Metaphor and Literalism in Buddhism

The doctrinal history of nirvana

Soonil Hwang
The notion of nirvana originally used the image of extinguishing a fire. Although the attainment of nirvana, ultimate liberation, is the focus of the Buddha’s teaching, its interpretation has been a constant problem to Buddhist exegetes, and has changed in different historical and doctrinal contexts. The concept is so central that changes in its understanding have necessarily involved much larger shifts in doctrine.

This book studies the doctrinal development of the Pali nirvana and subsequent tradition and compares it with the Chinese āgama and its traditional interpretation. It clarifies early doctrinal developments of nirvana and traces the word and related terms back to their original metaphorical contexts. Thereby, it elucidates diverse interpretations and doctrinal and philosophical developments in the abhidharma exegeses and treatises of Southern and Northern Buddhist schools. Finally, the book examines which school, if any, kept the original meaning and reference of nirvana.

Soonil Hwang is Assistant Professor in the Department of Indian Philosophy at Dongguk University, Seoul. His research interests are focused upon early Indian Buddhism, Buddhist Philosophy and Sectarian Buddhism.
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*Soonil Hwang*
METAPHOR AND LITERALISM IN BUDDHISM

The doctrinal history of nirvana

Soonil Hwang
FOR DONGJE
MY ABSOLUTELY ADORABLE DAUGHTER
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I am glad to be able to thank all those who have helped me to complete this book. It was written originally as a DPhil thesis in Mansfield College, Oxford. I have been using various libraries under the university; in particular, I would like to mention Chinese Studies library, a cosy little library in Walton Street, where I spent most of my time to produce this thesis. White Lotus Foundation (Korea) kindly gave me a scholarship award to support me financially to complete my research. The UK government also granted me a British Korean Scholarship award during the financial crisis in South Korea to continue my work in Oxford.

My debts to academics are many. Professor Richard Gombrich, my DPhil supervisor, helped me enormously to carry out my research. I don’t think I could have completed this work without his constant advice and generous encouragement. Professor Tim Barrett, Professor Johannes Bronkhorst, L. S. Cousins, the president of the Pali Text Society, and Dr Andrew Skilton have given valuable criticism, guidance and stimulation for this work. During the final preparation of this book, Professor Peter Harvey and Professor Rod Bucknell gave important comments and fresh perspectives on some matters. I also want to express my gratitude to Professor Damien Keown and Professor Robert Sharf for their kind encouragement.

I want to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to professors and colleagues in the Department of Indian Philosophy in Dongguk University (Korea), in particular Professor Seo Seungwon (Ven. Beopgyong), my MA supervisor, who initially led me into the world of early Indian Buddhism, and Miss Kim Bori who has kindly proofread all my notes in finalizing this book.

During my days in Oxford I enjoyed the privilege of being a member of the Oxford Korea Society and was elected as the president of OKS in 1999. I want to express thanks to all members of OKS, especially the committee members at that time who helped me greatly to carry on my task; to three Korean Buddhist monks, Ven. Hojin, Ven. Misan (Wandoo Kim) and Ven. Chong-dok, for their kindness and help; and to Sir Christopher and Lady Ball who allowed me to stay at their delightful flat in Walton Lane where my wife and I had the great joy of having a baby after six years of marriage.
Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my parents, who have supported me financially as well as spiritually for almost 15 years since my entrance of Dongguk University and to my wife, Jang Youngok, who has helped me enormously without any complaint whatsoever and gave birth to our adorable daughter, Hwang Dongje.

Seoul
# ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations for Pali texts mainly follow the conventions used in *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abhid-s</td>
<td><em>Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Akb-d</td>
<td><em>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</em>, ed. Swami Dwarkidas Shastri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td><em>Aṅguttara-nikāya</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As</td>
<td><em>Atthasālinī</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAU</td>
<td><em>Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BD</td>
<td><em>Buddhist Dictionary</em>, revised and enlarged by Nyanaponika, Kandy, 1980.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEFEO</td>
<td><em>Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême Orient</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUCD</td>
<td><em>The Buddhist Scriptures Information Retrieval 4.0</em> (Budsir IV on CD-ROM), Mahidol University Computing Center, Bangkok, 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHU</td>
<td><em>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td><em>Critical Pāli Dictionary</em>, Copenhagen, 1924.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cul</td>
<td><em>Cullaniddesa</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBT</td>
<td><em>Dictionary of Buddhist terms</em> (佛教語大辭典), Nakamura Hajime, Tokyo, 1981.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dhātuk</td>
<td><em>Dhātukathā</em>.</td>
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<td>Dhp</td>
<td><em>Dhammapada</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dhp-a</td>
<td><em>Dhammapada-āṭṭhakathā</em>.</td>
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</table>
ABBREVIATIONS

Dhs  Dhammasaṅgaṇī.
DN   Dīgha-nikāya.
Dk   Dhātukāya (in Chinese).
Ds   Dharmaskandha (in Chinese).
ed  edited by.
EOB  Encyclopaedia of Buddhism.
ERE  Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings.
It   Itivuttaka.
It-a Itivuttaka-āṭṭhakathā.
JIBS Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Tokyo.
JIP  Journal of Indian Philosophy, Dordrecht.
Khp  Khuddakapāṭha.
Kv   Kathāvatthu.
Kv-a Kathāvatthu-pakaraṇa-āṭṭhakathā.
Mil  Milindapañha.
Mmd-p Miḷaṁadhyamakakārika with Prasannapada, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin.
MN   Majjhima-nikāya.
Mp   Manorathapūraṇī (Aṅguttara-nikāya commentary).
Na   Nyāyānusārastra (in Chinese).
Nett Nettippakaraṇa.
Paṭis Paṭisambhidāmagga.
Pe   Paṭakopadesa.
PEW  Philosophy East and West, Hawaii.
Pj I Paramatthajotikā I (Khuddakapāṭha-āṭṭhakathā).
Pp   Puggalapaṇṇatti.
Ps   Papañcasūdanī (Majjhima-nikāya commentary).
PTS  Pali Text Society.
PTSCD Pali text version 1.0 (Buddhist Canon CD-ROM), Dhammakaya Foundation and PTS, Khlong Luang, 1996.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RV</td>
<td>Rgveda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa-d</td>
<td>Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa-w</td>
<td>Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed. U. Wogihara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sap</td>
<td>Samgītīparyāya (in Chinese).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Śatapatha-brāhma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sdp</td>
<td>Saddhammapajjotikā (Cullaniddesa commentary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sk</td>
<td>Sanskrit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLTP</td>
<td>Sri Lanka Tripiṭaka Project, the electronic version of the Pali Canon, available from <a href="http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/palicanon.html">http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/palicanon.html</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>Saṃyuṭṭa-nikāya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sn</td>
<td>Suttanipāta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sn-a</td>
<td>Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sp</td>
<td>Samantapāśādikā (Vinayapiṭaka commentary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spk</td>
<td>Sāratthappākāsinī (Saṃyuṭṭa-nikāya commentary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sv</td>
<td>Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (Dīgha-nikāya commentary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Tripitaka Koreana (The Tripitaka in Chinese preserved in Korea) The Research Institute of Tripitaka Koreana, available from <a href="http://www.sutra.re.kr">www.sutra.re.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Th</td>
<td>Thera-gāthā.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Th-a</td>
<td>Thera-gāthā-aṭṭhakathā.</td>
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<td>Thī</td>
<td>Therīgāthā.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thī-a</td>
<td>Therīgāthā-aṭṭhakathā.</td>
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<td>tr</td>
<td>translated by.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ud</td>
<td>Udāna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vibh</td>
<td>Vibhaṅga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vibh-a</td>
<td>Sammohavinodanī (Vibhaṅga commentary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vin</td>
<td>Vinayapiṭaka.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vism</td>
<td>Visuddhimagga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vk</td>
<td>Vijñānakāya (in Chinese).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol</td>
<td>Volume.</td>
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<td>Yam</td>
<td>Yamaka.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the exposition offered by the early canon is often described as contingent (*ābhiprāyika*),¹ in contrast to the definitive (*lākṣaṇika*) exposition of the *abhidharma*.

One of the problems concerning the truth of the origin of the suffering, the second noble truth, is, as asked in the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*, ‘All the impure dharmas can be the cause and thus the truth of the origin. Why then does the Blessed one say that only thirst (*ṭṛṣṇā*) is the truth of the origin and not others?’² In some *sūtras* it is only thirst (*ṭṛṣṇā*),³ while in some other *sūtras* it is action (*karma*), desire (*ṭṛṣṇā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*).⁴ Although we do not need to go through all thirty answers put forward by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas in the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*, we have to realise that the discrepancies among scattered quotations from the early canon (*sūtras*) became a serious problem for the masters of the *abhidharma*, especially when they wanted to define a certain concept, like the second noble truth. One of the answers to the above question given by Vasubandhu in the sixth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* was as follows: ‘Because the elucidation is contingent (*ābhiprāyika*) in the *sūtras*, yet definitive (*lākṣaṇika*) in the *abhidharma*.’⁵ ‘Contingent’ (*ābhiprāyika*), derived from *abhiprē* (to approach), seems to mean ‘dependent on context’ and, thus, means that the exposition of *sūtras* depends largely on taking words in their context, in contrast to the definition-based explanation of the *abhidharma*.⁶ That is to say, Vasubandhu tends to stick to the definitional explanation of the *abhidharma*, while also trying to find a reasonable explanation by considering the contextual nature of the *sūtras*.⁷ The situation in the Pali Theravāda tradition is no different. As pointed out by Gombrich in his book *How Buddhism Began*, the mode of teaching applied in the *suttas* is often expressed as *pariyāyena, ad hominem*, discursive, applied method, illustrated discourse, figurative language, as against *nippariyāyena*, the abstract, general states of *abhidhamma*.⁸

If the relatively straightforward explanation of the *sūtra* mentioned above caused problems for the masters of the *abhidharma*, how problematic it must have been if the *sūtra* used metaphor. Unlike the above case, which still leaves scattered traces, the metaphorical structure could easily have been forgotten.
INTRODUCTION

and leave little trace. Unless its contextual as well as historical features are fully understood, it could be almost impossible to clarify correctly what a certain metaphorical explanation in the sūtra meant. Moreover, the attitude of the abhidharmic masters towards the early canon tended to pay ‘too much attention to the precise words used and not enough to the speaker’s intention, the spirit of the text’.9

This unintentional literalism, when coupled with the metaphorical structure of a certain teaching in the sūtra, could easily trigger early changes in meaning and then the difference between the two might well lead to a doctrinal development in early Buddhism. The early Buddhist concept of nirvana may be a good example of how delicate it could be when we are dealing with an early Buddhist concept with a metaphorical nature. The whole picture of nirvana could not easily be revealed unless we pay full attention to its contextual and historical features together with its early developments in the abhidharma, as well as its later developments among Buddhist schools.

Aims and scope

Numerous studies of nirvana have been undertaken since Buddhism began to be studied in the Western world. There even is a book dedicated to the history of the Western interpretations of nirvana,10 yet it is really hard to find a work devoted entirely to the historical developments of nirvana from the early canon (sūtra) to the abhidharma and to the treatises (śāstra) in both Northern and Southern traditions.

One of the common mistakes scholars can make is that their general explanation of nirvana may represent the view of their favoured Buddhist school. In other words, their account of the early Buddhist concept of nirvana sometimes represents a view that is held only by a specific Buddhist school.

If the study of nirvana leans to the early canon (sūtra), the doctrinal development of nirvana could easily be missed; whereas if the study leans to the abhidharma and the treatises (śāstra), the early metaphorical nature of nirvana could easily be ignored. Moreover, the early canon (sūtra) was full of diverse terms and metaphors. Without considering the doctrinal and historical context of nirvana, we could easily stick to a partial meaning of a word in a sūtra and then regard that as the comprehensive meaning of the word in the entire early canon. Without considering the metaphorical nature of nirvana, we could not come close to the real picture of nirvana at its early stage, and as a consequence we could easily miss critical points in the later exegetical and doctrinal problems concerning nirvana.

When I first read Gombrich’s How Buddhism Began, it was, as described by Cousins in his review,11 ‘very stimulating’ and gave me a different view on some problems concerning the Buddhist concept of nirvana. Two questions I had before were: why nirvana during life, or enlightenment, was defined as the cessation of the triple fires of passion, hatred and delusion,12 while the way
INTRODUCTION

to reach it was described as a successive destruction of fetters (saṃyojana)\textsuperscript{13} or the cessation of all cankers (āsava);\textsuperscript{14} and why the lack of attachment, generally accepted as the reference of the word upādi, or upadhi in Sanskrit within mainstream Buddhist tradition, when used in the context of nirvana during life and nirvana at death, applied equally to nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sa-upādisesanibbānadadhātu / sopadhiśesanirvānadadhātu) and nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupādisesanibbānadadhātu / nir-lan-upadhiśesanirvānadadhātu).

The answer to my questions was that I had completely missed nirvana’s historical and metaphorical contexts. According to Gombrich, to number three could be to juxtapose the three sacrificial fires of a Brahman householder with the triple fires of passion, hatred and delusion,\textsuperscript{15} while the word upādi or upadhi when used in a metaphorical structure that embraces Enlightenment and its opposite could mean ‘fuel’ with an underlying reference to the five aggregates.\textsuperscript{16} That is to say, understanding nirvana’s historical and metaphorical contexts could reveal surprisingly rich information to solve some of the exegetical and ontological problems concerning nirvana from a different perspective.

The aim of this book is to clarify the early doctrinal history of the nirvana concept and the two nirvana theory, which flourished under the image of a fire extinguished, by tracing the term nirvāna back to its origin in terms of its metaphorical structure, then following its early developments in the Abhidharma by checking its technical uses with its philosophical developments, and elucidating diverse interpretations and doctrinal developments in the exegeses and treatises of the Southern and Northern Buddhist schools by examining which school kept the original references of the nirvana concept and the two nirvana theory expressed in the early metaphorical structure.

The scope of this book ends around the fourth or fifth century CE, when the Visuddhimagga was composed by Buddhaghosa in the Southern tradition, while the Abhidharmakośabhaṣya was composed by Vasubandhu and as a response the Nyāyāmūsārasāstra was composed by Saṅghabhadra in the Northern tradition. From the exegeses and treatises at around this time we can reconstruct the fully developed form of the nirvana concept and the two nirvana theory in three major Indian Buddhist schools: the Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. By examining their views on nirvana, established from their own exegetical and ontological perspectives, we may well determine at the end of the thesis which school was of the original meaning of nirvana, especially through their interpretation of the last stanza of the Anuruddha’s famous verse, believed to have been uttered at the time of the Buddha’s final release at Kuśinagara.

The Mahāyāna interpretations of the nirvana concept and their equivalent of the two nirvana theory are beyond the scope of this book, owing to their different approaches to early Buddhist materials and different doctrinal perspectives. According to Asaṅga in his Mahāyānasamgraha, the acceptance
of apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa was one of the ten differences between the Mahāyāna and the traditional Buddhist schools. According to Louis de La Vallée Poussin, there could be one more, anādikālika-prakṛtiṣuddha-nirvāṇa in the Vijñaptimātratāsāsiddhi, so that together there were four nirvanas in the Yogācāra tradition. Comparing these three or possibly four nirvanas with the traditional two nirvana theory could be interesting, yet in order to do this we would need look at all the relevant Mahāyāna materials from the doctrinal and historical perspective. I want to leave this task for further research, hoping that the current study will become a firm base from which ventures upon the Mahāyāna territory and their equivalent of the two nirvana theory can be Launched.

Outline of the chapters

In Chapter 1, I deal briefly with the word nirvāṇa, its etymological meaning and original reference. Despite its established definition, the cessation of the triple fires of passion, hatred and delusion, later Buddhists in both Northern and Southern traditions were searching for other explanations of the word nirvāṇa. What I show in this chapter is that missing nirvana’s historical and metaphorical context at an early stage could be one of the main causes for the later developments of diverse etymological explanations of nirvana seen in the Pali exegesis and Chinese treatises (śāstra).

The main issue dealt with in Chapter 2 is the two nirvana theory. The traditional explanation of the two nirvana theory, nirvana during life and nirvana at death, was challenged by such scholars as Hermann Oldenberg, A. O. Lovejoy and Peter Masefield and by one sūtra in the Chinese Ekottara-āgama. In this chapter, I deal with this problem of the two nirvana theory by examining the etymology of upādī in terms of its subjective and objective meanings, the usage of upādisesa within the context of nirvana and the usage of upādisesa within the context of the four noble persons, and by establishing the differences between the non-returner and the two nirvana elements.

The early canon in both Pali and Chinese traditions is the main material in this chapter. With the help of a computer-aided search of three CD-ROMs and the electronic version of the Pali canon on the web for the Southern tradition, and one CD-ROM for the Northern tradition, finding words and clauses related to nirvana is nowadays far easier and more convenient. Although I used these electronic materials for the Pali canon to retrieve data, my main source is the PTS editions. I also use the Chinese Āgamas to compare corresponding passages in the Pali Nikāyas.

