in such phrases as ‘at that time there are dhammas’ (Dhs passim) and ‘he dwells watching dhammas’ with regard to dhammas, dhamma indicates the absence of a substantial being (nissatta-nijjñāta). For a full discussion of dhamma in the commentaries see Carter, Dhamma, pp. 58-67.

33 Ps I 131 = Mp II 107; cf. Ps I 173; Khp-a 19.

34 Dhamma, pp. 131-5.

35 E.g. Mp V 33.


37 Ibid.

38 Edgerton (BHSD, s.v. pravica) rightly, I think, calls into question the translation ‘investigation’.


40 S III 96: katham na kho jānato kathāṁ passato anantarā āsavānaṁ khayo.
Dhamma is taught by me, bhikkhus, by way of discrimination; the four establishings of mindfulness are taught by way of discrimination; the four right endeavours are taught by way of discrimination; the four bases of success are taught by way of discrimination; the five faculties are taught by way of discrimination; the five powers are taught by way of discrimination; the seven awakening-factors are taught by way of discrimination; the noble eight-factored path is taught by way of discrimination. Thus dhamma is taught by me by way of discrimination.\textsuperscript{41}

The Buddha then goes on to detail the twenty modes of what is elsewhere called the ‘view of individuality’ (sakkāya-diṭṭhi).\textsuperscript{42} In each case it is pointed out that the formation (saṃkhāra), the craving (tanha), the feeling (vedanā), the contact (phassa) and the ignorance (avijjā) which add up to the view of individuality are impermanent, put together, and arisen by way of conditions (anicca saṃkhata pāticeca-samuppādana). It is knowing and seeing this that gives rise to immediate destruction of the āsavas.

The Sanskrit fragments of the Dharmaskandha preserve a parallel to this sutta presented as a quotation from the Pātaleya-vyākaranā.\textsuperscript{43} It presents a number of variations:

For the sake of discrimination of the [five] aggregates, bhikkhus, dharmas are taught by me to you, that is to say the four establishings of mindfulness, the four right endeavours, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven awakening-factors, the noble eight-factored path. With regard to dharmas taught by me to you, bhikkhus, for the sake of discrimination of the aggregates, some foolish persons dwell without strong purpose, without strong devotion, without strong affection, without strong delight. Slowly indeed do they contact excellence for the sake of destruction of the āsavas. With regard to dharmas taught by me to you, bhikkhus, for the sake of discrimination of the aggregates, some sons of families dwell with very strong purpose, with very strong devotion, with very strong affection, with very strong delight. Quickly indeed do they contact excellence for the sake of destruction of the āsavas.\textsuperscript{44}

The Sanskrit version goes on to discuss the various views of individuality in terms that closely parallel those of the Pāli version (though the phrase concerning the immediate destruction of the āsavas is not found). Both the Pāli and Sanskrit versions focus on the dharma taught by the Buddha as concerned with the discernment of the subtle operation of the view of individu-

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.: vicayaso desito bhikkave mayā dhammo, vicayaso desitā cattāro satipaṭṭhānā; vicayaso desitā samma-ppadhānā; vicayaso desitā cattāro ādhi-pādā; vicayaso desitāni pañcendriyāni; vicayaso desitāni pañca balāni; vicayaso desitā satta bojjanā; vicayaso desito ariyo aṭṭhāṅgiko maggo. evam vicayaso kho desito bhikkhave mayā dhammo.

\textsuperscript{42} Taking rūpa, vedanā, saṅkhāra and viññāna in turn as self, as what the self possesses, as in the self, as what the self is in; cf. R. Gethin, JIP 14 (1986), pp. 44-5.


\textsuperscript{44} Id., pp. 52-3: desitā vo bhikkavo mayā dhammāhā skandhānām pravicayāya, yad uta cattāri smṛty-upapāthānāni cattāri saṁyak-pradhānāni cattāri ādhi-pādāh panjendriyāni pañca balānāni sapta bodhi-āngāni ārājāṅgamo mārgga. evam desitēsu vo bhikkavo mayā dhammeṣu skandhānām pravicayāya. atha ca punar ihaikatyā moha-purusa na tīvra-chandā viharanti na tīvra-snehā na tīvra-premāho na tīvra-pramādās. te dhamham evaṁuttāryaṁ sprāsanti yad utāsraṇāṁ kṣayāya. evam desitēsu vo bhikkavo mayā dhammeṣu skandhānām pravicayāya, atha ca punar ihaikatīyā kula-putrāṁ atīva-tīvra-chandā viharanti atīva-tīvra-snehā atīva-tīvra-premāho tīva-tīvra-pramādās. te kṣipram evaṁuttāryaṁ sprāsanti yad utāsraṇāṁ kṣayāya.
ality with regard to the five aggregates; both understand that this is achieved by way of the practice of the dhammas that constitute the seven sets. In other words, the Buddha’s teaching is concerned with the interaction of various groupings of dhammas that make up dharma. Put simply, he teaches the discrimination of dhammas and the discernment of dharma.

3. Pīti and passaddhi

Pīti

In general Sanskrit literature prīti means ‘joy’, ‘delight’ or ‘pleasure’; it then comes to mean ‘friendship’, ‘love’ or ‘affection’. The word thus conveys a certain emotional intensity. In the Nikāyas a distinction is made between pīti that is ‘carnal’ (āmisā) and pīti that is free of the carnal (nirāmisā); the former arises dependent on the five kinds of sensual desire, the latter is especially characteristic of the pīti that arises in association with the first and second jhāna. More generally it seems that nirāmisā pīti is the kind of joy associated with spiritual practice as a whole. The term pīti is especially found in association with a sequence of terms (pāmujja, pīti, passaddhi, sukha, samādhi) that is seen as specifically related to the process of the mind’s becoming progressively contented and stilled. Thus we are told that one who has trust based in understanding (avecca-ppasāda) in the Buddha, Dhamma and Samgha gains enthusiasm for the goal and dhamma (labhati atta-vedam labhati dhamma-vedam); he gains gladness that is connected with dhamma (labhati dhammu-psamhitam pāmujjam); for one who is gladden, joy is born (pāmuditassa pīti jayati); the body of one who is joyful becomes tranquil (pīti-manassa kāyo passambhati); one whose body is tranquil experiences happiness (passaddha-kāyo sukhām vedići); the mind of one who is happy becomes concentrated (sukhino cittam saṃmihīyati). The same process occurs when one sees that the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa) are abandoned in oneself. According to a more extended sequence proper conduct (siḷa) leads to absence of regret (avippati-sāra), this leads to pāmujja, this to pīti, this to sukha, this to samādhi, this to knowledge and vision (nīṇa-dassana), this to disenchantment (nibbidā) and dispassion (vīraṁga), this to knowledge and vision of freedom (vimutti-ṇīṇa-dassana).

What seems to be clear is that pīti and these associated ideas are intended to convey a sense of the emotional fulfilment that is seen as inherent in the spiritual life. It is to be noted that this process of emotional fulfilment which culminates in the mind’s becoming concentrated is consistently seen as the precursor to the more advanced stages of the spiritual path.

The notion of pīti in the later literature has been fully discussed by L.S. Cousins in connection with the practice of jhāna. In this context the
commentaries give a list of five kinds of piti which in effect constitute five stages of increasing intensity. These are minor (khuddakā), momentary (khan-ikā), descending (okkantikā), transporting (ubbegā) and suffusing (pharana) piti, all of which are described in some detail. It is the fifth and final stage of piti which is the kind associated with full absorption (appanā) in the commentaries: ‘being the root of absorption-concentration, suffusing-piti comes by growth into association with samādhi’. It is this kind of piti too, it seems, that the commentaries wish to associate with piti-sambojha nga when they describe its characteristic as suffusing.

It is perhaps worth drawing attention to a difference in the interpretation of piti/priti among the ancient schools of Buddhism. The Theravādins and the Sautrāntikas (and the author of the *Satyasiddhi-strā) regard piti/priti as a distinct dhamma/dharmā to be classified under samkhāra-kkhandha/samskāra-skandha. Those who follow the traditions of the Vaibhāṣikas, however, regard it as vedanā-skandha, and as such a manifestation of saumanasya or pleasant mental feeling. This causes problems with the traditional list of factors for the first dhyāna, namely vitarka, vicāra, priti, sukhā, cittaikagrati, since one item (saumanasya) appears to be given twice (priti, sukhā). This is resolved by understanding sukhā to refer to prāśrābdhi; in the higher dhyānas, however, sukhā is taken to refer to saumanasya.

**Passaddhi**

The term *passaddhi* (‘tranquillity’, ‘calm’) is, then, closely associated with the term piti. It is perhaps of some interest that *passaddhi* is described in the ancient formula as being mediated through the body: ‘the body of one whose mind is joyful becomes tranquil; one whose body is tranquil experiences happiness’. In the *Samyutta-nikāya* we find a distinction being made between tranquillity of the body (kāya-passaddhi) and tranquillity of the mind (cittapaṣaddhi). This is taken up in the canonical Abhidhamma. The *Dhammasaṅgani* explains kāya-passaddhi as tranquillity of the aggregates of feeling (vedanā), recognition (saññā) and formations (samkhāra), and citta-passaddhi as tranquillity of the aggregate of consciousness (viññāna).

If one is to take this at face value, it seems to indicate that vedanā, saññā and samkhāras are seen as in some sense able to bridge the gap between mind and body. They are, as it were, what mediates one’s state of mind to the body, and vice versa. Some form of movement from mind to body and back again is, in fact, quite clearly indicated in the ancient formula concerned with the

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51 Vism IV 94-98; As 115-7.
52 Vism IV 99 = As 166: appanā-samādhisā mūlam huvā vadhamānā samādhi-sampayogam gati pharana-piti.
53 E.g Mp II 53; the lakkhana of piti is apparently more generally described as sampiyana or ‘delighting’ at Vism IV 94 and As 115.
55 S V 66, 104, 111; cf. Vibh 228.
56 Dhs 14-5, 66.
dynamics of pīti and passaddhi. To take the Dīgha version that introduces the four jhānas, the bhikkhu perceives that the hindrances are abandoned in him and as a result his mind becomes joyful; as a result of this his body becomes tranquil and he feels happy; a happy mind becomes concentrated.

The notion of the reciprocal nature of the relationship between mind and body is further brought out by the way in which in the Dhammasaṅgani (followed by the later Abhidhamma) tranquility of body and mind forms a group with five other pairs of items. These are lightness (lahuta) of mind and body, softness (mudutā) of mind and body, readiness (kammapatā) of mind and body, fitness (pāguṇhatā) of mind and body, straightness (ujukatā) of mind and body.57 The relationship that these factors bear to the body is underlined by the fact that precisely the same terminology in part is applied to the physical world. Among the twenty-seven varieties of rūpa distinguished by the Dhammasaṅgani are lightness, softness and readiness of rūpa.58 So what at one level seems to represent a quite straightforward observation of the relationship between body and mind is potentially a conception of some subtlety and precision.59

In view of passaddhi’s association in the Abhidhamma with these other terms, it is perhaps worth noting one or two characteristic Nikāya contexts for their usage. In a frequently repeated stock passage that I have already had occasion to refer to, the mind that is free from hindrances (vinivāraṇa-cittā) is said to be healthy (kalla), soft (mudu), enlivened (odagga—a term that the commentaries associate with pīti), trustful or clear (pasannu)—this is the kind of mind receptive to the special dhamma teaching of Buddhas.60 In the Sāmaññaphala-sutta and elsewhere the mind of one who has practised the four jhānas is described as, amongst other things, soft (mudu-bhūta) and ready (kammanīya).61

To sum up, pīti and passaddhi as bojjanīgas link into a range of ideas associated with the notion of the mind as happy, content and calm. Such a mind is seen as ready and suited to the gaining and developing of insight and knowledge. Together pīti and passaddhi are terms suggestive of the positive emotional content of ancient Buddhism.

4. Upekkhā

Apart from being considered one of the seven bojjanīgas, the term upekkhā is quite regularly found in the Nikāyas in connection with the discussion of vedanā, the description of the jhānas, and the description of the four divine-

57 Dīs 9; As 249 calls the group the six pairs (yugalaka). They are discussed in some detail by Nyanaponika Thera, Abhidhamma Studies, 3rd ed., Kandy, 1976, pp. 81-90.
58 Dīs 134, 144.
59 For their part Buddhist Sanskrit sources often explain prāsrabhdi directly as readiness (karmanīyatā) and lightness (lāghavā) of mind; see Abhidh-k 55; Abhidh-dī 72; Abhidh-sam Trsl 8. Cf. Satya Trsl 187: ‘When at the time of the mind’s working the body and mind become calm and free from ill-being, at that moment it is termed prāsrabhdi.’
60 E.g. M I 379-80.
dwellings (*brahma-vihāras*). As regards *vedanā*, the relevant term is *upekkhā* or ‘the faculty of *upekkhā*’; this is identified with feeling that is not-painful-and-not-pleasant (*adukkha-m-asukha* *vedanā*). In the ancient *jhāna* formula one who has attained the third *jhāna* is described as ‘with equipoise’ (*upekkhaka*) and ‘one who dwells happy, with equipoise and with mindfulness’ (*upekkhako satimā sukha-vihāri*). The fourth *jhāna* is termed *upekkhā-sati-pārisuddhi* which the later texts interpret as ‘purity of mindfulness (brought about) by means of equipoise’. Finally, as one of the four divine dwellings, *upekkhā* is practised and developed together with loving kindness or friendliness (*mettā*) towards beings, compassion (*karuṇā*) with regard to the suffering of beings, and joy (*muditā*) with regard to the happiness of beings. While *upekkhā*, which is last in the traditional sequence of these four items, can be regarded as completing the practice of the four *brahma-vihāras*, as H.B. Aronson has made clear in his discussions, it should not be regarded as supplanting or superseding the other three. The four always remain essentially complementary.

In the later literature a formal distinction is made between *upekkhā* as not-painful-and-not-pleasant feeling (i.e. a constituent of *vedanā-kkhandha*) on the one hand, and *upekkhā* as a skilful mental factor (i.e. a constituent of *samkhāra-kkhandha*) on the other. The distinction is common to both Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit sources and would appear to be part of the common heritage of ancient Buddhism. Although the distinction is not formally made explicit in the Nikāyas, *upekkhā* is quite explicitly understood as *vedanā*, while in other contexts an understanding of the term *upekkhā* as simply not-painful-and-not-pleasant feeling would seem to be inadequate. The Pāli commentarial tradition preserves a rather more comprehensive analysis that

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62 E.g. S V 210; Vibh 123.
63 E.g. D I 75.
64 This interpretation of the compound already occurs at Vibh 261 (*açayam sati imāya upekkhāya vivātā hoti pārisuddhā pariyodattā tena vuccati upekkhā-sati-pārisuddhin ti*); cf. As 178; Vism IV 194.
65 Abhidh-k 438 takes it as *upekṣa*-pārisuddhi and *smiti*-pārisuddhi.
66 E.g. D I 251.
68 If worked out, the *paññhāpucchaka* treatment of the twenty-two *indriyas* (Vibh 124-34) and seven *bojjhāngas* (Vibh 232-4) makes clear that *upekkhā* is treated as *vedanā* and *upekkhā* is *sambojjhānga* as *samkhāra*; see Table 12, p. 328. Cf. Dhātuk 16: *satta bojjhāngā ... ekena khandhena ... samghātā*.
69 E.g. Artha-n 230 comments of *upekṣā*-sambodhi-angā that it is *upekṣā* as a *samkāra* that is meant and not *upekṣā* as *vedanā*.
70 However, the Dhammasaṅgani makes explicit mention of *upekkhā* only as *adukkha-m-asukhā* *vedanā* (e.g. Dhs 28), *upekkhā* as *tatra-majjhātattā* belonging to *samkhāra-kkhandha* seems to be entirely absent even though what one assumes to be *tatra-majjhātattā*- *upekkhā* features in the quotation of the Nikāya *jhāna* formula (Dhs 32, 35); *upekkhā* or *tatra-majjhātattā* is one of the *yevāpanaka-dhammas* (cf. Dhs 9; As 132, 173). In the treatment of *lokuttara-citta* (Dhs 60-75, 99-117) this has the effect of leaving *upekkhā* *bojjhāngas* out of the reckoning, although the other six *bojjhāngas* are identified (Dhs 61-8). Unfortunately since *lokuttara-citta* is expanded in full for the first *jhāna* only, and given in a much abbreviated form for the remaining *jhānas* (Dhs 70), it is impossible to verify that the Dhammasaṅgani does not identify *upekkhā* as a *bojjhānga* with *upekkhā* as *vedanā*. The Vibhāṅga, however, makes it clear that *upekkhā*- *sambojjhaṅga* should be understood as *majjhātattā* and *samkhāra-kkhandha* and not *vedanā* (Vibh 230, 232).
distinguishes ten different applications or meanings of upekhā in the canonical literature. This list can be resolved into four basic items:

1. upekhā as 'specific balance' (tatra-majjhata) — six aspects
2. upekhā as 'feeling' (vedanā) — one aspect
3. upekhā as 'strength' (viriya) — one aspect
4. upekhā as 'wisdom' (paññā) — two aspects

In practice the last two items, constituting three of the ten aspects, are rather less conspicuous in the canon than the first two, and I shall not comment upon them further.

It is upekhā as tatra-majjhata or 'balance with regard to things' that is of immediate concern. It is worth noting the commentarial definitions of the six aspects of this. Six-limbed upekhā belongs to one who has destroyed the āsavas; it is upekhā that has the property (ākāra-bhūtā) of not losing (avijahana) the purified condition (parisuddha-pakati-bhāva) in the face of wished and unwished for objects at the six sense doors. As a brahma-vihāra, upekhā has the property of balance (majjhata) with regard to beings. Upekkhā as a bojjhanga has the property of balance with regard to conascent dhammas. Similarly, in its general aspect of balance with regard to things (tatra-majjhata), upekhā is what causes conascent (dhammas) to proceed evenly (sama-viḥita-bhūtā). Jhānuupekkhā produces impartiality (apakkha-pāta-janani) with regard to the highest kind of pleasant feeling, namely that which occurs in the third jhāna. Upekkhā that consists of purity (pārisuddhi-uppekkhā) is the repose (avyāpāra) from stilling adverse conditions (paccanikā-vūpasamana) that exists in the fourth jhāna. These six are said to be one by way of meaning, namely upekkhā as tatra-majjhatta, but are distinguished by virtue of the different occasions upon which they occur.

Keeping in mind these six aspects of upekkhā as tatra-majjhatta, it is worth considering a little further upekkhā as not-painful-not-pleasant feeling. According to the Cūḷavedalla-sutta, inherent in pleasant feeling is a latent tendency to attraction (rāgānusaya), in painful feeling a latent tendency to dislike (paṭighānusaya) and in not-painful-and-not-pleasant feeling a latent tendency to ignorance (avijjānusaya). What this means, then, is that while the extremes of attraction and dislike are held in check by not-painful-and-not-pleasant feeling, this may result in a state of uncertainty and indecision. Yet because not-painful-and-not-pleasant feeling is balanced between painful and pleasant feeling, there is a sense in which it can lead either way, be either positive or negative: 'not-painful-and-not-pleasant feeling is pleasant as knowing, unpleasant as not knowing' (adukkha-m-asukhā vedanā nāṇa-sukhā aññāna-dukkhā). In other words, if the danger of ignorance is avoided, because it is evenly poised not-painful-and-not-pleasant feeling is potentially a useful position.

70 As 172-3; Vism IV 156-179; Paṭīs-a 187-8; cf. Aronson’s discussion in Narain, SPB, pp. 2-6.
71 These six are discussed more fully by Aronson.
72 As 173; Vism IV 167; Paṭīs-a 188.
73 M I 303.
74 Ibid.
from which to see the dangers inherent in painful and pleasant feeling. A rather similar relationship exists between the four brahma-vihāras. The dangers associated with mettā, and muditā—their near enemies (āsanna-paccatthika), are attraction (rāga) and worldly happiness (geha-sitam somanassam) respectively. Associated with karunā is the danger of worldly dejection (geha-sitam domanassam). The brahma-vihāra of upekkhā, while avoiding these extremes, is associated with the danger of worldly indifference consisting of not knowing (geha-sitam aṭṭhānupekkhā). This is, of course, precisely not skilful upekkhā, but its near enemy, which the Abhidhamma would understand as some form of unskilful citta rooted in delusion (mohā). Yet if the brahma-vihāra of upekkhā is stable and its near enemy does not arise, then because of its balance and impartiality it can check the near enemies of mettā, muditā and karunā, which might arise if these three were developed in isolation. If karunā and muditā are the natural responses of the mind that has its home in mettā, then upekkhā assures that this mind remains stable and undisturbed.

The nature of upekkhā is further brought out with regard to the jhānas. Jhāna-upekkhā is said in the commentaries to manifest at the level of the third jhāna. This, it seems, is specifically due to the fading out of piti, which is seen as enlivening the mind to such an extent that upekkhā, although technically present in the first and second jhānas, is not fully obvious. In this context upekkhā plays a significant part in the process of the mind's becoming stiller, less agitated and more settled, and so less prone to becoming unbalanced or obsesssed. Once again this is not seen as implying indifference or insensitivity; on the contrary this is what allows the mind to become fully sensitive and effective. The process is seen as being completed in the fourth jhāna by the coupling of upekkhā and sati.

The explanation of upeksā in Buddhist Sanskrit sources appears essentially the same and to offer no real difficulties. It is described most generally as ‘evenness of mind’ (citta-samatā), which seems to accord well with the Abhidhamma definition of tatra-majjhattatā as that which causes conascent dhammas to proceed evenly (sama-vāhita).

The most important characteristic of upekkhā in all its various manifestations would seem to be the way in which it maintains the balance of skilful

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75 As 193-4; Vism IX 93-101; cf. Aronson in Narain, SPB, p. 5.
76 Aronson argues against the tendency of some (he cites Winston King and Melford Spiro) to understand upekkhā as indifference or detachment that sublimates all emotional response and feeling. He suggests that any study of particular meditational practices, such as upekkhā, must understand these in the wider context of Buddhist practice as presented in the Nikāyas and commentaries. He concludes that their understanding of upekkhā does not support the view that it is mere indifference and draws attention to the fact that the underlying motivating force for the Buddha’s teaching and for those who follow it is always considered to be sympathy (anukampa) for the world of beings, and benefit for both self and other. Cf. the following passages cited by Aronson: A I 22; Mp I 98-9, 101; A IV 134-5; D II 119. See also H.B. Aronson, ‘Love, Compassion, Sympathetic Joy and Equanimity in Theravāda Buddhism’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975).
77 See Abhidh-k 55; Abhidh-dī 72; Abhidh-h Trsl 15; Abhidh-sam Trsl 9; Satya Trsl 187. For further discussion of some of the terms used in Buddhist Sanskrit texts to explain upeksā see G.M. Nagao, ‘Tranquil Flow of Mind: An Interpretation of upeksa’, Mélanges Lamotte, pp. 245-58.
mental factors, and prevents them from subtly shifting from the skilful to the unskilful. Aronson, in his article on upekkhā, draws attention to the fact that tatra-majjhettatā is considered in the Abhidhamma to be a universal of skilful citta, likewise uddhacca or ‘restlessness’ is a universal of unskilful citta. This is also true of upekṣā and uddhataya in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma. This can be turned around to make the Abhidhamma/Abhidharma point somewhat clearer, I think. It is, in a sense, precisely because mental factors have become balanced and even that citta is skilful; when that balance is lost and mental factors become restless citta necessarily becomes unskilful. So upekkhā or tatra-majjhettatā is both the balance of the skilful mind and the force which maintains that balance. All this seems to be quite precisely conveyed in the following commentarial description of upekkhā as a bojjhanga:

‘He is one who oversees’: he is one who oversees by means of overseeing conascent [dhammas]. The awakening-factor of equipoise is the property of balance termed the not-drawing-back-and-not-over-running of the [other] six awakening-factors. For it is like the case of horses that are running evenly; then there is neither any urging on on the charioteer’s part, thinking, ‘this one is lagging behind’, nor any restraining, thinking, ‘this one is running ahead’; there is just the property of stability of one who sees thus. Just so the property of balance termed not-drawing-back-and-not-over-running of these six awakening-factors is called the awakening-factor of equipoise.78

5. The definitions of the Paṭisambhidāmagga and the commentaries

As with the indriyas and balas, the Paṭisambhidāmagga assigns a particular ‘meaning’ or ‘effect’ (āṭṭha) to each of the bojjhangas. The meaning of sati-sambojhaṅga is to be directly known as ‘standing near’ (sati-sambojhaṅgassa upaṭṭhānāttho abhināneyyo); the meaning of dhamma-vicaya-sambojhaṅga as ‘discrimination’ (pavicaya); that of viriya-sambojhaṅga as ‘taking on’ (paggaha); that of piti-sambojhaṅga as ‘suffusing’ (pharaṇa); that of passaddhi-sambojhaṅga as ‘stilling’ (upasama); that of samādhi-sambojhaṅga as ‘non-distraction’ (avikkhepa); that of upekkhā-sambojhaṅga as ‘judgement’ (paṭisambhāna).

These āṭṭhas are apparently taken up by the commentaries when defining the individual characteristic (lakkhana) of each of the bojjhangas, along with its particular property (rasa) and manifestation (paccuppāṭhāna).80 In every case the lakkhana given corresponds to the āṭṭha of the Paṭisambhidāmagga, though in the case of sati, piti, samādhi and upekkhā an alternative lakkhana is given as well. The various terms employed here are for the most part also found in the context of the general commentarial definitions of the relevant dhammas. But

78 Ps IV 143: ajjhupakekkhitā hoti ti sahajāta-ajjhupakekkhānāya ajjhupakekkhitā hoti ... imesam channam bojjhangānam anosakkana-anativattana-samkhāto majjhattakāro upekkhā-sambojhaṅgo. yath’eva hi sama-ppavattesu assesu sārathino ayam oliyati ti tudanam vā ayam atidhavaati ti ākāṣṭhamanam vā nathhi, kevalam evam paccamānassa jhitakāro vā hoti; evam eva imesam channam bojjhangānam anosakkana-anativattana-samkhāto majjhattakāro upekkhā-sambojhaṅgo nāma hoti. (Cf. As 133; Vism XIV 153; Abhidh-av 21.)
79 Paṭis I 16; for further details see below, Chapter 10.2.
80 Ps I 82-4; Mp II 52-4. See Table 3, p. 161.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sambojhaṅga</th>
<th>lakkhaṇa</th>
<th>rasa</th>
<th>paccupāṭṭhāna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sati</td>
<td>standing near (upāṭṭhāna) calling up (apilāpana)</td>
<td>not-forgetting (asammosa)</td>
<td>being faced with an objective field (gocarābhīmukha-bhāva)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dharmavyācayā</td>
<td>discrimination (pavicaya)</td>
<td>illumination (obhāsa)</td>
<td>non-delusion (asammoha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viriya</td>
<td>taking on (paggaha)</td>
<td>supporting (upatthambana)</td>
<td>non-collapse (anosidana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pīti</td>
<td>suffusing (pharana) contentment (tuṭṭhi)</td>
<td>delighting body and mind (kāya-citta-pīnanā)</td>
<td>elation (odagga)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>passaddhi</td>
<td>stilling (upasama)</td>
<td>overcoming the distress of body and mind (kāya-citta-daratha-maddana)</td>
<td>absence of trembling and the state of coolness (apariphanda-hūta-sīti-bhāva)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samādhi</td>
<td>non-distraction (avikkhepa) non-diffusion (avisāra)</td>
<td>collecting together (sampiṇḍana)</td>
<td>stability of mind (citta-ṭṭhiti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upekkhā</td>
<td>judgement (patissamkhāna) causing to proceed evenly (sama-vāhitar)</td>
<td>preventing deficiency or excess (unādhika-nivāraṇa) cutting through partiality (pakkha-pātupaccchedana)</td>
<td>state of balance (majjhatta-bhāva)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
one should note that these general definitions are not fixed and exhibit a certain amount of fluidity; this is especially clear in the Atthasālinī’s account.\textsuperscript{81} When we compare the bojjhāṅga definitions with the general definitions, a number of further variations are apparent. Thus the Atthasālinī gives delighting ( sampiyayana) as the lakkhana of piti and suffusing (pharana) as an alternative rasa;\textsuperscript{82} following the tradition of the Milindapañha illumination (obhāsana) is considered the lakkhana of pañña.\textsuperscript{83}

Perhaps one of the most interesting features of the Paṭisambhidāmagga’s and commentarial definition of the bojjhāṅgas is the association of the term paṭisamkhāna with upekkhā-sambojñhāṅga. This appears to be peculiar to upekkhā as a bojjhāṅga; paṭisamkhāna does not appear to feature in general descriptions of upekkhā or tatra-majjattatā. The Nikāyas occasionally speak of a paṭisamkhāna-balas\textsuperscript{84} which appears to be understood in terms appropriate to insight or wisdom, and this is how the term is understood in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi.\textsuperscript{85} What precisely is intended by paṭisamkhāna in the context of upekkhā-sambojñhāṅga is unclear; ‘reviewing’ or ‘balanced judgement’ might be appropriate.

6. The bojjhāṅgas and the viveka-nissita formula

In chapter three I drew attention to the association of the rddhi-pādās/iddhipādās with the viveka-nisīrita/viveka-nissita formula. Such an association is not apparently found in the Nikāyas, but is confined to Buddhist Sanskrit sources and the Nettippakarana. The Nikāyas do, however, regularly apply the viveka-nissita formula to the bojjhāṅgas:

Here a bhikkhu develops the awakening-factor of mindfulness, dependent on seclusion, dependent on dispassion, dependent on cessation, ripening in release. He develops the awakening-factor of dhamma-discrimination ... the awakening-factor of strength ... the awakening-factor of joy ... the awakening-factor of tranquillity ... the awakening-factor of concentration ... the awakening-factor of equipoise, dependent on seclusion, dependent on dispassion, dependent on cessation, ripening in release.\textsuperscript{86}

But the usage of the viveka-nissita formula is not restricted to the bojjhāṅgas in the Nikāyas; in the mahā-vagga of the Saṃyutta-nikāya, for example, the formula is systematically applied to the factors of the ariyo atṭhaṅgiko maggo,

\textsuperscript{81} See As 106-136 ( dhammuddesavāra-kathā); cf. Vism XIV 134-55.

\textsuperscript{82} As 115.

\textsuperscript{83} As 122; though visayobhāṣana is also subsequently given as a rasa.

\textsuperscript{84} D III 213; A I 52-3, 94; II 142.

\textsuperscript{85} Dhs 1354; paṭisamkhāna-balas is usually paired with bhāvanā-balas (see also Nett 15-6; Paṭis II 69-70) which is itself suggestive of dassana; at Nett 38 we have three balas: paṭisamkhāna, dassana, bhāvanā; this suggests that perhaps paṭisamkhāna characterizes insight prior to the ariya-magga.

\textsuperscript{86} E.g. D III 226: idha bhikkhu sati-sambojñhāṅgam bhāveti viveka-nissitam virāga-nissitam nirodhā-nissitam vosagga-parināmām dhamma-vicaya-sambojñhāṅgam ... viriya-sambojñhāṅgam ... piti-sambojñhāṅgam ... passaddhi-sambojñhāṅgam ... samādhi-sambojñhāṅgam ... upekkhā-sambojñhāṅgam bhāveti viveka-nissitam virāga-nissitam nirodhā-nissitām vosagga-parināmām. Buddhist Sanskrit sources give an exactly parallel formula, e.g. Artha 34; for further references see Lamotte, Traité, III 1128.
the bojhaṅgas, indriyas and balas. However, since this constitutes a special treatment of the seven sets collectively, it is worth considering the application of the viveka-vissita formula elsewhere in the four primary Nikayas in order to determine if there is any pattern to be discerned.

I calculate that the bojhaṅgas are itemized on thirty occasions in the four Nikayas on eight occasions we have just the bare list; on fourteen occasions we have each item together with the viveka-nissita formula; on two occasions the bojhaṅgas are itemized in connection with the fourth satipaṭṭhāna; on five occasions each bojhaṅga is considered as descriptive of a stage in a process; finally there is one Āṅguttara treatment that falls outside these categories.

The viveka-nissita formula is employed on eighteen occasions in all as indicated, fourteen of these involve its application to the bojhaṅgas, two to the factors of the path, one to the indriyas and one to the balas. The context in which the viveka-nissita formula is applied to the indriyas and balas also involves its application to the bojhaṅgas and path-factors, and is, in fact, a collective treatment of the seven sets. So apart from the context of the seven sets, the viveka-nissita formula is restricted to the bojhaṅgas and factors of the path.

I calculate that the factors of the ariyo atthangiko maggo are itemized on sixty-four occasions in the four Nikayas. On thirty-eight occasions the ariyo atthangiko maggo is cited and then itemized in a bare list; on four occasions the eight factors are listed without explicit reference to the ariyo atthangiko maggo; four occasions involve the contrast of the eight factors as 'right' and 'times' can be rather arbitrary.

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87 I refer to the sections that are common to all seven sets and the jhānas (cf. Chapter 7.5); the viveka-nissita formula is applied in these only to the items named, however; see S V 29-31, 32-4, 35-6, 38-42, 45-62, 134-40, 239-43, 249-53.

88 In this connection I find it useful to make a distinction between the number of 'occasions' on which a given list is itemized and the number of 'times'; 'occasions' takes no account of the repeated itemizing of a list within a given sūtta or according to an extended Samyutta or Āṅguttara treatment; 'times' takes into account all these repetitions, even when lost in the abbreviations of the text. E.g. at S IV 367-73 a text without any abbreviations would list the bojhaṅgas thirty-two times, but this can be viewed as only one occasion. Thus the bojhaṅgas are itemized on thirty 'occasions' but 235 'times'. In the Samyutta and Āṅguttara-nikāyas the line between 'occasions' and 'times' can be rather arbitrary.

89 D II 79 (the Mulasarvastivadin parallel adds the viveka-nissita formula, see Waldschmidt, MPS 128); III 106, 251, 282; A II 237; IV 23, 148 (× 160); V 211; taking into account all repetitions this comes to 167 'times'.

90 D III 226; M I 11; II 12; III 87-8, 275; S IV 367-73 (× 32); S V 312-3, 333, 334, 335, 340; A I 53; III 390; this comes to 45 'times'.

91 D I 303-4; M I 61-2 (2 'times').

92 M III 85-7 (× 4); S V 331-3 (× 4); 334 (× 4); 335 (× 4); 337-9 (× 4) (20 'times').

93 A I 39-40; see below, p. 269.

94 142 'times'.

95 S I 88; IV 367-8 (× 32) (33 'times').

96 S IV 365-8 (× 32) (32 'times' for both indriyas and balas).

97 372 'times'; this includes one Vinaya context.

98 Vin I 10 (× 2); D I 157, 165; II 251, 311; III 286; M I 15-6, 48-55 (× 15), 118, 299-307 (× 2); II 12, 82; III 231, 251, 289; S II 42-3 (× 12), 106; III 59 (× 5), 158-9 (× 3); IV 133, 175, 195, 220, 222, 233-4 (× 3), 252-62 (× 15), 330-1; V 347, 421-2 (× 2), 425, 426; A I 177, 180, 217; III 411-6 (× 6) (89 'times').

99 A I 39-40; II 89; IV 190, 348.
TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF THE USE OF THE VIVEKA-NISSITA FORMULA IN THE FOUR NIKĀYAS (EXCLUDING MAGGA-, BOJJHANGA-, INDRIYA- AND BALA-SAMYUTTAS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOJJHANGAS ITEMIZED:</th>
<th>TIMES</th>
<th>OCCASIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As bare list</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With <em>viveka-nissita</em> formula</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As process</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As aspect of <em>satipatthana</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>235</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VIVEKA-NISSITA FORMULA APPLIED:</th>
<th>TIMES</th>
<th>OCCASIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To bojjhargas</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To path-factors</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To indriyas</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To balas</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>142</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PATH-FACTORS ITEMIZED:</th>
<th>TIMES</th>
<th>OCCASIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo seyyathādaṃ</em></td>
<td>89</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 factors/factored</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 factors/factored <em>micchā/sammā</em></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 factors/factored</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 factors/factored <em>micchā/sammā</em></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With <em>viveka-nissita</em> formula</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ariyo sammā-samādhi sa- upaniso</em></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>372</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(sammanā) and ‘wrong’ (micchā);\textsuperscript{100} four occasions involve a bare list of ten factors;\textsuperscript{101} nine occasions involve the contrast of the ten factors as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’;\textsuperscript{102} only two occasions involve the viveka-nissita formula;\textsuperscript{103} finally three occasions involve right-concentration along with its supporting conditions (ariyo sammā-samādhi sa-upaniso iti pi sa-parikkhāro).\textsuperscript{104} The frequency of occurrence of these various usages confirms that, apart from the context of the seven sets, the application of the viveka-nissita formula to the factors of the path is rather restricted.\textsuperscript{105}

Outside the four primary Nikāyas, we find that the Paṭisambhidāmagga includes a treatment that once more applies the formula to the indriyas, balas, bojjhāṅgas and factors of the path.\textsuperscript{106} In the Vibhanga the formula is restricted to the bojjhāṅgas and factors of the path.\textsuperscript{107} Thus for the Pāli sources, Lamotte singles out the viveka-nissita formula with reference to those two sets of items.\textsuperscript{108} However, the conclusion of the foregoing survey of the usage of the viveka-nissita formula must be, I think, that in the Nikāyas the formula is in the first place to be associated with the bojjhāṅgas alone; it should be seen as being applied to other sets of items by a process of attraction, that is to say, by virtue of their association or affinity with the seven bojjhāṅgas.

What of the four terms employed in the formula, namely viveka, virāga, nirodha and vossagga? The concept of viveka or ‘seclusion’ is probably most frequently met with in connection with the stock description of the first jhāna:

> Secluded from the objects of sensual desire, secluded from unskilful dhammas, he attains and dwells in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by initial and sustained thinking, born of seclusion, and possesses joy and happiness.\textsuperscript{109}

T.W. Rhys Davids sums up the basic import of viveka clearly: ‘the stress is upon separation from the world, taking “world” in the sense of all hindrances to spiritual progress, and especially the five chief Hindrances (Nīvaraṇa).’\textsuperscript{110}

Taking vossagga or ‘release/letting go’ next, it appears that this term is less

\textsuperscript{100} S II 168-9; III 109; A 220-1 (x 2); IV 237-8 (5 ‘times’).
\textsuperscript{101} M I 446; A II 89 (x 2); V 221-2 (x 2), 310 (x 160) (176 ‘times’).
\textsuperscript{102} M I 42-5 (x 4); III 76-8; S II 168-9; A II 222 (x 2), 223 (x 2), 224-5 (x 2); V 211-21 (x 8); 222-36 (x 8); 240-9 (x 34) (62 ‘times’).
\textsuperscript{103} S I 88; IV 367-8 (x 32) (33 ‘times’).
\textsuperscript{104} D II 216-7; M III 71; A IV 40.
\textsuperscript{105} If we exclude the sections common to all seven sets in the mahā-vagga and just consider the usage of the viveka-nissita formula in the distinctive portions of the magga- and bojjhāṅga-samyuttas, it still appears that it is applied to the bojjhāṅgas with rather greater frequency than to the path-factors; for the path-factors, see S V 2-3, 29-38; for the bojjhāṅgas, S V 63-4, 72, 75, 76, 78-9, 86-8, 91, 101-2, 119-120, 128-34. Of course, S V 29-38 constitutes an exhaustive usage of the formula in connection with the path factors, though it is not entirely clear that the text of the bojjhāṅga-samyutta has not been excessively abbreviated at S V 129-34; furthermore, the way the viveka-nissita formula is used continually throughout the bojjhāṅga-samyutta matched in the magga-samyutta.
\textsuperscript{106} Paṭis II 219-23; the viveka-kathā.
\textsuperscript{107} Vibh 229, 236.
\textsuperscript{108} Lamotte, Traité, III 1128, 1130.
\textsuperscript{109} E.g. D I 73: so vivicc’eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkam savicāram viveka’jam piti-sukham pātthama-jhānām upasampajja viharati.
\textsuperscript{110} D Trsl I 84.
widely used in the Nikāyas than the other three. As a result it is rather lacking in particular association. However, its basic import of ‘release’ or ‘letting go’ as a term for the final goal of nibbāna or liberation seems clear.\textsuperscript{111} The term is suggestive of an active letting go or releasing (of defilements or fetters) rather than the state of having let go or being released (vimutti, vimokkha).

Dispassion (virāga) and cessation (nirodha) are together often directly associated with a number of terms that all seem to connote, more or less, the goal or culmination of the Buddhist path. Thus fairly frequently in the Nikāyas something is described as conducing (saṃvattati) to disenchantment (nibbidā), dispassion (virāga), cessation (nirodha), peace (upasama), direct knowledge (abhīññā), full awakening (sambodha), nibbāna.\textsuperscript{112} The fact that elsewhere the pair nibbidā and virāga occur as part of a sequence of terms that is descriptive of a process,\textsuperscript{113} suggests that the sequence viveka, virāga, nirodha, vossagga might also be understood as progressive. In other words, the bojjhaṅgas, and so on, are to be developed successively as dependent on seclusion, dispassion and cessation, until they finally ripen in release. The tradition itself does not seem to understand the formula in quite these terms. What it does do, however, is suggest a number of different levels for the interpretation of each of the four terms in question. The effect is not entirely different from the interpretation I have suggested.

The earliest exegesis of the viveka-nissita formula we have is probably that given in the viveka-kathā of the Paṭisambhidāmagga.\textsuperscript{114} According to this there are five kinds of viveka, five kinds of virāga, five kinds of nirodha and five kinds of vossagga:

For one developing the first jhāna there is seclusion from the hindrances by suppression; for one developing concentration that partakes of penetrative wisdom there is seclusion from wrong views by substitution of opposites; for one developing the transcendent path that leads to destruction [of the āsavas] there is seclusion by cutting off; at the moment of fruition there is seclusion by tranquilization; cessation, nibbāna is seclusion by relinquishing ... With regard to these five seclusions one has purpose, one’s confidence is resolved, one’s mind is well set.\textsuperscript{115}

The five kinds of virāga, nirodha and vossagga are defined in precisely parallel terms.\textsuperscript{116} The full development of the bojjhaṅgas, factors of the path, indriyas and balas depend on seclusion, dispassion and cessation, and ripening in release, according to the Paṭisambhidāmagga, involves their mastery in all these different respects.

\textsuperscript{111} BHSD, s.v. vyavasarga; as Edgerton suggests, PED (s.vv. vossagga and vavassagga) gives unwarranted emphasis to the meaning ‘handing over, donation’.

\textsuperscript{112} E.g. M I 431; sometimes nibbidā is replaced by ekanta-nibbidā, complete or final disenchantment, see S V 82, 179, 255.

\textsuperscript{113} See above, p. 154

\textsuperscript{114} Paṭis II 219-24.

\textsuperscript{115} vikkhambhāna-viveko ca nīvaranānaṃ pathama-jhānaṃ bhāvayato, tad-āṅga-viveko ca diṭṭhi-gatānaṃ nibbedha-bhāgavatā samādhiṃ bhāvayato, samuccheda-viveko ca lokuttaraṃ khaya-gāmi-maggam bhāvayato, patipassaddhi-viveko ca phala-kkhag, nissaraṇa-viveko ca nirodho nibbāṇaṃ ... imesu pañcasu vivēkāsu chanda-jāto hoti saddhādhammito cittam cassa svadhiṭṭhitāṃ.

\textsuperscript{116} They correspond in part to the three kinds of pahāna (tad-āṅga, vikkhambhāna, samuccheda) discussed above, p. 49.
In principle the commentaries follow the *Patisambhidāmagga* in explaining the *viveka-nissita* formula, but it is worth noting that they appear to save their treatment of the formula for a *bojhaṅga* context. Thus the *Vibhaṅga* commentary again explains that there are five kinds of *viveka*: *tad-ariga-viveka* is a name for insight (*vipassanā*); *vikkhambhāna-viveka* is a name for the eight attainments (i.e. the four *jhānas* and four formless attainments); *samuccheda-viveka* is a name for the [transcendent] path; *paṭippassaddhi-viveka* is a name for fruition; *nissarana-viveka* is a name for *nibbāna*, which has relinquished all signs (*sabba-nimitta-nissatī nibbānām*). But having distinguished these five *vivekas*, the commentaries then suggest that three in particular could be seen as especially relevant to the development of the *bojhaṅgas*:

For thus the yogin who is engaged in the development of *sati-sambojhaṅga*, at the moment of insight develops *sati-sambojhaṅga* dependent on *tad-ariga-viveka* as to function, and dependent on *nissarana-viveka* as to aspiration; but at the time of the path [he develops it] dependent on *samuccheda-viveka* as to function, and dependent on *nissarana-viveka* as to object.

This, then, sees the development of the *bojhaṅgas* as confined to moments of ordinary insight meditation, and the time of attaining the transcendent path. However, the commentaries go on to refer to a view of some (who are not contradicted) that all five kinds of *viveka* are relevant to the *bojhaṅgas*; in other words, the *bojhaṅgas* are also developed directly in ordinary *jhāna* by ‘suppression’. I shall return to the significance of this below.

According to the commentaries *virūga-* and *nirōduha-nissita* are to be understood according to the same method as *viveka-nissita*. The term *vossagga* is, however, taken rather differently. As ‘giving up’ (*paricīga*) and ‘leaping forward’ (*pakkhandana*) it is twofold:

Therein *paricīga-vossagga* is the abandoning of defilements both at the moment of insight by virtue of substitution of opposites, and at the path moment by virtue of cutting off; *pakkhandana-vossagga* is the leaping forward to *nibbāna* at the moment of insight by inclination towards it, and at the path moment by making it the object.

So *vossagga* is seen both as a releasing of the defilements and as a releasing into *nibbāna*.

To sum up, while the *viveka-nissita* formula is applied to other items in the Nikāyas, it seems clear that it is to be considered as primarily characteristic of the treatment of the *bojhaṅgas*. Generally speaking the *viveka-nissita* formula

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117 Vibh-a 316; cf. Ps I 85; Spk III 139.
118 Ibid.: *tathā hi ayam sati-sambojhaṅga-bhāvanānyogam anuyutto yogī vipassana-kkhave kicca* *tad-ariga-viveka-nissitam*, *ajjhātayato nissarana-viveka-nissitam*, *magga-kāle pana kicca* *samuccheda-viveka-nissitam*, *ārammanato nissarana-viveka-nissitam* sati-sambojhaṅgaṃ bhāveti.
119 This view is confined to the explanation of the *viveka-nissita* formula in the context of the *bojhaṅgas*; in the context of the *ariyo ajjhāṅgiko maggo* it is omitted and not adapted to fit the maggaṅgas (Spk to S I 88).
120 Ibid.: ❡ esa nayo virūga-nissitādīsu.

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appears to focus on the active development of the factors in meditation, especially that kind of meditation that immediately inclines towards bodhi itself. In conclusion, it is worth noting Asaṅga’s rather neat correlation of the four parts of the viveka-niśrīta formula to the four truths: viveka-niśrīta corresponds to the first truth (duḥkha), virāga-niśrīta to the second truth (samudaya), nirodha-niśrīta to the third truth (nirodha), vyavasarga-parināta to the fourth truth (mārga).122

7. The bojjhaṅga process formula

In the previous section I pointed out that one of the ways in which the list of bojjhaṅgas is itemized in the Nikāyas is in terms of what I call the bojjhaṅga process formula:

When, bhikkhus, mindfulness is established for a bhikkhu, not lost, at that time the awakening-factor of mindfulness is instigated for him, at that time he develops the awakening-factor of mindfulness, at that time the awakening-factor of mindfulness comes to full development for a bhikkhu. Dwelling mindful in this way, he discriminates, inspects and applies investigation to that dhamma by means of wisdom.

When a bhikkhu who dwells mindful in this way discriminates, inspects and applies investigation to that dhamma by means of wisdom, at that time the awakening-factor of dhamma-discrimination is instigated for him, at that time he develops the awakening-factor of dhamma-discrimination, at that time the awakening-factor of dhamma-discrimination comes to full development for a bhikkhu. Discriminating, inspecting and applying investigation to that dhamma by means of wisdom, strength without slackness is instigated.

When for a bhikkhu, as he discriminates, inspects and applies investigation to that dhamma by means of wisdom, strength without slackness is instigated, at that time the awakening-factor of strength is instigated for him, at that time he develops the awakening-factor of strength, at that time the awakening-factor of strength comes to full development for a bhikkhu. For one who has instigated strength non-carnal joy arises.

When there arises for a bhikkhu who has instigated strength a non-carnal joy, at that time the awakening-factor of joy is instigated for him, at that time he develops the awakening-factor of joy, at that time the awakening-factor of joy comes to full development for that bhikkhu. The body and mind of one who is joyful becomes tranquil.

When both the body and mind of a bhikkhu whose mind is joyful become tranquil, at that time the awakening-factor of tranquillity is instigated for him, at that time he develops the awakening-factor of tranquillity, at that time the awakening-factor of tranquillity comes to full development for that bhikkhu. The mind of one who is tranquil in body and happy becomes concentrated.

When the mind of a bhikkhu who is tranquil in body and happy becomes concentrated, at that time the awakening-factor of concentration is instigated for him, at that time he develops the awakening-factor of concentration, at that time the awakening-factor of concentration comes to full development for that bhikkhu. He is one who properly oversees his mind thus concentrated.

When a bhikkhu is one who properly oversees his mind thus concentrated, at that time the awakening-factor of equipoise is instigated for him, at that time he

122 Abhidh-sam Trsl 122-3; in dealing with the seven sets Asaṅga here relates the viveka-niśrīta formula to the seven bodhy-āṅgas alone.
develops the awakening-factor of equipoise, at that time the awakening-factor of equipoise comes to full development for that bhikkhu.\textsuperscript{123}

In the four primary Nikāyas this formula is usually found in the context of discussion of mindfulness of breathing in and out (ānāpāna-sati),\textsuperscript{124} and is made rather a lot of. As I have already pointed out, the detailed account of ānāpāna-sati in the Nikāyas is given as illustrative of how, when developed and made great it fulfils the four establishments of mindfulness; when these are developed and made great, they fulfil the seven awakening-factors; when these are developed and made great they fulfil knowledge and liberation (vijjā-vimutti). In this context the boonhaṅga process formula is given in full four times in succession, illustrating how all seven boonhaṅgas come to fulfilment by way of mindfulness established by watching body, feelings, mind and dharmas. That the process formula should be regarded as a significant and characteristic treatment of the boonhaṅgas is surely confirmed by the way the Vibhaṅga singles it out at the opening of the suttanta-bhājaniya for the boonhaṅgas.\textsuperscript{125}

The process formula quite plainly views the boonhaṅgas as arising successively, one leading on to the next. Earlier, in discussing pīti and passaddhi, I drew attention to a recurring sequence of terms in the Nikāyas: pāmujja, pīti, passaddhi, sukha, samādhi. Among various examples, I referred to the way in

\textsuperscript{123} For references see previous section: yasmim samaye bhikkhave bhikkhuno upāṭhiṭatī satī hoti asammujjhā, sati-sambojñhango tasmīm samaye bhikkhuno āraddhō hoti, sati-sambojñhāgāṃ tasmīm samaye bhikkhuno bhāvanā-pāripūrīṃ gacchati, so tathā satō viharanto tam dhammam paññāya pavicinati pavicarati parīvīmaṃsam āpajāti. yasmim samaye bhikkhuno tathā satō viharanto tam dhammam paññāya pavicinati pavicarati parīvīmaṃsam āpajāti, yasmim samaye bhikkhuno tathā satō viharanto tam dhammam paññāya pavicinati pavicarati parīvīmaṃsam āpajāti, yasmim samaye bhikkhuno dhamma-vicaya-sambojñharigāṃ tasmīm samaye bhikkhuno āraddhō hoti ... tassa tam dhammam paññāya pavicinato pavicarato parīvīmaṃsam āpajāto āraddhāṃ hoti viriyam asalīṇam. yasmim samaye bhikkhuno tam dhammam paññāya pavicinato pavicaro parīvīmaṃsanā āpajato āraddhāṃ hoti viriyam asalīṇam, viriyva-sambojñhango tasmīm samaye bhikkhuno āraddhō hoti ... āraddhā-viriyassa uppaṭiāti pīti nirāmiṣā. yasmim samaye bhikkhuno āraddhā-viriyassa uppaṭiāti pīti nirāmiṣā, pīti-sambojñhango tasmīm samaye bhikkhuno āraddhō hoti ... pīti-manassa kāyo pī passambhāti cittam pi passambhāti. yasmim samaye bhikkhuno pīti-manassa kāyo pi passambhāti cittam pi passambhāti, passaddhi-sambojñhāṅgo tasmīm samaye bhikkhuno āraddhō hoti ... passaddha-kāyassa sukhino cittam samādhiyāti, yasmim samaye bhikkhuno passaddha-kāyassa sukhino cittam samādhiyāti, samādhi-sambojñhāṅgo tasmīm samaye bhikkhuno āraddhō hoti ... so tathā samāḥitam cittam sādhukāṃ ajjhuekkhitā hoti, yasmim samaye bhikkhuno tathā samāḥitam cittam sādhukāṃ ajjhuekkhitā hoti, upekkhā-sambojñhāṅgo tasmīm samaye bhikkhuno āraddhō hoti, upekkhā-sambojñhāṅgo tasmīm samaye bhikkhuno bhāvāṇā-pāripūrīṃ gacchāti. (Lamotte's quotation and translation at Traiṭī, III 1128-9 contain abbreviations that are not indicated.)

\textsuperscript{124} The one exception is S V 67-9.

\textsuperscript{125} Vibh 227; this is a rather barer version than the one given in the Nikāyas, but still in principle the same formula. The bodhya-āṅga process formula apparently does not survive in Sanskrit sources (Lamotte cites no parallel to the bodhya-āṅgas in the Amṛtaraṣa of Ghoṣaṅka seems to reflect this process formula: (‘Le yogin’) commémore les dharma conditionnés: ils naissent et prennent fin; de multiples façons, ils sont un mal. Le nīrāva est suprême. Tel est le membre “attention”. Ici, il discerne et médite—c'est le membre “discernement des dharma”. Ici, il médite et applique l'énergie—c'est le membre “énergie”. Ici, en acquérant la saveur des bons dharma, il se réjouit—c'est le membre “joie”. Ici, quand il médite, le corps et la pensée sont légers, dociles et en sécurité et ils s'adaptent à la concentration—c'est le membre “relaxation”. Ici, la pensée fixée sur l'objet reste sur place et ne se disperse pas—c'est le membre “concentration”. Ici, il laisse aller sa pensée à sa guise, il se repose, n'exercer plus l'attention et ne pratique pas non plus le zèle—c'est le membre “equanimité.” (Amṛta Trsl 206-7; cf. Satya Trsl 44.)
which the four jhānas are introduced in the silakkhandha-vagga of the Dīgha-nikāya. At this point it is worth considering this account more fully.\(^{126}\)

It begins by describing how the bhikkhu retires to a secluded (vivitta) place, sits down crosslegged and sets up mindfulness in front of him (parimukhaṃ satim upaṭṭhapetvā). There follows an extended description of the abandoning of each of the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa), each illustrated by its own simile. The arising of the first jhāna is then introduced:

For one who sees (samanupassato) these five hindrances abandoned in himself, gladness is born; for one who is gladdened, joy is born; the body of one whose mind is joyful becomes tranquil; one whose body is tranquil feels happiness; the mind of one who is happy becomes concentrated. Secluded from the objects of sensual desire, secluded from unskilful dhammas he attains and dwells in the first jhāna, accompanied by initial and sustained thinking, and joy and happiness born of seclusion.

The second jhāna is without initial and sustained thought but is still accompanied by joy and happiness, now said to be born of concentration (samādhija). In the third jhāna the bhikkhu is said to possess equipoise (upekkhaka), and is mindful and clearly comprehending. Finally the fourth jhāna is characterized as ‘purity of mindfulness [brought about] by means of equipoise’ (upekkhā-sati-pārisuddhi).

The wording of the introduction to the jhāna formula here parallels, in some places exactly, the wording of the bojjhanga process formula. Clearly this is no accident. The parallels between the full sāmañña-phala account of the practice of jhāna and the list of bojjhāgas can be set out in full as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sati-sambojjhāṅga} & \quad \text{parimukhaṃ satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā} \\
\text{dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhāṅga} & \quad \text{bhikkhu ime paṭica nīvaraṇe pahīne attani samanupassati; tass'imepāvika nīvaraṇepahīne attani samanupassato} \\
\text{(viriya-sambojjhāṅga)} & \quad \text{pāmuṣjaṃ jayati; pamuditassa pītī jayati; pītīmanassa} \\
\text{pītī-sambojjhāṅga} & \quad \text{kāyo passambhati; passaddha-kāyo sukham vedeti;} \\
\text{passaddhi-sambojjhāṅga} & \quad \text{sukhino cittam samādhiyati … savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekaṃ pītī-sukham pāthamaṃ jhānāṃ upasampajja viharati … avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhiyam pītī-sukham dutiya-jhānāṃ upasampajja viharati …} \\
\text{samādhi-sambojjhāṅga} & \quad \text{upekkhā-sambojjhāṅga} \\
\text{sukhaṃ ca kāyena paṭisamvedeti yan tam ariyā acikkhanti upekkhako satimā sukha-vihāri ti tatīya-jhānāṃ upasampajja viharati … upekkhā-sati-pārisuddhiṃ catuttha-jhānāṃ upasampajja viharati.}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{126}\) D 171-6.
Only *viriya-sambojjhāna* fails to find a direct parallel here.\(^{127}\) Of course, the stock phrase that here introduces the first *jhāna* does not always do so. Elsewhere the practice of *mettā*, *karunā*, *muditā* and *upekkhā* is introduced in a similar fashion.\(^{128}\) In this context an immediate referent for *sati-sambojjhāna* is also lacking. On other occasions, however, the stock description of the four *jhānas* is introduced rather differently in a way that gives rather greater prominence to both *viriya* and *sati*:

For me strength was instigated and not slack, *brāhmaṇa*; mindfulness was established and not lost; my body was tranquil and not agitated; my mind concentrated and one-pointed.\(^{129}\)

While the parallels here are not so complete, the language still echoes that of the *bojjhāna* process formula.

As was seen in the course of the discussion of *piti* and *passaddhi*, the process of the mind’s becoming still and concentrated is seen in terms of the mind’s overcoming of the immediate factors that trouble and disturb it; a mind free of these hindrances (*vinivarana-citta*) is content and settled, and provides the ground for the realization of the special teaching of Buddhas, namely the four noble truths. This is particularly clear in the stock progressive discourse (*anupubbi-kathā*),\(^{129}\) but no less clear in the full *sāmañña-phala* schema. The mind that has accomplished the practice of the four *jhānas* is described here as purified (*parisuddha*), cleansed (*pariyodita*), without blemish (*anarigana*), with the immediate defilements gone (*vigatupakkilesa*), soft (*mudu-bhiita*), ready (*kammaniya*), steady (*īha*), having gained an unwavering state (*dneya-ppattā*).\(^{131}\) Such a mind is seen as suited to the gaining of various kinds of knowledge,\(^{132}\) culminating once more in the knowledge of the destruction of the *āsavas* and knowledge of the four truths.\(^{133}\)

Essentially it would seem that the list of seven *bojjhāgas* is a shorthand way

\(^{127}\) The parallel between *dhamma-vicaya* and *samanupassati* is less explicit than the rest, but in this kind of context surely any derivative of *passati* can be seen as connoting *paññā* (= *dhamma-vicaya*). Cf. Vibh 194-202 (passim) which identifies *anupassanā* in the context of the *satipaṭṭhāna* formula with *paññā*.

\(^{128}\) M I 283: *tassa sabbehi imehi pāpakhe akusalehi dharmehi visuddham attanām samanupassato vimuttaṃ attanām samanupassato pāmuṇjum jayati ... sukino cittām samādhiyati. so mettā-sahagatena cetassā ekāṃ disam phārīvat viharatī ...* (Cf. M I 37-8 and other references given above, p. 154, n. 47.)

\(^{129}\) M I 21, 117: *āradhāham kho pana me brāhmaṇa viriyam ahosi asalīnaṃ, upatīṭhī sati asamujjīva, passaddho kāyo asāradaddho, samāhītan cītgam ekaggam.* (Cf. M I 242-7; Vin III 4; again this stock phrase does not only introduce the four *jhānas*, see M I 286, III 85-7; S IV 125; A I 148, 282; II 14.)

\(^{130}\) E.g. M I 379-80: ‘When the Blessed One knew that Upāli the householder’s mind was fit, ready, soft, free of hindrances, happy and settled, then he revealed the special *dhamma*-teaching of Buddhas: suffering, arising, cessation, path.’ (yadā bhagavā anādi Upāliṃ gahapatim kalla-cittām mune-cittām vinivarana-cittām udagga-cittām pasanna-cittām atha yā buddhānam sāmikkansikā dhamma-desanā taṃ pakāsesi: dukkham samudayaṃ nirodham maggam.)

\(^{131}\) See D I 76-83 (passim).

\(^{132}\) The eight *vijjā* (Vism VII 20), the last six of which are often referred to as *abhinnā* (D III 281), and the last three as *vijjā* (M I 482).

\(^{133}\) D I 83-4. The term *ariya-sacca* does not occur, but *āsavānaṃ khaya-ñānam* is described in terms of knowing (*pajñānī)* dukkha, dukkha-samudaya, dukkha-nirodha, and dukkha-nirodha-gām-ini paṭipada.
of looking at the same process: progressive development of the factors of mindfulness, dhāma-discrimination, strength, joy, tranquillity, concentration and equipoise is the immediate pre-requisite of awakening. What the process formula does is make explicit the way in which the sequence of seven bojjhāṅgas is tied more or less specifically to the immediate course the mind is understood to follow as it becomes still in concentration. In the context of the bojjhāṅgas this course culminates in a point of clarity and mental balance that provides the opportunity for what the texts see as a decisive spiritual breakthrough.

I referred in chapter one to a statement that occurs several times in the Nikāyas summarizing the Buddhist path as the abandoning of the five hindrances, establishing the mind in the four satipaṭṭhānas, development of the seven bojjhāṅgas and nibbāna. As I pointed out, the full Nikāya treatment of mindfulness of breathing in and out looks remarkably like an expanded illustration of this summary (or the latter like a short statement of the former). Thus mindfulness of breathing in and out is taken (from among various possibilities) as the vehicle for abandoning the five hindrances and developing the four satipaṭṭhānas; the full development of the satipaṭṭhānas is marked by the bojjhāṅga process formula—the mind becomes still in that particular kind of concentration that leads directly to knowledge and liberation (vijjā-vimutti).

All this is of some interest. It brings to life aspects of the earlier discussion of 'with regard for exposition' (pariyāyena) and 'not with regard for exposition' (nippariyāyena). It also shows how various different elements of Nikāya teaching are interwoven, and even inextricably tangled—at least from the perspective of the modern scholar trying to unravel and arrange the material from the point of view of its historical evolution.

When the Nikāyas tell us, then, that by way of a particular exposition (pariyāyena) the first jhāna is to be regarded as nibbāna, this is not to be dismissed as a mere trick of language. On the contrary, it points towards the fundamental orientation of the Nikāyas as regards spiritual development. For, as implied in the bojjhāṅga process formula, the process whereby the mind becomes still and happy in the first jhāna, temporarily escaping the disturbances that arise in connection with the objects of sensual desire, is directly analogous to the process whereby the mind is stilled by turning towards nibbāna, escaping once and for all from suffering. In the latter we do not have a radically different process, but rather the same process brought to its proper conclusion. For the Nikāyas there is an essential unity to progress along the spiritual path. The laws that govern such progress are the same at any point along the path, for the principles that underlie the workings of the mind are always the same, whether we are talking of ordinary jhāna or of knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas. That this should be so is seen simply as the nature of things; in short, it is dhamma.

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135 Cf. S V 73-4, which summarizes the path as indriya-saṇṭvara, three sucaritas, four satipaṭṭhānas, seven bojjhāṅgas, vijjā-vimutti; A V 113-8 adds to the beginning of the same sequence saddhamma-savana, saddha, yoniso manasikāra.
8. The bojjhanga-samyutta

Having considered the two basic formulaic treatments of the bojjhangas in the Nikāyas, the most convenient place to gain an impression of their general understanding in the Nikāyas is the bojjhanga-samyutta. The single most outstanding feature of the bojjhanga-samyutta is the way in which the bojjhangas are repeatedly contrasted with the five nivaranas or ‘hindrances’—around half the samyutta is devoted to this theme. This contrast of the bojjhāngas with the nivaranas is of considerable interest and includes a number of important treatments and passages not found elsewhere in the Nikāyas.

General features of the contrast

Frequently the five nivaranas are collectively and individually termed defilements (upakkilesa) or, more fully, ‘obstructions, hindrances, defilements of the mind that weaken wisdom’ (āvarana-nivarana cetaso upakkilesā paññāya dubbali-karaṇā). In contrast, the bojjhangas are ‘non-obstructions, non-hindrances, non-defilements of the mind’ (anāvarana anīvarana cetaso anupakkilesā). In other words, bringing out the force of the particular terminology a little more fully, the nivaranas are what cover over, close up and obscure the mind; the bojjhangas, on the other hand, uncover the mind and open it up. The general import of this contrast is brought out rather effectively by the image of great trees which grow over smaller trees causing them to rot and fall. Similarly the nivaranas grow over the mind weakening wisdom; but the bojjhāngas ‘not growing over the mind, when developed and made great conduct to realization of the fruit of knowledge and freedom’ (cetaso anājñātā bhāvita bahulikāti vijjā-vimuttī-phala-sacchikiriyāya saṁvattanti).

In another passage the nivaranas are described as ‘causing blindness, lack of sight and lack of knowledge, destroying wisdom, contributing to distress and not conducing to nibbāna’ (andha-karaṇa acakkhu-karaṇa aṅāna-karaṇa paññānirodhikā vighata-pakkhiyā anibbāna-saṁvattanikā). The bojjhangas, however, cause sight and knowledge, increase wisdom, contribute to absence of distress and conduct to nibbāna’ (cakkhu-karaṇa aṅāna-karaṇa paññā-vuddhiyo avighata-pakkhiyā nibbāna-saṁvattanikā). Again, it is said that the mind possessed (pariyuṭṭhita) and overcome (pareta) by any one of the five nivaranas constitutes the cause (hetu) and condition (paccaya) for not knowing and not seeing,
whereas the mind that has developed the bojjhāṇgas constitutes the cause and condition for knowing and seeing.\footnote{S V 126-8.}

Two further similes should be mentioned here. These both illustrate the way in which the nīvaraṇas hinder the mind, and are both immediately followed by a simple statement that the bojjhāṇgas are what do not hinder or obstruct the mind. In the first of these similes,\footnote{F.L. Woodward misconstrues na ca pabhassaram pabhāṅgu ca (S Trsl V 77-8: ‘nor gleaming, nor easily broken up’); na governs only pabhassaram. Of the mind that has the attribute of pabhāṅgu, the commentary states that ‘its nature is to be broken up by undergoing the state of being broken into pieces with regard to the object’ (Spk III 151: ārammane cenna-vicenna-bhāvapagamena bhijjana-sabbhāvam).} the defilement of the mind by the five nīvaraṇas is likened to the defilement of unworked gold (jātā-rūpa) by various impurities; as a result of this the gold is not soft, not ready or workable, not bright, liable to break up, and not properly suitable for working (upakkiliṭṭhāṃ jātā-rūpaṃ na ceva muḍu hoti na ca kammaniyām na ca pabhassaram pabhāṅgu ca na ca sammā upeti kammatāya).\footnote{S V 92-3.} In the same way the nīvaraṇas result in the mind’s not being soft, not being ready, not being bright, being liable to break up; thus it does not become properly concentrated for [the task of] destroying the āsavas (na ca sammā samādhiyati āsavāṇām khayāya).

The other passage\footnote{S V 121-6.} concerns a brāhmaṇa who questions the Buddha about the cause and condition whereby verses that have been long learnt sometimes become unclear (dīgha-rattām sajjhāya-katā pi mantā na paṭibhati), and why verses that have not been long learnt sometimes become clear. The Buddha responds with an extended and detailed simile concerning the nature of each of the nīvaraṇas. The mind possessed and overcome by attraction for the objects of sensual desire (kāma-rāga-pariyuṭṭhita, kāma-rāga-pareta) is like a bowl of water mixed with lac or turmeric, or with blue or red colouring; a person with good eyesight looking down into this bowl of water for the reflection of his own face would not know and see it as it is.\footnote{seyyathāpi brāhmaṇa udā-patto agginā santatto ukkaṭṭhito usmudaka-jāto; the mind possessed and overcome by laziness and sleepiness (thina-middha) is like a bowl of water covered with moss and leaves (uua-patto sevāla-pañaka-pariyonaddho); the mind possessed and overcome by excitement and depression (uddhacca-kukkucca) is like a bowl of water ruffled by the wind, disturbed, stirred round and rippling (uda-patto väterito calito bhanto āmi-jāto); finally the mind possessed and overcome by doubt (vicikiccā) is like a bowl of water that is dirty, unclear, muddy and placed in the dark (uda-patto āvilo lulito kalali-bhāto andha-kāre nikkhitto). Again, anyone looking down into any of these for the reflection of his face would not know and see it as it is. In the same way, when the mind is possessed and overcome by any one}
of the nīvaraṇas one does not know (and see) as it is its letting go, what is of benefit to oneself, what is benefit to others, what is of benefit to both; verses which have long been learnt become unclear, let alone those which have not been learnt.\(^{147}\) A mind not possessed or overcome by the nīvaraṇas, however, is like a bowl of water unmixed with lac or turmeric, or blue or red colouring; like a bowl of water that has not been heated on a fire, is not steaming and boiling; like a bowl of water not covered with moss and leaves; like a bowl of water not ruffled by the wind, undisturbed, not stirred round, not rippling; like a bowl of water that is clear, bright, clean and placed in the light (\textit{accho vippasanno anāvilo āloke nikkhītto}). Anyone looking down into such a bowl of water for the reflection of his face would know and see it just as it is. In the same way, when the mind is not possessed and overcome by the nīvaraṇas, one knows (and sees) as it is their letting go, what is of benefit to oneself, to others and to both; verses that have not been long learnt become clear, let alone those that have.

\textit{Food for the nīvaraṇas and food for the bojjhāgas}

One of the most important aspects of the treatment of the contrast between the nīvaraṇas and bojjhāgas is the account of the way in which they both have their particular sets of foods (āhāra). The theme of the foods for the nīvaraṇas and bojjhāgas is one that is repeated several times in the bojjhāga-saṃyutta.\(^{148}\) The general principle is stated as follows:

\begin{quote}
Just as, bhikkhus, this body needs food for its subsistence, subsists conditioned by food, and without food does not subsist, just so, bhikkhus, the five nīvaraṇas need food for their subsistence, subsist conditioned by food, and without food do not subsist ... Just so, bhikkhus, the seven bojjhāgas need food for their subsistence, subsist conditioned by food, and without food do not subsist.\(^{149}\)
\end{quote}

How this is so is then elaborated in some detail and in the present context is most conveniently set out in tabular form.\(^{150}\) The basic principles can be summed up as follows: improper or inappropriate bringing to mind (\textit{ayoniso manasikāra}) of particular items is food for the nīvaraṇas; proper or appropriate bringing to mind (\textit{yoniso manasikāra}) of particular items is food for the bojjhāgas.

This kind of treatment directly relates actual spiritual practice in the Nikāyas to what are sometimes viewed as the more purely philosophical and theoretical portions of the Nikāyas, namely the notions of causality and conditionality. What we have here are essentially instances and illustrations of the well known general statement of conditioned arising:

\begin{quote}
\textit{147} nissaraṇanam yathā-bhūtam na pañjānītī; attatthagam pi tasmin samaye yathā-bhūtam na jānāti na passati; paratthagam ... ubhayaṣṭham pi tasmin samaye yathā-bhūtam na jānāti na passati; dīgha-ṛattam sajāhīya-katā pi mantā na paṭibhantī paṭeva asajāhīya-katā.
\textit{148} See S V 64-7; cf. 84-5, 93-4.
\textit{149} S V 64-5: seyyathāpi bhikkhave avam kāyo āhāra-ṭhitikā āhāram paṭicca tiṣṭhanti anāhārito tiṣṭhāti, evam eva kho bhikkhave pañca nīvarānā āhāra-ṭhitikā āhāram paṭicca tiṣṭhanti anāhārā no tiṣṭhāti.
\textit{150} See Table 5, p. 176.
### TABLE 5. FOOD AND NOT-FOOD FOR THE HINDRANCES AND FACTORS OF AWAKENING

#### A Food for the arising of hindrances that have not arisen, and for the increase and growth of hindrances that have arisen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Making great improper bringing to mind (ayoniso-manasikārā-bahulikārā) of:</th>
<th>Food for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. the sign of the beautiful (subha-nimitta)</td>
<td>- kāma-cchanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. the sign of the hateful (patigha-nimitta)</td>
<td>- vyāpāda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. non-delight, laziness, languor, drowsiness after eating, mental depression (arati vijambhita bhatta-samaddo cetaso ca linattam)</td>
<td>- thīna-middha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. mental disquiet (cetaso avtipasamo)</td>
<td>- uddhacca-kukkucca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. dhammas that provide a basis for doubt (vikīkiccha-thīniyā dhammā)</td>
<td>- vīkīkicchā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B Food for the arising of bojjhāngas that have not arisen, and for the development and completion of bojjhāngas that have arisen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Making great proper bringing to mind (yoniso-manasikārā-bahulikārā) of:</th>
<th>Food for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. dhammas that provide a basis for sati-sambojjhā</td>
<td>- sati-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. dhammas that are skilful-unskilful (kusalikusala), blameworthy-blameless (saṇṭājīnaṇāvajjī), inferior-refined (kaṇha-panita), belong to darkness or light (kaṇha-sukka-ppattihāga)</td>
<td>- dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. the bases of instigation (ārambhā-dhātu), exertion (nikkama), valour (parakkama)</td>
<td>- viriya-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. dhammas that provide a basis for pīti-sambojjhā</td>
<td>- pīti-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. tranquillity of body and mind (kāya-, citta-passaddhi)</td>
<td>- passaddhi-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. the sign of calm (samatha) and of non-distraction (avayagga)</td>
<td>- samādhī-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. dhammas that provide a basis for upekkhā-sambojjhā</td>
<td>- upekkhā-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### C Not food for the arising of hindrances that have not arisen, nor for the increase and growth of those that have risen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Making great proper bringing to mind of:</th>
<th>Not food for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. the sign of the ugly (asubha)</td>
<td>- kāma-cchanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. the liberation of heart that is loving-kindness (mettā-ceto-vimuttī)</td>
<td>- vyāpāda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. the bases of instigation, exertion and valour</td>
<td>- thīna-middha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. mental quiet</td>
<td>- uddhacca-kukkucca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. dhammas that are skilful-unskilful, blameworthy-blameless, inferior-refined, belong to darkness or light</td>
<td>- vīkīkicchā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### D Not food for the arising of bojjhāngas that have not arisen, nor for the development and completion of those that have arisen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not making great bringing to mind (amanasikārā-bahulikārā) of:</th>
<th>Not food for:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. dhammas that provide a basis for sati-sambojjhā</td>
<td>- sati-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. dhammas that are skilful-unskilful (kusalikusala), blameworthy-blameless (saṇṭājīnaṇāvajjī), inferior-refined (kaṇha-panita), belong to darkness or light</td>
<td>- dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. the bases of instigation, exertion and valour</td>
<td>- viriya-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. dhammas that provide a basis for pīti-sambojjhā</td>
<td>- pīti-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. tranquillity of body and mind</td>
<td>- passaddhi-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. the sign of calm and of non-distraction</td>
<td>- samādhī-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. dhammas that provide a basis for upekkhā-sambojjhā</td>
<td>- upekkhā-sambojjhā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When this is, that is; due to the arising of this, that arises. When this is not, that is not; due to the ceasing of this, that ceases.\textsuperscript{151}

In the present context the discussion of the particular foods for the nīvaranās and bojjhāngas tends to dissolve any distinctions between speculative philosophy and meditation practice. For to abandon the nīvaranās and develop the bojjhāngas is to see and understand how certain things feed the nīvaranās and certain things feed the bojjhāngas. This is to know how one thing arises conditioned by another, which is, of course, to know paṭicca-samuppāda.