Chapter 3 deals with the development of the nirvana concept in both the Pali abhidhamma tradition, and the Chinese abhidharma tradition, and then examines how this development affects the two nirvana theory in the Jñānapratisthāna and in the Theravāda exegetical traditions. I also trace Buddhaghosa’s seemingly Northern Buddhist originated explanation of the
two nirvana theory in the *Visuddhimagga* back to the *Nettipakarana* and the *Petàkopadesa* in the Southern tradition. Chapter 4 is mainly about the state of the *Tathāgata* after death, especially against the claim of such scholars as F. Otto Schrader and Peter Harvey that the allegedly common Indian view was already presupposed in the early canon when the metaphor of a fire extinguished was used to explain what happens to an enlightened person after death. In this chapter, I deal with this problem by examining Buddhist methodology seen in the early canon by the name of *yoniso manasikāra*, by clarifying the meaning of the metaphor of a fire extinguished in the context of Vacchagotta’s unanswered questions and by exploring later developments in the Therāvada tradition seen in the *Sammohavinodanī* (*Vibhaṅga* commentary), the *Teraṭṭhā-āṭṭhakathā* and the *Visuddhimagga*. I also discuss the Therāvadin’s unique argument, the ‘singularity’ of the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) that is nirvana, and its implications, under the influence of the Buddhist theory of momentariness.

Chapter 5 is devoted to the doctrinal development of the nirvana concept and the two nirvana theory in Northern Buddhist schools. It explores the later development of the two nirvana theory seen in the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*, reconstructs the Sautrāntika concept of nirvana in the *Abhidharmakosabhāsya* and deals with ontological issues surrounding Anuruddha’s simile seen in the *Abhidharmakosabhāsya* and the *Nyāyānusārasāstra*. Although the *Abhidharmakosabhāsya* presents both the Sarvāstivādin and the Sautrāntika opinion, its comment is mainly in favour of the Sautrāntika point of view. Thus the orthodox Sarvāstivādin’s position should be considered and defended from Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusārasāstra*. For the two Chinese treatises, the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra* and the *Nyāyānusārasāstra*, Louis de La Vallée Poussin did indispensable work: he selected the passages related to nirvana in those two and the *Abhidharmakosabhāsya* and translated them into French. My translation of these texts depends largely on his works.
Part 1

THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIRVANA IN EARLY INDIAN BUDDHISM
Since Buddhism began to be studied in the Western world, numerous studies of nirvana have been undertaken, yet no fully satisfactory clarification of it has been made. This is not surprising if we consider the fact that while for Buddhists it is to reach nirvana, it is for scholars to study what nirvana may be. That is to say, nirvana for Buddhists has always been their highest goal, which can be reached through morality, meditation and wisdom, whereas for scholars it has been a kind of state that can be, though with difficulty, defined and explained in human language. ‘A very different thing’ was the early verdict given by Louis de La Vallée Poussin in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

A good starting point to explore the word nirvāṇa could be from its etymology. Though there can be other opinions, such as T. W. Rhys Davids’s suggestion in his PED, Western scholars tend to agree on the etymological meaning of nirvana as ‘going out’: the noun nirvāṇa is derived from the negative prefix nir plus the root vā (to blow). Its original meaning seems to be, as Ñyānamoli suggested, ‘“extinction” of a fire by ceasing to blow on it with bellows (a smith’s fire, for example)’. When a smith stops blowing on a fire, it goes out automatically. In this respect, this word nirvāṇa should be understood as intransitive: a fire going out due to lack of cause, such as fuel or wind.

If we accept this etymological meaning, which is probably pre-Buddhist, what does the term refer to within the early Buddhist tradition? One of the common misunderstandings of nirvana is to assume that it refers to the extinction of a person or soul. This view may be caused by the words nibbuta and nibbuti, which can be used of the person or soul. However, both words are derived not from nirvāṇa (to blow) but from nirvṛtya (to cover) and their meaning in these cases is, as K. R. Norman suggests, ‘satisfied, happy, tranquil, at ease, at rest’ for the former and ‘happiness, bliss, rest, ceasing’ for the latter. Moreover, not only does this view lack any textual evidence, it is also the mistaken opinion identified in the early canon as annihilationism (ucchedavāda).
In the early canon, nirvana was applied to the two most important events in the Buddha’s life: enlightenment and final liberation. The former, technically called ‘nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sa-upādīsesānibbānaññadhātu)’, is the state in which the triple fires of passion, hatred and delusion are extinguished but the fuel, the five aggregates in a metaphorical structure, still remains; the latter, technically called ‘nirvana without remainder of clinging (an-upādīsesanibbānaññadhātu)’, is the state in which there is no more fuel left.

E. J. Thomas regarded Jainism as older than Buddhism and said that it is unlikely that the word nirvana, which has been used in both traditions, was borrowed from the latter. However, we cannot be so certain that Jainism predates Buddhism, because the existence of Jainism before the Jina, or Mahāvīra, has not been demonstrated and most of the Jain texts that survive are apparently later than the early Buddhist canon. The problem of the Jains’ use of nirvana is that it always refers, as Hermann Jacobi pointed out, to the final liberation:

liberated souls will be embodied no more; they have accomplished absolute purity; they dwell in the state of perfection at the top of the universe, and have no more to do with worldly affairs; they have reached nirvāṇa (nivṛti, or mukti).

The Jains’ notion of nirvana was clearly different from that of early Buddhism. However, there is a different use of nirvana in the Bhagavad-Gītā. Although Buddhist influence on the Bhagavad-Gītā is well known, the use of nirvana here gives a clue to what it refers to in early Buddhism. The following verses in the fifth chapter clearly show that it refers not to the final liberation but to Enlightenment:

Who finds his happiness within, his joy within, and likewise his light only within, that disciplined man to Brahman-nirvāṇa goes, having become Brahman. Brahman-nirvāṇa is won by the seers whose sins are destroyed, whose doubts are cleft, whose souls are controlled, who delight in the welfare of all beings. To those who have put off desire and wrath, religious men whose minds are controlled, close at hand Brahman-nirvāṇa comes, to knowers of the self. (5. 24–6).

The compound, ‘brahman-nirvāṇa (brahmanirvāṇa)’, recalls Buddhism, not only because the word brahman is used in compounds in Buddhist texts, but also because ‘become Brahman (brahmabhiṣṭa)’ is used in the early canon to describe the Buddha or a saint (arahant) who has already attained enlightenment. Thus, although this word seems to have been used in Jainism with the meaning of final liberation, it was later, in the Bhagavad-Gītā, borrowed from Buddhism with the already established meaning of enlightenment. For
early Buddhists the weight was more on nirvana during life, enlightenment, than nirvana at death, the final liberation.¹⁷

What this term refers to within the early Buddhist tradition seems to be the extinction of the triple fire of passion, hatred, and delusion.¹⁸ This is, according to R. F. Gombrich, part of an extended metaphorical structure that embraces enlightenment and its opposite.¹⁹ From the first part of the Mahāvagga in the Vinaya, we could assume that this reference was established at a very early stage of the Buddha’s mission. In the sermon known as the āditta-pariyāya,²⁰ the Buddha preached to newly converted matted-hair ascetics (jaṭila) that our liberation depended on putting out the triple fire of passion, hatred and delusion with which all parts of our cognitive process are on fire.²¹

Numbering the fires as three could have another hidden message: it is, according to Gombrich, ‘to allude to a set of three fires which the brahmin householder was committed to keeping alight and tending daily so that they came to symbolise life in the world, life as a family man’.²² While the fire image in Brahmanism is good and desirable, this triple fire of passion, hatred and delusion in Buddhism is the one that should be abandoned. In other words, this could make a deep impression on those matted-hair ascetics (jaṭila) also known as the ‘fire cult’.²³ Not only did the Buddha express his doctrine by using this fire image, he also used it as a riposte to Brahmanism.

This metaphorical reference did not entirely satisfy later Buddhists, since they sought other explanations of the word nirvāṇa. The problem seems to be that there is a gap between the definition of nirvana applying this reference and the way to reach this highest goal. Although it still was used as a definition of nirvana²⁴ and the unconditioned²⁵ in the Theravāda tradition,²⁶ what they did in practice was trying not only to extinguish the passion, hatred and delusion but also to extinguish all cankers (āsavas) or defilements (kilesa).

This situation is not very different in the Northern Buddhist tradition. The Chinese equivalent of the Nibbānasutta in which nirvana was defined as the extinction of the triple fires²⁷ seems to have been modified slightly: it defines nirvana as ‘The cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, the cessation of delusion and the cessation of cankers (āsavas).’²⁸

In later exegetical works, both traditions show a whole new set of etymological definitions of the word nirvana. In the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, the extinction of the triple fires was devalued in as much as it was just one of nine different etymological definitions of the word:

**Question:** why is it called nirvana? **Answer:** As it is the cessation of defilements (kleśamīrodha), it is called nirvana. As it is the extinction of the triple fires, it is called nirvana. As it is the tranquillity of three characteristics, it is called nirvana. As there is separation (viyoga) from bad odor (durgandha), it is called nirvana. As there is separation from destinies (gati), it is called nirvana. Vāna means
forest and nir means escape. As it is the escape from the forest of the aggregates, it is called nirvana. Vāna means weaving and nir means negation. As there is no weaving, it is called nirvana. In a way that one with thread can easily be woven while one without that cannot be woven, in that way one with action (karma) and defilements (kleśa) can easily be woven into life and death while an aśāikṣa who is without any action and defilements cannot be woven into life and death. That is why it is called nirvana. Vāna means new birth and nir means negation. As there is no more new birth, it is called nirvana. Vāna means bondage and nir means separation. As it is separation from bondage, it is called nirvana. Vāna means all discomforts of life and death and nir means passing beyond. As it passes beyond all discomforts of life and death, it is called nirvana.29

A similar approach can also be found in the Theravāda exegetical tradition. Steven Collins, in his book Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, presents four different etymological definitions.30 First of all, the word nibbāna means ‘without desire’, from the negative prefix nir, with vāna meaning desire derived from ēvan (to desire). Thus nirvana was explained in the Sammohavinodanī as ‘Craving is called desire. Since that does not exist there, it is called without-desire.’31 Second, it means ‘state of the renunciation of desire and craving’, from nir meaning to abandon or renounce by reference to the root ni-kkham, and vana meaning desire.32 Third, the word vāna can mean ‘wood’ or ‘jungle’,33 which refers to the aggregates (skandha) seen above.34 It could thus mean escape from the aggregates. Finally, it can be elucidated as ‘abandoning the desire which weaves together life to life (by means of) action (karma) and its result’,35 from taking vāna as ‘sewing’ or ‘weaving’.

In fact, Buddhaghosa also ignored the original etymological meaning of the word, the extinction of the triple fires of passion, hatred and delusion, and presented a different explanation of nirvāna based on vāna meaning weaving derived from vā (to weave) in his Visuddhimagga:

It is called nibbāna (extinction) because it has gone away from (ṇikkhanta), has escaped from (nissata), is dissociated from, craving, which has acquired in common usage the name ‘fastening (vāna)’ because, by ensuring successive becoming, craving serves as a joining together, a binding together, a lacing together, of the four kinds of generation, five destinies, seven stations of consciousness and nine abodes of being.36

What later Buddhists in both Northern and Southern traditions did seems to be to narrow the gap between the definition of nirvana based on the
original etymological definition and the developed and systematised opinion of their highest goal, nirvana. Since taking the word vana, or vāna, to refer to ‘forest’ or ‘weaving’ was common to both traditions, their search for a new etymology could probably be regarded as a common phenomenon among sectarian Buddhist schools. If we take these diverse definitions derived from a single original source, it probably started before the separation of the Sarvāstivādins and the Vibhajyavādins during the reign of the Emperor Ashoka. By contrast, if we take them as a result of the copying of each other among Buddhist sects, it could be a later sectarian development. In both cases, Buddhist masters in both traditions seem not to have been satisfied with the original etymological definition.

Searching for these new etymologies of nirvana seems to have started at the time when the extinction of the triple fires of passion, hatred and delusion was still used and accepted as the definition of nirvana, while its metaphorical structure had started to be forgotten. Without an understanding of its metaphorical structure, the original definition of nirvana could not satisfy later Buddhists, since it did not cover all aspects of their highest goal. In the next chapter, I discuss two most important aspects of nirvana: nirvana with a remainder of clinging and nirvana without a remainder of clinging.
THE TWO NIRVANA THEORY IN THE EARLY CANON

It is generally accepted that there are two nirvanas in early Buddhism and they are differentiated as nirvana with a remainder of clinging and nirvana without a remainder of clinging. There are, however, unsolved problems in their descriptions: not only are they spelt differently, sa-upādisesānibbānadhātu and anupādisesānibbānadhātu in Pali, as against sopadhiśesanirvāṇadhātu and nirlan-upadhiśesanirvāṇadhātu in Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit, but they also have different meanings according to what the word upādisa, or upadhi in Sanskrit, refers to.

The Theravāda exegetical tradition takes upādi to refer to ‘the aggregates’ and as a consequence the two kinds of nirvana correspond to the two most important events in the Buddha’s life: enlightenment and final liberation at death. The first is expressed as nirvana with a remainder of clinging and is explained as the cessation of defilements (kilesa-parinibbāna). That is to say, although defilements, such as passion, hatred and delusion, have completely ceased, the aggregates still remain (saupādisesa). The second is expressed as ‘nirvana without a remainder of clinging’ and is explained as the cessation of the aggregates (khandha-parinibbāna). That is to say, these remaining aggregates cease completely.

Figuratively speaking, it is like stopping a potter’s wheel. The potter’s wheel is spun around by the power of an electric motor. Saupādisesa is like a wheel spinning even after the power is turned off, due to momentum; anupādisesa is like the final stopping of the wheel because there is no more force left.

By contrast, some of the modern interpretations take upādi to refer to ‘attachment’. Such scholars as Hermann Oldenberg, A. O. Lovejoy and Peter Masefield insisted that upādi could not originally have meant ‘the aggregates’, since the early canon gives another usage of upādisesa. Not only is it used in describing the first three of the four noble persons (ariyapuggalā), it is also used in describing a pair with perfect knowledge (ānāma), one of whom is a non-returner (anāgāmin) and the other a saint (arāhant). Thus, the state of a non-returner can be expressed as nirvana with a remainder of clinging, since there still is attachment left (saupādisesa); whereas the state of a saint (arāhant) can be expressed as nirvana without a remainder of clinging,
since there is no more attachment left (anupādisesa). As certain advanced disciples will obtain either one or the other, the two nirvana elements cannot be understood as successive stages, as posited by the Theravāda exegetical tradition, but must be mutually exclusive means by which different disciples attain their liberation.\textsuperscript{12}

The crucial argument put forward is, as noted by Huzita Koudazu in \textit{The Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies}, that ‘there is no clear evidence within the early canon saying upādi to mean the aggregates’.\textsuperscript{13} Louis de La Vallée

\textit{Figure 2.2} Either non-returner or arahant
Poussin and E. J. Thomas seem to have had the view that the use of *upādi* to refer to the aggregates could not be the oldest usage. However, such evidence can be found within the early canon, though not directly but indirectly. According to Gombrich, the term *upādi* means objectively ‘fuel’, which denotes ‘the aggregates’ in a metaphorical structure that embraces enlightenment and its opposite.

In this chapter, I deal with this problem of the two nirvana theory by examining the etymology of *upādi* in terms of its subjective and objective meanings, the usage of *upādisesa* within the context of nirvana and the usage of *upādisesa* within the context of the four noble persons, and by establishing the differences between the non-returner and the two nirvana elements.

**Etymology of *upādi***

The word *upādi* is usually found compounded with *sesa*, ‘remainder’. Despite its phonetic similarity with *upadhi*, its synonym is *upādāna*, which shares the same etymology, deriving from *upa ā vādā* (to give). *Upādāna* has both objective and subjective meanings. Objectively, it means ‘fuel, supply, provision’ or, literally, that material substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going. In the *Upādānasutta* in the *Samyuttanikāya*, the word *upādāna* is used in the following way: ‘Verily such a great bonfire, so fed, so supplied with fuel, would burn for a long while.’ Subjectively, it means ‘drawing upon, grasping, holding on, grip, attachment’ in the sense that a fire clings to fuel in order to keep burning. Similarly, living beings cling to food, or more precisely nourishment, to keep alive. This word can also be used in terms of the process of rebirth. It is that by means of which the process of rebirth is kept going or alive: that is to say, it is the cause of rebirth.

In the later systematisation, *upādāna* was used in this subjective sense and was of four kinds: ‘Sensual Clinging (*kāmapūpādāna*), Clinging to Views (*dīṭṭhupūpādāna*), Clinging to mere Rules and Ritual (*sīlabbatupūpādāna*), and clinging to Personality-Belief (*atta-vādupūpādāna*). This subjective meaning of *upādi* is almost synonymous with a meaning of *upadhi* that is derived from a different verb: *upa vādhā* (to put). The literal meaning of *upadhi* is ‘that on which something is laid or rests, basis, foundation, substratum’. According to PED, it designates in the oldest texts worldly possessions and belongings, such as ‘wife and children, flocks and herds, silver and gold’. We can see this usage of *upadhi* in the famous dialogue between the Buddha and Māra in the *Suttanipāta*:

‘One with sons rejoices because of (his) sons’, said Māra the evil one. ‘Similarly the cattle-owner rejoices because of (his) cows. For acquisitions (*upadhi*) are joy for a man. Whoever is without acquisitions does not rejoice.’
'One with sons grieves because of (his) sons', said the blessed One. 'Similarly the cattle-owner grieves because of (his) cows. For acquisitions (upadhi) are grief for a man. Whoever is without acquisitions does not grieve.'