The bojjhāngas and wanderers of other schools

Three of the longer suttas in the bojjhāṅga-samyutta concerned with the nīvarana/bojjhāṅga contrast centre on the difference between the teaching of wanderers belonging to other schools (añña-tittihiyā paribbājaka) and the teaching of the Buddha in this respect.\textsuperscript{152}

The first opens with an account of how a number of wanderers belonging to other schools claim in the presence of some bhikkhus that they also teach dhamma consisting of the abandoning of the five nīvaranās and development of the seven bojjhāngas. So, ask the wanderers, what is the distinction, what the difference between the dhamma-teaching and instruction of the samana Gotama and their own?\textsuperscript{153} The bhikkhus make no response, but put the matter before the Buddha. There is, says the Buddha, a way of exposition (pariyāya) according to which the five nīvaranās are ten and the seven bojjhāngas fourteen; questioned about this, the wanderers of other schools will be unable to respond, for there is no-one in the world save a Tathāgata or the pupil of a Tathāgata who might satisfy the mind with an answer to this question.

So how are the five nīvaranās ten, and the seven bojjhāngas fourteen? In the case of the nīvaranās, sensual desire (kāma-cchanda), aversion (vyāpāda) and doubt (vicikicchā) can each be viewed as a pair by virtue of their being either ‘within’ or of oneself (ajñātta) or ‘without’ or of another (bahiddhā).\textsuperscript{154} Laziness and sleepiness (thīna-middha) and excitement and depression (udāhacca-kukkucca) can each be viewed as a pair by taking laziness and excitement as separate from sleepiness and depression. As for the bojjhāngas, mindfulness, dhamma-discrimination and equipoise are each considered pairs by virtue of their being either dhammas that are within or dhammas that are without. Joy and concentration are pairs because they may be either associated with or dissociated from initial and sustained thinking.

\textsuperscript{151} E.g. M II 32; S II 65: imasmīm sati idām hoti; imass’uppāda idām uppajjati. imasmīm asati idām na hoti; imassa nirodhā idām nirūjhatti.

\textsuperscript{152} See S V 108-21.

\textsuperscript{153} S V 108: samāno āvuso Gotamo sāvakānaṁ evam dhammam deseti. etha tumhe bhikkhave pañca nīvarete pahāya ... satta bojjhange yathā-bhūtam bhāvethā ti. mayam pi bho āvuso sāvakānam evam dhammam desema ... idha nu āvuso ko visesa ko adhippayo kim nānā-karanām samanassā vā Gotamassā amhākaṃ vā yad-idaṃ dhamma-desanāya vā dhamma-desanāṃ anussāsaniyā vā anussāsanānī ti.

\textsuperscript{154} For this understanding of ājñhattaṁ bahiddhā, cf. Dhs 187.
Tranquillity and strength may be either of the body or of the mind.\textsuperscript{155}

It is important to note that this exposition involves making distinctions between items according to principles that are taken up and explored in full in the early Abhidhamma. In effect we have a particular application of a method that finds comprehensive expression in the Abhidhamma mātikā of the Dhammasaṅgani. The particularity of the method’s application here is evident from the fact that from the broader perspective of the Dhammasaṅgani it could have been done differently. That is to say, there is no absolute reason why mindfulness, like joy and concentration, should not be considered as two by virtue of its association with or dissociation from initial and sustained thinking.

This suggests that there is intended to be a particular point to the way in which each item is divided into a pair. It is perhaps worth briefly considering this with regard to the bojjhaṅgas.

The way in which joy and concentration each form a pair by virtue of association with or dissociation from initial and sustained thinking further suggests the parallels that exist between the bojjhaṅgas and the description of jhāna, for the stilling (vīpasama) of initial and sustained thought is precisely what marks the transition from first to second jhāna. Next, strength and tranquillity seem to be viewed as complementary pairs balancing each other. Finally, mindfulness, dhamma-discrimination and equipoise are three items that are seen as actively involved in the discernment of dhammas in general. If joy, concentration, strength and tranquillity are what prepare and make the mind receptive and ready for bodhi, mindfulness, dhamma-discrimination and equipoise actively promote bodhi.

The theme of the particular nature of the various bojjhaṅgas is taken further in the second treatment\textsuperscript{156} that concerns wanderers of other schools. This treatment is introduced in precisely the same way as the first, but this time the Buddha states that the wanderers will be unable to respond when questioned about which bojjhaṅgas are inappropriate and which appropriate for development when the mind is depressed or slack (līna), and which are inappropriate and appropriate when the mind is excited or overactive (uddhatta). The Buddha goes on to explain that when the mind is depressed, then is not the right time (akāla) to develop tranquillity, concentration and equipoise; to do so would be to act like the man who throws wet grass, and so on, on to a small fire that he wants to blaze up. However, this is the right time (kāla) to develop dhamma-discrimination, strength, and joy; just as someone should throw dry grass, and so on, on to a small fire that he wants to blaze up. When the mind is excited, then is not the right time to develop dhamma-discrimination, strength and joy; to do so would be to act like the man who throws dry grass, and so on, on to a great fire that he wants to put out. However, it is the right time to develop tranquillity, concentration and equipoise; just as someone should

\textsuperscript{155} This fourteenfold analysis of the bojjhaṅgas also forms one of the principal parts of their suttanta-bhājaniya treatment at Vibh 228.

\textsuperscript{156} S V 112-5.
throw wet grass, and so on, on to a great fire that he wants to put out. As for mindfulness, this is always of benefit (sabbathika).^{157}

In the third treatment^{158} the nature of the wanderers' claim is somewhat different: like the Buddha they too teach dhamma that consists of abandoning the five nivaraṇas and dwelling suffusing the whole world with a mind that is accompanied by love (mettā), compassion (karunā), sympathetic joy (muditā) and equipoise (upekkhā)—a mind that is full (vipula), become great (mahaggata), immeasurable (appamāna), without hostility (avera) and without hatred (avyāpajjha).^{159} When the matter is put before the Buddha, he answers that the wanderers will not be able to respond when questioned about how these four freedoms of mind (ceto-vimutti) are developed (katham bhavita), their outcome (kim-gatika), their perfection (kim-paramā), their fruit (kim-phalā) and their conclusion (kim-pariyosānā). A detailed explanation of these questions is then given.

A bhikkhu develops the seven bojjhāṅgas each dependent on seclusion, dispassion and cessation and ripening in release; in addition each is accompanied by mettā. He then, if he wishes, dwells with the idea of the repulsive in what is not repulsive (so sace ākanikhati appatikkūle paṭikkūla-saññī vihareyyan ti paṭikkūla-saññī tatha viharati). He may dwell with the idea of the unrepulsive in what is repulsive; with the idea of what is unrepulsive in both what is repulsive and unrepulsive. Avoiding both the unrepulsive and the repulsive he may dwell with equipoise, mindful, clearly comprehending (appatikkulai ca patikkulai ca tad ubhayam abhinivajeto upekkhako vihareyyaṁ sato sampajāno ti upekkhako tattha viharati sato sampajāno). Or:

He attains and dwells in the liberation that is beautiful. I declare, bhikkhus, that the beautiful is the perfection of the freedom of mind that is mettā. Here a bhikkhu has wisdom, [although] not penetrating to a higher freedom.^{160}

The exposition for karunā, muditā and upekkhā follows that for mettā, except that what is declared as the perfection is different in each case: the sphere of infinite space (ākāśānañcāyatana) is the perfection of the freedom of mind that is karunā; the sphere of infinite consciousness (viññānañcāyatana) is the perfection of the freedom of mind that is muditā; the sphere of nothingness (aśīnañcāyatana) is the perfection of the freedom of mind that is upekkhā.

The development of the bojjhāṅgas is here considered in the context of the practice of mettā, karunā, muditā and upekkhā. This is perhaps slightly unexpected in that the consideration of the viveka-nissita formula showed that for the commentaries the bojjhāṅgas are characteristically developed at the time of insight practice and the arising of the transcendent path and fruit. However, as

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^{157} Cf. the following analysis of the bodhi-āṅgas given by Harivarman (Satya Trsl 448-9) and Asanga (Wayman, Śrāvakabhāmi, p. 109): dharma-pravicaya, viśaya and pratti constitute vipaśyanā; prasrabdhī, samādhi and upekkṣā constitute śamatha; smṛti is either.

^{158} S V 115-21.

^{159} The stock Nikāya description of the practice of mettā, karunā, muditā and upekkhā is given in full here; cf. D I 250; III 223; M II 76; A II 130; IV 300; Vibh 272.

^{160} S V 119: subhaṁ va kho pana vimoikkham upasampajja viharati. subha-paramānaṁ bhikkhave mettā-ceto-vimuttim vadāmi. idha paññassa bhikkhuno uttararo vimuttoṁ apaṭṭivijjato.
I noted above, the commentaries do suggest that this is not quite the whole story. What they have to say on this point is now worth quoting in full:

For there are those who bring out the bojjhangas not in respect of the moments of strong insight, path and fruit alone; they also bring them out in respect of kasina-jhānas that are a basis for insight, breathing-in-and-out, ugliness, and divine-abiding jhānas. And they are not contradicted by the teachers of the aṭṭhakathās.\(^{161}\)

Although it is not cited as such, the above account of the practice of mettā, and so on, would appear to be the kind of passage the commentaries have in mind when they say that the bojjhangas can be brought out in respect of divine-abiding jhānas. A few pages later in the bojjanaga-samyutta, the ānāpāna-vagga\(^{162}\) is devoted to a description of how the bojjhangas are developed in association with various meditation subjects, including the ‘divine abidings’: the ideas of (i) the skeleton, (ii) the worm infested corpse, (iii) the discoloured corpse, (iv) the rotting corpse, (v) the bloated corpse; (vi) mettā, (vii) karunā, (viii) muditā, (ix) upekkhā, (x) breathing in and out. Here, then, we have ugliness and breathing-in-and-out jhāna. The development of the bojjhangas in association with these is said to be of great fruit and benefit (mahā-phala, mahānīsamsa); either knowledge in the here and now (dīṭṭhe va dhamme aṇāṇa) or, if there is a residuum of attachment, the state of non-return (sati vā upādi-sese anāgāmitā) is to be expected as a result.

So how is the series of suttas concerning the relationship of the Buddha’s teaching to that of wanderers of other schools to be interpreted? It is surely striking that in none of the three cases is the Buddha represented as categorically denying the wanderers’ claim to a teaching that bears some similarity to his own—a fact which the commentary seems to want to play down.\(^{163}\) In other words, the Nikāyas seem to accept some form of basic common ground between the Buddha and the wanderers.\(^{164}\) So while we do have what amounts to a claim of superiority on the part of the Nikāyas, there is a certain subtlety to their argument here. The wanderers of other schools may abandon the five nīvarṇas and develop the seven bojjhangas, but the full potential inherent in this practice is not understood or fulfilled by them. In short, they do not really understand what they are doing.

Johannes Bronkhorst has argued that the four jhānas represent a characteristically Buddhist meditation tradition—a tradition original to the Buddha and quite distinct from the ‘main stream’ severely ‘ascetic’ non-Buddhist meditation

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162 S V 129-32; cf. the nirodha-vagga (S V 132-4). S V 312 also relates the bojjhangas to ānāpāna.

163 The wanderers do not really teach the abandoning of the nīvarṇas and the development of the bojjhangas. They merely overhear the Buddha teaching and then return to their own ārāma where they teach their own followers making it appear that the method has been penetrated as a result of their own knowledge (Spk III 168-9).

164 On the question of a common ground with the paribbajaka tradition, cf. Frauwallner, HIP I 135.
According to Bronkhorst, this distinctively Buddhist meditation is described in the texts as 'a pleasant experience, accompanied by joy (pītī), and bliss (sukha), or bliss alone, in all but the highest stages, whereas non-Buddhist meditation is not described as pleasurable'. While Bronkhorst’s basic thesis concerning the existence of two meditation traditions is not without its attractions, it seems to me that we cannot dismiss the idea of a ‘pre-Buddhistic’ form of ‘Buddhist meditation’ quite so readily as he suggests.

Towards the end of his study Bronkhorst writes:

We have become acquainted with a number of descriptions of non-Buddhist religious practice in the Buddhist canon in the course of this book. None of them ascribe to outsiders what we have come to regard as authentic Buddhist meditation.

Yet, if I am right concerning the nature of the bojjaṅga list (namely that it links directly into a range of ideas associated with the jhānas and is intended to characterize a particular variety of jhāna) then surely in preserving the wanderers’ claim that they too taught the abandoning of the nīvaraṇas and development of the bojjaṅgas the Nikāyas do preserve a tradition of ‘non-Buddhists’ practising ‘Buddhist meditation’. That is to say, it is not unreasonable to see in the wanderers’ claim a reflection of a historical situation where various groups, among them the Buddha and his followers, practised a form of meditation distinct from what Bronkhorst identifies as the main stream ascetic tradition.

If we bear in mind the way in which the bojjaṅgas are related to various meditation subjects, the point in all this would seem to be not that the Buddha teaches new or original meditation subjects, but that he is unsurpassed in defining the finer points of technique and relating these to progress towards the final goal. This further brings out the way in which the bojjaṅga list focuses on bodhi as a kind of jhāna. What we are concerned with is the transition from ordinary jhāna to the special jhāna that is bodhi itself. The various expositions that are here presented as the particular domain of the Buddha and his followers are concerned with seeing the precise nature of the items in question; this involves knowing how they stand in relationship to each other and how they interact. This once more brings us to the realm of ‘causality’ or ‘conditionality’ represented by paṭicca-samuppāda, or the realm of discriminating dhammas and discerning dhamma. In terms of Nikāya psychology what we are concerned with is wisdom (pāññā)—the wisdom that discerns dhamma and dhammas, and that knows the nature of suffering, its cessation and what brings about both. Thus what is claimed as distinctive about the teaching of the Buddha is that it always perfectly relates the

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165 See his The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India, Stuttgart, 1986.
166 Id., p. 17.
167 Id., p. 116.
168 Note that the phrase used here to describe the abandoning of the nīvaraṇas (paṇca nīvaraṇa pahāya cetaso upakkilese paṇñāya dubbali-karane) is regularly used to introduce the stock description of the jhānas; see D III 49; M I 52, 181, 270, 276, 347; III 4, 36, 136; A III 93, 100, 386-7; IV 195.
abandoning of the nivaranas and the development of the bojjhaṅgas to progress towards the cessation of suffering. It is the completeness of the Buddha’s teaching in this respect that is emphasized, rather than its radical departure from the wanderers’ teaching. What this seems to show is how the Nikāyas present the special dhamma teaching of the Buddhas not as something extra simply tacked on at the end, but as something that imbues the whole teaching.

The bojjhaṅgas and the seven treasures of the cakka-vattin king

Finally, it seems worth singling out one rather brief sutta that does, however, give a name to a whole vagga of the bojjhaṅga-samyutta:169

Due to the appearance of a cakka-vattin king there is the appearance of seven treasures. Which seven? There is the appearance of the wheel-treasure ... the elephant-treasure ... the horse-treasure ... the gem-treasure ... the woman-treasure ... the master-treasure ... the counsellor-treasure. Due to the appearance of a Tathāgata, an arahant, a fully awakened one there is the appearance of the seven treasures of the awakening-factors. Which seven? There is the appearance of the treasure of the awakening-factor of mindfulness ... of the awakening-factor of equipoise.170

In a number of places the ‘wheel-turning’ king is seen as some kind of counterpart to a Buddha; they are two varieties of the ‘great man’ (mahā-purusa). The interest of the present sutta lies in the way it is indicative of how the world of the cakka-vattin king (as described in the Mahāsūddassana- and Cakkavattisīhanāda-suttas, for example) might be viewed as a more complete mythological counterpart to the teaching of a Buddha. It is in this light that the commentary appears to explore the relationship between the treasures and the bojjhaṅgas:

For just as the wheel-treasure of the cakka-vattin is the leader of all [other] treasures, so the treasure of the awakening-factor of mindfulness is the leader of all dhammas belonging to the four levels. Thus in the sense of leading it is like the wheel-treasure of the cakka-vattin king. Next among the treasures of the cakka-vattin is the elephant treasure, formed of a great body, towering, vast, great. So too the treasure of the awakening-factor of dhamma-discrimination is formed of the great body of dhamma, is towering, vast, great. It is thus like the elephant-treasure. The horse-treasure of the cakka-vattin is swift and quick running. So too the treasure of the awakening-factor of strength is swift and quick running. Thus because of its swiftness and quick running it is like the horse-treasure. The gem-treasure of the cakka-vattin disperses darkness and reveals light. So too the treasure of the awakening-factor of joy, because of its extreme skillfulness disperses the darkness of defilements and by virtue of conascence condition, etc. reveals the light of knowledge. Thus because of its dispersing darkness and revealing light it is like the gem-treasure. The woman-treasure of the cakka-vattin tranquillizes the

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169 The cakkavatti-vagga, S V 98-102.
strain of body and mind, and soothes fever. So too the treasure of the awakening-factor of tranquillity tranquillizes the strain of body and mind, and soothes fever. Thus it is like the woman-treasure. The master-treasure of the cakka-vattin, by providing wealth at exactly the desired moment, cuts off distraction and makes for a one-pointed mind. So too the treasure of the awakening-factor of concentration, by virtue of its being as desired, etc. accomplishes absorption and, cutting off distraction, makes for a one-pointed mind. The adviser-treasure of the cakka-vattin, by everywhere accomplishing what needs to be done, makes for few concerns. So too the treasure of the awakening-factor of equipoise frees the mind from sluggishness and over-activity and, establishing it in balanced application, makes for few concerns. It is thus like the adviser treasure.171

9. The boj̄haṅgas according to the commentaries

With regard to the seven boj̄haṅgas the commentaries give the following analysis in a number of places:

Awakening-factors are ‘the factors of awakening (bodhi) or of the one awakening (bodhin)’. The following is what is said. The assemblage of dhammas designated by mindfulness, dhamma-discrimination, strength, joy, tranquillity, concentration and equipoise, and which is opposed to various dangers such as slackness and excitement, resting and exertion, engagement in sensual pleasure or (self-)torment, adherence to annihilationism or eternalism, when it occurs at the moment of the transcendent path is called ‘awakening’ (bodhi) with reference to the fact that the noble disciple awakens by means of this assemblage of dhammas. He awakens, i.e. he emerges from the sleep of the stream of defilements: either he penetrates the four noble truths or simply he realizes nibbāna, is what is said. Awakening-factors are, then, ‘factors of awakening’ [where awakening is] a designation for an assemblage of dhammas—like jhāna-factors, path-factors and so on. However, with reference to the fact that he is one who awakens by means of this assemblage of dhammas in the aforesaid manner the noble disciple is called ‘awakening’ (bodhin). [So] awakening-factors are also ‘factors of one awakening’—like parts of an army, parts of a chariot and so on. Accordingly the teachers of the attihakathās have said: ‘Awakening-factors are the factors of a person who is waking up.’172
The commentaries here take the transcendent path consciousness as the basis for the normative account of the bojjhangas, and ignore the possibility of ‘bringing out’ (uddharati) bojjhangas in the ordinary lokiya types of jhāna mentioned above. The explanation involves a play both on bodhi- (bodhi or bodhī) and on the various meanings of anga—‘limb’, ‘factor’, ‘part’.

In the first place the bojjhangas are seen as seven ‘factors’ that can collectively be called ‘awakening’. This same awakening is then described as penetrating the four truths or simply realizing or making visible (sacchikaroti) nibbāna, which are presumably offered as two ways of looking at the same thing. A little after the quoted passage, the Vibhaṅga commentary adds that seven bojjhangas are distinguished by reason of their each performing a particular function with regard to just one object. From the point of view of Abhidhamma, then, awakening is taken as what occurs when these seven dhammas take nibbāna as their object. This is to be compared, it is suggested, to the way in which jhāna is what occurs when the five jhāna-factors, having been brought to full strength, take the ‘semblance sign’ (paṭibhāga-nimitta) as their object.

Secondly, ‘awakening’ is taken as the ‘one who is awakening’ (bodhin) or the ‘person waking up’ (bujjhano puggalo). The seven bojjhangas are then seen as like the limbs or parts of the body of that person. This image is then further likened to the ‘parts of an army’ or the ‘parts of a chariot’. Presumably what is intended is that an army requires various different parts (e.g. elephants, horses, chariots, foot soldiers) in order to be effective as an army. Again, a chariot requires certain essential parts to function properly. Without these parts both are ineffectual or incapacitated. Similarly, then, the person who is awakening needs mindfulness, dhamma-discrimination, strength, joy, tranquillity, concentration and equipoise or else he cannot properly be that person.

Immediately following the passage quoted above, the commentaries quote the explanation of the Paṭisambhidāmagga:

They are awakening factors because they conduce to awakening; they are awakening-factors because they awaken; they are awakening-factors because they awaken further; they are awakening-factors because they awaken again; they are awakening-factors because they awaken fully.

These are in fact only the first five of 609 answers the Paṭisambhidāmagga gives


Vibh-a 311: idāni nesam ekasmiṃ yevārammaṇe attano attano kicca-vasena nāma-karanam dassetum tathā katama sati-sambojjhangato ti ādi ṛuddham.

Paṭis II 115: bodhīya samvattanti ti bojjhangā; bujhātī ti bojjhangā, anubujjhantī ti bojjhangā; paṭibujjhantī ti bojjhangā; sambujjhantī ti bojjhangā.
to the question: 'In what sense are they awakening-factors?'\textsuperscript{177} The \textit{Patisambhidā} commentary no doubt correctly relates 'they awaken' (\textit{bujjhanti}), 'they awaken further' (\textit{anubujjhanti}), 'they awaken again' (\textit{patibujjhanti}) and 'they awaken fully' (\textit{sambujjhanti}) to the four stages of the transcendent path: stream-attainment, once-return, non-return and \textit{arahant}-ship.\textsuperscript{178} Essentially the \textit{Pati Sambhidā} explanations again focus on the \textit{bojjhangas} as collectively achieving the event designated \textit{bodhi}.

Just how \textit{bodhi} is understood is worth exploring a little further. In defining \textit{bodhi-pakkhiya} the commentaries take \textit{bodhi} in one of two ways: either as knowledge (\textit{nāna}) with regard to the four transcendent noble paths (\textit{ariya-magga}) or as the noble person (\textit{ariya-pāgala}).\textsuperscript{179} The second of these corresponds to the explanation of the \textit{bojjhangas} as the \textit{āṅgas} of the \textit{ariya-sāvaka}. The first, however, makes explicit a different dimension: awakening is seen as essentially a species of knowledge, that is, an awakening to something. Of course, this conception of \textit{bodhi} is virtually stated in the \textit{bojjhanga} passage when \textit{bodhi} is equated with penetrating the four truths. However, this narrow and strict way of taking \textit{bodhi} as a particular knowledge is already quite explicit in the \textit{Mahāniddesesa}:

Knowledge with regard to the four paths, wisdom, the faculty of wisdom, the power of wisdom, the awakening-factor of \textit{dhamma}-discrimination, investigation, insight, right view is called awakening.\textsuperscript{180}

'Awakening' here, then, is not the assemblage of seven \textit{dhammas}, but just one \textit{dhamma}, namely \textit{dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhānga}.

A discussion found in the \textit{Milindapañha} is of some interest at this point.\textsuperscript{181} The king, Milinda, asks Nāgasena by means of how many of the seven \textit{bojjhangas} one actually awakens (\textit{kati hi pana bhante bojjhangehi bujjhati}). Nāgasena answers that it is by means of one, namely the \textit{bojjhanga} of \textit{dhamma}-discrimination (ekena mahā-rāja bojjhāṅgena bujjhāti \textit{dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhāṅgena}). So why, asks Milinda, are seven \textit{bojjhangas} mentioned (\textit{atha kissa nu kho bhante vuccanti satta bojjhāṅgā})? Nāgasena responds:

\begin{quote}
Does a sword placed in its sheath and not grasped in the hand succeed in cutting what needs to be cut? In exactly the same way, Your Majesty, one cannot awaken by means of the awakening-factor of \textit{dhamma}-discrimination without the [other] six awakening-factors.\textsuperscript{182}
\end{quote}

The import of this discussion is clear enough. The essential characteristic of \textit{bodhi} is knowledge—an aspect of wisdom or \textit{dhamma}-discrimination. Yet this

\textsuperscript{177} See below, Chapter 10.2.
\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Pātis-a} 100; \textit{Pātis} makes the same distinction with \textit{bodhenti, anubodhenti, paṭibodhenti, sambodhenti; bodhana, anubodhana, paṭibodhana, sambodhana; bodhi-pakkhiya, anubodhi-pakkhiya, paṭibodhi-pakkhiya, sambodhi-pakkhiya.}
\textsuperscript{179} See below, Chapter 9.3.
\textsuperscript{180} Nidd I 456: \textit{bodhi vuccati catusu maggesu nānam paññā paññindriyam paññā-balām dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhāṅgā vimāna s vipassanā samma-dīṭṭhi.}
\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Mil} 83.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.: \textit{asi sasiyā pakkhitto aggahito hathena uṣṣahati chejjam chinditum. evam eva kho mahā-rāja dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhāṅgena vinā cha bhanti bojjhāṅgehi na bujjhāti.}
knowledge is only gained in association with mindfulness, strength, joy, tranquillity, concentration and equipoise—these six are needed to unsheathe the sword of wisdom and make it wieldy. Rather similarly, **jhāna** might be looked at as essentially concentration (**samādhi**) or one-pointedness of mind (**cittass' ekaggatā**) supported by the other four **jhāna**-factors. Much the same way of looking at things is expressed in an analysis of the **bodhy-āṅgas** that is apparently peculiar to Buddhist Sanskrit texts. I quote from the commentary to the **Arthaviniścaya-sūtra**:

> Mindfulness is the factor of awakening that is a refuge, since by the power of mindfulness there is no wavering of the object. Dharma-discrimination is the factor of essential nature, since the essential nature of awakening is knowledge. Strength is the factor of escape, since by means of it one passes beyond the state of an ordinary man. Joy is the factor of benefit, since by means of it there is satisfaction of body and mind. Tranquillity, concentration and equipoise are factors of non-defilement, since they counteract the defilements.

What of the explanation of ‘awakening’ in terms of the person? From the perspective of Abhidhamma a ‘person’ is, of course, simply dhāmmas that might be analyzed by way of the five aggregates (**khandha**), the twelve spheres (**āyatanas**), the eighteen elements (**dhātus**) and so on. Thus if the seven **bojjhāngas** constitute an assemblage of dhāmmas equivalent to awakening, so too, apparently, does a ‘person’. For at the time of the arising of the transcendent mind (**lokuttara-citta**) the ‘person’ who is awakening is precisely the dhāmmas that contribute to that mind. In other words all dhāmmas that arise at that time, i.e. the complete assemblage of mind and its concomitants (**citta-cetasika**), might be viewed as constituting awakening. So here we have one perspective on ‘awakening’ as the person who is awakening. But this can perhaps be taken a stage further. The assemblage of mind and mental concomitants that constitutes the event of awakening has certain repercussions on future assemblages of mind and mental concomitants. That is to say, awakening in certain respects determines the kinds of mind that will arise for a ‘person’ in the future; awakening permanently changes the character of dhāmmas arising subsequently. Thus by stream-attainment greed types of consciousness associated with wrong-view, and consciousness associated with doubt are abandoned, while by the path of non-return all consciousness associated with aversion is abandoned. Finally, the path of arahant-ship abandons all

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183 Artha-n 229-30: *tatra smrīr bodher āsrayāngam smrīt-balena tasmād ālambanād avikṣepāt* [Samtanī comments that the text appears corrupt]. *dharma-pravicayaḥ svabhāvāngam jhānā-svabhāvatvād bodhe, vyāra nityāngam tena prthag-ṣaṇa-bhūmi-samatikramat, prātiḥ anvāsaṅgām tayā kāya-cittānguprahāt. praśrabhī-samādhy-upēkṣā āsamskeśāngam teṣām klesa-pratipakṣa-sāyāt.* (Cf. bhāyya to Madhyāntavibhāga IV 8(b) (Anacker, op. cit., pp. 249-50, 448); Abhidh-sam Trsl 122-3.)


185 Cf. Dhs 237: ‘The four arisings of consciousness associated with views, the arising of consciousness accompanied by doubt, these are the dhāmmas to be abandoned by seeing.’

186 This follows from the fact that by this path the five lower fetters (**orambhāgiyāni samyojanāni**) are abandoned; these include aversion (**vyāpāda**); cf. *Mahāmūlkkya-sutta*, M I
unskilful consciousness. In other words, awakening brings about a fundamental change in the nature or character of a 'person'; he is now a noble person.\(^{187}\)

In the various ways of looking at 'awakening'\(^{188}\) we get, I think, a gradually broadening perspective on one and the same thing. First of all 'awakening' is a particular knowledge. But it is a knowledge acquired in a particular way, by a particular path, so next we see 'awakening' as an assemblage of seven dhammas that show it to be a meditation attainment, a kind of jhāna. But it is a jhāna that has far reaching consequences, so finally we see awakening as a 'person', that is the aggregate of dhammas that constitutes the moment of awakening and issues from it.

At this point I should draw attention to a slightly different usage of terminology in the northern tradition. In the main bodhi is defined rather more narrowly than in the Pāli texts. It is not used of the knowledges of all four of the noble paths, but only of the knowledge of the path or arhat-ship; that is to say, bodhi refers strictly to the final awakening of the disciple (śrāvaka), pratyeka-buddha or samyak-sambuddha.\(^{189}\) This awakening is defined in terms of 'knowledge with regard to non-arising' (anupādā-jhāna) and 'knowledge with regard to destruction' (kṣaya-jhāna) of the āsravas.\(^{190}\) The term used for knowledge of the four truths prior to this, during the first, second and third paths, is abhisamaya.\(^{191}\) This terminological difference, although slight, coincides with one of the characteristic ways the seven sets are treated in Buddhist Sanskrit texts. According to one way of looking at the matter, the eight path-factors are brought into being at the stage of the path of seeing (darśana-
mārga), that is the path of stream attainment; the seven bodhi-aṅgas are only developed subsequently, during the path of development (bhāvanā-mārga).  

Finally, the commentaries preserve in several places a rather full account detailing various things conducive to the arising of each bojjhaṅga. This account is best understood as an extension of the Nikāya treatment, already discussed, concerning the foods and occasions appropriate for the development of individual bojjhaṅgas; indeed in certain commentaries it is explicitly presented as such. In the Visuddhimagga, however, it is adapted to the account of the tenfold skill in absorption (appanā-kosalla) which forms part of the general description of the development of samādhi. The tenfold skill in absorption is concerned with the practice the meditator undertakes in order to bring the achievement of access concentration (the result of initially overcoming the hindrances) to the point of full absorption (the result of making the jhāna factors strong). All this further brings out the particular meditational or yogic aspect of the bojjhaṅgas. The following are the bare headings each of which is illustrated in the commentarial account:

**Conducive to the arising of the awakening-factor of mindfulness**

1. mindfulness and clear comprehension (sati-sampajañña)
2. avoidance of people of lost mindfulness (muñḍha-ssatti-puggala-parivajjana-tā)
3. association with people of established mindfulness (upaṭṭhita-ssatti-puggala-sevanatā)
4. commitment to that (iad-adhimuttatā)

**Conducive to the arising of the awakening-factor of dhamma-discrimination**

1. asking questions (paripucchakatā)
2. keeping one’s person and belongings clean (vatthu-visada-kirijā)
3. balancing the faculties [of saddhā, etc.] (indriya-samatta-patipādanā)
4. avoidance of unwise people (duṇḍaṇḍa-puggala)
5. association of wise people (pāṇḍava-puggala)
6. reflection on practice with deep knowledge (gambhīra-ñāṇa-cariya-paccavekkhanā)
7. commitment to that

**Conducive to the arising of the awakening-factor of strength**

1. reflection on the dangers of the descents (apāya-bhaya)
2. seeing the benefits [to be gained] (ānisamsa-dassāvitā)
3. reflection on the course of the journey (gamana-vīthi)
4. honouring alms [received] (pīṇḍa-pātāpacāyanatā)
5. reflection on the greatness of the inheritance (dāya-jīva-mahatta)
6. reflection on the greatness of the Teacher (sattu-mahatta)
7. reflection on the greatness of one’s birth (jāti-mahatta)
8. reflection on the greatness of other practitioners (sabrahma-cārī-mahatta)
9. avoidance of idle people (kusita-puggala)
10. association with people of firm strength (āraddha-viriya-puggala)
11. commitment to that

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192 See below, Chapter 10.6.
193 Ps I 290-300; Spk III 155-65; Mp II 54-70; Vibh-a 275-86; Vism IV 42-65.
194 Vism IV 31-4.
Conducive to the arising of the awakening-factor of joy

1. recollection of Buddha (buddhānussati)
2. recollection of Dhamma
3. recollection of Samgha
4. recollection of virtue (sīla)
5. recollection of generosity (cāga)
6. recollection of devatās
7. recollection of peace (upasama)
8. avoidance of rough people (lākha-puggala)
9. association with affectionate people (siniddha-puggala)
10. reflection on satisfying discourses (pasādaniya-suttanta)
11. commitment to that

Conducive to the arising of the awakening-factor of tranquillity

1. taking fine food (panīta-bhojana-sevanatā)
2. living in a pleasant climate (utu-sukha-sevanatā)
3. keeping a comfortable posture (iriyā-patha-sukha-sevanatā)
4. maintaining balance (mājhāta-payogatā)
5. avoidance of violent people (sāraddha-kāya-puggala)
6. association with tranquil people (passaddha-kāya-puggala)
7. commitment to that

Conducive to the arising of the awakening-factor of concentration

1. keeping one’s person and belongings clean
2. balancing the faculties
3. skill with regard to the sign (nimitta-kusalatā)
4. appropriate application (samaye paggahanatā)
5. appropriate easing off (samaye niggahanatā)
6. appropriate encouragement (samaye sampahamsanatā)
7. appropriate overseeing (samaye ajjhupekkhanatā)
8. avoidance of unconcentrated people (asamāhīta-puggala)
9. association with concentrated people (samāhīta-puggala)
10. reflection on the jhānas and vimokkhas
11. commitment to that

Conducive to the arising of the awakening-factor of equipoise

1. balance with regard to beings (satta-majjhattā)
2. balance with regard to mental forces (sammākāra-majjhattā)
3. avoidance of people with bias with regard to beings and mental forces (satta-samkhāra-kelāyana-puggala)
4. association with people with balance with regard to beings and mental forces (satta-samkhāra-majjhatta-puggala)
5. commitment to that
CHAPTER SIX

THE NOBLE EIGHT-FACTORED PATH

1. General: the individual factors

I come now to the last of the seven sets, namely the \textit{ariyo aţthaŋiko maggo} or ‘noble eight-factored path’. In the course of my discussion of the \textit{vivekanissita} formula above, I have already drawn attention to the fact that most often in the Nikāyas the \textit{ariyo aţthaŋiko maggo} is simply stated and itemized as a bare list:

\begin{quote}
Just this is the noble eight-factored path, namely right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right striving, right mindfulness, right concentration.\footnote{\textit{aţan eva aţthaŋiko maggo seyyathidam sammā-diţthi sammā-samkappo sammā-vācā sammā-kamまって sammā-ajīvo sammā-vāyāmo sammā-satti sammā-samadhi.} (For references see above, p. 163.) Once again a parallel list is also found in Buddhist Sanskrit sources: \textit{tara bhikṣavah katama āryaţtāngō mārghā, tad-yathā samyak-dṛṣṭiḥ samyak-samkalpaḥ samyag-vāk samyak-karmāntah samyag-ajīvah samyag-vyāvāmah samyak-smṛtiḥ samyak-samādhīḥ} (Artha Trsl 34-5). (For further references see Lamotte, \textit{Traité}, III 1129.)}
\end{quote}

The \textit{ariyo aţthaŋiko maggo} is stated in this way again and again in the Nikāyas—perhaps more than any other single list, and certainly more than any other of the seven sets. As a result it seems fair to say that the \textit{ariyo aţthaŋiko maggo} appears less clearly associated with any one particular and definite formula than the other sets. It seems to stand more in its own right. But the factors of the path are also frequently listed quite apart from the expression \textit{ariyo aţthaŋiko maggo}. In this connection the ‘right’ (\textit{samma}) factors are nearly always contrasted with the factors as ‘wrong’ (\textit{miccha}); moreover two further items, right or wrong knowledge (\textit{samma/-miccha-nāna}) and right or wrong freedom (\textit{samma/-miccha-vimutti}) are often added. If any one treatment is to be considered especially characteristic of the path-factors, then it should be this.

However, before embarking on a general consideration of the relevant passages, it is as well to review briefly the way in which each of the eight factors is defined in the Nikāyas. A straightforward treatment of this matter, termed ‘analysis’ (\textit{vibhaŋga}), is given at several points in the Nikāyas.\footnote{\textit{D II 311; M III 251 (Saccavibhaŋga-sutta); S V 8-10 (vibhaŋga); the analysis is also found in the Vibhaṅga itself (Vibh 104-5, 235-6) and at Pañcas I 40-2. According to Lamotte (\textit{Traité}, III 1130) an exact equivalent is not found in the Chinese Āgamas.} This factor by factor analysis can be summarized as follows. Right view is knowledge concerning suffering (\textit{dukkhe &inam}), its arising, its cessation and the way leading to its cessation—in other words it is knowledge concerning the four truths or realities (\textit{sacca}) and is therefore presented as a species of wisdom.

Right thought is of three kinds: thoughts of desirelessness (\textit{nekkhamma}), thoughts of non-hatred (\textit{aviyāpāda}), thoughts of non-cruelty (\textit{avihīmśa}). Right...
speech is refraining (veramaṇī) from false speech (musā-vāda), divisive speech (pissā vācā), hurtful speech (pharasā vācā) and idle chatter (sampha-ppalāpa). Right action is refraining from attack on living beings (pāṇātipāta), taking what is not given (adinnadāna) and non-celibacy (abrahma-cariya). Right livelihood is simply ‘abandoning wrong livelihood and making a living by means of right livelihood’ (micchā-ājīvam pahāya sammā-ājīvena jīvam kappeti). Right striving is explained by the basic sammā-ppadhāna formula, right mindfulness by the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula, and right concentration by the stock account of the four jhānas.

It is immediately obvious that the way the factors are explained and defined is intended to key into matters that are recurring themes in the Nikāyas, and that are dealt with at length in other contexts. Of course this is also true of the five faculties and powers—right view, striving, mindfulness and concentration are explained in almost precisely the same terms as are the faculties and powers of wisdom, strength, mindfulness and concentration. But it is also clear that the scope of the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo is rather wider than that of the powers and faculties. Right thought, speech, action and livelihood bring in dimensions that, while omitted in the other sets, are certainly of considerable importance in the Nikāyas as a whole. The inclusion of right speech, action and livelihood, and the way these items are defined, explicitly brings in what elsewhere is summed up in the Nikāyas as ‘morality’, ‘virtue’ or ‘conduct’ (sīla). But as we shall see later, sīla is regularly given as the basis or foundation for the development of the seven sets individually and collectively. This has the effect, then, of presenting the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo as in some sense a more fully self-contained system than the other sets. The sense in which this is so will, I hope, become apparent in the course of this chapter. Since the four factors beginning with right thought are peculiar to the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo it is necessary, first of all, to consider them a little further.

Right thought

The triad desirelessness (nekkhamma), non-hatred (avyāpāda) and non-cruelty (avihimsā) is found in a number of contexts in the Nikāyas, usually in opposition to the triad of sensual desire (kāma), hatred (vyāpāda) and cruelty (vihimsā). In this connection these six terms are most regularly compounded with vitakka, but also with samkappa, saññā and dhātu. Not surprisingly the second triad is used on occasion to explain wrong thought (micchā-samkappa). But what precisely are thoughts of desirelessness, non-hatred, and non-cruelty?

I have translated nekkhamma as ‘desirelessness’ largely because in the present context it stands in opposition to kāma. But the derivation of nekkhamma has been a matter of discussion. PED (s.v. nekkhamma) opts for nai$kramya as the derivation, which gives a meaning such as ‘leaving behind’ or ‘renuncia-

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3 See below, pp. 255-7.
4 D III 215; M I 114-6; II 26-8; S II 152-3; A II 137-8; III 429, 446-7.
5 M III 73; Vibh 86.
tion'. This derivation seems to be supported by the occurrence of nāśkramya (q.v., BHSD) in Buddhist Sanskrit texts. PED recognizes, however, that there is clearly semantic confusion with nīskāma ('desireless'), and that nekkhamma may be a Middle Indo-Aryan form corresponding to an Old Indo-Aryan *naiskāmya; but, it suggests, if this were the true derivation the form ought to be *nekkamma. Presumably this is because we find Pāli nikkāma as the form apparently derived from nīskāma. But this is surely rather inconclusive, for Pāli witnesses as derivatives from nīs-kram both nikka and nikkamati alongside nikkhama and nikkhamati (q.vv., PED). So there appears to be no clear reason for thinking nekkhamma—as well as *nekkamma—cannot stand for *nais-kāmya. However, the Pāli commentaries explain nekkhamma as that which has 'turned away' or 'departed' (nikkhanta, nissata) from greed or desire. This might seem to indicate that they at least understood the term to be derived from nis-kram. But this is, I think, to misunderstand what the commentaries intend here. Now, kāma in the Nikāyas is used to mean both 'desire' and 'what is desirable'; this is equally true of kāma in Sanskrit. From the Niddesa onwards this distinction is expressed in terms of 'desire as defilement' (kilesa-kāma) and 'desire as object' (vatthu-kāma). Strictly, then, that which is opposed to kāma, namely nekkhamma, ought to reflect this distinction. It seems to me that this is why the commentaries seize on the possibility of taking nekkhamma as 'turning away' or 'departing': nekkhamma is absence of desire because it turns away from desire, but it also turns away from what might be desired. In other words 'turning away' is offered not so much as the actual meaning of the term as an explanation of the effect of nekkhamma, of what it does. In sum, then, the opposition of nekkhamma to kāma is so clear in the present context that we must accept 'absence of desire' or 'desirelessness' as its primary significance.

A Vibhanga passage dealing with kāma-dhātu, vyāpāda-dhātu, vihiṃsā-dhātu, nekkhamma-dhātu, avyāpāda-dhātu and avihimsā-dhātu brings out certain aspects of what has just been said. As the commentary makes clear, what the Vibhanga does is offer two distinct ways of taking each of these six compounds. Thus kāma-dhātu is either a 'dhātu connected with kāma' (kāma-paṭisāmyuttā dhātu) or the 'dhātu that is kāma' (kāma yeva dhātu); the same two possibilities exist for the rest. With regard to the first method dhātu is to be taken as indicating 'thought' (takka, vitakka, samkappa); with regard to the second method it is to be taken as indicating 'dhammas' or 'a dhamma'. In the case of kāma-dhātu and nekkhamma-dhātu there is also difference in the way in which kāma and nekkhamma are understood. According to the first method kāma is desire as active defilement (kilesa-kāma), according to the second it is the object of that desire (vatthu-kāma). So kāma-dhātu is either a 'thought connected with desire' or the totality of dhammas that make up the sense sphere since

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7 E.g. Ps II 79; Vibh-a 74, 117.
8 Nidd I 1.
9 Vibh 86-7.
10 Vibh-a 74-6.
these are the objects of that same desire.\(^\text{11}\) As for nekkhamma-dhātu, by the first method it means ‘thought connected with nekkhamma’ where nekkhamma can be taken either as non-greed or the first jhāna; by the second method it means ‘dhammas that make up nekkhamma’, i.e. the totality of skilful dharmas.\(^\text{12}\) This follows from the fact that all skilful consciousness is associated with non-greed and hence free of desire, as well as from the fact that skilful consciousness is what turns away from what is unskilful. So just as kāma is at once sense-desire and everything that might be the object of sense-desire, so nekkhamma is at once desirelessness and everything that turns away from those objects of sense-desire.

The explanation of the other four compounds is less involved, and it is only necessary to note just how the Vibhaṅga understands the terms (a) vyāpāda and (a) vihimsā. Vyāpāda is simply hate (dosa) and as such is defined by the same register of terms that is given for dosa in the Dhammasaṅgani.\(^\text{13}\) Consequently avyāpāda is taken as adosa and as ‘loving-kindness’ or ‘friendliness’ (mettā).\(^\text{14}\) Vihimsā is more extreme away than general hate. It is anger of such force that it causes one to inflict actual bodily harm.\(^\text{15}\) Just as avyāpāda as general friendliness stands in opposition to vyāpāda as general unfriendliness, so avihimsā, understood as compassion (karunā), opposes the more specific vihimsā. The point is, it would seem, that confronted with others’ suffering vihimsā is the state of mind that wants it to continue, and avihimsā the state of mind that wants it to cease.

But what precisely is saṁkappa (= Skt saṅkalpa)? The root klp means ‘to be in order’, ‘to be capable’, ‘to be suitable’. A saṅkalpa is literally, then, a ‘conforming’, a ‘(suitable) arrangement or adaptation’. However, the word is regularly used of a clearly formed thought or idea; it thus conveys the sense of ‘intention’ or ‘purpose’. One might say, then, that saṁkappa is the gearing of the mind to whatever is its object in a definite and particular way. By the time of the early Abhidhamma texts this is clearly identified with the technical term vitakka. The overriding connotation in this connection is that of the first jhāna-factor. Yet, as we have seen, the association of vitakka and saṁkappa is also present in the Nikāyas, though perhaps in a fashion that suggests a rather

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\(^\text{11}\) Vibh-a 74: kilesa-kāmaṁ sandhāya kāma-patisamyuttā dhātu kāma-dhātu; kāma-vitakkass' etam nāmam. vattu-kāmaṁ sandhāya kāmo yeva dhātu kāma-dhātu; kāmāvacara-dhammānāṁ etam nāmam.

\(^\text{12}\) Ibid.: nekkhammam vuccati lobhā nikkhantattā alohho, nivaranehi nikkhantattā pathama-jjhānāṁ. sabbākussalehi nikkhantattā sabba-kusalam. nekkhamma-patisamyuttā dhātu nekkhamma-dhātu; nekkhamma-vitakkass' etam nāmam. nekkhammam eva dhātu nekkhamma-dhātu; sabbassāpi kusalass' etam nāmam. (It is clear at Vibh 86 that nekkhamma as sabbe kusalā dhammā is restricted to the second method.)

\(^\text{13}\) Vibh 86; cf. Dhs 84, 189.

\(^\text{14}\) Vibh 86; cf. Dhs 13, 189.

\(^\text{15}\) Vibh 86: ‘Here someone injures beings by various means—with his hands, with a stone, a stick, a sword, or a rope. Such injuring, severe injuring, cruelty, severe cruelty, hostility, severe hostility, such onslaught is called vihimsā-dhātu.’ (idh'ekacco paññāva leddunā va dandena va satthena va rajjuyāva dhānataratātarena satte vihefheti. yā evarūpā heṭṭhānā viheṭṭhānā himsanā viheṭṭhānā rosanā viroṣanā parāpaghāto, ayaṁ vuccati vihimsā-dhātu.)
looser connection. The general idea seems to be, then, that *sanmā-samkappa* is equivalent to the way in which the mind applies itself to or thinks of various objects. Wrong thought turns towards various objects with thoughts and ideas of desire, hatred, or cruelty; right thought turns towards various objects with thoughts and ideas that are free of desire, friendly and compassionate.

A point of interest here is that we might have expected to find *moha-sanmā-samkappa* in place of *vihimsā-sanmā-samkappa*—the triad of greed, hate and delusion is after all normative in Buddhist thought. Why does hate feature in this double fashion? The answers seems to be because *samā-samkappa* is seen as the complement to *samā-ditthi*. It would be both inappropriate and unnecessary to bring in ‘thoughts of wisdom’ in the context of right view:

Endowed with four dharmas, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu has entered upon the way that is excellent, and the birth of the destruction of the āsavas is begun for him. With which four? With thoughts of desirelessness, thoughts of non-hatred, thoughts of non-cruelty, and right view.

Finally, the early Abhidhamma defines *samā-samkappa* as ‘thinking of, continued thinking of, thought, fixing upon, continued fixing upon, absorption of the mind, right thought’. It is tempting to see in this sequence a progressive intensity. Thus wrong thought ranges from thoughts and desires that only subtly tend to desire, hatred or cruelty, to thoughts and ideas that are absorbed in and obsessed with these; right thought ranges from thoughts and ideas that only subtly tend to desirelessness, non-hatred or non-cruelty, to thoughts and ideas absorbed in and fully given to these.

**Right speech, action and livelihood**

The seven items included under right speech and action in the analysis of the eight path-factors turn out to constitute the core of the Nikāya account of *sīla*. As such they comprise four of the five basic precepts, and in principle

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16 M II 28, however, states that *kusala-sanmā-samkappa* (consisting of *nekkhamma-*-, *avyāpāda-*-, *avihimsā-sanmā-samkappa*) ceases without remainder in the second jhāna, which, of course, precisely lacks *vitakka* (and vicāra).

17 Cf. YS II 33-4 which mentions *vitarkas* preceded by greed, anger or delusion (*lobha-krodha-moha-purvakā*), and how the yogin is to develop their opposites.

18 A II 76: *catuhi bhikkhave dhammehi samannāgato bhikkhu apānakkatam paṭipadām paṭipanno hoti yoni cassa āraddhā hoti āsavānaṁ khayāya. katamehi catuhi. nekkhamma-vitakkena avyāpāda-vitakkena avihimsā-vitakkena sammā-dīṭṭhiyā.*

19 Eg. Dhs 12: *takko vitakko samkappo appanā vyappanā cetaso abhinirapanā sammā-sanmā-samkappo.* (For the corresponding definition of *micchā-sanmā-samkappo* see e.g. Dhs 78).

20 In the *silakkhandha-vagga* of the *Dīgha* they account for the principal part of the *cūla-sīla* (D I 1-4, etc.; cf. M I 179-80, 267, 345). The items are also mentioned in many other contexts (e.g. M I 286-7, 360-2, 489-90; III 23-4, 209; S IV 313-4; A I 1297-8; II 254-5).

21 See D I 146; III 195, 235; M III 170-1, 254; A II 99, 217. Of the five, *surā-meraya-majja-pamāda-tīthāṇā veramanśi-sikkhā-padam* is not accounted for; occasionally this appears to be uninccluded in the basic list (e.g. M III 47). The other four appear to be part of the common yogic heritage; cf. the definition of *yama* at YS II 29 and the *anuvratas* of Jaina tradition (see P.S. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification*, Berkley, 1979, pp. 170-8).
the four pārājika offences involving defeat for the bhikkhu. The notion of right livelihood appears rather less specific. A recurring refrain of the mahā-sīla of the sīlakkhandha-vagga of the Dīgha is as follows:

Whereas some samanās and brāhmaṇas, while enjoying food given in trust, make a living by means of the wrong livelihood of animal arts such as ... he [i.e. the samana Gotama/the noble disciple] refrains from the wrong livelihood of such animal arts.

A whole series of examples of making a living by means of the wrong livelihood of animal arts is then given. What is being questioned here is not so much the ‘animal arts’ themselves as their appropriateness in the context of the life of one who is living on food provided by those of confidence. These examples, as far as they are intelligible, all involve providing some definite service for some other party which is accomplished by a special knowledge or art. No doubt behind this lies the historical reality of various ancient Indian ‘holy men’ living in precisely this way, namely receiving alms in return for offering the service of their special knowledges and arts. But, according to the present passage, this is not the job of the ‘true’ samana and brāhmaṇa. On the contrary, he enjoys the food given by those of confidence and trust not as payment, but only in so far as it supports the fulfilling of the spiritual life.

Much the same idea is found expressed in slightly different terms elsewhere in the Nikāyas. Thus it is said that a person who enjoys alms and the other requisites provided out of confidence and trust by khattiyas, brāhmaṇas and householders, and yet is someone of bad character (dussīlo pāpa-dhammo), of unclean and rotten conduct, of secret deeds, not a samana although pretending to be a samana (assamāṇo samāṇa-paṭiṇīno), not a celibate although pretending to be a celibate (abrahma-cāri brahma-cāri-paṭiṇīno), putrid, rotten, decayed—such a person will, at the breaking up of the body, after death arise in one of the places of regress (apāya). On the other hand if a bhikkhu for just a finger snap (accharā-samghāta) should develop the first jhāna, or any other spiritual attainment, then he can truly be called a monk; his jhāna is not in vain, he carries out the teacher’s instruction, takes his advice; his eating of the country’s alms food is not in vain.

The Majjhima version of the stage by stage account of the path corresponding

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22 Sexual intercourse, taking what is not given, intentional killing of a human being, falsely claiming spiritual attainments. Considerable space is devoted in the Vinaya to defining the precise circumstances that constitute an infringement.

23 D I 9-12 (passim), 67-9 (passim): yathā vā pan’eko bhonto samanā-brāhmaṇa sadhā-deyāṇi bhogāṇāti bhujjītīvā te evarūpāya tīrācchana-viśāya micchājīvāna jīvīkaṃ kappenti ... iti vā iti evarūpāya tīrācchana-viśāya micchājīvā paṭivirato hoti. (There are seven paragraphs to the mahā-sīla, each containing this sentence; curiously at both D I 9-12 and 67-9 micchājīva is absent from the final phrase in the first two paragraphs; Rhys Davids offers no comment but translates as if it was absent in all seven paragraphs (D Trsl I 16-26: ‘Gotama the recluse holds aloof from such low arts’); Buddhaghosa makes no comment, Ce (1962) I 16, however, includes micchājīva in these two paragraphs.)

24 See A IV 128-35.

25 See A I 38-43 (quoted more fully below, p. 268). With regard to this matter generally cf. Sn 12-5 where the Buddha refuses food that is offered as a result of recitation of verses; in terms of the mahā-sīla this would appear to be kāveya (D I 11).
to the sāmañña-phala schema uses a somewhat truncated form of the cūla- and majjhima-sīlas. The material that comes under the mahā-sīla in the Dīgha account is omitted. Presumably this is because it is thought of as assumed in what has already been stated. Thus the completed account of sīla (the term does not actually occur) here explains the expression ‘he is one who has accomplished the training and common mode of livelihood of bhikkhus’ (bhikkhunāṁ sikkhā-sājiva-samāpanno). For the bhikkhu the sum of his conduct constitutes his livelihood.

At this point the discussion of the nature of ājīva in the Atthasāliṇī is of some interest. This points out that ājīva inevitably consists of acts of speech and of body. However, skilful or unskilful acts of speech and body do not always constitute livelihood. For example, for one who lives by killing (i.e. killing beings is directly or indirectly his means of subsistence) there is both wrong action (killing beings) and wrong livelihood (living by killings beings). But for one who occasionally kills for reasons of, say, sport there is only wrong action. While this works well enough in the case of the layman, if we extend these principles to the life of the bhikkhu it is not at all clear how, even theoretically, one might distinguish between those acts of speech and body which constitute a means of livelihood and those which do not. In other words, for one living on alms and devoted to the spiritual life all acts of speech and body tend to become livelihood, for the spiritual life itself is his ‘livelihood’.

Finally, in connection with right speech, action and livelihood, a brief comment is necessary concerning their nature as conceived in the Abhidhamma literature. According to the Nikāya formulation, will or volition (cetanā) constitutes action (kamma); having willed one performs actions by body, speech and mind. This ought to mean that wrong speech, action and livelihood, and right speech, action and livelihood are essentially manifestations of mental will or volition. Up to a point this seems to be accepted as so in Abhidhamma. That is to say, when volition extends to a full course of action (kamma-patha, kiriyā-patha) then it is fulfilled in actions of body and speech. However, the Pāli Abhidhamma texts understand that in the case of right speech, action and livelihood there is a little more to this. Taking up the Nikāya definitions of right speech, action and livelihood in terms of refraining (veramaṇi) and abandoning (pahāya) the Dhammasaṅgani lists three dhammas that are distinct from cetanā; these are referred to in the commentaries as the three abstinences (virati). Thus at the time of right speech, action and livelihood there is not only the skilful volition that manifests in this way, there is also in the mind a force that actively abstains, withdraws and refrains from wrong speech, action and livelihood.

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26 M I 179, 267, 345.
27 As 220-1.
28 See A III 415: cetanāhaṁ bhikkhave kammaṁ vadāmi. cetayitvā kammaṁ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā. (Cf. Abhidh-k 191.)
29 On this whole question see As 89-90, 218-21.
30 Dhs 63-4.
31 Mp II 71 comments: ‘Right speech, etc., are three kinds of abstinence and also volition, but
One of the points at issue here is the understanding that the eight path-factors occur as a unit at the time of the arising of the transcendent path consciousness. In meditation states of this kind there is no action by body or speech, only action by mind.\textsuperscript{32} The notion of the three \textit{viratis} allowed the Theravādīn system to overcome this difficulty. The Sarvāstivādins tackled the same problem with the notion of 'non-communicative form' (\textit{avijñāpti-rūpa}).\textsuperscript{33} According to the Sarvāstivādins meditation attainments and communicative acts of body and speech (\textit{kāya-vijñāpti, vāg-vijñāpti}) produce a kind of form that is unmanifest or non-communicative, and which, although it shares none of the other characteristics of form, nevertheless exists dependent on the four great elements (\textit{mahā-bhūta}). One of the functions of this kind of form in the Sarvāstivādin system appears, then, to be to explain how particular actions of body and speech (and mind) continue to exercise a precise influence—either wholesome or unwholesome—after their occurrence. Since right speech, action and livelihood are incompatible with meditation (\textit{samādhi}) they can only operate as factors of the transcendent path (a meditation attainment) by virtue of their producing \textit{avijñāpti}.\textsuperscript{34}

2. \textit{The Bārāṇāsi discourse and the middle way}

Outside traditional Buddhist cultures the \textit{ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo} is probably one of the most familiar aspects of Buddhist teaching. Unfortunately the corollary of this is probably that it is one of the most widely misunderstood. This is perhaps excusable given that the treatment of the \textit{ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo} in the Nikāyas and early Abhidhamma is both extensive and complex. What is less excusable is that the fact of this treatment is effectively passed over in nearly all available accounts of early Buddhist thought. Our understanding thus gets little beyond a basic familiarity with the eight factors of the path, together with the notion that these can be related to the threefold scheme of virtue, concentration and wisdom (of which more below).

While it is apparent that the \textit{ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo} features extensively in early Buddhist literature, the immediate source of our familiarity with it is that, along with the four noble truths, it is held in Buddhist tradition to have formed the substance of the Buddha’s first discourse outside Bārāṇāsi. The assumption in modern writings appears to have been that if one wants a short introduction to the essentials of the Buddha’s teaching, then his first discourse is a suitable place to look. The kind of attitude to the Bārāṇāsi discourse involved here is well illustrated by the following statement by Frauwallner:

The sermon of Benares with its preaching of the eightfold path stands in the beginning of his teaching activity. In it he presents the simple basic thoughts which

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\item at the moment of path they are just abstinences.' (\textit{samā-m-vācādayo tayo viratiyo pi honti cetana-yo pi; magga-kkhaṇe pana viratiyo va}) Cf. also below, pp. 214-5.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Though the question of whether speech might occur at such times appears to have been a point of discussion; cf. Bareau, \textit{SBPV}; Kv 195-203.
\item \textsuperscript{33} See Abhidh-k. Cf. H.V. Guenther, \textit{PPA}, pp. 162-3.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Abhidh-k 196: \textit{aṣṭāṅgaś ca na syād avijñāptim antareṇa, samāpannasya samyag-vāk-karmānt-ājīvānām ayogāt}.\
\end{itemize}
had become an irrefutable certainty to him in the hour of his illumination. It is intelligible that here he gives basic directives in general words. Then followed forty long years of his wandering life as a teacher and preacher. Again and again it turned out necessary to give more exact guidance and instructions to disciples. And thus the preaching of the Deliverance-way was continually more and more improved and widened and became more finished until finally it gained the form with which we have got acquainted above [i.e the sāmañña-phala schema].

This appears almost naively historical, and no doubt other scholars would wish to question the extent to which the Bārāṇaṣī discourse of tradition can be regarded as an accurate record of an historical event. But it is not primarily the historical accuracy of the contents of discourse that concerns us here. Modern western scholarship's interest in the first discourse of the Buddha has no doubt been connected with the idea that to know the original form of something is to know its essence. But this is hardly the reasoning that underlies the importance of the first discourse in Buddhist tradition. To be sure, Buddhist tradition would not deny that the Bārāṇaṣī discourse does contain the essentials of the Buddha's teaching. But then in this respect the tradition would not see it as any different from many, if not all, other discourses. What is special for the tradition about the Bārāṇaṣī discourse is precisely and simply that it is the first discourse—the discourse that sets the wheel of dhāma rolling (dhāma-cakkavātātāna). To be too concerned with the question of the discourse as a historical record is, I think, to misconstrue its 'mythological' import. In evaluating its contents what we need to do is consider carefully the particular context in which the tradition places the discourse. Once this is done it is apparent, I think, that at least as far as the tradition is concerned the Bārāṇaṣī discourse should not be seen, as Frauwallner suggests, as ‘basic directives in general words’, but precisely as ‘exact guidance and instruction to disciples’.

The first discourse of the Buddha is addressed to a group of five bhikkhus who are described in the tradition as having spent some time living in close association with Gotama prior to his full awakening. In choosing to address just these five first, the Buddha is said to have had in mind that there are beings with weak faculties and beings with sharp faculties; the latter are ready to see, ready for awakening. These five must be regarded, then, as ready for the special teaching of Buddhas. The clue to the specific nature of the Bārāṇaṣī discourse seems to lie in the presentation of the ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo as the middle way (majjhima paṭipadā) between the two extremes (anta) of devotion to sensual pleasure (kāmesu kāma-sukhallikānuyogo) and devotion to self-torment (atta-kilamathānuyoga). For the discourse is addressed precisely to the

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35 Frauwallner, HIP, p. 148.
36 A. Bareau has compared the different recensions of the Buddha's first discourse (see RBB I 172-82) and is of the opinion that the definition of the two extremes and the 'middle way' is the older part, while the section dealing with the four truths is later. He points out that the Majjhima version of the corresponding events (M I 172-3) gives no indication of the contents of the first discourse, and suggests that the text of the first discourse as recorded in the three Vinaya recensions is 'non seulement apocryphe mais assez tardif' (p. 180); there was a point at which the Buddha's followers simply did not know what the theme of the first discourse had been.
bhikkhus who, when the bodhisatta gave up the practice of severe austerities (kaṭukā dukkāra-kārikā)37 and took proper food, became disillusioned with him: ‘The samāna Gotama is a man of excess, he has given up endeavour, he has lapsed into excess.’38 This is represented as still being their attitude to him when he approaches them in the animal park.39 In direct response the Buddha begins his first discourse:

There are these two extremes, bhikkhus, which are not to be pursued by one who has gone forth. Which two? First, that which is devotion to sensual pleasure with regard to the objects of sensual desire—this is inferior, vulgar, of the ordinary man, not noble, not concerned with what is beneficial. Secondly, that which is devotion to self-torment—this is painful, not noble, not concerned with what is beneficial. Not following these two extremes, the Tathāgata awakened to the middle way which brings sight, knowledge and conduces to peace, direct knowledge, awakening, nibbāna. And which is the middle way ... ? It is just the noble eight-factored path, namely right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right striving, right mindfulness and right concentration.40

The point is, then, that this is addressed to five bhikkhus who are presented as committed to the view that the spiritual life consists in the wholehearted rejection of pleasure and a strict adherence to severe asceticism and self-torment. If Bronkhorst’s ideas concerning the two traditions of meditation in ancient India41 are at all correct, then one of the things the Bārāṇaśī/discourse appears to do is to present a kind of apologetic and polemic in one. What is taught by the Buddha is truly a spiritual life (brahma-cariya) in that it is free of vulgar sensual indulgence, on the other hand it is distinct from what Bronkhorst characterizes as the old severely ascetic main stream meditation tradition.

From the point of view of the Bārāṇaśī/discourse, this is now superseded by the new middle way. What is important about the first discourse is the ‘middleness’ of what the Buddha teaches. From this point of view, the ariyo ātthangiko maggo is largely incidental to the discourse. True the eight-factored path here represents the ‘middle way’, but this is simply because, as we shall see, the ariyo ātthangiko maggo often in the Nikāyas epitomizes the totality of the spiritual life as taught by the Buddha, and not because it is the middle way per se.

What I have just said seems to be borne out by the fact that when we turn to the Nikāyas as a whole the theme of the ariyo ātthangiko maggo as the middle way between sensual indulgence and self-torment is not especially outstanding. Aside from the first discourse, the middle way between sensual indulgence and

37 M I 246.
38 M I 247 = II 93 = 212: yato kho ahaṃ afārikaṃ ahāraṃ ahāresin odana-kummāsaṃ attha me te paicca bhikkhā nibbiṣṭāpakkamīniṃ: bāhuliko samāno Gotamo padhāna-vibbhanto āvatto bāhul-lāyā ti.
39 M I 171; Vin I 8-9.
40 Vin I 10 = S V 421: dvēme bhikkhave anta pabbajitena na sevitabbā. katame dvē. yo cāyam kāmesu kāma-sukhalīkmānayo hīna gamma pathujaniko anariyo anatha-samhīto. yo cāyam atta-kilamathānayo dukkho anariyo anatha-samhīto. ete te bhikkhave ubho ante anupakamma mājhimā patipāda tathāgatena abhisambuddhā cakkhu-karaṇi hīna-karaṇi upasamāya abhiññāya sam-bodhīya nibbanāya samvattati. katama ca sa bhikkhave mājhimā patipāda ... ayaṃ eva ariyo ātthangiko maggo seyyathiddam sammā-dīṭṭhi ... sammā-samādhi.
41 See above, pp. 180-1.
self-torment appears to be mentioned in only four passages. Only two of these concern the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* exclusively; these are the *Araṇavibhaṅga-sutta* and a *Samyutta-nikāya* passage both of which describe the eight-factored path as the ‘middle way’ in exactly the same terms as the Bārāṇasi discourse.\(^{42}\)

Of particular interest from the point of view of the present study is an *Aṅguttara* passage\(^ {43}\) that details three ‘ways’ (*paṭipadā*): that of indulgence (*āgāhā*), that of burning away (*niṭṭhāmā*) and lastly the middle way. Although not described in precisely the same terms, the first two clearly correspond to the devotion to sensual pleasure and the devotion to self-torment of the Bārāṇasi discourse.\(^ {44}\) However, the middle way is here illustrated not in the first instance by the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo*, but by the short *satipaṭṭhāna* formula. The three ways are then detailed again, the first two as before, but the middle way is this time illustrated by the basic *samma-paṭṭhāna* formula. The text continues, rehearsing the material five more times and illustrating the middle way by the *iddhi-paṭṭhāna, indriyas, balas, bojjhaṅgas* and *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* in turn. This is not, I think, because the compiler or compilers of this sutta were uncertain about which of the seven sets truly represented the middle way,\(^ {45}\) but because, just as the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* represented the totality of the spiritual life as taught by the Buddha, so too, at least by the close of the Nikāya period, did the seven sets.

Towards the end of the *Dhammadāyāda-sutta* the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* is again termed the ‘middle way’. But this time not in relationship to the extremes of sensual indulgence and self-torment:

> Greed is bad, hatred is bad; for the abandoning of greed and for the abandoning of hate there is the middle way ... This is just the noble eight-factored path ... \(^ {46}\)

Elsewhere other pairs of extremes are made quite explicit. In the *nidāna-saṃyutta* the Buddha comments on the extremes of ‘all exists’ (*sabbam atthi*) and ‘nothing exists’ (*sabbam natthi*), and of eternalism (*sassata*) and annihilationism (*uccheda*) in terms reminiscent of the Bārāṇasi discourse: ‘not following either of these extremes the Tathāgata teaches dhamma by the middle’ (*ete te ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti*).\(^ {47}\) The ‘middle’ in question is the sequence of terms that constitutes conditioned arising (*paṭicca-*)

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\(^{42}\) See M III 230-1; S IV 330-1.

\(^{43}\) A I 295-7.

\(^{44}\) The *āgāhā paṭipadā* is defined as *ekacco evam vādī hoti evam diṭṭhi natthi kāmesu doso so kāmesu pāṭāvayaṃ āpajjati;* the *niṭṭhāmā paṭipadā* is illustrated by a long list of severe practices (cf. D I 166-7 where similar practices are described).


\(^{47}\) M I 15: *tatrāvuso lobho ca pāpakā doso ca pāpakā, lobhassa ca pahanāya dosassa ca pahanāya atthi majjhimā paṭipadā ... ayaṃ eva ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo ...* (Ps I 104 comments: ‘Greed is one extreme, hate is the other extreme and the path does not follow or approach these two extremes; it is free of these extremes therefore “middle way” is said.’ (maggo hi lobho eko anto doso eko anto ti ete dve ante na upeti na upagacchati mutto etehi atthi tasmi majjhimā paṭipadā ti vuccati.) However, the sutta goes on to repeat the same formula with seven more pairs of terms that do not seem to form extremes in the way that lobha and dosa do. The commentary gives rather a full explanation of the psychology of the terms in question (see Ps I 106-7; cf. Vibh 350, 353-6, 357-8) but there is no comment specifically on this point.)

\(^{47}\) S II 17, 20, 75-6, 76-7.
This 'middle' would seem to be rather more significant for the subsequent development of Buddhist thought than the specific notion of the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* as the middle way between sensual indulgence and self-torment. Certainly in Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* it is conditioned arising that appears to represent the 'middle way' *par excellence*. Of course, Nāgārjuna leads one to the conclusion that all dilemmas between two extremes, all 'middle ways', are in a sense the same, and this would not seem to be an improper understanding of the Nikāyas. In conclusion one can say that it is the Buddha’s teaching in general that is taken as a ‘middle’, and that the notion of the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* as the middle way between sensual indulgence and self-torment is a specific application of the general principle, and there appear to be no grounds for thinking it to be the original or earliest manifestation of the principle.

3. The way leading to the cessation of suffering

After the exposition of the 'middle way' the first discourse of the Buddha continues with an exposition of the four noble truths. Again the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* is mentioned. This time it explains the nature of the fourth of the noble truths or realities: the way leading to the cessation of suffering (*dukkha-nirodha-gāmini* *patipadā*). This proves to be a theme that is taken up and reiterated again and again throughout the Nikāyas, and would seem to be rather more fundamental and of more general significance than the theme of the eight-factored path as the 'middle way'. In all the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* explains the fourth truth explicitly some seven times in the Nikāyas. While this is not in itself excessive, the extent to which the theme is played upon is certainly striking. I refer here to passages that, while not explicitly referring to the *ariya-saccas* by name nor necessarily to *dukkha, samudaya, nirodha* and *magga*, nevertheless exploit the 'pattern' of the truths by taking some item and considering its arising, its cessation and the way leading to its cessation. A good example of this is the *Sammādiṭṭhi-sutta*. In construction this is basically a sixteenfold exposition of the four truths, beginning with the unskilful (cf. first truth), the root of the unskilful (cf. second truth), the skilful (cf. third truth) and the root of the skilful (cf. fourth truth)—which is said to be the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo*. Fifteen items follow (mostly taken from the *paṭicca-samuppāda* formula); in each case the arising, cessation and the way leading to the cessation of the item is considered, and in each case the way

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48 As A.K. Warder points out (‘Is Nāgārjuna a Mahāyānist?’ in *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, ed. M. Sprung, pp. 79, 81) the most frequently quoted and important canonical text for Nāgārjuna appears to be the *nidāna-samyukta*.
49 Cf. Ps I 104.
50 Vin I 10 = S V 421-2.
51 Vin I 10; D II 311; M III 251; S V 421-2, 424, 425; A I 177; cf. Vibh 104.
52 M I 48-55.
53 They are āhāra, dakkha, jāra-marana, jāti, bhava, upādāna, taṇhā, vedanā, phassa, salāyaana, nāma-rūpa, viññāna, saṃkhāra, avijjā, āsavas.
leading to the cessation is given as the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo*. Similar variations are scattered throughout the Nikāyas.\(^{54}\)

In the *magga-samyutta* the theme of the *ariyo-atthaṅgiko maggo* as the way to the cessation of dukkha is continually expressed in other ways. The eight-factored path is the way to the full understanding of suffering (*ayaṃ maggo ayaṃ paṭipadā etassa dukkhassa pariṇāya*).\(^{55}\) Developed and made great the eight factors are eight dhammas that lead to nibbāna, proceed to nibbāna, conclude in nibbāna (*atth’ime dhammā bhāvītā bahulikatā nibbāna-gamā honti nibbāna-parāyanā nibbāna-pariyosānā*).\(^{56}\) The conclusion (*pariyosāna*) of the eight-factored path is also expressed as the destruction (*khaya*) or restraint (*vinaya*) of passion (*rāga*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*);\(^{57}\) its four fruits are those of stream-attainment, once-return, non-return and arahant-ship;\(^{58}\) it is to be developed for the sake of abandoning the five kinds of sensual desire;\(^{59}\) its eight factors conduce to going from this shore to the far shore (*apaṁ paṇam gamanāya saṁvattanti*).\(^{60}\) In other words, the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* brings one to the conclusion, the goal of the spiritual life. This general theme is also rehearsed elsewhere in the Nikāyas. A distinctive example is a *Samyutta* variation on the well known raft simile; here the eight-factored path itself is directly likened to the raft for crossing a river in flood.\(^{61}\)

Some of these formulas and ways of looking at the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* are common to all seven sets—especially in the *mahā-vagga* of the *Samyutta-nikāya*.\(^{62}\) Yet, it is surely true that in the case of the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* this kind of treatment is rather more thoroughgoing. Indeed it would seem that it is in part precisely by association with the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* that the other sets are treated in a parallel fashion. Thus it is that the seven sets come collectively to be the ‘path’. For the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* is obviously the essential ‘path’ or ‘way’ in an explicit sense that none of the other sets can quite match.