K. R. Norman regards these two verses as ‘a punning exchange of words based upon the two meanings of upadhi’; ‘objects which one amasses’ and ‘the love and affection which one has for such things, which form an attachment and lead one back to rebirth’. While the reference of upadhi, or acquisition, in the first verse is objects themselves, such as sons and cows, the exact meaning in the second is not the objects themselves, but love or affection for such objects.

For example, the images or memories of his beloved cause pain to a man who has been dumped by his lover. He undergoes pain and this pain is not caused directly by the beloved one, but by his subjective affection for her. Once he overcomes his attachment, there is no more pain in him even if the beloved one is still around.

In CPD, this double aspect is explained as follows: just as kāma means, objectively, the objects of sensual enjoyment and, subjectively, enjoyment of those objects and sense-desire, upadhi thus means, objectively, possessions, belongings, and subjectively the attachment to, affection for, clinging to these possessions. It is thus equated with tanhā, ādāna, upādāna, āsava, kamma, and in later systematisation particularly with kāmā, khandhā, kilesā, abhisaṅkhārā, all of which are causes or bases of rebirth.

In the Sammasanasutta of the Saṅyuttanikāya, upadhi is used in much the same way as upādāna in the context of dependent origination.

Where there is upadhi, there comes to be old-age and death (jarāmarāṇa); where upadhi is not, old-age and death come not to be. . . . Where there is thirst (tanhā), there upadhi comes to be. Where thirst is not, upadhi comes not to be.

In other words, the two words can be used almost synonymously in this subjective sense. What is the relevance of this similarity? I think this could explain the well known problem that upādisesa is the Pali equivalent of upadhiśesa in Buddhist Sanskrit.

K. R. Norman has said: ‘the difference between the two was of course noticed long ago, yet little effort has been made to explain why they are different’. This difference eventually leads him to suggest another etymology, upa adhīlati vīśṣ (to leave), positing that these two phrases must originally have had the same meaning. Thus, the whole term originally consists not of two words meaning ‘a remainder of clinging’ but of a single word meaning simply ‘a remainder’. In fact, the Chinese translation of this word before Hiuan-tsang, who translates this words as yu-yi (余依), ‘a remainder of
clinging’, is *yu* (餘), simply ‘a remainder’. However, this etymology is not entirely satisfactory since the word *yi* (依, *upadhi* in Skt) is treated as a separate word and commented on individually in the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*.\(^{28}\) That is to say, a master of the *abhidhāma* regarded this *upadhiśeṣa* not as one but as a compound of two words.

According to the recent publication of ‘Ancient Buddhist Scrolls from Gandhāra’ by Richard Salomon,\(^ {29} \) the Gandhārī nirvana without a remainder of clinging (*anupādisesanibbāṇadhatu*) is spelled *anuadiśeṣaṇivanaṇadhadu*. According to Gandhārī phonology *anupādiśeṣa* like Pali could be the underlying form, but *anupādhiśeṣa* like Buddhist Sanskrit could not.\(^ {30} \) Moreover, *dh* and *bh* are often written in the place of *d* and *b*.\(^ {31} \) Thus, this could explain how *upādi* was replaced by *upadhi* in Buddhist Sanskrit. However, this is only possible if Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit originally came from Gandhāra.

I suggest that the similarity between *upādi* and *upadhi* in their subjective sense played a part in the replacement of *upādi* by *upadhi*. The two words in their subjective sense were already widespread among the wanderers of the Buddha’s day. In the *Saupādisesasutta* in the *Aṅguttaranikāya*, the word *upādisesa*, which should be understood in its subjective sense, is first mentioned not by the blessed one but by the wanderers of other views (*aññatitthīnaṃ paribbājakānaṃ*).\(^ {32} \) The four kinds of *upādana* listed and commented on in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* seen above\(^ {33} \) have a subjective sense, in line with psychological trends in the Pali *abhidhamma*. Thus, the subjective meaning of *upādi* seems to have become more and more widespread with the development of monastic Buddhism, while the objective meaning of *upādi* became forgotten along with its metaphorical structure. It is quite possible that the confusion between the two occurred in the context of nirvana and this eventually led to the replacement at a later stage.

**Upādisesa within the context of nirvana**

Nirvana is, according to Gombrich, part of an extended metaphorical structure that embraces enlightenment and its opposite.

His argument relies largely on the sermon that is known in English as the Fire Sermon,\(^ {34} \) but in Pali is called the Āditta-pariyāya, ‘The way of putting things as being on fire’. The term *pariyāya* means literally ‘a way round’ and is applied to the mode of teaching in the *suttanta, ad hominem*, discursively, applied method, illustrated discourse and figurative language. The opposite of this word is *nippariyāya* and is applied to the systematised presentation of the doctrine in the *abhidhāma*, the abstract general statements.\(^ {35} \)

We can find a similar approach in the Northern Buddhist tradition. Yaśomitra says in his *Sphuṭārtha*, a commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: ‘The elucidation of the *sūtra* is, indeed, contingent, not definitive like the *abhidhāma*.’\(^ {36} \) ‘Contingent’ (*ābhiprāyika*) here seems to mean ‘dependent on context’. It is the adjectival form of *abhiprāya*, which is
derived from abhiprê meaning ‘to go near to, approach; to approach with one’s mind, to think of’ according to MWD. The noun abhiprāya means ‘purpose, intention, wish, opinion, meaning and sense (as of a word or of a passage)’. It thus refers to meaning depending on context. In other words, the exposition of the sūtra depends largely on taking words in their context, on taking the text as a whole.

What is taught through the image of fire in the āditta-pariyāya? It reads as follows:

O monks, all is on fire. And, O monks, what all is on fire? I say, Oh monks, eye is on fire. Visual objects are on fire. Eye-consciousness is on fire. Eye-contact is on fire. This feeling which is caused by the eye-contact and is pleasant, painful or neither painful nor pleasant is also on fire. With what is it on fire? It is on fire with the fires of passion, hatred and delusion. It is on fire with birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentations, sufferings, griefs, and distresses.

What it says is that ‘all’ is on fire with passion, hatred and delusion and later that the key to being liberated is to lose interest in (nibbindati) the ‘all’ and, as a consequence, to put out the triple fire of passion, hatred and delusion. By the word ‘all’ it means the organs, i.e. the five sense faculties and the mind; their objects, such as visual objects; six consciousnesses; six contacts and the feelings arising from these contacts. In other word, it simply lists all parts of our cognitive process.

What is the fuel of the triple fire in this context? In the Ādittasutta in the Sañyuttanikāya, the five aggregates are used metaphorically as the fuel of a triple fire: passion, hatred and delusion. Within the early canon, the five aggregates are often designated as upādāna-kkhandhā, which is typically translated as ‘the aggregates of grasping’ by taking the subjective meaning of upādāna. The awkwardness in understanding this word is easily solved if ‘fuel’, the objective meaning of upādāna, is taken into consideration. It simply means ‘the aggregates of fuel’ or ‘the aggregates as fuel’ if taken as a descriptive compound (karmadhāraya). Since nirvana literally means ‘going out’, what has to go out is this triple fire of passion, hatred and delusion fuelled by these five aggregates.

On the origin of the word upādisesa, Nyāñamoli said in his translation of the Khuddakapāṭha, The Minor Readings, that the term upādisesa was originally used as a medical term, meaning ‘a residue of a poisoned arrow’s poison still clinging to the wound after treatment’, and then used ‘figuratively of the Arahant, who during the remainder of his life manifests the “residue of clinging left” in the form of the five-category process, which, however, “will cease” with the end of his life-span’.

Nyāñamoli traces this medical usage of the word to the Sunakkhattasutta in the Majjhimanikāya. Here the blessed one gives the simile of a person...
who is ‘pierced by an arrow thickly smeared with poison’. He is treated by a surgeon who opens the wound with the knife and drains the poison off from his wound. Although it looks as if there is no poison remaining, there is a possibility that some is left. Thus, the surgeon instructs him to take care of the wound by eating only beneficial foods, taking a regular bath, and not exposing the wound to the wind. If he follows this instruction he will be cured and if not he will die. The word upādisesa is used here to describe whether any poison is still remaining in him or not: ‘He might extract the arrow, he might drain off the poison leaving some behind but thinking none remained . . . the poison has been drained off so that none is left, there is no danger for me.’ Nyānamoli, however, could not clearly explain how this medical term, ‘the residue of a poisoned arrow’s poison still clinging’, becomes used to mean ‘the five aggregates’.

If we take upādi in upādisesa to mean ‘fuel’, the objective meaning of upādāna, we can easily understand what upādisesa means in the context of nirvana. What is called nirvana with a remainder of clinging is, as mentioned before, the state where the above triple fire is extinguished yet the fuel, the aggregates, is still remaining; whereas nirvana without a remainder of clinging is the state where there is no more fuel, the aggregates, left. Since there are no more rebirths in this state, it can also be regarded as going out or extinction.

This later state is the starting point of the ontological questions about nirvana: we can ask ‘Where does the candle’s flame go after going out?’ and the answer may be ‘It goes back to its origin’, ‘It goes to nothing’ or ‘That cannot be answered’. I discuss this question later in detail in Chapter 4, under ‘The Theravāda exegetical position on nirvana’ and Chapter 5, under ‘The Sautrāntika’s criticism of ontological issues surrounding nirvana’.

What is the textual evidence to support this explanation? A small passage in both the Itivuttaka in the Pali and the Chinese translation by Xuan-zang is the best known example to support this Theravāda exegetical tradition on the two nirvana theory: both nirvana elements are applied to a saint (arahant).

What is, O monks, the nirvana element with a remainder of clinging? Herein, O monks, a monk is a saint (arhant) whose impurities are destroyed, who has reached perfection, who has done what should be done, who has laid down the burden, who has reached the highest goal, whose bonds leading to becoming are exhausted, and who is liberated through perfect knowledge. In him, the five faculties still remain, through which, as they have not been destroyed, he undergoes the pleasant and the unpleasant; he experiences happiness and suffering . . .

What is, O monks, the nirvana element without a remainder of clinging? Herein, O monks, a monk is a saint (arhant) . . . For him,
O monks, all feelings, in which he takes no delight will become cool right here; this is called, monks, the element of nirvana without a remainder of clinging.\textsuperscript{49}

Although this \textit{sutta} is frequently referred to as textual evidence, it does not actually mention the five aggregates expected from the metaphorical structure as well as the Theravāda exegetical tradition. This could be the reason why scholars like Husita Koudazu have said that \textit{upādi} as meaning the five aggregates could not be found within the early canon.\textsuperscript{50} In fact, its description of \textit{saupādisesa nībbānadhātu} refers to the five faculties (\textit{pañcindriyāni}), as in the above mentioned \textit{Āditta-pariyāya}.\textsuperscript{51}

How he uses the five faculties (\textit{pañcindriyāni}) seems to differentiate a saint (\textit{arahant}) from an ordinary monk. Through the going out (nībbāna) of the triple fires, a monk leaps into the state of a saint (\textit{arahant}) in whom there is no more impurity left (\textit{khānasava}). Nirvana is, as Gombrich says, ‘not a “thing” but the experience of being without greed, hatred and delusion’.\textsuperscript{52} The outcome of his experience, ‘going out’, is the firm belief that he is no longer bound to endless rebirth.\textsuperscript{53} This is why what comes after the description of nirvana is always ‘the cry of jubilation’,\textsuperscript{54} seen here as ‘whose impurities are destroyed, who has reached perfection, who has done what should be done’.

On emerging from this experience this monk is a saint (\textit{arahant}). Although he is back to normal, he is different from before: he has a firm control of his mind (\textit{manoindriya}). However, he still is in contact with the outside world through his five sense organs and, as a consequence, he sometimes experiences suffering or happiness. The Buddha, the best example of a saint (\textit{arahant}), for example, in the \textit{Avassutasuttta} in the \textit{Samyuttanikāya} feels pain in his back and wants to stretch it.\textsuperscript{55} Since a saint (\textit{arahant}) has firm control over his mind, he, unlike an ordinary monk, no longer forms any attachment to external objects. When the \textit{Itivuttaka} passage says ‘In him, the five faculties still remain, . . . he experiences happiness and suffering’, we can see that a cognitive process is going on, even after this nirvana with a remainder of clinging.

In the early Chinese canon,\textsuperscript{56} our cognitive process is explained as follows: consciousness (\textit{vijñāna}) arises by reason of faculty (\textit{indriya}) and of object (\textit{viṣayā}); the coming together of the three is contact (\textit{sparśa}); conditioned by contact, feeling (\textit{vedanā}), apperception (\textit{sañjñā}) and volition (\textit{cetanā}) arise. Although the typical passages in the Pali canon tend to omit apperception and volition and go directly to thirst (\textit{taṅhā}),\textsuperscript{57} one passage in the \textit{Majjhimanikāya}\textsuperscript{58} shows what is missing between feeling (\textit{vedanā}) and thirst (\textit{taṅhā}). After ‘feeling (\textit{vedanā})’, it says ‘what one feels one perceives, what one perceives (\textit{sañjñānati}) one reflects about (\textit{vitakketi}), what one reflects about one is obsessed with (\textit{papañcetī}).\textsuperscript{59} Thus the cognitive process described in the Pali canon could be more or less the same as that in the Chinese canon.
In Sue Hamilton’s book *Early Buddhism: A New Approach* the human cognitive process in terms of the five aggregates is mentioned in this context. She understands *råpa* in the sense of both the living locus of subjectivity and the sense organs, *vedanā* in the sense of the initial feeling of awareness, *saṃjñā* in the sense of being the process of identifying what that initial feeling of awareness is and *viṣaya* in the sense of cognising something. 60

Later she explains *saṃskāra* in the cognitive process as one’s affective response to whatever one is experiencing. 61 These volitional activities correspond to volition (*cetanā*) seen in the above Chinese passage explaining the human cognitive process. Table 2.1 shows how this cognitive process is related to the five aggregates.

The significance of no-self (*aṇṭman* in terms of the cognitive theory could be that there is no need for a self (*ātman*), the subject of cognition, behind the five aggregates to explain the cognitive process. In other words, our cognitive process could be represented through the collective operation of the five aggregates and, in this respect, the *Itivuttaka*’s description of *saupādisesa nibbānadhātu* seems to keep the objective sense of the word *upādi*.

Nirvana without a remainder of clinging is explained here as ‘for him, O monks, all feelings (*vedanā*) in which he takes no delight will become cool right here’. This clearly shows that there is no more cognitive process going on at this stage, the final moment of the saint (*arahant*). That is to say, the remaining aggregates are finally extinguished.

Peter Masefield has argued in his paper ‘The nibbāna-parinibbāna controversy’ that the idea ‘that the Buddha taught dharmma merely for the sake of what must now be seen as some lesser, or at least intermediate, goal would seem somewhat out of keeping with the teachings of the Nikāyas’. 62 Bronkhorst has also argued in his book *The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India* that ‘the distinction between Nirvāṇa with and without

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*Table 2.1 Five aggregates and cognitive process*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five aggregates</th>
<th>Cognitive process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>råpa</em></td>
<td><em>indriya</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>viṣaya</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>vedanā</em></td>
<td><em>vedanā</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>saṃjñā</em></td>
<td><em>samjñā</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>saṃskāra</em></td>
<td><em>cetanā</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>vijñāna</em></td>
<td><em>vijñāna</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table is based on typical passages in SA (TD2: 71c9; TD2: 87c–88a).
a remainder of upādi, in spite of its later currency (see La Vallée Poussin, 1925: 171–77, 179–80), was initially no more than an attempt to find a middle course between the original idea of Nirvāṇa in this life and the later tendency to place Nirvāṇa after death. However, the reason why Buddhism focuses more on nirvana during life, saupādisesa nibbānadadhātu, seems to be that it automatically leads to final liberation, anupādisesa nibbānadadhātu, from the chain of rebirth.

Unlike Jainism, in which all action must bear fruit, only intentional action in the Buddhist system can eventually lead to a future result. The famous statement in the Aṅguttaranikāya makes this point: ‘It is intention (cetanā), O monks, that I call karma. Having intended, one does karma through body, speech, and mind.’ Since in their view all action will eventually produce a result, Jains try not to do any act even just before death. That is why a voluntary starvation to death is the best possible way to liberation in Jainism, and this is actually said to be how Mahāvīra died. So Jainism focuses more on what a Buddhist would call the final nirvana, anupādisesa nibbānadadhātu.

By contrast, since only intentional action will eventually produce a result, if a Buddhist monk has achieved firm control over his mind, so that all defilements have ceased and no further defilements will be produced, his final liberation, anupādisesa nibbānadadhātu, is already confirmed at this stage, saupādisesa nibbānadadhātu. This is why one who attains saupādisesa nibbānadadhātu is called a saint (arahant), literally ‘one who deserves praise’, which in Jainism is only applied to the revealers of the religion and is used synonymously with Bhagavat, Jina and Tīrthaṅkara. In other words, in early Buddhism the focus is more on nirvana in this life.

**Upādisesa within the context of the four noble persons**

In the early canon, the word sa-upādisesa is sometimes used to describe the first three stages of the four noble persons (ariyapuggala): a stream-enterer (sotāpanna), a once-returner (sakadāgāmin), a non-returner (anāgāmin) and a saint (arahant).