Accordingly the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* is presented in the *mahā-vagga* of the *Samyutta-nikāya* as the spiritual life in its entirety: it actually is brahma-cariya; it is brahma-ship (*brahmañña*), it is sīla-ship (*sīlañña*).\(^{63}\) The point is vividly put in a passage that likens the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* to the covered chariot of the brahma Jānusoṇī.\(^{64}\) Seeing his chariot people think it

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\(^{55}\) S V 6-7; cf. 21-2, 23-4.

\(^{56}\) S V 1-2.

\(^{57}\) S V 5-6, 8, 16-7, 25-7, 31-2, 34-5, 37-8, 40, 42, 58-62.

\(^{58}\) S V 25-6; cf. D I 157 which adds the destruction of the āsavas.

\(^{59}\) S V 22.

\(^{60}\) S V 24-5; (on this phrase cf. *CPD*, s.v. *apaṁ*).

\(^{61}\) S IV 172-5 (the more familiar passage is M I 134-5). For further examples of the general theme cf. D I 165; M I 118; S IV 251-62; A I 180, 217; IV 348; V 318.

\(^{62}\) See below, Chapter 7.5.

\(^{63}\) See S V 7-8, 15-7, 25-7.

\(^{64}\) S V 4-6.
a most ‘divine’ vehicle (brahmaṁ vata bho yānaṁ), similarly in the dhamma-
vinaya of the Buddha the eight-factored path is a ‘divine’ vehicle (brahma-yāna),
a vehicle of dhamma (dhamma-yāna), unsurpassedly victorious in battle (anut-
taro sangāma-vijayo).

The way in which the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo is seen as embracing the
spiritual life in its fullness is, I think, one of the most significant aspects of its
treatment in the Nikāyas. Comparison with the bojhāṅgas, for example,
indicates quite clearly what is distinctive. Like the bojhāṅga-saṁyutta, the
magga-saṁyutta also contains a number of passages concerning the interaction
of the followers of the Buddha with wanderers belonging to other schools.65
But in the magga-saṁyutta the wanderers are not represented as claiming that
they too teach the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo and therefore wanting to know the
difference between the Buddha’s teaching and their own. Their question is
rather more fundamental. For what purpose, they ask, is the spiritual life lived
under the samaṇa Gotama (kiṁ atthiyam āvuso samane Gotame brahma-cariyam
vussati)? The answer is that it is lived for the sake of the full understanding of
suffering (dukkhassa pariṇāttham).66 When the wanderers go on to ask
whether or not there is a path (maggo) or way (pāṭipadā) to such full
understanding, the response is that there is the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo. Here,
then, is the basic problem that the teaching of the Buddha is seen as addressing,
namely dukkha; and the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo is the straightforward solution,
complete in itself. So the eight-factored path, as the essence of the spiritual life,
acts as the thread that runs through the Nikāyas: ‘Formerly and also now,
bhikkhus, I make known just suffering and the cessation of
suffering.”67

Accordingly, one of the five ‘great dreams’ (mahā-supina) that the bodhisatta
has is that a tiriyā creeper grows up from his navel reaching the sky (tiriyā
nāma tiṇa-jāti nābhiyā uggantarvā nābhāṁ ahacca thitā ahosi); this dream is said
to be fulfilled in the fact that the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo, having been
awakened to by the Tathāgata, is well proclaimed by him to devas and men.68

The brahma-cariya of the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo, the spiritual practice that
is full and complete, stands in contrast to brahma-cariya that is somehow
incomplete:

At that time I was the brāhmaṇa Mahāgovinda. I taught my pupils the path to
communion with the world of Brahmā. But that brahma-cariya, Paṅcasikha, did
not conduce to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to direct
knowledge, to full awakening, to nibbāna, but only as far as rebirth in the world of
Brahmā. But now my brahma-cariya conduces to complete disenchantment, to
dispersion, to cessation, to peace, to direct knowledge, to full awakening, to
nibbāna. This is just the noble eight-factored path, namely right view ... right
concentration.69

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66 S V 6; S V 27-9 gives a series of eight different but more or less equivalent responses.
67 M I 140: pubbe cāham bhikkhave etaraṁ ca dukkhaṁ c’eva paṁṇāpemī dukkhaṁ ca
niruddham.
68 A III 240-2.
69 D II 251: ahām tena samayena Mahāgovinda brāhmaṇo ahosiṁ ahām tesam sāvakānaṁ
brahma-loka-sahavyatāya maggam desesīṁ. tam kho pana Paṅcasikha brahma-cariyam na nibbidāya
Again the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo is the yardstick against which all spiritual practice should be reckoned. When the wanderer Subhadda tries to draw the Buddha on the status of Pūrṇa Kassapa’s and other teachers’ understanding, the Buddha responds:

Enough, Subhadda, leave aside this question of whether all who claim direct knowledge for themselves really have not had direct knowledge, or whether some have and some have not. I shall teach you dhamma, Subhadda. Hear it, pay careful attention, I shall speak ... Now in the dhamma-vinaya where the noble eight-factor ed path is not found, there too the samaṇa is not found, there too the second ... the third ... the fourth samaṇa is not found. But in the dhamma-vinaya where the noble eight-factor ed path is found, there too the samaṇa is found, there too the second ... the third ... the fourth samaṇa is found.70

The ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo constitutes, then, the fourth truth, the way leading to the cessation of suffering, the essential brahma-cariya to that end. As the path or way, the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo strictly forms part of what is considered in the Nikāyas the special teaching of Buddhas: suffering, arising, cessation and path. Accordingly, in the stage by stage samaṇa-phala schema of the path it is only as part of the final stage—the stage of knowledge of the destruction of the āsava that the bhikkhu comes finally to see and know the way leading to the cessation of suffering.71

All this makes it clear that while the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo should rightly be regarded as embracing the essence of spiritual practice as conceived in the Nikāyas, it does not follow that it is seen as the Buddha’s instruction to beginners. Yet—and this is something that I have already drawn attention to—the special teaching of the Buddhas, of which the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo forms a part, is at the same time not presented as something entirely different or divorced from other brahma-cariya, from lesser paths. On the contrary it is the proper and natural conclusion of the process begun by these other paths which may lead, for example, only as far as rebirth in the world of Brahmā. As we have seen, nibbāna can be understood in some sense as standing in the same relationship to the conditioned world in its entirety, as the first jhāna stands in relationship to the world of the five senses. Accordingly the brahma-cariya of the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo subsumes the various other brahma-cariyas, which are seen as incomplete. It subsumes these not as mere incidentals or as optional sideroads and diversions, but rather as lesser manifestations of the whole. The

na virāgāya na nirodhiya na upasamāya na abhiññāya na sambodhiya na nibbānāya sampattati yāvad eva brahma-lokupapattiya. idam kho pada me Pañcasikha brahma-cariyaṁ ekanta-nibbiddāya virāgāya nirodhiya upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhiya nibbānāya sampattati, ayaṁ eva ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo seyyathidaṁ sammā-dīpighi ... sammā-samādhi. (Cf. M I 82.)

70 D II 151: alaṁ Subhadda. tiṣṭhitāṁ sabbe te sakāya paññāya abhaññāṁsu, sabbe va na abhaññāṁsu udāhu ekacce abhaññāṁsu ekacce na abhaññāṁsu ti. dhammaṁ te Subhadda desessāmi. tam suññhi sādhukam manasikkarohi bhāsissāṁ ti ... yasmin kha Subhadda dhamma-vinaye ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo na upalabbhati, samaṇo pi tattha na upalabbhati dutiyo ... tatiyo ... catuttho pi tattha samaṇo na upalabbhati, yasmin ca kha Subhaddha dhamma-vinaye ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo upalabbhati, samaṇo pi tattha upalabbhati, dutiyo ... tatiyo ... catuttho pi tattha samaṇo upalabbhati.

71 E.g. D I 83-4.
ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo is a sum and reflection of all brahma-cariya; it is its true and ultimate conclusion.

4. The significance of the term ariya

As P. Masefield has pointed out, any discussion of the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo must address itself to the significance of the term ariya. Masefield thinks it ‘no exaggeration to say that western scholarship has, almost without exception, completely overlooked the fact that the ariyan eightfold path is supramundane and thus restricted to those who are ariyan’. This, it seems to me, is in fact something of an exaggeration, and at the same time passes over the rather delicate issue of the proper relationship of the Nikāya usage of terms such as ariya to the Abhidhamma usage. In effect scholarship, when concerned with the Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin systems of Abhidhamma/Abhidharma, has been quite well aware that the eight-factored path is termed ariya/ārya and of the basic import of that fact within these systems. On the other hand, when scholarship has concerned itself with the Nikāyas it has chosen largely to ignore this fact, treating it as the later and irrelevant result of scholastic systematization, and without really considering how the Nikāyas themselves use the term.

The significance of the term ariya/ārya in the post-Nikāya literature is clear enough. In terms of Buddhist spiritual hierarchy it is applied to anything that is directly associated with the world-transcending (lokuttara) knowledge of the stream-attainer, the once-returner, the non-returner and the arahant/arhat—the ‘noble persons’ (ariya-puggalā/ārya-pudgala). By way of contrast we have the ‘world’ (loka): the sphere of the five senses (kāmāvacara), the jhānas of the form sphere (rūpāvacara) and the formless sphere (arūpāvacara); in short, the ‘world’ accessible to the ordinary man (puthujjana).

In dealing with the indriyas I have already drawn attention to the fact that, as far as the general principles of this contrast are concerned, the Nikāyas’ technical usage of the term ariya must be considered in broad agreement with, although not always as clear cut as, the usage in the Abhidhamma/Abhidharma literature. That is, it is quite possible to work out on the basis of the Nikāyas alone that the ariya-sāvaka, so frequently contrasted with the puthujjana, is at least a stream-attainer and that stream-attainment is the result of seeing the four truths. So already there are strong grounds for thinking that the ariyo

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73 Ibid.
74 Tracing the logic of the Nikāya usage of a term such as ariya can be quite involved. For example, the puthujjana sees rūpa, etc., as ‘this is mine, I am this, this is my self’; the ariya-sāvaka in contrast sees rūpa, etc. as ‘this is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self’ (e.g. S III 56); elsewhere there are given twenty ways in which the puthujjana might see rūpa, etc. as ‘this is mine … ’ (e.g. M III 188, 227; S III 3, 16, 96); elsewhere these same twenty ways of seeing rūpa, etc. as self are termed ‘the view of individuality’ (sakkāya-ditthi) (M I 300; III 17, 102); elsewhere sakkāya-ditthi is given as one of the three samyojanas abandoned as a result of proper attention to dukkha, dukkha-samutaya, dukkha-nirodha, dukkha-nirodha-gāminī paṭipadā (e.g. M I 9); elsewhere the sotāpanna is described as one who has completely destroyed three samyojanas (D I 156; II 92-3).
atthaṅgiko maggo should be particularly associated with the notion of sotāpatti. This seems only to be confirmed by what is said elsewhere. Thus in the case of the path-factors the Mahācattārīsaka-sutta\(^{75}\) makes a quite explicit distinction between sammā-diṭṭhi, sammā-samkappa, sammā-vācā, sammā-kammanta and sammā-ājiva as with āsava, concerned with merit (puñña-bhāgīya), resulting in acquisition (upadhi-vepakka) and as ariya, without āsava, transcendent (lok-uttara), a factor of the path (maggathā). Finally a sotāpatti-samyoja passage defines the stream and stream-attainer as follows:

‘The “stream” is spoken of, Sāriputta. What stream is this, Sāriputta?’
‘The stream, lord, is just the noble eight-factored path, namely right view ... right concentration.’
‘Good, good, Sāriputta ... The “stream-attainer” is spoken of, Sāriputta. What stream-attainer is this?’
‘Now, lord, one who is endowed with this noble eight-factored path he is said to be a stream-attainer—just a venerable one of some name, of some family.’\(^{76}\)

So whether or not a term like ariya always carries precisely its technical significance in the Nikāyas, whether or not it is possible to trace convincingly the development of the usage of such a term within the Nikāyas themselves, its basic technical import must be considered to be fully worked out by the close of the Nikāya period and not an Abhidhamma innovation grafted on to a radically different or even vastly looser usage.

The stream-attainer has, then, abandoned the three samyojanas or ‘fetters’ of doubt (vicikicchā), holding on to precept and vow (sīla-bhata-parāmāsa) and the view of individuality (sakkāya-diṭṭhi). He is endowed with the four limbs or factors of stream-attainment, that is trust based in understanding (avecca-ppasāda) towards the Buddha, Dhamma and Samgha, and the sīla that is dear to the ariyas or ‘noble ones’; he cannot commit an action of the sort that would cause him to be reborn in a place of regress.\(^{77}\) In short, stream-attainment is in the Nikāyas the crucial spiritual break-through. Further it is the spiritual breakthrough that endows the one who achieves it with the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo.

Of some relevance at this point is the sequence of ten factors which adds right knowledge (sammā-nāṇa) and right freedom (sammā-vimutti) to the list of eight. I have already mentioned the fact of the contrast between the eight and ten factors in detailing the extent of the Nikāya treatment of the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo. The contrast is, then, one of its principal characteristics.\(^{78}\)

\(^{75}\) M III 71-8.
\(^{76}\) S V 347: soto soto ti ha Sāriputta vuccati. katamo nu kho Sāriputta soto ti. ayam eva hi bhante ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo soto, seyyathidham sammā-diṭṭhi, pe. sammā-samādhi ti. sādhu sādhu Sāriputta ... sotāpanno sotāpanno ti hidam Sāriputta vuccati. katamo nu kho Sāriputta sotāpanno ti. yo hi bhante iminā ariyena atthaṅgikena maggena samamāgato. ayam vuccati sotāpanno yoyaṃ ñayam evam nāmo evam gotto ti. (Cf. Ud-a 306: sotāpanno ti magga-sammhāta-sotam ināpi līvī pāpūnīvā ñhito sotāpatti-phalatho ti attho.) On the question of the ‘path’ as ‘stream’, see also below, Chapter 7.4.
\(^{77}\) D II 93.
\(^{78}\) See M III 76-8; S II 168-9; A II 89, 220-5. The eight/ten contrast is not explicit in the magga-samyoja; this seems to indicate that it should be taken as focusing precisely on the ‘noble eight-factored path’. In fact the principles of the contrast seem to be reflected in the two
The method of contrasting the eight and ten factors is purely a feature of Suttanta exposition and does not appear to feature in the Abhidhamma. The basic principle expressed by the contrast can be stated as follows. The primary aim of spiritual practice is to cause the noble eight-factored path to arise; endowed with the eight factors a bhikkhu is a sotâpanna or ‘in training’ (sekho) and develops the eight existing factors and also the two further factors. I shall return to this below in dealing with the Mahâcattârîsaka-sutta.

5. The ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo and the gradual path

It seems to me that there are two fairly distinct dimensions to what I have so far considered of the Nikâya account of the ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo—two dimensions that can appear slightly paradoxical. Both these dimensions arise out of the notion of the ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo as the spiritual life or spiritual practice in its fullness. In the first place the ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo subsumes all other spiritual practice; it is, as it were, the whole of the spiritual life. Secondly, as complete and perfect spiritual practice, it is the ultimate form of spiritual practice; it is what the bhikkhu aspires to; it is the goal, the end, the culmination of the spiritual quest. The ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo is the transformation of view, thought, speech, action, livelihood, striving, mindfulness and concentration into right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right striving, right mindfulness and right concentration. Thus the ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo is at once where one wishes to arrive at, and the way one must go to get there. For the destination is not exactly something different from the journey; where one arrives is only the consummation of the way one has come.

I have already referred on several occasions to the sâmañña-phala stage by stage account of the Buddhist path as found in the silakkhandha-vagga of the Dîgha-nikâya. This account follows a well defined order: the preliminary stages of the path can be categorized as sīla, the middle stages as samâdhi and the final stages as paññâ. This kind of progressive description of the Buddhist path, always following essentially the same pattern of sīla, samâdhi and paññâ, occurs again and again in the Nikâyas. The Majjhima-nikâya uses a version

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70 In the silakkhandha-vagga the terminology in fact varies. The Sâmaññaphala-sutta, while giving the account in full, does not explicitly divide it into three categories. This is true also of the Kudâenta-, Mahâlî-, Jâliya-, Kevadhiya- and Lohicca-suttas. (The Pujâhapâda- and Tevijja-suttas depart from the standard pattern after the account of the fourth jhâna, inserting descriptions of the four formless attainments and four brahma-vihâras respectively.) In the Ambattha-sutta the categories are just two, carana and vijj; in the Somadâma-sutta just sîla and paññâ; in the Kassapasâhanâda-sutta they are sîla-sampadâ, citta-sampadâ and paññâ-sampadâ; in the Subha-sutta they are sîla-kkhandha, samâdhi-kkhandha and paññâ-kkhandha.
that appears to be a slightly abbreviated form of the silakkhandha-vagga material.\footnote{Cf. M I 178-84, 267-71, 344-8; III 33-6, 134-7.} Basically the same pattern is expressed in the scheme of the seven purifications (visuddhis) of the Rathavinīta-sutta,\footnote{M I 145-51.} and these seven form the basis for the Visuddhimagga's account of the path. Other works such as the Vimuttimagga and Abhidharmakośa, while not making use of the scheme of the seven visuddhis, also follow the principle of sīla, samādhi, pañña in their systematic description of the stages of the path. It seems fair, then, to regard the scheme of the stages of sīla, samādhi and pañña as expressing the essential principles of the stage by stage description of the path, both for the Nikāyas and later Indian Buddhist literature. What concerns us here is not the actual terminology, but the principles it reveals.

One of the clearest statements of the principles of this stage by stage path in the Nikāyas is the formula of ‘progressive talk’ (anupubbi-kathā) that culminates in the special teaching of Buddhas. This formula is scattered throughout the Nikāyas and I have already had occasion to refer to it. I give it now in full:

Then the Blessed One gave a progressive talk ... namely talk on giving, talk on sīla and talk on heaven; he revealed the danger, elimination and impurity of sensual desires, and the benefit of desirelessness. When the Blessed One knew that the mind of ... was ready, soft, without hindrances, uplifted, settled, then he revealed the special dhamma-teaching of Buddhas: suffering, arising, cessation, the path.\footnote{atha kho bhagavā ... anupubbi-kathā ... dhamma-sagga-kathā kāmānāṁ adinnānaṁ okaṇānaṁ saṇḍhikāñaṁ nekkhamme ānissamāṁ pakāsati. yadā bhagavā aññāsi ... kalla-cittāṁ mudda-cittāṁ vinivaraṇa-cittāṁ udaggu-cittāṁ pasanna-cittāṁ atthā yā buddhānāṁ sammakkamāṁ dhamma-desanāṁ tam pakāsati: dukkhāṁ samudayaṁ nirodham maggam.}

This quite explicitly begins with sīla. What comes next, culminating in a mind that is soft and without hindrances, quite clearly indicates samādhi. Finally pañña is indicated by the reference to the four truths. A recurring passage in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta also shows how sīla, samādhi and pañña should be seen as forming some kind of successive spiritual hierarchy:

Such is sīla, such samādhi, such pañña; when imbued with sīla, samādhi is of great fruit and benefit; when imbued with samādhi, pañña is of great fruit and benefit; when imbued with pañña, the mind is rightly freed from the āsavas, namely the āsavas of sensual desires, the āsavas of becoming, the āsavas of views, the āsavas of ignorance.\footnote{D II 81, 84, 91, 98: iti sīlam iti samādhi iti paññā. sīla-paribhāvito samādhi mahāpphalo hoti mahāniśanam, samādhi-paribhāvīta paññā mahāpphalo hoti mahāniśanam, paññā-paribhāvito cittāṁ sīlam samma-d-eva āsahecī vimuccati seyyathidham kāmāsavā bhavassāvā diṭṭhāsavā avijñāsavā ti. (A similar formula is found in the Sanskrit version; see MPS 160, 220. For some further examples reflecting the principles of the progressive path, cf. Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 396-7.)}

Thus we have in sīla, samādhi and pañña the basic principles of a spiritual hierarchy. This hierarchy is not a purely ideal schema, but is seen as reflecting the actual hierarchy of the world. When it comes to spiritual development the bhikkhu, in order to progress, will have to attend to sīla, samādhi and pañña more or less in that order. That is, it is understood that if one tries to develop...
panñā, it will become apparent that some measure of samādhi is a prerequisite; if one tries to develop samādhi, it will become apparent that some measure of sila is a prerequisite. What this means in practice is that it is understood that someone can have developed sila but need not necessarily have developed samādhi and panñā; someone can have developed sila and samādhi, but not necessarily have developed panñā to any great degree. However, the converse cannot be so. This is reflected in a corresponding hierarchy of religious goals. The development of sila alone leads to happy rebirth in the kāma-loka; the development of sila and samādhi to rebirth in the brahma-loka; by developing sila, samādhi and panñā rebirth of all kinds is transcended. This is all neatly summed up in the following passage from the Vimuttimagga:

> After acknowledging the Path of Freedom, through virtue he transcends the way to states of regress (apāya); through concentration he transcends the sense plane, through wisdom he transcends all becoming. If he practises virtue to the full and practises little of concentration and wisdom, he will reach the stage of Stream-entrant and the stage of Once-returner. If he practises virtue and concentration to the full and practises little of wisdom, he will reach the stage of Non-returner. If he practises virtue, concentration and wisdom to the full, he will reach the peerless freedom of the Consummate One.84

While this hierarchy stands in theory, the relationship between the three elements of sila, samādhi and panñā in practice is recognized in the ancient literature as being rather subtle. A number of writers have drawn attention to this fact.85 Sila, samādhi and panñā are in fact inextricably bound up together. In other words the hierarchy does not mean that when the novice at the initial stages of the path establishes sila, he does not also in some way and to some degree begin to develop samādhi and panñā, or that when the adept at the advanced stages of the path develops panñā he does not need sila or samādhi:

> Just as, Gotama, one might wash hand with hand or foot with foot, even so panñā is fully washed by sila, sila is fully washed by panñā; where there is sila there is panñā, where there is panñā there is sila; one who has sila has panñā, one who has panñā has sila; sila and panñā together are declared the summit of the world.86

What this means, presumably, is that the intent to develop sila is seen as bound up with panñā and that the development of sila naturally tends to the development of panñā and, one can assume, samādhi.87 The latter two in turn tend to the development of sila.

It is precisely in this context—the context of the inter-relationships between sila, samādhi and panñā—that the structure of the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo is, I

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84 Vimutt Trsl 5; cf. A IV 380-1.
87 The Sonadanda-sutta, from which this passage is taken, considers the stages of the path by way of just two categories sila and panñā.
think, crucial. How the eight factors are to be classified in terms of *sīla*, *samādhi* and *pañña* is detailed in the *Cūḷavedalla-sutta*:

Right speech, right action and right livelihood—these *dhammas* are comprised by the aggregate of *sīla*; right striving, right mindfulness and right concentration—these *dhammas* are comprised by the aggregate of *samādhi*; right view and right thought—these *dhammas* are comprised by the aggregate of *pañña*.88

The sequence of the eight factors thus throws the normative progression into complete disorder: instead of *sīla*, *samādhi* and *pañña* we have *pañña*, *sīla*, *samādhi*.

The order of the eight factors is really quite remarkable in this respect. It is in marked contrast with the order and structure of the eight *aṅgas* of *yoga*, for example, which appear to follow the same principles as the stage by stage account of the path.89 The order of the factors of the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* is distinctive and must be regarded as being quite deliberate and intended to convey something quite specific. Yet the question of the order of the factors has been little discussed in scholarly literature. To begin with, the order of its factors seems to show that the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* is understood not primarily as a description of the successive stages of the path. Indeed, this much is quite often pointed out. Saddhatissa, an oriental monk writing here primarily for a non-specialist western readership, comments:

> The path leading to the release from suffering is said to be eight-fold. These are not consecutive steps. The eight factors are interdependent and must be perfected simultaneously, the fulfilment of one factor being unlikely without at least the partial development of the others.90

Yet within the world of scholarship the way in which this might be so for early Buddhist literature appears neither to have been properly appreciated nor worked out and presented. More often the account of the successive stages of the path in terms of *sīla*, *samādhi* and *pañña* is simply confounded with the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo*. Even as careful and accomplished a scholar as Étienne Lamotte seems to follow this trend:

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88 M I 301: *ya cāvuso Viśākha sammā-vācā yo ca sammā-kammanto yo ca sammā-ājīvo, ime dhammā sīla-kkhandhe sangahītā; yo ca sammā-vāyāmo yo ca sammā-satī yo ca sammā-samādhi, ime dhammā samādhi-kkhandhe sangahītā; yo ca sammā-dīśhiyo ca sammā-samkappo, ime dhammā paññā-kkhandhe sangahītā ti. (Certain northern sources give a different analysis: sāmyaṅga-dṛṣṭi, sāmyaṅga-saṅkalpa and sāmyaṅga-vyāyāma are praṇāṭa-skandha; sāmyaṅga-vāk, -karmānta and -ājīva are sīla-skandha; sāmyaṅga-smiṭi and sāmyaṅga-saṅkhāra are samādhi-skandha; see Wayman, Śrāvakakāśī, p. 101; Satya Trsl 43, 448-9.)

89 The eight *aṅgas* of *yoga* are control [of conduct] (*yama*), observance (*niyama*), posture (*āsana*), breath control (*prāṇāyāma*), withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*), composure (*dhrāmanā*), absorption (*dhyāna*), concentration (*samādhi*); see YS II 29. Vāṣṭā comments that ‘the following up of these must be performed in succession’ (J.H. Woods, *The Yoga System of Patañjali*, Harvard, 1914, p. 177); the first *aṅga* clearly corresponds more or less to what is termed *sīla* in Buddhist thought, while *samādhi* in the *YS* probably embraces rather more than the term *samādhi* always does in Buddhist thought. The eight *aṅgas* of *yoga* seem, then, to represent a progression or succession of stages. The logic is similar to that of the gradual path in the *sāmaṅga-phala* schema; while elements of the later stages are not necessarily absent from the earlier stages, the basic idea of successive stages remains. There seems to be no concept of the eight *aṅgas* adding up to a *mārga* similar in conception to the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo*.

La quatrième vérité sainte ... a pour objet le chemin conduisant à la destruction de la douleur (duḥkhanirddhāgāmini pratiyāp). Le noble chemin à huit branches défini dans le sermon de Bénarès comporte trois éléments: la moralité, la concentration et la sagesse.\footnote{Lamotte, HBI, p. 45.}

Lamotte here gives no indication of any discrepancy between the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo on the one hand and the scheme of sīla, samādhi and pāññā on the other. He continues his exposition of the fourth truth, (i.e. of the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo), with a full account of sīla, samādhi and pāññā. Yet this procedure gives the impression that in the early literature the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo and the account of the successive stages of the path in terms of sīla, samādhi and pāññā are simply equivalent when they quite manifestly are not.

The statement just quoted from Lamotte’s Histoire du bouddhisme indien is indicative of how, while generally following the Cūḷavedalla-sutta’s method of classifying the eight factors in terms of sīla, samādhi and pāññā, scholars have tended to ignore the discussion in the sutta that immediately precedes this:\footnote{The passages Lamotte refers to in this connection rather curiously refer only to sīla, samādhi and pāññā and make no mention of their relationship to the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo.}

‘Is it, sister, that the three aggregates [of sīla, samādhi and pāññā] are comprised by the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, or is it that the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo is comprised by the three aggregates?’

‘The three aggregates are not, Visākha, comprised by the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, but the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo is, Visākha, comprised by the three aggregates.’\footnote{M I 301: ariyena nu kho ayye āṭṭhaṅgikena maggena tayo khandhā saṃgaḥti, udāhū tīhi khandhehi ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo saṃgaḥti ti. na kho āvuso Visākha ariyena āṭṭhaṅgikena maggena tayo khandhā saṃgaḥti, tīhi ca kho āvuso Visākha khandhehi ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo saṃgaḥti.}

The commentary indicates what must be intended here:

Herein, because the magga is specific while the three aggregates are all inclusive, therefore, because of its specificity, it is comprised by the three all inclusive aggregates like a city by a kingdom.\footnote{Ps II 361 = Vism XVI 95: ettha Yasmā maggo sappadeso tayo khandhā nippadesā, tasāya ayam sappadesattā nagaram viya rajena nippadesehi tīhi khandhehi saṃgaḥti. (The technical meanings of sappadesa and nippadesa are clear at As 37; in the case of some Abhidhamma triplets and couplets, any given dhamma will be classifiable by one of the three or two categories; such triplets and couplets are ‘inclusive’ or ‘comprehensive’ (nippadesa); in the case of others certain dharmas will not fall into any of the three or two categories; these triplets and couplets are of ‘limited scope’ or ‘specific’ (sappadesa).)}

So why is the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo comprised by the three khandhas but not vice versa? Technically, what this seems to mean is that one can instance dhammas such as vicāra and pīti, for example, which as jhāna-factors have a place in samādhi-kkhandha, yet are left out of the reckoning in the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo. More generally this must mean that the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo should be understood as having a more specific import than the all embracing gradual scheme of sīla, samādhi and pāññā. At first sight this might seem to contradict some of what I have said above, namely that the ariyo āṭṭhaṅgiko maggo does embrace and comprise spiritual practice in its entirety,
that it does represent the sum of the Buddhist path as presented in the Nikāyas. However, in fact, I think this allows us to form a clearer idea of how and in what sense this is so.

The triad of *sīla*, *samādhi* and *pañña* implies a comprehensive graded description of the stages of the spiritual path. In terms of content it comprises the successive stages in full, and while reflecting the overall general nature of the actual stages of the path, it does in part represent something of an ideal scheme. The *ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo* does something rather different. While it does not by way of content fully embrace the aggregates of *sīla*, *samādhi* and *pañña*, its eight factors do collectively touch on and comprise each of these three aspects—uniquely among the seven sets. Thus the eight factors collectively represent, as it were, an actual manifestation of all three aspects, so that the *ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo* can be seen as the essential distillation of the aggregates of *sīla*, *samādhi* and *pañña*. The *ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo* comprises the whole of the spiritual life precisely in the sense that it is the consummation of the development of *sīla*, *samādhi* and *pañña*. It is the path or way of life that issues from that development. Its end is a reflection and crystallization of the way one has come. In other words, the development of *sīla*, *samādhi* and *pañña* in all its various aspects culminates in right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right striving, right mindfulness, right concentration—*pañña*, *sīla* and *samādhi*, the three essential aspects of spiritual practice in perfect balance. It is only in this manner that the treatment of the *ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo* in the *Cūlavādalla-sutta* becomes properly intelligible.

The *ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo* is not, then, primarily descriptive of the successive stages of or points along a path. The eight factors constitute a ‘path’ or ‘way’ not in the sense of a linear progression from starting line to finishing post; rather they embody a complete ‘way of going along’ or ‘mode of practice’—a *paṭipadā*. The eight factors embrace all that is essential to spiritual progress.

**6. The eight factors in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī**

At this point the treatment of the eight factors of the path in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* is of some interest in that it provides an indication of how the *ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo* is considered to arise; I mean by this that it suggests a relationship between the path factors in ordinary consciousness and the *ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo* as an aspect of transcendent consciousness. While, of course, the exact details of its treatment must be viewed as belonging to a later phase of Buddhist thought, the general way in which the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* handles the path-factors seems to me to be entirely relevant to the Nikāyas. The sense of the *Mahācattārisaka-sutta*, which I shall consider, in some detail below, does seem to become rather clearer in the light of the early Abhidhamma treatment.

As its title suggests, much of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* is concerned with enumerating or listing *dhammas*—but not simply listing *dhammas*, rather listing *dhammas* according to various groupings (*samghana*). The principles behind these various groupings are diverse, overlap and operate at different
levels. Thus the triplets and couplets of the \textit{mānīkā} provide an initial set of groupings. Within the first grouping of \textit{kusala-dhammas} various other groupings are then distinguished: there are \textit{kāmāvacara-kusala-dhammas}, \textit{rūpāvacara-kusala-dhammas}, \textit{arūpāvacara-kusala-dhammas} and \textit{lokuttara-kusala-dhammas}. However, there are, of course, other \textit{kāmāvacara-dhammas} that are not \textit{kusala} but \textit{akusala} or \textit{avāyākata} (undetermined). Again within the grouping of \textit{kāmāvacara-kusala-dhammas}, there are distinguished eight further groupings, namely eight varieties of ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’ (\textit{citta}). Each one of these eight \textit{cittas} represents an assemblage of \textit{dhammas} which comes together, arises at a particular time (\textit{samaya}) and then passes away. The items that constitute each assemblage of \textit{dhammas} or each \textit{citta} can simply be listed, but once again the \textit{Dhammasaṅgani} indicates that the various \textit{dhammas} present fall into various groupings. This is most obviously brought out in the \textit{kotthāsa-vāra} or ‘section on sets’,\footnote{Discussed more fully below, Chapter 10.3.} a section which is apparently understood as forming part of the exposition of each kind of \textit{citta}, although it is lost in most cases in the abbreviations of the text. I quote here the opening of the \textit{kotthāsa-vāra} for the first kind of skilful \textit{kāmāvacara-citta}:

Now at that time there are four aggregates, two spheres, two elements, three foods, eight faculties, there is five-factoried \textit{jhāna}, a five-factoried path, there are seven powers, three causes . . .

What underlies the \textit{Dhammasaṅgani}’s method here is the fundamental notion of what \textit{dhammas} really are. They are not the inert contents of the mind, but rather basic forces that collectively constitute the mind; and that mind is never stable, but always on the move. Therefore it is not enough to simply list \textit{dhammas} as if they were static pieces of the mind. To understand the mind as active (which by nature it is) one must see its forces at work, how they come together and interact. Within the \textit{Dhammasaṅgani} the \textit{kotthāsa-vāras} play a significant part in plotting the various courses of this interaction.

The opening of the \textit{kotthāsa-vāra} for the first kind of skilful \textit{kāmāvacara-citta} mentions a ‘five-factoried path’. The \textit{kotthāsa-vāra} goes on to explain this as consisting of right view, right thought, right striving, right mindfulness and right concentration. Later on we are told that for the first kind of unskilful \textit{kāmāvacara-citta} there is a ‘four-factoried path’ consisting of wrong view, wrong thought, wrong striving and wrong concentration.\footnote{Dhs 78-9.} This seems to be understood as applying to all \textit{kusala-} and \textit{akusala-citta}, though probably not to \textit{avāyākata}. The eight items that potentially make up the \textit{ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo} thus apparently form the basis of one of the groupings of \textit{dhammas} that indicate the ways in which \textit{dhammas} are conceived of as coming together and interacting. In other words, a path (consisting in however many of the sixteen items—eight \textit{sammā} or ‘right’ and eight \textit{micchā} or ‘wrong’—happen to be present) is always present in the mind. Considered by way of the eight aspects of \textit{diṭṭhi}, \textit{sāmkappa}, \textit{vācā}, \textit{kammanta}, \textit{ājīva}, \textit{vāyāma}, \textit{sati} and \textit{samādhi}, at any
given time the mind reveals a ‘path’; that is, the way it is orientated, the
direction in which it is moving.

Why do these eight aspects do this, and not another grouping? Partly
because, as I have already suggested, in touching upon paññā, sīla and
samādhi, they indicate, as it were, a crystallization of or a momentary window
on a complete way of life. Like the mind in general, one’s way of life is seen as
ordinarily unstable and changing. At times of skilful citta the ‘way of life’
revealed by the eight aspects is essentially the right way of life, the right path or
direction; it is potentially the ariyao atthaṅgiko maggo. But at times of unskilful
citta the ‘way of life’ is essentially wrong, the wrong path or direction.

According to the Dhammasaṅgani and the Abhidhamma in general it is,
however, only at the time of lokuttara-citta that all eight factors of the path
come together within a single ‘mind’ or citta. In the case of lokuttara-citta
the Dhammasaṅgani adds to the standard definitions of each factor (i.e. the
definition used in the context of kāmāvacara, rūpāvacara and arūpāvacara
consciousness) the epithets ‘factor of the path’ (magganga) and ‘included in the
path’ (magga-pariyāpāna). This can only be to bring out the point that here
we have the ariyao atthaṅgiko maggo itself.

The Dhammasaṅgani in fact never explicitly considers the ‘path’ of ordinary
citta as more than five-factored, and neither right nor wrong speech, action
and livelihood are ever mentioned in the context of ordinary citta. The Atthasālinī explains—and there seems no reason to doubt that this is basically
the correct interpretation of the Dhammasaṅgani—that in ordinary citta only
one of right or wrong speech, action and livelihood can ever occur at a given
time. The logic behind this would seem to be that it is understood that the
ordinary skilful mind may well temporarily refrain from one of wrong speech,
action or livelihood—which one depending on particular circumstances. How-
ever, each of the four lokuttara-maggas turns away from all three at once
because it results in the refraining from certain kinds of wrong speech, action
and livelihood for once and for all. The magga of stream-attainment, for
example, is understood as refraining finally from the more extreme kinds of
wrong speech, action and livelihood such as would result in rebirth in the
places of regress (apāya).

With this discussion one comes up against what appears to be another
ancient Abhidhamma moot point: can the lokuttara-magga ever be anything
other than eight-factored? The debate seems to have centred around an
account of the path as found in the Mahāsālāyatanika-sutta. The passage
considers the fulfilment of the development of the ariyao atthaṅgiko maggo in
terms of the arising of right view, thought, striving, mindfulness and concen-

97 One must understand ‘any given time’ slightly loosely here since, as I shall discuss, ordinarily
a single arising of consciousness has only a maximum of six path-factors.
98 Dhs 60-9.
99 Ibid.
100 As 154; but As 220-2 (discussed above, p. 196) would lead one to think that either
sammā-vācā and sammā-ājīva, or sammā-kammanṭa and sammā-ājīva could occur together in
ordinary citta.
The implication is that at the time of the fulfilment of ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo (that is, according to the later terminology, at the time of the lokuttara-magga) in certain circumstances only the five factors of the path concerned with pañña and samādhi need be relevant, and that the three factors concerned with sīla can be left out of the reckoning. This is basically a manifestation of the principles of the consecutive stages of the path or of the hierarchy of sīla, samādhi and pañña: the essential work of sīla is understood as being completed in the lower stages of the path and as providing the basis for the development of samādhi and pañña. Of course, this is not to be taken as implying that the bhikkhu at the higher stages of the path no longer keeps sīla, but simply that he does not have to work at it—he keeps sīla naturally and, as it were, spontaneously. The question is at what point exactly sīla can be said to have been purified. The Pāli commentaries strongly resist the notion of a transcendent five-factored path. Although they largely appeal simply to the authority of the sutta, the logic behind their point of view would appear to be that, although to all practical intents and purposes sīla may well be purified at some stage prior to the arising of the lokuttara-magga, still the possibility of decline exists. It is of the nature of the lokuttara magga to cut off the possibility of decline and finally purify sīla. Until it has arisen, the bhikkhu may still lapse back into the wrong speech, wrong action and wrong livelihood from which he has turned away by means of the lokiya-magga or ordinary spiritual practice.

Before passing on to the Mahācattārīsaka-sutta, I should perhaps make it clear exactly how I view the relevance of the Dhammasaṅgani’s treatment of the eight factors. The Dhammasaṅgani shows how the notion of the ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo cuts across the notion of the progressive path characterized by the sequence of sīla, samādhi and pañña. If this sequence can be seen as highlighting the conception of the spiritual path as a vertical hierarchy with sīla at the bottom, samādhi in the middle and pañña at the top, then the notion of the magga as eight-factored cuts a horizontal cross-section through this, indicating that elements of sīla, samādhi and pañña—or their unskilful counterparts—are present and interacting wherever we are in that hierarchy. At any time they move the mind inevitably either in a skilful or unskilful direction. The basic principles of this psychology of the eight-factored path are, I think,

102 The point is discussed at Ps V 104; As 154; Vibh-a 319-21; Kv-a 188-9. A five-factored lokuttara-magga is detailed at Vibh 237-41 but this is taken by the commentary to be purely a matter of exposition (see below, pp. 330-1). Kv 599-601 takes issue with the Mahimsāsaka (so Kv-a 188) for upholding the notion of the five-factored path. The commentaries, however, do allow a seven-factored lokuttara-magga corresponding to the second, third, fourth, fifth jhānas that lack vitakka (= samkappa) (see Ps V 104; As 226-228; and below, p. 330). Underlying these discussions is the question of the conception of the three factors of speech, action and livelihood. As mentioned, the Sarvāstivādins used the notion of avijñapti-ṛūpa to maintain all eight factors in the lokuttara-mārga; the Theravādins conceived of the matter in different terms. Some cited a Sūtra equivalent to the Mahāsaṅgata-sūtra passage as contrary to the notion of avijñapti-ṛūpa (Abhīdh-k 196). Those who denied avijñapti but did not adopt a specific notion of virati like the Theravādins were left only with cetanā, and since the transcendent path was taken as an act of ‘thought’, and not of speech or body, how all eight factors were encompassed was problematic.
quite evident in the *Mahācattārīsaka-sutta* and are generally valid for the Nikāyas.

The notion of the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* is understood as an expression of the fact that the immediate way or approach (*patipada*) to perfection consists in bringing into being the *collective* rightness (*sammatta*) of view, thought, speech, action, livelihood, striving, mindfulness and concentration.\(^{103}\)

### 7. The *Mahācattārīsaka-sutta*: the law of the eight-factored path

The *Mahācattārīsaka-sutta*\(^{104}\) is an exposition of noble right concentration (*ariya-sammā-samādhi*) along with its supports (*sa-upanissā*) and its equipment (*sa-parikkhāra*). These supports and equipment of noble right concentration are right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right striving and right mindfulness; in other words, the seven remaining items that make up the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* in addition to right concentration:

That one-pointedness of mind, bhikkhus, which is equipped (*parikkhāta*) with these seven factors is called noble right concentration along with its supports and its equipment.\(^{105}\)

This notion of *ariyo sammā-samādhi sa-upaniso sa-parikkhāro* is referred to in a number of places in the Nikāyas\(^{106}\) and is obviously of some significance in connection with the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo*. The *Mahācattārīsaka-sutta* constitutes its fullest treatment in the Nikāyas, and as such must be judged a *sutta* of considerable importance. In the Chinese versions of the Āgamas the equivalent to the *Mahācattārīsaka-sutta* apparently finds its place in the equivalent to the *magga-samyutta*.\(^{107}\) The recurring theme of the *Mahācattārīsaka-sutta* is the priority of right view with regard to ‘noble right concentration along with its supports and equipment': ‘with regard to this, right view comes first’ (*tatra sammā-diṭṭhi pubbaṁ-gamā*). This is the starting point of the *sutta*, and the exposition that follows falls into three sections.\(^{108}\) Each opens with a statement of the priority of right view, and proceeds to explain just how this is so.

The first section explains that right view comes first because it knows wrong view as wrong view and right view as right view (*micchā-diṭṭhiḥ micchā-diṭṭhiḥ ti pajānāti sammā-diṭṭhiḥ sammā-diṭṭhiḥ ti pajānāti sassa hoti sammā-diṭṭhiḥ*). In the same way right view knows wrong and right thought, wrong and right speech, wrong and right action, wrong and right livelihood. In each case the *sutta* states that there are two kinds of right view, thought, speech, action and livelihood. One kind is with *āsavas*, concerned with merit (*puṇṇa-bhāgiya*) and resulting in acquisition (*upadhi-vepakka*). The second kind is *ariya*, without

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\(^{103}\) See SV 17-8.

\(^{104}\) M III 71-8.

\(^{105}\) M III 71: yā kho bhikkhave imehi sattāngehi cittassa ekaggata parikkhāta ayam vuccati bhikkhave ariyo sammā-samādhi sa-upaniso iti pi sa-parikkhāro iti pi.

\(^{106}\) In addition see D II 217; S V 21; A IV 40.

\(^{107}\) See C. Akanuma, op. cit., p. 75.

\(^{108}\) M III 71-5, 75-6, 76-7.
āsavas, transcendent (lokuttara), a factor of the path (maggaṅga). Each of the five parts of the first section concludes by stating that as the bhikkhu strives to abandon the item in question—view, thought, speech, action, or livelihood—as wrong and arouse it as right, his striving is right-striving. As he mindfully abandons what is wrong and attains and dwells in what is right, his mindfulness is right mindfulness. So ‘these three dhammas flow around after (anuparidhavanti), revolve around (anuparivattanti) right view—namely right view, right striving and right mindfulness’.

The second section of the sutta explains the way in which right view comes first, with the following formula that sees the factors as consecutive:

For one of right view, bhikkhus, right thought appears; for one of right thought, right speech appears; for one of right speech, right action appears; for one of right action, right livelihood appears; for one of right livelihood, right striving appears; for one of right striving, right mindfulness appears; for one of right mindfulness, right concentration appears; for one of right concentration right knowledge appears; for one of right knowledge, right freedom appears. Thus, bhikkhus, the learner on entering is possessed of eight factors, the arahant of ten factors.

Finally the third section consists of another formula again in explanation of how samma-diṭṭhi comes first:

For one of right view, wrong view wastes away and those various bad unskilful dhammas that come into being conditioned by wrong view, they too waste away for him; the various skilful dhammas that have right view as their condition reach fulfillment.

This is repeated nine more times substituting in turn for right and wrong view, right and wrong thought, speech, action, livelihood, striving, mindfulness, concentration, knowledge and freedom.

The Mahācattārīsaka-sutta quite clearly constitutes an exposition of how noble right concentration with its supports and equipment comes into being, and how right view leads the way in all spiritual practice. The basic notion would seem straightforward enough. To use the image of the journey, if one wants to go somewhere one must have an initial understanding of where one is and how one got there, along with where one wants to go and how to get there. This, in other terms, is an initial appreciation of the four truths. Specifically in the Mahācattārīsaka-sutta, where one is and also how one got there, is typified by wrong view, etc., where one wants to go and how to get there is typified by

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109 Cf. how Dhs adds the terms maggaṅga and magga-pariyāpama when defining the eight factors for lokuttara-citta.

110 M III 76: samma-diṭṭhissa bhikkhave samma-samkappo pahoti; samma-samkappassa samma-vācā pahoti; samma-vācasssa samma-kammanto pahoti; samma-kammantassa samma-ājīvo pahoti; samma-ājīvassa samma-vāyāmo pahoti; samma-vāyāmassa samma-sati pahoti; samma-satissā samma-saññā pahoti; samma-saññadhissā samma-ñānam pahoti; samma-ñānam samma-vimutti pahoti. iti kho bhikkhave atīhānga-samannāgato sekho pātipado dasaṅga-samannāgato arahā hoti. (I emend sekho pātipado to sekho pātipado (cf. M I 354; III 300); PED, s.v. sekha, is misleading; Ce (1974) reads just sekho.)

right view, etc. Thus it is that right view must lead the way in knowing what wrong view, etc. and what right view, etc. are. But while right view has precedence because of its function of knowing and seeing what is wrong and what is right, in the actual task of abandoning what is wrong and causing what is right to arise, right view must be supported by right striving and right mindfulness. Thus the first section emphasizes that right view must in some sense lead the way because it is what 'sees', but three dhammas, namely right view, right striving and right mindfulness, continually interact with the other factors in order to promote them in their 'right' aspect.

Of great importance here is the fact that in this first section, the sutta distinguishes between two levels of right view, thought, speech action and livelihood,\(^{112}\) the ordinary skilful variety concerned with merit, and the ariya factor of the transcendent path. This is taken up in the commentary which distinguishes here between right view that is concerned with ordinary vipassana or 'insight' and right view that is concerned with the path—the lokuttaramagga.\(^{113}\) What this indicates is two quite distinct stages in the coming into being of ariya right concentration along with its supports and equipment. First there is the turning away from wrong view, etc., and the turning towards right view, etc. that are of the ordinary skilful variety. Secondly there is the attainment of right view, etc. as noble, without āsavas, lokuttara, a factor of the path. It is precisely this second stage that must be understood as ariyo sammā-samādhi sa-upaniso sa-parikkhāro.

At this point the second section of the Mahācattārīṣaka-sutta becomes relevant. Once again right view leads the way, but this is now the stage of the 'learner who has come to the way' (sekho pātipado)—the way that leads to the cessation of suffering, the ariyo atīhangiko maggo. Such a learner has brought the eight items to the stage of being factors of the ariya-magga, and endowed with these eight factors he begins to bring two further items into being, namely right knowledge and right freedom, such that, endowed with all ten factors in full, he becomes an arahant. This brings us to the final section of the sutta where once again right view is said to lead the way in the final and absolute wasting away of the ten items in their wrong aspects, and their coming to full development in their right aspects. This contrast between the eight factors of the learner and the ten factors of the one who has nothing to learn (asekha) or arahant, as already noted, occurs with some frequency in the Nikāyas. The Mahācattārīṣaka-sutta is an exposition of the processes involved in the passing from wrong view, etc. to right view, etc. that is ordinary and skilful, and from here to right view, etc. that is ariya and without āsavas; and from here to the full development of right view, etc. Throughout it is emphasized that right view leads the way. Thus right view comes first not just as the preliminary stage in spiritual practice, not just as the preparation or basis for

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\(^{112}\) Why the sutta stops with sammā-dājīva and does not continue with sammā-vāyāma, -sati, and -samādhi is unclear. These are dealt with within the body of the sutta as a whole, so perhaps one should ask why sammā-diṭṭhi is repeated here. The answer in this case would seem to be to do with the great emphasis on the priority of sammā-diṭṭhi in the sutta.

\(^{113}\) Ps IV 131.
higher stages, rather it comes first at all stages of spiritual practice. The
treatment of the factors as consecutive steps takes on the character not so
much of a map showing the stages of spiritual practice, as of a working model
illustrating the operation of spiritual practice at whatever stage. In the Dhamma-
saṅgani the items embraced by the factors of the path are understood to
indicate the path the mind is following at any given time, the direction in which
it is going. In the Mahācattārisaṅka-sutta right view, closely followed by right
striving and right mindfulness, interacts with the other factors of the path
leading the way down the path that will eventually become the ariyo atthaṅgiko
maggo. Just like the Dhammasaṅgani, the Mahācattārisaṅka-sutta sees in the
eight factors not the successive stages of the spiritual path, but rather the
process that is active at all stages of the path.

One more aspect of the Mahācattārisaṅka-sutta’s treatment of the factors of
the path seems to me to be of particular interest. It serves both to bring out
what I have already said and also adds something of a further dimension. I
refer to the actual contrast between the eight or ten items in their wrong aspect,
on the one hand, and in their right aspect, on the other hand. Exactly this
contrast is made again and again within the magga-saṁyutta and in many
other places in the Nikāyas. Amongst the seven sets this kind of contrast is
peculiar to the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo, and must be reckoned as one of the
most distinctive and characteristic aspects of its treatment in early Buddhist
literature. In the Mahācattārisaṅka-sutta this contrast is particularly striking
and well developed. It is made throughout the sutta and also forms the real
climax—it is what actually gives the sutta its title.

The ‘great forty’, the twenty items in the party of the unskilful (akusala-
pakkha) and the twenty items in the party of the skilful (kusala-pakkha), are
contained in the third section. Wrong view counts as the first item that
contributes to what is unskilful; ‘the various bad unskilful dhāmmas that come
into being with wrong view as their condition’ count as the second item. In the
same way wrong thought, speech, action, livelihood, striving, mindfulness,
concentration, knowledge and freedom each give two items and complete the
twenty. The ten items beginning with right view are considered in a similar
fashion: right view itself as the first item, ‘the various skilful dhāmmas with
right view as their condition’ as the second. So the ‘great forty’ is counted.

The ‘great forty’ consists, then, of two sequences of items balancing each
other: one is negative and unskilful, the other positive and skillful. The first is
headed by wrong view and the second by right view; these lead the way into an
unskilful and skilful cycle respectively. Significantly the opening sutta of the
magga-saṁyutta gives exactly these two cycles in a formula, that reflects the
second section of the Mahācattārisaṅka-sutta:

Ignorance comes first, bhikkhus, in the attaining of unskilful dhāmmas; after [come]
lack of self-respect and disregard for consequence. For one given to ignorance, for
one who is ignorant, bhikkhus, wrong view appears; for one of wrong view, wrong
thought ... wrong speech ... wrong action ... wrong livelihood ... wrong striving ...
wrong mindfulness ... wrong concentration appears. Knowledge comes first, bhikkhus in the attaining of skilful dhammas; after [come] self-respect and regard for consequence. For one given to knowledge, for one who has knowledge, bhikkhus, right view appears; for one of right view, right thought ... right speech ... right action ... right livelihood ... right striving ... right mindfulness ... right concentration appears.115

Looked at in this way, the whole treatment of the micchā-diṭṭhi sequence and the sammā-diṭṭhi sequence begins to resemble another set of two alternative cycles, one negative, one positive, frequently found in the Nikāyas. I refer, of course, to the anuloma and paṭiloma sequences of conditioned arising (paṭicca-samuppāda).116 The great emphasis on the priority of sammā-diṭṭhi in leading the way in the positive cycle in the Mahācattārīṣaka-sutta, is exactly an application of what might be called the first principle of paṭicca-samuppāda: that avijjā comes first in the sequence of conditions that result in the coming into being of this whole mass of dukkha, and that the cessation of avijjā comes first in the sequence of conditions that result in the cessation of this whole mass of dukkha.

The significance of this is, I think, that we might speak of the law of paṭicca-samuppāda in the Nikāyas, and also of the law of the eight-factored path. These are in a sense two aspects of essentially the same thing, namely dhamma. According to early Buddhist literature the law of paṭicca-samuppāda is not something that can be avoided, it is not something that there is any choice about; it is the law of the universe and endures whether or not a Tathāgata arises in the world.117 Either the cycle of paṭicca-samuppāda will tend towards the accumulation of ‘this mass of dukkha’ or it will tend towards its cessation; it cannot be otherwise. The ‘law of the eight-factored path’ can be understood similarly. The eight factors embrace eight essential aspects of existence—eight aspects that cannot be avoided. As long as these eight aspects are sammā or ‘right’ they continue to interact ‘properly’ and move in a skilful direction towards the cessation of dukkha. When they are micchā or ‘wrong’ they interact wrongly and move away from the cessation of suffering. What ultimately issues from the skilful interaction or cycle is the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo itself. All this highlights a tension that exists in Buddhist thought between descriptive dhamma (how things are, paṭicca-samuppāda) and prescriptive dhamma (how things ought to be, the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo).

This view of the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo might be summed up like this. There are various eight-factored paths, some micchā, some sammā. These ‘paths’ are there all the time, and whether we like it or not we inevitably follow

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115 S V 1-2: avijjā bhikkhave pubbam-gamā akusalānām dhammānāṁ samappattiya anudeva ahirikām anottappam. avijjā-gatassa bhikkhave aviddasuno micchā-diṭṭhi pahoti. micchā-diṭṭhissā micchā-samkkappo ... micchā-vācā ... micchā-kammanṭo ... micchā-ājīvo ... micchā-vāyāmo ... micchā-sattī ... micchā-samādhī pahoti. avijjā bhikkhave pubbam-gamā kusalānām dhammānāṁ samappattiya anudeva hirikām ottappam. avijjā-gatassa bhikkhave aviddasuno sammā-diṭṭhi pahoti. sammā-diṭṭhissā sammā-samkkappo ... sammā-vācā ... sammā-kammanṭo ... sammā-vāyāmo ... sammā-sattī ... sammā-samādhī pahoti. (Cf. A V 211-2.)

116 E.g. S II 1.

117 S II 25; cf. A I 286.
one variety or the other, sometimes micchā, sometimes sammā. The *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo then becomes a particular variety of eight-factored paths in general. It is the eight-factored path as it really should be, it is the eight-factored path as it truly is, while the eight-factored paths that exist for us ordinarily are either—when they are micchā—distortions of this reality, or—when they are sammā—partial or momentary reflections of it.

I should add here that I do not wish to deny that there may well be a logic by which the eight factors of the path can be understood as characterizing the progressive stages of a spiritual path. Indeed Frauwallner himself suggests a quite attractive correspondence between the sāmaṇḍa-phala account of the path and the eight factors: right view corresponds to the initial confidence (saddhā) in the awakening of the Tathāgata; right thought, right speech and right action to the practice of sīla; right livelihood to the way of life of the monk as described at the conclusion of the sīlas; right striving to his trying to avoid future unskilful dhammas and to arouse future skilful dhammas; right mindfulness to the preparations for meditation; right concentration to the various meditation attainments. Yet it is surely significant that the Nikāyas themselves never attempt such a correspondence, although the Buddhist tradition can on occasion do something rather similar with the factors, as is shown by the following passage from Harivarman’s *Satyasiddhi-sāstra:

The right view is when one having the wisdom born of listening believes that the five aggregates of elements are impermanent and suffering, etc. When the knowledge turns to be reflective it is called right thought. As a result of this thought one attempts to eradicate sins and cultivate merits; that is right endeavour. In due course he, being ordained in the order follows good conduct and adheres to right speech, right action and right livelihood. As a result of these restraints the foundations of mindfulness, trances and concentrations are received in order. And as a result of the latter again the yogin secures a true knowledge of things as they are. This is the order of eight constituents of the path.

What I do suggest, however, is that this is not the primary way of understanding the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo in the Nikāyas. I suggest, then, that the process formula in the case of the factors of the path is intended to show the continuing priority of right view at all stages of the spiritual path: how one speaks, acts and thinks at any time is dependent on one’s vision of oneself and the world.

At this point it is worth pursuing the question of the way in which right view is understood to develop a little further. Peter Masefield has argued that there is in the Nikāyas an unbridgeable gap between right view that is ordinary and right view that is transcendent, a factor of the path, noble and without āsavas. He then goes on to consider how this second kind of right view (i.e. the path-factor) is seen as being acquired in the Nikāyas. According to a

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119 *Satya Trsl* 43. It is, perhaps, significant that Harivarman here changes the place of *sanyāk-vyāyāma*.
120 Cf. the account of the path-factors at *Mp II* 71-3; *Vibh-a* 115-6.
121 Masefield, op. cit., p. 43.
Majjhima and Aṅguttara saying there are two conditions for the arising of right view, namely ‘the utterance of another’ (parato ghosa) and ‘appropriate bringing to mind’ (yoniso manasikāra).\footnote{M I 294; A I 87; whether ariya right view or ordinary right-view is intended here is not actually specified; but the Ps II 346 takes it as both (sammā-diṭṭhiyā uppādāyā ti vipassanā-sammā-diṭṭhiyā ca magga-sammā-diṭṭhiyā ca).} Masefield proceeds to ignore the question of yoniso manasikāra as a condition for the arising of right view, in the case of ordinary disciples (sāvakas) of the Buddha, and concentrates on parato ghosa.\footnote{Masefield, op. cit., p. 50, but Ps II 346 is misrepresented here; while it does say that yoniso manasikāra is the means of acquiring right view for pacceka-buddhas and sabbaṅgu-buddhas, it does not say that parato ghosa is the means for sāvakas; what they need are both conditions: ‘Therein for disciples, even for Dhammasenī [i.e. Siriputta], the two conditions conduce to the gaining [of right view].’ (tattha sāvakesa Dhammasenīpato dve paccayā laddham vatantī yeva.)} This he takes as meaning the ‘sound from the Beyond’.\footnote{Masefield, op. cit., p. 52. In discussing the meaning of parato ghosa Masefield cites Sn 696, 698 (id., pp. 51) but ignores Sn 818 (sutta pāresam nigghosam) which surely must be translated as ‘hearing the outcry of others’.} This is then taken as support for his main thesis: the sound of the beyond is mediated to other disciples only by the Buddha and his immediate disciples—this is the only way of gaining noble right view, which is religious truth ‘revealed’ in sound.

Many of Masefield’s ideas and suggestions are of great interest and not without their attraction. I should not wish to deny that parato ghosa might mean ‘the roar or thunder from beyond’; what I would wish to deny is that this excludes the meaning ‘the utterance of another’. For, from the Nikāya’s point of view, to hear the utterance of one who speaks dhamma is perhaps precisely to hear ‘the sound from beyond’. In the course of bringing to life a neglected dimension of the Nikāya’s outlook, Masefield fails, I think, to relate this to other dimensions.

The thinking that underlies the notion of parato ghosa and yoniso manasikāra as the ‘conditions for the arising of right view’\footnote{On khanti in this sense see BHSD, s.v. kṣanti.} finds expression in different terms elsewhere in the Nikāyas. In the bojjhanga-samyutta appropriate bringing to mind is said to be the internal condition for the development of the bojjhangas, and having a good friend (kalyāṇa-mittatā) the external condition.\footnote{D III 219; Vibh 324, 325; they do not appear to be mentioned elsewhere in the canon; in later writings suatā-mayā paññā is given first. The list is also known to Buddhist Sanskrit sources, e.g. Abhidh-k 334.} Again, in the Saṃgīti-sutta and Vibhaṅga we find the notion of three kinds of wisdom: wisdom produced by reflection (cintā-mayā paññā), wisdom produced by hearing (sutta-mayā paññā) and wisdom produced by development (bhāvanā-mayā paññā).\footnote{See below, p. 256.} The Vibhaṅga defines wisdom produced by reflection as openness to knowledge\footnote{D III 346; A I 87; whether ariya right view or ordinary right-view is intended here is not actually specified; but the Ps II 346 takes it as both (sammā-diṭṭhiyā uppādāyā ti vipassanā-sammā-diṭṭhiyā ca magga-sammā-diṭṭhiyā ca).} not gained by hearing from another (khantiṃ ... parato assutvā paṭilabhati); wisdom produced by hearing as openness to knowledge gained by hearing from another (khantiṃ ... parato sutvā paṭilabhati); and wisdom produced by development as all wisdom of the one who has...
spiritual attainments (sabbā pi samāpannassa paññā). These three kinds of wisdom and their connection with parato ghosa and yoniso manasikāra are fully explored in the Peṭakopadesa and Nettippakaraṇa; I give just one illustrative quotation:

The Teacher or a fellow practitioner in the position of a teacher teaches someone dhamma. Having heard this dhamma he gains confidence. Therein, whatever is investigation, energy, consideration, examination, this is wisdom produced by hearing. Whatever is investigation, consideration, examination, contemplation in dependence on what is thus heard, this is wisdom produced by reflection. The knowledge that arises either at the stage of seeing or the stage of development for one engaged in bringing to mind by means of these two kinds of wisdom is wisdom produced by development. From the utterance of another there is wisdom produced by hearing; from appropriate bringing to mind undertaken individually there is wisdom produced by reflection; the knowledge that arises both as a result of the utterance of another and as a result of appropriate bringing to mind undertaken individually is wisdom produced by development.

The point here is that ‘right view’, whether initiated by hearing another’s utterance or by appropriate bringing to mind, develops by means of the interaction of these two.

8. The ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo and the notion of ‘path’

The commentaries preserve the following explanation of the expression ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo:

It is noble due to its remoteness from the defilements to be slain by the appropriate path, due to bringing about the state of a noble, and due to bringing about the acquisition of the noble fruit. It is eight-factored in that it has eight factors; like an army of four parts, like musical instruments of five kinds, there is only the sum of parts, there is not something separate from the parts. It is a magga in that it is traced (maggati) by those whose goal is nibbāna, or it traces (maggati) nibbāna, or killing defilements it goes along (mārento gacchati).

The term magga or ‘path’ is used in the Abhidhamma, both canonical and commentarial, to refer to four specific spiritual attainments, namely stream-attainment, once-return, non-return, and arahant-ship. These four attainments constitute the four varieties of lokuttara-magga; they are the four ‘ways’ (patipadā) that lead specifically to the cessation of suffering. In the Abhidhamma literature this usage of the term magga might seem to acquire its

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129 Vibh 325 = Sv III 1002; for further definition see Vibh-a 410-2 = DAṬ III 272-4.
ultimate contradictory form. The image of a path, it might be thought, ought to imply 'a path along with one travels from beginning to end'; yet in the Abhidhamma literature 'path' comes to describe an experience so specific that it is, at least in the fully developed systems, seen as lasting only a single moment (or at most fifteen thought moments, if we choose to follow the traditions of the Sarvāstivāda). But what I have tried to show above is that in the Nikāyas the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* was always primarily conceived of as a way of practising or of going along; it is a path in the sense of how one goes, rather than where one goes. I mean by this that the image of the 'path' in the Nikāyas seems much more concerned with how one travels or one's means of conveyance than with the sequence of places through which one passes on the journey. This is particularly clear with the image of the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* as a 'divine vehicle' (*brahma-yāna*). If one considers this image in the light of the *Mahācattārīsaka* treatment, the point seems to be that on the one hand there is a kind of consistency about how one travels at all stages of the journey, on the other hand a transformation occurs: one may start in a chariot and finish in a chariot, yet the chariot one sets out in is old, broken and in need of repair, the chariot one arrives in is suited to a god.

The eight factors are, then, thought of as eight items that are to be collectively brought to rightness. We start with the condition of the ordinary man (*puthujjana*) which is characterized by the continual fluctuation of the eight items (sometimes they are 'right', sometimes they are 'wrong'); we finish with the condition of the *arahan* which is characterized by the eight items being firmly and fully 'right'. The notions of stream-attainment, and so on, must always have served the purpose in Buddhist thought of defining possible stages in this process of the mind's turning away from wrong view, etc., beginning with the grosser manifestations and continuing until the subtlest forms are left behind. Once there are stages, there are points of transition between the stages; the precise nature of these points of transition is the domain of Abhidhamma, which defines them ever more closely and subtly. While the Abhidhamma literature does add new details, it does so within an existing framework.

The traditional image of finding an ancient path in the jungle provides a convenient point of reference for the summing up of the notion of the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* in the Nikāyas, for the image seems to me to present what is in fact a rather exact model of the Nikāya conception of spiritual progress:

As if, bhikkhus, a person wandering in the forest, in the jungle were to see an ancient path, an ancient road along which men of old had gone. And he would follow it, and as he followed it he would see an ancient city, an ancient seat of kings which men of old had inhabited, possessing parks, gardens, lotus-ponds, with high walls, a delightful place. And then that person would tell the king or his minister: 'You should surely know, sir, that while wandering in the forest, in the jungle I saw an ancient path . . . an ancient city . . . a delightful place. Claim that city, sir!' And then the king or the king's minister would claim that city. And after a time that city would become prosperous and wealthy, with many people, filled with people, achieving growth and prosperity. Just so, I saw an ancient path, the ancient road along which the fully awakened ones of old had gone . . . namely the
Let us consider this from the point of view of the king informed of the existence of the path and the city in the jungle. He is clearly to be likened to one instructed by the Buddha concerning the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* as the way leading to the cessation of suffering. Having been informed of the path and city, of its general whereabouts, the king must find the path in the jungle himself. Likewise the Buddha’s disciple, the *bhikkhu*, following the instructions concerning the abandoning of wrong view and so on, and the development of right view and so on, sets out to find the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo*; thus he develops right view and so on that are ordinary and concerned with merit. Now, the king or his ministers who have set out into the jungle have accepted the existence of the path and city on trust; wandering in the jungle doubts may arise, but as soon as they come across the path and see the way before them leading to a city all those doubts will be dispersed. Similarly, as the *bhikkhu* develops ordinary right view and so on, he may doubt the existence of a path that leads to the cessation of suffering, but when in the course of that development he comes across right view and so on that is noble, when, that is, he comes across the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* and sees that it truly does lead on to the cessation of suffering, how can he doubt it? This is surely the significance of the stream-attainer’s being characterized as one who has complete trust (*avecca-*ppasāda) in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sāmaṇgha, as one who has overcome doubt. One who has found the path and sees that it leads to the city, has only to follow that path and enter the city. Thus the *bhikkhu* who has gained the path develops the eight factors along with right knowledge and right freedom and finally destroys the āsavas.

In conclusion it is worth noting how Jaina sources give the path of spiritual progress a structure that shows quite definite parallels to this. The spiritual path is understood as consisting of fourteen successive stages called *guna*-sthānas. The fourth of these is known as *samyag-dṛṣṭi* which, according to P.S. Jaini, is understood as an initial flash or experience of insight (*dariana*). He writes:

Thus it is said that a soul which retains its *samyak-darśana* at the time of death will not fall into hells or the lower tiryakka destiny. Even more important, it will...
remain in bondage no longer than the amount of time required to take in and use up half of the available karmas in the universe ... \(^{134}\)

Further the arising of *samyag-darśana* is associated with the arising of eight factors (*āstāṅga*) which are subsequently cultivated and brought to perfection. These turn out to be rather different in nature from the eight path-factors in Buddhist literature, and the image of the path does not appear to be used.\(^{135}\)

Of note, however, is the inclusion of freedom from doubt (*niḥṣaṅkita*) and freedom from delusive views (*amūḍha-dṛṣṭi*). From the point of view of general principle the fourth *guna-sthāna* bears considerable resemblance to stream-attainment, which abandons doubt, and the view of individuality, cuts off rebirth in a place of regress, and destines one for awakening. Of course, Jaini is following here exgetical literature removed by as much as 1,200 years from the time of Mahāvīra. But however one views the origins of these parallels—whether as deriving from a common earlier source or as the result of deliberate borrowing at some later date—their very existence tends to indicate a particular way of looking at the structure of spiritual development that modern expositions of the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* have failed to make clear.

\(^{134}\) Ibid.
\(^{135}\) Id., pp. 151-6.
PART TWO

THE SEVEN SETS COLLECTIVELY
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SEVEN SETS IN THE NIKYAYS

1. Preliminary remarks: different usages distinguished

In this chapter I wish to discuss the treatment of the seven sets collectively in the earlier parts of the Pali canon, and begin to come to some conclusion about just what the seven sets represent for this literature. The seven sets are listed together some seventy-four times in the Vinaya-pitaka and the Nikayas.¹ As I have noted above, it is not always easy to determine what counts as a parallel passage, and what as mere repetition—especially, in this case, in the Samyutta-nikaya. But it seems reasonable to suggest that these seventy-four times the sets are listed represent some twenty-seven distinct occasions upon which the seven sets are collectively cited.²

As I hope to make clear, these passages are of four basic types. The first type is distinguished by the fact that it presents the seven sets as ‘dhammas taught’ by the Buddha. The second type presents the seven sets more specifically as representing the path or practice to be undertaken by the bhikkhu. In the third type of passage the seven sets form a part of more extended lists of items and appear to be treated rather more generally. Finally there is the maha-vagga of the Samyutta-nikaya; although I have already referred to its treatment of the individual sets, it deserves also to be considered as a distinctive treatment of the seven sets collectively.

2. The appeal to the seven sets as dhammas taught by the Buddha

It seems appropriate to begin here with an important passage from the Mahaparinibbana-sutta that is frequently cited as an instance in the Nikayas where the seven sets occur as a definite group.³ This passage is of additional interest as a starting point since it happens to afford a considerable amount of parallel material in Buddhist Sanskrit sources and in Chinese and Tibetan translations. First of all, however, it is worth placing the passage in question in its proper context in the Pali version of the Mahaparinibbana-sutta.

The sutta opens on Vulture Peak near Rājagaha with a discussion of those

¹ The only text of the Khuddaka-nikaya that turns out to be relevant is the Udāna which lists the seven sets once in a passage that has a parallel in both the Vinaya-pitaka and Aṅguttara-nikaya; the Niddesa and Patisambhidāmagga I do not take as belonging to the earlier parts of the Pali canon.


³ E.g. Warder, IB, p. 81.
conditions that will prevent the decline (aparihiiniya-dhamma) of the Samgha. Whatever historical value one attaches to the details of person and place in this introductory section (and Bareau, for one, attaches very little), it is clear that it carefully sets the mood for the rest of the sutta: our concern is the imminent death of the Buddha and the future of the Samgha and his teaching. According to the narrative the Buddha then journeys in stages from Rājagaha to Vesālī. Not far from Vesālī at Beluva the Buddha decides to spend the rainy season. At this point the Buddha falls ill, whereupon Ānanda questions the Buddha concerning any final instructions he might have for the Samgha before he dies.

The Buddha responds with what is again a well known passage:

But what, Ānanda, does the bhikkhu-samgha expect of me? Dhamma is taught by me, Ānanda, making no ‘inside’ and no ‘outside’; in this connection, Ānanda, the Tathāgata does not have the closed fist of the teacher with regard to dhammas. After this the Buddha retires to the Cāpāla-cetiya. I have already discussed this incident at some length in connection with the iddhi-pādas; the culmination is the announcement of the Buddha’s imminent death—after three months have passed. The Buddha then requests Ānanda to assemble the bhikkhus who live in the neighbourhood of Vesālī at the Kūtāgara-sālā where he addresses them with the passage concerning the seven sets:

Then the Blessed One approached the meeting hall; having approached he sat down on the prepared seat. Seated he addressed the bhikkhus: ‘So, bhikkhus, those dhammas that I have directly known and taught to you—having properly grasped them, you should practise them, develop them, make them great so that the spiritual life might continue and endure long; this will be for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, for the sake of compassion for the world, for the benefit, good and happiness of devas and men. And what, bhikkhus, are the dhammas that I have known directly and taught to you ... ? Just these—the four establishments of mindfulness, the four right endeavours, the four bases of success, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven factors of awakening, the noble eight-factored path ... ’ Then the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus [further]: ‘Now let me address you, bhikkhus, the nature of conditions is to decay; work with heedfulness, the pariizibbā of the Tathāgata will not be long ...’

As is well known, the rest of the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta goes on to detail how the Buddha continues his journey; at Pāvā he has his last meal and falls ill for a second time and then moves on to Kusinārā where the parinibbāna takes place. The passage concerning the seven sets by no means constitutes the

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4 Bareau, RBB II 7-16.
5 D II 100: kim paṇānanda bhikkhu-sangho mayi paccāsimsati. desito Ānanda maya dhammo anantaram abhihrām karitvā, na tathānanda tathāgatassa dhammesu ācārya-muṣṭi.
6 D II 119-120: atha kho bhagavā yena upajñhāna-sālā ten upasāṅkhami, upasāṅkamatvā pāritattē āsane nisidhi. nisajja kho bhagavā bhikkhu āmantesi. tasmāt iha bhikkhave ye vo maya dhammā abhihrāya destīta te vo sādhukaṁ uggahetvā aśeṣitābā bhāvetabbā bahuñkātatābh yathay- idam brahma-caritam addhanieyam asa cira-ṣhīhikam, tad asa bahu-jana-hitaya bahu-jana-sukhāya lokānukampaya atiḥāya hitiḥāya sukhiḥāya deva-mannussānām. katame ca te bhikkhave dhammā maya abhihrāya destīta ... seyyathiṣām cattāro satipaṭhānaṁ cattāro ābhisam-puddhāṁ cattāro iddhi-pādaṁ paricārdyāni paśca balāṁ satta bojhāṅgā arīyo atiḥāṅgiko maggo ... atha kho bhagavā bhikkhu āmantesi. handa dāni bhikkhave āmantayāmi vo, vaya-dhammā saṃkārā appamādeha sampādetha, na ciraṁ tathāgatassā parinibbānaṁ bhavissati.
Buddha’s last discourse—the narrative states that the Buddha subsequently gave *dhamma* talks (*dhammikāṃ kathāṃ karoti*) at various places and also gives some details of what was said on specific occasions. While this is so, the passage itself and the immediate context of the announcement of the imminent *parinibbāṇa* of the Buddha make it abundantly clear that this is intended as an important and essential summary of the Buddha’s teaching. That this is so is underlined by a consideration of parallel sources.

The Pāli *Mahāparinibbāṇa-sutta* can be conveniently considered alongside the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* which exists in Sanskrit as well as in Chinese and Tibetan translation. Bareau’s detailed analysis of the *parinirvāṇa* traditions also takes into account additional Chinese translations of further recensions of the same material. All these recensions apparently include a version of the present incident, namely a summary of the Buddha’s teaching based on the seven sets and given by the Buddha in the context of the announcement of his imminent *parinirvāṇa*.

The Mūlasarvāstivādin version is worth setting out in full here, since it illustrates both a basic correspondence with the Pāli version as well as interesting variations in matters of detail:

> Then the Blessed One approached the meeting hall. Having approached he sat down on the prepared seat before the bhikkhu-samgha. Seated the Blessed One addressed the bhikkus: ‘Impermanent are conditions, bhikkus, they are unstable, uncertain, their nature is to change. In so far as this is so, one should condition all conditions, one should desist (from them). So, bhikkus, those dharmas which conduce to good and happiness in the world of the here and now, to good and happiness in the future—having grasped and mastered those [dharmas], bhikkus should thus preserve them, give instruction in them, teach them, so that the spiritual life might endure long; this will be for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, for the sake of compassion for the world, for the benefit, good and happiness of devas and men. And what are those dharmas ...? Just these, the four establishings of mindfulness, the four right abandonings, the four bases of success, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven factors of awakening, the noble eight-factored path.’

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7 See E. Waldschmidt *MPS*.


9 Bareau, RBB II 196: ‘Cet épisode est raconté par les six MPNS. Dans cinq d’entre eux, il suit immédiatement celui dans lequel le Buddha annonce à Ananda le rejet de ses compositions vitales et lui fait des reproches, alors que, dans le chinois A, il le précède immédiatement; mais, dans tous les cas, il vient aussitôt après les divers événements qui se sont déroulés près du sanctuaire de Cāpāla entre le Bienheureux et Ananda demeurés seuls.’

10 *MPS* (Waldschmidt) 222-4: *atha bhagavān yenopasthānā śālā tenopasamkrāntah, upasamkramya purastād bhikṣu-saṃghaśya prajñāpita evāvane nyāsāt. niṣadāya bhagavān bhikṣuṁ āmantrayate sma. anityā bhikṣavāḥ sarva-saṃskārād adhruvā anāśvāsaśā vipaśyāma-dharmano yāvad alam eva bhikṣavāḥ sarva-saṃskārān saṃskāritum alam virantum. tasmāt tarhi bhikṣavo ye te dharmā dyāṣa-dharma-hitaṁ samvarante dyāṣa-dharma-sukhāya samparāṇā dyāṣa-dharma-sukhāya te bhikṣubhir udghṛtya paryavāpya tathā tathā dhārayitavya grāhāyitavya vāca-vitavya yathādham brahma-caryam cira-saṅhitaṁ syāt tad bhaviṣyati bahu-jana-hitaṁ bahu-jana-sukhāya lokāṃkampāyārthāya hitāyā sukhaṁ deva-mama-puñyām. kaṁte te dharmā dyāṣa-dharma-hitaṁ samvarante ... tadyathā catvāri śrīmiṛty-upasthānāni catvāri samyak-prahārāṇī catvāri rādhī-pādāḥ pañcendriyāni
The opening formula of this Mūlasarvāstivādin version seems to parallel in spirit what comes at the close of the Pāli passage; a more direct Pāli parallel to this opening formula—though still with interesting variation—is found in a different Nikāya context. The formula used in the body of the Mūlasarvāstivādin version and applied more directly to the seven sets is also slightly different from the formula used in the Pāli version. Once again a direct Pāli parallel to this formula exists, though it appears to be very rare in the Nikāyas. Bareau gives no information on the formulas used in the Chinese translations, but does comment that one Chinese translation details the seven sets. Two of the Chinese translations also apparently add to the list of the seven sets, between the rāddhi-pādas and indriyas, the four dhyānas. I shall return to the significance of this below. Finally one should note that the Mūlasarvāstivādin version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra gives the seven sets in another context as well, namely the context of the Buddha's first illness and his remark concerning the closed fist of the teacher.

Already, I think, we have good grounds for thinking that as far as the early Buddhist tradition is concerned, the seven sets should be seen as encapsulating the essential teaching and practice of Buddhism. As far as the Pāli canon is concerned, however, there are a number of passages citing the seven sets that bear close comparison with this Mahāparinibbāna-sutta passage. Although these passages seem to have been largely overlooked, they do, I think, make the nature of the appeal to the seven sets rather clearer.

The Pāśadīka-sutta16 opens with the Buddha dwelling among the Sakkas immediately after the death of Nigantha Nāthaputta at Pāvā. The sutta then recounts how at Nigantha Nāthaputta’s death the Niganthas become split and start quarrelling with each other. Cunda Samanuddesa relates the matter to Ānanda who suggests that they put it before the Buddha. The Buddha responds with a discussion of the relationship between teacher (satthar), pātisādhipati


11 Cf. D II 198: evam anicca kho Ānanda samkhārā evam addhuvā ... anassāsikā kho Ānanda samkhārā, yāvah c'idam Ānanda alam eva sabba-samkhāresu nibbinditum alam virajjitum alam vimuccitum.

12 At A IV 281-9 (passim) we find cattāro dhammā kula-putassa dīṭṭha-dhamma-sukhāya samvattanti dīṭṭha-dhamma-sukhāya, and cattāro dhammā kula-putassa samparāya-hitāya samvattanti samparāya-sukhāya. According to PTC (s.v. dīṭṭha-dhamma-sukhāya, -hitāya) this is the only occurrence in the Pāli canon.


14 There is a lacuna in the Sanskrit manuscript at this point: mama khālī ānanda naivam bhavati mamāsti bhikṣu-sanghāh. aham bhikṣu-sangham parihartiyāmīti [lacuna] tadyathā catvāri smṛty-upasthānāni ... (MPS 197). Snellgrove (BSOAS 36 (1973), p. 401) translates the relevant portion from the Tibetan as follows: ‘Ānanda, I do not have the idea that the order of monks is mine, that I must cleave to the order and lead it, so how should I have a last exhortation, even a slight one, with which to instruct the order? Whatever teachings I have had which were relevant to the order of monks, I have already taught them as the principles which must be practised, namely the four smṛty-upasthānas ... As Buddha I do not have the closed-fistedness of a teacher who thinks he must conceal things as unsuitable for others.’

15 Cf. Warder, IB, pp. 81-2.

16 D III 117-41.
dhamma and pupils (sāvaka). He concludes\(^ {17} \) that although he is now old, dhamma is well proclaimed by him, an arahant and sammāsambuddha; among his pupils are bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs who are elders, middle-aged and novices, among his pupils are both upāsakas and upāsikās. He continues:

A man speaking rightly who would say of something, ‘The spiritual life is well proclaimed—accomplished and complete in every respect, without deficiency and without excess, well set forth, whole and complete’, would say it of this [spiritual life, this dhamma]\(^ {18} \). So, Cunda, regarding those dhammas which I have known directly and taught to you, you should all meet and come together to chant meaning for meaning, word for word, and not to dispute so that the spiritual life might continue and endure long; this will be for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, for the sake of compassion for the world, for the benefit, good and happiness of devas and men. And what, Cunda, are those dhammas ... ? Just these, the four establishings of mindfulness ... the noble eight-factored path.\(^ {19} \)

This passage marks what is more or less the halfway point in the Pāśādika-sutta and as such seems to act as a kind of pivot for the sutta as a whole. The sutta continues by detailing what are in effect a number of ways in which the tradition of the teacher and his pupils can be preserved. The emphasis is on avoiding dispute and reaching clear agreement: the bhikkhus should not quarrel, on the other hand they should not allow the tradition to be distorted.

The second passage I wish to consider here comes from the Sāmagāma-sutta.\(^ {20} \) In some ways this has the appearance of an alternative Majjhima-nikāya version of the Dīgha-nikāya’s Pāśādika-sutta. Apart from the mention of the Buddha’s specific place of residence among the Sakkas at Sāmagāma, the Sāmagāma-sutta opens in exactly the same manner as the Pāśādika-sutta: Nīganṭha Nīthaputta has just died and the Nīganṭhas become split and begin quarrelling; Cunda Samanuddesa and Ānanda put the matter before the Buddha.\(^ {21} \) This time, however, Ānanda concludes with a more specific point:

This occurs to me, lord: let not a dispute arise in the Saṁgha after the passing of the Blessed One. Such a dispute would be to the detriment, unhappiness and

\(^ {17} \) D III 125-6.

\(^ {18} \) So Sv III 911.

\(^ {19} \) D III 127-8: yam kho tam Cunda sammā-vadāmāno vadeyya: sabbākāra-sampannam sabbākāra-paripūrām anānam anadhikam svākkhātam kevala-paripūrām brahma-cariyam suppakāsītan ti idam eva tam sammā-vadāmāno vadeyya ... suppakāsītan ti. tasmat iha Cunda ye vo mayā dhammā abhiññā desitā tathā sabbe'eva samāgama samāgamma athena atham yavañjanena yavañjanam saṃgāyitabbaṃ no vivadītabbaṃ yathiyidam brahma-cariyam addhāhīyaṃ assa cira-ṭhitikāṃ ... katame ca te Cunda dhammā ... seyyathidam cattāro satipaṭṭhānā ... ariyo aṭṭhānīkiko maggo ...

\(^ {20} \) M II 243-51.

\(^ {21} \) Interestingly the Saṁgīti-sutta (D III 207) is said to have been delivered by Sāriputta also at the time of Nīganṭha Nīthaputta’s death, when the Buddha was staying at Pāvā in the mangrove of Cunda Kammāraputta (who prepared the Buddha’s last meal). Bareau (RBB II 254-5) comments on the possible association of the name Cunda (both layman and bhikkhu) with the city of Pāvā in Buddhist tradition. As a great ‘compendium’ of dhammas the Saṁgīti-sutta would also seem to act as a point of reference in the settling of disputes; it too opens with the formula concerning the long duration of the spiritual life for the good of the many.
disadvantage of the many; it would be to the detriment and suffering of devas and men.  

The Buddha responds:

What do you think, Ananda? Those dhammas which I have directly known and taught to you, namely the four establishings of mindfulness ... the noble eight factored path—regarding these dhammas, Ananda, do you see any two monks who have opinions at variance with one another?

Ananda replies that he does not but suggests that after the Buddha’s passing those who live taking him as their refuge (patissayamana) might become involved in dispute about the proper way of life (ajjhative) and about the code of discipline (adhipatimokkhe), and that this would be to the disadvantage of the many. The Buddha, however, replies that dispute about such matters is of little matter (appa-mattaka); it is dispute about the path (magga) and the way (patipada) that is really to the disadvantage of the many. The Buddha then proceeds to detail six roots of dispute (vivada-mula) and how they are to be abandoned, four points that can constitute matters of formal controversy (adhikarananta), seven ways of settling such matters, and six dhammas that make for affection and concord amongst fellow spiritual practitioners.

The last passage I wish to consider here is taken from the Kinti-sutta—the sutta that immediately precedes the Samagama-sutta. This sutta begins with a question put by the Buddha to the bhikkhus:

What do you think of me, bhikkhus? That the samana Gotama teaches dhamma for the sake of the robe? Or that the samana Gotama teaches dhamma for the sake of alms ... or for the sake of lodgings ... or for the sake of different states of being?

The bhikkhus reply that they do not think in this way, but rather that ‘as one who is compassionate, desirous of good, the Blessed One teaches dhamma out of compassion’ (anukampako bhagavite hitesi anukampam upadaya dhamman deseti). Immediately the Buddha responds:

So, bhikkhus, there are those dhammas that I have directly known and taught to you, namely the four establishings of mindfulness ... the noble eight-factored path. You should all train yourselves therein united, in concord, not disputing. While

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22 M II 245: tassa mayham bhante evam hoti ma heva bhagavato accayena sanghe vivado uppajji so vivado baha-jaanathitaya bahu-jaanaskhaya bahunno janassa anaththaya ahitaya dukkahaya deva-manussanabb.

23 M II 245: tam kim maanasi Ananda ye vo maya dhamma abhiintha desita seyyathidham cattoro satipatthana satiyo ariyo ajjhangiko maggo passasi no evam Ananda imesu dhammesu dve pi bhikkhu nana-vadeit.

24 On these terms cf. CPD, s.vv. ajjhative, adhipatimokkhe; ‘with regard to the rigours of the regimen’ and ‘regarding the code of discipline’ respectively; CPD refers to Ps IV 38 for technical definitions.

25 These seven adhikarananta-samatha-dhammas constitute the last seven rules of the patimokka; their equivalents are also found in the Mulavarstivadin and Mahasanghika Pratimoksa sutras, see C. Prebish, Monastic Discipline, Pennsylvania, 1975, pp. 106-9.

26 M II 238-43.

27 M II 238: kinti vo bhikkhave mayi hoti. civa-hetu samano Gotamo dhamman deseti pinda-pata-hetu va ... senasana-hetu va ... iti bhavabhava-hetu va ...
you are training yourselves united, in concord, not disputing there might be two bhikkhus who hold opinions about dhamma28 at variance with one another.29

The Buddha then goes on to discuss ways of dealing with possible areas of contention and friction: where there is disagreement about meaning and wording (both together and each separately); where a bhikkhu commits some offence (āpatti) or transgression (vītikamma); where argument and ill-feeling exist between two groups.

These four passages beginning with the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta all more or less concern themselves with the long term fortunes of the Samgha and the maintenance of the tradition established by the Buddha. The nature of the appeal to the seven sets in this particular context is worth considering carefully. In all four passages the seven sets are described as dhammas that the Buddha has gained direct knowledge (abhiññā) of and then taught to the bhikkhus. For their part, the bhikkhus should grasp these dhammas well (sādhukaṃ uggahetvā), practise them (āsevitabba), develop them (bhāvetabba), make them great (bahuḷikatabba)—so the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta; they should come together and with regard to these dhammas (tattha) they should chant meaning for meaning and word for word (attena attham vyaṭjanena vyaṭjanam samgāṭītabbam) and not dispute—so the Pāsādika-sutta; they should train themselves in these dhammas united, in concord and without disputing—so the Kinti-sutta. The Sāmagāma-sutta opens with the question of dispute, but, says the Buddha, there is no dispute among the bhikkhus about the dhammas embraced by the seven sets; we are then told that disputes about the details of the way of life are of little importance; it is disputes about the path and way that matter. The implication seems clear: if the bhikkhus preserve the dhammas embraced by the seven sets in the above manner, then no disputes of importance will arise and the tradition will be preserved for the good and benefit of the many. The Mahāniddesa, apparently taking up this notion, states that agreement about dhamma (dhamma-sāmaggi) consists in the seven sets—collectively they find satisfaction, clarity, stillness, release (te ekato pakkhandanti pasidanti santiṭthanti vimuccanti); there is no dispute or argument about these dhammas (na tesaṃ dhammānām vivādo vippavādo atthi).30

The first thing that follows from this is, I think, that the appeal to the four establishing of mindfulness, and the rest, is not an appeal to dhammas as ‘teachings’ or ‘doctrines’—at least not in the limited sense of a body of teachings or doctrines that can exist apart from the actual experience and practice of those teachings, apart from the actual path and way. The nature of the appeal to the seven sets is a matter of appeal to practice and experience rather than an appeal to theory and scripture. The appeal ultimately rests on the fact that the seven sets embrace dhammas that the bhikkhu can gain

28 On abhi-dhamme in this passage see CPD, s.v. abhidhamma, and Norman, PL, p. 97.
29 tasmañ iha bhikkhave ye vo mayā dhammā abhiññā desitaṃ seyyathidham cattāro satipaṭṭhānā ... ariyo atthangiko maggo, sattha sabbe'eva samaggehi sampaddānāhi avivadamānāhi sikkhitabbām. tesaṃ ca vo bhikkhave samaggaṇām sammodamānānam avivadamānānaṃ sikkhatam siyamsu dve bhikkhū abhi dhamme nānā-vādā.
30 Nidd I 132.
personal direct knowledge of, they constitute *dhamma* that is ‘to be known by the wise each one for himself’ (*paccattam veditabbo viññūhi*).\(^{31}\)

It might be objected that in talking of ‘chanting meaning for meaning and word for word’ the *Pāsadika-sutta* especially implies precisely an appeal to scriptural authority. This raises the question of the proper understanding of the notion of *dhamma* in the Nikāyas, the question of the relationship between what the commentaries call *dhamma* as ‘tradition’ (*pariyatti, āgama*) and *dhamma* as practice and attainment (*patipatti, pativedha, adhigama*).\(^{32}\) I shall return to this presently. However, it seems to me that the appeal to the seven sets is a classic instance showing that the authority of the former rests in its capacity to conduce to the latter. The yardstick is a practical test.

The question of difference of opinion over meaning (*attha*) and wording (*vyanjana*) is in fact dealt with in some detail in the *Kinti-sutta*. Difference of opinion over *vyanjana* is once more regarded as something of little consequence (*appa-mattaka*).\(^{33}\) Difference of opinion over *attha* is a potentially more serious affair. The solution proffered here seems to be that the two sides in a dispute over *attha* should accept that some matters may be hard to grasp (*duggahīta*) others easy (*sugahīta*).\(^{34}\) I take it that this implies that since differences of opinion over the *satipaṭṭhānas* and so on ultimately concern quite subtle matters of practical experience, *bhikkhus* should guard against attachment to particular interpretations of their theoretical formulation. Whether this is so or not, it seems to me that the appeal to the seven sets must be taken as in exactly the same spirit as the formula I quoted in connection with the *satipaṭṭhānas* and which occurs in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* in the context of Ānanda’s request for some final instruction from the Buddha:

> Therefore, Ānanda, you should dwell with yourselves as island, with yourselves as refuge, not with some other refuge; with *dhamma* as island, with *dhamma* as refuge, not with some other refuge.\(^{35}\)

A passage that bears some resemblance to the four passages so far considered is found in the *Sampasādanīya-sutta*.\(^{36}\) Here the seven sets are simply listed as skilful *dhammas* taught by the Buddha:

> Now, lord, this is unsurpassable: the way the Blessed One teaches *dhamma* with regard to skilful *dhammas*. *Therein these are skilful *dhammas*, namely the four establishings of mindfulness ... the noble eight-factored path. Here, lord, a *bhikkhu* by the destruction of the *āsavas* himself knows directly in the here and now, realizes, attains and dwells in the freedom of mind, the freedom of wisdom that is without *āsavas*.\(^{37}\)

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31 E.g. D II 93.

32 On these terms see Carter, *Dhamma*, pp. 131-5.

33 M II 240. An example of difference with regard to *vyanjana* is given at Ps IV 29 as *satipaṭṭhāno* (masculine) and *satipaṭṭhānam* (neuter).

34 M II 239-41.

35 Cf. above, pp. 67, 230.


37 D III 102, aparaṃ pana bhante etad ānuttariyam yathā bhagavā dhammaṁ deseti kusalesu dhammesu. tatr’ime kusalā dhammā seyyathidam cattāro satipaṭṭhānaṁ ... ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo.
This, then, is the first of the sixteen ānuttariyas or 'unsurpassables' of the Buddha. The practical way in which the seven sets collectively constitute the highest realization of the Buddhist path is here explicit.

Returning to the usage of the seven sets as a reference point or yardstick in order to preserve and maintain the tradition, this invites comparison with the principle cited in connection with the four mahāpadesas or 'great authorities'.\(^{38}\) According to this principle any statements or expressions (pada-vyāñjana) that are claimed by a bhikkhu to have the status of dhamma-vinaya or the instruction of the teacher (satthu sāsanam) are ‘to be grasped well and brought into Sutta and compared with Vinaya; if being brought into Sutta they do in fact enter into Sutta, if being compared with Vinaya they do in fact bear comparison with Vinaya’ (tāni pada-vyāñjanāni sādhukaṃ uggahetvā sutte otaretabbāni vinaye sandassetabbāni ... tāni ce sutte otariyamānāni vinaye sandassiyamānāni sutte c'eva otaranti vinaye ca sandissanti), then one should conclude that the statements and expressions in question do represent the word of the Buddha. Étienne Lamotte has discussed the mahāpadesas at some length in two contexts. Commenting in the Traité on the question of the criterion of authenticity he says:

Le point de vue orthodoxe, traditionaliste, est celui du pieux Asoka dans l’édition de Bairat ... «Tout ce qu’a dit le bienheureux Buddha est bien dit» (e kechi bhante bhagavatā Budhena bhāṣite sarve se subhāṣite). Par conséquent, dirent les rédacteurs du canon, pour savoir si une doctrine ou un texte est parole du Buddha, il faudra le confronter avec les recueils d’écritures bouddhiques qui seuls font autorité.\(^{39}\)

He goes on to paraphrase the passage concerning the mahāpadesas as follows:

Quand un texte est proposé ... il faut voir si ce texte (pada-vyāñjanāni) se trouve dans le Sūtra (sutta otaranti) et apparaît dans le Vinaya (vinaye sandissanti).\(^{40}\)

He concludes by suggesting that, with the development of Buddhist literature, it is increasingly the intrinsic merits of the text itself that determines its acceptance or otherwise as the authentic word of the Buddha:

Finalement le critère d’autorité est complètement abandonné. Pour admettre un sūtra, on ne s’inquiète plus de savoir s’il a été prêché par le Buddha en un lieu donné à telle ou telle personne; on se demande seulement si les doctrines qu’il renferme sont, oui ou non, utiles et profitables. C’est le triomphe de la critique interne sur la critique externe, du subjectivisme sur l’objectivité. L’ancienne formule «Tout ce que le Buddha a dit est bien dit» est renversé et on proclame communément: «Tout ce qui est bien dit a été dit par le Buddha».\(^{41}\)

Certainly Lamotte here regards this way of thinking as typical of a later text such as the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, but rather curiously in a footnote on

\(^{38}\) D II 123-6; A II 167-70.
\(^{39}\) Lamotte, Traité, I 80.
\(^{40}\) Id., p. 81.
\(^{41}\) Id., pp. 81-2.
the next page he quotes an *Aṅguttara* passage: *yaṁ kiñci subhāsitam sabbaṁ tāṁ bhagavato vacanaṁ*.42

In all this Lamotte appears to understand the *mahāpadesa* passage primarily in terms of an appeal to a commonly accepted corpus of literary texts. Elsewhere,43 however, he prefers to to understand it precisely in the light of the fact that ancient Buddhism lacked an agreed and fixed canon of scriptures. This is surely nearer the truth:

In order that a text proposed with reference to one of the four Great Authorities be guaranteed, it is not necessary for it to be literally reproduced in the Scriptures, it is enough that its general purport be in keeping with the spirit of the Sūtras, the Vinaya and the Buddhist doctrine in general.44

He goes on to cite the *Nettippakarana* in support of this conclusion. More recently L.S. Cousins too has suggested that the particular terms of the *mahāpadesa* passage (*otaranti* and *sandissanti*) should be understood in the light of the traditions preserved by the *Peṭakopadesa* and *Nettippakarana*.45 According to these, categories such as the aggregates (*khandha*) spheres (*āyatana*), elements (*dhātu*), truths (*sacca*) and conditioned arising (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) are to be used to analyze the contents of a discourse and place it in its context in the teaching as a whole:

What is envisaged for sutta is not then a set body of literature, but rather a traditional pattern of teaching. Authenticity lies not in historical truth, although this is not doubted, but rather in whether something can accord with the essential structure of the *dhamma* as a whole. If it cannot, it should be rejected. If it can, then it is to be accepted as the utterance of the Buddha. We may compare from the later commentarial tradition: 'Whosoever ... might teach and proclaim the *dhamma*, all that is accounted as actually taught and proclaimed by the Teacher.'46

I think the usage of the seven sets collectively in the passages that have been under consideration begins to throw some light on what is happening here, and also shows why any notion of a gradual shift from a principally text based criterion of authenticity to one based on practical merit is misconceived. Our problem is the very notion of *dhamma* in Buddhist literature. In contexts where there is a question of the Buddhist tradition it is all too easy to render 'dhamma' as 'teaching' or 'doctrine', yet this fails to convey a fundamental nuance of the notion of *dhamma*. There is in the appeal to the seven sets a kind of equivocation that is inherent in the notion of *dhamma* as at once truth itself—truth that is to be directly known and realized—and teachings about the

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42 A IV 164, quoted Lamotte, *Traité*, I 84 (n. 2).
43 'The Assessment of Textual Authenticity in Buddhism', *BSR* I (1983-4), pp. 4-15 (originally published as 'La critique d'authenticité dans le bouddhisme', *India Antiqua*, Leiden, 1947, pp. 213-22; although published three years after the appearance of *Traité* I, it seems likely that this represents Lamotte's more considered opinion; the *mahāpadesas* are discussed again briefly at *HBI*, pp. 180-1).
44 Id., p. 13.
46 Denwood and Piatigorsky, *BSAM*, p. 3.
truth—teachings that indicate how the truth is to be directly known and realized.

What, I think, needs to be distinguished here are two conceptual pairs. The first pair contrasts dhamma as tradition with dhamma as path; the second pair dhamma as the teaching of specifically the historical Buddha, the samanā Gotama, with dhamma as the teaching of all Buddhas and wise men. What is important is that there exists a certain parallelism between these two pairs: the first members of each pair are related, as are the second members of each pair. So, dhamma as tradition is represented basically by the Tipitaka; what the Tipitaka contains is the theory or teaching about dhamma as path, dhamma that is to be put into practice, directly known and realized. Now what is remembered in the Tipitaka is basically considered to be the teaching of one particular historical teacher, namely the samanā Gotama. But the teaching of the samanā Gotama is not regarded as his original invention or discovery, it is the teaching common to all Buddhas; dhamma is not just samanā Gotama’s ‘truth’, it is the ‘truth’ of all Buddhas; it is a ‘truth’ that potentially all can come to know directly. In other words the first member of each of the conceptual pairs that I have distinguished is particular and historical in nature, the second member is universal and transcendent.

In the appeal to the seven sets as a reference point of truth, there is a sense in which the four elements that make up the two conceptual pairs revolve around the seven sets. The seven sets can be singled out as a constant point of reference because they encapsulate dhamma that is at once the tradition of the samanā Gotama and dhamma that is to be personally and individually directly known. If one asks why the appeal is not made to the aggregates, spheres, elements, truths or conditioned arising, then the answer must be, I think, that these items of the teaching are in some sense subordinate to the seven sets; knowledge of them only exists to the extent that the seven sets are directly known and realized, developed, made great; that is to say, they are not so much dhamma that is to be developed (bhāvetabba) and realized (sacchikātabba) as dhamma that is to be fully known (pariṇeyya). I drew attention in an earlier chapter to reasons for thinking that the criterion of ‘truth’ in Buddhist thought was always more or less the usefulness or profitability of something; the question asked was: ‘In what way does this conduce to the goal, the cessation of suffering?’ And in the context of the appeal to the seven sets it seems that teachings about the satipaṭṭhānas and so on could only be considered as ‘authentic’ or ‘true’ in so far as they conduce to direct knowledge and realization of them.

As a footnote to this discussion I wish to draw attention to one more passage, which relates how the chief of the asuras, Pahārāda, visits the Buddha who asks him what wonderful and marvelous things (acchariyā abbhutā dhammā) asuras perceive in the great ocean and which cause them to delight in it. Pahārāda lists eight such things. The Buddha responds by listing eight corresponding wonderful and marvelous things that bhikkhus perceive in the dhamma-vinaya and which cause them to delight in it. The seventh in the list is of relevance here. Just as the ocean has many and various treasures (bahu-
ratana, aneka-ratana) such as pearls, jewels, lapis lazuli, shells, crystal, coral, rubies, silver, gold and emeralds, so too does the dhamma-vinaya have many and various treasures, namely the four establishments of mindfulness, the four right endeavours, the four bases of success, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven factors of awakening and the noble eight-factor path.\(^{47}\) The way in which the seven sets are singled out here as the jewels or treasures of the Buddha’s dhamma-vinaya seems to represent a poetic and imaginative echo of the appeal to the seven sets as dhammas directly known by the Buddha and subsequently taught to his pupils.

3. The seven sets as the path

I have already suggested that the appeal to the seven sets as a yardstick or reference point must ultimately be seen as an appeal to dhamma as practice and realization—that is, to dhamma as path. The association of the seven sets with the path is also already apparent in the characterization of each one of the seven sets in turn as the middle way between the ways of sensual indulgence and ‘burning away’.\(^{48}\)

A succinct and explicit characterization of the seven sets as path (magga) occurs in the ancient expositions or ‘old commentary’ to the fourth ‘offence involving defeat’ (pārājika) and eighth ‘offence involving expiation’ (pācittiya) in the Vinaya-piṭaka.\(^{49}\) The fourth pārājika is said by the Buddha to consist in a bhikkhu’s announcing an attainment beyond normal human capacity (uttari-manussa-dhamma), saying that he sees when in fact he does not. A detailed exposition of this then follows in which the term uttari-manussa-dhamma is defined as jhāna, liberation (vimokkha), concentration (samādhi), attainment (samāpatti), knowledge and vision (ñāṇa-dassana), development of the path (magga-bhāvanā), realization of the fruit (phala-sacchikirīya), abandoning of defilements (kilesa-pahāna), the absence of the hindrances from the mind (vinīvaraṇatā cittassa), ‘delight in empty-dwellings’ (suñāgāre abhirati). The expression magga-bhāvanā is in turn explained as cattāro satipaṭṭhāna cattāro iddhi-pādā pañca balāni satta bojjhāngā ariyo atthāṅgiko maggo.\(^{50}\) It might be felt that this already simply reflects later Abhidhamma conceptions, since the date of this old commentary embed-

\(^{47}\) The whole basic passage listing the two sets of eight dhammas occurs four times in the Pāli canon: A IV 197-204 (which I follow here) has the Buddha in conversation with Pahārāda; at A IV 204-8 the passage is introduced by an incident concerning the recital of the pātimokkha after which the Buddha alone simply lists the two sets of eight items; Ud 51-6 is identical with this latter version except that an udāna (= Th 447) is appended; Vin II 236-40 again follows this second version except that certain words are transposed to the end of the passage. Frauwallner (EVBBL, pp. 147-8) argues that A IV 197-204 represents the earliest version.

\(^{48}\) See above, p. 200; another passage I have already considered and which is also suggestive of the notion of the seven sets as the path is S III 94-9 (see, p. 293).

\(^{49}\) Vin III 87-109 (fourth pārājika); IV 23-30 (eighth pācittiya).

\(^{50}\) Vin III 93, 94, 95, 97. The exposition of the eighth pācittiya is similar to that of the fourth pārājika, the difference being that the claim to uttari-manussa-dhamma is not false, but is made to one who has not received upasampadā; for the seven sets as magga-bhāvanā see Vin IV 26, 27, 28.
ded in the text of the Pāli Vinaya-piṭaka is difficult to determine with any precision.\textsuperscript{51}

Certainly, as I stated at the outset of this study, later treatises of different traditions provide treatments of the seven sets that identify them with the path (magga/mārga) in a variety of ways. At this point I should like to begin to look more closely at the possible Nikāya antecedents of this. A good place to start is a \textit{sutta} I referred to above in connection with the noble eight-factored path, the Mahāsaḷāyatanika-sutta.\textsuperscript{52} According to this \textit{sutta} when the bhikkhu does not know and does not see according to what is (ajānām apassambhūtā) the six senses, the six kinds of sense object, their contact or interaction (samphassa) and the feeling that arises conditioned by their interaction (samphassa-paccayā uppajjati vedayitam), then he is impassioned (sārajjati) with regard to these things; the five aggregates of grasping continue to perpetuate themselves (āyatim pañc'upādāna-kkhandhā upacayaṃ gacchanti), and in the end he experiences suffering of both body and mind (so kāya-dukkhaṃ pi ceto-dukkhaṃ pi paṭisamvedeti). However, when the bhikkhu does know and see according to what is the six senses, the six kinds of sense-object, their interaction and the feeling that arises conditioned by their interaction, then he is not impassioned with regard to these things; the five aggregates of grasping diminish in the future (āyatim pañc'upādāna-kkhandhā apacayaṃ gacchanti) and eventually he experiences happiness of both body and mind (so kāya-sukhaṃ pi ceto-sukhaṃ pi paṭisamvedeti).

The view of one who exists accordingly is his right view\textsuperscript{53}; the thought of one who exists accordingly is his right thought; the striving of one who exists accordingly is his right striving; the mindfulness of one who exists accordingly is his right mindfulness; the concentration of one who exists accordingly is his right concentration. His bodily actions, his actions of speech and his livelihood have been previously well purified. Thus for him the noble eight-factored path reaches full development.

As he develops the noble eight-factored path thus, the four establishings of mindfulness also reach full development; the four right endeavours ... the four bases of success ... the five faculties ... the five powers ... the seven factors of awakening also reach full development. For him these two dhāmmas, calm and insight, occur yoked together.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{51} K.R. Norman (\textit{PL}, p. 19) suggests that its method of word analysis (pada-bhājaniya) perhaps indicates that it belongs to the same period as the \textit{Nidāsa}, that is more or less to the latest stratum of the canon. He goes on to comment (id., p. 21) that the Sanskrit text of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin \textit{Bhistunī-vinaya} includes a word commentary that is not the same as the Pāli pada-bhājaniya.

\textsuperscript{52} M III 287-90.

\textsuperscript{53} Miss Horner translates: 'Whatever is the view of what really is, that is for him right view; whatever is aspiration for what really is, that is for him right aspiration ... ' (\textit{M Trsl} III 337-8). But it seems more natural to take \textit{yathā-bhūtassa} as balanced by \textit{assa} (K.R. Norman, private communication), in which case \textit{yathā-bhūtassa} refers back to the bhikkhu who knows and sees the senses, etc. in accordance with what it is, and experiences bodily and mental happiness; this at least is how the commentary takes it: '\textit{yathā-bhūtassa}: of the one who has become endowed with mental happiness associated with skilful consciousness' (\textit{kusala-citta-sampayutta-ceto-sukha-samāngi-bhūtassa}), (Ps V 103). Some MSS read \textit{tathā-bhūtassa}, as does Vibh-a 319 in quoting this passage.

\textsuperscript{54} M III 289: yā \textit{yathā-bhūtassa} diṭṭhi sāsā hoti sammā-diṭṭhi yo \textit{yathā-bhūtassa} samkappe svāsā hoti sammā-samkappe yo \textit{yathā-bhūtassa} vāyāmo svāsā hoti sammā-vāyāmo yā \textit{yathā-bhūt-
And so the exposition concludes that the dhammas that should be fully known (pariṭṭeyya) by direct knowledge (abhijñā), namely the five aggregates of grasping, are fully known; the dhammas that should be abandoned by direct knowledge, namely ignorance and craving for existence (avijjā ca bhava-tanha ca), are abandoned; the dhammas that should be developed by higher knowledge, namely knowledge and freedom (vijjā ca vimutti ca), are realized. So when a bhikkhu brings to fulfilment the development of the noble eight-factor path, he at the same time brings to fulfilment the development of the four satipaṭṭhānas and so on. In other words, the final stage of the development of the noble eight-factor path represents the culmination of the development of all seven sets.

Already, it is not so hard to see how we get from here to the more specific and technical formulations of the Visuddhimagga (when it says that the seven sets are associated with the transcendent path and fruit moments) or the Abhidharmakośa (when it uses the seven sets to characterize the successive stages of the path). In fact, viewed in the light of the Mahāsālāyatanika-sutta the shift represented by the later formulations becomes really rather subtle. It is a question not so much of a radical recasting of the Nikāya thought-world as of gently placing a finger upon something that is rather intangible and elusive in the Nikāya formulations. The spirit of the later formulations is certainly not entirely inconsonant with the spirit of the Nikāya formulations. Nor is the Mahāsālāyatanika formula an isolated instance. The mahā-vagga of the Saṃyutta-nikāya makes quite a lot of a slightly different version of the same formula. This version is initially given in full in the magga-samyutta with an introductory simile:

As, bhikkhus, in the sky various winds blow: east winds and west winds, north winds and south winds, winds of dust and winds free of dust, cool winds and warm winds, gentle winds and strong winds—just so, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu develops and makes great the noble eight-factored path, the four establishings of mindfulness also reach full development; the four right endeavours ... the five faculties ... the five powers ... the seven factors of awakening also reach full development.\(^{55}\)

The usage of this formula in the mahā-vagga is particularly interesting in that, apart from its occurrence in the magga-samyutta, it is also understood to

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\(^{55}\) S V 49: evam eva kho bhikkhave bhikkhu/ ariyam ariyam araham eva kho bhikkhus when a bhikkhu develops and makes great the noble eight-factored path, the four establishings of mindfulness also reach full development; the four right endeavours ... the five faculties ... the five powers ... the seven factors of awakening also reach full development.
occur in each of the relevant *samīyuttas*: the *bojjhāṅga-*,, satipaṭṭhāna-,, indriya-, *samma-ppadhāna-*, *bala-* and *iddhi-pāda-samīyuttas*; in addition it is also understood to occur in the *jhāna-samīyutta*—a fact of special interest. However, in the case of each of these repetitions the occurrence of the formula is indicated only by a mnemonic verse and not given in full. Presumably what is intended is not mere repetition but that the relevant categories should be substituted in the original formula for the noble eight-factored path. This is clearly the procedure that operates for the other formulaic treatments that are indicated by mnemonic verse in the *mahā-vagga*. Unless this is so it is difficult to see how the formula might be made relevant to the *jhāna-samīyutta*. In this particular case the formula should read, I think:

Just so, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu develops and makes great the four *jhānas*, the four establishings of mindfulness also reach full development; the four right endeavours ... the noble eight-factored path also reaches full development.

This association of the four *jhānas* with the seven sets is in itself of some importance and significance since it seems to correlate with the same association found in two of the Chinese translations of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*.

The casting of each of the seven sets in turn in the role played by the noble eight-factored path in the initial version brings to the fore a dimension that is really only latent in the *Mahāsaḷāyatanika* version: the bringing to a state of full development of any one of the seven sets involves also the bringing to a state of full development of each of the other sets; one set cannot be fully developed without at the same time the other sets being fully developed. That is to say, any one of the seven sets is seen as embracing all seven. This kind of notion has already in part been adumbrated especially in chapters one and two where I drew attention to the way in which the Nikāyas on occasion fit the stages of the Buddhist path into the structure of either the four *satipaṭṭhānas* or the four *samma-ppadhānas*. Moreover, one has only to consider for a moment the items that constitute the seven sets and the way in which these are defined in the Nikāyas in order to realize the extent of the overlap and cross-referencing inherent in the basic Nikāya treatment of the sets.

Finally, the *Nettippakarana*—a text in which the association of the expression *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā* has become more or less firmly associated with the seven sets—gives another slightly different version of the *Mahāsaḷāyatanika* formula:

When the four establishings of mindfulness are being developed, the four right endeavours reach full development; when the four right endeavours ... the four bases of success ... the five faculties ... the five powers ... the seven factors of awakening are being developed, the noble eight-factored path reaches full development. What is the reason? *All dhāmmas* leading to awakening, contributing to awakening have one characteristic by reason of the characteristic of leading out.\(^{57}\)

\(^{56}\) The simile occurs in the *balakariṇiya-vagga* of the *mahā-vagga* which is common to the *samīyuttas* mentioned above; for the relevant mnemonic verses see S V 136, 138, 191, 240, 246, 250, 252, 291, 309.

\(^{57}\) Nett 31, 83: *catusu satipaṭṭhānesu bhāviyamānēsu cattāro samma-ppadhānā bhāvanā-pāripārim gacchanti. catusu samma-ppadhānesu ... catusu iddhi-pādesu ... pañcindriyesu ... pañca balesu ...*
The wording here brings out even more explicitly the relationship of reciprocity that exists between the seven sets, and brings us one step nearer, I think, to the more technical Abhidhamma formulations. This principle of reciprocity is summed up in the Petakopadesa as 'when one dhamma that contributes to awakening is spoken of, then all dharmas that lead to awakening are spoken of' (ekamhi bodhi-pakkhiya-dhamme vutte sabbe bodha-gamaniyā dhammā vutta).

Before turning to a number of other similes that illustrate the process of the development of the seven sets, I should briefly mention the treatment of the sets in the Pindapātapārisuddhi-sutta. This is perhaps the most developed account of the path incorporating the seven sets in the Nikāyas. In this sutta the Buddha gives an account of how a bhikkhu should proceed if he wishes to dwell ‘by the dwelling of emptiness’ (suññatā-vihārena). First he should reflect on (patissācikkhitabbaṃ) his alms round and consider whether or not there was any compulsion (chanda), desire (rāga), hate (dosa), delusion (moha), repugnance (patigha) with regard to the objects of the five senses and the mind. If there was, then the effort should be made (vāyatita) for the abandoning (pahānāya) of unskilful dharmas; if there was not, then he should dwell in joy and gladness training day and night in skilful dharmas (bhikkhuṁ ten’eva piti-pāmujjena vihātàbbaṃ ahorrattānusikkhinā kusalesu dhammesu). Next the bhikkhu should reflect on the five kinds of sensual desire (kāma-guṇa): are they abandoned in him? If not he should make an effort for their abandoning; if they are, he again should train himself night and day in skilful dharmas. In precisely the same way the bhikkhu considers whether the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa) are abandoned; whether the five aggregates of grasping are fully known (parinīṭa); whether in turn the four satipaṭṭhānas, four samma-ppassanās, four iddhipādas, five indriyas, five balas, seven bojjhaṅgas and ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo are developed (bhāvita); whether calm and insight are developed; and whether knowledge and freedom are realized (sacchikata). In each case if the answer is no, then the appropriate effort is to be made; if the answer is yes, then the bhikkhu should dwell in joy and gladness, training himself in skilful dharmas night and day. The account finishes with a statement of the universal and timeless nature of this scheme of things: those bhikkhus who in the past purified their alms round, all did so having reflected and considered just so again and again; likewise with those who will do so in the future and who do so now.

58 Pet 188.
59 M III 293-7.
60 Miss Horner takes vihātàbbaṃ here as if from vihāhati; apart from sense, ten’eva tvan Rāhula piti-pāmujjena vihareyyāsi ahorrattānusikkhi kusalesu dhammesu (M I 417-9) would suggest this is mistaken.
Effectively this is a scheme of the whole Buddhist path set out in seven stages:

(i) attention to and reflection on the five senses and mind.
(ii) abandoning of the five kāma-gñānas
(iii) abandoning of the five nīvaraṇas
(iv) full knowledge of the five upādāna-kkhandhas
(v) development of the four satipaṭṭhānas ... ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo
(vi) development of samatha and vipassanā
(vii) realization of vijā and vimutti

The seven sets are here used to characterize what appears to be specific and relatively advanced stages of the path. The abandoning of the kāma-gñānas and nīvaraṇas might be thought of as implying the development of ordinary concentration or jhāna; the full knowledge of the upādāna-kkhandhas as implying the development of wisdom that directly knows nibbāna. In that case the seven sets are here seen as essentially what the bhikkhu properly develops only during the final stages of the path. If this way of looking at the Pindapiṇḍa-patisuddhi-sutta is valid it in fact once more represents a rather good correspondence with the general principle expressed in the commentarial tradition, namely the association of the seven sets with the four transcendent paths and fruits beginning with stream-attainment.61

The passage I wish to turn to next is common to both the Samyutta- and Aṅguttara-nikāyas.62 With its accompanying similes it makes the way in which the Nikāyas conceive of the seven sets as representing the path to awakening a little clearer:

When a bhikkhu is not engaged in development, although the wish might arise thus, ‘That my mind might be freed from the āsavas as a result of not grasping’, still his mind is not freed from the āsavas as a result of not grasping. Why is this? ‘Because of the state of undevelopment’ is what should be said. Because of the state of undevelopment of what? Because of the state of undevelopment of the four establishments of mindfulness ... the noble eight-factored path.63

This is then illustrated by a simile:

Suppose, bhikkhus, there were eight or ten or twelve hen’s eggs that were not

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61 The commentary (Ps V 105-6) in fact pitches the sutta at a rather more specific and absolute level, so that already at the abandoning of the kāma-gñānas there is the path of non-return (anāgāmi-magga); at the abandoning of the five nīvaraṇas there is arahant-ship. The development of the seven sets thus represents the final consummation of the path in the reaching of arahant-ship. The reason for the commentary’s interpretation is probably to do with the fact that the exposition is addressed to Sāriputta and that the term suññatā-vihāra is taken to mean suññatā-phala-samāpatti-vihāra. In other words the sutta is understood to concern the highest perfection of spiritual faculties. However, I do not think that this necessarily invalidates my more general interpretation.

62 See S III 153-5; A IV 125-7.

63 S III 153 = A IV 125 (with minor variations): bhāvanāyogam anāpyuttassa bhikkhave bhikkhuno viharato kīt ācāp evam icchā uppaśijeyya aha vata me anupādāya āsāvehi cītīm vi mùc ceyyā iti, atha khaṃsa nevā anupādāya āsāvehi cītīm vi mùc ce iti. tam kīsa heru. abhāvittā tīssa vacanīyam. kīsa abhāvittāt. abhāvittāt catunaṃ satipaṭṭhānānaṃ ... ariyassa aṭṭhāṅgikassa maggassā.
properly sat upon, not properly warmed, not properly nurtured by the hen. Although the wish might arise for the hen, 'O that the chicks should pierce the eggshell with the points of their claws or with their beaks and break out safely', still those chicks would be unfit to break out ...  

The whole is now repeated in its positive form. Thus when a bhikkhu does engage in development, although the wish that the chicks might be freed from the āsavas as a result of absence of grasping does not arise, still his mind is in fact freed from the āsavas. Why? Because of the state of development of the four satipāṭhānās, and so on. Similarly, if a hen tends to her eggs properly, even if there is no wish that the chicks should break out of their shells, still those chicks will be fit to break out. This positive treatment is further filled out by the addition of two more similes:

As, bhikkhus, a carpenter or carpenter's apprentice, when inspecting the handle of his knife, sees the marks of his fingers and the mark of his thumb, yet has no knowledge that so much of the handle has been worn away by him today, so much yesterday, so much previously; but when the last bit has been worn away, then he has knowledge. Just so, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who dwells engaged in development has no knowledge that so much of the āsavas has been worn away by him today, so much yesterday, so much previously; but when the last bit has been worn away, then he has knowledge.

Suppose, bhikkhus, that there were an ocean going ship lashed with reed ropes that, having sailed the sea for six months, had been beached for the winter; the ropes affected by the wind and heat, drenched by the clouds of the rainy season would slacken with ease and become rotten. Just so, bhikkhus, for a bhikkhu who dwells engaged in development the fetters slacken and become rotten.

These descriptions and similes bring out very clearly a number of important aspects of the Nikāya conception of the spiritual path. First the path is something that is gradual and cumulative; secondly and on the other hand this gradual and cumulative path comes to a quite specific and definite culmination or climax. These two aspects are both implicit in the succinct expression of the

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64 S III 154 = A IV 125-6: seyyathāpi bhikkhave kukkutiyā aṇḍāni attha va dasa va dhākasa va tān'assu kukkutiya na sammā adhisayitāna na sammā parisayitāna na sammā paribhāvānā. kiṅ cāpi tassa kukkutiya evam iñcā appajjeyya aho vata me kukkutasotaka padā-nakha-sikhāya va mukha-taṇḍakaṃ va aṅga-kosam padātāva sotikāna abhinibhūjeyyaṃ tī, attha kho aṭṭhāva te kukkutiya-potakā ... sotikāna abhinibbūjhitum.

65 The simile of the hen is also found at M I 104 and 357; a rather different application of the same image is also found at Vin III 3 = A IV 176.

66 S III 154-5 = A IV 127: seyyathāpi bhikkhave palagandassāva palagandantevasiṣeṣa va vāsi-jate dossante aṅguli-padāni dossanit aṅgajha-pudām, no ca khassa evam naṃho hoti ettaṃ katha va ala vāsi-jate nāmaṃ nīyo ettaṃ katha pare ti. attha khassa kiṅce kiṅcante va naṃho hoti, evam eva kho bhikkhave bhāvanāyogam anuvattassa bhikkhuno viharato kiṅ cāpi na evam naṃho hoti, ettaṃ katha va ala vāsa-nāmaṃ nīyo ettaṃ katha pare ti. attha khassa kiṅce kiṅcante va naṃho hoti.

67 S III 155 = A IV 127: seyyathāpi bhikkhave samuddikāya nāyāva vetto-bandhāna-haddhāya chammānāni udake pariyādāya hemantike thale ukkhittāya vāsati-paredāni bandhānāni, tāni pāvassakena meghena abhippa-vatthuṃ appa-kasiren eva patippassambhanti pītiṃ bhavanti. evam eva kho bhikkhave bhāvanāyogam anuvattassa bhikkhuno viharato appa-kasiren eva sāmya-jānāni patippassambhanti pītiṃ bhavanti. (This simile of the ship is repeated in the balakaraṇīya-ragga of the mahā-ragga of the Samyutta-nikāya, illustrating the development of each of the seven sets and four jhānas in turn; see S V 51.)
commentaries here: 'the path of arahant-ship acquired gradually' (anupubbâdhi-gato arahatta-maggo). The notion that the process of awakening is at once something gradual and something sudden is thus suggested. But there is a further aspect to the conception of the path here—one that tends to draw these two somewhat divergent aspects back together. The path is thus here conceived of as essentially a natural process. Its final consummation is seen as simply the natural unfolding and consequence of the setting in motion and maintenance of the appropriate practice. The appropriate practice is engagement in the development of the seven sets. The mere self-conscious wish that the conclusion of the path be reached is inadequate to bring it about, while the development of the seven sets will have its natural result quite apart from any such wish. Furthermore, the process involved in the gradual progress towards awakening—that is the process of the development of the seven sets—is essentially the same as the process involved in the final consummation, in awakening itself—that is the full development of the seven sets. Any difference is one of order rather than kind. This is particularly evident in the image of the wearing away of the knife handle.

These are ideas that I have already suggested are involved to some extent in the Nikâyas' understanding of the noble eight-factored path. I also suggested in conclusion that the treatment of the noble eight-factored path in the Nikâyas involved a certain fusion of or deliberate ambiguity with regard to the notions of dhamma as prescriptive and descriptive. These are things that are evident once more in the notion of the path as a natural process of unfolding, and are worth pursuing a little further at this point.

4. The path as 'stream'

In an important section of his recent book Selfless Persons Steven Collins has considered several distinct patterns of imagery that are repeatedly exploited and played upon in Buddhist literature. His treatment indicates, I think, how these patterns of imagery form an imaginative substrate to the more abstract and theoretical formulations of the Nikâyas that can to some extent be used to bring the latter to life. Certainly the relevant sections of Collins' book are of some interest since in the academic pursuit of Buddhism the imaginative thought world of the Nikâyas has received rather scant and often unimaginative treatment.

Regarding the usage of vegetation imagery in connection with the processes involved in progress along the path, Collins has the following to say:

We can, I think, gain empathy into the psychological attitude recommended here from one particularly ingenious application of the image. There are three 'urgent duties' [accayikāni karanīyāni] of a householding farmer. He must plough and

68 Spk II 330 = Mp IV 62.
69 S. Collins, SP, pp. 165-76 (house imagery); 218-24 (vegetation imagery); 247-61 (river imagery).
70 Apart from Collins' work, one of the few recent attempts to take the imagery of the Nikâyas seriously albeit within the compass of a brief and general article is B.G. Gokhale, 'The Image-World of the nikāyas', JAOS 100 (1980), pp. 445-52.
harrow his field quickly, he must plant the seed quickly, and he must be quick to water it. Although he has these three urgent duties to perform, he cannot hasten the growth of his crops by saying 'let the crops spring up today ... ear tomorrow ... ripen on the next day!' It is rather a natural process of seasonal change [atu-parināma] which brings the crops to ripening. In the same way, although a monk has the three urgent duties of ‘the higher training in morality, concentration and insight’, he has no ‘magic power or influence’ [iddhi vā anubhāvo vā] to hasten their development. In a psychological perspective, this depiction of Buddhist training suggests the feeling of inculcating a natural process of personal growth, rather than the magical or ‘occult’ production of spiritual states. Seeds work slowly, beneath the ground, as the process of character development in Buddhist training is meant to work slowly, beneath the level of conscious perception.⁷¹

The passage cited here by Collins is clearly rather similar in intent to the passages I have just cited in connection with the seven sets, although the imagery is of a rather different nature. Later Collins turns his attention to the imagery of ‘streams, rivers and water in general’ and attempts to make a distinction between the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ evaluation the themes and concepts illustrated by such imagery receive in Buddhist thought. Collins’ treatment is not always, I think, entirely satisfactory.

He surely quite rightly points out that river imagery in the classical texts of the Pāli tradition is not brought into play with the specific aim of illustrating the paradoxes of difference and identity involved in the concept of change, as has sometimes been assumed.⁷² However, according to Collins:

The ‘positive’ uses of river and water imagery in the Theravāda tradition cannot be brought into a single piece with the conceptual analysis of bhavaṅga and the mind-in-sāṃsāra. When images of water are applied to matters of individual psychology the idea is not that of a moving flowing current, but of a still, cool, deep and peaceful expanse, as in a lake or the ocean. In so far as the idea of moving [Collins’ emphasis] water is used positively, it refers to the Buddhist religious life and Community in its entirety, and not to matters of individual psychology.⁷³

By way of illustrating the negative usage of water imagery in the Nikāyas Collins states a little earlier that, ‘The process of Dependent Origination, which keeps one within the temporal world of sāṃsāra, is compared to the flow of rain water down hillsides, into streams, lakes and rivers and finally into the sea.’⁷⁴ On inspection this appears to be a rather loose statement on the part of Collins. The usage he here refers to is found in the nidāna-samyutta of the Samyutta-nikāya.⁷⁵ Yet the simile is used here not to illustrate the usual forwards (anulomu) and backwards (paṭiloma) sequence of twelve links (nidāna), but a distinctive ‘negative’ and then ‘positive’ sequence, illustrating quite explicitly not the process whereby one is kept within the temporal world of sāṃsāra but how one is released from it. Thus from the condition of ignorance (avijjā) there are volitional activities (saṃkhāra); from these, consciousness

⁷¹ Id., p. 222. The passage cited occurs at A I 239-40; cf. 229-33.
⁷² Collins, SP, pp. 252-8.
⁷³ Id., p. 259.
⁷⁴ Id., p. 249.
⁷⁵ S II 32; cited by Collins, SP, p. 306, n. 11.
from this, mind and form (ndma-rcpa); from this, the six spheres of sense (āyatana); from these, contact (phassa); from this, feeling (vedanā); from this, craving (tanhd); from this, grasping (upldzna); from this, becoming (bhava); from this, birth (jāti); from this old-age and death (jarā-marana); from this, suffering (dukkha). At this point, instead of then describing how from the cessation of ignorance there is the cessation of volitional activities, and so on, the present sutta continues: from the condition of suffering there is confidence (saddhd); from this, gladness (pdmoj~a); from this, joy (piti); from this, tranquility (passaddhi); from this, happiness (sukha); from this, concentration (samā- dhe); from this, knowledge and vision (nāna-dassana); from this, disenchantment (nibbidl); from this, dispassion (virdga); from this, knowledge with regard to the destruction of the āsavas (āsava-kkhaye ŋānam). I take it that Collins would regard this as referring to matters of individual psychology, but I cannot see how the Nikāyas’ evaluation of this might be accurately characterized as ‘negative’.

The simile referred to by Collins here is worth quoting in full:

Just as, bhikkhus, when the deva rains with huge raindrops upon a mountain top, the water running down with the slope fills-up the mountain crevices, clefts and gullies; when full, the mountain crevices, clefts and gullies fill up the pools; when full, the pools fill up the lakes; when full, the lakes fill up the streams; when full, the streams fill up the rivers; when full, the rivers fill up the great ocean, the sea.

This simile is in fact found on at least five other occasions in the four Nikāyas. On three occasions the simile is used unambiguously to illustrate either the development and coming to completion of the process of spiritual growth or the potential inherent in something for spiritual growth. In each of two adjacent suttas the simile is twice repeated, on both occasions illustrating first a negative sequence, and secondly a positive sequence. The two latter suttas begin with the notion of ignorance as ‘specifically conditioned’ (ida-paccayd avQJa) and discuss the ‘food’ (dhdra) for ignorance. It is worth recalling in this connection the various discussions in the boj~hariga-samyutta of the ‘foods’ for the hindrances and the foods for the factors of awakening.

In the mahā-vagga of the Saṃyutta-nikāya we find other examples of the

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76 S II 29-32; I have already cited part of this sequence in connection with the bojhaṅgas.
77 seyyathāpi bhikkhave uparpabbata thulla-phusitake deve vassante tam udakam yathā ninnam pavattamānaṃ pabbata-kandara-padara-sākhā paripūreṇi. pabbata-kandara-padara-sākhā paripūrā kusubbe paripūreṇi. kusubhā paripūrā mahāsobbhe paripūreṇi. mahāsobbhe paripūrā kundadiyo paripūreṇi. kundadiyo paripūrā mahānadiyo paripūreṇi. mahānadiyo paripūrā mahāsamuddamā sāgaram paripūreṇi.
78 See index of similes, JPTS (1906-07), p. 69, s.v. udaka.
79 At S V 396 it illustrates the potential inherent in the three kinds of ‘intelligent trust’ (avecca-ppasrida) and conduct pleasing to the ariyas; at A I 243-4 the potential inherent in the assembly that is united (samaggā parisā); at A II 140 the potential inherent in hearing dhamma at the appropriate time (kālena), discussion of dhamma at the appropriate time, calm at the appropriate time, insight at the appropriate time.
80 A V 113-6, 116-9: asappurisa-samseva > asaddhamma-savana > assaddhiya > ayoniso-manasikāra > asatasampajānā > ādiyāsānvara > three duccaritas > five nivaraṇas > avijjā, sappurisa-samseva > saddhamma-savana > saddhā > yoniso-manasikāra > sati-sampajānā > ādiyā-sānvara > three sucaritas > four satipaṭṭhānas > seven bojhaṅgas > vijjā-vimutti.
positive usage of moving water or river imagery. The following illustrates the practice of each of the seven sets and seems intended to draw attention to the gradual and cumulative process of their development—a development that as it progresses becomes inevitable:

Just as, bhikkhus, the Gangā river tends to the east, flows to the east, slides to the east, so, bhikkhus, the bhikkhu who develops and makes great the noble eight-factored path [ ... the seven factors of awakening ... the four establishments of mindfulness ... the five faculties ... the four right endeavours ... the five powers ... the four bases of success] tends to nibbāna, flows to nibbāna, slides to nibbāna.81

The application of this image is taken a little further when the Buddha asks the bhikkhus whether they think that a great crowd of people taking picks and baskets might be able to make the Gangā river, tending, flowing and sliding to the east as it does, tend, flow and slide to the west. No, they respond. Similarly, continues the Buddha, it cannot be that kings, ministers, friends and relatives should make a bhikkhu who develops the noble eight-factored path, and the rest, turn to the lesser life by offering him goods. What is the reason?

Certainly, bhikkhus, it cannot be that the mind that has long tended to seclusion, flowed to seclusion, slid to seclusion should turn to the lesser life.82

Once more this does not, I think, refer to ‘the Buddhist religious life and Community in its entirety’ as distinct from ‘matters of individual psychology’. The point is simple enough, just as the arising of dukkha is conditioned (paticca-samuppāda), so too is the path leading to its cessation,83 so too is the practice and development of the four satipaṭṭhānas, the four samma-ppadhānas, the four iddhi-pādas, the five indriyas, the five balas, the seven bojjhāngas and the ariyo atthārikiko maggo. In fact it is just this that, as far as the Nikāyas are concerned, makes the spiritual path possible. What the simile of the rain filling gullies, streams and rivers that eventually over flow into the sea brings out, is the way in which the Nikāyas conceive of dhammas—whether unskilful or skilful—as naturally tending to perpetuate their own kind so that they gather momentum, snow-ball, accumulate and build up to a final culmination. This is the way of things, this is what dhammas do, this is dhamma.

Collins argues that river imagery is used in Buddhist literature to characterize the flowing stream of desire and attachment by which the ordinary man gets swept along.84 Collins is certainly quite right in this, but the imagery also involves an exact inverse corollary. Indeed, Collins hints at it when he notes

81 S V 38: seyyathāpi bhikkhave Gangā nadi pācinā-nimno pācinā-ponā pācinā-pabhāra. evaṁ eva kho bhikkhave bhikkhu ariyam atthāngikam maggam bhāvento ariyam atthāngikam maggam bahullakoronto nibbāna-nimno nibbāna-pono nibbāna-pabbhāro. (In the Gangā-peedyāla (S V 38-40) this simile is applied to the ariyo atthāngiko maggo a total of twelve times; six variations are achieved by substituting different rivers for the Gangā, and a further six by substituting ‘ocean’ (samudda) for ‘east’. In the mahā-vagga the Gangā-peedyāla should be repeated in full for all seven sets and the four jhānas.

82 S V 53: yaṁ hi tam bhikkhave cittam dīgha-rattam viveka-nimno viveka-ponam viveka-pabhāram tam vata hīnāvattaṁsi ti netam jhānam vijjati. (Again this should be repeated in full for all seven sets and the four jhānas.)

83 Cf. the application of paticca-samuppāda to lokuttara-citta at Vibh 172-3, 179-80, 186-7, 189.

84 See especially Collins, SP, pp. 250-2; he cites in particular S IV 174-5 and 114.
that those who make progress along the Buddhist path are often said to go upstream (uddham-sota) or against the stream (patisota-gamin) as opposed to with the stream (anusota-gamin). Yet he seems not to follow this up. The conclusion I think one should draw from the Nikāyas usage of this imagery is that there are in a sense two distinct 'streams': the stream or current that tends to desire and selfishness and that ordinary humanity is always in danger of getting caught up in, and the stream or counter current that tends to absence of desire and selflessness and which is most fully realized in the actions, speech and thought of the 'noble ones' (ariya).

Thus I think Collins is quite wrong to suggest that when the noble eight-factored path is called 'stream' (sota), it refers to 'the Buddhist religious life and community in its entirety, and not to matters of individual psychology'. I have in some measure already tried to make clear how in the Nikāyas the association of 'stream-attainment' (sotāpatti) with the noble eight-factored path characterizes a specific stage in the development of the Buddhist path. I think the nature of this stage and just why it comes to be seen as a quite specific psychological event in the Abhidhamma literature is beginning to become clearer. What lies behind the imagery of 'stream-attainment' is perhaps something like this. As skilful and wholesome dhāmmas are nurtured and developed, the stream or current of unskilful and unwholesome dhāmmas is weakened and begins gradually to lose hold. If the process of development is maintained sooner or later a point is reached when the stream or current of skilful and wholesome dhāmmas must once and for all become the overpowering current of the mind; the 'stream' is attained and the mind now tends, flows and slides inexorably towards nibbāna.

It seems to me that in his discussion of river imagery Collins is in danger of introducing a dichotomy between 'negative' and 'positive' evaluation precisely at the point where the thought-world of the Nikāyas in a sense equivocates. Collins is rather nearer the mark, I think, when he notes:

In the end, the flowing stream of sense-desire must be 'cut' or 'crossed' completely; nevertheless, for the duration of the Path, a monk must perforce work with motivational and perceptual processes as they ordinarily are, that is to say based on desire. Accordingly for this specific context, the imagery can be used without the extreme condemnation it carries in the passages I have cited so far.

Strictly the imagery of water in the passages I have been discussing must be characterized as neutral—if, that is, the characterization dhāma can be properly called 'neutral' in the Nikāyas. For the imagery here illustrates 'the way things are', but this 'way things are' is actually what allows there to be a cessation of suffering; the way things are is, it turns out, the way we want things to be.

What I have tried to show so far in this chapter is that underlying the

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85 Collins, SP, p. 250; he cites M I 168; S I 136; A II 5; Sn 319; A I 223; D II 237.
86 Cf. Collins, SP, pp. 259-60.
87 Peter Masefield, however, offers (op. cit., pp. 134-5) an intriguing interpretation of sotāpammatheory as 'one who attains the ear [of dhāma]'.
88 Collins, SP, p. 251.
apparent simplicity of these Nikāya passages concerning the seven sets is a
developed, sophisticated and subtle psychology that already adumbrates in
important respects much of what is spelt out and made explicit in the early
Abhidhamma literature.

5. The Mahā-vagga of the Saṃyutta-nikāya

Having looked at certain particular treatments of the seven sets collectively
in the Nikāyas, it is worth now considering some of the features that stand out
in the overall treatment of the seven sets in the mahā-vagga of the Saṃyutta-
nikāya. The mahā-vagga contains separate chapters or collections (saṃyutta) of
suttas devoted to each of the seven sets, as well as collections devoted to a
number of other topics.

Apart from the material that is distinctive to and characteristic of each
particular set of items, these collections of suttas also exhibit a certain number
of common features in the form of various recurrent themes and set formulaic
treatments. Indeed a considerable proportion of the mahā-vagga consists
entirely of the repetition of stock formulas applied to each of the seven sets in
turn. Although the usage of set formulas is certainly not confined to these
sections, I am speaking principally of the Ganga-peyyāla, the appamāda-
bala-karaniya-, esanāc and ogha-vaggas, which apply the same formulaic
treatments in the case of the ariyo aṭṭhāṅgiko maggo, bojjaṅgas, satipaṭṭhānas,
indriyas, samma-padhānas, balas, iddhi-pādas and in addition—as I have
already noted—to the four jhānas. Indeed the samma-padhāna-, bala- and
jhāna-samyuttas consist of nothing more than the repetition of these five
formulaic treatments. Such repetition of formulaic treatments has the effect of
making the presentation of the mahā-vagga as a literary text impracticable
without extensive abbreviations. Certainly all manuscripts and printed editions
would appear to exhibit such abbreviations, although their precise extent
varies.89 Even with abbreviations the PTS edition runs to 478 pages.

This means that in important respects we are not presented with a fixed
literary text so much as a method or technique for dealing with certain themes
according to set patterns. Such a technique while demonstrating how the parts
should be related to the whole, also allows for a certain amount of freedom
and improvisation; once the principles, themes and patterns are familiar, any
portion of the material might be expanded or abbreviated as seemed fit. Thus
in order to understand what the mahā-vagga as a whole has to offer on the
matter of the seven sets what we must do is to attempt to bring out those
particular themes and patterns that are considered appropriate to all seven
sets.

89 Cf. L. Feer's comments S V vi-ix. The conventions of classical Indian music would seem
to provide an interesting parallel: the performance of an individual rāga may well last in excess of an
hour, but the same rāga performed for record may well last only fifteen minutes.
(i) The seven sets are to be developed and made great

Perhaps the most obvious feature of the mahā-vagga treatment—so obvious that one almost simply overlooks it—is the extent to which derivatives of bhāveti and bahulikaroti are used in connection with the seven sets. As far as the noble eight factored path, the awakening-factors, the establishments of mindfulness, the faculties, the right endeavours, the powers and the bases of success are concerned, what the bhikkhu must do above all is simply 'bring them into being' (bhāveti) and 'make them become great' (bahulikaroti). How this will bring to the bhikkhu all the fruits of the spiritual life is stated again and again on nearly every other page of the mahā-vagga.

Developed and made great the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo, the seven bojjhāgas, the four satipatthānas, the four iddhi-pādas conduce to going from this shore to the farther shore (apāra-pāraṁ-gamanā-saṁvattantī); for whomever these are initiated (āraddhā), the noble path leading to the right destruction of dukkha is initiated (āraddho tesam ariyo maggo saṁma-dukkha-khhaya-gāmini); developed and made great the seven bojjhāgas, the four satipatthānas, the four iddhi-pādas are 'noble, leading out; for the one who practises them they lead out to the right destruction of dukkha' (ariyā niyyānīka niyyantī tak-karassa saṁma-dukkha-khhaya-yā); they conduce to complete turning away, dispassion, cessation, peace, direct knowledge, awakening, nibbāna (ekanta-nibbidāyā virāgāya nirodhāya upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṁvattantī).

The ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo is the path that leads to full knowledge of dukkha, to full knowledge of the three feelings, to the allaying of passion (rāga-virāgā), to the abandoning of the fetters, (saṁyojana-pahāna), to abolishing of the tendencies (amusaya-samugghātana), to full knowledge of the journey (addhāna-pariṁñā), to the destruction of the āsavas (āsava-khhaya), to realization of the fruit of knowledge and freedom (viţā-vimuttī-phala-sacchikiriyā), to knowledge and vision (nāma-dassana), to nibbāna without grasping (anupāda-parinibbāna). The ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo leads to the deathless (amata-gāmin), to the restraint and destruction of greed, hate and delusion (rāga-, dosa-, moha-vinoya, -kkhaya); it leads to nibbāna (nibbāna-gama), goes to nibbāna (nibbāna-parāyanā), has its conclusion in nibbāna (nibbāna-pariyosāna); it is to be developed for the abandoning of the five classes of object of sensual desire.
CHAPTER SEVEN

The seven boj̄hāṅgas turn towards awakening (bodha), towards penetrative insight (nibbāna), towards growth (vuddhi) and not decay (apariñāṇa), towards the realization of the fruit of knowledge and freedom; they constitute the path and the way that turns towards the destruction and cessation of craving (tānha-kkhaya, tānha-nirodha); they constitute the path that crushes the army of Māra (māra-sena-pamaddano maggo).

Developing and making great the seven sets, the bhikkhu abandons and destroys the āsavas; he abandons the fetters; he is in training (sekha) and he is trained (asekha); he is a stream attainer, a once returner, a non-returner, or an arahant.

Two thorough treatments are represented by the esanā- and ogha-vaggas, sections which as I indicated above are common to the treatment of all seven sets in the mahā-vagga. According to these, then, the seven sets are to be developed for the sake of direct knowledge (abhiniruddhi), full knowledge (pariñāṇa), complete destruction (parikkhaya) and abandoning of the three desires (esanā), the three modes (vidha) [of pride], the three āsavas, the three becomings (bhava), the three sufferings (dukkhata), the three stains (mala), the three destructions (nīgha), the three feelings (vedanā), the three cravings (tānha); the four floods (ugha), the four graspings (upādāna), the four ties (ganīha), the seven tendencies (anusaya), the five kinds of object of sensual desire (kāma-guna), the five hindrances (nivarana), the five aggregates of grasping (upādāna-khhandha), the five lower fetters (orambhāgīyāni samyojanāni), the five higher fetters (uddhambhāgīyāni samyojanāni).

So the seven sets individually and collectively when developed and made great lead to the fruits of the spiritual life. But exposition of the theme of the seven sets as the path to awakening does not end here in the mahā-vagga; it is extended to the individual factors of the path, awakening factors, faculties and powers. Thus in the Gaṅgā-peyyāla, appamāda-, balakaraniya-, esanā-, and ogha-vaggas of each of these four sets it is stated at some length how the bhikkhu develops in turn each of the individual path-factors, awakening-factors, faculties and powers dependent on seclusion (viveka-nissita), dependent on dispassion (virīga-nissita), dependent on cessation (nīrodha-nissita), ripening in release (vosaga-pariṇāmin); he develops each one in turn as that which concludes in the restraint of greed, hate and delusion (rāga-, dosa-, moha-vinaya-pariyosāna); he develops each one in turn as that which plunges into the

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99 S V 72, 83; 87; 94; 93, 97, 126.
100 S V 86-7
101 S V 99.
102 S V 8, 28 (maggā); 72 (boj̄hāṅga); 190 (satipatthāna); 220-2, 236 (indriya); 256-7, 275-6, 284, 288-9 (iddhi-pīdā).
103 S V 14 (maggā); 88 (boj̄hāṅga); 177-8 (satipatthāna); 236 (indriya).
104 S V 14 (maggā); 174-5 (satipatthāna); 229-30 (indriya).
105 S V 25-6 (maggā); 174-5, 188 (satipatthāna); 200-1, 236-7 (indriya).
106 S V 54-62; 136-7; 139-40; 172-3, 236-7 (indriya).
107 S V 72, 83; 87; 94; 93, 97, 126.
108 S V 86-7
109 S V 99.
110 S V 8, 28 (maggā); 72 (boj̄hāṅga); 190 (satipatthāna); 220-2, 236 (indriya); 256-7, 275-6, 284, 288-9 (iddhi-pīdā).
111 S V 14 (maggā); 88 (boj̄hāṅga); 177-8 (satipatthāna); 236 (indriya).
112 S V 14 (maggā); 174-5 (satipatthāna); 229-30 (indriya).
113 S V 25-6 (maggā); 174-5, 188 (satipatthāna); 200-1, 236-7 (indriya).
114 S V 54-62; 136-7; 139-40; 191-2; 240-3; 246-8; 250-3; 291-3.
115 The satipatthānas, samma-ppadhānas and iddhi-pīdās are excluded since as aspects of what is essentially a unity it appears to be considered inappropriate or unnecessary to itemize them in quite the same way as the maggāṅgas, boj̄hāṅgas, indriyas and balas.
116 On the viveka-nissita formula see above, Chapter 5.6.
deathless (amatagadha), goes to the deathless (amata-parāyana), concludes in the deathless (amata-pariyosana); he develops each one in turn as that which tends, flows and slides to nibbāna (nibbāna-ninna, -pona, -pabhāra).\textsuperscript{109} All this is entirely consistent with the tendency to see the seven sets as representing a description of the path, as corresponding to the fourth of the four noble truths—the reality of the way leading to the cessation of suffering.

(ii) Prior and supporting conditions

Another theme that recurs in the treatment of the seven sets throughout the mahā-vagga is that of prior and supporting conditions that are conducive to the development of the seven sets and form a suitable basis for their development. The two items most consistently singled out in this connection are ‘conduct’ (sīla) and ‘heedfulness’ (appamāda).