In the Saupādisesasutta in the Aṅguttaranikāya, the word saupādisesa is used by the blessed one to describe nine noble persons: five sub-divisions of non-returner, antarāparinibbāyin, upahaccaparinibbāyin, asaṅkhāraparinibbāyin, sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyin and akanitthagāmin; a once-returner (sakadāgāmin); and three kinds of stream-enterer (sotāpanna, ekabhiñjī, kolaṅkola and sattakkhattuparama).

In the Tissasutta in the Aṅguttaranikāya, two kinds of arahant, ubhatobhāgavimutta and paññāvivimutta, are described as anupādisesa; while kāyasakkhin, diṭṭhipatta, saddhāvimutta, dhammānusārin and animittavihārin are described as saupādisesa. While the four noble persons and their sub-categories are listed in the Saupādisesasutta, the seven noble persons are listed in the Tissasutta.
Before going further, we need briefly to survey how the above technical terms have been understood in the Theravāda Buddhist tradition. Here is a brief explanation of the four noble persons and their sub-categories.²²

An average person in Buddhism is called *puthujjana*, or ordinary person. When he is about to start Buddhist practices he is called *gotrabhe*, literally one who has become a member of the spiritual lineage.³³ This *gotrabhe* is, according to his dominant spiritual faculties,³⁴ further divided into two sub-categories: *dhammānusārin*, follower of the teaching, if his dominant faculty is insight (*paññindrya*), and *saddhānusārin*, follower through faith, if his dominant faculty is faith (*saddhindrya*).⁷⁵

In the next stage, he becomes the first of the four noble persons: a stream-enterer (*sotāpanna*), which is further divided into three kinds according to their spiritual developments. At first, he is called *sattakkhattuparama*, one who has at most seven more births. When he acquires the pure faculties (*anāsavindriya*),³⁶ he becomes *kolaikola*, one who passes from one family of beings to another. When he further develops the faculties of concentration and of insight, he becomes *ekabījin*, one who has one more existence.⁷⁷ In the next stage, he is a once-returner (*sakadāgāmin*), the second of the four noble persons.

The third is a non-returner (*anāgāmin*) and is classified into five sub-categories: *antarāparinibbāya*, one who reaches nirvana within the first half of his life;³⁸ *upahaccaparinibbāya*, one who reaches nirvana after crossing half his life-time;³⁹ *asaṅkhāparinibbāya*, one who reaches nirvana without great effort; *sasaṅkhāparinibbāya*, one who reaches it with great effort; and *uddhamsotā-akanīṭṭhaṅkāmin*, one who goes upstream and to the highest gods. The last noble person in this list is of course a saint (*arahant*) and is, according to the method of achieving the state, of two kinds: *ubhatobhāgavimutta*, released on both sides; and *paññavimutta*, released by insight.⁸⁰

The typical description of the seven noble persons in the Theravāda Buddhist tradition can be found, though not the old one,⁸¹ in the *Visuddhimagga*.⁸² It starts from a person who has acquired the faculty of faith, of concentration or of insight.

When a person acquires the faculty of faith,⁸³ he becomes *saddhānusārin*, follower through faith, at the moment of stream-entry, and then he becomes *saddhāvimutta*, one who is released through faith, at the later stages. When a person acquires the faculty of concentration, he is called *kāyasakkhin*, bodily witness,⁸⁴ and then he, at the last stage, becomes *ubhatobhāgavimutta*, released on both sides. In the above *Tissasutta, animittavihārin*, one who stays unaffected, is mentioned instead of the traditional *saddhānusārin*, follower through faith.⁸⁵ Although the Pali commentary glosses it as *saddhānusārin*, it could be a special term for one who is about to acquire the faculty of concentration, which seems to be missing in the traditional list of the seven noble persons. When a person acquires the faculty of insight, he becomes *dhammānusārin*, follower of the teaching,⁸⁷ at the moment of stream-entry,
### Table 2.2 Four and seven noble persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four noble persons</th>
<th>Seven noble persons</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main category</strong></td>
<td><strong>Faculty of</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>faith</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathujjana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saupādisesa</td>
<td>Gotrabhū</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotāpanna</td>
<td>Sattakkhattparama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakadāgāmin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anāgāmin</td>
<td>Antarā-parinibbāyin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upanibbāyin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asankhāra-parinibbāyin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sasankhāra-parinibbāyin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uddhamśotā-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>akāṣāṭhagāmin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anupādisesa</td>
<td>Arahant</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table is based on explanations from Dutt (1960: 252–71), Katz (1982: 83–95), and Nyānamoli (1976: 770).

a According to the Tissasutta (AN IV: 74–9). It lists animittavihārīn instead of the traditional saddhānusārīn.

and then he becomes diṭṭhipatta, one who has grasped vision at the later stages. When he reaches the last stage, he becomes paññāvimutta, released by insight. Thus, saupādisesa is used in describing the first three stages of the four noble persons and dhammānusārīn and animittavihārīn according to the Tissasutta.

The two kinds of arahant, ubhatobhāgavimutta and paññāvimutta, are described as anupādisesa in the Tissasutta. This usage is further confirmed from the story in the first part of the sutta. Here, nuns surrounding the blessed one are described by two devas as anupādisesa: ‘Lord, these nuns are wholly freed and without attached remainder.’ Since these nuns, Mahāpajāpati and five hundred others according to E. M. Hare, are still alive, what this word anupādisesa designates could not be one enlightened after death, but a living arahant. They are illustrated in Table 2.2.

In the Theravāda tradition, the four noble persons tend to be understood entirely in terms of their giving up a traditional list of ten fetters. They are often divided into two categories: the lower fetters (orambhāgiya-samyojana), which belong to the world of desire (kāmaddhātu), and the higher fetters (uddhambhāgiya-samyojana), which belong to the world of form (rūpadhātu) and the world of the formless (ārūpyadhātu).
Table 2.3 Ten fetters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ten saṃyojana</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>orambhāgiya-saṃyojana</td>
<td>Personality belief (sakkāyadiṭṭhi), skeptical doubts (vicikicchā), attachment to rules and rituals (sīlabbataparāmāsa), sensual desire (kāmarūga), and ill-will (vyāpāda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uddhambhāgiya-saṃyojana</td>
<td>Desire for form (rūparūga), desire for the formless (arūparūga), pride (māna), restlessness (uddhacca), and ignorance (avijjā)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nayanatiloka in his Buddhist Dictionary says that

He who is free from 1–3 is a Sotāpanna, or Streamwinner, i.e. one who has entered the stream to Nibbāna, as it were. He who, besides these 3 fetters, has overcome 4 and 5 in their grosser form, is called a Sakadāgāmi, a ‘Once-Returner’ (to this sensuous world). He who is fully freed from 1–5 is an Anāgāmi, or ‘Non-Returner’ (to the sensuous world). He who is freed from all the 10 fetters is called an Arahant, i.e. a perfectly Holy One.92

Thus, upādi in this context of the four noble persons refers to fetters (saṃyojana) that are said to bend man to the wheel of transmigration and is, like the four kinds of upādāna in the later systematization,93 taking its subjective meaning.

However, this interpretation of the four noble persons is, as pointed out by Somaratne,94 problematic if we consider typical passages that describe the four noble persons in the Pali canon.95

a stream-enterer . . . a monk after vanishing of the three fetters has entered the stream, has forever escaped the woe, is affirmed, assured of final enlightenment . . . a once-returner . . . after the vanishing of the three fetters and the attenuation of passion, hatred, and delusion, the monk returns only once more to this world. And only once more returning to this world, he puts an end to suffering . . . a non-returner . . . after the vanishing of the five lower fetters, however, the monk becomes one who is spontaneously born (opapātika) and there he reaches complete nibbāna without ever returning from that world . . . a saint (arahant) . . . after the vanishing of cankers (āsavā), being cankerless, he reaches already in this world, the freedom which is concentration, the freedom which is understanding, after personally experiencing and comprehending that state.96
Although the *nikāya* passages agree with Nyanatiloka’s above description of a stream-enterer and a non-returner, they differ in the description of a once-returner and a saint (*arahanta*). What makes a person become a once-returner is not by ‘overcoming 4 and 5 in their grosser form’ but by ‘weakening passion, hatred, and delusion’. What makes a monk become a saint (*arahanta*) also is not by ‘being free from all ten fetters’ but by ‘the vanishing of cankers’ (*āsavānaṃ khayā*).

Moreover, explaining the four noble persons entirely in terms of their giving up of the traditional ten fetters is a later development, within the abhidhamma. It is in the *Dhammasaṅgani* that a once-returner was first explained in this sense. It says that one attains the second path, a once-returner, while diminishing sensual desire and ill-will (*kāmarāgavāpādānam patanubhāvāya*); whereas one attains the third path, a non-returner, while giving up sensual desire and ill-will without any remainder (*kāmarāgavāpādānam anavasesappahānāya*). Their new interpretation was later applied in the *Puggalapaññatti* and also appeared in the *Dharmaskandha* in the Chinese abhidharma. Therefore, not only could fetters not be the exclusive means through which the four noble persons are differentiated in the early canon, but this tendency should be regarded as a later *abhidhammic* development.

The Pali canon actually shows other ways of differentiating the four noble persons. In the *Saṅkhittasutta* in the *Sānīyuttanikāya*, the four noble persons are judged according to the degree to which five spiritual faculties: faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and insight, have been cultivated. By the fulfilment and accomplishment of all five, one is a saint (*arahanta*); by having them to a lesser degree, one is a non-returner; and by having them to successively lesser degrees, one is a once-returner, a stream-enterer, *dhammanusārin* and *saddhānusārin*. The *Ekābhīññasutta* in the *Sānīyuttanikāya* also gives a long list in terms of the degree of the same five spiritual faculties starting from a saint (*arahanta*); five sub-divisions of a non-returner, a once-returner, two sub-divisions of a stream-enterer, and two sub-divisions of *gotrabhū*.

Moreover, in the small *suttas* in the *Indriyasamyutta* in the *Sānīyuttanikāya*, six organs, such as the faculties of sight, and five sensations, i.e. the faculties of pleasure, displeasure, satisfaction, dissatisfaction and indifference, are separately used as a measure to qualify as a stream-enterer or a saint (*arahanta*). These *suttas* say that ‘when a noble disciple (*ariyasāvaka*), Oh monks, truly understands the arising of, the perishing of, the satisfaction in, the danger in and the escape from these six organs, this noble disciple is called a stream-enterer’, and the same is said of the five sensations. In the case of a saint (*arahanta*), they say that ‘when a monk, O monks, having truly known the arising of, the perishing of, the satisfaction in, the danger in, and the escape from these six organs, becomes released without any further attachment, this monk is called a saint (*arahanta*)’, and the same is said of the five sensations.
In the later abhidhamma tradition, these various faculties are classified and enumerated as twenty-two: six organs, female organ, male organ, vital organ, five sensations, five spiritual faculties and three pure faculties, i.e. *anāññātānāññassāmitindriya, aṭṭhisāntindriya, and aṭṭhāvindriya*. One thing common to the last three pure faculties is that they all share the word *aṭṭhā*, perfect knowledge. The word *aṭṭhā* is in the early canon often used to express the moment when a disciple claims to have won arahant-ship, and the phrase ‘to be established in perfect knowledge (aṭṭhāya saññhāti)’ is sometimes used to denote a saint (arahant). In fact, faculties and perfect knowledge (aṭṭhā) are mentioned together in the four small suttas called *Pubbārāmasutta* in the *Saṃyuttanikāya*.

In the later Chinese abhidharma text, the *Jñānaprasthāna*, the four noble persons are described according to the number of faculties they have among the twenty-two faculties, and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* also has its own classification of the four noble persons in terms of the number of faculties. Moreover, the key factors to differentiate the seven noble persons, who share most of their technical terms with the four noble persons, are not ten fetters but three of the five spiritual faculties. Therefore, fetters could not be the only means through which the four noble persons are classified and this tendency was instead the outcome of the later systematisation in the abhidharma literature.

**The non-returner and the two nirvana elements**

A. O. Lovejoy in his paper ‘The Buddhist technical terms *upādāna* and *upādisesa*’ wrote that ‘the oldest and probably the most numerous texts point to the interpretation of *upādisesa* suggested by Oldenberg’. That suggested interpretation of *upādi* is of course the subjective one: attachment or defilement.

Hermann Oldenberg, who interprets *upādi* in the ethical, or subjective, sense, argued that the expression *anupādisesa nibbānadhatu* contains a tautology as ‘without a remainder of attachment’ is the same as nirvana, whereas *saupādisesa nibbānadhatu* describes the incomplete, or inferior, nirvana known as a non-returner. Peter Masefield’s argument also follows this line of thought. He has tried to ignore the above-mentioned passage from the *Itivuttaka* by emending the verse that it follows. However, Peter Harvey has successfully criticised this argument by showing some parallel passages in the *Saṃyuttanikāya* and the *Dīghanikāya* which confirm the wording of the *Itivuttaka*. The problem behind their arguments is that they took the subjective meaning of *upādi*, which is used in the context of the first three noble persons, to explain two nirvana elements, whereas it is the objective meaning that is relevant.

There are two major pieces of textual evidence they put forward to support their view. In the *Suttanipāta*, monks gathered and approached the blessed
one to ask the fate of Kappāyana at death. The question is: ‘Did he gain quenching (without grasping) or did he have some grasping remaining?’\textsuperscript{124} At first glance, it looks as if it is a question of whether he died as a saint (arahant), referred to by the word nibbāyi, or as a non-returner, referred to by the word saupādiseso. However, it is a question whether he passed away as a saint (arahant) or as one of the three lower noble persons. In fact, the commentary seems to follow this interpretation: ‘How was he released? Was it through anupādisesa nibbānadhātu like asekha, or was it through sa-upādisesa like sekha?’\textsuperscript{125}

As Norman has pointed out, the nirvana element (nibbānadhātu) is not applied to saupādisesa, while it is applied to anupādisesa.\textsuperscript{126} In fact, only a saint (arahant), asekha, can automatically pass away through anupādisesa nibbānadhātu. That is to say, saupādisesa here is used not in the context of the two nirvana theory but in the context of the four noble persons. If the word upādi in the saupādisesa has got the subjective meaning, i.e. defilements or fetters, how many nirvanas are we to accept? From Table 2.2 we may have to say that even saddhānasūrin and dhammānasūrin, two sub-categories of gotrabhā, have attained nirvana.

Moreover, the answer from the blessed one confirms the Theravāda exegetical tradition: ‘He has cut off craving for name-and-form in this world. He has passed beyond all birth and death, the stream of thirst, which has long been latent (in him).’\textsuperscript{127} In other words, he has been a saint (arahant) for a long time through the saupādisesa nibbānadhātu and now he is finally liberated through the anupādisesa nibbānadhātu.

Another piece of textual evidence presented is the passage in which a remainder of clinging (upādisesa) is used to describe a pair along with perfect knowledge (aññā). It says that if a monk has faith in the Buddha’s instruction and lives in unison with it, he expects one of two fruits: ‘One of two fruits is to be expected: perfect knowledge (aññā) in this very life, or if there is a remainder of clinging (upādisesa), the state of non-return.’\textsuperscript{128} The assumption that a remainder of clinging (upādisesa) is a yardstick to distinguish a non-returner (anāgāmin) from a saint (arahant) is largely based on this passage.\textsuperscript{129}

It looks as if the word upādisesa was used in the context of the two nirvana theory, which would not be quite satisfactory if we consider some passages in the early canon in which perfect knowledge is used together with the four noble persons. I. B. Horner argued, though not precisely, that the alternative in this passage hinges not on the presence of a remainder of clinging but on the presence of perfect knowledge in the monk: either he has achieved perfect knowledge (aññā) or not.\textsuperscript{130}

In the Naḷakapānasutta in the Majjhimanikāya,\textsuperscript{131} although the description of the four persons is almost the same as that of typical nikāya passages seen above,\textsuperscript{132} the description of the saint (arahant) is ‘established in perfect knowledge (aññā)’ instead of the usual ‘vanishing of cankers (āsavā)’.
The word perfect knowledge (añña) is used instead of the straightforward word arahant, not only does it mean a saint (arahant), a simple substitution by the word perfect knowledge, but it could also imply the categorization of the noble persons through the faculties seen above. In other words, perfect knowledge was used in the context of the four noble persons.

The word añña is then further used together with the five sub-categories of a non-returner. In the early canon, we can see the description of the seven fruits or results. These results could be expected when a monk has cultivated the seven limbs of wisdom (bojjhanga), the five spiritual faculties (indriya), the four bases of psychic power (iddhipāda) or the concentration by mindfulness of breathing in and breathing out (ānāpānasati). Here is the usual passage of the seven fruits:

What are the seven fruits, the seven results? [1] He attains perfect knowledge (añña) earlier in this very life. [2] If he does not, then he attains perfect knowledge at the time of death. [3] If he neither attains perfect knowledge earlier in this very life nor at the time of death, then he, having ended the five lower fetters, becomes antarāparinibbāyin.

Although the above passage is usually found isolated in the fifth book of the Saṅyuttanikāya in the Pali canon, its Chinese equivalent is found in both the Dīrgha-āgama and the Saṅyukta-āgama. A slightly different version of this kind is also found in the Purisagatisutta in the Aṅguttaranikāya and its Chinese equivalent in the Madhyama-āgama. Thus, the idea of the seven results seems to have been widely accepted within the early Buddhist community.

If we look at the seven results carefully, we can classify them into two main categories: perfect knowledge (añña), either earlier in this very life or at death, and one of the five sub-categories of the non-returner. This division into main categories concurs not only with the above question in the Suttanipāta but also with the above standard passage listing the two results. In fact, the two results appear next to the seven results as a fruit of cultivating the four bases of psychic power (iddhipāda) in the Saṅyuttanikāya. According to its equivalent in the Saṅyukta-āgama, cultivating the seven limbs of wisdom (qi-jue-fen, 七覺分) will lead not only to the two and the seven results but also to the four results, i.e. the four noble persons.

Thus, two pieces of textual evidence put forward could simply be a shortened version of the above seven results and, in this respect, the word upādisesa in this context could not have the same sense as when it is used in the context of the two nirvana theory. In other words, upādi in this passage cannot be understood in its objective sense, as in the context of the two nirvana
theory, but is to be understood in its subjective sense, as in the context of
the four noble persons.

Although these two pieces of textual evidence are not quite enough to
support this view, there is one sūtra found in the Chinese Ēkottara-āgama that
seems to support it. Traditionally, this sūtra was regarded as the Chinese
equivalent of the famous Itivuttaka passage\textsuperscript{145} in the Pali canon.\textsuperscript{146} It reads:\textsuperscript{147}

There are two nirvana elements. What are the two? They are nirvana
with a remainder of clinging and nirvana without a remainder of
clinging. How is it called nirvana with a remainder of clinging? A
monk, by destroying the five lower fetters, that is to say, one who
has attained nirvana in the intermediate state (antarāparinirvāyin),\textsuperscript{148}
does not return to that world [of desire]. That is why it is called
nirvana with a remainder of clinging. How is it called nirvana with-
out a remainder of clinging? A monk, by destroying impurity and
accomplishing purity, witnesses himself [in this very life] the libera-
tion through mind (cetovimukti), the liberation through wisdom
(prajñāvimukti) and himself delighted. He really knows ‘birth is
destroyed, the holy life is fulfilled, and there is no more birth [in this
world]’. That is why it is called nirvana without a remainder of
clinging.

The first answer designates a non-returner (anāgāmin) through the term
antarāparinirvāyin, one of its five sub-categories; the second answer denotes
a saint (arahant) through ‘the cry of jubilation’. Thus, the word upadhi in
this case should be taken to mean fetters or defilements, as regularly used in
the context of the four noble persons.

However, there are some philological problems with accepting this small
sūtra as a genuine one. First of all, we cannot find this sūtra in the Pali
Aṅguttaranikāya. It is well known that the Chinese Ēkottara-āgama has a
different origin from the Pali tradition. Although the seven books of the
Chinese abhidharma are said to belong to the Sarvāstivādin, we cannot say
that the same school is responsible for the four Chinese āgamas. They were
in fact collected and translated independently without mentioning which
sects they belong to. According to Bareau, the Dīrgha-āgama would be of
the Dharmaguptaka school and the two versions of the Saṃyukta-āgama
would be of the Kāśyapīya school.\textsuperscript{149} Although the Ēkottara-āgama is said
to be translated from a manuscript belonging to the Mahāsāṅghika tradi-
tion, that is mere speculation. According to Lamotte, the Ēkottara-āgama
was ‘translated between 397 and 398 by Gautama Saṅghadeva, using
a recension established in North-West India or Serindia and containing
numerous Mahāyāna additions’.\textsuperscript{150}

The Sarvāstivādins seem to think that there was no complete explanation
of two nirvanas in the early canon (sūtras) apart from mentioning their names:
nirvana with and without a remainder of clinging.\textsuperscript{151} Since the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma also supports the Theravāda exegetical perspective on the two nirvana theory,\textsuperscript{152} the above sūtra could not have originated from the mainstream Sthavira tradition to which both the Theravādin, one of the subcategories of the Vibhajyavādin, and the Sarvāstivādin belong.\textsuperscript{153} The presence of this sūtra, however, suggests that there could have been sects, probably in the Mahāsāṅghika tradition, that developed their own theory on the two nirvana elements.

Second, we cannot rely on the Chinese technical terms, especially when they are related to nirvana. Unlike in Pali or Sanskrit, there are no grammatical inflections in Chinese. The word nei-pan (涅槃), the usual Chinese translation of the word nirvana, is also used to translate such words as parinirvāna, nirvāti, parinirvīta and parinirvāya. The Chinese translation of the word antarāparinibbāya, for instance, is zhong-pan-nei-pan (中間涅槃), in which the same word nei-pan (涅槃) is used. Moreover, the word wu-yu-nei-pan (無餘涅槃), the usual Chinese translation of ‘nirvana without a remainder of clinging’, is applied to the Pali word anupādā parinibbāna, ‘nirvana without any further attachment’ in the Madhyama-āgama’s equivalent of the above mentioned Purisagatisutta in the Āṅguttaranikāya.\textsuperscript{154}

Although the same term is used in the Chinese translation, the meaning is totally different. Nirvana without any further attachment is the word not for the last moment of a saint (arahant) but for the moment of enlightenment of one whose cankers (āsava) have vanished. In other words, it could not be nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupādisesa nibbānadhātu) but must be nirvana with a remainder of clinging (saupādisesa nibbānadhātu), which is usually translated into Chinese as you-yu-nei-pan (有餘涅槃).

If we consider that the Madhyama-āgama was translated by the same translator, Gautama Saṅghadeva, as the Ekottara-āgama,\textsuperscript{155} this confusion could play a part in the presence of the above sūtra. In other words, this sūtra could be the outcome of a confusion between anupādā parinibbāna and anupādisesa nibbānadhātu.

Although we could ignore the validity of the above Chinese sūtra for these suggested reasons, we still need to explain how the state of non-return becomes so close to the state of arahantship. It is well known that the four noble persons are by stages known as ‘the four pairs and eight individuals’ (cattāri purisayugāṇi aṭṭha purisa-puggālā).\textsuperscript{156} In this formula each of the four noble persons is further divided into the way (magga) and the fruit (phala). The stream-enterer, for instance, is divided into the way of the stream-entry (sotāpatti-magga) and the fruit of the stream-entry (sotāpatti-phala). Each of the four ways (magga) is simply the practice that leads to the corresponding fruit (phala). All stages in this formula are heading towards the final fruit, the fruit of a saint (arahant), and to reach the goal is basically like going up a staircase.
However, this hierarchical structure becomes ‘physically unbridgeable’ at a certain point. Practising the way of non-return leads to the vanishing of the five lower fetters and, as a consequence, one has achieved the fruit of the non-return: spontaneously rising (opapātika) and then reaching final nirvana without ever returning from that world. Considering the early Buddhist promise of reaching sainthood (arahant) in this very life (diṭṭhe va dhamme), it is almost impossible for the same person to practise the way of sainthood after reaching the fruit of non-return. This obvious gap could suggest that before the two noble persons, the non-returner and the saint (arahant), were placed in this hierarchical structure, they had already been conceptualised separately. In other words, the non-returner was originally conceived not as an intermediate state on the way to arahantship but as an independent state almost corresponding to nirvana.

Within the early Buddhist canon, the word non-returner (anāgamin) was sometimes replaced by the expression ‘of a nature not to return from that world (anāvatti-dhammo tasmā lokā)’. This expression seems to correspond to the early Upaniṣadic idea of liberation described in two of the oldest Upaniṣads: the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.158

It is well known that at the time of the Veda, living for 100 years was compared to immortality.159 From the Brāhmaṇa period, the idea of a next life was introduced and it consisted of two worlds: the world of gods (devaloka), which is deathless, and the world of fathers (pitrloka), where there are endless rebirths, i.e. people die again and again (punar mrtyu).160

When it comes to the early Upaniṣadic period, the world of Brahman (brahmaloka) was regarded as the highest and one who succeeded in reaching this world through knowledge and sacrifice was believed not to return to the human condition again: he is liberated from endless rebirth. The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, which is believed to predate Buddhism, explains this state as follows: ‘A person consisting of mind comes to the regions of lightning and leads him to the worlds of Brahman. These exalted people live in those worlds of Brahman for the longest time. They do not return (na punar āvṛttih).’161 In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, those who proceed along the Brahman path and reach the world of Brahman are likewise said not to return to this human condition again.162

This early Upaniṣadic idea of liberation seems to correspond to the Buddhist expression ‘of a nature not to return from that world (anāvatti-dhammo tasmā lokā)’, which sometimes replaces the word non-returner (anāgāmin) in the Buddhist canon. The difference between the two concepts seems to be on ontological one. While in the Upaniṣad the person does not return to the human condition as he stays there, in the world of Brahman, forever as a liberated soul, the person in Buddhism does not return since he is about to be finally liberated there. However, they share the idea of the final departure from the human condition towards liberation.
In the *Brahmāyusutta*, in the *Majjhimanikāya*, for example, the fate of a 120-year-old Brahman called Brahmāyu was described as follows:

Clever, monks, was the Brahman Brahmāyu; he followed after dhamma according to various parts of dhamma, and he did not annoy me with questionings about dhamma. Monks, Brahmāyu the Brahman, by the complete destruction of the five lower fetters binding to this lower, is of spontaneous uprising, one who attains nirvana there, of a nature not to return from that world.

In the canon, the same passage is applied to two other lay disciples. They are Pukkusāti, a young man of family, who was killed in an accident with a cow when he had been searching for a bowl and robe in order to receive ordination, and Dīghāvu, a layman suffering from disease, who passed away soon after meeting the Blessed one. Brahmāyu in the above case was too old to become a monk. One thing in common in all three occasions is that the idea of non-return is applied to a lay disciple who is as knowledgeable as a monk yet for some reason cannot go forth from home to homelessness.

In the early canon, we can see the soteriological limitation for the laity. In the small suttas in the *Indriyasamīyutta*, while the term ‘noble disciple’ (*ariyasāvako*) is used to describe a stream-enterer, it is a monk (*bhikkhu*) who is said to be a saint (*arahant*). Although F. L. Woodward discounted this by commenting ‘a monkish point of view’, it is a common phenomenon in the early canon. In fact, the highest stage that can be reached by a lay follower is the state of non-return. Although we can see an effort to apply the hierarchy of the four noble persons to the obvious Buddhist social hierarchy – monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen – in *Mahāparinibbānasuttanta* in the *Dīghanikāya*, the early canon tends to make a clear distinction between ‘monks and nuns’ and ‘laymen and laywomen’. In other words, the state of non-return is the maximum achievement for lay people, and only monks or nuns can achieve sainthood.

Although the term *arahant* was applied in the *Rg-Veda* to the god Agni and then used as a term for an honorific title bestowed upon some high official in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, it was used differently among the recluse groups during the time of the Buddha. In Jainism it was used synonymously with *Bhagavat*, *Jīna* and *Ṭīrthāṅkara*, while in the early Buddhist canon it appeared as the term for a person with magic powers (*iddhi*), such as the six heretical leaders and Kassapa before ordination, or a person who performed physical austerities in the forest. That is to say, this term seems to have been widespread among the recluses at the time of the Buddha to designate a person who deserved praise for some reason, such as religious leadership, magic powers or asceticism.
Considering that the idea of non-return could be widely spread among Brahmans and their followers, the Buddha seems to use this term as a kind of metaphor for the laity’s equivalent of the recluse’s sainthood (arahant). This could explain why the expression ‘in nature not to return from that world (anāvatti-dhammo tasmā lokā)’ was repeatedly applied to laity when it appeared independently. Placing it below the state of sainthood (arahant) could also have another meaning: it seems to allude to the Brahmanical liberation by saying that our ideal is higher than yours.

As seen above, a non-returner (anāgāmin) is, by definition, one who will experience nirvana while alive in the pure abodes and then go beyond rebirths. Although he will not come back to the human condition due to the lack of the five lower fetters that bound him into the world of desire (kāmadhātu), he still needs to destroy the higher fetters (uddhambhāgiya-samyojana) to attain nirvana after his spontaneous uprising (opapātika) in the pure abodes in the world of form (rūpadhātu). In this respect, it can be regarded as the final departure from the human condition; it cannot be regarded as nirvana or liberation. Thus, it seems to be far-fetched to say that the original pair of the two nirvana theory were non-returner (anāgāmin) and sainthood (arahant).

The double aspect of the word upādi seems to cause many exegetical problems in the abhidharma tradition. In fact, the Mahāvibhāṣastra, the exegesis of the Jñānaprasthāna, was well aware of the two different meanings of the word: upadhi as defilement (kleśopadhi) and upadhi as birthbody (janmakāyopadhi). Thus we need to treat this problem from a wide abhidharmic perspective.
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE TWO NIRVANA THEORY

The Jñānapraśasthāna, the last book of the Sarvāstivāda abhidharmā, survives only in a Chinese translation and is the only text in both Northern and Southern abhidharmic traditions where the two nirvana theory was explained from the abhidharmic point of view. In fact we cannot find any explanation of the two nirvana theory in the seven books of the Pali abhidhamma. Most explanations we have are from their exegetical works.

Before going into these explanations on nirvana with and without a remainder of clinging, we need briefly to survey how nirvana has been understood from the perspectives of the later systematisations both of the Pali abhidhamma and of the Sarvāstivādin’s abhidharma works.

As to the origin of the abhidharma literature, some Japanese scholars have suggested that it was to be found in dialogues concerning the doctrine (abhidharmakathā), or monastic discussions in catechetical style characterised by an exchange of questions and interpretative answers intended to clarify complex or obscure points of doctrine. But most Western scholars agree that it originated from lists (mātrkā) of all topics of the Buddha’s teaching arranged according to both numerical and qualitative criteria.2

Mātrkā are comprehensive lists to collect and preserve doctrinal concepts used in the nīkāyas. An early list of this kind could be the Saṃgītisuttanta3 of the Dīghanikāya in Pali or the Saṃgītisūtra4 of the Dīrhāgama in Chinese. The first of the seven Chinese abhidharma books, the Saṃgītiparāyāyaśāstra, is in fact a commentary on this text.5

Since they articulate doctrines through classifications and definitions, there is no place for metaphorical or contextual explanations in this genre. They prefer clear simple concepts to the complex ambiguities of metaphor. Thus nirvana, which was used in the metaphorical sense of ‘blowing out’ within the early canon, became a technical term within the abhidhamma: a term to be rigorously defined and classified.

Within the abhidhamma works, thus, problems tend to occur when the definition of a dharma conflicts with the definition of another dharma or when the classification of a dharma overlaps with the classification of another
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE TWO NIRVANA THEORY

dharma. In fact, these problem areas were the starting point of the abhidharmic developments of Buddhist doctrines.

In this chapter, I discuss the development of the nirvana concept in both the Pali abhidhamma tradition and the Chinese abhidharma tradition and then examine how this development affects the two nirvana theory in the Jñānaprasthāna and in the Theravāda exegetical traditions.

The Pali abhidhamma works

Nirvana with and without a remainder of clinging is hardly mentioned within the seven Pali abhidhamma works. In fact, the word nibbāna is not used in the main body of the Dhammasaṅgani, the first and oldest work in the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. It prefers the expression asaṅkhatā dhātu, which also belongs to the sphere of mental data base (dhammāyatana).6

The word dhātu is usually translated by ‘element’ and always refers, according to L. S. Cousins,7 to a distinct sphere of experience. Visual object, for example, is perceived only by the faculty of sight and not by any of the other five faculties. The word dhātu seems first to be used with asaṅkhatā in the Bahudhātukasutta in the Majjhimanikāya in order to distinguish the unconditioned as an object of experience from the conditioned.8 Since the term asaṅkhatā in the Theravādin abhidhamma retains its earlier usage, nirvana,9 this expression seems to be established to distinguish conceptually the unconditioned element of enlightened experience from all others.

Unlike the early canon (nikāyas), where doctrines were expressed through metaphors and contexts, the abhidhamma works articulate doctrines through classifications and definitions. Nirvana was first distinguished, as a kind of classification, from the five aggregates in the Dhammasaṅgani in the following way: ‘Which are dhammas with condition? They are the five aggregates: form, feeling, apperception, volitional activities and consciousness. Which are dhammas without condition? They are the unconditioned element.’10 Later in the Dhātukathā, it is explicitly stated that ‘the unconditioned is not classified as an aggregate’.11 The definition of nirvana was first seen in the Vibhaṅga. It places the unconditioned (asaṅkhata), which is nirvana, both in the sphere of mental data base (dhammāyatana)12 and in the element of mental data base (dhammadhātu),13 and establishes a basic definition of nirvana based on the Nibbānasutta14 as follows: ‘What is the unconditioned element? It is the cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred and the cessation of delusion.’15

The outcome of this early classification and definition was that nirvana was the unconditioned (asaṅkhata), which was different from the five aggregates and was made up of the cessation of passion, hatred and delusion. On top of this notion, the Theravāda abhidhamma seems to have a monistic approach towards this dhamma: nirvana is the one and only unconditioned.
The Kathāvatthu in this respect gives us much valuable information. First of all, the view that there are two cessations, extinction through knowledge (pāṭisāṅkhānirodha) and extinction without knowledge (appāṭisāṅkhānirodha) in Pali, which are two kinds of nirvana, is refuted in the second chapter. It asks ‘Of the two nibbānas, is one high one low, one excellent one deficient, one superior one inferior, and is there a boundary or difference, a line or interval between them?’ The answer is no. In other words, there cannot be any hierarchy, superior or inferior, or division in nirvana.