As I have already indicated, a chapter on heedfulness—the appamādavagga—is common to all seven sets. This chapter consists of ten different similes illustrating how ‘whatever skilful dharmas there are, they all are rooted in heedfulness and come together in heedfulness; heedfulness is reckoned the chief of these dharmas’ (ye keci kusalā dhammā sabbe te appamādā-mūlakā appamāda-samosanaṁ, appamado tesam dhammānaṁ aggam akkhāyati); and so ‘the bhikkhu who is heedful can be expected to develop and make great’ (appamattass’etam bhikkhuno pāṭikaṅkham ... bhāvessati bahuḷikarissati) the noble eight-factored path, the awakening-factors, the establishings of mindfulness, the faculties, the right endeavours, the powers, the bases of success.\textsuperscript{110} Similarly the balakaraniya-vagga, also common to all seven sets, opens with three similes illustrating how ‘the bhikkhu depending on conduct, established in conduct develops and makes great the noble eight-factored path’ (bhikkhu sīḷam nissāya sīḷe patiṭṭhāya ariyāṁ atṭhāngiko maṅgaṁ bhāveti bahuḷikaroti).\textsuperscript{111}

The way in which conduct and heedfulness are fundamental to the development of the seven sets is also emphasized within the distinctive portions of the

\textsuperscript{109} In extending the application of amatogadha, etc. and nibbāna-ninna, etc. to the individual bojjhāgas, indriyas and balas I depart from the PTS edition of the text as edited by Leon Feer. Feer seems to regard the repetitions in the mahā-vagga as rather excessive (cf. S V iii) and, lest they should get out of hand, restricts the amatogadha and nibbāna-ninna formulas to the initial exposition of the Gāṅgā-peatyāla, appamāda-, balakaraniya-, esanā- and ogha-vaggas in the context of the magga-samyutta (see S V 38-62). In the context of the bojjhāga-, indriya- and bala-samyuttas Feer confines the exposition of these sections to the viveka-nissita and rāga-vinaya-pariyosana formulas. Clearly this is all that is explicit in some manuscripts, but equally clearly other manuscripts understand all four formulas to be relevant here. Thus with regard to the Gāṅgā-peatyāla, etc., some Burmese manuscripts state yad api magga-samyuttam vīṭṭhāretabbaṁ tad api bojjhāga-samyuttam vīṭṭhāretabbaṁ (S V 140; cf. 243 n. 4, 251 n. 3); certain Ceylonese manuscripts apparently include the other formulas in the peyyālas (see S V 243 n. 1, 251 n. 2). The commentary gives no reason why all four formulas should not be relevant in each case; on the contrary it seems to imply that at least in the case of the bojjhāga-samyutta they are all relevant: Gāṅgā-peatyāladdayo magga-samyutto vutta-nayena veditabba (Spk III 176). The amatogadh formula is in fact applied directly to the individual indriya in the body of the indriya-samyutta (see S V 220), while the nibbāna-ninna formula is used of each set as a whole in the Gāṅgā-peatyāla treatment; there would thus appear to be no technical reason for excluding them.


\textsuperscript{111} S V 45-54 (passim); (135, 138, 191, 240, 242, 245, 250, 252, 291).
samyuttas devoted to the individual sets. In ‘the repetitions of the sun’ (suriyassa peyyālo), peculiar to the magga-samyutta, the accomplishment of conduct and heedfulness (śīla-, appamāda-sampadā) are two of seven items that are the prelude and signal of the arising of the noble eight-factored path (ariyassa atthangikassa maggassa uppadāya etam pubbañ-gamam etam pubba-nimittam), exactly as the dawn is the prelude and signal of the rising sun (suriyassa udayato etam pubbañ-gamam etam pubba-nimittam yad idam arunaggam). The other five items here are having good friends (kalyāna-mittatā), accomplishment (sampadā) of the wish to act (chanda), of self (attā), of view (dīthi), of proper bringing to mind (yoniso manasikāra). In the ‘one dhamma repetitions’ (eka-dhamma-peyyāla), again peculiar to the magga-samyutta, the same seven items are singled out as individual dhāmas particularly useful for the arising of the noble eight-factored path (eka-dhammo bahu-pakāro ariyassa atthangikassa maggassa uppadāya), and as affording the means by which the noble eight-factored path once arisen reaches full development: ‘I see no other single dhamma, bhikkhus, by means of which the noble eight-factored path not yet arisen arises, or the noble eight-factored path once arisen reaches full development.’ (nāham bhikkhave aññam eka-dhammaṃ pi samanupassāmi yena anuppanno vā ariyo atthangiko maggo uppajjati, uppanno vā ariyo atthangiko maggo bhāvāna-pāripūrin gacchati). That the bojjñhangas and satipaṭṭhānas must be developed dependent on śīla is also further emphasized on a number of other occasions, as is also the importance of appamāda for the development of the bojjñhangas and indriyas.

Thus of the seven items mentioned in the ‘repetition of the sun’ and ‘one dhamma repetitions’ of the magga-samyutta it is śīla and appamāda that are the most generally emphasized as prior and supporting conditions for the development of the seven sets. However, ‘having good friends’ (kalyāna-mittatā) and ‘proper bringing to mind’ (yoniso manasikāra) receive some additional attention in both the magga- and bojjñhanga-samyuttas. In the former ‘having good friends’ is termed ‘the entire spiritual life’ (sakalāṃ brahma-cariyāṃ), in the latter the relationship between the dawn and the rising sun is now likened to the relationship between having good friends and the arising of the awakening-factors, and to the relationship between proper bringing to mind and the arising of the awakening-factors. Proper bringing to mind is further explained as the internal factor or condition (ajjhātikāṁ āṅgam) and having good friends as the external factor or condition (bāhirām āṅgam) for the arising of the awakening-factors.
I do not intend to discuss these items further individually. What I have said in other contexts should be sufficient to make it clear that what these various passages with their similes seem intended to show is how the maintenance and continuance of certain conditions, disciplines and tendencies of the mind will gradually give rise to and support the development of those spiritual faculties encompassed by the seven sets. Thus the seven sets are presented here as representing something psychologically and spiritually more specific and definite that arises and develops naturally out of the generality of the proper supporting conditions. In terms appropriate to the imaginative thought world of the Nikāyas, it is as if the continuing support of the right conditions in the shape of sila, appamāda, proper bringing to mind, good friends and so on is the continuing rain of the deva on the mountain top that initiates the trickle that eventually will become the Gaṅgā flowing majestically towards the ocean. The literary form of much of the mahā-vagga here seems to echo the sense. The abundant repetitions, not just with the recurrence of the themes but in the actual structure of sections such as the appamāda- and balakaraṇīya-vaggas, have their own cumulative effect.

(iii) Some further similes

I have already commented on a number of similes both in the mahā-vagga and elsewhere that illustrate the gradual and inevitable nature of the development of the seven sets—a development that is seen as reaching a decisive and definite culmination. Apart from the Gaṅgā similes, the ship simile and the simile of the various winds in the sky, the mahā-vagga contains a number of other important similes illustrating the development of each of the seven sets in turn. For the most part these similes occur in the balakaraṇīya-vagga, common to all of the sets.

A tree that leans, tends and inclines to the east (pācīna-nīna, -pona, -pabbhāra) will, when cut at the root, fall to the east; in the same way a bhikkhu developing and making great the noble eight-factored path and the rest leans, tends and inclines to nibbāna. Just as a pot that is upset spills out its water and cannot be refilled with it (kumbho nikkujo vamateva udakam no paccā-vamati), so a bhikkhu who develops and makes great the noble eight-factored path and the rest spills out bad unskilful dhammass and cannot be refilled with them. Just as a stem of wheat or grass that is appropriately directed (sammā-panihiita) can pierce the skin and draw blood (lohitam uppadessati) when the hand or foot is placed on it, so the bhikkhu by appropriately directed development of the path can pierce ignorance, draw knowledge and realize nibbāna (bhikkhu sammā-panihiitāya magga-bhāvanāyā avijjām chijjati vijjām

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121 On kalyāṇa-mittatā see S. Collins, ‘Kalyāṇamitta and Kalyāṇamittattā’, JPTS (1986), pp. 51-72; on appamāda cf. comments in chapter one (pp. 43-4); on atta-sampadā cf. the instruction to the bhikkhus to dwell atta-dīpa and atta-saranā, explained in terms of the satipatthāna formula (see above, p. 67); on chanda cf. comments above (pp. 90-1, 114-5).

122 S V 47-8.

123 S V 48; cf. A V 337 and different application of kumbha simile to just the ariyo aṭṭhāṅgiko maggo at S V 20.
uppadessati nibbānaṁ sacchikarissati); in this connection he develops the noble eight-factored path and the rest.\textsuperscript{124} Just as in the last month of the hot season when the dust and dirt rise up, a great cloud out of season suddenly causes it to disappear and settle (gimhānaṁ pacchime māse uggatam rajo-jallam tam enam mahā akāla-megho thānaso antaradhāpeti vīpasameti), so a bhikkhu developing and making great the noble eight-factored path and the rest suddenly causes bad unskilful dhammas that continually arise (uppannuppanne) to disappear and settle.\textsuperscript{125} Just as a great cloud that has arisen is dispersed, made to disappear and settle by a great wind (uppannam mahā-megham tam enam mahā-vāto antarāy′eva antaradhāpeti vīpasameti), so a bhikkhu developing and making great the noble eight-factored path and the rest disperses the bad unskilful dhammas that continually arise, he makes them disappear and settle.\textsuperscript{126}

\textit{(iv) The seven sets as normative}

A final theme of the mahā-vagga is that which presents the seven sets as ‘normative’: the seven sets illustrate the nature and law of things, and are at once central and peculiar to the teaching of a Buddha. There are two formulaic cycles illustrating this theme; one may be termed the ‘past-future-present’ formula, the other the ‘not-apart-from-the-training-of-a-Sugata’ formula. One of the passages in the first cycle is a variation of a passage I referred to above in chapter one:

All those Blessed Ones who in the past were arahants, fully awakened ones, abandoning the five hindrances, defilements of the mind that weaken wisdom, their minds well established in the four establishings of mindfulness, developed in accordance with what is the seven factors of awakening and awakened to the unsurpassable full awakening. All those Blessed Ones who in the future will be arahants, fully awakened ones ... will awaken to the unsurpassable full awakening. And the Blessed One, an arahant, a fully awakened one now ... awakens to the unsurpassable full awakening.\textsuperscript{127}

Similarly all those samanās and brāhmaṇas who abandoned the three forms of pride in the past, who will abandon them in the future, and who abandon them in the present—all have done so, will do so and do so now as a result of developing and making great the seven factors of awakening (sattannam bojjhaṅgaṁ bhāvitattā bahukatattā).\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{124} S V 49; cf. S V 10.
\textsuperscript{125} S V 50.
\textsuperscript{126} S V 50-1.
\textsuperscript{127} S V 160-1 (= D II 81-3; III 99-101): ye pi te bhante ahesum aṭṭaṁ addhānam arahanto sammāsambuddhā sabbe te bhagavanto paṇca nivaranā pahāya cetaso upakkilese pahāya dubballi-karanā catusa satipaṭṭhāṇesu supatīṭhitā-cittā satta bojjhaṅge yathā-bhūtaṁ bhāvetvā amuttaram sammā-sambodhiṁ abhisambuddhiṁsu. ye pi te bhante bhāvissanti anāgatam addhānam ... abhisambuddhiṁ. bhagavā pi bhante etarāhā arahante sammāsambuddho ... abhisambuddho. (Cf. above, p. 58.)
\textsuperscript{128} S V 98. Cf. S V 86: ‘I see no single dhamma, bhikkhus, other than the seven awakening-factors such that when developed and made great it turns towards the abandoning of those dhammas connected with the fetters.’ (nāham bhikkhave anīham eka-dhammaṁ pi samanupassāmi yo evam bhāvito bahukatātī samyojanīyānaṁ dhammānaṁ pahānaṁya samvattati, yathayidam bhikkhave satta bojjhaṅgā.)
who achieved partial or full meditational power (*iddhi-padesa, samattam iddhim*) in the past, or will achieve it in the future, or achieve it in the present—all have done so, will do so, and do so now as a result of developing and making great the four bases of success.\(^{129}\) All those *bhikkhus* who by the destruction of the āsavas, have in the here and now directly known, realized, attained and dwelt in the freedom of mind, the freedom of wisdom that is without āsavas in the past, or will dwell in it in the future, dwell in it now—all have done so, will do so, and do so now as a result of developing and making great the four bases of success.\(^{130}\)

The form of the second formulaic cycle is as follows:

> When these eight *dhammas* are as yet unarisen as [dhammas that are] developed and made great, they do not arise apart from the appearance of a Tathāgata, an arahant, a fully awakened one. Which are the eight? They are right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.\(^{31}\) A number of variations are achieved by making certain changes: they do not arise outside the training of a Sugata (*nānātra sugata-vinaya*); or the eight *dhammas* are considered as purified, cleansed, without blemish, defilements gone (*parisuddha pariyoḍātā anānganā vigatupakkikesā*).\(^{132}\) In the *bojjhaṅga*-and *indriya-samyyuttas* the same formula is applied to the awakening-factors and faculties.\(^{133}\)

Thus the treatment of the seven sets by way of these two formulas—the ‘past-future-present’ formula and the ‘not-apart-from’ formula—is not systematic or comprehensive; that is to say, not all of the seven sets are treated by way of each formula: the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* is not treated by way of the ‘past-present-future’ formula, and the *satipatthānas* and *iddhi-pādas* not by way of the ‘not-apart-from’ formula; while the *samma-ppadhānas* and *balas* do not feature at all.

Whether we should attempt to see some method in this, or whether it is better viewed as largely a matter of chance might be made clearer by a detailed study of the Chinese Āgamas. My own suspicion is that the latter is nearer the mark. Thus the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* passage which states that the four classes of *samaṇa* are only found in that *dhamma-vinaya* where the *ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo* is found is rather close in intent to the ‘past-future-present’ formula.\(^{134}\) While the fact that the *samma-ppadhānas* and *balas* do not feature here is largely consistent with the fact that, of the seven sets, these two clearly receive rather less individual attention in the Nikāyas than the others. The

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129 S V 255-6; cf. 273-5; 269-71; 288 (of Moggallāna); 289 (of the Tathāgata).
130 S V 256-7.
131 S V 14: *att'ime bhikkhave dhammā bhāvitā bahulikatā anuppamā uppajjianti noññatra tathāgatassa pātubhāvā arahato sammāsambuddhassa. katame attha. seyyathidoñī sammā-diṭṭhi ... sammā-samādhi.*
132 S V 14-5.
133 S V 77, 235.
134 See above, p. 204.
Petakopadesa in fact uses a variation on the 'past-present-future' formula in the context of the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā:

The four establishings of mindfulness ... the noble eight-factored path—these are the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā. Those dhammas which conduce to nibbāna for past, future and present blessed Buddhas, Paccekabuddhas and disciples, they are the path.\footnote{Pet 114: caturā satipáṭṭhānā yādā ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo, evam ete sattaṁsā bodhi-pakkhiśā dhammā. ye dhammā attāṅgagata-paccuppanānam buddhānam bhagavatānām pacceka-buddhānam sāvākanāti ca nibbāniga samvattanti, so maggo. (Cf. Aśāṅga's Śrāvakabhūmi, quoted Wayman, JIP 6 (1978), p. 418.)}

At this point I can perhaps make one or two further comments on the notion of dhamma and its relationship to the seven sets in the Nikāyas. What I want to say follows on from what was said at the conclusion of the section of this chapter dealing with the seven sets as dhammas taught by the Buddha. What the passages just considered suggest then is that if the samana, the brāhmaṇa or the bhikkhu practises in a certain way, that is to say, develops and makes great the seven sets, then the natural consequence of this will be the cessation of suffering, will be awakening. This is the truth that the Nikāyas claim to expound, this is dhamma. Put like this, dhamma is for the Nikāyas not so much an absolute statement of truth as an observation of cause and effect; on the basis of this observation the seven sets are suggested as a prescription if the desired effect happens to be the cessation of suffering; the teachings about the seven sets are not so much a final statement about the way things are as useful to the one who desires to arrive at the cessation of suffering.

But this is not strictly the end of the story for the Nikāyas. The development of the seven sets has in the past, will in the future and does in the present bring about the cessation of suffering—it always was so, it always will be so, and it is so now. Inherent in this kind of thinking is the notion that in some sense the universal and fundamental nature of things has been tapped. Thus if the path to awakening is set out in terms of the seven sets, it does in some sense actually represent a description of the way things are—the way things have been, and always will be.

So, we are told, anyone who has come to the cessation of suffering must have come by this path, the path that is encompassed in the development of the seven sets. Or, turning this around, any path that ends in the cessation of suffering must essentially be this path. This kind of thinking is of some importance to our understanding of the seven sets in the Nikāyas. This is precisely why the Nikāyas can describe the seven sets as collectively and individually reaching the end of the path to awakening, why the seven sets are bound up together, why the full development of any one of the sets brings to fulfilment all seven. The seven sets are essentially just different ways of looking at or describing the same thing, namely what is seen as the one reality of the truth of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. But the teachings about the seven sets are not necessarily the absolute or final description of that truth or of the path; as I have already suggested, for the Nikāyas such teachings can...
only be 'true' in so far as they are effective, since it is what is effective, what works, what brings about the cessation of suffering that constitutes the path, that constitutes what is true, what is dhamma.

Finally, we are told this path is not found outside the training of a Sugata or apart from the appearance of a Tathāgata. This does begin to look rather more like an absolute and exclusive claim on the part of the Nikāyas, and possibly should be taken as such. Yet in one sense it is merely the consequence of the internal consistency of the Nikāya thought-world, of the particular function of certain concepts. For to say that there is no path apart from the teaching of a Buddha is merely the corollary of the notion that the one—anyone—who discovers and teaches the way to the cessation of suffering should be called 'buddha', for this is what Buddhas do. Yet the teaching of Buddhas is not something at variance with the teaching of other wise men:

I do not quarrel with the world, bhikkhus, but the world quarrels with me. One who speaks dhamma does not quarrel with anyone in the world. Of that to which the wise men of the world do not assent, I too say that it is not so. Of that to which the wise men of the world assent, I too say that it is so.136

6. The powers of the one who has destroyed the āsavas

This discussion of the way in which the seven sets are used in the Nikāyas to describe the course and final consummation of the path to awakening is conveniently brought to a conclusion by turning briefly to the notion of the particular powers that belong to the one who has come to the end of the path, namely the powers that belong to the one who has destroyed the āsavas (khīnasava-balas). The Nikāyas give these powers as seven, eight or ten in number. The full ten are as follows:

Here, sir, for a bhikkhu for whom the āsavas are destroyed | all conditions are well seen by means of right wisdom as they are, as impermanent | this is a power of the bhikkhu for whom the āsavas are destroyed, and depending on it he recognizes the destruction of the āsavas: 'The āsavas are destroyed for me.' [ii] ... sensual desires are well seen by means of right wisdom as they are, as like a fire pit | this is a power ... 'The āsavas are destroyed for me.' [iii] ... his mind leans towards, tends towards, inclines towards, is intent upon seclusion, it delights in absence of desire, it is completely removed from those dhammas that form a basis for the āsavas ... this is a power ... 'The āsavas are destroyed for me.' [iv] ... the four establishings of mindfulness are developed, well developed ... this is a power ... 'The āsavas are destroyed for me.' [v] ... the four right endeavours ... [vi] ... the four bases of success ... [vii] ... the five faculties ... [viii] ... the five powers ... [ix] ... the seven factors of awakening ... [x] ... the noble eight-factored path is developed, well developed ... this is a power ... 'The āsavas are destroyed for me.'137

136 S III 138: nāham bhikkhave lokena vivadāmi loko ca mayā vivadati, na bhikkhave dhamma-vādā kena lokasmiṃ vivadatī, āham bhikkhave natthi sammataṃ loko panditānaṃ āham pi tam natthi ti vadāmi, āham bhikkhave atti sammataṃ loko panditānaṃ āham pi tam atti ti vadāmi.

137 For the ten khīnasava-balas see A V 175, Patis II 173-4: idhāvuso khīnasavassā bhikkhuno aniccato sabbe samkhārā yathā-bhūtān samma-paṭikāya sudīthā hoti, āham pi āvuso khīnasavassā bhikkhuno ... honti, idam pi khīnasavassā bhikkhuno balaṃ hoti yaṃ balaṃ āgama khīnasavo
Rather interestingly when the list of the seven *khīṇāsava-balas* is given, it does not simply consist of the seven sets (iv-x) as might have been guessed. What is omitted are the references to the *samma-ppadhānas*, the *iddhi-pādas* and the *balas*. The list of eight *khīṇāsava-balas* restores the *iddhi-pādas*, but once again omits the *samma-ppadhānas* and *balas*. Why this variation, and what principles govern the omissions?

It seems that the *khīṇāsava-balas* should be seen as an attempt to define the special capacities of a *khīṇāsava* or *arahant* in much the same way as the ten *tathāgata-balas* define the special capacities of a Buddha. Thus the fluctuation between seven, eight and ten *khīṇāsava-balas* might be seen as concerned with the definition of the minimum number of special powers, the basic capacities common to all *arahants*. Certainly the early history of Buddhist thought would seem to bear witness to such concerns. The theoretical problem is, then, that although all individuals looked upon as *arahants* need not be expected to exhibit precisely the same capacities, by definition they must still exhibit some common traits.

So why may the *samma-ppadhānas* be omitted from the list of *khīṇāsava-balas*? It seems that in some sense 'endeavour' or 'strength' is simply not seen as crucial for the *arahant* in quite the same way as it is for one who is actively developing the path. That this is so would seem to follow from the way in which the four *samma-ppadhānas* appear to be understood as *viriya*, especially in its capacity of maintaining what has been achieved and checking any falling back. This would also appear to tie in with the Abhidhamma tradition that omits *samma-ppadhāna* from the reckoning at the time of the occurrence of the transcendent fruition (*lokuttara-phala*) consciousness.

Above I discussed how the *iddhi-pādas* are especially associated with the acquiring of facility in a variety of meditation attainments. In particular this facility is considered to result in a number of different meditation powers. It is clear from the later tradition that the full development and mastery of such powers was regarded not as an absolute prerequisite of the destruction of the *āsavas* (although certainly useful to that end) but rather as the particular domain of the master and adept of *jhāna*. Presumably, then, whether or not the *iddhi-pādas* are counted among the special powers of the one who has destroyed the *āsavas* is indicative in some measure of the distinction made in later writings between the practitioner who follows the vehicle of calm (*samatha-*)

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138 D III 283-4.
139 A IV 223-5.
yāna) and the practitioner who follows the vehicle of pure insight (vipassanā-
yāna). The reason why the balas can be omitted from the reckoning when
talking of the khīnasava-balas is perhaps simply because to say of the indriyas
that they are ‘developed, well developed’ is to say precisely that they are balas.

141 Cf. L.S. Cousins, ‘Samatha-yāna and Vipassanā-yāna’ in Dhammapala, BSHS, pp.56-68.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SEVEN SETS EXPANDED

1. In the four Nikāyas

So far I have confined myself to Nikāya passages that deal more or less exclusively with the seven sets. Of course the treatments in the Mahāsalāyatanika- and Pīṇḍapātāpārisuddhi-suttas do bring in other items, principally calm (samatha) and insight (vipassanā), but it remains fair to say that the seven sets still function here as a more or less self-contained group. However, at this point in my study I need to look at a number of Nikāya passages that expand the seven sets by bringing various items into rather more direct association with them.

The first passage I wish to consider in this context is the asamkhata-samyutta.1 The asamkhata-samyutta consists of variations on the following basic form:

I shall teach you, bhikkhus, the unconditioned and the path leading to the unconditioned. Hear it. And what, bhikkhus, is the unconditioned? That which is the destruction of passion, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion—this is called the unconditioned. And what is the path leading to the unconditioned? Mindfulness concerned with body—this is called the path leading to the unconditioned. Thus, bhikkhus, the unconditioned and the path leading to the unconditioned is taught by me to you. That which should be done by a teacher desiring the welfare of his pupils, out of compassion, depending on compassion has been done by me for you. There are roots of trees, there are empty places; meditate, bhikkhus, do not be heedless, do not be regretful later. This is my instruction to you.2

Into this framework, in place of ‘mindfulness concerned with body’ (kāya-gatā sati) as an explanation of ‘the path leading to the unconditioned’ (asamkhata-gāmi maggo), ten different items are then substituted giving ten more rehearsals of this basic sutta form. The ten items are:

(i) calm and insight (samatho vipassanā cā)
(ii) concentration with initial and sustained thought (savitakko savicḍro samādhi), concentration without initial thought yet with sustained thought (avitakko vicḍra-matto samādhi), concentration without initial and sustained thought (avitakko avicḍro samādhi)

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1 S IV 359-73.
2 S IV 359; asamkhata sā ca vo bhikkhave desissāmi asamkhata-gāmi ca maggo, taṁ suṇātha. katamaṁ ca bhikkhave asamkhataṁ, yo bhikkhave rāga-kkhayo dosa-kkhayo moha-kkhayo idam veccati bhikkhave asamkhataṁ, katamo ca bhikkhave asamkhata-gāmi maggo. kāya-gatā sati, ayaṁ veccati bhikkhave asamkhata-gāmi maggo. iti kho bhikkhave desitaṁ vo mayā asamkhataṁ desito asamkhata-gāmi maggo. yaṁ bhikkhave sattāhārā karaniyaṁ sāvakānaṁ hitesinā anukampena anukampam upādāya katamo taṁ mayaṁ. etūni bhikkhave rukkha-mūḷāni etūni suṇāgārāni jhāyatha mā paccāvatthe mā pacchā-vipajjasūrino ahuvattha. ayaṁ kho vo amhākaṁ anusāsani ti.
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(iii) empty concentration (suññato samādhi), signless concentration (animitto samādhi), wishless concentration (appañihito samādhi)
(iv) the four establishing of mindfulness
(v) the four right endeavours
(vi) the four bases of success
(vii) the five faculties
(viii) the five powers
(ix) the seven factors of awakening
(x) the noble eight-factored path

The asamkhata-samyutta then continues by breaking down these ten groups into their constituent parts so that each of these parts is itself said to be equivalent to the path leading to the unconditioned. This procedure gives a further forty-five rehearsals of the basic sutta form. Of course, as far as the seven sets are concerned the implications of such a procedure are familiar enough: the totality of each of the sets is a complete path; each item of each of the sets is also a complete path—these are ideas that have already been met with in the course of this study. Once again what is brought out is the essential unity of the seven sets and the path—how each of the sets and each of the items that make up each of the sets are in some sense equivalent. What of the items brought into association with the seven sets? The expansion of the seven sets here would seem to follow a principle of numerical progression: first we have a single item (kāya-gatā sati), followed by one pair and two sets of three, and finally the seven sets in numerical order beginning with the four establishings of mindfulness. This gives a total of forty-six items. As was seen in chapter one, kāya-gatā sati is merely another way of looking at the first establishing of mindfulness; so in the asamkhata-samyutta the seven sets are effectively once more brought into association with samatha and vipassanā (as in the Mahāsākyatana- and Piṇḍapātāparisuddhi-suttas), and also six varieties of samādhi.

Three other Nikāya passages take the extension of the seven sets rather further than this; the connection between the seven sets as a self-contained yardstick of Buddhist teaching or as a description of the Buddhist path that is at once concise and complete seems to become more tenuous. The seven sets are apparently just examples, along with other examples, of what the Buddha and his followers teach and practise.

According to the Mahāsakullūḍāyi-sutta3 there are five reasons why the pupils of the Buddha esteem, revere, think highly of, honour and rely on him (pañca dhammā yehi mama sāvakā sakkaronti garukaronti mānenti pūjenti sakkatvā garukatvā upanissāya viharanti).4 The fifth of these reasons is that the Buddha explains to his pupils various paths or ways:

Moreover, Udāyi, explained by me to my pupils is the way entering upon which my pupils develop the four establishings of mindfulness ... the four right endeavours ... the four bases of success ... the five faculties ... the five powers ... the seven factors of awakening ... the noble eight-factored path ... the eight liberations ... the eight

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3 M II 1-22.
4 M II 9.
spheres of mastery ... the ten *kasināyatana* ... the four *jhānas* ... the way entering upon which my pupils know thus: 'This body of mine has form, consists of the four great elements, is born of mother and father, is sustained by cooked rice and gruel; its nature is to be impermanent, to run down, to wear away, to break up, to perish, and this consciousness of mine is tied to it, bound to it.' ... [They] create from this body another body, having form, mind-made, with all limbs, not lacking in any faculty ... [They] enjoy various kinds of power ... [They,] by means of the divine ear-element, purified, surpassing the human, hear sounds, both divine and human, far and near ... [They,] embracing with the mind the minds of other beings, of other persons, know [them] ... [They] recall various former existences ... [They,] by means of the divine eye, purified, surpassing the human see beings arising and falling—inferior or refined, fair or ugly, well-born or ill-born, they know beings as faring according to their actions ... [They,] by the destruction of the *āsavas*, in the here and now directly know for themselves, realize, attain and dwell in the freedom of mind, the freedom of wisdom that is without *āsavas*.5

In the first instance the list of seven sets seems here to be once more extended according to a principle of numerical progression: two sets of eight—the *vimokkhas* and abhibhāyatanas—are added, and one set of ten—the *kasināyatana*. The *vimokkhas* and abhibhāyatanas are two sets of categories not specifically discussed at great length in the later literature. This at least in part appears to be because they are considered to overlap with matters dealt with in detail under the more general headings of *jhāna* and formless attainment. Thus, as far as the *Dhammasaṅgani* is concerned, the abhibhāyatanas seem to be concerned with mastery and facility in certain aspects of the *jhāna* practice.6 The *vimokkhas* would appear to embrace *jhāna* of both the form and formless spheres.7 The ten *kasinas*, however, are rather more central to the exposition of *jhāna* in such works as the *Visuddhimagga* and *Vimuttimagga* than are the *vimokkhas* and abhibhāyatanas.8 Having reached ten *kasināyatana* by way of

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5 M II 11-22: *puna ca param Uḍāyi akkhātā mayā sāvakānaṃ paṭipadā yathā paṭipannā me sāvakā cattāro satipaṭṭhāne bhāvanti ... cattāro samma-paṭṭhāne ... cattāro iddhi-pāde ... paṭe-indriyāni ... paṭe ca balāni ... satta bojhāhe ... ariyam aṭṭhatākam maggam ... aṭṭha vimokkhe ... aṭṭha abhibhāyatanāni ... dasa kasiṇas ... cattāri jhānāni ... paṭipadā yathā paṭipanno me sāvakā evam paṭijānanti: ayam kho me kāyo rūpi catum-maññā-bhūtiko mātā-pettiko sambhavo odana-kummasu pacayo anicca cchādaṇa-parimuddaṇa-bhāvāna-viṭtika paridhāsana dhammo idāna ca pana me viṇhānaṃ ettha sitam ettha paṭṭhaddham ... imanā kāya aṭṭha kāya abhinimminanti rūpi moho-mayaṃ sābhānga-paceccagā abhinindriyāṃ ... akeka-vihiṭṭhām iddhi-viṭṭhām paccamubhonti ... dibbāya sota-dhātuyā visuddhāya atikkanta-mānasikāya ubho sadde sunanti dibbe ca mānuse ca ye dūre sanitke ca ... para-sattānaṃ para-puggalānaṃ cetāsa ceto paricca paṭijānanti ... akeka-vihiṭṭhām pubbe-nivāsaṃ anussaranti ... dibbāna cakkhuṇa visuddhena atikkanta-mānasakena satte passanti cavamāne upajjāmāne hēhe paṇīte suwanne dubbanne sugate duggate yathā-kammāpayāt satte paṭijānanti ... aśavānāṃ khaṇā anāśavāṃ ceto-vimuttiṃ paṇiḥ-vimuttim dīṭhe va dhamme sayam abhināhā sacchiketā purasampajjā viharanti. (The text details in full each of the items mentioned.)

6 See Dhs 42-52 where the eight abhibhāyatanas (with slight variations from the Nikāya formulation) are treated as an aspect of *jhāna* that is *rūpāvacara*; cf. As 187-90.

7 The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh *vimokkhas* straightforwardly correspond to the four formless attainments respectively; the eighth *vimokkha* is *saṅhāra-vedayita-nirodha*; the formulation of the second *vimokkha* (ajjhātām arūpa-saṅkhī bahiddhā rūpāni passati) suggests that it is a shorthand for all eight abhibhāyatanas which consist of variations on the theme ajjhātām arūpa-saṅkhī eko bahiddhā rūpāni passati. For a more detailed exposition of the *vimokkhas* see Patis II 38-40.

8 Dhs 31-42 gives only eight *kasinas*; Vism has ten but with *āloka* for *viṇhāna*; the *Vimuttimagga* has all eleven.
numerical progression, the Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta abandons this principle and gives next the four jhānas. The eight individual items that follow after the jhānas correspond to the eight items that follow the jhānas in the sāmañña-phala schema. In effect it seems that we have two lists: one list consists of the seven sets along with the eight vinokkhas, eight abhībhāyatana and ten kasiṇāyatana; the other of the sāmañña-phala schema beginning with the four jhānas.

To move on to the second passage, near the beginning of the Ānāpānasati-sutta the Buddha is described as surveying the bhikkhu-samgha and commenting:

There are, bhikkhus, bhikkhus in this bhikkhu-samgha who are arahants who have destroyed the āsavas ... who by the destruction of the five lower fetters are ones who will arise spontaneously [in the pure abodes] ... who by the destruction of three fetters and the weakening of greed, hatred and delusion are once returners ... who by the destruction of three fetters are stream attainers ... the seven factors of awakening ... the noble eight-factor path ... loving kindness ... compassion ... sympathetic joy ... equipoise ... ugliness ... the notion of impermanence ... mindfulness of breathing in and out.9

This list is a little different in character from the preceding. We begin with the four basic types of noble person. Presumably what follows are the practices and meditations that the one aspiring to the state of the noble person must develop: these are the seven sets; the four meditations often collectively referred to as the ‘immeasurables’ (appamañña)10 or ‘divine abidings’ (brahma-vihāra);11 the meditation on ugliness; the notion of impermanence; mindfulness of breathing in and out. The items added to the list of seven sets here agree in large measure with additional items singled out for association with the bojhaṅgas in both the Saṁyutta-nikāya and also the commentaries.12 This is especially so if we can take aniccā-saññā as implying something similar to the development of insight or what the commentaries call ‘jhāna as a basis for insight’ (vipassāna-pādako-jjhāna). This agreement should possibly be seen as connected with the fact that the account of the path associated with ānāpānasati in this sutta and also elsewhere, culminates specifically in the complete development of the seven bojhaṅgas.

The third and final expansion of the seven sets13 in the four primary

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9 M III 80-2: santi bhikkhave bhikkhā imasmīṃ bhikkhux-samgha arahanto kīhāsavā ... pañcannam oramāhāgāyānam saṃyojanānah parīkkhayā opapātikā ... tinnaṃ saṃyojanānah pari-kkkhayā rāga-dosa-mohānah tantruttā sakad-āgāmino ... tinnaṃ saṃyojanānah sotāpannaḥ ... catunnaṃ satipaṭṭhānānām bhāvanānuyogam anuvutā viharanti ... catunnaṃ samma-pradāhānaḥ ... catunnaṃ iddhī-pādānaḥ ... pañcannam indriyānānaṃ ... pañcannam dhanānānaṃ ... sattanām bojhāhaṅgānaṃ ... ariyassa attāhaṅgikassa maggassa ... mettā-bhāvanānuyogam ... karunā-bhāvanānuyogam ... muditā-bhāvanānuyogam ... upekkhā-bhāvanānuyogam ... anubbha-bhāvanānuyogam ... aniccā-sanñāḥ-bhāvanānuyogam ... ānāpāna-sati-bhāvanānuyogam anuvutā viharanti.
10 E.g. D III 223.
11 E.g. D II 196.
12 See above, pp. 179-80.
13 A I 38-43.
Nikāyas is the most exhaustive; it is to be found in the eka-nipāta of the Aṅguttara-nikāya and is based on the following formula:

If a bhikkhu develops the first jhāna for even a mere finger snap then, bhikkhus, he is called a bhikkhu who dwells as one whose meditation is not in vain; practising the instruction of his teacher, following his advice, he does not eat the country’s almsfood for nothing.¹⁴

A further one hundred and ninety repetitions of this basic formula follow, each one substituting a different single item where the initial statement has ‘develops the first jhāna’. The full one hundred and ninety-one variations are achieved by substituting the following items: the development of the four jhānas (1-4); the development of the four ceto-vimuttis of loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equipoise (5-8); the four parts of the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula (9-12); the four parts of the samma-p paddhāna formula (13-16); the development of the four iddhi-pādas (17-20); the development of the five indriyas (21-25); the development of the five balas (26-30); the development of the seven bojjhangas (31-7); the development of the eight path-factors (38-45); the eight items elsewhere termed abhi bhāyatana (46-53); the eight items elsewhere termed vimokkha (53-61); the development of the five kasiṇas (62-71); the development of twenty ‘notions’ or ‘ideas’ (saññā) (72-91);¹⁵ the development of ten varieties of recollection (amussati) and mindfulness (sati) (92-101).¹⁶ The remaining ninety items are achieved by combining each of the five indriyas and five balas with each of the four jhānas and four ceto-vimuttis beginning with loving kindness (102-181);¹⁷ finally, for good measure, we have the recapitulation of the development of the five indriyas and five balas singly (182-191).

It would be hard to detect any clear system or pattern in these three extended lists. Certainly they seem to be casting their nets wider in order to give a more representative impression of the range and depth of early Buddhist yogic or meditation practice. Yet it remains true to say that none of them appears to make any real attempt to be exhaustive and comprehensive. Moreover, the lists are hardly uniform in character, they seem to represent collections of rather miscellaneous items. While in one or other of the lists all

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¹⁴ A I 38: accharā-samghāta-mattam pi ce bhikkhave bhikkhu pathamaṃ jhānam bhāveti ayam uvacati bhikkhave bhikkhu arutta-jhāno viharati satthu sūṣaṇa-karo ovāda-paṭikaro anomaṃ raṭṭhapiṃdatā bhunājati.

¹⁵ The twenty saññās are: asubha-, marana-, āhare paṭikkūla-, sabba-loke anabhirata-, anicca-, anicce dukkha-, dukkhe anatta-, pahāna-, virāga-, nirodha-, anicca-, anatta-, marana-, āhare paṭikkūla-, sabbe-loke anabhirata-, attika-, pujavaka-, vinilaka-, vicchiddaka-, udhumātaka-saññā. The list is rather odd in that a number of items occur twice in a rather haphazard way. It seems to be based on a list of ten saññās (A V 105) and the list of five kinds of corpses (e.g. S V 129-31). D III 251 gives a list of six nibbedha-bhāgiya-saññās (anicca-, anicce dukkha-, dukkhe anatta-, pahāna-, virāga-, nirodha-), and D III 253 a list of seven saññās (anicca-, anatta-, asubha-, ādīnava-, pahāna-, virāga-, nirodha-).

¹⁶ These are: buddhānussati, dharmānussati, saṃghānussati, sīlamussati, cāgānussati, devatānussati, ānāpāna-sati, marana-sati, kāya-gatā sati, upāsamānussati. These ten are the same as in the later literature (e.g. Vism VII-VIII).

¹⁷ The bhikkhu thus develops saddhindriya accompanied by the first jhāna (paṭhama-jhāna-sahagatam saddhindriyam bhāveti), then viriyindriya accompanied by the first jhāna, and so on through the remaining indriyas and balas. The sequence of ten is then repeated with the other jhānas and four ceto-vimuttis.
forty *kamma-tṭhānas* or thirty-eight *ārammanaṇas* current in the later literature are found, it does not seem to me that these Nikāya exercises in extending the seven sets can be viewed as mere lists of meditation subjects in the manner of the lists of forty *kamma-tṭhānas* and thirty-eight *ārammanaṇas*.

So are these extended Nikāya lists perhaps best viewed as accidental chance compositions—the result of the idle whims of the *bhānakas* whose work underlies the Pāli canon? It would be difficult to answer such a question definitely without a detailed comparison of the Pāli sources with the Chinese Āgamas. However, two points can perhaps be made at this stage. First, the sequence of seven sets appears to be firm and fixed enough to withstand any insertion into the actual body of the list. Thus where the number of items in an additional set makes this possible (i.e., in the case of the four *jhānas*, four *brahma-vihāras*, eight *vimokkhas* and eight *abhirabhāyatanas*), they cluster around the sequence of seven sets rather than being incorporated into it. Secondly, it would seem to be fair to characterize the common element in all the additional items associated with the seven sets as *jhāna* or *samādhi*. In effect what we have are the four *jhānas* themselves along with various *jhāna* type meditations and practices that are the vehicle for the development of *jhāna*.

2. In the rest of Buddhist literature

Before attempting to draw any conclusions from the material so far considered in this chapter it is worth briefly surveying the rest of Buddhist literature for comparable extended lists that appear to be based on or incorporate the seven sets.

Beginning with the *Khuddaka-nikāya* of the Pāli canon, two recurrent lists in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* stand out in particular; I call these list A and list B.\(^*\) It is list B that occurs the most frequently in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, and is the characteristic feature of the treatment of the seven sets in this text.\(^{19}\) I shall describe that treatment more fully and generally in chapter ten. Here it is simply worth noting that these two lists appear to be largely peculiar and distinctive to the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*. There appears to be no precedent for the combination of just these items in the earlier literature, nor any obvious correspondence with lists found in the later literature. Again we are left with something of a problem. Either we view them as rather arbitrary in nature, or we accept that underlying them is a careful plan and particular logic which must, however, remain largely inaccessible to us apart from guesswork and speculation. In the context of a work as intricate as the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* their very peculiarity suggests that the latter is in fact the case. In spite of the difficulties one or two comments are in order. I leave aside the question of the order of the seven sets here and the repetition of the *indriyas*, *balas*, *bojjhāṅgas* and *maggangās* which are considered first item by item and then set by set; this

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\(^*\) These two lists are set out in Table 7, p. 271.

\(^{19}\) For list A see Paṭis 1 16-8; II 120. For list B (i) see Paṭis 1 21-2, 180-2; II 29, 124-5, 160-2. For list B (ii) see Paṭis 1 73-6; II 84-5, 90-1, 142-6, 216-7.
### TABLE 7. THE 7 SETS EXPANDED IN THE PATISAMBHIDĀMAGGA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B (i)</th>
<th>B (ii)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5 indriyas (5)</td>
<td>indriyas (5)</td>
<td>maggaṅgas (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 bala (5)</td>
<td>bala (5)</td>
<td>bojjhaṅgas (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-17 bojjhaṅgas (7)</td>
<td>bojjhaṅgas (7)</td>
<td>bala (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-25 maggaṅgas (8)</td>
<td>maggaṅgas (8)</td>
<td>indriyas (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 indriya</td>
<td>indriya</td>
<td>bala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 bala</td>
<td>bala</td>
<td>bala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 bojjhaṅga</td>
<td>bojjhaṅga</td>
<td>bojjhaṅga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 magga</td>
<td>magga</td>
<td>magga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 satipaṭṭhāna</td>
<td>satipaṭṭhāna</td>
<td>satipaṭṭhāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 samma-ppadhāna</td>
<td>samma-ppadhāna</td>
<td>samma-ppadhāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 iddhi-pāda</td>
<td>iddhi-pāda</td>
<td>iddhi-pāda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 sacca</td>
<td>sacca</td>
<td>sacca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 payoga</td>
<td>samatha</td>
<td>samatha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 phala</td>
<td>vipassanā</td>
<td>vipassanā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 vitakka</td>
<td>samatha-vipassanā</td>
<td>samatha-vipassanā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 vicāra</td>
<td>yuganandha</td>
<td>yuganandha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 pīti</td>
<td>sīla-visuddhi</td>
<td>sīla-visuddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 sukha</td>
<td>citta-visuddhi</td>
<td>citta-visuddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 citta</td>
<td>diṭṭhi-visuddhi</td>
<td>diṭṭhi-visuddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 āvajana</td>
<td>vimokkha</td>
<td>vimokkha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 vijñāna</td>
<td>vijā</td>
<td>vijā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 pañjāna</td>
<td>vimutti</td>
<td>vimutti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 sañjāna</td>
<td>khaye ānānām</td>
<td>khaye ānānām</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 ekodi</td>
<td>anuppāde ānānām</td>
<td>anuppāde ānānām</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 chanda</td>
<td>manasikāra</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>phassa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>vedanā</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>samādhi</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>sati</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>paññā</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>vimutti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>amatogadham nibbānām</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
latter feature does in fact have some parallels with the treatment of the sets in the Vibhaṅga.20

In list A jhāna is once more to the fore, this time under the guise of the jhāna factors, namely vitakka, vicāra, pīti and sukhā; citta apparently stands in for cittass'ekaggatā. These five terms are followed by ‘adverting’ (āvajjana)21 and then by ‘discriminating’ (vijjana), ‘knowing’ (pajjana) and ‘conceiving’ or ‘noting’ (sañjāna). This in fact does in part tie in with discussions found elsewhere in Pāli literature. For instance two sections of the Mahāvedalla-sutta are devoted to a discussion of the close relationship between pañña and viññāṇa, and vedanā, sañña and viññāṇa respectively.22 Buddhaghosa too in the course of his account of the nature of pañña devotes some space to the question of its relationship to sañña and viññāṇa.23 Buddhaghosa’s account implies that although pajjana is ‘knowing’ in a different mode from sañjāna and viññāṇa, it nevertheless builds on the basis of these.24 It looks, then, as if the sequence āvajjana, sañjāna, pajjana, viññāna might be viewed as adding up to insight (vipassana). In other words, what the latter half of list A does is breakdown samatha and vipassana into its constituent parts: the jhāna-factors and various modes of ‘knowing’ respectively. What we then have in list A are the seven sets culminating in ‘truth’ (sacca), which suggests ‘vision of the four truths’; this is followed by ‘application’ (payoga) and ‘result’ or ‘fruit’ (phala) considered by way of samatha and vipassana which together add up to a unification (ekodi) of mind. This way of understanding list A seems to be confirmed by list B (i and ii). The four truths here are explicitly followed by the coupling of samatha and vipassana; this leads on to purification of conduct, mind and view; knowledge and freedom; and the destruction of the āsava—all in some sense representing the culmination of the development of the seven sets. The list now begins to bear some resemblance to the Mahāsālaśayanika-sutta’s account of the path.

The Theragāthā contains a sequence of ten verses with a recurring refrain that has some of the characteristics of an expanded list of the seven sets:

One should know the goal as one’s own, one should inspect the teaching for what is fitting to the one who has entered into the state of the samana.

A good friend here, undertaking of the training in full, attentiveness to teachers—this is fitting for the samana.

Respect for the Buddhas, homage to the Dhamma as it is, and esteem for the Samgha—this is fitting for the samana.

A purified and blameless livelihood along with good conduct and associations; stilling of the mind—this is fitting for the samana.

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20 See below, Chapter 10.4.
21 A term of some significance in the commentarial accounts of the consciousness process.
22 M I 292-3.
23 Vism XIV 3-5.
24 I am thinking particularly of his simile here: sañña is like a child who ‘knows’ a particular object as round and figured, viññāṇa is like a villager who ‘knows’ the object as a coin; pañña is like a money changer who ‘knows’ the value of the coin, whether it is genuine or not, etc.
Right conduct, restraint and a pleasing way of acting; application with regard to higher consciousness—this is fitting for the samana.

Forest lodgings, remote, with little noise are to be resorted to by the sage—this is fitting for the samana.

Virtue and great learning, discrimination of dhammas as they are, understanding of the truths—this is fitting for the samana.

Thinking, 'This is impermanent', he should develop the notion of not-self and the notion of ugliness; absence of delight in the world—this is fitting for the samana.

And he should develop the awakening factors, the bases of success, the faculties and powers, the noble eight-factor path—this is fitting for the samana.

The sage should abandon craving, he should split the āsavas and their roots, he should dwell freed—this is fitting for the samana.25

Certain features are immediately familiar from the extended lists already considered and from the treatment of the seven sets elsewhere in the four Nikāyas: the good friend; the emphasis on good conduct; the stilling of the mind; the development of the ideas of impermanence, not-self and ugliness; the destruction of the āsavas. Such irregularities and peculiarities as there are—for example the omission of the satipaṭṭhānas and samma-ppadānas—are presumably to be explained by reference to the fact that we are dealing with verse.

Moving on to the para-canonical literature,26 a passage in the Nettippakarana gives as opposed to the sixty-two kinds of view (as expounded in the Brahmajāla-sutta)27 'forty-three bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā, eight vimokkhas and ten kasiṁ-āyatanas'.28 Apparently we are expected to know what the forty-three bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā in question are. The context gives no obvious clues, but Dhammapāla’s commentary tells us that they consist of the seven sets together with six kinds of saṁnā, namely the notions or ideas of impermanence, suffering, not-self, abandoning, dispassion and cessation.29 In the Dīgha-nikāya these are appropriately enough called 'six ideas concerned with penetrative wisdom (nibbedha-bhāgiya)'.30 It is difficult to see how we might do better than this. Dhammapāla continues: 'Having in this way indicated the opposite by

25 Th 587-96; viṭṭheyya sakam atthena avadheyyathā pavacanan/saṁnaṁ atjhupatassa/jitam idha kalyānam, sikkhe-vipulam samaddanam/ sussūsa ca garuṇam etam samanassa paṭirūpam| buddhesu sāgaravatā dhamme apaccitī yathā-bhūtaṁ/saṁgha ca citti-kāro etam samanassa paṭirūpam| ācāra-gocare yutto ṣāho agārayo/cittassa saṅdhapanam etam samanassa paṭirūpam| cārittaṁ aha vārītīṁ triyā-paṭhiyam pasādāniyam| adhicite ca ayogo etam samanassa paṭirūpam| arāhakkāni senasānasāi paṁtāni appa-saddāni/ bhajitabhānī muninā etam samanassa paṭirūpam| sīlaṁ ca bahu-saccānaṁ ca dhammānaṁ pavacayo yathā-bhūtaṁ/saccānaṁ abhisamayō etam samanassa paṭirūpam| bhāveyya aniccān ti anatta-saṁñān asubhā-saṁñān ca/ lokamhi ca anabhāritam etam samanassa paṭirūpam| bhāveyya ca bojjhāṅge iddhi-pādāṁ indirīya-balāṁ/ aṭṭhaṅga-maggam ariyam etam samanassa paṭirūpam| sīlaṁ paṭipadoyā muni samulake āsale padāleyyā/ viharayya vimutto etam samanassa paṭirūpam|

26 Two sequences from the Niddesa can be viewed as extended lists based on the seven sets, but I have chosen to deal with them in another context, see below, pp. 279, 292-3.
27 D 1146.
28 Nett 112.
30 D III 251.
way of vipassanā, in order to indicate it by way of samatha he mentions the eight vimokkhas and ten kasināyatanas. This suggests that Dhammapāla understood this extended list as indicating how the seven sets fulfill both samatha and vipassanā.

The Milindapānha also provides several examples of extended lists based on or incorporating the seven sets:

Morality, your majesty, has the characteristic of being the foundation for all skillful dhāmmas: morality is the foundation for the faculties, powers, awakening factors, path, establishing of mindfulness, right endeavours, bases of success, jhāna, liberations, concentration, and [other] attainments.

Moreover, your majesty, the sun moves satisfying the mass of people; just so the world along with its devas is to be satisfied by the yogin, by the practitioner of yoga, by conduct, morality, merit, observance, practice; by jhāna, liberations, concentration, attainments, faculties, powers, awakening-factors, establishings of mindfulness, right endeavours, bases of success. Moreover, your majesty, the sun reveals what is good and bad; just so by the yogin, by the practitioner of yoga the faculties, powers, awakening-factors, establishings of mindfulness, right endeavours, bases of success, ordinary and transcendent dhāmmas are to be revealed.

One extremely extended and miscellaneous list describes how in the dharmacity of the Blessed One there dwell the following sorts of people: those versed in Suttanta (suttantika), Vinaya (venayika) and Abhidhamma (ābhidhammika); those who give talks on dhāmma (dhāmma-kathika); chanters (bhānaka) of the Jātaka, the Dīgha, the Majjhima, the Samyutta, the Aṅguttara, the Khuddaka; those who have accomplished (sampanna) morality (sīla), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom; those devoted to the development of the awakening-factors (bojjhanga-bhāvanā-rata), practitioners of insight (vipassaka), those intent on the highest good (saīd-astham anuyuttā); those who dwell in the forest (āraññaka), at the roots of trees (rūkka-mūlika), in the open (abhikkāsika), on heaps of grass (palā-puñjakaka), in the cemetery (sosānnika), always sitting (nesajjika); those entering the way (patipanna), those established in the fruit (phalaṭṭha), those who have three knowledges (tevijja), those who have six direct knowledges (chal-abhijñā), those skilled (kusala) in the establishings of mindfulness, the right endeavours, the bases of success, the faculties, the powers, the awakening-factors, the excellent path, the jhānas, vimokkhas, and

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peaceful and happy form and formless attainments—crowded and teeming with these arahants, the dhamma-city was like a grove of reeds.\footnote{Mil 341-2.} Once more in these Milindapañha passages it is the jhānas and jhāna-type meditations and attainments that are most closely associated with the sequence of the seven sets.\footnote{The changed order of the sets in these passages corresponds to the order of the sets in the Pañjadsamhītādhamma lists.}

Looking further afield in Buddhist literature, the following is an example of an extended list based on the seven sets from the Mahāyāna prajñāpāramitā literature:

Subhūti said: ‘Which are the dharmas that are skilful or contribute to awakening? Which dharmas are Pratyeka-buddha-dharmas, Bodhisattva-dharmas and also Buddha-dharmas—[dharmas] that are comprised and reach a conclusion in the perfection of wisdom?’ The Blessed One said: ‘Just these: the four establishing of mindfulness, the four right abandonings, the four bases of success, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven awakening-factors, the noble eight-factor path, the four noble truths, the gateways to liberation—the empty, the signless, the wishless—the four dhyānas, the four immeasurables, the four formless attainments, the six direct knowledges, the perfections of giving, morality, patience, strength, concentration and wisdom ...\footnote{Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā (ed. P. Ghosa, Calcutta, 1902), p. 1636: Subhūti dhal katame bhagavān kuṣala-dharmā bodhi-pāksāḥ vē ke dharmmaś ca pratyeka-buddha-dharmmaś ca bodhi-sattva-dharmmaś ca buddha-dharmmaś ca ye prajñā-pāramitāyām saṃgrahaṃ samavasaranaṃ gacchanti bhagavān āha/ tād yathā catvāri śmrty-upasthānāni catvāri samyak-prahānāni/ catvāra āmāśi-pādāḥ/ pañcendriyāni/ pañcāda-bhānī/ satya-bodhy-āngāni/ āryāśatāngo mārgāḥ/ catvāryy āryasatyāni/ śīyattāmittāpariṇāhita-vimokṣa-mukhāni/ catvāri dhīyānāni/ catvāryy apramāṇāni/ catvāra ārūpya-samāpattayā/ saṁ-bhājīyatā/ dōna-pāramitā/ śīla-pāramitā/ kṣānti-pāramitā/ viρya-pāramitā/ saṁādhi-pāramitā/ prajñā-pāramitā/ ... (Cf. pp. 274-5 where thirty-seven bodhi-pāksā dharmāḥ are mentioned in the context of various other items: four dhyānas, four apramāṇas, four ārūpya-samāpattis, six abhījñās, ten tathāgata-balas. These passages, along with other passages relevant to the bodhi-pāksā dharmāḥ from the same work, are cited but not quoted by Dayal, op. cit., p. 82.)}

No doubt further examples from Mahāyāna sūtras and the prajñāpāramitā literature might be searched out\footnote{E.g. Śatasāhasrikā, pp. 1427-39; Pañcācāksamālāśāhasrikā (E. Conze, The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom, Part I, London, 1961, pp. 140- 3); Daśasāhasrikā (S. Konow, ‘The Two First Chapters of the Daśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā’, Avhandlinger utgitt av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akadem i Oslo, II. Hist.-Filos. Klasse 1941, No. I, pp. 1-117). G. Roth also cites some interesting extended lists in some 1st/2nd century CE works dealing with the significance of the various parts of a stupa (‘The Symbolism of the Buddhist Stūpa’ in A.L. Dallapiccola (ed.), The Stūpa: Its Religious, Historical and Architectural Significance, Wiesbaden, 1980, pp. 183-209).} but from the point of view of present concerns this one example suffices to show that in this type of literature too, familiar additional sets are at times juxtaposed with the sequence of seven sets. It is worth noting that even here the list of seven sets is self-contained and once more resists any insertion directly into its sequence. All the additional sets have already been seen appended to the list of the seven sets in the Nikāyas apart, that is, from the four truths and six perfections.\footnote{For the three gateways to liberation cf. the second set of three samādhis in the asamkhata-samyutta; I take the four ārūpya-samāpattis as comprised in the eight vimokkhas, and the six abhījñās as comprised in the sāmanā-paṭa-samayārtha schema.} The addition of the six perfections is of course to be expected in a prajñāpāramitā text. The addition of
the four truths is in general terms hardly surprising, but more specifically the immediate juxtaposition of the seven sets and the four truths would seem to correspond to the stage by stage account of the path in Sarvástivādins manuals.\textsuperscript{39} However, as I shall consider presently, it is not without a certain precedent in the \textit{mahā-vagga} of the \textit{Samyutta-nikāya}. But before turning to this, it is worth noting that Bareau records as a thesis of the Vibhajyavidins (according to the \textit{Vibhāsā}) that there are forty-one \textit{bodhi-pāksikā dharmāḥ}—the thirty-seven along with the four truths.\textsuperscript{40}

Alongside all these examples of extended lists based around the seven sets should be placed the actual headings that form the basis for the \textit{mahā-vagga} of the \textit{Samyutta-nikāya}, as well as what we know of the headings used in the corresponding portions of other recensions of the \textit{samyukta} material. Thus I have set out \textsuperscript{41} the twelve divisions of the Pāli \textit{mahā-vagga} alongside the twenty-one divisions that Aaesaki has identified in what he calls the \textit{magga-vagga} of the Chinese \textit{Saṃyuktāgama} translations.\textsuperscript{42} These lists are of a rather different make-up from the lists so far considered. The reasons that lie behind the changed order in the Pāli must remain obscure, as must those behind the omission of the \textit{iddhi-pādas} from the Chinese. The Chinese list seems to include rather a large number of miscellaneous additional items. Aesaki's analysis indicates, however, that the items towards the end of the list—especially those from fifteen onwards—have rather little space devoted to them.\textsuperscript{43} It should also be borne in mind that Aaesaki's list is something of a reconstruction—an attempt to bring order to what are apparently rather disordered texts showing no clear divisions.\textsuperscript{44} Thus it is not entirely clear how far we should regard Aaesaki's analysis as final.

I shall return to the \textit{saṃyutta/samyukta} lists presently. First, I wish to turn briefly to the \textit{mātikās/mātrikās} that provide the subject headings for four

\textsuperscript{39} See below, pp. 335-6, 337-9.
\textsuperscript{40} Bareau, \textit{SBPV}, p. 174; however, he refers to La Vallée Poussin's Abhidh-k Trsl IV 281 where it is noted that the Vibhajyavidins have a list of forty-one \textit{[bodhipāksikas]} adding the four \textit{arya-vamśas}; Lamotte notes the same at \textit{Traité}, III 1121. Interestingly, Vasubandhu includes the four \textit{arya-vamśas} at the beginning of his account of the path before the practice of \textit{asya-bhāvanā} and \textit{ānāpāna-smṛti} (Abhidh-k 336 ff.).
\textsuperscript{41} See Table 8, p. 277.
\textsuperscript{42} See Aeesaki, op. cit., pp. 68-76. Aeesaki sees eight major divisions underlying the Chinese \textit{Saṃyuktāgama} material: (i) \textit{Khandha-vagga}, (ii) \textit{Saḷāyatana-vagga}, (iii) \textit{Nidāna-vagga}, (iv) \textit{Sāvaka-vagga}, (v) \textit{Magga-vagga}, (vi) \textit{Puggala-vagga}, (vii) \textit{Saṅgāhā-vagga}, (viii) \textit{Tathāgata-vagga}, (he uses Pāli-forms). As far as can be ascertained various recensions of the \textit{Saṃyukta} material seem to have been agreed in devoting major divisions to the \textit{skandhas, āyatana}, \textit{pratītya-samutpāda} and \textit{mārga} (i.e. a major division devoted more or less to the seven sets), but the detailed constitution of these major divisions is largely unknown, except in the case of the Chinese \textit{Saṃyuktāgamas}; see Aeesaki, op.cit., pp. 68-70; J. Bronkhorst, 'Dharma and Abhidharma', \textit{BSOAS} 48 (1985), p. 317.
\textsuperscript{43} Aeesaki, op. cit., p. 73. Note that the treatment of the six \textit{āyatana}s in this context appears to be secondary in that they also form the basis of a major division of the Chinese \textit{Saṃyuktāgamas}; see id., p. 71.
\textsuperscript{44} Id., p. 70: 'When we come to the two extant versions of the Saṃyukta in Chinese ... the classifications are in utter confusion.' Cf. E. Mayeda, 'Japanese Studies on the Schools of the Chinese Agamas' in H. Bechert (ed.), \textit{Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna Literatur}, Göttingen, 1985, pp. 94-103; Mayeda comments on the difficulties of the reconstruction of the arrangement of the fifty vol. \textit{Saṃyuktāgama} (probably Sarvāstivādin); a sixteen vol. and one vol. \textit{Saṃyuktāgama} trsl appear incomplete.
### TABLE 8. SAMYUTTA/SAMYUKTA TABLES OF CONTENTS:  
MAHĀ-VAGGA/MĀRGA-VARGA

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<th>Saṃyuktāgama*</th>
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<tr>
<td>magga (8)</td>
<td>smṛty-upaṭthāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bojjhanga (7)</td>
<td>indriya</td>
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<tr>
<td>satipaṭṭhāna (4)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>indriya (5, etc.)</td>
<td>bodhy-āṅga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samma-ppadhāna (4)</td>
<td>mārga</td>
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<tr>
<td>bala (5)</td>
<td>ānāpāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iddhi-pāda (4)</td>
<td>śaikṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anuruddha</td>
<td>avetya-prasāda/srotā-āpatti</td>
</tr>
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<td>deva</td>
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<td>ānāpāna</td>
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<td>sacca (4)</td>
<td>dhyāṇa</td>
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<td></td>
<td>traividyā</td>
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<td>asaṃskṛta</td>
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<td>saḍ-āyatana</td>
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<td>bija</td>
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<td>śaṣṭr</td>
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<td>Rāhula</td>
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<td>bhikṣu</td>
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* See Anesaki, op.cit., pp. 72-3. (I have sanskritized the forms given by Anesaki.)
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Dhātukathā</th>
<th>Dhammaskandha*</th>
<th>Arthavinīścaya-sūtra</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>khandha (5)</td>
<td>khandha (5)</td>
<td>śikṣā-pada (5)</td>
<td>skandha (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>āyatana (12)</td>
<td>āyatana (12)</td>
<td>srotā-āpatty-aṅga (4)</td>
<td>upādāna-skandha (5)</td>
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<td>dhātu (18)</td>
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<td>avetra-prasāda (4)</td>
<td>dhātu (18)</td>
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<td>sacca (4)</td>
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<td>śramaṇya-phala (4)</td>
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<td>abhiṣijñā-pratipada (4)</td>
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<td>appamaṇṇa (4)</td>
<td>dhyāna (4)</td>
<td>pratipada (4)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>indriya (5)</td>
<td>apramāṇa (4)</td>
<td>samādhī-bhāvanā (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appamaṇṇa (4)</td>
<td>bala (5)</td>
<td>ārūpya-dhātu (4)</td>
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<td>sikkhā-pada (5)</td>
<td>bojhaṅga (7)</td>
<td>bhāvana-samādhi (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>paṭisambhidā (4)</td>
<td>magga (8)</td>
<td>bodhy-aṅga (7)</td>
<td>ṛddhi-pāda (4)</td>
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<td>phassa</td>
<td>ksudraka-vastu</td>
<td>indriya (5)</td>
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<td>khuddaka-vatthu</td>
<td>vedanā</td>
<td>indriya (22)</td>
<td>bala (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>dhamma-hadaya</td>
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<td></td>
<td>cetanā</td>
<td>skandha (5)</td>
<td>mārga (5)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>citta</td>
<td>dhātu (6/18/62)</td>
<td>ānāpāna-smṛti (16)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>adhimokkha</td>
<td>pratītya-samutpāda (12)</td>
<td>srotā-āpatty-aṅga (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>manasikāra</td>
<td></td>
<td>tathāgata-bala (10)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

works: the *Vibhaṅga*, the *Dhātukathā*, the *Dharmaskandha* and the *Arthavinīcaya-sūtra*. I take the latter two texts as representative of the literature of the wider Buddhist tradition. These tables of topics are again of a rather different nature from the lists so far considered. They are not collations that focus primarily on the sphere of what is actually to be practised and developed. They attempt to embrace the whole of Buddhist teaching in a rather more explicit and straightforward way. What are apparently considered the most important headings covering the full range and expanse of early Buddhist teaching are singled out in order to give summaries of the teaching in all its various aspects. While some topics are peculiar to one or other of the lists, or are subsumed under a different heading in different lists, it is not hard to identify a common core.

This common core in fact corresponds quite closely with the topics that receive special attention in the *Samyutta-nikāya* and *Samyuktāgama*. These *mātikās/mātrkās* also invite comparison with Nikāya works such as the *Sangīti- and Dasuttara-suttas*, and also the *Kumāra-pañha* and *Mahā-pañha*, which are all in their different ways attempts to give accounts of the teaching in all its aspects. From the point of view of present concerns it is enough to consider the role of the seven sets when brought into such a context. A number of features are immediately noticeable in these *mātikās/mātrkās*. There is a tendency to treat the five *indriyas* not in the context of the seven sets but as subsumed in the full list of twenty-two *indriyas*, which are then grouped with the *khandas, āyatanas, dhātus, paticca-samuppāda* and *saccas*; the *balas* have no separate existence apart from the *indriyas* in the *Vibhaṅga* and *Dharmaskandha*. The *Arthavinīcaya-sūtra* is the only one of the four to maintain the sequence of all seven sets; the other three texts tamper with it in various ways. In contrast to the Nikāyas, there is a tendency for these *mātikās/mātrkās* to insert additional sets of four directly into the sequence of the seven sets.

3. Conclusions

What are the implications of all these different extended lists for our un-
standing of the role of the seven sets in early Buddhist literature? Before attempting to answer this question one should perhaps remind oneself that the list of the seven sets both in its own right and under the guise of the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas/bodhi-päksika-dharmas continues to remain an important and distinct list of items in probably all varieties of post-canonical Buddhist literature—it continues to crop up in Abhidharma, Mahāyāna and even in tantric texts. The fact that this is so means that the extended lists based around the seven sets cannot be viewed as the end result of some simple process that involved the gradual accretion of further sets until finally the list of seven sets was superseded and ceased to be of importance as a distinct list. This simply does not happen. Nor, I think, can we view the existence of extended lists as an indication that the sequence of the seven sets was not yet established as a separate and distinct list. It seems to me that the passages I have considered in chapter seven are quite sufficient to show that the sequence of seven sets was already firmly established as a distinct and separate list in the period of the four primary Nikāyas. As far as the whole of the Pāli canon is concerned, it should also be noted here that the Vibhanga gives the seven sets the appellation saddhamma. So if the Petakopadesa talks of thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya dhammas, but the Nettippakaraṇa of forty-three bodhi-pakkhiya dhammā, it is not out of any uncertainty about the seven sets as a distinct and separate list.

The fact that the seven sets remain important as a distinct list in the later tradition despite the existence of extended lists both in the Nikāyas and later literature must indicate that the list of seven sets acquired a certain authority rather early in the history of Buddhist thought. Possibly this authority can be adequately explained merely by reference to the ancientness of the list, yet I think we ought to go a little further than this. For in fact the very existence of the extended lists alongside the fixed list of seven sets already in the Nikāya period suggests that in appreciating the authority of the seven sets we have not simply to do with their ancientness. If this is the sole source of authority, why is the sequence of seven sets not always respected, why are further sets added? It seems reasonable to suggest that it is in order to bring out something of the nature of the seven sets as conceived and worked out already in the Nikāyas. Thus, in the Nikāya lists especially, what we consistently have are the seven sets along with a variety of meditation subjects. What is being indicated, I think, are the particular contexts in which the seven sets are developed. In other words, the seven sets remain a distinct set of items not simply because they came down as a bare and distinct list from ancient times and therefore had to be fitted in somehow, but because rather early on—well before the end of the period of the four primary Nikāyas—they began to be understood and elaborated together in a quite specific way as a description of the unfolding of

49 For an indication of the extent of the importance of the seven sets/thirty-seven bodhi-päksika-dharmas in a wide range of Buddhist literature see the ‘Note on the seven sets/thirty-seven bodhi-päksika-dharmas in non-Pāli sources’ below, pp. 357-8.
50 Vibh 372.
51 Pet 114, 138.
the Buddhist path from beginning to end. The particular quality of the description of the Buddhist path in terms of the seven sets is something I shall return to at the conclusion of this study, but it has, I think, to do with the rather elaborate system of 'cross-referencing' inherent in the seven sets, the way in which they inter-relate with each other and also draw together various Nikāya themes. The kind of thinking that underlies this is, I think, fundamental to Buddhist thought and psychology of meditation. Thus the description of the path in terms of the seven sets is important in that it is suggestive of a certain depth and subtlety along with a certain simplicity and conciseness.

In a recent article Johannes Bronkhorst has suggested that we can view the expansion of the seven sets as the result of attempts to complete the list with meditational states. According to Bronkhorst, first the four dhyānas were added—he cites the Chinese translations of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra and some further Dīrghāgama and Madhyamagama passages. Next were added the four apramāṇas (he cites the mātikā of the Dhātukathā) and finally the four ārūpyas or 'formless attainments', giving a list of ten sets: the four smṛty-upasthānas, four samyak-prahānas, four ṛddhi-pādas, four dhyānas, four apramāṇas, four ārūpyas, five indriyas, five balas, seven bodhy-aṅgas, āryaśāṅga-mārga. In fact Bronkhorst can find no example of just this sequence of ten sets anywhere in Buddhist literature, but suggests that it must have been the source of the appropriate portion of Samgiti-sūtra's section of 'fours', and cites four different versions of the sūtra to this effect; of this portion of the Samgiti-sūtra's section of fours he says that it is 'difficult to doubt that this enumeration was taken from an earlier list' of ten sets, and gives the list of ten as above. Yet this seems certainly dubious, and amounts, I think, to a rather unconvincing and indeed unhelpful line of speculation that tends to distract attention from the way in which the seven sets are actually handled and understood in the early literature. Not the least of its problems is that it totally ignores the various other extended lists that I have been considering in this chapter. The lists that Bronkhorst cites, on the other hand, are somewhat hypothetical in nature. The only hard evidence for the expansion to nine sets is the occurrence of this sequence within the body of the mātikā of the Dhātukathā. But this mātikā contains rather more than just these nine sets and, as I have suggested, its nature is such that it is not clear that it is entirely valid to extract the sequence of nine sets in the way Bronkhorst does. The evidence for the list of ten sets is even more tentative—the sequence of these ten sets does not appear to occur even within the body of some longer list. The whole procedure begins to look dubious. The point is that we have no grounds for believing that lists of just these sets—either nine or ten—ever played a part in the exposition of Buddhist thought.

Of the three expanded lists considered by Bronkhorst we are thus left with

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53 Id., p. 306.
54 Ibid., n. 8.
55 Id., p. 307.
56 Ibid.
the expanded list of eight sets—the seven together with the four dhyānas—as the only one that is certainly witnessed in the literature. As I have already indicated, this fact is of some interest since the occurrence of this list of eight sets in the Chinese Āgamas seems to find close harmonies in the Pāli Nikāyas. The association of the four jhānas—and only the four jhānas—with the seven sets is quite explicit in the application of common treatments in the mahā-vagga of the Samyutta-nikāya; that is to say, on the basis of the mahā-vagga one would have to single out eight sets and not seven. Again I have argued that jhāna or at least a state of meditation close to jhāna is consistently implicit in much of the Nikāya treatment of the seven sets individually. Similarly in what I have considered as the Nikāya treatment of the seven sets as ‘path’ or ‘practice’, and in the various extended lists, samatha, samādhī and the jhānas are certainly recurrent themes: in the Mahā-saḷāyatanika-sutta we have the coupling of samatha and vipassanā, in the Piṇḍapātāpārisuddhi-sutta, the abandoning of the five nīvaraṇas and samatha and vipassanā; in the asamkhata-samyutta, samatha and vipassanā along with savitakko savicāro samādhī, avitakko vicāra-matto samādhī and avitakko avicāro samādhī—merely a different way of looking at the jhānas; in the Mahāsakuludāyī-sutta, the four jhānas and abhībhāyatanas; in the eka-nipāta treatment the four jhānas along with the brahma-vihāras receive special emphasis—this in a section entitled jhāna-vagga.

What lies behind all this is not the mechanical accumulation of lists of meditation states. It is rather a feeling that in one sense and in certain contexts the list of the seven sets is not quite specific, is not quite enough. As I said above, what is lacking is an indication of the context in which the seven sets are to be developed. So we are told that the seven sets are developed in association with the practice of jhāna, in association with the practice of the brahma-vihāras, in association with ānāpāna-sati or with some other meditation subject or practice. This means, I think, that the treatment of the seven sets as a definite list of thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas in the later literature must be seen as related rather more closely to their treatment in the early literature than might have been supposed. Unless this is so it is difficult to see why the later literature should have felt the need to develop the notion of thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas, given that other more extended lists were available.

I have already pointed out some of the ways in which the Nikāya handling of the seven sets begins to approach and imply something of the more explicit statements concerning the seven sets as the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas in the later literature. Before passing on to look at the Abhidhamma treatment more closely it is worth just considering once more the nature of the topics brought into association with the seven sets in the mahā-vagga of the Samyutta-nikāya. The Anuruddha-samyutta seems to be attracted by association with the satipaṭṭhānas, which are mentioned in every sutta. I have already discussed the jhāna-samyutta. Next is the ānāpāna-samyutta; ānāpāna-sati is an aspect of the first satipaṭṭhāna (kāye kāyānupassanā) and is treated as such in the (Mahā-) Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta; the treatment in the ānāpāna-samyutta follows in general that found in the Ānāpānasati-sutta, which gives special emphasis to
all four satipatthānas and the bojjhangas. The Ānāpānasati-sutta opens, as I have already pointed out, with an extended list based around the seven sets. This list culminates in ānāpāna-sati. The commentary states here that the reason why ānāpāna-sati is the only one of the items in the list to be explained in full is because of the large number of bhikkhus who take it as their kamma-ṭhāna.\textsuperscript{57} The practice of ānāpāna-sati seems to have something of a special status within the tradition as the practice of the Buddha on the night of his awakening.\textsuperscript{58} It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that, in the case of the mahā-vagga, ānāpāna-sati is where it is because it is regarded as the normative vehicle on the basis of which the seven sets are ‘to be developed and to be made great’. Finally there are the sotāpatti- and sacca-samyuttas. Their appearance just here shows a clear correspondence with the notion, explicit both in the Visuddhimagga and Abhidharmakośa, that stream attainment and definite knowledge of the four truths coincide with the culmination of the development of the seven sets. Of course the actual structure and ordering of the Nikāyas is likely to be rather later than the contents itself. Yet, with the proviso that Anesaki’s list is somewhat tentative, it is worth noting that much the same sets seem to cluster most closely around the seven sets in the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama translations.

\textsuperscript{57} Ps IV 139: yaśmā pan’ettha ānāpāna-kamma-ṭhānā-vasena abhini vitthā bahū bhikkhū, tasmā sesa-kamma-ṭhānāni saṅkhēpeṇa kathetvā ānāpāna-kamma-ṭhānāni viśṭhārena kathento ānāpāna-sati bhikkhave ti ādīm āha.

CHAPTER NINE

DHAMMAS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO AWAKENING

1. The expression bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā in the canon

I have already noted that 'thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā' becomes a standard way of referring to the seven sets in post-canonical Buddhist literature, and that while the expression occurs in a number of passages in the Pāli canon, it is not found in any context where the seven sets appear as a definite group, nor is the number of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā anywhere specified as thirty-seven. So what exactly is understood by the expression in these canonical passages? What are its implications and connotations? Is the expression understood to define a particular set of items—a set of items other than the seven sets?