Moreover, the Kathāvatthu also rejects the idea that anything apart from nirvana can be unconditioned. There are six short discourses on nirvana in the sixth book of the Kathāvatthu. The subjects discussed are fixation (niyāma), dependent origination (pāṭiccasamuppāda), the four noble truths (sacca), the four formless spheres (āruppajhāna), the absorption of extinction (nirodhasamāpatti) and space (ākāsa). When the opponent insists that these are unconditioned, it replies that if any one of them is unconditioned, it should be regarded as nirvana, as there is only one unconditioned thing. Since the unconditioned cannot be plural, it is not possible for nirvana and something else to be unconditioned.

This rejection of plurality was, according to André Bareau, based on the analogy of infinite space, in which there is no limit, and was supported by the following unique argument: ‘If there were various Absolute (unconditioned), various nibbānas, there would be between them a demarcating limit, one here and the other there.’ I discuss problems or side effects caused both by this abhidhamma definition and classification of nirvana and by the rejection of plurality of the unconditioned in the next chapter, under the heading ‘The Theravāda exegetical position on nirvana’.

The rejection of plurality in the Pali abhidhamma seems to cause some difficulties concerning the two nirvanas, with and without a remainder of clinging, in the later exegetical traditions. The word dhātu, which is applied in both cases, seems to suggest that the difference between them is conceptual, as they both belong to the sphere of mental data base (dhammāyatana), like the unconditioned elements. Buddhaghosa, nevertheless, has to make an excuse first in his Visuddhimagga before commenting on the two nirvana theory by saying, ‘The aim of the Buddha, etc. is one because there is no distinction.’

The Chinese abhidharma works

It is well known that while the Pali abhidhamma accepts only one unconditioned thing (dhamma), nirvana, the Chinese abhidharma accepts three, space (ākāsa) and two extinctions: extinction without knowledge (apratisaṅkhyaṇirodha) and extinction through knowledge (pāṭisāṅkhyaṇirodha), which is the equivalent of nirvana. Like the Pali abhidhamma seen above, these three unconditioned things are said to belong both to the spheres of mental
data base (dhammāyatana) and to the elements of mental data base (dhammadhātu), yet do not belong to any of the five aggregates.22

According to E. Frauwallner, the abhidharma classification, which is based primarily on the five aggregates (skandha), is the oldest one and is termed pañcaskandhaka.23 This old system of classification was step by step replaced in the Chinese abhidharma by a new and more comprehensive system called pañcavastuka, the five categories of form (rūpa), mind (citta), mental states (caitta), states not associated with mind (cittaviprayukta) and the unconditioned (asamskṛta). The unconditioned is a new category, not found in the old classification of the five aggregates (pañcaskandhaka).24

The process of adopting this new system in the Sarvāstivādin abhidharma was slow and gradual. It was applied in the Dhātukāyāpādaśāstra and the Prakaraṇapādaśāstra, which are, according to Pu-guang (普光), a disciple of Xuan-zang, written at the beginning of the fourth century after the final nirvāṇa of the Buddha.25

Modern scholars, although they differ slightly, place these texts together with the Vijñānakāyaśāstra and the Jñānaprasthānaśāstra in the middle period of abhidharma development, whereas the Saṃgītīpāryāyaśāstra and the Dharmaskandhaśāstra, which applied the old system and relied more on quoting sutras, are placed in the early period.

Among the four texts in the middle period, the Prakaraṇapādaśāstra and the Jñānaprasthānaśāstra are regarded as more advanced texts since they show great developments in both organisation and doctrinal exposition.27 While both classifications were applied in the Dhātukāyāpādaśāstra,28 the Prakaraṇapādaśāstra29 applied the new system alone. Thus the new system may have become fully established at some time between when the two texts were written. Within the Sarvāstivādin abhidharma tradition in this middle period, the abstract concepts, or dharmas, were, under the five new categories (pañcavastuka), further classified into around seventy sub-categories in terms of their distinctive intrinsic nature (svabhāva); later, in the Abhidharma-makośabhāṣya, they were enumerated as seventy-five.30

The three unconditioned things are first mentioned in relation to the pañcaskandhaka in the Dharmaśadvadāsastra,\textsuperscript{31} one of the early abhidharma texts, and then listed as real existents (dravya) under the new classification, pañcavastu,\textsuperscript{32} in the Prakaraṇapañcadvadāsastra.\textsuperscript{33} Since these new categories differ from those mentioned in the early canon, a new basis was needed to establish their authority. The concept of ‘intrinsic nature’ (svabhāva) plays a major role in this establishment; it was widely used from this middle period on.

In the Pali tradition, the word sabhāva is seen only once, in the Paṭisambhidāmagga,\textsuperscript{34} within the three Piṭakas, but is used extensively for exegetical purposes in the Visuddhimagga and the main commentaries and sub-commentaries.\textsuperscript{35}

Intrinsic nature in the Sarvāstivādin abhidharma not only provides the basis for the new classification, but also functions as the determinant of its existential status: any concept or any dharma characterised by intrinsic nature is said to exist as a real existent (dravya); all other phenomena that one can experience exist as aggregations of these real existents and, as a consequence, they are said to exist as mere designations (prajñapti).\textsuperscript{36}

Within the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma, extinction through knowledge (pratisaṃkhyānirrodha) is regarded as the equivalent of nirvana\textsuperscript{37} and is characterised by its intrinsic nature, ‘all extinction which is disjunction (visamyoga)’.\textsuperscript{38} This dharma was defined in the Abhidharmaśabdabhāsya as follows:\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{quote}
Disjunction from impure dharmas is extinction through knowledge.
Knowledge (pratisaṃkhyā) is a special understanding, the penetration (pratisaṃkhyāna) of suffering and the other noble truths. The extinction which is to be attained by that is extinction through knowledge. For as in ‘oxcart’, the middle word is elided.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

The Sarvāstivādin on the one hand insist on the existence of all dharmas in the three time periods, while on the other hand they accept the momentariness of conditioned dharmas. Moreover, dharmas are on a par: they are impersonal and do not ‘possess’ each other, like substances and properties in other scholastic systems. What looks like possession is just conjunction, a shift in position, within a series of aggregates (skandhasamātana).

Thus, if a person, or technically a series of aggregations (skandhasamātana), attains a certain defilement, it does not mean that the series possesses the defilement directly but means that there is the arising of the acquisition (prāpti) of that defilement in the series.\textsuperscript{41} Once there occurs the acquisition of the defilement, the acquisition (prāpti) makes the defilement renew its existence and continue its activity: arising, duration, decay and ceasing, within the series until this acquisition is eliminated from the series. Thus, what changes momentarily is not the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of a dharma
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE TWO NIRVANA THEORY

but its activities – arising, duration, decay and ceasing – through its inherent characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of impermanence.

This repeated ceasing was different from the two unconditioned extinctions: extinction without knowledge (apratisamkhyaṇīrodha) and extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyaṇīrodha). For the Sarvāstivādins, the former is the perpetual non-existence of the future dharmas within a series of aggregates, while the latter is the perpetual separation of an impure dharma from a series of aggregates through the antidote, ‘acquisition of disjunction’ (visamyojagaprāpti).

One of the common examples, though it seems to be of later origin, to explain extinction without knowledge (apratisamkhyaṇīrodha) is a cognitive one. According to the Sarvāstivādins, only one type of consciousness operates at each moment within the series of aggregates (skandhasamāna). At a certain moment of visual consciousness, even though other objects of visual consciousness as well as other types of consciousness and their objects exist in the future waiting to arise, they do not arise, because a particular visual consciousness has already arisen in the moment within the series. Those other particular objects and types of perceptual consciousness, having missed their opportunity to arise, are as if at a standstill; though they still exist as intrinsic nature (svabhāva) in the future time period, they will be forever incapable of arising. The person, the series of aggregates, is then said to have extinction without knowledge with regard to those that have not arisen. Thus, although it explains the future non-existence of a certain dharma within one’s series, it actually occurs not because of the cessation or destruction of a dharma, which is impossible within the Sarvāstivāda system, but because of a deficiency of the conditions necessary for that dharma to arise.

What is the nirvana that in this abhidharma is called ‘extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyaṇīrodha)’? In this system, it is impossible to destroy defilement and thus the elimination of a defilement is referred to as a ‘separation’ from the series. That is to say, the acquisition of the defilement is negated, or technically ‘disjoined’ (visamyoja), through the power of knowledge that terminates the junction between that defilement and the series of aggregates. By reason of this separation, then, there arises ‘the acquisition of disjunction’ (visamyojagaprāpti) that serves as an antidote (pratipakṣa), which henceforward prevents the junction between the defilement and this series.

These two steps are later compared to throwing out a thief and closing the door or to catching an insect in a jar and plugging the jar’s mouth. Extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyaṇīrodha) is thus equated with nirvana not in the sense of cessation or destruction of defilement, but in the sense that defilement has been removed from a person and will henceforward be separated from him.

Therefore, nirvana as extinction through knowledge in the Chinese abhidharma has two distinctive features. First, it should be regarded as a
real existent (dravya). The main role of nirvana in this case is henceforward to prevent a particular defilement from attaching to a person through the antidote, ‘the acquisition of disjunction’ (vismyogaprāpti), which arises from knowledge (pratisamkhya). This role could not be fulfilled if it were non-existent. In other words, nirvana must exist as a real existent (dravya) in the three time periods.46

Second, it is quite different from the two nirvana elements in the early canon. Nirvana in this case is used in a narrow sense applied to a single perpetual prevention of a certain defilement, while nirvana in the early canon is the cessation of the triple fire: passion, hatred and delusion. It is also quite different from the nirvana in the Pali abhidhamma, where it is the one and only unconditioned thing. In fact, nirvana as extinction through knowledge is multiple.

Later in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra it is explained as follows: ‘there are as many extinctions through knowledge as there are objects of junction’.47 In other words, a saint (arahant), who has nirvana with a remainder of clinging, in this system is the one who has terminated all junctions with impure objects and as a consequence has henceforward been protected from them through antidotes, ‘the acquisition of disjunction’ (vismyogaprāpti). Thus, nirvana in a narrow sense called disjunction (vismyoga) is quite different from what is known as nirvana with and without a remainder of clinging.48

The Sarvāstivāda interpretation in the Jñānaprasthāna

The Jñānaprasthāna is the only abhidharma work in which the two nirvana theory is mentioned and interpreted. In the Sarvāstivāda tradition, the Jñānaprasthāna is regarded as the body of six other abhidharma works, which are collectively entitled ‘Abhidharma consisting of six feet’ (sadpādābhidharma).49 However, that does not mean that the Jñānaprasthāna was established earlier than the other six abhidharma works. In fact, the Jñānaprasthāna can be seen by its style and its detailed interpretations based on Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy to be among the latest of these seven works.50

After explaining the Sarvāstivādin’s three extinctions, extinction through knowledge, extinction without knowledge, and impermanent extinction,51 it clarifies the two nirvana theory as follows:

What is nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhatu)? A saint (arahant) has completely extinguished his impurity (kṣīnāsrava); his vitality (āyus) alone exists; the series of primary elements (mahābhūtāni) and secondary matter (upādāyārūpa) have not yet become extinct; the mental series supported by the five faculties is active as there is still a remainder of clinging. The complete cessation of all fetters (saṃyojana) which is obtained (prāpta),
possessed (pratilabdha), touched (spraṣṭa), and realised (sāksamāna) [by this saint] is what is called nirvana with a remainder of clinging.

What is nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu)? A saint (arahant) has completely extinguished his impurity; his vitality has come to an end; the series of primary elements and secondary matter have already been destroyed; the mind supported by the five faculties is no longer active as there is no remainder of clinging. The complete cessation of all fetters is what is called nirvana without a remainder of clinging.52

Here we can see a coherence in approach towards the two nirvana theory between the Pali exegetical tradition and the Sarvāstivāda interpretation: both nirvanas are here ascribed to a saint (arahant) who has completely extinguished his impurity (kṣīnārav). It also puts an end to the speculation that nirvana with a remainder of clinging is achieved through the destruction of five lower fetters belonging to the world of desire. As it shows, it is attained through ‘the complete cessation of all fetters (結, sāmyojana)’.

This passage also shows a doctrinal development of the two nirvana theory from the Sarvāstivādin’s point of view. Although the five faculties (pañcaindriya) are mentioned, agreeing with the Itivuttaka53 in the description of nirvana with a remainder of clinging, it is vitality (āyu) that is mentioned first in this interpretation.

How did this vitality (āyu) come into the context of the two nirvana theory? One clue seems to come from the Pali Peṭakopadesa,54 where vitality (āyu) was mentioned not in the context of nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu), like the Itivuttaka, but in the context of nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu).55 The final nirvana can only be reached through the elimination of vitality. Thus, vitality (āyu) could be first used to explain how the process of the final nirvana, nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu), starts. The use of vitality (āyu) in the Peṭakopadesa passage clearly shows this is the case.56 Vitality (āyu), then, seems to be being applied backwards to nirvana with a remainder of clinging, since it gives such a clear distinction between the two nirvanas. From this clarity, explaining the two nirvana theory in terms of vitality may have become widespread among Buddhist communities in both Northern and Southern traditions.

In my opinion, the Jñānapraśthāna explanation of the two nirvanas could be in the middle between the old clarification by the five faculties (pañcaindriya) in the Itivuttaka57 and this new distinction by vitality (āyu) in the later systematisation. The author of the Jñānapraśthāna probably knew the Itivuttaka passage, yet not as an authentic sūtra but as a form of the chanted verses.58 While both texts explain the cognitive process following nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu), they are different in details in their explanation. In the Itivuttaka the cognitive
process was explained through the relationship between the five aggregates shown in Chapter 2, whereas in the Jñānapraśthāna it was explained through the continuation of the series of aggregates (skandhasaṃtāna), which was clearly influenced by the Buddhist theory of momentariness.

Especially for the Sarvāstivādins, vitality (āyu) could solve one problem caused by the Buddhist theory of momentariness. In this system, only one dharma is working at a moment (ksana). Basically, it is not possible for the five faculties (indriyas) to work together at the very moment when a monk emerges from nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhīṣeṣānirvāṇadhātu). That is to say, a single dharma is probably needed to explain this very moment, like a starting point of our cognitive process. Vitality (āyu) can be an ideal fit in this case. We shall, however, see in Chapter 5, under ‘The development of the two nirvana theory in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra’, that the validity of this hybrid clarification of the Jñānapraśthāna was doubted by the author of the treatise.

The Sarvāstivādins are sometimes called ‘those who talk of causes’ (設因部, hetuvāda) according to the Chinese translation of the Vasumitra’s Samayabhedoparacanacakra and the list of Bhavya. This other name seems to suggest that they are not only affirming the existence of dharmas in the three time periods, but also keen on explaining things through their causes. For the author of the Jñānapraśthāna, introducing vitality could be a big step forwards in searching for the foundation through which a monk emerges from nirvana with a remainder of clinging, the experience of the state where there is no more passion, hatred, delusion or any defilement.

Despite introducing vitality (āyu), he continued to use the old term, the five faculties (pañcaindriya), in his explanation. Table 3.2 shows the sequence of how a series of aggregates (skandhasaṃtāna) continues from vitality in the Jñānapraśthāna explanation. How could this sequence from vitality to the five faculties and to mental series be justified? In fact, this sequence does not lack textual evidence in support.

First, vitality (āyu) was regarded as the basis of stability of the five faculties (indriyas) in the early Buddhist tradition. In the Mahāvedallasutta in the Majjhimanikāya, there is a conversation between Mahākāśīṭhita and Sāriputta on the mutual relation of the mind and mental concomitants. When Sāriputta was asked the basis of the five faculties, he replied that they depend on vitality and then he added that vitality depends on warmth (usmā),

\[
\text{Table 3.2 The sequence of emerging from nirvana with a remainder of clinging}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The series of aggregates (skandhasaṃtāna)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[vitality] → [primary elements] → [secondary matter] → [five faculties] → [mental series]</td>
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and the two are interdependent like the flame and the light of a lamp. Taking warmth (usmā) as secondary matter, we can easily explain the first sequence, from vitality to primary elements and secondary matter, as inter-dependent, while the five faculties depend on them.

The relationship of these three, vitality, warmth and the five faculties, seems to be extended to explain our life as psycho-physical phenomena, that is to say, the five aggregates consisting of name and form (nāmarūpa). The material five faculties (indriyas) seems to be replaced by consciousness (vijñāna) to give a kind of psycho-physical balance. In this way, minimum components of our life could be explained by three basic dharmas with different characteristics: vitality (āyu), an abstract principle; warmth (usmā), a form of secondary matter; and consciousness (vijñāna), mental constituent.

Within the Sarvāstivāda tradition, the relationship of these three things, vitality, warmth and consciousness, is explained as interdependence or mutually to support one another.66 Its textual evidence came from the Phenaṇutta in the Saṃyuttanikāya:67 ‘When vitality, warmth, and consciousness abandon this body, then [a person] lies discarded food for others devoid of consciousness.’ Wherever there is vitality there is warmth and consciousness and vice versa. In order for consciousness (vijñāna) to occur, sense faculties (indriya) and objects (viṣaya) are required, since consciousness arises by reason of a faculty and its object.69 In this way, the whole sequence seen in the Jñānaprasthāna passage can be explained through mutual support.