What does the expression bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā mean? The Pāli textual tradition bears witness to a number of variations in the form of both parts of the adjectival compound bodhi-pakkhiya. As far as the meaning of the term in the Nikāyas is concerned these variations would appear to be of little consequence. Yet the term bodhi-pakkhiya has in the course of the history of modern Buddhist scholarship been the occasion for a number of academic footnotes and asides concerning these variations and other matters. Since the term is one that is central to the present study it is perhaps as well to consider all this rather carefully.

The term bodhi-pakkhiya occurs in some eighteen different contexts within the Pāli canon. However, in these various contexts we find forms not only ending in -pakkhiya but also in -pakkhika. It is clear that alternation between the -pakkhiya and -pakkhika forms as we now have it is often the result of the predilections of manuscript copyists. In the absence of critical editions of the texts it is virtually impossible to determine any consistent preference for one form or the other among the different works of the canon. The sometimes rather limited variant readings indicated in PTS editions suggest that in many, if not in most, instances some manuscripts of a given text read bodhi-pakkhiya and others bodhi-pakkhika. On the other hand where no variants are recorded—if this does in fact reflect the state of the manuscripts—bodhi-pakkhika appears the more regular form. The attakathās show that in one case at least...
the variation between bodhi-pakkhiya and bodhi-pakkhika is ancient. In other cases the PTS edition of the text reads bodhi-pakkhika with no variants recorded, yet all manuscripts of the commentary apparently read bodhi-pakkhiya without further comment. The Pāli manuscript tradition preserves, then, forms in both -pakkhiya and -pakkhika, and one must surmise that these were already largely interchangeable in ancient times. Probably they should be regarded as simply reflecting the preferences of particular Middle Indo-Aryan dialects for either the ending -iya or -ika.

Buddhist Sanskrit sources similarly evidence a variety of forms: bodhi-pakṣā dharmāḥ, bodhi-pakṣikā dharmāḥ, bodhi-pakṣyā dharmāḥ and bodhi-pakṣikā dharmāḥ. Now -pakṣa might represent a sanskritization of Middle Indo-Aryan -pakkha; both -pakṣika and -pāksika might represent sanskritizations of Middle Indo-Aryan -pakkhika, while -paksya might represent, a sanskritization of -pakkhika and indeed -paksika. Classical Sanskrit literature records the following adjectival formations derived from the substantive pakṣa ('wing' or 'side'): pakṣin, pakṣya, pakṣīya and pāksika.

What we appear to have then in -pakkhiya and -pakkhika is an adjectival formation in either -iya or -ika, derived from the substantive pakṣa, possibly with vrddhi; compounded with bodhi it would mean 'siding with' or 'taking the part of awakening'. The evidence of Buddhist Sanskrit literature also suggests a Middle Indo-Aryan form *bodhi-pakkhā dharmāḥ deriving from an Old Indo-Aryan -pakṣa or -paksya. Since -paksya may not be recorded in the sense of 'siding with' until rather later in the history of Sanskrit literature, the former is perhaps to be preferred; the whole expression would then mean something like 'dhammas whose side/party is (that of) awakening', 'dhammas that take the side of awakening', or even 'dhammas that are the wings of awakening'. I shall return to the question of the meaning of pakṣa/pakkha at the beginning of section three of this chapter. In conclusion, it seems doubtful that one might meaningfully talk of the 'original' or 'correct' form of the expression. The texts (Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit) indicate an absence of concern about the exact form, and it is difficult to see at what point in the history of the language and literature it would have been otherwise.

Two variations in the first member of the compound bodhi-pakkhiya are

Commenting on bodhi-pakkhiyānam dharmānām at It 75, Dhammapāla draws attention to the alternative reading: bodhi-pakkhiyakān ti pi pātho (It-a II 73-4).

E.g, Mp III 259 to A III 70; Mp III 351 to A III 300.

Q.v. BHSD; different forms sometimes appear in the same text.

Edgerton regards bodhi-pakṣa as 'rare, and possibly only a phonetic variant of the commoner -paksya' (BHSD, s.v. bodhi-pakṣa), but it may not be as rare as he suggests; it seems to be the regular form in the prajñāpāramitā texts (not cited by Edgerton here) and cf. Abhidh-k 382 n.9.

Q.v., BR, MW; pāksya is recorded in the Harivamśa in the sense of 'siding with'; Pānini also gives the expression pūrva-pāksya (q.v., MW), 'situated on the front side', but there appears to be no corresponding *bodhi-pāksyā dharmāḥ in Buddhist Sanskrit texts. Turner cites Pkt pakkha under Skt pāksika.

 Cf. the adjectival usage of kusala-pakkha at M III 77: iti kho bhikkhave visati kusala-pakkhā visati akusala-pakkhā.

See BR and MW, s.v. pāksya.
also found. First there is the alternation between \textit{bodhi-} and \textit{bodha-},\textsuperscript{13} and secondly the addition on one occasion in the four primary Nikāyas of the prefix \textit{sam-}, giving \textit{sambodha-pakkhika}.\textsuperscript{14} The alternation between the \textit{-i} and \textit{-a} stem forms has no obvious significance in early Buddhist literature.\textsuperscript{15} As for \textit{sambodha}, I commented in the course of my discussion of the \textit{bojjhanga}s that in a late canonical work such as the \textit{Paṭisambhidāmagga} (where we have such sequences as \textit{bujjhanti}, \textit{anubujjhanti}, \textit{patibujjhanti}, \textit{sambujjhanti} and indeed \textit{bodhi-pakkhiyāṭṭhena}, \textit{anubodhi-pakkhiyāṭṭhena}, \textit{patibodhi-pakkhiyāṭṭhena}, \textit{sambodhi-pakkhiyāṭṭhena}) it is not unreasonable to see the addition of the various prefixes as imparting a specific meaning.\textsuperscript{16} However, it is equally clear that in the Nikāyas \textit{samojihanga} and \textit{bojjhanga} are regularly equivalents. In the context of the four primary Nikāyas there seem to be no good grounds for thinking that \textit{sambodha-pakkhikā dhammā} are conceived of as anything different from \textit{bodha-pakkhikā dhammā}.\textsuperscript{17}

These, then, are the basic facts concerning the occurrence of the term \textit{bodhi-pakkhiyā} in the Pāli canon. However, commenting on \textit{bodhi-pakṣika-dharma} in a note to his translation of the \textit{Mahāvastu}, J.J. Jones wrote as follows:

\textit{Pakṣika} is the Pāli \textit{pakkhika} or \textit{pakkhiya} ... The term \textit{pakṣika} has been taken as a derivative of \textit{pakṣa}, and has accordingly been rendered either 'being on the side of' or 'forming the wings of' ... This interpretation seems to be borne out by the fact that in \textit{BSk.} the forms \textit{bodhipakṣa} and \textit{-pakṣya} are more frequent than \textit{-pakṣika}. At

\textsuperscript{13} For \textit{bodha-} see S V 227, 231, 237-9. It is not at all clear what is the 'correct' reading in many instances. D III 97 has \textit{bodhi-pakkhiyā} as does Sv III 872 and Sv (Be 1902) III 48, but Sv (Ce 1925) II 632 has \textit{bodha-pakkhiyā}; DAT III 63 has \textit{bodha-pakkhiyā} but records as variants \textit{bodhi-pakkhiyā} (Be Chatthasamgyānā, one Sinhalese MS), \textit{bodhi-pakkhiyā} (two Sinhalese MSS). At S V 227, 231, 237-9 Feer is not consistent about which form he prefers, but the variant readings he notes show that the Burmese prefer \textit{bodhi-pakkhiyā} and the Sinhalese \textit{bodha-pakkhiyā}. Mp IV 162 (to a A IV 251) has \textit{sambodha-pakkhiyā} and \textit{sambodhassa}, but records Be (1924) as reading \textit{sambodhi-pakkhiyā} and \textit{sambodhissa}. Vibh-a 346 reads \textit{bodhi-pakkhiyā}, following Be (1902), but gives two Sinhalese MSS as reading \textit{bodha-}; but Sinhalese MSS do on occasion have \textit{bodhi-pakkhiyā} (cf. variant given at Vibh 250). For the \textit{-a} stem cf. \textit{sambodha-gāmino} (Sn p. 140), though Sn also has \textit{sambodhi} (Sn 478, 503, 693, 696).

\textsuperscript{14} A IV 352; variant \textit{sambodhi-}.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{PED}, \textit{BHSD}, s.vv. \textit{bodha}, \textit{bodhi}. Edgerton comments that the usage of \textit{bodha} in Buddhist, non-Buddhist and Jaina Sanskrit is much the same, whereas \textit{bodhi} is very rare in non-Buddhist and non-Jaina texts. It is clear from the stock commentarial exegesis of \textit{bojjhanga} (see above, Chapter 5.9) that whether \textit{bodhi} is glossed as \textit{ñāna} or \textit{ariya-puggala} hinges on whether the commentators take \textit{bodhi-} as \textit{bodhi} or \textit{bodhin}, and not on whether they read \textit{bodhi-} or \textit{bodha-}, as Nāṇamoli implies at Paṭis Trsl 316 n. 2; likewise \textit{bodha-} might be taken in two ways, as 'awakening' itself or as an adjective descriptive of the one who is awakening, i.e. 'the awakening [man]'.

\textsuperscript{16} See above, p. 184-5.

\textsuperscript{17} It is not clear to me why Hare says (A Trsl IV 231 n. 1) of \textit{sambodha-pakkhikā dhammā} 'the context clearly shows that it is not the same as \textit{bodhipakkhiyā dhammā}'; possibly it is because he understands the latter to refer straightforwardly to the seven sets. Citing the commentary he ignores the extent to which the explanation of \textit{sambodha-pakkhika} here corresponds with that of \textit{bodhi-pakkhiyā} elsewhere (see Chapter 9.3); clearly the commentarial tradition takes them as basically equivalent. \textit{PED}, s.v. \textit{sambodha} does give 'the insight belonging to the three higher stages of the path' but without stating its authority; Mp IV 162 states that \textit{sambodha} at A IV 352 has to do with all four paths \textit{(catu-magga-sānkhātassa sambodhassa)}, while Sp I 229 takes \textit{bodhi} to refer only to the path of \textit{arahanti}-ship. Thus it is clear that the commentaries interpreted these terms in the Nikāyas as they saw fit according to particular contexts.
the same time, as the word *pakkhika* does definitely occur in the older Pāli texts, it cannot be regarded as certain that the term as well as the complete formula originated among the Sanskritists or quasi-Sanskritists as Har Dayal maintains... There is every possibility that the Pāli *pakkhika* is more original, and the etymology of this, viz. from *pakkha*, Sk. suffix *-prakhyya*, ‘like’, ‘resembling’ would seem to suit its application in this formula better than the derivation from *pakṣa*, ‘wing’ or ‘side’. For then *bodhipakṣikadharma* would mean a ‘bodhi-like quality or condition.’ On this supposition all the BSk. forms are due to a wrong Sanskritization of the Pāli *pakṣha*, *pakkhika*.18

I shall turn to Har Dayal’s comments presently, but what of Jones’ suggestion that *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā* might be an erroneous formation for an expression that originally signified ‘bodhi-like dhammas’?

As I have suggested, there are possibly grounds for preferring the reading *-pakkhika*, but it is difficult to see why and even how Jones derived this from *-prakhyya*—the dictionaries record no such forms as *prakhyika* or *prākhyika*. On the other hand, Pāli *pakkhika* does represent a quite regular Middle Indo-Aryan equivalent to the perfectly correct Sanskrit *pākṣika*. Jones appears to be quite alone in relating *pakkhika* to *prakhyya*.19 The suggestion that we have to do with an expression meaning ‘bodhi-like dhammas’ might be better founded on the assumption that *bodhi-pakkha* and not *bodhi-pakkhika* represents the ‘correct’ form; *pakkha* might very well represent Sanskrit *prakṣa*. Yet the usage of Pāli *pakkha* in the sense of Sanskrit *prakṣa* is not reliably attested,20 while the postulated *bodhi-pakkhā dhammā*, as I have already pointed out, still makes good sense in terms of Sanskrit *-pakṣa*: ‘dhammas that take the side of awakening’.

The existence of various adjectival formations derived from a common substantive and having little difference in meaning is, of course, quite normal in both Sanskrit and Middle Indo-Aryan. Expressing a rather similar notion to Sanskrit *pakṣin*, *pakṣiya*, *pakṣya* and *pākṣika* are a number of derivatives from *bhāga*: *bhāgika*, *bhāgin*, *bhāgya*.21 These all mean, more or less, ‘having a share in’. Similarly in Pāli we find *bhāgin* and *bhāgiya*.22 These adjectival derivatives from *bhāga* prove particularly relevant to the question of the meaning of *bodhi-pakkhiya* in the Pāli canon, since *-pakkhiya/-pakkhika* is often found juxtaposed with *-bhāgiya* in a way that suggests they should be taken as alternative ways of expressing a similar idea:

\[ \text{ye keci bhikkhave dhammā kusala-kusala-bhāgiya kusala-pakkhiyā sabbe te appamāda-mulakā.}^{23} \]

A further indication of this overlap in meaning and usage is the way in which *-pakkhiya/-pakkhika* and *bhāgiya* are on occasion apparently glossed by the

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18 Mvu Trsl II 272 n.1.
19 Cf. Childers, PED, PTC, s.v. *pakkhika*.
20 PED (s.v. *pakkha*, 2) does take *pakkha* in *mātu-pakkha* and *pitu-pakkha* at Mil 75 as equivalent to *prakhyya*, though the Skt expressions *mātr-pakṣa* and *pitr-pakṣa* (q.v., MW) suggest that it is mistaken in doing so; PED cites no further examples.
21 Q.v., MW.
22 Q.v. PED.
23 S V 91; misprinted as *kusalākusala-bhāgiya*; cf. A I 11.
same phrase. Thus to describe something as nibbedha-bhāgiya indicates that it 'turns towards' or 'conduces to' (saṃvattati) penetrative wisdom;24 similarly something that is bodha-pakkhika is said to 'turn towards' or 'conduce to' awakening.25 At this point it is worth comparing the expression bodhi-pakkhiyā dharmā to an expression found in a prose section of the Suttanipāta: 'skilful dharmas which are noble, lead out, lead to awakening' (kusalā dharmā ariya niyāṇikā sambodha-gāmino).26 In conclusion, to treat -pakkhiya or -pakkhika in the expression bodhi-pakkhiya or bodhi-pakkhikā dharmā as anything other than a derivative of pakṣa seems perverse; the basic meaning of the expression must be taken as 'dhammas that side with or take the part of awakening'.

What of Dayal's comments referred to in the above quotation from Jones? In his study of the bodhisattva according to the Sanskrit sources Dayal states:

The Pāli word bodhi-pakkhiya is probably derived from the Sanskrit form, which was the earlier of the two, as this word does not occur often in the Nikāyas or Milindapaṇīho ... The term emphatically refers to bodhi and not to the nirvāṇa of the Pāli scriptures. Both the term and the complete formula seem to have orginated among the Sanskritists or quasi-Sanskritists, who were the forerunners of the Mahāyāna. The Pāli rendering points to paksya as the correct Sanskrit form ... 27

What has already been said should make it clear why I regard Dayal's comments concerning the correct form to be misconceived. The more surprising claim is that the Pāli usage of the term bodhi-pakkhiya is a borrowing from 'Sanskritists or quasi-Sanskritists'. The bases of this claim, namely that the term is found only infrequently in the Nikāyas and Milindapaṇīha and that the reference to bodhi is suggestive of the Mahāyāna, are certainly dubious. Dayal refers to Buddhist Sanskrit works such as the Mahāvastu, Mahāvyutpatti, the Lalitavistara, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Daśabhūmika-sūtra. Yet we have no reason for thinking that these works are older than Pāli works such as the Petakopadesa, and Milindapaṇīha which mention 'thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā' explicitly. Furthermore the term bodhi-pākṣika (and variants) hardly occurs with greater frequency in the Buddhist Sanskrit works mentioned than bodhi-pakkhiya does in paracanonical Pāli literature; and although rare in the canon it is not that rare. Finally, it is true that the term bodhi is taken up in certain concepts associated with the development of the Mahāyāna, but the usage of derivatives from the root budh is hardly to be regarded as an exclusive feature of the Mahāyāna. As I stated at the outset of this study, it is clear that the expression bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā/bodhi-pākṣikā dharmā should be regarded as part of the common heritage of ancient Buddhism.

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24 S V 87.
25 S V 237. Cf. also the juxtaposition of vighāta-pakkhiya (variant: -pakkhika) and anibbāna-samvattanika at S V 97; M I 115; As 382.
26 Sn p. 140.
27 Dayal, op. cit., p. 81. Rather curiously he seems to regard pakṣa meaning 'wing' and pakṣa meaning 'side' as two distinct homonyms: 'It seems probable that the form pakṣya is not related to the word pakṣa, which means "wing". That simile would not be very appropriate as no bird has thirty-seven wings.' He goes on to say that pakṣya 'is derived from the substantive pakṣa, which means "a side, party, faction".'
2. Usage and application of the expression

Six of the canonical passages that speak of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā employ the expression ‘to dwell engaged in the development of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā’ (bodhi-pakkhiyānaṁ dhammānaṁ bhāvanānyogam anuyutto viharati). First there is a Vinaya passage (Vin) that constitutes part of the preamble to the final formulation of the first of the four pārājika rules of training, the transgression of which involves the bhikkhu in ‘defeat’. The particular rule in question is the one prohibiting sexual intercourse. A number of bhikkhus from Vesāli are represented as eating, drinking and bathing as much as they like; without proper reflection, without first renouncing the training and declaring their weakness they indulge in sexual intercourse. Some time later they think better of their back sliding and request that Ānanda should put the matter before the Buddha in the following terms:

Even now, Ānanda, if we might obtain the ‘going-forth’ in the presence of the Blessed One, if we might obtain ordination—even now as practitioners of insight into skilful dharmas we would dwell engaged in the development of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā during the first and last parts of the night.

Two Āṅguttara-nikāya passages (A.1 and A.2) make use of a slightly fuller version of essentially the same formula:

Therefore, bhikkhus, I say that you should train thus: we shall be guarded as to the doors of the [sense-] faculties; knowing the right amount in food, engaged in wakefulness, as practitioners of insight into skilful dharmas we shall dwell engaged in the development of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā during the first and last parts of the night.

In each of these Āṅguttara passages the formula occurs both in a negative version (regarding the consequences when bhikkhus are not guarded as to the doors of the sense-faculties, and so on) and a positive version as quoted. In the first passage the Buddha addresses a bhikkhu who complains: ‘My body becomes drugged, directions are not clear to me, dharmas are not apparent to me, weariness and lethargy invade my mind and remain [there], I practise the spiritual life without enthusiasm, and I have doubt about dharmas.’ Taking heed of the Buddha’s instructions, the bhikkhu subsequently attains arahant-ship. In the second passage the Buddha admonishes a group of bhikkhus, recently gone-forth, for their laziness, asking them whether they have seen or heard of a samaṇa or brāhmaṇa who is unguarded as to the doors of the

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28 Vin III 23; A III 70-1, 300-1; It 75, 96; Vibh 244.
29 Vin III 23: idāni ce pi mayām bhante Ānanda labheyyāma bhagavato santike pabbaṭṭaṁ labheyyāma upasampadaṁ idāni pi mayām vipassakā kusálānaṁ dhammānaṁ pubba-rattāpayataṁ bodhi-pakkhiyānaṁ dhammānaṁ bhāvanānyogam anuyutto vihareyyāma.
30 A III 70-1, 300-1: tasmaś tī ha vo bhikkhave evam sikkhiyabbam: indriyesu gutta-dvārā bhavissāma bhojane mattaṅṅavo jāgariyo anuyuttā vipassakā ... bhāvanānyogam anuyuttā vihareyyāma.
31 A III 69: etarāhi me bhante madhurakā-jāto c’eva kāyo, disā ca me na pakkhāyanti. dhammā ca maṁ na ppaṭṭibhanti, thīna-middhaṁ ca me cittaṁ pariyaṭṭāya tiṣṭhati, anabhārirato ca brahma-cariyo ca, attiha ca me dhammesu vickicchāya tī. The formula is thus initially directed to one individual and as quoted needs adjustment for the singular; however, the instructions are generalized for all bhikkhus at the close of the sutta.
sense-faculties, and so forth, but has nevertheless attained the liberation of mind and wisdom that is without āsavas. They have not, and neither has the Buddha.

Turning to the *Itivuttaka*, we find two passages (It.1 and It.2) that employ the expression ‘dwelling engaged in the development of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā’ as the second part of a threefold series. The first of these concerns the three occasions on which a deva-cry issues forth among the devas:

[i] At that time, bhikkhus, when an ariya-sāvaka shaves off his hair and beard, puts on orange robes and intends to go forth from the home into homelessness, a deva-cry issues forth among the devas: ‘This ariya-sāvaka intends to do battle with Māra.’ [ii] At that time when an ariya-sāvaka dwells engaged in the development of the seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā, a deva-cry issues forth ...: ‘This ariya-sāvaka does battle with Māra.’ [iii] At that time when an ariya-sāvaka by the destruction of the āsavas directly knows for himself in the here and now, realizes, attains and dwells in the liberation of mind, the liberation of wisdom that is without āsavas, a deva-cry issues forth ...: ‘This ariya-sāvaka is victorious in the battle; victorious he enters into the front-line of the battle.’

In the second passage the Buddha explains how ‘in this dhamma-vinaya the bhikkhu who has lovely virtue, lovely dhamma and lovely wisdom is called one who is whole, accomplished, the best of men’.

[i] How does a bhikkhu have lovely virtue? Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu has virtue and dwells restrained by the restraint of the pātimokkha; endowed with good conduct and good associates, seeing danger in the slightest of faults, he undertakes and trains in the rules of training. [ii] How does a bhikkhu have lovely dhamma? Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu dwells engaged in the development of the seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā. [iii] How does a bhikkhu have lovely wisdom? Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu by the destruction of the āsavas ... dwell in the liberation of mind, the liberation of wisdom that is without āsavas.

Finally the following forms the opening passage of the ‘analysis according to Suttanta’ of the chapter on jhāna in the *Vibhaṅga*:

Here a bhikkhu dwells restrained by the restraint of the pātimokkha; endowed with good conduct and good associates, seeing danger in the slightest of faults, he undertakes and trains in the rules of training; guarded as to the doors of the [sense-] faculties, knowing the right amount in food, engaged in wakefulness during

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33 *It 96*: kalyāṇa-sīlo bhikkhave kalyāṇa-dhammo kalyāṇa-panṭho imasmin dhamma-vinaye kevali vastavā uṭṭama-puriso ti uccatti.

34 Ibid.: kathā ca bhikkhave bhikkhu kalyāṇa-sīlo. idha bhikkhave bhikkhu sīla-vā hoti pātimokkha-samvara-samvuto viharati ācāra-gocara-sampanno anuvattesu vajjesu bhaya-dassāvī samuddaya ākkhāti sikkhā-epadesi ... idha bhikkhave bhikkhu sattannam bodhi-pakkhiyānaṃ dhammānaṃ bhāvanāṇyaṃ anuvutto viharati ... idha bhikkhave bhikkhu āsavānaṃ kho yā anāsavāṃ ceto-vimuttimaṃ paññā-vimuttim viharati.
the first and last parts of the night, he is continually and wisely engaged in the
development of bodhi-pakkhiya dhamma. This Vibhaṅga passage (Vibh) goes on to detail how the bhikkhu acts with clear
comprehension in everything he does, how he retires to a suitable place, sits
crosslegged, abandons the five hindrances and attains the four jhānas and four
formless attainments.

What are we to make of these passages? I shall for the moment ignore the
question of the ‘seven’ in the Itivuttaka passages. The way in which the six
passages embrace various common elements is abundantly clear. Moreover
these various elements that make up the passages also represent stock phrases
and formulas that are scattered throughout the canon. If we exclude the phrase
vipassakā kusalānaṃ dharmānaṃ and the actual expression concerning the
bodhi-pakkhiya dhamma, none of the various elements is unique to these
passages. This suggests that one might collate the six passages in order to
produce a synoptic version:

(a) He shaves off his hair and beard, puts on orange robes and goes forth from
the home into homelessness.
[It.1]

(b) He (has virtue and) dwells restrained by the restraint of the pātimokkha; endowed with good conduct and good associates, seeing danger in the
slightest of faults, he undertakes and trains in the rules of training.
[It.2, Vibh]

(c) Guarded as to the doors of the [sense-] faculties, knowing the right amount
in food, engaged in wakefulness (during the first and last parts of the
night).
[A.1, A.2, Vibh]

(d) as a practitioner of insight into skillful dharmas,
[Vin, A.1, A.2]

(e) (he dwells) (continually and wisely) engaged in the development of bodhi-
pakkhiya dhamma (during the first and last parts of the night).
[Vin, A.1, A.2, It.1, It.2, Vibh]

(f) By the destruction of the āsavas he directly knows for himself in the here
and now, realizes, attains and dwells in the liberation of mind, the
liberation of wisdom that is without āsavas.
[(A.1), A.2, It.1, It.2]

35 Vibh 244: idha bhikkhu pātimokkha-saṁvara-saṁvuto ... sikkhā-padesu ... indriyesu gutta-
dvāro bhojane maṭṭhaṇā pubba-rattāpara-rattam jāgariyānuyoγaṁ anyutto sātaccam nepakkam
bodhi-pakkhiyānaṁ dhammaṇāṁ bhaṭṭa-vuddhikānaṁ anyutto. 36 kesa-massum ohāretvā kāsāyaṁ vatthāni acchādetvā aṅgāraṁ anagañīyaṁ pabbajati. (sīlaṅga
hoti) pātimokkha-saṁvara-saṁvuto viharati ṛcārā-gocara-sampanno anumattesu vajjesu bhaya-dass-
āvi samāddhaṁ sikkhāti sikkhā-padesu. indriyesu gutta-dvāro bhojane maṭṭhaṇā pubha-rattāpara-
rattam) jāgariyānuyoγaṁ anyutto vipassako kusalānaṁ dharmānaṁ (sātaccam nepakkam) (pubba-ratt-
āpara-rattam) (sattanāṁ) bodhi-pakkhiyānaṁ dhammaṇāṁ bhavañānuyoγaṁ anyutto (viharati)
āsavānaṁ khayā anāsavānaṁ ceto-vimuttim paññā-vimuttim diṭṭhe va dhamme sayaṁ abhiññā sacchi-
What the above synoptic version of the whole formula does is to bring bodhi-pakkhiyānam dhammānam bhavāna into perspective within what amounts to a summary of the whole Buddhist path; development of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā is apparently conceived of as a specific stage or practice within the general schema of the Buddhist path. This is perhaps also reflected in the following verses from the Theragāthā:

But he is one who is mindful, desiring little, content, untroubled; he delights in seclusion, [stays] secluded; his strength is always firm.

For him dhammas are skilful, siding with awakening; and he is one without āsava-—thus it is spoken by the great seer.

However, Lamotte has commented with reference to some of the passages I have just been considering:

Dans les Nikāya et les Āgama, l’expression bodhipakkhiyā dharma est plutôt rare et de contenu encore mal défini. L’Āṅguttara, III p. 70, 300 (cf. Vibhanga, p. 244) range parmi eux: la garde des sens (indriyesu gutta-dviiratā), la sobriété (bhojane mattaţutā) et la vigilence (jigariyānuyoga).

Certainly it is not possible on the basis of these passages alone to be very specific about just how bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā are conceived of, but surely it is a misreading of the passages in question to suggest that there indriyesu gutta-dvārata, bhojane mattaţutā and jāgariyānuyoga are all considered bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā.

The six passages so far considered prompt comparison with a rather interesting sequence that occurs several times in the Mahāniddesa, defining the content of the expression ‘skilful dhammas’. According to the Niddesa skilful dhammas consist of or in the following: the right-way (sammā-paṭipadā), the way forward (amaloma-paṭipadā), the way leading forward (apaccanīka-paṭipadā), the way following on (anvattha-paṭipadā), the way of dhamma (dhamma-anudhamma-paṭipadā); the fulfilment of virtues (sīlesu pāripūrkāritā), guarding the doors of the sense-faculties (indriyesu gutta-dvārata), knowing the right...
amount in food (*bhojane mattaṁñūtā*), engaging in wakefulness (*jāgariyānu-yoga*), mindfulness and clear comprehension (*sati-sampajañña*); engaging in the development of the four establishing of mindfulness, the four right endeavours, the four bases of success, the five faculties, the seven awakening-factors, the noble eight-factored path.\(^{40}\)

It seems to me rather too much of a coincidence that here the *Niddesa* inserts the seven sets just at the point where in the other passages we have ‘(as a practitioner of insight into skilful dhammas) he dwells engaged in the development of *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā* (during the first and last parts of the night)’. At the very least this must indicate that by the time of the *Niddesa* the seven sets had come to represent for the tradition what *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā* represents for the earlier tradition. Possibly we can go further and suggest that the *Niddesa* implies here a conscious and deliberate identification of the seven sets with the expression *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā*. If so it probably constitutes the earliest such identification we have.

Returning to the four primary Nikāyas, an *Anguttara* passage would seem to confirm that the development of *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā* is conceived of as something rather specific that pertains to the higher stages of the path. This occurs in the *navaka-nipāta*. The Buddha explains how wanderers from other schools should be answered if they ask about the conditions or supports (*upanisi*) for the development of *sambodha-pakkhiyā dhammā*:

Here, sirs, a bhikkhu is one who has good friends, good companions, good associates. This is the first support for the development of *sambodha-pakkhiyā dhammā*. Furthermore a bhikkhu has virtue and dwells restrained by the restraint of the *pātimokkha*; endowed with good conduct and good associates, seeing danger in the slightest of faults, he undertakes and trains in the rules of training. This is the second support ... Furthermore a bhikkhu easily, readily, without difficulty finds just that kind of talk which concerns application and leads to the opening of the heart, namely talk of wanting little, contentment, seclusion, detachment, initiating strength, virtue, concentration, wisdom, freedom, knowledge and vision and freedom. This is the third support ... Furthermore a bhikkhu dwells having initiated strength for the abandoning of unskilful dhammas and the arousing of skilful dhammas; he is firm, steadfast and resolute with regard to skilful dhammas. This is the fourth support ... Furthermore a bhikkhu has wisdom; he is endowed with the wisdom that attains to the rise and fall [of things], that is noble, penetrating, and attains to the right destruction of suffering. This is the fifth support for the development of *sambodha-pakkhiyā dhammā*.\(^{41}\)

\(^{40}\) *Nidd I* 13-4, 361-2, 468-9; the same basic sequence occurs with some additions or omissions (the first five items) at *Nidd I* 1 54-5, 143-4, 219, 332, 361-2, 365, 468-9, 480, 502.

\(^{41}\) A *IV* 351-2: *idhāvuso bhikkhu kalyāṇa-mitto hoti kalyāṇa-sahāyo kalyāṇa-sampavāniko, sambodha-pakkhiyān dhammānaṃ āvuso ayam paṭhamā upanisā bhāvanāya. puna ca paraṃ āvuso bhikkhu sīlavā hoti ... sikkhati sikkhā-padesu ... ayam dutiyya upanisā ... puna ca paraṃ āvuso bhikkhu yāyam kathā abhisālakkāvikā ceto-vivarana-sappāyā seyyathiddaṃ appiccha-kathā santuṭhi-kathā paviveka-kathā asamsagga-kathā viriyārumbhā-kathā sīla-kathā samādhi-kathā paññā-kathā vimutti-kathā vimutti-nāma-dassana-kathā evaruṇiyā kathāya nikāma-lābhi hoti akiccha-lābhi akasira-lābhi ... ayam tariyya upanisā ... puna ca paraṃ āvuso bhikkhu āraddha-virīyo viharati akusalañānaṃ dhammānaṃ pahānāya kusalañānaṃ dharmānaṃ upasampadāya thānavā dalha-parakkamo anikkhitta-dhuro kusalesu dhammesu ... ayam catuttha upanisā ... puna ca paraṃ āvuso bhikkhu paññāvā hoti udayattha-gāminiyā paññāya samamāgato ariyāya nibbānikkāya sammā-dukkhā-kkhaya-gāminiyā ... ayam pañcamī upanisā bhāvanāya.
The Buddha goes on to review these five conditions as follows:

Of the bhikkhu, bhikkhus, who is one who has good friends, good companions, good associates, this is to be expected (pathikankham): he will have virtue ... he will undertake and train in the rules of training. Of the bhikkhu who is one who has good friends ... this is to be expected: he will easily, readily and without difficulty find just that kind of talk which concerns application ... talk about knowledge and vision and freedom. Of the bhikkhu who is one who has good friends ... this is to be expected: he will dwell ... firm, steadfast and resolute with regard to skilful dhammas. Of the bhikkhu who is one who has good friends ... this is to be expected: he will have wisdom ... that attains to the right destruction of suffering.42

These five supports for the development of sambodha-pakkhis dhammā are thus interconnected and bound up together. In so far as all this makes clear what the conditions for the development of the sambodha-pakkhis dhammā are, it also makes clear what the sambodha-pakkhis dhammā themselves are not: they are clearly seen as something different from the generality of conditions and practices that constitute the Buddhist path; on the other hand they emerge directly out of those conditions. The passage continues:

By the bhikkhu who establishes [himself] in these five dharmas, four further dharmas are to be developed: [the meditation on] ugliness is to be developed in order to abandon passion; loving kindness is to be developed in order to abandon ill will; mindfulness of breathing in and out is to be developed in order to cut off [discursive] thought; the idea of impermanence is to be developed in order to abolish the conceit, 'I am'. For the bhikkhu who has the idea of impermanence, the idea of not-self is present; one who has the idea of not-self gains the abolition of the conceit, 'I am', [gains] nibbāna in the here and now.43

Since these four further dharmas are the dharmas that arise on the basis of the supports for the sambodha-pakkhis dhammā, it seems fair to assume that the passage intends us to understand that these four further dharmas are in fact the sambodha-pakkhis dhammā themselves. At any rate, if they are not indeed identical with them, it seems that at least they should be seen as in some sense embracing sambodha-pakkhis dhammā.44

At this point I need to return to the fact that the number of bodhi-pakkhiya dhammā is specified as seven in the Itivuttaka. One other Nikāya passage also talks of seven bodhi-pakkhiya dhammā:

A khattiya, Vāsetṭha, restrained in body, speech and mind, as a consequence of developing the seven bodhi-pakkhiya dhammā attains full nibbāna in the here and now. A brāhmaṇa too ... A vassa too ... A suddha too ... A sammā too, restrained

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42 A IV 352-3.
43 A IV 353: tena ca pana bhikkhave bhikkhuno imesu pañcasu dharmam su paṭiṭṭhāya ca tātāro dharmā uttarim bhavetabbā: asubhā bhavetabbā rāgassa pahānāya; metta bhavetabbā vyāpādassā pahānāya; anāpāna-sati bhavetabbā vitakkapaccāchedāya; anicca-saṁñhe bhavetabbā asmi-māna-samujjhatta; anicca-saṁñho bhikkhave bhikkhuno anatta-saṁñha saññhāti. anatta-saṁñhi asmi-māna-samujjahātan paññūtī dītthe va dharmam nibbūnan ti.
44 The same nine dharmas are detailed at Ud 35-7 without any mention of bodhi-pakkhiya-dhamma; here the first five dharmas are specifically termed 'five dharmas that lead to the ripening of unripe freedom of mind' (aparipakkhāya ceto-vimuttiyā pañca dhammā paripākāya samvattantii).
in body, speech, and mind, as a consequence of developing the seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā attains full nibbāna in the here and now.\textsuperscript{45}

So what are the seven dharmas referred to in these passages as bodhi-pakkhiyā? The old commentary of the 'word-analysis' (pada-bhājaniya) type that forms an important part of the text of Vibhaṅga has this to say with regard to the Vibhaṅga passage quoted above (which does not specify the number seven):

Therein, which are [the] bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā? The seven factors of awakening—the mindfulness factor of awakening ... the equipoise factor of awakening.\textsuperscript{46}

In the light of this it seems reasonable to assume that talk of seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā in other contexts should also be taken as a reference to the seven bojjhāṅgas.\textsuperscript{47} But can we simply conclude that bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā was originally always merely an alternative expression for the seven bojjhāṅgas? I think not.

Obviously, as I have taken it, the Āṅguttara passage concerning the supports for the development of sam bodha-pakkhiyā dhammā is a complicating factor. The usage of the expression bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā in the indriya-sam yutta further complicates matters:

Just so, bhikkhus, of whatever bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā there are, the faculty of wisdom is reckoned the pinnacle, that is for awakening. And which, bhikkhus, are [the] bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā? The faculty of confidence is a bodhi-pakkhiyo dhammo; it turns towards awakening. The faculty of strength ... The faculty of mindfulness ... The faculty of concentration ... The faculty of wisdom is a bodhi-pakkhiyo dhammo; it turns towards awakening.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{45} D III 97: khattiyo pi Vāsetṭhā kāyena samvuto vācāya samvuto manasi samvuto sattanam bodhi-pakkhiyānām dhammānām bhāvanām avāya diṣṭhe va dhamme pariṇībhāyatī. brāhmaṇo pi vi esso pi ... suddo pi ... samano pi ... (Of the three versions of the Aggaṇṭha-sutta that come down in Chinese translation, the Dirghāgama version talks of ‘seven thoughts of awakening’ at this point, while the Madhyamāgama version talks of the ‘seven components of awakening’. Neither of the Chinese expressions involved is apparently usual for either bodhi-pākṣika-dhamma or bodhiy-ātga. The third version uses a different formula at this point: ‘With his mind well established in the four establishments of mindfulness he develops the seven factors of awakening.’ (Cf. above, pp. 58-9.) See K. Meisig, Das Sāra von den vier Stūden, pp.162-3.)

\textsuperscript{46} Vibh 249-50: tattha katame bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā. satta bojjhāṅga: sati-sambojhāṅgo ... upekkhā-sambojhāṅgo.

\textsuperscript{47} We can add to this the fact that at Patis II 115, 122 bodhi-pakkhiya is used in explanation of bojjhāṅga, while the term bojjhāṅga is also on occasion explained in terms similar to those used in explanation of bodhi-pakkhiya. ‘they turn towards bodha, bhikkhus, therefore they are called bojjhāṅgas’ (bodhāyā samvatattati ti kho bhikkhā nasā bojjhāṅga ti vaccanitt) (S V 72; cf. Patis II 115). The commentaries get around the problem of ‘seven’ rather neatly. According to both Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla there are seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā because there are seven sets (Sv III 872: satthatan bodhi-pakkhiyānām ti cattāro satipaṭṭhāna ti ādi koṭṭhadā-svasa satthatan, pāťiyā pana satta-īmśāya bodhi-pakkhiyānām dhammānām. Ita 73-4: satthatan ti koṭṭhadā satthatan pabhedato pana te satta-īmśa honti ... evam pabhedato satta-īmśa-viḍhā ti satipaṭṭhānādā koṭṭhadā satt eva honti ti vuttaṃ satthatan iti). While it may seem a little unlikely that this expresses the intention of the Dīgha or Itivuttaka, taking the seven sets as ‘seven dhammas’ is not entirely without precedent in the Nikāyas in that they are treated in the sattaka-nipaṭa of the Āṅguttara-nikāya, see A IV 125-7 and above, pp. 245-6.

\textsuperscript{48} S V 227, 231, 237-9: evam eva kho bhikkhave ye keci bodha-pakkhiyā dhammai paññānīdriyam tesam aggam akkākhāyati yad idam bodhāya. katame ca bhikkhave bodha-pakkhiyā dhammā. saddhānīdriyam bhikkhave bodha-pakkhiyo dhammo tam bodhāya samvatattī. viriyaṇīdriyam ... satīnīdriyam ... samādhiṇīdriyam ... paññānīdriyam ... I have now discussed all canonical passages known to me.
It is perhaps important to note that this passage occurs six times in the _indriya-samyutta_ illustrated on each occasion by a different simile. In other words, it is not an isolated passage, but is in fact made rather a lot of. In the context of the _mahā-vagga_ it is also perhaps significant that this treatment is restricted to the _indriyas_. Clearly its application to the _satiпатṭhānas, saṃmappadhānas_ and _iddhi-pādas_ would not work. The reason for its omission in the case of the _balas_ is probably best explained by the fact that they are considered entirely by way of the common formulaic treatments. Its omission from the treatment of the _ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo_ is interesting; the nature of the treatment of the _ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo_ in the Nikāyas is such that to single out _saṃmā-diṭṭhi_ as the ‘pinnacle’ of the eight factors might just be seen as inappropriate. However, when it comes to the _bojjhāṅgas_, it is not so clear that the same applies to _dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhāṅga_.

At first glance the application of the expression _bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā_ to the five _indriyas_ would seem to contradict what I have been arguing, namely that we must understand the expression _bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā_ as indicating something quite specific in the Nikāyas. I suggested in chapter four that the five _indriyas_ can be thought of as representing for the Nikāyas the five spiritual faculties considered by way of their most general capacities, yet here they are being identified with _bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā_. However, I also drew attention in chapter four to a certain tension in the way the _indriyas_ are handled in the _indriya-samyutta_; this tension manifests as a moot point of Abhidharma among certain schools, some among them suggesting that strictly speaking it is only confidence, strength, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom that are transcendent that can be termed _indriyas_.

It is perhaps not so hard to trace the line of thinking involved here. If the five _indriyas_ are the spiritual faculties considered by way of their most general capacity, then corresponding to that general capacity is the capacity perfected, the capacity of each _indriya_, when uncluttered by defilements, to function as it really should. It is only when they function as they ideally should that their true nature as _indriyas_ is properly manifest. The _indriyas_ are at once the five basic and the five essential spiritual faculties; they are the five ‘cardinal virtues’, to use Conze’s expression. Hence they are singled out as _bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā_ in the _indriya-samyutta_.

However, the problem of the precise import of _bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā_ in the canon remains. We must accept that _bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā_ is used in the

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49 Mil does indeed single out _dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhāṅga_; see above, p. 185.
canon not simply in the sense of the seven bojjhaṅgas or the five indriyas or the four ‘further’ dhammas given in the navaka-nipāta of the Āṅguttara. These are all attempts to give particular content to an expression that was originally used apart from a particular content. This is not the same thing as saying that bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā was originally used as a rather vague and indeterminate expression. What it means is that the specific implications of the expression bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā were not immediately connected with the specific implications of other expressions and concepts. In other words, it took time for various elements to be fully integrated.

Why are the seven bojjhaṅgas and five indriyas originally proffered in answer to the question: ‘Which are [the] bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā?’ How one should approach this question suggests itself if one considers the nature of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā alongside that of kusala-pakkhiyā dhammā or, more simply, kusala-dhammas. What we need to ask is in what sense bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā—dhammas that side with or take the part of awakening—are different from kusala-pakkhiyā dhammā—dhammas that side with or take the part of the skillful. Certainly bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā and indeed the seven sets are also kusala-dhammas. But can everything that might be termed a kusala-dhamma equally be termed a bodhi-pakkhiyo dhammo. All the indications are, I think, that it cannot. A bodhi-pakkhiyo dhammo is rather a special variety of kusala-dhamma. We must surmise that a bodhi-pakkhiyo dhammo, a dhamma that sides with awakening, is a dhamma that sides more or less directly with awakening; in comparison with the generality of kusala-dhammas, a bodhi-pakkhiyo dhammo is a kusala-dhamma that is rather more immediately and closely bound up with and involved in bodhi. So the nature of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā hinges on the way bodhi itself is understood.

The nature and treatment of the seven bojjhaṅgas that I outlined in chapter five make it clear how bodhi is basically thought of as a particular variety of jhāna. The general understanding of the exegetical tradition is of some relevance at this point. With regard to the bojjhaṅgas it provides two basic perspectives on bodhi: it is either the assemblage of seven dhammas or, more specifically, it is the special knowledge inherent in that assemblage; in particular the special knowledge is represented by the one bojjhaṅga, dhamma-vicaya. If we reconsider the canonical bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā passages rather similar themes are apparent. In the Vibhaṅga the development of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā is considered as an aspect of the practice of jhāna. Buddhaghosa’s comment is worth noting here:

Engaged in the development of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā: this is an indication that his practice shares in penetrative wisdom.50

The fifth of the five supports for the development of sambodha-pakkhi-kā dhammā is wisdom that attains to the rise and fall of things (udayaṭṭha-gāminī) and is penetrating (nibbedhika). The four ‘further’ dhammas in the Āṅguttara

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50 Vibh-a 324: bodhi-pakkhiyo dhammānaṁ bhāvanānuyogam anuyutto ti idam asa paṭipatti-yā nibbedha-bhāgiyatta-paridipanam.
correspond to the greater part of the items directly associated with the bodhipakkhiyā dhammā in the Samyutta-nikāya and according to the tradition preserved in the commentaries. Of the five indriyas it is the faculty of wisdom that is singled out as the pinnacle of all bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā.

So bodhi is a special variety of jhāna. What is special about it is the fact that it embraces a particular kind of knowledge. In discussing bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā we are concerned with the particular dhammas that are directly involved in the cultivation of that special kind of jhāna. Obviously this is why the seven bojjaṅgas are early on directly associated with the expression bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā. Yet, also fairly clearly, there is a sense in which the perspective of the seven bojjaṅgas is felt to be not quite broad enough in this respect. The dhammas that are directly and immediately involved in the meditation experience that is awakening are felt to be rather more far reaching than just these seven dhammas. The seven bojjaṅgas are, after all, cultivated in a particular context. This is, in fact, precisely the significance of much of the Nikāya treatment of the seven sets: the seven bojjaṅgas must be seen as existing in a reciprocal relationship with the other sets.

It begins to emerge how the notion of the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā constitutes one of various strands of thinking in the Nikāyas. The nature of this fusion, and just why the seven sets are brought together under the rubric ‘thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā’ is something I shall return to at the conclusion of this study.

3. The commentarial exegesis

At this point it might prove helpful to consider how the explanation of the bare expression bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā is taken up in the later literature. As far as the actual meaning of the expression is concerned, the paracanonical Petakopadesa and Nettippakarana do not add substantially to its understanding. Yet these two texts do serve to underline the general Suttanta interpretation that is suggested by the canonical usage. Accordingly expressions such as ‘those dhammas ... that conduce to nibbāna’ and ‘dhammas that lead to awakening’ are found as glosses for or in the context of discussion of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā.

Before turning to the commentarial tradition proper it is worth registering the range of meanings and usages recorded for pakṣa in Sanskrit literature. The primary meaning of the word would seem to be ‘wing’; it can then mean the ‘flank’ or ‘side’ of anything, and subsequently comes to denote ‘a side, party, faction; multitude, number, troop, set, class of beings; partisan, adherent, follower’. The usage of pakṣa as a collective noun denoting a group or set consisting of a number of members, and then as a way of referring to one of

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51 See above, pp. 179-80.
52 Pet 114 (ye dhammā ... nibbānā samvattanti); 188 (bodha-gamantiyā dhammā); Nett 31 (bodham-gamā dhammā).
53 Cf. Mayrhofer, s.v. pakṣa.
54 MW s.v. pakṣa. The other most important meaning of pakṣa is the half of a lunar month.
the members of such a set underlies, I think, what the commentaries have to say about bodhi-pakkhiya dhammā. Once more we have the notion of ‘awakening’ as at once a single dhamma and the sum of an assemblage or collective of dhammas operating together.

The commentarial tradition preserves a number of fairly succinct analyses of the term bodhi-pakkhiya some of which are worth quoting in full. In the Visuddhimagga Buddhaghosa states:

These thirty-seven dhammas [i.e. the satipaṭṭhānas, etc.] are called bodhi-pakkhiyas due to their being in the party of the noble path which has the name ‘awakening’ in the sense of waking up. ‘Due to their being in the party’, i.e. due to their being established in the condition of aiding.\(^55\)

The Mahā-ṭīkā comments:

Alternatively, awakening in the sense of waking up is the arising of the path consciousness. Bodhi-pakkhiyas are items in the party [of bodhi] due to their suitability to the waking-up-activity of this [consciousness].\(^56\)

Presumably the point of the Mahā-ṭīkā’s comment here is to give a slightly broader perspective. Buddhaghosa here identifies bodha with the noble path; that is to say, I think, the eight factors that constitute the path. Bodhi-pakkhiyas are then seen as those items whose relationship to the eight factors of the path is one of ‘aiding’, ‘helping’, ‘supporting’ or ‘contributing’. The Mahā-ṭīkā gives an alternative view whereby bodha is seen as the ‘arising of the path consciousness’ (magga-cittuppāda), that is to say the whole complex of citta and cetasika, of mind and associated mental factors, that makes up the path consciousness. Bodhi-pakkhiyas are then seen as those items that are adapted to the particular function of this citta, namely awakening. The Mahā-ṭīkā includes in this all mental dhammas present at that time.

Turning to the aṭṭhakathās, we find the following:

‘Of bodhi-pakkhiya [dhammā]’: of items in the party of awakening; ‘they are aids to the path-knowledge of arahant-ship’ is the meaning.\(^57\)

‘Of sambodha-pakkhiya [dhammā]’: of items in the party of awakening, [here] a designation for the four paths; ‘they are aids’ is the meaning.\(^58\)

‘Of bodhi-pakkhiya dhammā’: of dhammas that are items in the party of path-knowledge, [here] designated awakening to the four truths.\(^59\)

The foregoing come to us by way of Buddhaghosa; Dhammapāla in the Itivuttakaṭṭhakathā comments:

\(^{55}\) Vism XXII 33: ime satta-timsa dhammā bujjanatthena bodho ti laddha-nāmassa arīya-maggassa pakkke bhavatīt bodhi-pakkhiyā nāma. pakkke bhavatīt ī upakāra-bhāve ṭhitattā. ( Cf. Pātis-a II 482; III 618.)

\(^{56}\) Vism-mht (Ne) III 1606: bujjanatthena vā bodho magga-cittuppādo. tassa bujhana-kiriyāya anupunabāhavo pakkke bhavāti bodhi-pakkhiyā.

\(^{57}\) Sp I 229: bodhi-pakkhiyānān ti bodhissā pakkke bhavānum arahatta-maṅgagānassā upakāra-kānān ti attho.

\(^{58}\) Mp IV 162: sambodha-pakkhiyānān ti catu-magga-samkhātassā sambodhassa pakkke bhavānum upakārakānān ti attho.

\(^{59}\) Vibh-a 346-7: bodhi-pakkhiyānān dhammānān ti catu-sacca-bodhi-samkhātassā magga-nānassā pakkke bhavānum dhammānān.
'Of bodhi-pakkhiya [dhamma]': of items in the party of the noble person or just of path-knowledge which [here] have the name 'awakening' in the sense of waking up; of bodhi-pakkhiyas, 'of those things that belong to the set of bodhi' is the meaning ... 'they possess the party of bodhi or they are appointed to the party of bodhi' is the meaning.60

Finally, the atthakathā to the Paṭisambhidāmagga has this to say:

'In the sense of bodhi-pakkhiya': due to being in the party of the yogin who has the name 'awakening' in the sense of waking up. This is an indication of their aiding the yogin.61

As with the analysis of the bojjhangas, we have a number of different perspectives on what constitutes bodhi; it is 'knowledge' (of the four truths), it is the 'path', it is the 'path-consciousness', it is the 'noble person'; and bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā are what 'aid', 'assist' or 'support' this knowledge, this path, this path consciousness, this noble person; they cause it to succeed or prosper (upākāraka).62

The use of the term upākāraka in this context is not without significance, in that it possesses certain technical Abhidhamma connotations. In the Pāli commentaries the term is used especially to define and illustrate the way in which one dhamma can be a condition (paccaya) for the arising of another. The following definition is given by way of introduction to the twenty-four paccayas of the Theravādin Abhidhamma:

Now as to characteristic, a paccaya has the characteristic of an upākāraka, for when one dhamma is an upākāraka either for the maintenance or for the arising [of another dhamma], then the one is said to be a paccaya for the other.63

The Burmese monk, U Nārada, has explained upākāraka as follows:

This means that when a state is present, the other states that are connected with it will (1) arise if they have not arisen, (2) continue to exist if they have already arisen, or (3) gradually develop while in existence. The ultimate states of reality cannot make efforts on their own or plan to do so. But if one of them is present the accomplishments of the connected states are brought about.64

The introduction of the notion of the twenty-four paccayas is of some importance. If bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā are paccayas for bodhi, then in what way are they paccayas? Which of the twenty-four paccayas are relevant to the relationship that exists between bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā and bodhi? A complete answer to this question would probably have the effect of expanding the

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60 It-a 73-4: bodhi-pakkhiyānaṃ ti bujjhanāthanena bodhī ti laddha-nāmassa ariya-puggalassa magga-nāṇass' eva paṭkhe bhavānaṃ; bodhi-pakkhiyānaṃ bodhi-kotthāsāyaṃ na athaṃ ... bodhi-pakkha-vantānaṃ bodhi-pakkhe vā niyuttānāṃ ti atho.
61 Paṭis-a III 600: bodhi-pakkhiyāthanā ti bujjhanāthanena bodho ti laddha-nāmassa yogassa pakkhe bhavattā. ayaṃ etesam yogino upakāratta-niddeso. (Cf. I 100; at II 482 and III 618 we also have a parallel to Vism XXII 33, but reading just ariyassa where Vism has ariya-maggassa.)
62 Cf. MW s.v. upa-kr.
63 Vism XVII 68 = Tikap-a 11-2: lakkhanato-pana upakāra'ka-lakkhano paccayo. yo hi dhammo jhitiyā vā uppattiya vā upakārako hoti so tassa paccayo ti vuccati. (Cf. Abhidh-av 58; Moh 322.)
64 Paṭṭh Trsl I xii.
present study to the infinite proportions that the Paṭṭhāna itself is said to possess. But a general point can be made here. The list of twenty-four paccayas can be considered by way of two basic aspects. The first concerns those paccayas that illustrate the various relationships that exist simultaneously between dhammas that arise together in a given assemblage or complex at a given moment in time. The second concerns those paccayas that focus on the relationships that exist between dhammas over a period of time; that is to say, the way in which a dhamma that arises at one time can be related to a dhamma that arises at another time.⁶⁵ The foregoing suggests two ways of considering bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā in the Abhidhamma. First, bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā arise in one moment along with bodhi; they assist and contribute to the event called 'awakening'—however, precisely, that is thought of. Secondly, they are prior conditions that make for the arising of bodhi at some point in the future. What needs to be borne in mind in turning to a consideration of the seven sets in the Abhidhamma, is how remote these conditions can be from the actual event of ‘awakening’ and still be meaningfully called bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā. What is the accepted Abhidhamma usage?

Before turning to the Abhidhamma treatment of the seven sets, it is worth noting some definitions of bodhi-pāksikā dhammā from the northern tradition. Lamotte quotes the following Vibbhāsā definition:

Pourquoi sont-ils nommés bodhipāksika? Les deux savoirs du saint, le savoir de la destruction des impuretés (āśravakasaya jānāna) et le savoir que celles-ci ne renaitront plus (anutpādajānāna) reçoivent le nom de Bodhi parce qu'ils comportent l'intelligence complète des quatre vérités. Si un dharma est favorable à cette intelligence complète il reçoit le nom de bodhipāksika.⁶⁶

Vasubandhu gives the following:

[Bodhi is] knowledge of destruction and knowledge of non-rising. By division of persons three bodhis arise: śrāvaka-bodhi, pratyeka-bodhi and unsurpassable samyaksambodhi ... Due to their being adapted to this [i.e. bodhi] there are thirty-seven in its party—because of being adapted to bodhi, thirty-seven [dharmas] belonging to the party of bodhi arise.⁶⁷

Finally the author of the Abhidharmadīpa states:

Moreover this bodhi, which consists of knowledge of destruction and of non-arising, divides into three by means of the division of persons. The three bodhis are those of

⁶⁵ The first aspect is illustrated especially by the paccayas of conascence (sahajāta), reciprocity (āṭham-aṭha), association (sampayutta), presence (āṭhi), non-departure (avīgata); the second aspect by precedence (anantara), immediate precedence (samanantara), strong remote support (upanissaya), prior nascence (pure-jāta), posterior nascence (paccha-jāta), repetition (āsevana), dissociation (vippayutta), absence (natthi), departure (vīgata). A number of the twenty-four paccayas cover both these two aspects either because of subvarieties or particular circumstances that mean that a given relationship can exist both between conascent (sahajāta) dhammas and dhammas that arise at different moments (nāna-ikkhānika). Cf. F. Lottermoser, 'The Doctrine of Relationship (Paṭṭhāna)', unpublished MA thesis, University of Mandalay, 1969/70.

⁶⁶ Lamotte, Traité, III 1119.

⁶⁷ Abhidh-k 383: kṣaya-jñānam anutpāda-jñānam ca, pudgala-hhedena tisro bodhaya utpadyante, śrāvaka-bodhiḥ pratyeka-bodhir anuttarā samyaksambodhir iti ... tadanulomyataḥ saptatrimśat tu tat-pāksyāḥ bodher anulomatvād bodhi-pāksyāḥ saptatrimśad utpadyante.
a Buddha, pratyeka-buddha and śrāvaka [respectively] ... The dharmas that incline towards these three kinds of bodhi are namely the thirty-seven, beginning with the smṛty-upaśṭhānas.\(^{68}\)

The rather more restricted definition of bodhi in northern sources has already been noted. The usage of such terms as anuloma (‘adapted to’) and anukūla (‘inclining to’) where in the Pāli commentaries we seem to have upakāraka is of some interest, for it appears to parallel something we find in the Vimuttimagga. In the Vimuttimagga account of the final stages of the path (as in the Visuddhimagga account) knowledge of the path of stream attainment is immediately preceded by ‘adaptive knowledge’ (anuloma-ñāna) and ‘knowledge of the state of lineage’ (gotra-bhū-ñāna).\(^{69}\) It is at the stage of anuloma-ñāna that the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dharmā begin to come into their own:

Q. What is adaptive knowledge? The knowledge which conforms to the four foundations of mindfulness ... and the factors of the Noble Eightfold Path.\(^{70}\)

All this suggests that we should not be misled by English translations such as ‘helping’, ‘aiding’, ‘favourable to’, ‘conducive to’ and so on, into thinking that the relationship between bodhi-pakkhiyā dharmā and bodhi is one of rather vaguely and generally assisting in the bringing about of awakening. On the contrary, they appear to be thought of as rather closely and definitely related to bodhi. In conclusion ‘dharmas that contribute to awakening’ would seem to be a generally applicable translation of the expression, which is neither too imprecise nor too technical.

\(^{68}\) Abhidhā 357-8: sā punar eṣā bodhvī kṣayānātā-pāda-jīnā-mūtpatte su pūdgala-bhedena tridō̄hā bhidyate. tīsro bodhayāḥ budhi-pratyeka-buddha-śrāvaka-bodhayāḥ ... tasyāḥ punas tri-prakārāyā bodher anukūla-dharmāḥ smṛty-upaśṭhānādavaḥ saṃ-patra-trimśaḥ nāmātāḥ.

\(^{69}\) It is not quite clear from the text whether or not Vimutt here sees these as momentary in the way Vism does; cf. below, p. 334.

\(^{70}\) Vimutt Trsl 301. Cf. below, pp. 334-5.
CHAPTER TEN

THE SEVEN SETS IN THE ABHIDHAMMA

1. The Visuddhimagga: the classic developed account

In the previous chapter I discussed the meaning of the term bodhi-pakkhiya both in the Nikāyas and the later literature without too much regard for the specific association of the term with the seven sets in the paracanonical and postcanonical literature. What I wish to do now is to consider directly the treatment of the seven sets collectively in the Pāli Abhidhamma, both canonical and commentarial. Rather than beginning with the canonical Abhidhamma, the most convenient course to follow is to begin with Buddhaghosa's standard account of the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā in chapter twenty-two of the Visuddhimagga.¹ This can then serve as a point of reference when dealing with the canonical Abhidhamma texts. I have already had occasion to refer to what this section of the Visuddhimagga has to say about the seven sets individually; now the picture needs to be completed by an account of what it has to say about the seven collectively.

The relevant section is introduced under the heading bodhi-pakkhiyānāṃ paripunna-bhiive'the fulfilment of the things that contribute to awakening'. This heading itself is suggestive. We are concerned here with the arising of the four kinds of path knowledge. These four knowledges are thus seen as representing the fulfilment of the various conditions that contribute to awakening. Having discussed each of the sets in turn, Buddhaghosa then says:

In the prior stage [i.e. the stage prior to the arising of the transcendent path] when ordinary insight occurs, these thirty-seven dhammas are found in a series of consciousnesses in the following way. For one apprehending the body in the fourteen ways [described in the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta], there is the satipaṭṭhāna of watching body; for one apprehending feeling in the nine ways, there is the satipaṭṭhāna of watching feeling; for one apprehending mind in the sixteen ways, there is the satipaṭṭhāna of watching mind; for one apprehending dhammas in the five ways, there is the satipaṭṭhāna of watching dhammas. For one who sees that there has arisen in another unskilfulness that is previously unarisen in himself, and thinks: ‘It has arisen in one practising thus, I will not practise thus, and it will not arise in me’—for such a one at the time of striving thus for the non-arising [of unskilful dhammas], there is the first samma-ppadhāna; for one who sees unskilfulness pertaining to his own behaviour, at the time of striving for [its] abandoning, there is the second; for one striving to arouse in himself previously unarisen jhāna or insight, there is the third; for one arousing again and again what has thus arisen so that it does not decay, there is the fourth samma-ppadhāna. At the time of

¹ It seems reasonable to regard Vism XXII 33-43 as the standard commentarial account; it is presumably what is referred to as the full discussion of the bodhi-pakkhiyas at Ps III 255 (ayaṃ ettha sāṁkhayo viṁśatīraṇa paṇāyam bodha-pakkhiya-kathā Visuddhimagge vutā); cf. Sv II 564 (etesam pana bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammānaṃ vinicchayo sabbākāreṇa Visuddhimagge jhāna-dassana-visuddhi-niddese vutto). Mahānāma also follows it, apart from a number of minor variations, at Patis-a III 618-20.
arousing skilfulness having made chanda chief, there is chandiddhi-pāda, [and similarly for viriyiddhi-pāda, cittiddhi-pāda and vināṃsiddhi-pāda]. At the time of refraining from wrong speech, there is right speech, [and similarly for wrong-action and wrong-livelihood]. But at the time of the arising of the four knowledges [i.e. the four path-knowledges] [these thirty-seven dhammas] are found in a single consciousness. At the moment of fruition, leaving aside the four samma-ppadhānas, the remaining thirty-three are found.2

When they are found in a single consciousness in this way, just the one mindfulness which has nibbāna as its object is called ‘four satipatthānas’ by virtue of its accomplishing the function of abandoning the notions of beauty, etc. with regard to body, etc. And just the one strength is called ‘four samma-ppadhānas’ by virtue of its accomplishing the function of non-arising of things not arisen, and so on. As for the remaining [items] there is no decrease or increase.3

Buddhaghosa continues with a mnemonic verse:

Nine in one way, one in two ways, and in four and five ways; and in eight ways, and in nine ways—thus they are in six ways.4

The explanation of this verse can be conveniently set out as follows:

(i) **nine in one way**
   - chanda — iddhi-pāda
   - citta — iddhi-pāda
   - pīti — bojjhanga
   - passaddhi — bojjhanga
   - upekkhā — bojjhanga
   - samkappa — maggaṅga
   - vācā — maggaṅga
   - kammanta — maggaṅga
   - ājīva — maggaṅga

(ii) **one in two ways**
   - sādappā
   - bala, indriya

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2 Vism XXII 39: *iti ime satta-timśa bodha-pakkhiyā dharmā pubba-bhāge lokīya-vipassanāyā vattamāṇāya cuddāsa-vidhena kāyam parigantā cā kāyānupassanā-satipatthānam nava-vidhena vedanam parigantā cā vedanānupassanā-satipatthānam sālā-sa-vidhena cittam parigantā cā cittiānupassanā-satipatthānam, pañca-vidhena dhamme parigantā cā dhammānupassanā-satipatthānam; īmām āttha-bhāve anuppanna-pubbaṁ parassa uppannam akusalam dīvā, yathā paṭipannass’ evam uppannam, na tathā paṭipajissāmi, evam me etam n’uppajissati ti tassa anuppādāya vāyamanā-kāle paṭhamanā samma-ppadhānam, attano samudācāra-pattanām akusalam dīvā tassa pañcāni vāyamana-kāle dutiyaṁ, īmām āttha-bhāve anuppanna-pubbaṁ āhanāṁ vā vipassanāṁ vā upāpadevāṁ vāyamanatassa tatiyaṁ, uppannam yathā na parihiyati evam puna-punam uppaṇḍatāna catutthāna samma-ppadhānaṁ; chandaṁ dhuraṁ katvā kusala-uppāda-kāle chandiddhi-pādo, miccha-vācāya viramapa-kāle samma-vācāṁ ti evam nānā-cittesu labbhiṁ; īmesam pana catunnam nānānam upatti-kāle eka-citte labbhanti phala-ikkhane ṭhavāti cattāro samma-ppadhāne avasesa te-ṭimśa labbhanti. (In the above the remaining iddhi-pādas and viratis are to be supplied according to Vism-mūl (Ne) III 1610.)

3 Vism XXII 40: evam eka-citte labbhamānesu c’etesu ekā vā nibbāna-ranmanā sati kāyādūna subha-saṅhādi-pahāna-kicca-sādhana-vasena cattāro satipatthānaṁ ti vuccati; evaṁ eva ca viriyam anuppannam na anuppādādi-kicca-sādhana-vasena cattāro samma-ppadhānaṁ ti vuccati. (In the above the remaining iddhi-pādas and viratis are to be supplied according to Vism-mūl (Ne) III 1610.)

4 Vism XXII 41: nava eka-viḍhā ekā dvedhāthā catu-pañcādāḥ | aṭṭhādāh navadhā c’eva iti chaddā bhavanti te//'
(iii) **one in four ways**  
*Samādhi* — indriya, bala, bojjhanga, maggaṅga

(iv) **one in five ways**  
*Pañña* — iddhi-pāda (vīmaṃsā), indriya, bala, bojjhanga (dhamma-vicaya), maggaṅga (samma-dīṭṭhi)

(v) **one in eight ways**  
*Sati* — satipaṭṭhāna (× 4), indriya, bala, bojjhanga, maggaṅga

(vi) **one in nine ways**  
*Viriya* — samma-ppadhāna (× 4), iddhi-pāda, indriya, bala, bojjhanga, maggaṅga

Buddhaghosa concludes with some further verses:

Without division there are just fourteen items that contribute to awakening; by way of sets they are sevenfold, by way of division they are thirty-seven.

Because of performing an individual function and because of similarity in occurrence, they are all produced in the production of the noble path.\(^5\)

With the exception of the identification of vīmaṃsā with pañña,\(^6\) the basic correspondences involved here are all explicit in the four Nikāyas. The Sarvāstivādin based northern texts arrive at a slightly different breakdown of the thirty-seven dharmas, but this is due to other considerations.\(^7\)

A number of questions arise from Buddhaghosa’s account: (i) What precisely is the nature of the different consciousnesses that give rise to the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā in the stage prior to the arising of the transcendent path? In what kind of ordinary lokiya consciousness exactly are bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā present? (ii) What precisely is the significance of the fact that only the first three sets and the three kinds of refraining are detailed with regard to bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā that are lokiya? (iii) Why are the four samma-ppadhānas excluded from the fruit moment? (iv) A point is made of the fact that the one sati and the one viriya are termed ‘four satipaṭṭhānas’ and ‘four samma-ppadhānas’ respectively at the lokuttara path moment, but how precisely are we to understand the occurrence of all four iddhi-pādas in a single consciousness?

For the moment I shall restrict my comments to matters that relate to questions (ii) and (iv). If one considers for a moment the point that at the moment of the lokuttara path it is the one sati and the one viriya that is regarded as the fulfilment of all four satipaṭṭhānas and all four samma-ppadhānas, together with the fact that Buddhaghosa details only the first three sets and the three path factors of right speech, action and livelihood, then what is going on is clear enough. As I have discussed above, according to the

\(^5\) Visn XXII 43: cuddas'eva asambhinnā hont'ete bodhi-pakkhiyā/ koṭṭhāsato satta-vidhā satta-tīṃsa pabhedato// sakicca-nipphādanato sarūpana ca vuttito/ sabbe va ariya-maggassa sambhavante te//

\(^6\) This is made in the *Vibhaṅga*.

\(^7\) See below, p. 3387.
commentaries (apparently following the Dhammasaṅgaṇī) the only times that all three kinds of refraining (virati) occur in a single moment of consciousness is at the time of the occurrence of the four transcendent path and fruit types of consciousness. In a sense the presence of all three of these factors is precisely what defines the citta as transcendent. Ordinarily, at a given time, the mind refrains from only one of wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood. In a rather similar way, then, mindfulness found in a single moment of lokiya consciousness is regarded as mindfulness concerned with the body, or with feeling, or with mind, or with dhammas—but it cannot be concerned with all four at once. What Buddhaghosa seems to be saying here is that as the practitioner develops vipassanā any given arising of sati takes only one object at a time. This object will be classifiable as rūpa-kkhandha (first satipaṭṭhāna), vedanā-kkhandha (second satipaṭṭhāna), viññāna-kkhandha (third satipaṭṭhāna), or saññā-kkhandha or saṃkhāra-kkhandha (fourth satipaṭṭhāna). However, when the mind is transcendent, when its object is nibbāna, it cannot be understood by way of just one of the satipaṭṭhānas, for nibbāna is not rūpa, not vedanā, not viññāna, not saññā, not saṃkhāras. But this is to be viewed, not as the absence of the satipaṭṭhānas, but as the occurrence of all four satipaṭṭhānas together. The implications of this are rather interesting. Making the same point the other way round, we can say that in the fulfilment of the satipaṭṭhānas, the object of the mind ceases to be body, feeling, mind, ideas and formations but becomes nibbāna. This is particularly important for the understanding of the fourth satipaṭṭhāna, namely watching dhammas or dhamma (dhammānupassanā). In a sense the practice of all the satipaṭṭhānas involves the watching of dhammas—rūpas, vedanās, cittas are no less dhammas than are saññās and saṃkhāras, than are nivaranas and bojjhāgas. However, it is only when they are truly seen as dhammas, rising and falling, that there is dhammānupassanā; at that stage the point seems to be that practitioner sees not dhammas so much as dhamma itself, which, it seems, amounts to seeing nibbāna. This fits with the Nikāya notion that all four satipaṭṭhānas are fulfilled in ānāpāna-sati: what begins as ānāpāna-sati or kāyānupassanā gradually transforms itself into dhammānupassanā. To sum up, in ordinary citta the four satipaṭṭhānas are mutually exclusive, and the fact that sati only fulfils the role of one satipaṭṭhāna is what defines citta as ordinary.⁹

Buddhaghosa's comments suggest that in the same way the four modes of samma-pakkhāna are also viewed as mutually exclusive in the case of a single moment of lokiya consciousness. Similarly, since only one of chanda, viriya, citta and vīmaṃsā can operate as adhipati at any given time, the four iḍḍhi-pādas too are viewed as mutually exclusive in a single moment of lokiya consciousness. What this means is that what in general distinguishes ordinary lokiya consciousness from lokuttara as far as bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā are

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⁸ This applies generally to the practice of vipassanā; in the case of samathā, at the time of the occurrence of rūpānivāra-jhāna and the first and third formless attainments the object of the mind is considered to be paññātīti or 'concept'; in the case of the second and fourth formless attainments it is the citta of the previous formless attainment.

⁹ Cf. Chapter 10.4.
concerned, is the fact that at any given time only a maximum of twenty-six may be found.\textsuperscript{10} Transcendent \textit{citta} is thus the kind of consciousness that completes or fulfils the conditions that contribute to awakening: all thirty-seven are found.\textsuperscript{11}

All this makes all the more curious Buddhaghosa's failure to comment on what is involved in the notion of all four \textit{iddhi-pādas} being present in a single moment of transcendent consciousness. With such questions in mind, I wish now to turn to the seven sets in the canonical Abhidhamma works.

2. The \textit{Patisambhidāmagga}

The \textit{Patisambhidāmagga} clearly belongs to a rather late stratum of the Pāli canon.\textsuperscript{12} It has been suggested\textsuperscript{13} that its rightful home is the \textit{Abhidhamma-piṭaka} and not the \textit{Khuddaka-nikāya} of the \textit{Sutta-piṭaka}. Of course this depends on what we understand to be the necessary features of an 'abhidhamma' text. It would be difficult to relate the \textit{Patisambhidāmagga} directly to the unified system of thought that seems to underlie the \textit{Dhammasaṅgani, Vibhaṅga, Dhātukathā} and \textit{Paṭṭhāna}, neither does it seem that its method could be rightly characterized as 'without regard for exposition' \textit{(nippariyāyena)}. But to view Abhidhamma in its early phase as exclusively concerned with such a system of thought is perhaps to be too much influenced by the method of the later manuals such as the \textit{Abhidhammatthasāmañgaha}. The \textit{Patisambhidāmagga} is perhaps indicative of an early Abhidhamma technique of providing extended improvisations on Suttanta themes. These themes are woven into a pattern so intricate that it becomes impossible to unravel, at least formally. One of the threads woven into the pattern by the \textit{Patisambhidāmagga} is spun of the seven sets. In what follows I shall make some attempt to trace its course.

The seven sets are immediately in evidence among the titles of the thirty 'talks' (\textit{kathā}) that make up the \textit{Patisambhidāmagga}, only the \textit{summa-ppadhānas} are without their own 'talk'. Yet there seems to be no discernable system to the way in which the seven sets are treated. They are not treated in a block, and their order is without precedent. In fact, the way they are picked out seems almost deliberately haphazard, and there appears to be no common method to their treatment in their respective \textit{kathās}; on the contrary, the 'talks' seem intentionally designed to treat their subject matter in different and not entirely expected ways. The \textit{indriya-kathā} (IV) concerns itself exclusively with the five spiritual \textit{indriyas} (there is no mention of the other seventeen) but does bring in all seven sets at the close. The \textit{magga-kathā} (IX) discusses the four paths and eight path-factors; again all seven sets are brought in. The \textit{bojjhanga-kathā}
(XIII) concerns the bojjhaṅgas again bringing in all seven sets. The bala-kathā (XIX) begins with an account of the five balas but then immediately moves on simply to define the individual items in a list of sixty-eight balas. The īḍḍhi-kathā (XXII) discusses ten kinds of īḍḍhi and includes an account of the īḍḍhi-pādas. Finally, the satipaṭṭhāna-kathā gives a fairly straightforward but in certain respects distinctive account of the satipaṭṭhānas.