Later in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, the commentary on the Jñānaprasthāna, vitality (āyu) is further interpreted as the life faculty (jīvendriya), one of twenty-two controlling faculties as well as one of fourteen dharmas not associated with the mind (viprayuktasamskāra), and as homogeneous character (sabhāgatā), which determines the specific rebirth state of sentient beings.70 I discuss this matter in detail in Chapter 5, under ‘The development of the two nirvana theory in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra’.

The Theravāda exegetical tradition

Nirvana with and without a remainder of clinging is usually interpreted as the cessation of defilements (kilesa-parinibbāna) and the cessation of the aggregates (khandha-parinibbāna) in the Theravāda exegetical tradition.71 Peter Masefield has argued that the above distinction could be traced back only as far as the fifth-century CE commentator Buddhaghosa.72

A lengthy and detailed explanation of the two nirvana elements can be found in the Visuddhimagga. It became widely accepted as the standard explanation and was used frequently in the post-Buddhaghosa period of Theravāda Buddhism. After making the excuse cited above,73 Buddhaghosa explains the two nirvana elements:
The doctrinal development of nirvana

but this [single goal, nibbana] is firstly called with result of past clinging left since it is made known together with the [aggregates resulting from past] clinging still remaining [during the arahant’s life], being thus made known in terms of the stilling of defilement and the remaining [result of past] clinging that are present in one who has reached it by means of development. But [secondly, it is called without result of past clinging left] since after the last consciousness of the arahant, who has abandoned arousing [future aggregates] and so prevented kamma from giving result in a future [existence], there is no further arising of aggregates of existence, and those already arisen have disappeared. So the [result of past] clinging that remained is non-existent; and it is in terms of this non-existence, in the sense that there is no [result of past] clinging here, that that [same goal is called] without result of past clinging left.74

Although Buddhaghosa’s explanation largely follows the Theravāda exegetical explanations of the two nirvana elements mentioned above, he adds some interesting remarks to clarify the final nirvana.

For the Sarvāstivādins nirvana is, as mentioned above, a real existent (dravya) and is understood in a narrow sense applied to a single perpetual prevention of a certain defilement;75 whereas for the Sautrāntikas nirvana is not a real existent (dravyasat) but a mere designation (prajñaptisat), something spoken of conventionally, as well as ‘non-existence succeeding existence (paścādabhāva), like a sound that is non-existent before and will be non-existent after its occurrence.76

Although the Theravādins do not accept the idea that nirvana is mere non-existence,77 the way Buddhaghosa explains nirvana without a remainder of clinging reminds us of the Sautrāntikas’ perspective, especially when he says ‘there is no further arising of aggregates of existence and those already arisen have disappeared’.78 This could lead us to assume that the two nirvana theory was introduced by Buddhaghosa, a northerner, who went to Ceylon (Sri Lanka) early in the fifth century CE, and it is probably one of the reasons why Peter Masefield has argued that the two nirvana theory could only be traced back as far as Buddhaghosa.

However, we can see a prototype of this interpretation in the Nettippakarana and the Peṭakopadesa. Modern scholars have rejected the traditional Buddhist claim that both these texts were established at around the time of the first council by one of the Buddha’s disciples, Mahā-Kaccāṇa.79 He was, according to early suttas,80 known as ‘foremost of those who analyse in detail what has been stated in brief’, and appears to have lived mostly in the rather remote south-west Kingdom of Avanti.81 From this, Nyānamoli surmises that this compendious method could have been handed down orally in some skeleton form and then at some time between Asoka and the first
century CE an attempt was made, somewhere in southern India, to set forth this method in the form of a treatise. According to A. K. Warder, both texts contain some new ideas, such as inherent nature (svabhāva), which were alien to the earlier Theravāda traditions. Since both texts under the name of Mahā-Kaccāna were already in circulation among Sinhalese monks when Buddhaghosa arrived there, they seem to have reached Ceylon well before the fifth century CE. Although their canonicity was recognized only by Burmese Buddhists, they still were cited as authoritative by Buddhaghosa in his Atthasālinī and Visuddhimagga.

The Nettippakarana has been regarded by modern scholars as somewhat older than the Peta-kopadesa since the latter presupposed the former. Yet it is not clear whether the word netti in both texts is a noun meaning simply ‘guide’ or is, as believed, a proper name designating the Nettippakarana. In fact their style and handling of the subject matter suggest the reverse order. While the former is even, clear, economical, neat and well exemplified, the latter is crabbed, only occasionally clear, redundant and sometimes poorly exemplified. From this, Nyānamoli insists that the former, the Nettippakarana, seems to be the improved and revised version of the latter, the Peta-kopadesa. The description of the two nirvanas in both texts seems to support Nyānamoli’s claim.

The Nettippakarana gives us a simple and clear explanation of the two nirvana theory. It explains them as follows: ‘The state of being without thirst is nirvana with a remainder of clinging; with the breaking up of the body there is nirvana without a remainder of clinging.’ Whereas ‘the state of being without thirst’ corresponds to the cessation of defilements, ‘the breaking up of the body’ corresponds to the cessation of aggregates in this clarification. The word upādi here seems to be regarded as referring to the body (kāya) because it is destroyed at the final stage. In fact, this agrees literally with the Sarvāstivādins’ interpretation of the word upadhi as ‘birth body’ (jannakāya) in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra.

By contrast, the Peta-kopadesa gives us an uneven but quite interesting explanation of the two nirvana theory. Here, the perfection of insight (vipassanā) is designated as nirvana with a remainder of clinging (soppādisesanibbānadāhhātu). After explaining that, it explains nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupādisesanibbānadāhhātu) as follows:

By two steps a monk has done what he had to do. This is the nirvana element with a remainder of clinging. Through taking up his vitality (āyu) completely, through checking his life faculty (jīviten-driya), suffering here has been destroyed and no further suffering arises. In that state the destruction, laying to rest, of these aggregates, elements and spheres and the non-linking, non-appearance, of other aggregates, elements and spheres, is nirvana without a remainder of clinging.
The mention of vitality (壽命: āyu) here requires special attention. As seen above, it was said to exist alone after the nirvana with a remainder of clinging in the Jñānaprasthāna, the seventh book of the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma, and was interpreted later in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra as life faculty (jīvitendriya) and homogeneous character (sabhāgata). This similarity could suggest that vitality (āyu), instead of the five faculties mentioned in the Itivuttaka, becomes the key element to distinguish the two nirvanas and that this exposition was probably well established not only among Northern Buddhists but also among Southern Buddhists around the first century CE. The explanation of nirvana without a remainder of clinging here seems to influence Buddhaghosa’s interesting remark on the final nirvana in the Visuddhimagga: ‘there is no further arising of aggregates of existence and those already arisen have disappeared’. The influence of the Buddhist theory of momentariness, destruction alone cannot be enough to explain why it should be regarded as the unconditioned. Non-arising becomes a more important ingredient than destruction since every dharma is said to cease repeatedly due to its momentary nature. The mention of no further arising of suffering, aggregates and so on thus suggests that the theory of momentariness was already widespread around India at this stage and that with the coming of the Pēṭakopadesa, Ceylon was probably under the influence of the Buddhist theory of momentariness well before the arrival of Buddhaghosa.

The Suttanipāta atṭhakathā by Dhammapāla traces its interpretation of the two nirvana theory back to the Sundarikabhāradvājasutta in the Suttanipāta. While the Buddha was talking about the qualities of the Tathāgata to a Brahman called Sundarikabhāradvāja, he said as follows: ‘The Tathāgata, who, seeing the end and destruction of fetters and birth, has thrust away the path of passion entirely, is purified, faultless, stainless, clear; he deserves the sacrificial cake’. In Dhammapāla’s commentary, ‘the end and destruction of fetters’ was interpreted as nirvana with a remainder of clinging, while ‘that of birth’ was interpreted as nirvana without a remainder of clinging. Although we cannot be sure that in the original text the Buddha meant to speak so specifically in terms of the two nirvana elements, we still can see that this Suttanipāta passage fits the Southern exegetical explanation as well as the Northern interpretation of the two nirvana theory, including both the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas.

The best known exegetical passage to explain the two nirvana elements is in Dhammapāla’s Theragāthā-atṭhakathā. It reads as follows: ‘By “quenched” it means two nirvanas, the nirvana element with a remainder of clinging which is the destruction of defilements, and the nirvana element without a remainder of clinging, which is the destruction of aggregates.’ The Dhammapada-atṭhakathā also says that the first is ‘because the cycle of defilements has been destroyed’ (kilesavatṭassa khepitattā), while the second is ‘because the cycle of aggregates has been destroyed with the cessation of the
[arahant’s] last thought’ (carimacittanirodhena khandhavaṭṭassa khepitattā).99 We frequently see this type of explanation in the various ṭīkās, exegeses of the atṭhakathās.

Taking ‘clinging’ as the aggregates seems to have been largely settled within Buddhist schools. Later in the Prasannapadā, Candrakīrti also adopted this interpretation. He said: ‘By the word upadhi is meant the five aggregates as fuel, which is the cause of the conventionally designated self (ātman).’100
NIRVANA IN THE THERAVĀDA
BUDDHIST TRADITION

In Chapter 3, we saw that the right interpretation of nirvana with and without a remainder of clinging is, agreeing with its metaphorical structure, as the cessation of all defilements during life for the former and the cessation of the aggregates at death for the latter. In the early canon, the state of nirvana without a remainder of clinging was often explained through the image of a fire extinguished. In fact, we can get an early idea of this state through one of the well known discourses concerning one of the four unanswered questions: the state of the Tathāgata after death. As its name suggests, the early canon did not really answer this question and, as a consequence, there have been many attempts to fill ‘the silence of the Buddha’ through clarifying this metaphor of a fire extinguished.

One of the attempts to fill this silence is through the common Indian view on fire seen in the later Upaniṣads. F. Otto Schrader, for example, tried to interpret this state positively through clarifying this metaphor in terms of the so-called common Indian view based on several later Upaniṣads.1 According to him, ‘an expiring flame does not really go out, but returns into the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire it had before its appearance as visible fire’.2 Thus, the enlightened person after death does not become nothing but returns to the primitive and pure state like the paramāṭman, the ultimate reality in Brahmanism.3

Peter Harvey has recently tried to interpret this state as something positive, not a state of nothingness, from the Dārukkhandhasutta in the Āṅguttaranikāya.4 Through the fact that the monk who possesses supernormal powers (iddhimant) can see earth, water, fire and air elements in a large log of wood because there are these elements in the log, he drew the following conclusion:

While to a Western-educated person, an extinct fire goes nowhere because it does not exist, the Buddha’s audience in ancient India would generally have thought of an extinguished fire as going back into a non-manifested state as latent heat. The simile of the extinct fire thus suggests that the state of an enlightened person after death
is one that is beyond normal comprehension, not that is a state of nothingness.\(^5\)

Although the two interpretations are based on different sources, they have one thing in common: as a fire extinguished does not finally end its existence but goes back to its origin or latent state, the state of an enlightened person after death cannot simply be mere non-existence.

However, it has not been proved that the allegedly common Indian view was already presupposed in the early canon when the metaphor of a fire extinguished was used to explain what happens to an enlightened person after death.\(^6\) That is to say, it should be determined through the context in which this metaphor was used in the early canon. In this chapter, I am dealing with this problem by examining Buddhist methodology seen in the early canon, by clarifying the meaning of this metaphor in the context of Vacchagotta’s unanswered questions and by exploring later developments, especially within the Theravāda system.

**Buddhist methodology**

In order to see how the metaphor of a fire extinguished was used in the dialogue between the Buddha and Vacchagotta, we may need to look at the methodology, or the way of thinking, underlying their conversation. The methodology used by the Buddha could be termed *yoniso manasikāra*, meaning ‘thinking according to the cause’.

This term has been translated in various ways as wise attention, proper attention, systematic attention, reasoning attention, critical reflection and thinking according to the law. ‘Making in the mind’, the literal meaning of *manasikāra*, seems to favour translating this word as ‘attention’. Actually, *manasikāra* is not included in the category of good *dhamma* (*kusala dhamma*) in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* but added later by Buddhaghosa in its commentary, the *Atthasālinī*, as one of nine states.\(^7\) That is to say, it is highly unlikely that attention was the original meaning of this word *manasikāra*.

In the early canon, it is more likely to mean simply ‘thought’ or ‘reflection’ and is usually found together with *yoniso*. The word *yoniso*, an adverbial form of *yoni*, the womb, origin or way of birth, tends to mean ‘from the origin, methodically, wisely and thoroughly’. This compound, thus, means ‘thinking according to the origin’ or ‘reflecting from the origin’, and was generally used in the early canon in three different ways.

First, it can be used as a means through which cankers (*āsava*) are removed according to the *Sabbāsavasutta* in the *Majjhimanikāya*:

> Then, Oh monks, what is the cessation of cankers (*āsava*) of one who knows and of one who sees? There is thinking according to the
cause (yoniso manasikāra) and thinking without considering the cause (ayoniso manasikāra). Monks, from thinking without considering the cause cankers which had not arisen arise and also cankers which have arisen increase. But, monks, from thinking according to the cause cankers which had not arisen do not arise and also cankers which have arisen decline.8

Second, it was one of two conditions that lead to right understanding (sammādiṭṭhi) according to the Mahāvedallasutta in the Majjhimanikāya:

But how many conditions are there, friend, to bring about right understanding (sammādiṭṭhi)? There are indeed two conditions, friend, to bring about right understanding. They are the utterance of another [person] and thinking according to the cause (yoniso manasikāra).9

Finally, it is regarded as the base of mindfulness (sati), one of the seven facts for enlightenment according to the Āhārasutta in the Saṃyuttanikāya:

Then what, oh monks, is the cause (āhāra) of the arising of mindfulness (sati) as a constituent of enlightenment which had not arisen and the cultivation and fulfillment of mindfulness (sati) as a constituent of enlightenment which has already arisen? There is, oh monks, a dhamma which is founded on mindfulness (sati) as a constituent of enlightenment. Thinking according to the cause indeed is here the cause (āhāra) of the arising of mindfulness (sati) as a constituent of enlightenment which had not arisen and the cultivation and fulfilment of mindfulness (sati) as a constituent of enlightenment which has already arisen.10

In the Chinese canon, this word was translated as ‘right reflection’ (正思惟)11 and ‘suitable reflection’ (常思惟)12 and then later, in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya translated by Xuan-zang, it was translated as ‘making up one’s mind correctly (如理作意),13 as opposed to ‘making up one’s mind incorrectly’ (非理作意), which is the cause of ignorance (avidyā), the first of the twelve formulae of dependent origination.14

According to the MahāSakyamuniGotamasutta in the Saṃyuttanikāya, this methodology, thinking according to the cause (yoniso manasikāra), played an important role in the Enlightenment of the Buddha. In the sutta, the blessed one looks back into the past when he was just a bodhisattva:

Before I was enlightened, oh monks, while I was a bodhisattva who was not fully enlightened, I thought: Oh! This world which is fallen into misery is being born, getting old, dying, falling away and
getting born again. Yet it does not know the escape from this suffering and from decay and death. When indeed will the escape from them be known? I then thought, oh monks, ‘From what that exists do decay and death come to be, from which cause is there old age and death?’ Then oh monks I had a realisation of understanding through thinking according to the cause (yoniso manasikāra): ‘When birth exists, decay and death come to be, with birth as condition, there is decay and death’.15

Here the problem of death turned out to be the crucial issue that the Buddha before enlightenment sought to overcome. Although it was not mentioned in this sutta, the Buddha before enlightenment could ask himself ‘What is death?’ as against ‘What is life?’ in accordance with the ordinary way of thinking.

The Buddha, according to Gombrich in his book How Buddhism Began, ‘was not an essentialist, and in contrast to Brahmins was interested in how things worked rather than in what they were’.16 From the modern terminology, these two ways of looking at things seem to correspond to two types of methodology suggested by Karl Popper in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies: methodological essentialism and methodological nominalism.

Karl Popper explained the first, methodological essentialism, as to aim at finding out what a thing really is and at defining its true nature, by asking, for example, what movement is or what an atom is. The second, methodological nominalism, is to aim at describing how a thing behaves in various circumstances, by asking, for instance, how a planet moves or under what conditions an atom radiates light.17

His point, according to Gombrich, is that ‘knowledge and understanding do not advance through asking for definitions of what things are, but through asking why they occur and how they work’.18 The content of yoniso manasikāra could resemble modern scientific method. The question and answer given under yoniso manasikāra focused clearly on how or why things like old age and death occur. Late in this text, this method was regarded as a whole new one, ‘not being heard of before’ (pubbe ananusamuppāda),19 and as a means through which enlightenment was possible.

We can see another aspect of this new way of questioning and answering in the Phaggunasutta in the Sānyuttanikāya. Here the Buddha actually took some questions from a monk, Moliya Phagguna, as unfit questions and suggested fit questions and answers based on his new way of thinking, yoniso manasikāra. He asked the Buddha, when the doctrine of the four foods (āhāra) was taught, ‘Then, blessed one, who eats the consciousness-food?’ 20

The four foods (āhāra) are made up of physical food, sense-impressions, mental volitions and consciousness, and the last food is interpreted by Warder as ‘experience through our sentient body’.21 This question thus means simply ‘Who is conscious?’22 Here is the answer from the blessed one:
The Buddha said this was not a fit question. I am not saying someone eats. If I were saying so, the question would be a fit one. But I am not saying so. Although I am not saying so, however, if you asked me ‘Then the Blessed one, what has consciousness as food?’, this would be a fit question. And the fit answer to it is that the consciousness food is the cause of future becoming and of rebirth. When that has come about there are the six senses. With the six senses as condition there is sense-contact.23

The Buddha further corrected Moliya Phagguna’s questions such as ‘Who contacts?’ and ‘Who feels?’ to ‘From which cause is there sense-contact?’ and ‘From which cause is there feeling?’ From the Buddhist methodology, yoniso manasikāra, questions raised by Moliya Phagguna were unacceptable as they had already assumed an agent or subject, such as a soul (ātman), behind our cognitive activities.