While from this it might seem that the seven sets receive a somewhat incomplete and uneven treatment, when the Paṭisambhidāmagga is taken as a whole it is clear that the seven sets are in fact rather central to its system. In all, the sequence of seven sets features in twelve of the thirty kathās, and in some repeatedly. Of the references to the seven sets that constitute isolated and self-contained statements or treatments two can be singled out. First, there is the general Abhidhamma type direct association of the seven sets with the four transcendent paths and fruits:

Which dhammas are transcendent? The four establishments of mindfulness, the four right endeavours, the four bases of success, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven awakening-factors, the noble eight-factored path, the four noble paths, the four fruits of sāmaṇa-ship and nibbāna—these dhammas are transcendent. Secondly, in the ‘talk on the fine extract to be drunk’ (maṇḍapeyya-kathā) it is the seven sets along with the four noble truths that are singled out as the ‘fine extract’ or ‘distilled essence’ of the teaching (desañā). This shows clearly that the seven sets were taken by the Paṭisambhidāmagga as the central core of the Buddha’s teaching.

Apart from these isolated passages the Paṭisambhidāmagga’s treatment of the seven sets revolves around an extended list that I have already referred to. What I found convenient to treat as two lists (A and B) in chapter eight, in fact in certain contexts form parts of one extended composite list. This full list (hereafter C) would appear to occur seven times in the whole of the Paṭisambhidāmagga. I calculate that list C contains a total of 382 items. The list is of such a nature that certain items are continually recalled or returned to in various ways. Associated with each of the items in the list is an attha; that is, a ‘meaning’, ‘aim’, ‘purpose’, ‘objective’ or even ‘effect’. The initial exposition

\[
14 \text{ The twelve are the } \text{ñāna-kathā (I), ānāpāna-kathā (III), indriya-kathā (IV), vimokkha-kathā (V), magga-kathā (IX), maṇḍapeyya-kathā (X), bojjhaṅga-kathā (XIII), dharmacakkha-kathā (XVII), lokuttara-kathā (XVIII), mahā-paññā (XXI), abhisamaya-kathā (XXIII).}
\]

\[
15 \text{ I.e. Paṭis II 15, 22, 23, 37, 34; II 118-25. This adds up to 6 times in the } \text{ñāna-kathā (5 times lost in peyyālas; cf. Paṭis Trsl) and once in the bojjhaṅga-kathā.}
\]

\[
16 \text{ Paṭis II 86; the } \text{ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo cattaro ariya-magga cattāri ca sāmaṇa-phaḷāni nibbānaṁ ca ime dharmā lokuttarā.}
\]

\[
17 \text{ Paṭis II 86; the ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo is the ‘distilled essence’ of the spiritual life (brahma-cariya) itself (cf. the conclusions of Chapter 6).}
\]

\[
18 \text{ See pp. 270-2.}
\]

\[
19 \text{ Paṭis I 15-22, 23, 27, 34, 35; II 118-25. This adds up to 6 times in the } \text{ñāna-kathā (5 times lost in peyyālas; cf. Paṭis Trsl) and once in the bojjhaṅga-kathā.}
\]

\[
20 \text{ forty-four miscellaneous items; forty-five items of list A; ten miscellaneous; fifteen based on citta; forty-two based on ekatta; twenty miscellaneous; forty based on chanda, viriya, citta, vimāṇa; sixteen/twenty based on four truths; fifty-four miscellaneous, fifty-four items of list B.}
\]

\[
21 \text{ Cf. A.K. Warder’s discussion, Paṭis Trsl x-xi. Paṭis seems to deliberately play on the usage of } \text{attha; its general meaning in Paṭis seems to amount to ‘nature’.}
\]
TABLE 10. THE PATISAMBHIDĀMAKGGA ĀṬTHAS FOR THE SEVEN SETS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indriya</th>
<th>Commitment (adhimokkha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>viriyindriya</td>
<td>Taking on (paggaha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satindriya</td>
<td>Standing near (upāṭṭhāna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samādhindriya</td>
<td>Non-distraction (avikkhepa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paññindriya</td>
<td>Seeing (dassana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sādhā-bala</td>
<td>That which is unshakeable by distrust (assaddhiye akampiyam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viriya-bala</td>
<td>That which is unshakeable by laziness (kosaja)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satti-bala</td>
<td>That which is unshakeable by heedlessness (pamāda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samādhi-bala</td>
<td>That which is unshakeable by agitation (uddhacca)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pañña-bala</td>
<td>That which is unshakeable by ignorance (avijjā)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satti-sambojjhāṅga</td>
<td>Standing near</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dhamma-vicaya-sambojjhāṅga</td>
<td>Discrimination (pavicaya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viriya-sambojjhāṅga</td>
<td>Taking on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pīti-sambojjhāṅga</td>
<td>Suffusing (pharana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>passaddhi-sambojjhāṅga</td>
<td>Peace (upasama)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samādhi-sambojjhāṅga</td>
<td>Non-distraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upekkhā-sambojjhāṅga</td>
<td>Judgement (patissamkhāna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sammā-dīṭṭhi</td>
<td>Seeing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sammā-saṅkappa</td>
<td>Setting [one’s thought] on [something] (abhiniropana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sammā-vācā</td>
<td>Embracing (pariggaha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sammā-kammanta</td>
<td>Undertaking (samuṭṭhāna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sammā-dījīva</td>
<td>Cleansing (vodana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sammā-vāyāma</td>
<td>Taking on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sammā-sati</td>
<td>Standing near</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sammā-samādhi</td>
<td>Non-distraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indriya</td>
<td>Overlordship (adhipateyya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bala</td>
<td>That which is unshakeable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bojjhāṅga</td>
<td>Leading out (niyyāna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>magga</td>
<td>Cause (hetu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satipaṭṭhāna</td>
<td>Standing near</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sammapiṭṭhāna</td>
<td>Endeavouring (padhāna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>īddhi-pāda</td>
<td>Succeeding (ijjhana)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. For the last seven items cf. As 237: niyyānaṭṭhena is given for magga (though hetvattahena is added at As 154) and bujjhanaṭṭhena for the bojjhāṅgas.
of the list in the ṇāṇa-kathā states that the ṛṭha of each item is ‘to be directly known’ (abhūṇñeyya). As the list unfolds it becomes apparent how the ṛṭhas of certain items is to be directly known in terms of other items in the list. The items directly associated with the seven sets, which I have in places already referred to, are set out in full at the end of this section. The next exposition states that the ṛṭhas are to be fully known (pariṇñeyya); next seeing the ṛṭhas one abandons (passanto pajahati); seeing the ṛṭhas one develops (passanto bhāveti); seeing the ṛṭhas one realizes (passanto sacchikaroti). In the seventh and final exposition in the bojhaṅga-kathā, the bojhaṅgas are what awake to (buṭjhanti) the various ṛṭhas. Rather more regularly in the Paṭisambhidāmagga the concluding portion of list C is focused upon; this consists of the fifty-four items of list B (i and ii). In the ṇāṇa-kathā we are told that at the moment of each of the four paths and four fruits each of the fifty-four items is ‘then come forth’ by means of its particular ṛṭha (e.g. sotāpatti-magga-kkhāne dassanaṛtha samma-dīṭṭhi tadā samudāgata). In the ānāpāṇa-kathā as a bhikkhu knows one-pointedness of mind by way of each of the sixteen stages (vattthi) of mindfulness of breathing, he ‘applies’ or ‘connects’ each of the fifty-four items by means of its ṛṭha (e.g. adhimokkhaṛṭhena saddhindriyam samodhāneti). In the magga-kathā the form is rather different. Right view is not to be known, or whatever, ‘by means of its aim of seeing’ or ‘in the sense of seeing’, rather the path of seeing is right view (dassana-maggo samma-dīṭṭhi), the path of setting [one's thought] on [something] is right thought (abhīropana-maggo samma-samkappo), and so on for the rest of the individual path-factors, awakening-factors, powers and faculties. However, in the sense of overlordship the faculties are the path (adhipateyyaṛṭhena indriyaṁ maggo), nibbāna that plungrs into the deathless is the path in the sense of conclusion (amatogadham nibbānam pariyosānaṛṭhena maggo). The same pattern is followed in the maṇḍpeyya-kathā: the distilled essence of seeing is right view (dassana-maṇḍo samma-dīṭṭhi), in the sense of overlordship the faculties are the distilled essence (adhipateyyaṛṭhena indriyaṁ maṇḍo), nibbāna that plungrs into the deathless is the distilled essence in the sense of conclusion (amatogadham nibbānam pariyosānaṛṭhena maṇḍo).

In certain contexts the individual indriyas, balas, bojhaṅgas and maggaṅgas

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\[^{22}\] E.g. avikkhepaṁ abhiṇñeyyo (Paṭis I 15.23); samādhindriyassa avikkhepaṁ abhiṇñeyyo (Paṭis I 16.16-7); avikkhepaṁ samādhindriyam abhiṇñeyyam (Paṭis I 21.6-7); niyyāṇaṁ abhiṇñeyyo (Paṭis I 16.2); bojhaṅganaṁ niyyāṇaṁ abhiṇñeyyo (Paṭis I 17.5-6); citassā niyyāṇaṁ abhiṇñeyyo (Paṭis I 17.31-2).

\[^{23}\] Paṭis I 73-6 ( × 8), 180-94 ( × 16); II 29, 84-5, 90-1, 142-3 ( × 2), 145-6 ( × 2), 160-5 ( × 6), 216-7 ( × 9). This adds up to a total of 48 times.

\[^{24}\] Cf. correction to PTS text at Paṭis Trsl 207 n. 21. The same formula is used in the indriya-kathā; again cf. correction to PTS text at Paṭis Trsl 235 n. 9-10.

\[^{25}\] Cf. Paṭis II 143, 146 where the same formula is used for two of the rehearsals of list B in the virāga-kathā.

\[^{26}\] Cf. The virāga-kathā: ‘the dispassion of seeing is right view’ (dassana-virāga samma-dīṭṭhi), etc., ‘the freedom (vimutti) of seeing is right view’, etc.; the dhammacakkha-kathā: ‘the faculty of trust is dhamma, he sets that dhamma in motion’ (saddhindriyam dhammo, tam dhammaṁ pavatteti), etc.; the abhisamaya-kathā: ‘the convergence of seeing is right view’, etc. (‘convergence’ is Nāṇamoli’s translation of abhisamaya).
are itemized and the other sets left out of the reckoning, presumably because they cannot be individualized in quite this way. One treatment is of particular interest in that it attempts to bring out the unity of the various items embraced by these four sets:

What is the development of the one taste? For one who develops the faculty of trust in the sense of commitment, four faculties have one taste by virtue of the faculty of trust. This is the development of the faculties in the sense of one taste. For one who develops the faculty of strength ... For one who develops right concentration in the sense of non-distraction, seven path-factors have one taste by virtue of right-concentration. This is the development of the path-factors in the sense of one taste. This is the development of the one taste.28

The Paṭisambhidāmagga is a frustrating text to use if one is trying to cull specific facts and pieces of information from its pages. This is well illustrated by the bojjhaṅga-kathā, which begins by simply listing the seven bojjhaṅgas. It then asks in what sense they are bojjhaṅgas (kena tānena bojjhaṅga). Nearly the whole of the kathā is devoted to answering this question. I have counted that there are in fact 609 answers—that is, 609 senses in which the bojjhaṅgas are bojjhaṅgas. The initial twenty-seven centre around words and notions derived from the root budh, but the next 200 range rather wider. These are followed by answers based on the 382 items of the full list C. In short, the Paṭisambhidāmagga appears to relate the bojjhaṅgas to everything it can think of.

In order to begin to make sense of its method, it appears that one needs to ask not so much what it says but what it does. It is clear that in the Paṭisambhidāmagga the full list C, and especially its final portion (= list B) is intended to focus on the path to awakening in general, and the nature of the awakening experience in particular—list B is consistently related to the transcendent stages. One thing that seems to follow from the Paṭisambhidāmagga’s method is that the awakening experience must be understood as an experience of many different dimensions and many different aspects. It is an experience of many facets and subtleties. It is an experience of great richness and, above all, of great depth. It is sometimes suggested that one of the universals of mystical literature is the claim that the highest mystical experience is ineffable, beyond language. The effect of the Paṭisambhidāmagga’s treatment is not entirely dissimilar. So much is said about the awakening experience, that what is said defies simple description. In this respect its technique has something in common with some of the prajñāpāramitā texts.

At the same time as suggesting the richness and depth of the awakening experience the Paṭisambhidāmagga also suggests something of its simplicity. All the different dimensions are woven into a coherent whole. All the different aspects simply follow from the fullness and completeness of what is yet one

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simple moment of ‘awakening’. The *Patisambhidāmagga* is thus a classic ekābhīsamaṇava text.\textsuperscript{29} The awakening experience is simple, unitary, self-contained and complete in itself. Even so the constitution of the extended lists in the *Patisambhidāmagga* shows how the awakening experience is related to the whole of the teaching, to the whole of the path from beginning to end. The *Patisambhidāmagga* thus develops a way of thinking that I have already suggested is inherent in the understanding of the noble eight-factored path in the four Nikāyas and later finds expression in Buddhaghosa’s treatment of the moment of the transcendent path as the fulfilment of that which contributes to awakening (*bodhipakkhiya-paripūṇa-bhāva*).

### 3. The seven sets in the Dhammasaṅgani

The portion of the *Dhammasaṅgani* that is relevant here is ‘the section on the arising of consciousness’ (*cittuppāda-kaṇḍa*).\textsuperscript{30} This takes the form of an analysis of different varieties of consciousness (*citta*) according to the divisions of the first triplet (*tika*) of the Abhidhamma mātikā: *dhammas* that are skilful (*kusala*); *dhammas* that are unskilful (*akusala*); *dhammas* that are undetermined (*avyākata*). The *Dhammasaṅgani*’s analysis in this respect falls into fourteen basic parts:

**kusala**

- (1) kāmāvacara-kusala [Dhs 9-30]
- (2) rūpāvacara-kusala [Dhs 31-55]
- (3) arūpāvacara-kusala [Dhs 55-6]
- (4) × adhipati [Dhs 56-60]
- (5) lokuttara [Dhs 60-75]

**akusala**

- (6) kāmāvacara-akusala [Dhs 75-87]

**avyākata**

- (7) kāmāvacara-kusala-vipāka [Dhs 87-97]
- (8) rūpāvacara-kusala-vipāka [Dhs 97]
- (9) arūpāvacara-kusala-vipāka [Dhs 97-9]
- (10) lokuttara-vipāka [Dhs 99-117]
- (11) kāmāvacara-akusala-vipāka [Dhs 117-20]
- (12) kāmāvacara-kiriya [Dhs 120-3]
- (13) rūpāvacara-kiriya [Dhs 123]
- (14) arūpāvacara-kiriya [Dhs 123-4]

Each of these fourteen basic parts of the *cittuppāda-kaṇḍa* details a number of different kinds of *citta* distinguished according to various principles. Each kind of *citta* that is distinguished is treated in the text by way of what the commentary calls three ‘great sections’ (*mahā-vāra*).\textsuperscript{31} the section that deter-

\textsuperscript{29} Cf. A.K. Warder’s comments, *Patis* Trsl xxv.

\textsuperscript{30} Dhs 9-124.

\textsuperscript{31} As 55.
mines dhāmmas (dhāmma-vavatthāna); the section of groups (saṁgaha) or sets (koṭṭhāsa), and the section on emptiness (suññata). In the text of the Dhamma-saṅgaṇi these three great sections are indicated and fully elaborated only in the case of the first kind of skilful citta belonging to the sphere of sense-desire (kāmāvacara).32 I have already commented on the role of the saṁgaha- or koṭṭhāsa-vāra in the course of my discussion of the ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo.33 Essentially the suññata-vāra would seem to involve a review of the koṭṭhāsa-vāra from the perspective of ‘emptiness’; from the point of view of content it adds nothing new, though from the point of view of the spirituality of the Dhamma-saṅgaṇi it is not without some significance. What I wish to do here is to consider a little more closely for each kind of citta the extent to which the seven sets feature or do not feature, both in the initial determination of dhāmmas and also among the groupings and sets brought out in the koṭṭhāsa- and suññata-vāras.

The dhāmma-vavatthāna-vāra for the first kind of citta distinguished begins by simply listing fifty-six dhāmmas as being present when there arises kāmāvacara-kusala-citta that is accompanied by pleasant feeling (somanassa-sahāgata) and associated with knowledge (ñāṇa-sampayutta). There then follows a ‘word-analysis’ (pada-bhrijaniya) which defines each of the fifty-six dhāmmas in turn. It becomes clear in the process of this analysis that a number of the fifty-six dhāmmas represent different aspects of what are essentially equivalents. The fifty-six fall fairly clearly into the following groups:34

(i) phassa, vedanā, sañña, cetanā, citta
(ii) vitakka, vicāra, pīti, sukha, cittass’ekaggatā
(iii) saññā-ditthi, saññā-samkhappa, saññā-vāyāma, saññā-sati, samā-samādhi
(iv) saddhā-balā, viriya-balā, satī-balā, samādhi-balā, paññā-balā, hiri-balā, ottappa-balā
(v) alobha, adosa, amoha
(vi) anabhijjā, avyāpāda, samā-ditthi
(vii) hiri, ottappa
(ix) kāya-citta-passaddhi; kāya-citta-lahutā; kāya-citta-mudutā; kāya-citta-kammaññatā; kāya-citta-pāguññatā; kāya-citta-ujukatā
(x) sati, sampajaññā
(xi) samatha, vipassanā
(xii) p aggaha, avikkhepa

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32 Dhs 9-26. The name dhāmma-vavatthāna-vāra does not occur in the text (though where the commentary understands it to close is indicated by the words pada-bhrijaniyam niṣṭhitam at Dhs 17); the names koṭṭhāsa- and suññata-vāra do occur (Dhs 25, 26 respectively). The actual indication of these sections in the text may not be original, but the use of the commentarial terminology is convenient when discussing the method of Dhs.

33 See pp. 212-4.

34 Identified in the commentary; for a full discussion see Nyanaponika, AS, pp. 31-93.
Groups (ii)-(vi) are immediately suggestive of groups frequently found elsewhere in the canonical literature. We have all five jhāna-factors, eight (of the twenty-two) faculties, five of the eight path-factors, seven powers and three motivations (hetu).35 The other groups are also suggestive of various Nikāya contexts—pairs such as sati and sampajāńa and samatha and vipassanā especially have become familiar in the course of this study. I shall return to the way the Dhammasaṅgani defines these fifty-six items when I come to lokuttaracitta. For the moment I simply make the general observation that the correspondences inherent in the Dhammasaṅgani definitions reduce fifty-six items to thirty.

Essentially the koṭṭhāsa-vāra and suññata-vāra bring out the groups I have already identified, but with rather more besides. The initial exposition of the koṭṭhāsa-vāra for the first kind of citta reads as follows:

At that time there are four khandhas, two āyatanas, two dhātus, three āhāras, eight indriyas; there is a five factored jhāna, a five factored magga; there are seven balas, three hetus; there is one phassa, one vedanā, one saññā, one cetanā, one citta, one vedanā-kkhandha, one saññā-kkhandha, one saññika-kkhandha, one viññāna-kkhandha; one manāyavana, one manindriya, one mano-viññāna-dhātu, one dhammāyata, one dhamma-dhātu.36

The constitution of these various elements is then spelt out in some detail. It is worth noting the general resemblance the structure of the koṭṭhāsa-vāra bears to the mātikās/mārkās of the Vibhaṅga, Dhātukathā and Dhammāskandha. As far as the seven sets are concerned it is clear that the indriyas, balas and path factors are fundamental to the Dhammasaṅgani's treatment of all eight kinds of skilful consciousness belonging to the sense sphere.

It is important to understand how the various groups or sets brought out in the koṭṭhāsa- and suññata-vāras are directly related to the correspondences that the preceding 'world analysis' makes between various of the fifty-six items. Thus the 'word analysis' of vitakka, sees it as at once a jhāna-factor (vitakka) and a path-factor (sammā-samkappa); cittass'ekaggatā is seen as at once a jhāna-factor (cittass'ekaggatā), a faculty (samaññhilindriya), a power (samaññhil-bala) and a path-factor (sammā-samādhi), and so on. This multiplicity of aspect which the fifty-six items possess is thus reiterated in the koṭṭhāsa- and suññata-vāras.

A consideration of the Dhammasaṅgani's treatment of the remaining varieties of skilful consciousness—of the form-sphere (rupāvacara), of the formless sphere (arūpāvacara), and transcendent (lokuttara)—and also of the various kinds of unskilful consciousness (which always belongs to the sense sphere) reveals a similar state of affairs. With one interesting exception—the unskilful consciousness associated with doubt (vicikicchā-sampayutta) which I shall come back to—the relevant indriyas, balas and path-factors are brought

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35 Group (vii) is in a sense incomplete; we have here the last three of the ten kusala-kamma-paṭhas (e.g. D I 139); cf. Nyanaponika, AS, p. 80.
36 Dhs 17. Why the koṭṭhāsa- and suññata-vāras should invert the order of the jhāna factors and indriyas as given in the dhamma-vavatthāna-vāra, I do not know.
However, when we come to certain kinds of undetermined \( (avyākata) \) consciousness, the position is rather different. Although the abbreviations in the text make it rather difficult in places to determine precisely what is going on, a number of points are quite clear.

The eight varieties of skilful resultant consciousness \( (kusala-vipāka-citta) \) that in the later literature number among those types of \( citta \) termed ‘without motivation’ \( (ahetūka) \) \(^{39}\) are each in the relevant \( dhamma-vavatthāna-vāras \) said to possess ‘one pointedness of mind’ \( (cittass’ekaggatā) \). In the case of \( kāmāvacara-kusala-citta \) this was further explained in the subsequent ‘word analysis’ by reference to, amongst other things, \( samādhindriya, samādhi-bala \) and \( sammāsamādhī \). \(^{40}\) In the case of these eight varieties of \( kusala-vipāka-citta \), however, the subsequent ‘word analysis’ does not refer to \( samādhindriya, samādhi-bala \) and \( sammāsamādhī \). \(^{41}\) Moreover the relevant \( ketkhāsa-vāra \) treatment states in this connection not that there are four \( indriyas \), but that there are just three \( (manindriya, jīvitindriya \) and one of \( sukhindriya, somanassindriya \) and \( upekkhīndriya) \), while no mention at all is made of \( balas, jhānaṅgas \) or \( maggāṅgas \). \(^{42}\) In other words, although ‘one-pointedness of mind’ is a component of these eight kinds of \( kusala-vipāka-citta \), the \( Dhammasaṅgani \) makes a point of not treating it as an \( indriya, \) \( bala, \) \( jhānaṅga \) or \( maggāṅga \). One needs also to take account here of the fact that the \( kusala-vipāka-mano-dhūt \) (often referred to in the commentaries by way of its function of \( sampaṭṭicchana \) or ‘receiving’) \(^{43}\) and the two \( kusala-vipāka-mano-viññāna-dhūt \) (often referred to in the commentaries by way of their function of \( santirāṇa \) or ‘investigating’) \(^{44}\) are said, in the initial determination of \( dhammas \), to possess both \( vitakka \) and \( vicāra \)-items missing from the five-sense consciousnesses. The second of the \( mano-viññāna-dhūt \) also has \( somanassindriya \) (in place of \( upekkhīndriya \) in the first and in the \( mano-dhūt \)) and hence \( pīti \). But none of these four items is treated as a path-factor or \( jhāna \)-factor in these varieties of \( citta \). \(^{45}\)

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\(^{37}\) The treatment of \( arūpāvacara \) consciousness is so abbreviated in the text that one cannot actually see that this is so, but it seems safe to assume that it is to be elaborated following the pattern of the fourth/fifth \( jhāna \) of the \( rūpāvacara \).

\(^{38}\) Nyanaponika has drawn attention to some of these (‘Gradations of Intensity among Parallel Factors’, \( AS \), pp. 95-9), but he has overlooked the commentarial material.

\(^{39}\) The eight are the five consciousnesses related to each of the five senses (Dhs 87-90), the mind-element (Dhs 91-2), and the two mind-consciousness-elements (Dhs 92-6).

\(^{40}\) See Dhs 10 (S. 11).

\(^{41}\) The PTS text is misleading and inaccurate in this respect. Dhs 88 (§ 438), 90 (§ 450), 92 (§ 464), 94 (§ 479), 95 (§ 493) all read: \( yā tasmin samaye cittassa \( jhīti \) \( pe \) \( … \) \( ayam tasmin samaye cittass’ekaggatā hoti \). In addition Dhs 92 (§ 464) and 94 (§ 479) refer the \( pe \) back to Dhs 10 (§ 11), but this is surely mistaken since the definition of \( cittass’ekaggatā \) here includes \( samādhindriya, samādhi-bala \) and \( sammāsamādhī \) all of which are omitted from the initial determination of \( dhammas \) at Dhs 91 (§ 455) and 92-3 (§ 469). At Dhs 88 (§ 438) Buddhaghosa apparently read just \( yā tasmin samaye cittassa \( jhīti \) ayam tasmin samaye cittass’ekaggatā \) (see \( AS \) 262: \( cittassa \( jhīti \) \( ti \) \( ekam \) \( eva \) \( padam \) \( vuttam \)). This corrected reading is to be preferred in the other four instances listed above; cf. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, \( Dhs Trsl 115 \) (n. 1), 119 (n.1), 121 (§§ 463-7), 123 (§§ 470-82), 124-5 (§§ 485-96).

\(^{42}\) Dhs 90 (§ 453), 92 (§ 467), 94 (§ 482), 96 (§ 496).

\(^{43}\) As 263.

\(^{44}\) As 264.

\(^{45}\) See Dhs 92.
Similar considerations apply to the Dhammasaṅgaṇī’s treatment of the seven types of akusala-vipāka-citta, and to the three kiriya types of citta without motivation—the mano-dhātu, or ‘mind-element’ that performs the function of advertising to the doors of the five senses, and the two mano-viññāna-dhātus, namely what the commentary understand as the ‘laughter-producing’ (hāsayamāna) citta of the arahant, and the citta that advert to the mind-door. However, in the case of the two latter types there is a complication that I discussed in connection with the indriyas and balas in chapter four (p. 143), namely that cittass’ ekaggata is counted as samādhindriya though not apparently as a balā, jhāñanā or maggaṅga. Finally, returning to akusala-citta, in the type that is associated with doubt (vicikicchā-sampayutta), cittass’ ekaggata, although present, is not counted an indriya, balā or maggaṅga; it is, however counted a jhāñanā, while other relevant items are also counted indriyas, balas and maggaṅgas in this kind of citta.

This clearly has something to do with the opposing natures of ‘one-pointedness of mind’ and vicikicchā, which is seen in the commentaries as a basic wavering (kampana, calayati) of the mind. So although cittass’ ekaggata is weak, this kind of citta is not seen as completely devoid of jhāna- and path-factors in the way the ahetuka types of citta are.

What is the significance of all this? One can do little better here than refer to a number of comments made in the Atthasālinī. With regard to the omission of samādhindriya and other terms from the account of cittass’ ekaggata in the twice-five sense-consciousnesses, the Atthasālinī has the following to say:

For this too is a weak citta, and only the degree of stability [necessary] for occurrence is found here—it is unable to obtain the state of increased and strong stability. In the samgaha-vāra the jhāna- and path-factors are not brought out. Why? For jhāna follows in the wake of vitakka, and a path in the wake of motivations; by nature jhāna-factors are not found in citta without vitakka, and path-factors in citta without motivation, therefore neither are brought out here.

A little later on, with regard to the kusala-vipāka-manovo dhātu, which does contain vitakka, the Atthasālinī comments:

Since this citta is neither skilful nor unskilful, neither sammā-samkappa nor micchā-samkappa are stated. In the samgaha-vāra, although the jhāna-factor is found [in this

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46 Dhs 120 (§§ 566–7); cf. As 294.
47 Dhs 120–2 (§§ 568–73); cf. As 294.
48 Dhs 122 (§§ 574–5); cf. As 295.
49 Dhs 85–6 (§§ 422–6).
50 See Dhs 85 (§ 424); once more delete pe; cf. As 259 and p. 315, n. 41, above. Dhs 86 (§ 425) tells us that at that time there are four indriyas (viriyindriya, manindriya, upekkhindriya, jīvitindriya); there is four-factored jhāna (vitakka, vicārā, upekkhā, cittass’ ekaggata); there is a two-factored path (micchā-samkappa, micchā-vāyāma); and there are three balas (viriya-bala, ahirika-bala, anottappa-bala).
51 As 259.
52 The other citta that is weak is the vicikicchā-sampayutta variety just mentioned.
53 As 262: idam pi hi dubbala-cittaṁ pavatti-ñitti-mattam ev’ttha labbhati; saṅhiṭṭhī-avaṭṭhī thi bhave pāpam aha sakkoti; samgaha-vāra jhānāṅga-maggangāṁ na uddhaṁ. Kasnā, vitakka-pacchimaṁ hi jhānaṁ nāma heu-pacchimakmo maggo nāma, pakatīya avitakka-citte jhānāṅgaṁ na labbhati ahetu-citte ca maggagāṁ ti tasmā idha ubbhayam pi na uddhaṁ. (On saṅhiṭṭhī and avaṭṭhī, see As 143–4.)
citta], because of following the pattern of the five-sense consciousnesses, it is not brought out; but path-factors are not even found, so they are not brought out. Thus two reasons are given for the fact that jhāna-factors are not brought out. In the first place, jhāna-factors are seen to exist dependent, in some sense, upon vitakka. That is to say, it is only by virtue of application of the mind to its object with sufficient force and conviction that cittass' ekaggatā can warrant the epithet jhānanga. Presumably, then, even in the second, third, fourth and fifth jhānas (of the fivefold system) where there is no vitakka, the remaining jhānaṅgas are such by virtue of their ‘following in the wake’ of the vitakka that contributed to the arising of the first jhāna. In the second place, it seems that direct association with the twice-five sense-consciousnesses is what tends to weaken would-be jhāna-factors. In other words, what the Athasālinī seems to be suggesting is that jhāna-factors are those forces of the mind that need to be developed if the mind is to be able to free itself from the distractions of the five senses; their development allows the mind to pass unhindered from the sphere of sense-desire (kāmāvacara) to the sphere of form (rūpāvacara). The nearer the mind comes to rūpāvacara consciousness, the more the jhāna-factors come into their own, the more fully they are jhāna-factors.

As for the path-factors, that their presence depends in some sense on the ‘motivations’, and that they are stated only in skilful and unskilful citta would seem to be equivalent points. If one is to think in terms of the three motivations of skilful citta (i.e. amoha, alobha and adosa) and the three motivations of unskilful citta (i.e. moha, lobha and dosa), then citta that is avyākata is excluded on both accounts.

As far as the Dhamma saṅgāṇi itself is concerned, all this amounts, I think, to a principle that can be stated quite generally and simply. It is only with regard to consciousness that has a certain force, strength or power that one should speak of balas, jhānaṅgas and maggaṅgas. This kind of citta is characteristic-skilful or unskilful; that is to say, it is the kind of consciousness that constitutes a kamma, or fulfils the active function of ‘running’ (javana)—according to the commentarial theory of the consciousness process (citta-vīthi). Consciousness, on the other hand, that operates more automatically and is bound up with the twice-five sense-consciousnesses is considered to be relative-

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54 As 264: yasvad pan’ etam cittam neva kusalam nākusalam tasmā sammā-samkappo ti vā nicchā-samkappo ti vā na vuttam. sanghā-vāre labbahamānaṃ pi jhānaṅgam pañca-viḥāna-sote patitvā gataṃ ti na uddhātaṃ; maggaṅgām pana naLabhāti eva ti na uddhātaṃ. (For the reading pana na as against just pana in the PTS edition, see As Trsl 351 (n. 1) and variant given at As 508 (revised edition, 1979); the na is supported by maggaṅgāni alabhāto yeva as As 264.24.) The logic behind the usage of labbhati and uddhāta here seems to be as follows: maggaṅgas are said to be ‘not found’, because although vitakka and cittass' ekaggatā are stated in the initial determination of dhāmas, sammā-samkappā and sammā-samādhi are not, and therefore they are ‘not brought out’ in the sanghā-vāra; but because vitakka, vicāra and cittass' ekaggatā are stated in the initial determination of dhāmas, jhāna-factors are said to be ‘found’, but they are still not ‘brought-out’ in the sanghā-vāra. Cf. Dh-Mṭ (Be) 126.

55 Cf. Abhidh-av 31: sabbaṃvittenavitakke su jhānaṅgani na uddhāre.

56 Cf. Abhidh-av 31: sabbaṅheuka-cittasu maggaṅgani na c' uddhāre.

ly weak; there are no balas, jhānaṅgas or maggaṅgas, and even indriyas can be said to be present in only a very limited sense.

As far as they can be ascertained from an abbreviated text, the details of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi's handling of the indriyas, balas, jhānaṅgas and maggaṅgas for the remaining types of citta are set out below. For this I have adopted the classic commentarial schema of eighty-nine cittas, but follow the order of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi arrangement. I include in this table the adhipatis (as an indication of the extent of the relevance of the iddhi-pādas) and the bojjhāṅgas. A few comments are in order.

Although it cannot be definitely determined from the text of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, the Atthasālinī seems to be of the view that the seventeen vipāka-cittas (42-58) should all be taken as having indriyas, balas and jhānaṅgas; possibly we should exclude the maggaṅgas on the principle that they are only properly relevant to actively skilful and unskilful citta. The same considerations apply to the seventeen kiriya-cittas of the arahant (73-89). Buddhadatta's Abhidhammāvatāra provides some assistance in determining the commentarial position on these matters, but also raises the problem of later divergence from the traditions of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi. Buddhadatta brings out jhāna-factors in all but the twice-five sense-consciousnesses, and this is clearly at odds with the text of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi as we have it. For in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi the treatment of the remaining eight types of ahetuka-citta is not different from that of the twice-five sense-consciousnesses in this respect; the relevant koṭṭhāsa-vāras plainly omit the jhāna-factors (although cittass'ekaggatā and some variety of vedanā are given as present).

I should reiterate here something that I mentioned in chapter six. The treatment of the maggaṅgas with regard to the eight varieties of lokuttara-citta (18-21, 59-62)—the four paths and the four fruits (lokuttara-vipāka)—is rather special on two accounts. Not only are samma-diṭṭhi, -saṅkappa, -vācā, -kammanta, -ājīva, -vāyāma, -sati and -samādhi stated in the initial determination of dhammas present, and brought out as an eight-factored path in the koṭṭhāsa-vāra, but in addition the detailed definition of terms, the pada-bhājaniya,
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**KEY**

- 'brought out'
- while certain items of the 22 are 'brought out' as *indriyas*, items usually classed as or equivalent to the five spiritual indriyas are not all 8 *maggas* are 'brought out' in *lokuttara-citta*
- Dhs and As are not explicit
- the position of Abhidh-av (where apparently at odds with Dhs and As or where they are not explicit)
- *cittass'ekaggatā* is not 'brought out' as *indriya*, *bala* or *magga* in *vicikicchā-sampayutta-citta*
- the treatment of the *balas* in these *cittas* is problematic
comments of each of these eight items and their equivalents that they are ‘factors of the path’ and that they are ‘included in the path’ (magga-pariyāpanna).

This added emphasis on the path is because, it seems, the presence of all eight path-factors, which defines lokuttara-citta, brings to completion and fulfilment the ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo. Another distinctive feature of the Dhammasaṅgani’s treatment of the eight lokuttara varieties of citta is that, where appropriate, dhāma-vicaya-sambojhaṅga, sati-, viriya-, piti-, passaddhi- and samādhi-sambojhaṅga are brought out. ‘This is confined to the detailed definition of terms or pada-bhājaniya, and is not a feature of the koṭṭhāsa-
vāra.

I referred to the relationship between the iddhi-pādas and adhipati in chapter three. The Dhammasaṅgani confines its treatment of the adhipatis to actively skilful and unskilful citta (1-33), and also to the four lokuttara-vipaṅka (59-62).

According to the Atthasālini, kāmavacara-citta may or may not have an adhipati depending on particular circumstances; rūpavacara and arūpavacara always has an adhipati. Once more this appears to have something to do with the dynamics and power of different types of consciousness; it fits well with the notion of the iddhi-pādas as tied up with the potential for growth inherent in different types of consciousness, which are then seen as the bases for further development.

Finally we need to note that the Dhammasaṅgani makes it explicit that the breakthrough to stream-attainment, and so on takes place in a state of mind equivalent in some sense to that of rūpavacara-jhāna. In other words, it makes explicit a point already noted, namely that ‘awakening’ is itself conceived of as a kind of jhāna. The Dhammasaṅgani introduces the various types of lokuttara consciousness by the following formula:

At that time when one develops transcendent jhāna, which leads out and brings about dispersal, for the sake of abandoning wrong views and for achieving the first stage, [and when] secluded from sensual desires ... one attains and dwells in the first jhāna ... at that time there is ...

Three parts of this formula are then varied. ‘For the sake of abandoning wrong views and for achieving the first stage’ is replaced first by ‘for the weakening of passion for the objects of sensual desire and illwill, and for achieving the second path’ (kāma-rāga-vyāpādānām patānu-bhāvāya dutiyāya bhummīyā pattiya), then by ‘for the sake of abandoning passion for the objects of sensual desire and illwill without remainder, and for achieving the third stage’ (kāma-rāga-vyāpādānām anavasesa-ppahānāya tatiyāya bhummīyā pattiya), and finally by ‘for the sake of abandoning without remainder passion for the world of

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67 See Dhs 61-8, 75, 117; As 292.
68 On the omission of upekkhā-sambojhaṅga see above, p. 157, n. 69.
69 See Dhs 61-8, 75, 117; As 292.
70 Could we also include the seventeen kiriya (73-89)?
71 See As 213. Of vipāka-citta, why the lokuttara alone has adhipati is discussed at As 291. Cf. Abhidh-av 11: honti sādhīpatin eva lokuttara-phalāni tu/ vipāke’dhipati nāththi ṣhapetvā/ ।
72 Dhs 60: yasmim samaye lokuttaron jhānaṁ bhāveti niyānīkam apacaya-gāmīṁ dīṭṭha-gaṭānām pahānāya paṭhamāya bhummīyā pattiya viviec’eva kāmehi ... pe ... paṭhamam jhānam upasampajjā viharati ... tasmiṁ samaye hoti ...
forms and the formless, conceit, agitation and ignorance (rūpa-rāga-arūpa-rāgamaṇa-uddhacca-avijjā) and for achieving the fourth stage;\textsuperscript{73} we thus have the paths of stream-attainment, once-return, non-return and arahant-ship. Next, for 'first jhāna' any of the remaining four jhānas of the fivefold system may be substituted.\textsuperscript{74}

However, from the point of view of present concerns, the most important variable in the formula is the following: in place of 'transcendent jhāna' we can have 'transcendent magga', 'transcendent satipaṭṭhāna', 'transcendent sammappadhāna', 'transcendent iddhi-pāda', 'transcendent indriya', 'transcendent bala', 'transcendent bojhāṅga', 'transcendent sacca', 'transcendent samatha', 'transcendent dhamma', 'transcendent khandha', 'transcendent āyatana', 'transcendent dhātu', 'transcendent āhāra', 'transcendent phassa', 'transcendent vedanā', 'transcendent saññā', 'transcendent cetanā', 'transcendent citta'.\textsuperscript{75} These twenty 'great methods' (mahā-naya) apply equally to lokuttara-vipāka consciousness. This list can perhaps be compared to list B in the Paṭisambhidāmagga; both lists seem intended as a way of reviewing the transcendent mind from all possible aspects. The way in which the 'path' comes first of the seven sets perhaps reflects the perspective of the Mahāsalāyatanika-sutta where the 'path' is seen as the fulfilment of the seven sets.

So, nothing is said in the Dhammasaṅgani about the satipaṭṭhānas and samma-ppadhānas apart from lokuttara-citta. In so far as the iddhi-pādas are identifiable with the adhipatis, they occur in skilful and unskilful citta, but are especially characteristic of rūpāvacara and arūpāvacara consciousness according to the Atthasālīni, a fact that is suggestive of their particular association with meditational power. Indriyas appear to be the most universally applicable category, while balas and maggaṅgas are restricted to skilful and unskilful conscious, though matters are complicated as far as balas are concerned by the 'laughter producing' citta of the arahant. The bojhāṅgas are restricted to lokuttara consciousness, while the maggaṅgas also receive special emphasis in this context. All seven sets are considered as characteristic of lokuttara-citta.

4. The seven sets in the Vibhaṅga

When we turn to the second book of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, the Vibhaṅga, the seven sets are dealt with directly and not obliquely as in the Dhammasaṅgani. The Vibhaṅga, then, gives an account of all seven sets except that, as I have already pointed out, the five spiritual indriyas are dealt with in the context of the full list of twenty-two indriyas, and the five balas do not feature at all as distinct items; presumably this is because the Vibhaṅga's particular method of analysis would fail to distinguish them from the five spiritual indriyas.

In the Vibhaṅga, each of the five chapters devoted to the satipaṭṭhānas, samma-ppadhānas, iddhi-pādas, bojhāṅgas and magga respectively has three

\textsuperscript{73} See Dhs 74-5.
\textsuperscript{74} See Dhs 70-2.
\textsuperscript{75} See Dhs 73, 107-8; cf. As 237-8.
sections: an analysis according to Suttanta (suttanta-bhājaniya), an analysis according to Abhidhamma (abhidhamma-bhājaniya), and a section of question and answer (paññhāpucchaka). I have already, in the course of the analysis of the sets individually, referred to the appropriate suttanta-bhājaniya sections, so now I wish to look more closely at the general principles of the abhidhamma-bhājaniya treatment of the sets. The paññhāpucchaka sections, to which I shall also refer, extend the Abhidhamma analysis by putting each of the sets through the matrix of the Abhidhamma triplets and couplets set out at the beginning of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī. Thus it is asked how many of the twenty-two indriyas, and so on, are skilful, how many unskilful and how many undetermined, and so on for the rest of the twenty-two triplets and 100 couplets.76

The abhidhamma-bhājaniya for the indriya-vibhaṅga is quite straightforward.77 It consists simply of twenty-two registers of terms defining each of the indriyas. The registers given for the five spiritual indriyas agree exactly with those given for the corresponding terms in the word analysis for the first kind of citta treated in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī. Thus saddhindriya is related to saddhā-balā; viriyindriya to viro bhā-balā and samma-vāyāma; satindriya to sati-balā and samma-sati; samīdhindriya to samādhi-balā and samma-samādhi; paññindriya to paññā-balā, dhamma-vicaya and samma-dīṭṭhi. However, there is no use of the actual terms bojjhaṅga and maggaṅga. Examination of the paññhāpucchaka shows that the five spiritual indriyas are not here understood in their exclusively lokuttara aspect or even in their skilful aspect; as in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, they are seen as indriyas in their general aspect, whether skilful, unskilful or undetermined.78

In the abhidhamma-bhājaniya for the satipaṭṭhānas,79 however, the four activities of dwelling watching body, feeling, mind and dhamma are treated exclusively as aspects of lokuttara consciousness. The basic formula for lokuttara-jñāna is borrowed directly from the Dhammasaṅgaṇi,80 and the four phrases kāye kāyānupassī, vedanāsu vedanānupassī, cittē cittānupassī, dhammesu dhammānupassī are inserted one at a time in four consecutive rehearsals of the formula. At the conclusion of each rehearsal we are told that ‘whatever at this time is sati, anussati ... samma-sati, sati-sambojhaṅga, maggaṅga, magga-pariyāpanna, this is called satipaṭṭhāna and remaining dhammas are associated (sampayutta) with satipaṭṭhāna.’ This, then, is the full register for lokuttara mindfulness as given in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi.81 Next we have a fifth rehearsal (omitted in the PTS text) of the basic lokuttara-jñāna formula in answer to the bare question, ‘Therein what is satipaṭṭhāna?’ This is called the bare (suddhika)

76 See Table 12, pp. 328-9.
77 Vibh 122-4.
78 At Vibh 125 we are told that six indriyas may be skilful, unskilful and undetermined; the arithmetic of this only works if viriyindriya and samādhindriya are counted among these six; the way in which the indriyas are treated generally can also be determined by reference to a number of other triplets in the paññhāpucchaka for the indriyas; see table.
79 Vibh 202-5.
80 See Dhs 60 (§ 277); abbreviated at Vibh 203.
81 E.g. Dhs 62 (§ 290).
The seven sets in the Abhidhamma

satipaṭṭhāna method in the commentary. The formula concludes with the same summary statement as the previous rehearsals. This completes the treatment of satipaṭṭhāna for skilful lokuttara consciousness. The Vibhaṅga then relates satipaṭṭhāna to the basic Dhammasaṅgāni formula for lokuttara-vipāka types of jhāna according to the same pattern of five rehearsals (this time the 'bare' satipaṭṭhāna method is included in the PTS text).

These basic rehearsals relate only to the first jhāna and to the first path and fruit—those of stream-attainment. Though the text of the Vibhaṅga gives no definite indications, the commentary takes it that the basic rehearsals of the formula should be expanded in full according to the method of the Dhammasaṅgāni; that is to say, by way of the fourfold and fivefold system of jhāna and so forth. Taking into account all possible variables, the commentary states that the ten basic methods expand to 80,000.

The fifth rehearsals—the two 'bare' satipaṭṭhāna methods of skilful lokuttara and lokuttara-vipāka respectively—are of some interest. The precise wording here is in doubt. Certainly we need to insert a paragraph into the PTS Vibhaṅga text for the skilful lokuttara type:

\[
\text{tattha katamam satipaṭṭhānam. idha bhikkhu yasmiṃ samaye lokuttaram jhānam bhāveti nīyānīkaṃ apacaya-gāmin diṭṭhi-gatānām pahānāya pathāmāya bhūmiyā pattiya, vivic'eva kāmehi, pe. paṭhamam jhānam upasampaja viharati dukkha-paṭ-padaṃ dandhābhīhiṃnāṃ (dhammesu dhammānupassi) yā tasmiṃ samaye sati anussati. pe. sammā-sati sati-sambojjhāngo maggangaṃ magga-partyāpam, idam vuccati satipaṭṭhānāṃ.}
\]

Our problem is the inclusion or otherwise of the phrase dhammesu dhammānupassi. Printed oriental editions seem to be fairly consistent in including the phrase for the skilful lokuttara bare satipaṭṭhāna method, and rather less so in including it for the lokuttara-vipāka. The Mūla-ṭikā, while not perhaps finally deciding the issue, does offer some clues:

In the abhidhamma-bhājaniya, [first] with [the words] 'And how does he dwell watching body with regard to body? Here at the time when a bhikkhu ... [and] direct knowledge slow; he watches body with regard to body—whatever at that time is sati ... ' and so forth, the persons are determined and the [different] satipaṭṭhānas distinguished by way of approach [i.e. kāya, vedanā, citta, dhamma]. Next, with [the words] 'Therein what is satipaṭṭhāna? Here at the time when a bhikkhu ... direct knowledge slow ... whatever at that time is sati ... ' and so forth, by not citing the persons and not making any distinction of approach, the bare satipaṭṭhāna method is stated by way of one sati accomplishing four functions. This is the distinction between the two methods here.
The *pa* in the text of the *Mūla-ṭīkā* surely shows that the text of the *Vibhaṅga* that the author of the *Mūla-ṭīkā* had before him had something between *dandhābhīṣṇam* and *yā tasmīṃ samaye sati* in the bare *satipaṭṭhāna* formula. Since a number of manuscripts and printed editions have *dhammesu dhammadūmapassi* precisely at this point, it seems reasonable to view it as an authentic part of the text. It is difficult to see why the *vīpāka* should be different from the *kusala* in this respect—the *āṭṭhakathā* and *ṭīkā* fail to make any comment. It would seem that the *Mūla-ṭīkā*’s point about the different *satipaṭṭhānas* being distinguished or not, and the persons being cited or not refers to the difference in the form of the initial questions: *kathā ca kāye kāyāṇupassi viharati*, etc., and *tattha katamam satipaṭṭhānam*. The point about the one mindfulness fulfilling four functions in *lokuttara* consciousness refers back to the *Visuddhi-magga*’s account. If we are correct in reading *dhammesu dhammadūmapassi* in the bare *satipaṭṭhāna* method, then we seem to have an expression of the notion that at the level of *lokuttara* consciousness all four *satipaṭṭhānas* collectively resolve into *dhammesu dhammadūmapassanā* (cf. section one of this chapter).

Rather interestingly this would appear to have rather close parallels with the understanding of the four *smṛty-upasthānas* in the *Abhidharmakośa*. Vasubandhu states that the first three *smṛty-upasthānas* have individual objects (*āmiśrālambana, asambhīṁlālambana*) that fall into the categories of *kāya, vedanā* or *citta*. However, *dharma-smṛty-upasthāna* can be of two varieties: that which has an individual object—a *dharma* that does not fall into the categories of *kāya, vedanā* or *citta*; and that which has a unified object (*samastālambana*). This more advanced stage of *dharma-smṛty-upasthāna* unifies the watching of *kāya, vedanā, citta* and other *dharmanas*, and gives rise to the kind of *dharma-smṛty-upasthāna* that constitutes the four *nirvedha-bhāgīyas*, i.e. the stages of the path that are concerned with actively developing the penetrative wisdom that leads directly to the *lokottara* path. This seems to be making a very similar point to the one made in the Pāli sources, and in the *Vibhaṅga* in particular. For the *Abhidharmakośa*, in the higher stages of the path, one *smṛty-upasthāna* fulfils the functions of all four *smṛty-upasthānas*; this one *smṛty-upasthāna* is to be considered a variety of *dharma-smṛty-upasthāna*. The main difference vis-à-vis the Pāli sources is that this kind of *smṛty-upasthāna* is not strictly confined to transcendent (*lokuttara/lokottara*) consciousness. Probably this difference should be seen simply as a point of strict Abhidharma, and should, I think, be related to the Theravādin notion that the *lokuttara* path-consciousness endures for but a single moment, as opposed to the fifteen moments of the Sarvāstivādin system. The *ekāḥśīsamaṇa* outlook of the Theravādins is bound to emphasize the special quality of the moment that finally and at once fulfils all that was previously only partially fulfilled.

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katamam satipaṭṭhānama? idha bhikkhu yasmīṃ samaye|| pa|| dandhābhīṣṇam|| pa|| yā tasmīṃ samaye sati’ ti ādīnā puggalāṃ anāmasītī āgamanā- [reading with *Anuṭṭika*] vīsesānaṃ ca akatvā catu-kicca-sādhakeka-sati-vasena suddhika-satipaṭṭhāna-nayo vutto ti ayaṃ ettha naya-dvaye vi-seso//

87 Abhidh-k 343.
88 See Abhidh-k 343-4.
both systems seem to understand is that the final stages of the path involve a fundamental transformation of awareness whereby the practitioner sees not so much isolated dhammas/dharmas as dhamma/dharma itself. This transformation is sealed by the transcendent path, but presumably in the Theravāda, as in the Sarvāstivāda, the higher stages of ‘ordinary insight’, i.e. the stages that would be thought of as concerned with the development of the lokiya-bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas (see section six of this chapter), would also be seen as already actively participating in this transformation. In other words, the four nirvedha-bhāgiyas correspond rather closely to the stages of the lokiya-bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas.

So the treatment of the satipaṭṭhānas in the abhidhamma-bhājaniya brings us back to their treatment in the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta. For the distinguishing of the four individual satipaṭṭhānas at the level of lokuttara consciousness suggests that each satipaṭṭhāna in some sense can be developed up to the stage of lokuttara consciousness. At the same time the bare satipaṭṭhāna method suggests that in the actual arising of lokuttara consciousness all four satipaṭṭhānas are fulfilled.

Turning now to the abhidhamma-bhājaniya for the samma-ppadhānas, we find that they are treated here similarly to the satipaṭṭhānas. First each of the four parts of the samma-ppadhāna formula is combined with the basic skilful lokuttara-ijjhāna formula from the Dhammasaṅgani, giving us four successive rehearsals. Finally, we once more have a fifth rehearsal—a ‘bare’ samma-ppadhāna method. Presumably this once more relates to the Visuddhimagga point that in the path-consciousness, one viriya fulfils the function of all four samma-ppadhānas. One should note here that there appears to be no suggestion in the text that it is the fourth samma-ppadhāna that should be seen as fulfilling the functions of all four. A basic contrast with the satipaṭṭhāna treatment is the fact that the samma-ppadhānas are not combined with lokuttara-vipāka consciousness: there are no samma-ppadhānas in the fruition citta. Indeed the answer to the very first question in the pañhāpucchaka confirms the point: the samma-ppadhānas are just skilful. This is taken up in the bodhi-pakkhiya-kathā of the Visuddhimagga, as already noted. The Vibhāṅga commentary here states simply that ‘in the vipāka there is no function to be performed by the samma-ppadhānas’.

The abhidhamma-bhājaniya treatment of the iddhi-pādas does not quite follow the pattern of the satipaṭṭhāna and samma-ppadhāna treatments. To begin with the iddhi-pādas are taken in two quite distinct ways. The first method treats them by way of their standard Suttanta formula: ‘the iddhi-pāda that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of chanda ... viriya ... citta ... vīmāṇsā, and with forces of endeavour’. Each of the four parts is in turn related to the Dhammasaṅgani lokuttara-ijjhāna formula as in the cases of the satipaṭṭhānas and samma-ppadhānas. There follows a brief ‘word-commentary’ virtually identical to the one found in the suttanta-bhājaniya. The iddhi is

89 Vibh 211-4.
90 Vibh-a 302: vipāke pana samma-ppadhānehi kattabba-kiccam n’atthi ti vipāka-vāro na gahito ti.
91 Vibh 220-4.
once more defined as the 'success', 'growth', 'attainment' and so on, of all dhammas present. The basis of this 'success'—the iddhi-pāda—is the totality of skilful dhammas that have arisen at that time.92

This first way of taking the iddhi-pādas is followed by what the commentaries call the uttara-cūla-bhājaniya93 in which the four iddhi-pādas are defined succinctly as chandiddhi-pāda, viriyiddhi-pāda, cittiddhi-pāda and vimānsiddhi-pāda. Once more these four are in turn related to the lokuttara-jjhāna formula from the Dhammasaṅgani. No 'word-commentary' follows, but each rehearsal continues with a statement that shows that it is chanda itself—or viriya, citta, or vimānsā—that is being taken as the 'basis of success';94 remaining dhammas are associated with chandiddhi-pāda, and so on.

So there is no 'bare' method for the iddhi-pādas. There are just two ways of taking each of the four iddhi-pādas. According to the first, the totality of skilful dhammas is seen as the iddhi-pāda, according to the second just chanda, viriya, citta or vimānsā.95 What is also remarkable is that there is no treatment of the iddhi-pādas with regard to lokuttara-vipāka consciousness. Again this omission is confirmed by the answer to the first question in the paññāpucchaka: all four iddhi-pādas are just skilful.96 This treatment raises two problems. In the Visuddhimagga account of the bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas Buddhaghosa appears to take it that four iddhi-pādas can be said to be present in some sense at the time of the arising of both the lokuttara path-consciousness and the lokuttara fruit-consciousness. But in what sense? Secondly, why are the iddhi-pādas excluded from vipāka-citta in the Vibhanga but not in the Visuddhimagga?

The answer to these problems should possibly be seen as connected with the two ways of looking at the iddhi-pādas in the abhidhamma-bhājaniya. The very fact that there are two alternative ways of taking the iddhi-pādas here, suggests that even according to Abhidhamma analysis the way of handling the iddhi-pādas cannot be as strict and as final as it can be with other categories. To the extent that the iddhi-pādas are to be related to the notion of adhipati, it appears that only one iddhi-pāda could function at any time. However, this strict way of taking the iddhi-pādas would appear to be confined to the uttara-cūla-bhājaniya and paññāpucchaka. If it is the totality of skilful dhammas that constitutes the iddhi-pādas at the time of lokuttara consciousness then there is perhaps a sense in which all four iddhi-pādas can be said to be present at once, or can be said to be fulfilled at once. The relationship of the iddhi-pādas to the four adhipatis would seem to suggest that they should be regarded as present in

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92 Vibh 221-3 (passim): iddhi-pādo ti tathā-bhātassa phasso vedanā, pe. paggaho avikkhepo. (Cf. discussion of suttanta-bhājaniya above, Chapter 3.3.)
93 Vibh 223-4; see Vibh-a 308.
94 E.g. Vibh 216: yo tasmin samaye chando chandikatā kattu-kamyatā kusaio dhamma-cchando, ayam vuccati chandiddhi-pādo.
95 Cf. Moh 160-1.
96 See Vibh 224. It is clear that the paññāpucchaka, despite being introduced by the full Suttanta iddhi-pāda formula, considers the iddhi-pādas from the point of view of the narrower uttara-cūla-bhājaniya definition; this comes out in the section on the couplets: e.g. vimānsiddhi-pādo hetu, tayo iddhi-pāda na hetu and tayo iddhi-pāda bāhirā, cittiddhi-pādo ajjhattiko (see Vibh 225).
lokuttara-vipāka consciousness—as I have noted, the Atthasālinī and Abhidhamma-māvatāra make a point of the fact that lokuttara-vipāka is the only variety of vipāka-citta to possess adhipatis. Yet the equation of the adhipatis and iddhipādas is not something absolute.

The Mahā-jikā to the Visuddhimagga comments that when it is said that, excepting the four samma-ppadhānas, the remaining thirty-three bodhi-pakkhiyadhammas are found in the fruition consciousness, this is ‘by way of exposition’ (pariyāyato). This comment is presumably made with regard to the fact that strictly the seven sets encompass fourteen dhammas and not thirty-seven, and that viṇīya is, of course, still a constituent of the fruit, although not reckoned as ‘four samma-ppadhānas’. This suggests that the whole question of counting the thirty-seven dhammas in lokuttara consciousness is ultimately a matter of ‘exposition’; the fact that the way of construing the iddhi-pādas is not entirely fixed would seem to make this doubly so.

The exclusion of the iddhi-pādas from the lokuttara-vipāka is in many ways quite consistent with the way they are understood in the literature. The phala is essentially a passive kind of consciousness; it is not seen as something actively involved in the dynamics of spiritual growth. It is noticeable that the commentarial discussion of various kinds of iddhi and iddhi-pāda leaves the phala entirely out of the reckoning. Thus the path of non-return may be viewed as the basis for the iddhi of the path of arahant-ship, but it does not seem that the fruit of non-return should be viewed as such a basis.

Next in the Vibhaṅga comes the analysis of the seven bojjhaṅgas. In the abhidhamma-bhājanīya first of all the seven bojjhaṅgas are related collectively to the lokuttara-maṅga, and then individually. Thus we are told that at the time of developing lokuttara-jhāna at the level of the first jhāna there are seven bojjhaṅgas (which are defined in the text), and remaining dhammas are associated with these bojjhaṅgas. Following this, the seven bojjhaṅgas are related individually to the lokuttara-jhāna formula. The first of these subsequent rehearsals concludes, then, with a statement that whatever is sati at that time, that is sati-sambojjhaṅga, and remaining dhammas are associated with sati-sambojjhaṅga. Each of the other six bojjhaṅgas is treated similarly. There are thus eight basic rehearsals of the lokuttara-jhāna formula: one for the seven bojjhaṅgas collectively, and one for each of the bojjhaṅgas individually. Again the commentary suggests that each of these is to be expanded following the pattern of the Dhammaśāṅgaṇī. The seven bojjhaṅgas are then related to lokuttara-vipāka consciousness in precisely the same way, with eight rehearsals of the basic formula.

We have here the notion that the bojjhaṅgas form a collective function, along with the notion that the whole, that is to say lokuttara consciousness, exists in some sense only by virtue of its relationship to each individual bojjhaṅga. It is also worth drawing attention to the way in which the treatment

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97 Vism-mht (Ne 1972) III 1620.
98 Vibh-a 307.
99 Vibh 229-32.
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**KEY**

- The 22 triplets are set out in Table 13 (p. 330)
- x falls or may fall into triplet category a/b/c
- should not or may should not be said to fall into triplet-category a/b/c
- is without object (triplets 13, 16, 19, 21)

E.g. The full analysis of the 22 *indriyas* by triplet 16 reads as follows: ‘Seven *indriyas* are without object; four *indriyas* should not be said to have the path as object, to be connected with the motivations of the path, to have the path as overlord; *anānātānātānāsāmitindriya* does not have the path as object, is connected with the motivations of the path, may have the path as overlord, or may should not be said to have the path as overlord; *ubhāṅdindriya* does not have the path as object, may be connected with the motivations of the path, may have the path as overlord, may should not be said to be connected with the motivations of the path, or to have the path as overlord; nine *indriyas* may have the path as object, may be connected with the motivations of the path, may have the path as overlord, may should not be said to have the path as object, to be connected with the motivations of the path, or to have the path as overlord.’ [Vibh 127]
TABLE 13. THE 22 TRIPLETS OF THE ABHIDHAMMA-MĀTIKA
(Dhs 1-2; for the Pāli text see page 360)

1 [a] skilful dhammas; [b] unskilful dhammas; [c] undetermined dhammas.
2 [a] dhammas accompanied by pleasant feeling; [b] dhammas accompanied by unpleasant feeling; [c] dhammas accompanied by not-unpleasant-not-pleasant feeling.
3 [a] dhammas that are results; [b] dhammas that have results; [c] dhammas that neither are results nor have results.
4 [a] dhammas that have been grasped and can be subject to grasping; [b] dhammas that have not been grasped but can be subject to grasping; [c] dhammas that have not been grasped and cannot be subject to grasping.
5 [a] dhammas that are defiled and connected with defilement; [b] dhammas that are undefiled and connected with defilements; [c] dhammas that are undefiled and not connected with defilement.
6 [a] dhammas with initial and sustained thinking; [b] dhammas without initial thinking but still with sustained thinking; [c] dhammas without initial and sustained thinking.
7 [a] dhammas associated with joy; [b] dhammas associated with happiness; [c] dhammas associated with equipoise.
8 [a] dhammas to be abandoned by seeing; [b] dhammas to be abandoned by development; [c] dhammas to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development.
9 [a] dhammas connected with motivations to be abandoned by seeing; [b] dhammas connected with motivations to be abandoned by development; [c] dhammas connected with motivations to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development.
10 [a] dhammas which lead to accumulation; dhammas which lead to dispersal; dhammas which lead neither to accumulation nor to dispersal.
11 [a] dhammas concerned with training; [b] dhammas that are beyond training; [c] dhammas that are neither concerned with training nor beyond training.
12 [a] small dhammas; [b] dhammas that have become great; [c] immeasurable dhammas.
13 [a] dhammas that have a small object; [b] dhammas that have an object that has become great; [c] dhammas that have an immeasurable object.
14 [a] deficient dhammas; [b] middle dhammas; [c] refined dhammas.
15 [a] dhammas destined to wrongness; [b] dhammas destined to accomplishment; [c] dhammas without fixed destiny.
16 [a] dhammas that have the path as object; [b] dhammas that are connected with the motivations of the path; [c] dhammas that have the path as overlord.
17 [a] dhammas that have arisen; [b] dhammas that have not arisen; [c] dhammas that will arise.
18 [a] past dhammas; [b] future dhammas; [c] present dhammas.
19 [a] dhammas that have a past object; [b] dhammas that have a future object; [c] dhammas that have a present object.
20 [a] dhammas that are within; [b] dhammas that are without; [c] dhammas that are within and without.
21 [a] dhammas that have an object within; [b] dhammas that have an object without; [c] dhammas that have an object within and without.
22 [a] dhammas that can be indicated and offer resistance; [b] dhammas that cannot be indicated but offer resistance; [c] dhammas that cannot be indicated and do not offer resistance.
of the bojjhangas contrasts with that of the indriyas. The paññāpucchaka for the indriyas makes it clear that viriya, for example, as an element of skilful or unskilful citta of any kind is to be reckoned viriyindriya. However from the paññāpucchaka for the bojjhangas, it is apparent that it is only as a constituent of lokuttara consciousness that viriya is to be reckoned viriya-sambojjhangā. The same principle operates in the case of the remaining bojjhangas.

So finally there is the magga-vibhaṅga. In principle the abhidhamma-bhājaniya for the magga100 follows the method adopted for the bojjhangas; the path factors are related to lokuttara-jhāna, both skilful and resultant, collectively and then individually. In the case of the path factors, however, we have the complication of the eight-factored path and—omitting sammā-vācā, sammā-kammanta and sammā-ājīva from the reckoning—the five-factored path.

Both the eight-factored and the five-factored paths are each collectively related to the lokuttara-jhāna formula with concluding statements following the usual form: 'this is called the eight-factored path; remaining dharmas are associated with the eight-factored path; remaining dharmas are associated with the five-factored path'.101 However, it is only the five factors that are individually related to the lokuttara-jhāna formula, with concluding statements following the form: 'this is called right view; remaining dharmas are associated with right view'. I have already referred to the ancient Abhidharma discussions concerning the eight- and five-factored path. The Pāli commentaries wholeheartedly reject the notion of a five-factored lokuttara path. Does the Vibhaṅga here preserve a tradition at odds with the received commentarial thinking on the matter? It is just possible, but if it were truly the case one would expect the eight-factored and five-factored paths to be given equal weight as alternatives; that is to say, one would expect both to be related to lokuttara-jhāna collectively and individually. One might also expect there to be mention of a seven-factored and even four-factored path.102 The fact that there is not suggests that it is the special function of the five factors that is being highlighted rather than alternative paths. This, at any rate, is how the commentary takes it:

So what is the point of including this ‘five-factored path’? In order to indicate the extra function. For when one abandons wrong speech and fulfils right speech, then there is no right action and right livelihood. Just these five active factors abandon wrong speech, while right speech fulfils itself by way of refraining ...

The five-factored path is included in order to indicate the extra function of these five active factors.103

100 Vibh 236-41.
101 See Vibh 237-8.
102 Sammā-samkappa (= vitakka) is absent in the second, third, fourth and fifth jhānas of the fivefold system. The possibility of there being a lokuttara path with only seven maggaṅgas is recognized at As 226, 228; similarly there may only be six bojjhangas present (piti-sambojjhangā is absent after the third jhāna in the fivefold system). The possibility of these variations is inherent in the Vibhaṅga in the paññāpucchaka sections; cf. triplets two and seven.
103 Vibh-a 320: atha pañcāntikko maggo ti idam kim attham gahītan ti, atireka-kicca-dassanattham. yasmin hi samaye micchā-vācam pajahati, sammā-vācam pūreti, tasmin samaye sammā-kammanta-sammā-ājīva natthi. imāni pañca kārāpakaṅgān’eva micchā-vācam pajahanti sammā-vācā
The commentary spells this out for right action and livelihood as well. So, in other words, the five path-factors are universally active in the development of right speech, and the rest, but the latter are only active in the refraining from wrong speech, wrong action and wrong livelihood respectively.

As with the bojjhāṅgas, the paññāpucchaka makes it quite clear that the path factors are here treated exclusively as constituents of lokuttara consciousness. The Vibhaṅga is not here concerned with the path-factors in their more general aspect. That this is so is also apparent from the fact that the definitions of the individual path-factors in the abhidhamma-bhājaniya include the terms magga-rīga and magga-pariyāpanna.

What are the general conclusions to be drawn from this treatment? In the first place the Vibhaṅga gives a strict Abhidhamma account of the indriyas, satipaṭṭhānas, samma-ppadhānas, iddhi-pādas, bojjhāṅgas and maggaṅgas. According to this account strictly one only talks of the five last mentioned categories with reference to lokuttara consciousness. For it seems that it is only at this time that they come into their own. This is what they are geared to; this is their ultimate point of reference. Apart from lokuttara consciousness, strictly one should talk only of indriyas. It seems, then, that when the satipaṭṭhānas and so on are spoken of in the context of ordinary skilful citta, it is only in so far as that citta approximates to or is geared towards the development of lokuttara consciousness. It should be noted that the jhānas are treated quite differently from the seven sets in the Vibhaṅga; they are not confined to lokuttara consciousness (which is, however, included) but are treated by way of ordinary rūpāvaca skilful and resultant citta.

5. The thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā: ordinary and transcendent

As noted above, in the Visuddhimagga a distinction is made between the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā as lokiya or ‘ordinary’ and lokuttara or ‘transcendent’. In fact the commentaries repeatedly draw attention to this distinction:104 when samatha and vipassanā are being actively developed during ‘the prior stage’ (pubba-bhāga, i.e. the stage prior to the arising of the lokuttara path) we can speak of the bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā as lokiya; when the lokuttara path and fruit arise the bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā are themselves lokuttara. What does this strictly mean? In what kinds of consciousness does the commentarial tradition understand ‘ordinary’ bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā to be present? What exactly is the extent of the ‘prior stage’ and what precisely is to be reckoned as samatha and vipassanā?

These questions are worth considering initially in relationship to the varieties of citta distinguished in the Dhammasaṅgāni. Which of these might be said to possess ‘ordinary’ bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā? Clearly we can exclude all unskilful and all vipāka consciousness on the grounds that the development of samatha and vipassanā must involve active skilful consciousness. Of the eight

pana sayam virati-vasena pārati ... imam etesaṃ pañcannam kārāpakāṅgānaṃ kiccātirekakatam dassetuṃ pañcāṅgiko maggo ti gaḥitam.

104 Cf. Sp II 494; Sv II 564; III 883-4; Ps III 243-4; IV 28-9; Mp II 49-51, 70, 73; It-a 73-4.
kāmāvacara skilful citta, the four dissociated from knowledge (ñāna-vippayutta) can also be excluded on the grounds that there is no vipassanā apart from knowledge. This leaves the four kāmāvacara skilful cittas associated with knowledge, and the various kinds of rūpāvacara and arūpāvacara skilful citta. Are we to conclude that whenever any of these varieties of citta occurs, the relevant fourteen dhāmmas are to be termed ‘ordinary’ bodhi-pakkhiyā dhāmman? After all, the Dhammasaṅgani does bring out the pair samatha and vipassanā in these varieties of consciousness. It seems clear that in principle these are the varieties of citta to be associated with ‘ordinary’ bodhi-pakkhiyā dhāmman, but there is perhaps a little more to the commentarial understanding of the matter than this. The question can be taken a little further by pursuing the notion of the pubba-bhāga or ‘prior stage’.

In general, the term pubba-bhāga appears to be a straightforward relative term—the ‘prior stage’ it signifies depends on its precise point of reference. However, its usage seems to indicate that what it refers to is most characteristically whatever is immediately prior to something else; that is to say, a pubba-bhāga is the initial stage of some particular further stage. The usage of the term pubba-bhāga in connection with the exposition of the iddhi-pādas brings this out most clearly. An iddhi-pāda is to be understood as a pubba-bhāga for an iddhi. It is said that the meaning of this is to be explained with reference to either access concentration (cf. samatha) or insight. Accordingly if the point of reference is the first jhāna, then the pubba-bhāga is the ‘preparation’ (parikamma) for the first jhāna; if the point of reference is the path of stream-attainment, then the pubba-bhāga is the insight for the path of stream-attainment (sotāpatti-maggassa vipassanā).

The association of pubba-bhāga with parikamma is of some significance. In the description of the consciousness process that immediately precedes full absorption (appanā) of form-sphere jhāna, formless-sphere attainments and the lokuttara path and fruit types of consciousness, parikamma appears as a technical term. This consciousness process focuses on the actual transition from the ordinary sense-sphere consciousness to form-sphere, formless-sphere or lokuttara consciousness. The moment of transition is understood to be preceded by three or four moments of ordinary kāmāvacara skilful citta associated with knowledge. These four moments of consciousness may be termed ‘preparation’ (parikamma), ‘access’ (upacāra), ‘conformity’ (anuloma) and ‘state of lineage’ (gotra-bhū) respectively. By an alternative method the initial three (parikamma, upacāra and anuloma) may be collectively termed parikamma or upacāra or anuloma. It seems that it is with reference to this that

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105 See Dhs 9-29; the four nāna-sampayutta are the first, second, fifth and sixth types of citta distinguished.
106 Cf. Dhs 9.
107 As 378 characterizes the pubba-bhāga and aparā-bhāga of sleep as thīna-middha.
108 See above, p. 88.
109 See Vism IV 74-5, XIV 121, XXI 129-30.
110 Abhidh-s IV 7; see (JPTS (1884), p. 18).
111 When there are only three initial moments of citta, it is the parikamma moment that is taken as missing.
the parikamma for the first jhāna is taken as an iddhi-pāda or pubba-bhāga. Quite consistently, the term pubba-bhāga is elsewhere identified with upacāra concentration.\textsuperscript{112} The significance of this is that the notion of ‘access-concentration’ involves not only a momentary consciousness that is passed through on the way to full absorption, but also a more definite and enduring stage; upacāra is a level of concentration to be cultivated in its own right.\textsuperscript{113} It seems that the pubba-bhāga with regard to the arising of the lokuttara path might be taken in a similar way; that is to say it might be taken to indicate either a momentary stage passed through immediately prior to the arising of lokuttara consciousness, or a more enduring stage that nevertheless corresponds in level more or less to the momentary stage. In other words, if one’s point of reference is the lokuttara path-knowledge, then the pubba-bhāga is samatha and vipassanā that either immediately precedes its arising, or approximates and is close to it in character. In this connection it is worth quoting a commentarial gloss:

‘He does not take up the sign’: he does not know that, having reached conformity and the state of lineage, the meditation subject has been established by him; he is unable to take up the sign in his mind. In this sutta the satipaṭṭhānas connected with insight of the prior stage only are spoken of.\textsuperscript{114}

This outlook is perhaps to be related to a brief comment in a later Abhidhamma work, the Paramatthavavinicchaya, to the effect that the bodhipakkhiyā dhammā are seen at the stage of watching the rise and fall of things (udaya-bbaya-dassana).\textsuperscript{115} According to Buddhaghosa and the author of the Paramatthavavinicchaya, watching rise and fall (udaya-bbayañapassanā) is characteristic of both the fifth visuddhi (knowledge and vision of path and not-path) and the sixth visuddhi (knowledge and vision of the way).\textsuperscript{116} The knowledge connected with watching rise and fall at the stage of the fifth visuddhi is initially disabled by the ten defilements (upakkilesa) of insight. Having overcome the ten defilements, the practitioner completes the fifth visuddhi and enters the stage of the sixth visuddhi which begins once more with the watching of rise and fall, and culminates in the momentary ‘knowledge of conformity’ (anulomanañāna) that signals the arising of the lokuttara path. According to Buddhadatta the last of the nine knowledges that add up to the sixth visuddhi is called ‘conformity’ because it conforms both to the previous eight knowledges and to the bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas.\textsuperscript{117} So anulomanāña is what links the domain of the advanced stages of insight to the domain of the bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas

\textsuperscript{112} Vism III 6: ‘And that which is one-pointedness in the prior-stage of the absorption concentrations—this is access concentration.’ (yā ca appanā-samadhiñāna pubba-bhāga ekaggatā ayam upacāra-samādhi.)

\textsuperscript{113} Cf. Vism III 6, 106, IV 32-3.


\textsuperscript{116} See Vism 93-104, XX 2-9; Paramatthavavinicchaya, JPTS 10 (1985), pp. 210-11.

\textsuperscript{117} Abhidh-av 124: purimānaṁ paṭṭhamānaṁ aññānaṁ anulomato bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammaṁ uddhatā ca anulomato/ tenēva taṁ hi saccānulomaṅānaṁ pavuccati/ (Cf. Vimutt Trsl 301, quoted above, p. 302).
proper, namely the lokuttara paths and fruits. To then view the advanced stages of insight as the particular domain of the lokiya or ordinary bodhipakkhiya-dhammas requires only a small shift in one’s perspective.

It seems possible, then, to form a fairly clear idea of the particular domain of the ordinary bodhi-pakkhiya dhamma as understood in the commentaries. But one should note here that the notion of pubba-bhāga is sometimes extended to the notion of sabba-pubba-bhāga or ‘the prior stage of all’.118 Thus the Vibhāṅga commentary states that the discussion of the samma-ppadhānas is twofold, lokiya and lokuttara; the lokiya discussion refers to the sabba-pubba-bhāga.119 This might suggest that at whatever stage in a bhikkhu’s practice skilful viriya arises, it can be appropriately termed samma-ppadhāna. But this principle would not seem to apply equally to all seven sets. Even when the application of the bojhāngas is extended beyond the confines of lokuttara paths and fruit, and beyond the confines of strong insight, the usage of the term is still fairly tight: the kasina-jhānas that are a basis for insight and the jhānas of breathing in and out, ugliness and the brahma-vihāras.120 If one recalls the treatment of the Dhammasaṅgani, all this is perhaps indicative of a certain hierarchy underlying the conception of the seven sets, that is to say one might speak of samma-ppadhāna, indriyas and balas in rather more contexts than one might speak of bojhangas. This is certainly rather suggestive when considered alongside the Sarvāstivādin conception of the seven sets as spanning the various stages of the path to awakening.

6. The thirty-seven bodhi-pāṭṣikā dhammā according to the Sarvāstivāda

In this section I do not intend to attempt a systematic and comprehensive account of the thirty-seven bodhi-pāṭṣikā dhammā according to Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma sources; such an undertaking would extend this study indefinitely. Rather I wish to draw attention to the basic features and principles of the treatment of the thirty-seven dharmas in Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts—and also other texts that bear a kinship relationship to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma system. This will help to throw the Theravādin Abhidhamma treatment into relief. My basic sources for this section are the *Abhidharmahṛdaya (or

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118 At M 1 70 the sabba-pubba-bhāga of mettā is clearly distinguished from both ‘access’ and ‘absorption’; it is ‘the mere suffusion of friendliness towards beings’ (mettāya sabba-pubba-bhāgo nama neva appāra na upacāro sattām hita-pharaṇa-mattam eva ti). The same passage continues: ‘But here it should be understood that he practises just by the mere occurrence of a suffusion of friendliness which is the prior stage of mettā.’ (idha pana mettā-pubba-bhāgo nama neva appāra na upacāro sattām hita-pharaṇa-mattam eva āsavo ti veditabbam.) I do not think that the equation of mettayā pubba-bhāga and mettāya sabba-pubba-bhāga in this particular context can be taken to mean, as Aronson suggests (LCSJE, p. 224), that the two expressions are used as simple equivalents in all contexts; Aronson’s conclusion that mettayā pubba-bhāga is always necessarily something different from ‘access’, therefore appears to me unsound. (Cf. Aronson, LCSJE, pp. 112-8, 160-4, 223-4.)


120 See above, p. 180.
The precise dating of these texts is, as always, problematic, but the first three of the aforementioned works seem certainly to pre-date the *Abhidharmakośa* (4th-5th centuries CE), while the *Abhidharmadīpa* certainly assumes the *Kośa*.125

Like the Pāli sources, these Buddhist Sanskrit sources identify the bodhipāksikā dharmā with the mārga or 'path'. As we have seen, strictly the Pāli Abhidhamma sources tend to identify the seven sets or thirty-seven bodhipakṣikā dhammā with the actual arising of the lokuttara path, i.e. the culmination of the path, though a more general identification of the seven sets with the path seems to be assumed in the Suttanta formulations. Buddhist Sanskrit sources, too, tend to see the relationship of the thirty-seven dharmas to the path in broad terms.126

So the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma understands the thirty-seven bodhipāksikā dharmā to be one possible way of characterizing the path to awakening. However, the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma does, of course, preserve its own account of the consecutive stages of the path to awakening—the counterpart to the account of the seven visuddhis in the *Visuddhimagga*. The basic features of this Sarvāstivādin account of the stages of the path have been well documented by others,127 and since the treatment of the bodhipāksikā dharmā is to some extent geared to this gradual account, it is as well to set it out in brief here.

The complete path to awakening is usually conceived of as made up of five paths: 'the path of equipment' (sambhāra-mārga), 'the path of application' (prayoga-mārga), 'the path of vision' (darśana-mārga), 'the path of development' (bhāvanā-mārga), and 'the path of the adept' (aśaikṣa-mārga).128 The sambhāra-mārga consists of the various practices that are considered the necessary preliminaries to the cultivation of the path proper; it culminates in the practice of aśubha-bhāvanā and ānāpāna-sṛṃṭi results in śamatha or samādhi, and it is at this point

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121 The Essence of Metaphysics, translated and annotated by C. Willemen, Bruxelles, 1975; Le Coeur de la Loi Suprême, traduit et annoté par I. Armelin, Paris, 1978. (References are to the former).
125 For additional references to non-Pāli sources see below, pp. 357-8.
126 By means of the seven sets one attains nirvāṇa (Amṛta Trsl 201); the truth of the path consists of the thirty-seven bodhipāksikā dharmā (Satya Trsl 41); the path is called bodhipāksika (Abhidh-k 382; Abhidh-dī 356).
127 La Vallée Poussin, Abhidh-k Trsl IV iv-xi; Lamotte, HBI, pp. 678-85; Conze, BTI, pp. 175-7; H.V. Guenther, PPA, pp. 215-32.
128 Also called the viśesa- or niṣṭhā-mārga.
129 Abhidh-k 337 (VI 8-9).
that the practitioner begins to develop the four smṛty-upaṣṭhānas proper.\textsuperscript{130} Borne of the practice of the fourth smṛty-upaṣṭhāna\textsuperscript{131} (which here, as noted, subsumes the other three) are the four stages of penetrative wisdom (nirvedha-bhāgiya) that constitute the prayoga-mārga: ‘sparks’ (uṣma-gata), ‘summits’ (mūrddhan), ‘acceptance’ (ksānti) and the state that constitutes the peak of ordinary experience, the laukikāgra-dharma. This last is momentary and signals the immediate arising of the transcendent darsana-mārga. In the Abhidharma-kosa-bhāṣya Vasubandhu’s account of the four nirvedha-bhāgiyas sees them as an extension of the practice of the fourth smṛty-upaṣṭhāna.\textsuperscript{132} The nirvedha-bhāgiyas are developed only in the preliminary to full dhyāna (i.e. the anāgamyā; cf. the Theravāda notion of upacāra) or in the dhyānas themselves (including the dhyānāntara or ‘in between dhyāna’ without vitarka but still with vicāra); they are not developed in the four formless attainments.\textsuperscript{133} The momentary stage of laukikāgra-dharma is still considered to be ‘with āsravas’ (sārava). The darsana-mārga consists of fifteen moments of consciousness that are said to be ‘without āsravas’ (anāsrava).\textsuperscript{134} There follows a sixteenth moment which completes the vision of the four truths in sixteen aspects. This sixteenth moment constitutes the beginning of the bhāvanā-mārga.\textsuperscript{135} The fifteen moments are equivalent to path-attainment and the sixteenth moment to fruit attainment.\textsuperscript{136} Like the nirvedha-bhāgiyas, these sixteen consciousnesses occur only at the levels of the anāgamyā, dhyānāntara, and four dhyānas.\textsuperscript{137} The culmination of the bhāvanā-mārga is the ‘diamond like concentration’ (vajropama-samādhi) of the path of arhantship that issues in bodhi itself: knowledge with regard to non-arising (anutpāda-jñāna) and knowledge with regard to destruction (ksaya-jñāna).\textsuperscript{138} The fruit of arhant-ship is equivalent to the āsaikṣa-mārga.

This summary account of the Sarvāstivādin path will suffice for present purposes. Alongside it I wish to consider the thirty-seven bodhi-pākṣikā dharmāḥ by way of three topics:\textsuperscript{139} (i) the consideration of the thirty-seven dharmas as ten dravyas or ‘elements’; (ii) the distribution of the seven sets over the five paths of equipment, application, vision, development and the adept; (iii) the distribution of the thirty-seven dharmas through the various levels of existence, beginning with the realm of sense-desire (kāma-dhātu).

\textsuperscript{130} Abhidh-k 341 (VI 14a): niśpanna-śamathāḥ kuryāt smṛty-upaṣṭhāna-bhāvanām.
\textsuperscript{131} Abhidh-k 343 (bh to VI 17a): tasmā dharma-smṛty-upaṣṭhānād evam abhyastāt krameṇoṣma-gataṁ nāma kuśala-mūlaṁ upadyaye.
\textsuperscript{132} Abhidh-k 345 (bh to VI 19c): te eva uṣma-gatādayaḥ smṛty-upaṣṭhāna-smabhāvatvāt prajñātmakā ucyānte.
\textsuperscript{133} Abhidh-k 346 (VI 20 c-d).
\textsuperscript{134} Abhidh-k 345 (bh to VI 19c), 350 (bh to VI 26a).
\textsuperscript{135} Abhidh-k 353 (bh to VI 28c-d).
\textsuperscript{136} Abhidh-k 353-4 (VI 29-31). The nature of the path and fruit attainment (whether of stream-attainment, once-return or non-return) is determined by previous practice in the course of the laukika-bhāvanā-mārga.
\textsuperscript{137} Abhidh-k 352 (bh to VI 27d): yad bhūmiko’gra-dharmas tad bhūmikāny etāni sūdāsa cittāni; te punah sad-bhūmikā ity uktam prāk.
\textsuperscript{138} See Abhidh-k 364-5 (VI 44-5). I have commented on the restricted usage of the term bodhi in Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma above.
\textsuperscript{139} Cf. Lamotte, Traité, III 1132-3.
The dravyas

Just as in the Theravādin system the various correspondences inherent in the Nikāya definitions of the seven sets are resolved to give a list of fourteen dhāmmas, so in the Sarvāstivādin system, except that the Sarvāstivādins generally arrive at only ten dravyas. The discrepancy is to be explained by reference to the four rddhi-pādās and the three path-factors samyag-vāk, samyak-karmānta and samyag-ājīva. Thus the rddhi-pādās are reduced to just one item, namely samādhi, and the three path-factors to one item, namely śīla. That this should be so is not entirely surprising. As we have seen, the method of taking the iddhi-pādās is somewhat undecided or fluid in Theravādin Abhidhamma texts. The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya also notes that certain teachers (the Vaibhāśikas according to the Vyākhyā of Yasomitra) took the rddhi-pādās as four items (chanda, citta, viśya, mīmāṁsā) and thus added chanda and citta to their list of dravyas.141 Opinion also seems to have varied on whether to take the three path-factors as one, two or three items.142 Thus the author of the Abhidharmadīpa distinguishes samyag-vāk and samyak-karmānta but not samyag-ājīva, giving a list of eleven dravyas;143 while the Abhidharmakośa refers to a Vaibhāṣīka list of eleven dravyas whereby samyag-vāk and samyak-karmānta are taken as one item, samyag-ājīva as a separate item.144 Lamotte notes that the Viśhāṣā, in addition to ten and eleven dravyas, allows twelve;145 he does not elaborate, but such a total might be arrived at by either taking the rddhi-pādās as three and the śīlāṅgas as one, or the rddhi-pādās as one and the śīlāṅgas as three.

The distribution of the seven sets

Both the Abhidharmakośa and Abhidharmadīpa give the following account of the way in which the seven sets can be allocated to the various stages of the path:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ādi-karmika} & \quad - \quad \text{smṛty-upasthāna} \\
\text{usma-gata} & \quad - \quad \text{samyak-prahāna} \\
\text{mūrdhan} & \quad - \quad \text{rddhi-pāda} \\
\text{ksānti} & \quad - \quad \text{indriya} \\
\text{laukikāgra-dharmas} & \quad - \quad \text{bala}
\end{align*}
\]

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140 Abhidh-h Trsl 139; Amrta Trsl 208-9; Abhidh-k 383-4 (VI 67-9).
141 Abhidh-k 384 (bh to VI 69c-d): ye tv dvuh samādhir evardhiḥ pādaḥ chandādaya iti. teṣām dravyatās trayodaśa bodhi-paksyāḥ prāpnuvanti chanda-cittayor ādikyāt. (They get thirteen because they also count two śīlāṅgas; see below.)
142 Cf. the Arthasāṅgīnī discussion of these three path-factors; see above, p. 196.
143 Abhidh-dī 358: dravyatās tv ekadsaṁ: śraddhādīni pañca balāṇi prīti-prāsrābdhy-upekṣā-samyaksamkālpavāk-karmāntas ca sad iti.
144 Abhidh-k 383-4 (bh to VI 19a-b): vaibhāṣīkāṁ nām ekadaśa kāya-vāk-karmāṇor asambhinnaṁ tvāt śīlāṅgāṁ de dravye iti.
145 Traité, III 1132.
146 Abhidh-k 384-5 (bh to VI 70); Abhidh-dī 362.
Of note here is the inverting of the bodhy-āṅgas and mārgāṅgas, though it is pointed out that some teachers follow the order of Sūtra and thus identify the bodhy-āṅgas with the darśana-mārga and the mārgāṅgas with the bhāvanā-mārga.

In the *Jewel Ornament of Liberation*, sGam.po.pa preserves a slightly different tradition for which I have been unable to find an Indian source that gives full details, though the *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya* all but does so:147

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<th>sambhāra-mārga</th>
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<td>(smaller)</td>
<td>— smṛty-upasthāna</td>
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<td>(mediocre)</td>
<td>— sanyak-prahāna</td>
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<td>(greater)</td>
<td>— ṭṛddhi-pāda</td>
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<tr>
<td>usma-gata</td>
<td>— indriya</td>
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<td>mūrdhan</td>
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<td>kṣānti</td>
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<tr>
<td>laukikāgra</td>
<td>— bala</td>
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| prayoga-mārga        |               |               |               |
| darśana-mārga        | — bodhy-āṅga  |
| bhāvanā-mārga        | — mārgāṅga    |

The *Abhidharmahṛdaya* makes use of a different terminology but again seems to want to view the seven sets as developed successively:148

| upasthāna             | — smṛty-upasthāna |
| vyāyāma               | — sanyak-prahāna |
| cittaikāgratā         | — ṭṛddhi-pāda    |
| indriya (mṛdu)        | — indriya        |
| indriya (tīkṣṇa)      | — bala           |
| darśana-mārga         | — bodhy-āṅga     |
| bhāvanā-mārga         | — mārgāṅga      |

A similar progressive view of the seven sets seems inherent in the following from the *Abhidharmaśamuccaya*, again involving rather different terminology:149

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147 *Jewel Ornament of Liberation*, translated by H.V. Guenther, London, 1959, pp. 112-4, 232-4. The *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya* (IV 8-10) identifies the first two of the nirvedha-bhāgīyas with the indriyas, and the second two with the balas; it identifies the bodhy-āṅgas with the darśana-mārga and the mārgāṅgas with the bhāvanā-mārga (see S. Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, Delhi, 1984, pp. 249-5, 448) but is silent on the question of the sambhāra-mārga.

148 Abhidh- h Trsl 140. Abhidh-h Trsl (II) 194 gives the term sthiti for upasthāna; this might indicate 'abode' or 'resting place', echoing the various Nikāya treatments of thesatipāṭhānas as the gocara of the bhikkhus. The association of sanyak-prahāna with vyāyāma ('striving'), ṭṛddhi-pāda with cittaikāgratā ('one-pointedness') and indriya and bala with weak and sharp faculties follows the usual pattern.

149 Abhidh-sam Trsl 116-7. The seven paths might be translated as the path of examining things, the path of striving, the path of preparation for concentration, the path of application to comprehension, the path that adheres to comprehension, the path of comprehension, the path that leads out to purification.
The occurrence of the 37 bodhi-pākṣikas in the different levels\(^{150}\)

This is most conveniently set out in tabular form. The Sarvāstivādin treatment of the bodhi-pākṣikā dharmā in this respect in fact shows broad agreement with the Dhammasaṅgāni: the seven bodhy-āṅgas and eight mārgāṅgas are generally excluded from the kāma-dhātu. This relates to the fact that the mārgāṅgas and bodhy-āṅgas are said to be anāsrava because of their association with lokottara comprehension of the four truths, which cannot be achieved by consciousness of the kāma-dhātu type. In other words, these two categories are only relevant to lokottara consciousness. In the Dhammasaṅgāni, although maggaṅgas are brought out in kāmāvacara-citta, they are brought out fully and completely only in the lokuttara. Interestingly, though, the Sarvāstivādin texts bear witness to a certain amount of discussion concerning the proper way to handle the mārgāṅgas. The Amṛtarasa states that of the seven sets the seven bodhy-āṅgas are always without āsravas; the remaining six sets may be either with or without āsravas.\(^{151}\) However, it goes on to note that some teachers are of the view that both the bodhy-āṅgas and the mārgāṅgas are only without āsravas. Again, in keeping with the view that it is just the bodhy-āṅgas that are only without āsravas, the Abhidharmānḍāpā excludes the bodhy-āṅgas alone from the kāma-dhātu. The Abhidharmakośa, however, sides with those who are of the opinion that both the bodhy-āṅgas and mārgāṅgas are only without āsravas, while the rest may be either with or without.\(^{152}\) The principal divergence from the Theravādin system in all this would seem to be that lokottara comprehension (abhisamaya) of the four truths can take place in the anāgamiṇa and first three ārūpya-samāpattis in addition to the dhyānānītara and four dhyānas, which correspond to the five jhānas of the Theravādins. But the ārūpyas that are anāsrava are restricted to the lokottara-bhāvanā-mārga; the dārsana-mārga is never of the ārūpya level.\(^{153}\)

What are the general conclusions to be drawn from this treatment of the

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\(^{150}\) Abhidh-h Trsl 140-1; Amṛta Trsl 209; Abhidh-dī 365; Abhidh-k 385-6 (VI 71-3). See Table 14, p. 341.

\(^{151}\) Despite the fact that Amṛta excludes both the bodhy-āṅgas and mārgāṅgas from the kāma-dhātu.

\(^{152}\) Abhidh-k 385 (VI 71).

\(^{153}\) E.g. see Abhidh-k 365 (bh to VI 44d) (on three ārūpyas as vajropama-samādhi), 368 (bh to VI 48 c-d). Cf. L. Schmithausen ‘On some aspects of descriptions or theories of “liberating insight” and “enlightenment” in early Buddhism’ in Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus (Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf), ed. K. Bruhn and A. Wezler, Wiesbaden, 1980, pp. 240-4.
## Table 14. The Occurrence of the Bodhi-Pāksikas in Different Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kāma-dhātu</td>
<td>Abhidh-h 22</td>
<td>7 bodhy-āṇgas, 8 mārgāṇgas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amṛta 22</td>
<td>7 bodhy-āṇgas, 8 mārgāṇgas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abhidh-k 22</td>
<td>7 bodhy-āṇgas, 8 mārgāṇgas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abhidh-dī 30</td>
<td>7 bodhy-āṇgas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anāgāmya</td>
<td>all 36</td>
<td>prīti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dhyāna (1)</td>
<td>all 37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dhyānāntara</td>
<td>all 35</td>
<td>prīti, saṃkalpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dhyāna (2)</td>
<td>all 36</td>
<td>saṃkalpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dhyāna (3-4)</td>
<td>all 35</td>
<td>prīti, saṃkalpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ārūpya (1-3)</td>
<td>Abhidh-h 31</td>
<td>prīti, saṃkalpa, 3 śīlāṇgas, kāya-smṛty-upasthāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amṛta 32</td>
<td>prīti, saṃkalpa, 3 śīlāṇgas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abhidh-k 32</td>
<td>prīti, saṃkalpa, 3 śīlāṇgas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adhidh-dī 32</td>
<td>prīti, saṃkalpa, 3 śīlāṇgas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bhavāgra</td>
<td>Abhidh-h 21</td>
<td>7 bodhy-āṇgas, 8 mārgāṇgas, kāya-smṛty-upasthāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amṛta 22</td>
<td>7 bodhy-āṇgas, 8 mārgāṇgas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abhidh-k 22</td>
<td>7 bodhy-āṇgas, 8 mārgāṇgas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abhidh-dī 25</td>
<td>7 bodhy-āṇgas, 3 śīlāṇgas, prīti, saṃkalpa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes

1. The 3 śīlāṇgas are absent from the first 3 ārūpyas because they are avijñānaprīta.
2. Yaśomitra takes up the question of why Abhidh-k does not exclude kāya-smṛty-upasthāna from the ārūpyas (Abhidh-k-vy 605).
thirty-seven bodhi-pākṣikā dharmāḥ? In the first place it is clear that the distribution of the seven sets over the successive stages of the path to awakening is not something fixed or final; it is offered as a way of looking at the bodhi-pākṣikā dharmāḥ rather than the final word on their nature. Thus although the Abhidharmakośa associates the smṛty-upasthānas with the ādi-karmika or one beginning meditation, it also gives an account of the nirvedha-bhāgīyas solely in terms of smṛty-upasthāna. The Amṛtarasa similarly notes that the four smṛty-upasthānas are included in the attainments of all the different levels.154 Again, the fact that it is said that all seven sets may be without āsravas can only mean that in some sense all thirty-seven bodhi-pākṣikā dharmāḥ are understood to be present in lokottara consciousness. In other words, although from one point of view the smṛty-upasthānas and samyak-prāhānas can be looked at as characteristic of the earlier stages of the path, what is practised at one stage is not left behind but is rather carried over into the next stage. The perspective of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma is not then so different from that of Theravādin Abhidhamma when it sees the attainment of the transcendent path as involving the fulfilment, and hence ‘presence’, of thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyas all at once.

154 Amṛta Trsl 201.
CONCLUSION

Alex Wayman has criticized A.K. Warder for taking the seven sets/thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā as representing the 'basic doctrines of Buddhism as originally propounded by the Buddha':

If he is going to intelligently insist that these constitute the Buddha's original doctrine, he should admit—which he does not—that the only teaching of the Buddha amounted to the details of the Buddhist path as followed by the monks, and so there were no characteristic doctrines of Buddhism as contrasted with monkish practice, no instructions to the laymen of how they could lead a Buddhist life without going into a monastery, and so on.

It seems to me that Wayman is both right and wrong here. He is right to criticize Warder's particular presentation of the seven sets as the Buddha's basic teaching, but wrong in thinking that, as the essence of the teaching or the saddhamma itself, they necessarily reduce the Buddha's teaching to 'monkish practice'. Wayman is rather happier when Warder indicates that the Buddha's 'doctrine has to do with causation':

This is just one of the many correct statements in this book that are not integrated into a total image of early Buddhism, because the author insists on the thirty-seven bodhipakkhiyadharmanā for the chief role.

The more telling criticism here is that of failure to present an integrated picture of early Buddhism. What I hope the present study has shown at least is that the Nikāya and Abhidhamma understanding of the seven sets does in fact fully integrate them with Buddhist teaching as a whole. The presentation of the seven sets in early Buddhist thought is in fact adapted rather precisely to early Buddhist ideas of causation (paticcasamuppāda).

Before I go on to make some concluding remarks about the thirty-seven bodhipakkhiyā dhammā, I should like to reiterate something that I said in my introduction. This study is essentially an attempt to explore the logic and coherence of early Buddhist meditation theory; it does not expressly try to search out inconsistencies and contradictions in order to lay bare the various strata of historical development and retrieve the early, essential and original message of the Buddha. In fact, I have come to rather few, if any, definite conclusions about the historical development of the notion of the bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā. While I trust I have been sufficiently mindful of historical considerations, what I have tried to show is that, if allowed, the outlook of the earlier (i.e. Nikāya) and later (i.e. Abhidhamma and commentaries) tradition has a certain coherence and consistency. At any rate it is possible to read them in this way, and to read them in this way makes at least as good sense as do the conclusions arrived at by homing in on certain apparent inconsistencies and

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1 Warder, IB, p. 82.
CONCLUSION

contradictions. This study contains ample evidence, I think, to suggest that before we come to any conclusions about the chronological stratification of the Nikāyas we need to pay much more careful attention to the nature of the processes that govern the creation and spread of oral literatures; before we throw away the Abhidhamma and the commentaries, we need to be very sure that we have understood what it is they are saying, and how it is they are actually interpreting the texts.

Jhāna

At this point I wish to trace not so much the evolution of the Nikāya and Abhidhamma understanding of the seven sets and bodhipakkhiyā dharmas as its logic. A ‘path to awakening’ must in some sense be conceived of as a process of change and development. One starts somewhere and finishes somewhere else. In the beginning there is ignorance (avijjā), at the end there is ‘awakening’. But what exactly is ‘awakening’? True, it seems ultimately in the Abhidhamma to be conceived of as a species of knowledge, but the experience of this knowledge has definite and far reaching consequences. Awakening is not the mere transformation of avijjā into vijjā; it is the transformation of wrong view, wrong thought, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, wrong striving, wrong mindfulness and wrong concentration into right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right striving, right mindfulness and right concentration. It is thus an inner transformation of thought, word and deed; in short a transformation of the ‘person’ (chapter five, section nine). The teaching of the path to awakening is concerned with how this transformation occurs. I should like here to try to summarise the understanding of the Buddhist path that I think emerges from this study.

The path to awakening is then about a process of transformation—it is about how to effect that transformation. The transformation in question is the transformation of the ‘unawakened’ mind of the ordinary man into the ‘awakened’ mind of the arahant. The texts’ presupposition is that such a transformation is possible—there is a way in which the unawakened mind can be woken up. The theory and practice of the path to awakening involves coming ‘to know’ the relationship between the unawakened mind and the awakened mind: in what ways is it similar, in what ways is it different? The outlook of the body of texts considered above is that the ordinary unawakened mind is not to be understood as uniform in character. In fact the ordinary mind is very complex and very subtle; it is of many different kinds; it has many different and contradictory tendencies. Some of these kinds of mind and some of these tendencies are more useful than others in trying to wake up the mind. Some kinds of ordinary mind actively perpetuate the sleep of the defilements, while some kinds of ordinary mind actually approximate rather closely to the waking mind itself. In other words, some states of mind, some tendencies are to be cultivated, others are to be curbed. The task, then, is to maximise these kusala or ‘skilful’ tendencies, to use the technical terminology of the texts. How does one go about this? The problem is that in ordinary everyday states of
mind, while these skilful tendencies may often arise, they are always in danger of being crowded out. The texts immediate solution is that we must attempt to still the mind—we must practise calm (samatha) and concentration (samādhi).

According to the texts, in calm, still states of mind the natural 'skilful' tendencies of the mind tend to come into their own—they naturally grow and strengthen, and the mind becomes clearer. Indeed the mind is by nature shining and bright—defilements are what are alien to it. So, in the technical terminology of the texts, one must cultivate the jhānas. The texts appear to understand that when the mind is stilled in the jhānas some very powerful skilful forces or tendencies become available to the mind—these powerful skilful forces are none other than the 'ordinary' bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā. One might say that in the course of cultivating jhāna the mind has generated—or exposed—these very powerful skilful forces. The forces are not essentially peculiar to these states of mind, indeed the same tendencies of confidence, strength, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, etc. are present at other times, but in jhāna they are fully activated. The mind that has settled in jhāna is thus rather close to 'waking up'—with a little nudge from 'the good friend' (kalyāṇa-mitta) it might actually start out of its sleep; if it attends to things in an appropriate way (yoniso manasikāra) an even deeper transformation than jhāna may take place.

Traditionally Buddhist meditation theory talks of two things in this context: samatha and vipassanā or samādhi and paññā. Samatha/samādhi is the bare and pure stilling of the mind—which is what is seen as making the powerful forces available to the mind in the first place. Vipassanā/paññā is the wielding of those forces to a particular end—as the Milindapañha puts it, the various other factors of awakening allow the sword of wisdom to perform its task.

Samatha and vipassanā and samādhi and paññā are, of course, in a sense artificial abstractions. According to Abhidhamma theory, in practice, when the mind is stilled in jhāna there is always some element of paññā involved—in fact a being whose natural mind (bhavaṅga-citta) is devoid of wisdom is said to be unable to cultivate the jhānas. Again, when the mind is developing wisdom there must be present some degree of concentration. So in talking of samatha and vipassanā we are really talking about different focuses: do we focus on samatha or do we focus on vipassanā? As far as we know the ancient Buddhist schools were unanimous that, in order that the mind should 'wake up', it needs to develop both samatha and vipassanā. Wisdom may be what actually cuts the 'fetters' but it cannot perform this function without some degree of concentration. The ancient (and modern) debate concerning samatha and vipassanā centres not on whether samatha or samādhi are essential for awakening, but on the question of what degree of samatha or samādhi is required. The Theravādin Abhidhamma traditions, beginning with the Dhammasaṅgani and followed by Buddhaghosa, are clear that one needs full jhāna or 'absorption'—at least at the actual moment of awakening, if not before. As we saw in chapter ten, the

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4 A I 10.
5 Abhidh-s 19.
Vaibhāṣika traditions differ in that they appear to allow an 'access' type of concentration as sufficient.

The whole question of samatha and vipassanā has caused a certain amount of discussion in modern accounts of traditional Buddhist meditation theory. Because Buddhist theory allows that the jhānas can be developed apart from the actual 'world transcending' wisdom that wakes the mind up, a conclusion is drawn that the jhānas are somehow not really 'Buddhist'—Buddhism borrowed them from what went before and added the distinctively 'Buddhist' vipassanā meditation. Thus, from the point of view of true 'Buddhist' meditation, the jhānas are something of a diversion. In recent years this line has perhaps been most clearly taken by W.L. King in his book Theravāda Meditation: the Buddhist transformation of yoga.

There are a number of problems. In the first place Buddhist theoretical abstractions are confused with the question of historical development. As we saw in chapter six, the theory of the Buddhist path works (sometimes) with the hierarchy of sīla/samādhi/paññā. I shall attempt to sum up what I see as the implications of this hierarchy. In the first place what it conveys is the idea that it is possible to have basically 'skilful' conduct without having actually developed states of concentration or the jhānas. However, the keeping of sīla, the practice of good conduct, will naturally tend to bring about calm and peace such that if good conduct is firmly established, when one tries to develop states of concentration, progress is likely to be easier than otherwise. The corrolary of this is that if one tries to develop states of concentration without the basis of good conduct, one is likely to find that one will need to attend to conduct before states of concentration can succeed and be firmly established. In short, real good conduct without meditation attainments is possible, but real meditation attainment without good conduct is not. Again, it is possible to have good conduct and to have meditation attainments without having developed the wisdom that penetrates to the four truths; but one cannot have that wisdom without in some measure having established good conduct and some level of concentration. Of course, I think the theory is meant to allow that someone who seemingly has rather 'bad' conduct might, apparently out of the blue, have an experience of deep 'world-transcending' penetrative insight, but such an experience if 'true' would, according to the principles of the hierarchy under discussion, have to involve also both a transformation of sīla, and a degree of samādhi equivalent to jhāna. The basic principle holds good: sīla can stand without samādhi and paññā, but samādhi and paññā cannot stand without sīla; sīla and samādhi can stand without paññā, but paññā cannot stand without sīla and samādhi.

In modern scholarly writings this piece of Buddhist theorizing tends to be confused with historical development: the jhānas are not truly 'Buddhist', they are borrowed from a pre-existing 'yogic' tradition. What is original 'Buddhist' teaching is vipassanā. But what does this really mean? What precisely do we mean by 'Buddhist' here? If we mean invented and taught by the historical Buddha, then we have to acknowledge that we really have no idea what the Buddha borrowed from the pre-existing nascent 'yogic' tradition of India and
what the Buddha added as 'new'; all we can safely say, as I pointed out in my introduction, is that it is clear that he inherited something. While I would not want to go along with everything Bronkhorst says in his book on 'the two traditions of meditation' in ancient India, he does highlight a basic fact: we do not have any clear evidence of the jhāna meditations prior to their appearance in early Buddhist texts—the jhānas surface first in Buddhist writings.

W.L. King's *Theravāda Meditation* is one of the fullest descriptions of traditional Theravādin meditation theory to be published in recent years. This book certainly provides what is a generally useful and comprehensive account, but in the light of the present study it also certainly perpetuates certain misunderstandings.

For King the jhānas and formless attainments, from the perspective of strict Theravādin 'orthodoxy', are to be characterized as 'alien' and 'non-Buddhist'—they are derived from 'Brahmanical-yogic spirituality' (p. viii). Vipassanā, on the other hand, is the 'Buddhist heart of the Theravāda meditational discipline' (p. 82). Many problems are raised by this view of Theravādin Buddhist meditation. One is the simple lumping together of the jhānas and formless attainments. Indeed King acknowledges this as a problem (pp. 14-16) but concludes that 'the series [of jhānas and formless attainments] is continuous in quality and method through all eight stages' and is of the view that "jhānic" as a characterizing adjective applies equally well to the four jhānas and to the four immaterial states' (p. 41). But this simple compounding of the jhānas and the formless attainments is full of problems. As King himself acknowledges, in the story of Gotama's abandoning of the practice of severe austerities the jhānas are seemingly presented as the alternative to—almost the rejection of—the earlier 'yogic' teaching, which seems to encompass both the practice of severe austerities and the practice of the formless attainments taught to Gotama by Āḷāra Kāḷāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. Can we afford to simply pass over this presentation of the jhānas in the face of other evidence that also suggests that the jhāna meditations were central to early Buddhist meditation theory? Again, to oppose 'Buddhist' and 'Brahmanical-yogic' spirituality in the way King does in the context of the fourth or third century BCE is surely historically inadequate. The evidence of Buddhist, Jaina and Brahmanical texts suggests that there were numerous groups practising and experimenting with, loosely speaking, 'yogic' techniques and formulating various theories and ideas about them; furthermore the relationship of the Brahmanical tradition to the emerging 'yogic' tradition is hardly clear cut. No doubt everybody was borrowing ideas and practices from everybody else.

The present study suggests that we must see the jhāna meditations as at the heart of early Buddhist meditation theory, and, at least as far as the Theravāda tradition goes, they continue to occupy a central place in the meditation theory of the Abhidhamma and commentaries. There can be no doubt that for the Nikāyas, the Abhidhamma and the commentaries the jhānas represent central, mainstream (i.e. 'Buddhist') meditation; more or less everything is continually being related back to the jhānas. As we have seen, as far as the seven sets are concerned, this is particularly clear with the treatment of the four establishing
of mindfulness, the four bases of success and the seven factors of awakening. When the list of the seven sets is expanded in the Nikāyas and other classes of Buddhist literature it is the four jhānas/dhyānas and other meditation practices leading to jhānā/dhyānā that are immediately and most often brought in. This indicates the 'context' in which the seven sets were understood to be developed. Thus in the Abhidhamma and commentaries too the seven sets are collectively associated with lokuttara-jhāna (cf. the Dhammasaṅgīti), and individually (i.e. as lokiya-bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas) with especially the advanced stages of samatha and vipassanā. The stage of the lokiya-bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas seems to correspond in some measure to the stages of the nirvedha-bhāgyas in the Sarvāstivādin account of the path; the latter are especially associated with the smṛty-upasthāna, sāmyak-prahāna, ādhi-pādas, indriyās and balas in the Abhidhammakośa.

Furthermore, according to the texts studied here, the awakening experience itself was essentially understood as a species of jhāna—that is, it is a meditation experience that shares the characteristic features of jhāna, yet it is a special jhāna, a jhāna in which paññā plays a special role, and a jhāna that establishes the eight factors of the noble path in the subsequent deeds, words and thoughts of the person attaining it. This conclusion is based in the first place on the terminology associated with the factors of awakening, but is reinforced by the whole thrust of our study of the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammā. The question of the origin of the jhāna meditations is a separate issue, and something that is probably unanswerable. To ask whether they are 'Buddhist' or 'non-Buddhist' seems to me essentially misconceived. All we know is that they first become explicit in and are a central feature of early Buddhist texts.

The Nikāyas seem consistently to conceive of a turning point or point of cross-over in the process of the path to awakening. This crucial point is encountered in several guises. Most generally it might be characterized as the point of cross-over from the state of the ordinary man (puthūjīna) to that of the 'noble person' (ariya-puggala). Spiritually and psychologically this turning point is the point at which the pull of awakening becomes overwhelming. Although there is not full or final awakening, the gravitation towards awakening is now the most significant force at work in the mind (chapter seven, section four). The lower limit of this turning point is stream-attainment and is marked by the establishing of the eight factors of the 'noble path' beginning with right view. Hitherto these factors were unstable (chapter six, section seven).

This breakthrough to the noble eight-factored path is not, it seems, always presented in the Nikāyas as a formal 'meditation' experience. Classically it might take the form, perhaps, of a sudden and radical change of heart—a sudden seeing prompted by the gradual discourse of the Buddha, for example. There are in the Nikāyas also notions such as those of the saddhāmusārīn and dhammānusārīn which are rather close to the notion of stream-attainer and indeed at times hard to distinguish from it. Generally, however, they seem to stand slightly lower in the scale of persons. This has the effect of defining the 'turning point' as something specific that nevertheless covers a certain range of
types of experience. This somewhat looser Nikāya conception of the path of stream-attainment seems to find a counterpart in the commentarial notion of the ‘lesser stream-attainer’ (chapter four). The general notion of stream-attainment appears sometimes to be used in the Nikāyas to characterize the stage of spiritual development of the ideal layfollower or householder. The stream-attainer is one who has abandoned doubt, the view of individuality, and holding on to precept and vow; he has trust or faith based in understanding in the Buddha, Dhamma and Samgha. Moreover, while he need not be a celibate, his conduct is pleasing to the ‘noble ones’ and he has abandoned the grosser kinds of unwholesome behaviour that can lead to rebirth in the places of regress; his behaviour thus conforms to the five precepts.

The Nikāyas may not always present the turning point in spiritual development as a formal ‘meditation’ experience (or even as issuing from immediately prior spiritual practice), but what clearly interests the texts, what they continually return to, is the precise nature of the mind at the turning point. What kind of mind is it that produces such a fundamental and far-reaching change of heart? What is so special about it? What is different about it? How is it related to other types of mind? What are the factors that contribute to it? A concern with such questions is quite apparent from the description contained in the gradual discourse, and much of the early Abhidhamma is in one way or another an exploration of such matters. The state of mind that the gradual discourse focuses upon is described as well (kalla), open (mudu), free of hindrances (vinivarana), joyful (udagga), at peace (pasanna). The terminology used here clearly also relates to the kind of mind that is brought about by the practice of jhāna. Here, then, is the explicit path of meditation. And what the path of meditation issues in is a particular kind of jhāna termed bodhi and characterized by the seven bojjhāngas (chapter five). In the Nikāyas the path of meditation is neatly summed up as abandoning the five hindrances, establishing the mind in the four establishings of mindfulness and developing the seven awakening-factors; this path finds one of its fullest elaborations in the Ānāpānasati-sutta (chapter one). What is significant about the path of meditation, however, is that it only succeeds in a specific context and under certain conditions—conditions such as having a ‘good friend’, continual application and heedfulness (appamāda), the basis of sīla; the hindrances must be starved of food and the awakening-factors nourished (chapter five). The factors that make for the particular mental state of peace and balance that allows the mind to awake are varied and subtle.

In all this, I arrive, via a completely different route, at conclusions that have something in common with the findings of J. Bronkhorst (The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India) and T. Vetter (The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism). Both these scholars argue that that the jhānas represent mainstream early Buddhist meditation; unlike Vetter, who argues that the jhāna meditation path early on gave way to the meditation based on

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6 See especially the sotāpatti-samyutta (S V 343-413); many of these suttas are addressed to layfollowers and relate the ‘factors of stream-attainment’ to lay-practice.
'discriminating insight', I maintain that the jhānas continue to be of paramount importance for the Abhidhamma and the commentaries. What I suggest is that a book such as King's relies far too heavily on Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* systematisation of the path under the headings of 'conduct', 'consciousness' and 'understanding'. This separating out of the three categories is certainly a useful device for a presentation of the Buddhist path, but the structure of the *Visuddhimagga* can make it appear that much of the account of the development of *samatha* given under the heading 'purification of consciousness' (*citta-visuddhi*) has rather little bearing on the remaining five 'purifications', which are therefore to be understood more or less exclusively in terms of wisdom and insight. The result of following Buddhaghosa too closely can be a rather distorted and misleading account of Theravādin meditation theory. My point here is not that Buddhaghosa gets it wrong, but that in failing to have an adequate grasp of the theory of meditation presented in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma, modern scholars misunderstand Buddhaghosa. The treatment of the seven sets in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma, on the other hand, seems to make clear and emphasize the ancient conception of the path as the yoking together of calm and insight (cf. the *Ānāpānasati-sutta*). The mind is stilled and brought to a state of happiness and balance; awakening arises directly in this soil. Thus in emphasizing the interdependence and reciprocity of the various elements that contribute to the path, the teaching of the seven sets presents us with a rather more integrated view of the path to awakening.

**Abhidhamma**

To recapitulate somewhat, to follow the path to awakening is to undergo a process of transformation. Such processes have a beginning, middle and an end. Specifically the Buddhist path to awakening concerns the 'ordinary' unawakened mind (beginning) coming to a critical point where 'waking up' is in some sense understood to be near (middle) such that it is only a matter of time until the occurrence of final perfect awakening (end). The question is: what mental forces, what mental qualities effect this waking process? what helps it along, what hinders it? From one point of view, Buddhist texts are full of different descriptions of this one process. (One might also venture to suggest that it is the critical 'middle' stage that is the particular focus of many texts.) If we find the process at all interesting we might, like the early ābhiddhamnikas, feel we want to focus in on particular parts and get a closer look so that we can see exactly what is going on. That is, we can attempt to distinguish the stages within a stage, the processes that make up the process. Now what the early ābhiddhamnikas tell us they saw when they did precisely this is more of the same. The more one focuses in on a process and tries to observe the processes operating within a process, the more one comes to see that all small scale processes are essentially reflections of large scale processes. This, it seems, is the kind of thinking that underlies the view of *paṭicca-samuppāda* (which is found in the early Abhidhamma) as extending over a period of time or as being
The processes that operate in the microcosm are the same as the processes that operate in the macrocosm—*dhammas* are only Dhamma. In fact there is only one process—wherever one looks and however closely one looks there is only Dhamma. The process that binds one to *samsāra* is in the end precisely the process that liberates one. It does not seem unreasonable to extend this way of thinking to the seven sets. The handle of the carpenter’s knife is worn away bit by bit each day by the repeated process of wearing away until suddenly, all at once, it is completely worn away and the process of wearing away is complete. Just so the seven sets are developed little by little until suddenly, all at once, they are fully developed and the path to awakening is complete (chapter seven, sections three and four).

What I am trying to suggest, then, is that in taking the traditional lists and exploring their application, the early *ābhidhammikas* were not contributing to the ossification of Buddhist teaching, but were rather developing something that was at the heart of early Buddhism. The concerns of the early Abhidhamma were precisely the same concerns as those of the Nikāyas. The concerns of the early Abhidhamma are practical rather than purely theoretical or scholastic; they arise directly out of the concerns of the Nikāyas themselves: what is going on in the mind when one tries to train it and wake it up? Thus the Abhidhamma enterprise continues a way of conceptualizing and exploring the processes of meditation and spiritual development that is clearly evidenced from the beginnings of Buddhism. In this respect, as I suggested earlier, I take a line quite opposite to that taken by Peter Masefield in his recent book, *Divine Revelation in Pāli Buddhism*, in which he presents a rather extreme form of the argument that the *ābhidhammika* monks had completely lost touch with the spirit (or rather ‘sound’) of the earlier tradition.

Path

Perhaps the most general point about the nature of the path to awakening as understood in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma is that the end is essentially the means. If awakening results in right view, etc., then the way to awakening is equally right view, etc. (chapter six). I pointed out in chapter one that the Nikāyas seem to suggest that by developing just one of the thirty-seven
dhammas (any aspect of the four satipaṭṭhānas) to its full one comes to the conclusion of the path to awakening. Or, the full development of the first satipaṭṭhāna actually involves the development of all four satipaṭṭhānas, and the conclusion of the path is again reached. Similarly in chapter two the four samma-ppadhānas were found on occasion to be interpreted so as to embrace the whole path. Again in chapter three the notion of iddhi-pāda (especially in the commentarial analysis) was interpreted on a number of different scales involving in some cases the conclusion of the path. In chapter four it was found that it is through development of the indriyas that one is an arahant, etc. I need not go on. If one of the seven sets—or even just one of the thirty-seven dhammas—is sufficient for awakening, then what purpose is served by the other sets, and by the other thirty-six dhammas? The answer seems to be to show that the path and awakening itself is at once simple and multi-dimensional. This is most clearly seen in some of the treatments common to all seven sets. The bringing to fulfilment of any one of the seven sets cannot be accomplished without bringing to fulfilment all seven sets. For, as the Nettipakarana puts it, all dhammas that lead to awakening and contribute to awakening have but one characteristic, the characteristic of ‘leading out’. In other words, there exists between the thirty-seven dhammas a relationship of reciprocity and radical interdependence.

Finally, in the Abhidhamma/Abhidharma traditions we find two perspectives: one that sees the seven sets as indicative of the gradual progress of the path, and one that sees them as characterizing its final culmination. In chapter ten I suggested that these two perspectives should not be considered peculiar to the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda respectively, and thus mutually exclusive. Rather they amount to a difference of emphasis in each tradition. After all, once again we have only an application of the principle of momentary and extended paticca-samuppāda/pratitya-samutpāda. For the Pāli commentaries, inspired perhaps by the ekāhīsamaya traditions found in a text such as the Paṭisambhidāmagga, what above all distinguishes the transcendent mind from the ordinary mind is that the latter only ever partially fulfils the conditions that contribute to awakening, the transcendent mind in a moment fulfils them completely. One might sum up the two Abhidhamma/Abhidharma perspectives as follows. From the perspective of the beginning of the path the unknown way stretches out ahead; yet from the perspective of its conclusion it is apparent that all the factors that contributed to it at once find their fulfilment. So while the perspective of the whole path is never lost in the teaching of the seven sets, its point of focus, its orientation is always the consummation of the path. As we have seen, the expression ‘development of bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā’ was

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8 Cf. Traité, III 1143-4: Question.—Les quatre fixations de l’attention (smṛty-upasthāna) étant suffisantes pour obtenir le chemin (mārga), pourquoi parler de trente-sept auxiliaires? ...Réponse.—Bien que les quatre fixations-de-l’attention soient suffisantes pour obtenir le chemin, il faut aussi prêcher les quatre efforts corrects (samvak-pradhāna) et les autres dharma auxiliaires. Pourquoi? Chez les êtres, les pensées (citta) sont multiples (nāṇāvidha) et dissemblables (viṣama); leurs entraves (samyojana) aussi sont multiples, et les choses qu’ils aiment ou dont il se détachent sont multiples.
originally used in the Nikāyas as generally descriptive of the higher stages of the path. The expression bodhi-pakkhiyā dharmā focuses on bodhi in much the same way as bojjhangā does, but is less specific. The actual notion of the 'thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiyā dharmā' derives, I think, from the association of the term bodhi-pakkhiya with the bojjhaṅgas on the one hand, and the association of the bojjhaṅgas with the ancient sequence of seven sets on the other. This imparts something of the specific perspective of the bojjhaṅgas to the whole, to all thirty-seven dhammas, while retaining the broader perspective of sets such as the satipaṭṭhānas and noble eight-factored path.

So what is the place of the seven sets in Buddhist thought? For the Vibhaṅga they are simply the saddhamma. For the Patisambhidāmagga they are, together with the four truths, the essence of the teaching. The Nikāyas, for their part, state that bhikkhus should preserve the establishing of mindfulness, the right endeavours, the bases of success, the faculties, powers, awakening-factors and noble eight-factored path so that the spiritual life endures, out of compassion for the world, for the good and happiness of the many. But we are not to confuse the preservation of the dhamma as teaching with the preservation of dhamma as knowledge and experience. What seems to underlie the Nikāyas outlook here is the understanding that all those who have in the past, will in the future and also now come to the end of the path to awakening do so by the development of the seven sets. Teachings about the seven sets are only saddhamma in so far as they conduce to the realization of dhamma; teachings that conduce to the realization of dhamma are teachings about the seven sets.

I have suggested that lokiya-bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas are seen as primarily relevant to the more advanced stages of samatha and vipassanā. But I do not think this means that talk of bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas should be absolutely excluded from all other contexts. According to the Dhammasaṅgani, samatha and vipassanā may be seen as general characteristics of skilful kāmāvacara consciousness. This means that acts of giving (dāna), and conduct in conformity with the precepts (sīla) may, like certain meditation states, be associated with a mind that reflects the nature of the awakening mind. This has some bearing on the kind of distinction that Spiro and others have tried to make between the ‘kammatic’ or ‘merit making’ Buddhism of the majority of the Buddhist populace, and the ‘nibbānic’ or ‘release producing’ Buddhism of an orthodox meditating elite. From the perspective of the path to awakening understood in terms of the Nikāya and Abhidhamma teaching of the seven sets such a distinction is artificial and misconceived. Many of the classic merit-making activities might be brought into the scheme of the path to awakening by way of the faculty of confidence or faith, or, more significantly perhaps, by way of the establishing of mindfulness, for the standard list of anussatis or ‘recollections’ (which the Niddesa directly relates to the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas) includes the recollection of the Buddha, Dhamma and Samgha,

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9 The four hāna-sampayutta-cittas; Dhs 9-27, 28-9.
11 E.g. Nidd I 10.
which are standard popular lay meditations in all Buddhist countries. Thus one of the things the early Abhidhamma seems concerned to show is that the kind of mind in which 'awakening' arises is not necessarily or always so far removed from the kinds of mind that might 'ordinarily' be experienced. And why should this not be so? To develop just one of the dharmas that contribute to awakening is to develop them all. The beginning of the path is in a sense already its end, the end is in a sense not different from its beginning. In the words of T.S. Eliot:

*In my beginning is my end ...*

*In my end is my beginning.*
APPENDIX

I SUMMARY OF TEXTUAL REFERENCES

A. PASSAGES IN THE PĀLI CANONICAL AND PARACANONICAL SOURCES DEALING WITH THE SEVEN SETS INDIVIDUALLY

(4) satipaṭṭhāna/basic formula
D II 83, 94-5, 100, 216, 290-314; III 58-77, 101, 141, 221, 276, 283.
M I 55-63, 83, 221, 224, 301, 339-40; III 82-8, 135-6, 252.
A II 218, 256; III 12, 81ff, 155, 386, 450; IV 223-5, 300-1, 457-8, V 56, 114-8, 175, 194-5, 350, 352.
Th 100, 166, 352, 765, 1090.
Nidd I 9-10, 21, 241-4, 347, 399, 475.
Paṭis I 177-96; II 13-21, 152-5, 164-5, 232-5.
Ap 26, 44, 518.
Vibh 105, 193-207, 236.
Kv 63, 155-9.
Pet 4, 71, 90, 95, 98, 121, 138, 185, 201, 247, 249, 257.
Nett 7, 94, 123.
Mil 178, 332, 368, 375, 388, 399, 402, 407, 407, 418.

(4) samma-ppadhāna/basic formula
D II 312; III 221.
M I 301; II 26-8, 129; III 251.
S V 9, 196, 198, 244-8, 268-9.
A I 153; II 15, 74, 256; III 12; IV 462-3;
Dhs 234
Vibh 105, 208-15, 216, 235.
Pet 71, 98, 128, 183, 185.
Nett 18, 123.
Mil 371.

(4) iddhi-pāda
D II 103, 115-8, 213; III 77, 221.
M I 103.
S I 116, 132; V 254-93.
A II 256; III 81-2, IV 225, 309, 463.
Ud 62.
Th 595; Thī 233.
Paṭis I 19, 111-5; II 205.
Vibh 216-26.
Pet 247.
Nett 15-6.
Mil 140, 400.

(3)/4/5, etc.) indriya
Vin I 294.
D III 239, 278, 284.
M I 19-20, 164, 479.
S V 193-204, 219-43.
A I 42-4, 118-9; II 141, 149-52; III 277-8, 281-2; IV 225, 264-6; V 56.
Th 352, 437, 595, 672, 1114; Thī 170-1.
Nidd I 115, 233. Paṭis II 1:34.
Dhs passim.
Vibh 122-34.
Kv 589-92.
Yam see indriya-yamaka
Patth passim.
Nett 7, 19, 28, 100-1.
Mil 33ff, 43.

(2/4/5/7) bala
Vin I 294.
D III 213, 229, 253.
S V 249-53.
A II 141; III 10-2, 245, 277-8, 281-2, IV 3-4.
Th 352, 437, 595, 672, 1114; 170-1.
Nidd I 14, 151.
Paṭiś II 166-76.
Pet 37, 79, 179, 189.
Nett 100-1.

(7) bojjhanga
Vin I 294.
D III 79, 83; 303-4; III 101, 106, 226, 251, 282, 284.
M I 11, 61-2; III 85-8, 275.
S I 54; V 24, 63-140, 161, 312, 331-40.
A I 14, 53; II 16, 237; III 386, 390; IV 23, 148, 225; V 58, 114-8, 194-5, 211, 233, 253.
Khp 2.
Dhp 89.
Th 161-2, 352, 437, 595, 672, 725, 1114; Thī 21, 45, 170-1.
Paṭiś II 115-29.
Dhs 61-8, 232.
Vibh 199-201, 227-34, 249.
Pet 10, 12, 56, 103, 122, 141, 167-8, 189, 248.
Nett 82-3, 94.
Mil 83, 336, 340, 356.
ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo/sammā-dīthi, etc.
Vin I 10.
D I 157, 165; II 151, 251, 311; III 284, 286.
M I 15-6, 42-3, 48-55, 118, 221-4, 299-301, 446, 508; II 82; III 231, 251, 289.
S I 88; II 42, 57, 106ff, 168-9; III 59ff; 86, 109, 158-9; IV 133; 175, 220-3, 233, 252-62.
A I 177, 180, 217, 297; II 34, 220-5; III 242, 411-6; IV 190, 225, 348; V 58, 211-49, 349, 352.
It 18.
Khp 2.
Vv 19.
Pv 61.
Th 35; 349, 421, 980, 1115; Thī 171-2, 215, 222.
Paṭiś II 82-5.
Ap 6, 314.
Cp 103. Dhs passim.
Vibh 104-6, 235-43.
Pet 10, 54, 55, 124-6, 130, 132, 165, 191, 238.
Nett 51-2.
Mil 218.

B. PASSAGES LISTING THE SEVEN SETS (CANONICAL AND PARACANONICAL)
Vin II 240; III 93, 94, 95, 97; IV 26, 27, 28.
D II 120; III 102, 127.
M II 11, 238, 245; III 81, 289, 296.
S III 96, 153-4; IV 360-8; V 49-50.
A I 39-40, 295-7; IV 125-7, 203, 208; V 175.
Ud 51-6.
Nidd II passim.
C. DHAMMAS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO AWAKENING

**bodhi-/bodha-/sambodhi-/sambodha-hpa (dhamma)**
Vībh III 23.

**DhLtuk** passim.


**Pet** 114-5.

**Nett** 31, 83.

**Mil** 33, 37, 330, 342-3, 358.

D. PRINCIPAL COMMENTARIAL PASSAGES

**satipatthāna**
Sv III 741-806; Ps I 225-302; Paṭīs-a III 695-7; Vibh-a 214-88; Moh 153-7.

**samma-pādānā**
Ps III 243-54; Spk III 164-5; Vibh-a 289-301; Moh 157-9.

**iddhi-plidda**
Sv II 641-3; Daṭ 262-9; Ps II 69; Spk III 255-7; Vibh-a 303-9; Vism XII 50-3; Moh 159-61.

**indriya**
Vibh-a 125-9; Moh 139-4.

**bojhaṇa**
Ps I 85; Spk III 138-9; Paṭīs-a III 600; As 217; Vibh-a 310-8; Moh 161-4.

**maggā**
Paṭīs-a I 162-96; Vibh-a 114-22, 319-22; Moh i 64-6.

The seven sets
Mp II 49-73; Ud-a 303-6; Nidd-a I 66-7; Paṭīs-a I 95-7; III 618-20.

Vism XXII 32-42.

E. A NOTE ON THE 7 SETS/BODHIPĀKṢIKĀ-DHARMAS IN NON-PĀLI SOURCES

**APPENDIX**

Samādhirāja-sūtra (see Dayal, op. cit., p. 80); Vimalakīrtinirdeśa (É. Lamotte, L’Enseignement de Vimalakīrtī, Louvain, 1962, (pp. 117, 139, 201-2, 216, 378); Samdhinirmocana-sūtra (ed. É. Lamotte, Louvain, 1935, pp. 82-3, 205).


The foregoing is not intended to be exhaustive or comprehensive by any means, but it is illustrative of the importance of the thirty-seven bodhipākṣika-dharmas/seven sets in a wide range of Buddhist literature.

### II RESOLUTION OF BUDDHADATTA’S SUMMARY OF THE PRESENCE OF INDRIYAS, ETC.

**IN THE CLASSES OF CITTA** (Abhidh-av 30-1)

Buddhadatta here adopts the schema of 121 cittas, multiplying the eight lokuttara-cittas by the fivefold jhāna system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDRIYA</th>
<th>16 cittas have 3 indriyas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 cittas: 2 × 5 viññāna, 2 mano-dhātu (kusala-, akusala-vipāka), 3 mano-viññāna-dhātu (2 kusala-, 1 akusala-vipāka), 1 kriya-mano-dhātu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 indriyas:</strong> 1 ‘feeling’ indriya, jīvitindriya, manindriya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 citta has 4 indriyas
1 citta: 1 akusala (viśīvika-sampayutta)  
4 **indriyas:** upēkkhā, jīvitindriya, viriya, manindriya

13 cittas have 5 indriyas
13 cittas: 11 akusala, 2 kriya-mano-viññāna-dhātu  
5 **indriyas:** 1 ‘feeling’ indriya, jīvitindriya, viriya, sati, samādhi, manindriya

12 cittas have 7 indriyas
12 cittas: 12 kamavacara (nāṇa-vippayutta)  
7 **indriyas:** 1 ‘feeling’ indriya, jīvitindriya, saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi, manindriya

39 cittas have 8 indriyas
39 cittas: 12 kāmavacara (nāṇa-sampayutta), 15 rūpavacara, 12 arūpavacara  
8 **indriyas:** 1 ‘feeling’ indriya, jīvitindriya, saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi, paññā, manindriya

40 cittas have 9 indriyas
40 cittas: 40 lokuttara  
9 **indriyas:** 1 ‘feeling’ indriya, jīvitindriya, saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi, paññā, 1 lokuttara ‘knowledge’ indriya, manindriya
APPENDIX

29 cittas: 12 kāmāvacara (somanassa-sahagata), 4 akusala (somanassa-sahagata), 3 rūpāvacara (1st jhāna), 8 lokuttara (1st jhāna), 1 kusala-vipāka mano-viññāṇa-dhātu (somanassa-sahagata), 1 kiriya-manovoññāṇa-dhātu (somanassa-sahagata)

37 cittas: 12 kāmāvacara (upekkhā-sahagata), 8 akusala (upekkhā-sahagata), 2 mano-dhātu (kusala-, akusala-vipāka), 2 mano-viññāṇa-dhātu (kusala-, akusala-vipāka, upekkhā-sahagata), 1 kiriya-manovoññāṇa-dhātu, 1 kiriya-manovoññāṇa-dhātu (upekkhā-sahagata)

11 cittas: 3 rūpāvacara (2nd jhāna), 8 lokuttara (2nd jhāna)
4 factors: vicāra, pīṭha, sukha, cittass’ekaggatā

26 cittas: 12 kāmāvacara (upekkhā-sahagata), 8 akusala (upekkhā-sahagata), 2 mano-dhātu (kusala-, akusala-vipāka), 2 mano-viññāṇa-dhātu (kusala-, akusala-vipāka, upekkhā-sahagata), 1 kiriya-manovoññāṇa-dhātu, 1 kiriya-manovoññāṇa-dhātu (upekkhā-sahagata)
4 factors: vitakka, vicāra, upekkhā, cittass’ekaggatā

11 cittas: 3 rūpāvacara (3rd jhāna), 8 lokuttara (3rd jhāna)
3 factors: pīṭha, sukha, cittass’ekaggatā

34 cittas: 6 rūpāvacara (4th, 5th jhāna), 12 arūpāvacara, 16 lokuttara (4th, 5th jhāna)
2 factors: upekkhā, cittass’ekaggatā

10 cittas: 7 factors: piti, sukha, cittass’ekaggatā

7 cittas: 7 akusala (4 diṭṭhi-gata-vippayutta, 2 paṭīgha-sampayutta, 1 uddhacca-sampayutta)
3 factors: micchā-saṅkappa, micchā-vāyāma

7 cittas: 7 factors: micchā-saṅkappa, micchā-vāyāma, micchā-samādhi

40 cittas: 4 akusala (diṭṭhi-gata-sampayutta)
4 factors: micchā-diṭṭhi, micchā-saṅkappa, micchā-vāyāma, micchā-samādhi

12 cittas: 12 kāmāvacara (nāṇa-vippayutta) 4 factors: saṃmā-saṅkappa, saṃmā-vāyāma, saṃmā-sati, saṃmā-samādhi

24 cittas: 12 rūpāvacara (2nd-5th jhāna), 12 arūpāvacara 4 factors: saṃmā-diṭṭhi, saṃmā-vāyāma, saṃmā-sati, saṃmā-samādhi

15 cittas: 5 factors: saṃmā-diṭṭhi, saṃmā-saṅkappa, saṃmā-vāyāma, saṃmā-sati, saṃmā-samādhi


18 cittas: 18 abetuka

1 citta: 1 vicikicchā-sampayutta
2 factors: micchā-saṅkappa, micchā-vāyāma

7 cittas: 7 factors: micchā-saṅkappa, micchā-vāyāma, micchā-samādhi

40 cittas: 4 factors: micchā-diṭṭhi, micchā-saṅkappa, micchā-vāyāma, micchā-samādhi

12 cittas: 12 kāmāvacara (nāṇa-vippayutta) 4 factors: saṃmā-saṅkappa, saṃmā-vāyāma, saṃmā-sati, saṃmā-samādhi

24 cittas: 12 rūpāvacara (2nd-5th jhāna), 12 arūpāvacara 4 factors: saṃmā-diṭṭhi, saṃmā-vāyāma, saṃmā-sati, saṃmā-samādhi

15 cittas: 5 factors: saṃmā-diṭṭhi, saṃmā-saṅkappa, saṃmā-vāyāma, saṃmā-sati, saṃmā-samādhi

8 cittas have 8 path-factors
8 cittas: 8 lokuttara (1st jhāna)

BALA

2 cittas have 2 balas
2 cittas: 2 kiriya-mano-viññāna-dhātu
2 balas: viyāra, samādhi

1 citta has 3 balas
1 citta: 1 vicikicchā-sampayutta
3 balas: viyāra, ahirika, anottappa

11 cittas have 4 balas
11 cittas: 11 akusala
4 balas: viyāra, samādhi, ahirika, anottappa

12 cittas have 6 balas
12 cittas: 12 kāmāvacara (ñāna-vippayutta)
6 balas: saddhā, viyāra, sati, samādhi, hiri, ottappa

79 cittas have 7 balas
79 cittas: 12 kāmāvacara (ñāna-sampayutta), 15 rūpāvacara, 12 arūpāvacara, 40 lokuttara
7 balas: saddhā, viyāra, sati, samādhi, paññā, hiri, ottappa

16 cittas have no balas
Remaining ahetuka

III THE 22 TRIPLETs OF THE ABHIDHAMMA MĀTIKĀ

This is a glossary of selected Pāli terms; where they differ, relevant Sanskrit forms are given in brackets after the Pāli.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pāli Term</th>
<th>Commentary</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>akusala (akuśala)</td>
<td>unskilful, unwholesome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ānāga</td>
<td>limb, part, factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>āṭṭha-kathā</td>
<td>commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adhipati</td>
<td>overlord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anāgāmya</td>
<td>non-attainment (as stage of meditation; cf. upacāra and samantaka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anāgāmin</td>
<td>one who does not return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anupassanā (anupaśyanā)</td>
<td>watching, contemplation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anusatis (anusmṛti)</td>
<td>recollection, mindfulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appamāda (apramāda)</td>
<td>heedfulness, alertness, lack of carelessness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abhidhamma (abhidharma)</td>
<td>further dhamma, third section of the Buddhist canon and system of thought expounded on its basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abhibhāyatana</td>
<td>(class of) meditation attainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arahant (arhant)</td>
<td>one who has completed the path</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ariya (ārya)</td>
<td>noble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arūpāvacara</td>
<td>belonging to the sphere of the formless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asubha (āsubha)</td>
<td>ugliness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asura</td>
<td>one of the jealous gods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>āgama</td>
<td>section of the Buddhist canon (cf. nikāya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ānāpāna</td>
<td>breathing in and out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ānuttariya</td>
<td>unsurpassable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ābhidhammika</td>
<td>one versed in Abhidhamma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>āyatana</td>
<td>sphere (of the senses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ārammama</td>
<td>object of consciousness, subject of meditation (defiling) influx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>āsava (āsava)</td>
<td>(meditational) success or power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iḍḍhi (ṛddhi)</td>
<td>basis of success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iḍḍhi-pāda (ṛddhi-pāda)</td>
<td>(controlling) faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indriya</td>
<td>access (as stage of meditation; cf. anāgāmya and samantaka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upacāra</td>
<td>higher ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upasampadā</td>
<td>aggregate of grasping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upadāna-kkhandha</td>
<td>equipoise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upekkhā (upeksā)</td>
<td>one-pointedness (of mind)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ekaggata (ekāgratā)</td>
<td>one-going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ekāyana</td>
<td>subject of meditation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kamma-tīhāna</td>
<td>action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kammantā (karmānta)</td>
<td>compassion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>karunā</td>
<td>the good friend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kālīyāna-mitta</td>
<td>sensual desire, object of sensual desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kāma</td>
<td>(five) classes of object of sensual desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kāmā-guna</td>
<td>belonging to the sphere of sense-desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kāmāvacara</td>
<td>body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kāya</td>
<td>unskilful, unwholesome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kusala (kuśala)</td>
<td>aggregate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khandha (skandha)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
cakka-vattin (cakra-vartin)  wheel-turning king, universal monarch
citta  mind, (class of) consciousness
cetasika (caitta)  concomitant of consciousness
ceto-khila  barrenness of mind
chanda  desire to act, purpose
jhāna (dhyāna)  state of absorption in meditation
jhānānga  limb or factor of jhāna
nāṇa (jñāna)  knowledge
jikā  subcommentary
tanhā (tṛṣṇā)  thirst, craving
tika  triplet
dassana (darśana)  seeing
dīṣṭhi (dṛṣṭi)  (wrong) view
duka  couplet
deva(tā)  god
dhamma (dharma)  law, teaching, ultimate constituent of reality
dhamma-vicaya (dharma-pravicaya)  discernment of dhamma
dhātu  element
nikāya  section of the canon (cf. āgama)
nipāta  numerical section of the of the Āṅguttara-nikāya
nimitta  sign, mental image (as object of meditation)
niraya  hell
nivarana  hindrance
nekkhamma  desirelessness
paccaya (prataya)  condition
paccupatthāna  manifestation
paññā (prajñā)  wisdom
paticca-samuppāda (pratīya-samutpāda)  dependent arising
pada-ñāṇa  footing, basis
pada-bhājaniya  word analysis
padhāna (pradhāna)  endeavour
pabbajjā  going forth
pahāna (prahāna)  abandoning
passaddhi (prasrabdhi)  tranquillity
pātimokkha (prātimokṣa)  the rule of the Samgha
pārājika  offence involving ‘defeat’
piti (priti)  joy
pūba-bhāga  prior or initial stage
pattihīna  ordinary man
phala  fruit, result, stage of attainment (cf. magga)
phassa (spärka)  contact
bala  power
bojjhanga (bodhy-āṅga)  factor of awakening
bodhi  awakening
bodhi-pakkhiya (bodhi-pākyā)  contributing to awakening
brahma-vihāra  divine dwelling (as a meditation attainment)
bhāvanā  development
bhikkhu (bhūkṣu)  monk
GLOSSARY

bhikkhuni (bhikṣunī)
nun

magga (mārga)
path, stage of attainment (cf. phala)

maggaṅga (mārgāṅga)
limb or factor of the path

mātrikā (māṭrikā)
scheme of categories or topics

micchā (mithyā)
wrong

muditā
sympathetic joy

mettā (maitri)
loving kindness

yoga
(spiritual) work

yogāvacara
practitioner of yoga

rasa
taste, property, function

rūpa
form, materiality

rūpāvacara
belonging to the sphere of form

lakṣaṇa
characteristic (mark)

loka
world

laukika
belonging to the world, ordinary

lokuttara
(world) transcendent

vagga (varga)
chapter, section

vara
portion, section

vāyāma (vyāyāma)
effort

vicāra
sustained thought

vicikicchā (vicikitsā)
doubt

vijñāna (vijñāna)
consciousness

vittakka (vitarka)
initial thought

vippamutto (vīpaśiyandu)
insight

vibhanga
analysis

vimokkha (vimokṣa)
liberation

viriya (vīrya)
strength, vigour

visuddhi
purification

vacara
investigation

vedanā
feeling

sāmkarika (sāmkalpa)
thought

sāmkhāra (sāṃskāra)
(volitional) force

sangha
community of Buddhist monks and nuns

sakadāgāmin (śrāddāgāmin)
one who returns once

saṅgha (satya)
third, reality

saṃjñā (sāṃjñā)
recognition

saññī (śaṅgī)
mindfulness

satipaṭṭhāna (śrāddhaṇī)
establishing of mindfulness

satipatthāna (śraddhāṇī)
confidence, faith

saddhā (śraddhā)
calm

samatha (samathā)
neighbouring (as stage of meditation; cf. anāgāmya and upacāra)

samanakā
concentration

samādhi (samyak)
right, perfect

samma-pāṭhāna (samyak-pradāna)
right endeavour

sīla (śīla)
morality, ethical conduct

sukha
happiness

sotāpanna (srotāpanna)
one who has attained the ‘stream’

hetu
cause, motivation
**ABBREVIATIONS**

Except in the case of dictionaries and other works of reference abbreviated titles of secondary sources are not listed; for these see under the author's name and appropriate work in BIBLIOGRAPHY (C).

### A. PĀLI AND SANSKRIT TEXTS

For full citation of editions used see BIBLIOGRAPHY (A). In the footnotes -a or -t after an abbreviated title indicates *attha-kathā* or *ṭūkā* respectively; Trsl indicates a translation from Pāli, Sanskrit, Chinese or Tibetan into a modern European language, for which see BIBLIOGRAPHY (B).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<td>A</td>
<td>Anguttara-nikāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap</td>
<td>Apadāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidh-av</td>
<td>Abhidhammavatara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidh-k</td>
<td>Abhidharmakośa (bhāṣya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidh-k-vy</td>
<td>Abhidharmakośavyākhyā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidh-dī</td>
<td>Abhidharmadīpa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abhidh-s</td>
<td>Abhidharmamathasamgaha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abhidh-sam</td>
<td>Abhidharmasamucaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abhidh-h</td>
<td>*Abhidharmahṛdaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amṛta</td>
<td>*Abhidharmāmrṛtarasā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arth(-n)</td>
<td>Arthavinīścayasūtra (- nibandhana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As</td>
<td>Atthasālinī (= Dhs-a)</td>
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<td>It</td>
<td>Itivuttaka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ud</td>
<td>Udāna</td>
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<td>Kv</td>
<td>Kathāvatthu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khp</td>
<td>Khuddakapāṭha</td>
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<td>Ch-Up</td>
<td>Chāndogya-upaniṣad</td>
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<td>J</td>
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<td>Th</td>
<td>Theraghāthā</td>
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<td>Thī</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>Dīgha-nikāya</td>
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<td>DAT</td>
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<td>Dhammapada</td>
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<td>Dhammasaṅgāni</td>
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<td>Nidd I</td>
<td>Mahāniddesa</td>
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<td>Nidd-a I</td>
<td>Mahaniddesaṭṭhakathā (= Saddhammapajjotikā)</td>
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<td>Nidd II</td>
<td>Cullaniddesa</td>
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<td>Nett</td>
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<td>Patis</td>
<td>Pāṭisambhidāmaggā</td>
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<td>Pet</td>
<td>Petakopadesa</td>
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<td>Ps</td>
<td>Papañcasūdanī (= M-a)</td>
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<td>Brh-Up</td>
<td>Bhadrāranyaka-upaniṣad</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>Miḷindapaṇḍha</td>
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<td>Mp</td>
<td>Manorathapūraṇī (= A-a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBh</td>
<td>Mahābhārata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mhv</td>
<td>Mahāvamsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YS</td>
<td>Yoga-sūtras</td>
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</tbody>
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Vin Vinayapitaka
Vibh Vibhaṅga
Vibh-a Vibhaṅgaṭhakathā (= Sammohavinodani)
Vimutt Vimuttimagga
Vism Visuddimagga
Vism-mhū Visuddhimagga-mahātikā
S Samyutta-nikāya
Satya *Satyasiddhi-sāstra
Sadd Saddanthi
Sn Sutta-nipāta
Sp Samantapāśadikā (= Vin-a)
Spk Sāratthapakāsinī (= S-a)
Sv Sumangalavilāsinī (= D-a)

B. JOURNALS

AO Acta Orientalia, Copenhagen
BFEEO Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient, Paris
BSR Buddhist Studies Review, London
HR History of Religions, Chicago
IHQ Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta
IIJ Indo-Iranian Journal, Dordrecht
IT Indologica Taurinensia, Turin
J A Journal Asiatique, Paris
J AOS Journal of the American Oriental Society, New Haven
JAS Journal of Asian Studies, Berkeley
JIABS Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Madison
JIP Journal of Indian Philosophy, Dordrecht
JPTS Journal of the Pāli Text Society, London
JRAI Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London
PBR Pāli Buddhist Review, London
RS Religious Studies, Cambridge
TASJ Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan
UCR University of Ceylon Review, Colombo
WZKS Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, Vienna

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BHSD Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, F. Edgerton, Yale, 1953
BR O. Böhtlingk and R. Roth, Sanskrit Wörterbuch, St. Petersburgh, 1852-75
Childers R. Childers, A Dictionary of the Pāli Language, London, 1875
CPD A Critical Pāli Dictionary, Copenhagen, 1924-
ERE Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. J. Hastings, Edinburgh, 1908-26
Mayrhofer M. Mayrhofer, A Concise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary, Heidelberg, 1956-80
MW Sir Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford, 1899
PTC Pāli Tipitakam Concordance, PTS, London, 1955-

D. GENERAL

Common abbreviations listed in dictionaries (e.g. Collins English Dictionary, London and Glasgow, 1979) are not listed here.

Be Edition in Burmese characters
Ce Edition in Sinhalese characters
Ne Edition in Nāgarī characters
Pkt Prakrit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>Pāli Text Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skt</td>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tib</td>
<td>Tibetan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trsl</td>
<td>Translation/Translated</td>
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