While the Buddha explained our mental phenomena through the causal relationship between cognitive units, questions from Moliya Phagguna expect answers explaining our mental phenomena through the hierarchical relationship of the subject within, such as a soul (ātman), and cognitive activities outside, such as sense and feeling. If mental phenomena can be explained through the causal relationship between dharmas, there is no need to establish such a hierarchical subject–object relationship. Soul, according to Buddhism, is known neither by direct perception (pratyakṣa), as are the objects of the five sense consciousnesses and the object of mental consciousness, nor by inference (anumāna), as are the five faculties (indriya).24

Since our cognitive activities can be explained through the causal relationship between dharmas that can be known either by direct perception or by inference, there is no need to accept the existence of a soul, which is not known and is not part of this causal relationship between phenomena. In this new way of thinking, yoniso manasikāra, there is no place for something that is outside the range of this causal relationship.

In both suttas mentioned above, the answer given by the Buddha leads us to the formulae of dependent origination (patīcchasamuppāda) consisting of ten or twelve dhammas. This could mislead us to assume that this way of thinking, yoniso manasikāra, can be applied only to the relationship between dhammas within the formulae of dependent origination. I hold that the scope of yoniso manasikāra is a lot wider.

We can see a kind of general rule beyond the chain of ten or twelve formulae within the early canon. It is ‘When there is A, there is B; from the arising of A, B arises’ (imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti imass’uppādā idaṃ uppajjati). According to the very first part of the Udāna,25 this general rule was built up on the basis of the Buddha’s enlightened experience. That is to say, yoniso manasikāra can be applied not only to the twelve dharmas within the formulae, but also to all causally related phenomena.
The Unanswered questions and the fire image in the early *Upaniṣads*

A set of questions asked by Vacchagotta have been known as avyākata. Murti, in his book *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, has translated it as ‘The Inexpressibles’ in accordance with his interpretation of these questions as ‘a parallel with the Kantian antinomies’. This translation is not correct literally because vyākata is the past passive participle of vyākaroti, meaning ‘explain or answer’. The proper interpretation of avyākata should be, as pointed out by Jayatilleke, ‘unexplained or unanswered’.

The set of ten or fourteen unanswered questions can be classified into four main categories. The four topics are whether the world is eternal, whether the world is finite, whether the soul (jīva or ātman) is the same as the body (sarīra) and the state of the Tathāgata after death. Each issue consists of two or four alternatives: affirmative and negative for the two, or affirmative, negative, both and neither for the four.

For instance, the four sets for the last category are: ‘the Tathāgata exists after death’, ‘the Tathāgata does not exist after death’, ‘the Tathāgata does and does not exists after death’ and ‘the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death’. In the set of ten only the last topic, the state of the Tathāgata after death, has four alternatives, whereas in the set of fourteen all the topics except the third one, the soul as body, have four alternatives.

Although Jayatilleke has relied largely on the set of ten, found in the Pali canon, the set of fourteen appears not only in the Sanskrit literature but also in the Chinese equivalent of the Pali sutras with the set of ten unanswered questions. That is to say, the Pali could be the only canon in which the unanswered questions enumerate ten.

There have been many attempts to solve the problems surrounding these unanswered questions. Main concerns can be of two kinds: whether the Buddha knew the answers to these questions, and on what grounds these questions were not answered. When it comes to our topic, the state of the Tathāgata after death, they are: whether the Buddha accepts a certain state reachable by an enlightened one after death and on what grounds he wants this question to remain unanswered.

While Jayatilleke, taking a logical positivist position, seems to accept the existence of a transcendental state realisable after death yet considers that it is unanswered because this state is indescribable or logically meaningless, Kalupahana, from an empiricist point of view, rejects the existence of such a state on the same ground as the rejection of the *Upaniṣadic* conception of ātman and explains the silence of the Buddha as his awareness of the limitations of empiricism. I think that the silence of the Buddha on this particular question could largely be responsible for his new way of thinking, thinking according to the cause (yoniso manasikāra), if we consider how the metaphor of a fire extinguished was used in the dialogue between the Buddha and Vacchagotta.
The doctrine of nirvana

In the Aggivacchagottasutta in the Majjhimanikāya, the curious Vacchagotta asked the set of ten unanswered questions. The answer given by the Buddha to all his questions was simply ‘I am not of a such view, Vaccha (na kho aham Vaccha evamdiṭṭhi)’. After some additional questions from him, the Buddha struck back, asking the following questions concerning the state of the Tathāgata after death using the image of a fire extinguished and of a palm uprooted:

If, Vaccha, this fire in front of you were to go out (nibbāyeyya), would you then know ‘This fire in front of me has gone out’? Yes I would, Gotama. Again if you, Vaccha, were asked ‘This fire which has gone out in front of you, in which direction – to the east, west, north or south – has it gone from here?’, how would you answer? It does not fit, Gotama. This fire has blazed up through grass and sticks as fuel. Through using them up completely and through the non-supplying of anything else, it is said to have gone out with nothing to feed on’ (anāhāro nibbuto). Even so, Vaccha, the material form (rūpa) of the Tathāgata through which the Tathāgata could be identified should be known as ‘abandoned, with root cut off, like a palm uprooted, destined to be non-existent, no longer reappearing in the future’.

As we see from this passage, the Buddha was not entirely silent on this issue. He actually explained his position through his own methodology, thinking according to the cause (yoniso manasikāra) mentioned above, with the images of the extinguished fire and of a palm uprooted. He did not simply follow the way Vacchagotta had questioned him since he regarded his questions as unfit and saw a danger if he answered.

In fact, Vacchagotta’s questions on the state of the Tathāgata after death have already assumed a certain state reachable after the death of the enlightened one. In any case, affirmative, negative, both and neither, answering him means that the Buddha had to explain a certain state that was basically known neither through direct perception (pratyakṣa), like material form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā) and so on, nor through inference (anumāna), like the faculty of sight. This state, like a soul (ātman) as we saw before, cannot be explained through his way of thinking, thinking according to the cause (yoniso manasikāra), which clarifies things through the causal relationship between dharmas that are known through either direct perception or inference.

Actually accepting the existence of the enlightened one after the final nirvana inevitably leads the Buddha to admit a soul (ātman), an agent or subject behind our cognitive activities, since the soul according to the
Upaniṣads also has a transcendental state, like Brahman. As the Buddha shows in the Phaggunasutta seen above,¹¹ how our cognitive activities work without admitting an agent, all he needs to do here is to show how a Tathāgata, an enlightened one, finally passes away and no longer returns to endless rebirths; he does not need to admit a certain transcendental state, like Brahman, reachable after death. The image of the extinguished fire was applied in this context together with the image of a palm uprooted.

What is compared to a fire extinguished in the context of the final nirvana, nirvana without a remainder of clinging? As this discourse clearly shows, it is not nirvana itself but ‘the material form (rūpa) of the Tathāgata’ and so on. Although it is not seen in the above passage, the Buddha not only mentioned material form but also the rest of the four aggregates, as does the Chinese equivalent of this Pali sutta in the Saṃyukta-āgama.⁴²

What is extinguished in this final moment is, as expressed by Walpola Rahula, ‘the “being” composed of the Five Aggregates who realized Nirvāṇa’.⁴³ That is to say, what is extinguished like a fire in this final moment of nirvana cannot be nirvana itself but the five aggregates, conventionally designated as a person (puggala). Thus, the image of a fire extinguished here was used differently from nirvana with a remainder of clinging, where it is compared to the cessation of the triple fires of passion, hatred and delusion.⁴⁴

How do these five aggregates finally cease like a fire extinguished? The answer was given through the words of Vacchagotta: ‘This fire has blazed up through grass and sticks as fuel. Through using them up completely and through the non-supplying of anything else, it is said to have gone out with nothing to feed on’ (anāhāra nibbuto).

The Buddha was consistent in saying there are rebirths with fuel and not without fuel. In another dialogue between the Buddha and Vacchagotta in the Kutūhalaśālāsutta in the Saṃyuttanikāya, he explains this as follows:

You could doubt, Vaccha. You could be suspicious. Doubt has risen from the suspicious part. I indeed declare that there are rebirths with fuel but not without fuel. Just as, Vaccha, a fire is burning with fuel but not without fuel, I declare that there are rebirths with clinging but not without clinging. But, Gotama, in case that a fire has been carried a long way through the wind, what does the venerable Gotama consider as the fuel? In that case, I say the wind is fuel. For at that time the wind becomes its fuel. Again, Gotama, in case a being lays aside this body and then is born again in another body, what does the venerable Gotama consider as the fuel? In that case, I say thirst is the fuel. For at that time thirst becomes its fuel.⁴⁵

We can see the similar use of the image of a fire’s going out through lack of fuel elsewhere in the early canon.⁴⁶ Steven Collins has tried to establish that the standard image of nirvana, when it is used as a soteriological metaphor,
is not of wind or some other agent actively putting out a fire, but of a fire’s automatic going out through lack of fuel.\textsuperscript{47} For example, one passage in the \textit{Majjhimanikāya} reads as follows:

\begin{quote}
Just as an oil-lamp burns because of oil and wick, but when the oil and wick are exhausted, and no others are supplied, it goes out through lack of fuel, so the [enlightened] monk . . . knows that after the break-up of his body, when further life is exhausted, all feelings which are rejoiced in here will become cool.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

It is ‘lack of fuel’ that is the main cause of the extinction of a fire in this context. This point is further confirmed from the simile of a palm uprooted.\textsuperscript{49} When a palm is uprooted, it cannot sprout a new trunk to continue in the future.

In order not to reappear in the future, there should be no more causes whatsoever to produce a new fire or to sprout a new trunk. Thus, the image of the extinguished fire and of a palm uprooted in this context explains that it cannot reappear in the future owing to a lack of any cause whatsoever.

In my opinion, this could be the best explanation of how the \textit{Tathāgata} finally passes away and why he no longer returns to endless rebirths without admitting any transcendental state reachable after death. Although the Buddha was silent instead of replying to Vacchagotta’s question, his solution looks as if he is answering by asking in return, as in Phagguna’s case:\textsuperscript{50}

‘This was not a fit question. I am not saying that the \textit{Tathāgata} exists, does not exist, does and does not exist or neither exists nor does not exist after death. If I were saying so, the question would be a fit one. But I am not saying so. Although I am not saying so, however, if you asked me “Then, Blessed one, how does the \textit{Tathāgata} finally pass away”, this would be a fit question. And the fit answer to it is . . .’

Earlier in this chapter, I showed that there are two main concerns around this last issue of the unanswered questions: whether the Buddha accepts a certain state reachable by an enlightened one after death and on what grounds he wants this question to remain unanswered. For the first matter the Buddha seems to leave such a state, a kind of absolute, aside,\textsuperscript{51} since it is outside the range of his methodology, which explains things through the causal relationship between phenomenal \textit{dharmas}. For the second, I could say that his methodology, thinking according to the cause (\textit{yoniṃ manasikāra}), could help to account for his leaving questions on the state of the \textit{Tathāgata} after death unanswered.

\textit{The image of a fire in the early Upaniṣads}

How does the metaphor of a fire extinguished relate to the so-called common Indian view suggested by F. Otto Schrader above? Could the audience
of the Buddha have thought that an expiring flame does not really go out but goes back into a non-manifested state as latent heat?

In order to answer this question, we may need to look at some passages in the Upaniṣads suggested by F. Otto Schrader in his article ‘On the Problem of Nirvāṇa’. Apart from the passages mentioned above, one passage in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad seems to show where this Indian view could have originated. It reads as follows:

When a fire is contained within its womb (yoni), one cannot see its visible form and yet its essential character (liṅga) is not extinguished; one can grasp the fire once again from its womb by means of tinder. In just the same way, one can grasp both within the body by means of the syllable OM.

According to Olivelle, the image here is the production of fire by using a fire-drill. In the fire-drill method, a stick is rotated rapidly in a pit in a stationary piece of wood to produce a fire. The womb (yoni) here is the depression on the lower slab into which the drill is inserted and then twirled to produce fire.

Thus, the essential character (liṅga) of a fire is believed not to be extinguished but to be hidden in the depression on the lower slab. That is to say, this imperishable essential character could be the origin of the common Indian view in which people think of an extinct fire not as having gone to nothing but as having returned to its origin or pure state. However, there are some problems with accepting that this notion of the imperishable essential character (liṅga) behind a phenomenal fire is already presupposed in the metaphor of a fire extinguished in the context of nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu).

This essential character is something ready to produce a fire in the future when suitable conditions, such as tinder and friction, are given. As long as it can be made to reappear easily in the future it could not be the image of a fire extinguished in the context of nirvana without a remainder of clinging, where the most important message to be conveyed is that it will never reappear. Moreover, the notion of this imperishable essential character behind a phenomenal fire is absent from the description of the fire-drill in the one of the oldest Upaniṣads, the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, which probably predates Buddhism. It reads as follows: ‘Then he churned like this and, using his hands, produced fire from his mouth as from a vagina. As a result the inner sides of both these – the hands and the mouth – are without hair, for the inside of the vagina is without hair.’ ‘Churned like this’ is, according to Olivelle, a good example of the oral nature of the Upaniṣads. What it meant could be the reciter’s demonstration of the fire-drill by churning with his palms to make friction and then by blowing with his mouth to produce a fire blaze.
Unlike the passage in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad in which the idea of the imperishable character behind a phenomenal fire is expressed, this passage seems to focus on the creation of a fire, as the whole passage is dealing with Brahman’s super-creation. In fact, the production of fire by this fire-drill method has sexual connotations: the depression on the slab is often compared to a vagina, or a womb, and the churning stick to a penis. Although this reciter’s demonstration of the fire-drill began to be used as a metaphor in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, there seems to be no idea of an eternal character behind a phenomenal fire at this stage.

The notion of the imperishable essential character behind a phenomenal fire seems to be influenced by the notion of a self (ātman), which is all-pervading and is contained in our body. Since it is the main message of the Upaniṣads, the relationship between the phenomenal body and the self is expressed through various images, such as salt in brine. Later in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, fire in fire-drills was compared to oil in sesame seeds, butter in curds and water in a river-bed, all of which are used to explain the self (ātman) behind phenomena.

In my opinion, the Buddha probably knew this notion of a self (ātman) behind the Upaniṣadic image of a fire extinguished. Since accepting self was against one of the basic principles of his thought, the principle of no-self (anātman), the Buddha perhaps was precisely arguing against this kind of view by using it slightly differently.

By replying to Vacchagotta’s question, ‘This fire that has gone out in front of you, in which direction – to the east, west, north or south – has it gone from here?’, not only did the Buddha maintain his own way of thinking, thinking according to the cause (yoniso manasikāra), but he also reacted against this notion to show how irrelevant this view was. Assuming a state like a soul is outside the range of his methodology and the best thing we can do is just leave it aside.

The Theravāda exegetical position on nirvana

We have seen that the fire image when used for nirvana without a remainder of clinging was a fire’s going out through lack of fuel. Although most suttas explain this final stage in this way, there is one sutta in the Pārāyanavagga in the Suttanipāta that explains the extinction of a fire in a different way. There is no Chinese equivalent of this text, yet its antiquity cannot be doubted. Not only is it mentioned in the Vinaya but more than half the suttas in this text also have correspondents in Sanskrit and Prākrit. The Pārāyanavagga seems to have been known among Buddhists in mainland India not as one of the traditional sūtras, but as one of the collections of chanted verses.

According to Lamotte, ‘there are clearly ancient compositions of considerable poetic value which use stanzas as a means of expression. The Buddha was not responsible for composing them and they do not develop the
profound meaning associated with the doctrine of emptiness.\textsuperscript{63} The name Pārāyana, among other names, such as Dharmapada and Arthavarga, was nearly always found in lists of such works\textsuperscript{64} and this could be the reason why Northern Buddhists hesitated to form a definitive collection of this kind, as the Theravādin did in their Pali Khuddakanikāya. That is to say, its authenticity was not universally accepted among early Indian Buddhists.

\textit{The Pārāyana stanza in the Suttanipāta}

The text of the Pārāyanavagga was about a kind of question time offered by the Buddha to fifteen young brahmans who were pupils of a renowned Brahman, Bāvari. When Upasīva, one of the young Brahans, asked the Buddha about the last consciousness of an enlightened one at the final stage, the Buddha answered as follows: ’“Just as a flame is tossed about by the force of the wind, Upasīva”, said the blessed one, “goes out and no longer counts (as a flame), so a sage released from his mental body goes out and no longer counts (as a sage)”’.\textsuperscript{65} Steven Collins has translated ‘mental body’ (nāmakāya) as ‘name-and-form’ in his book \textit{Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities},\textsuperscript{66} so that it is synonymous with nāmarūpa, psycho-physical phenomena.\textsuperscript{67} He seems to translate it as a coordinate (dvandva) compound, thinking that, as long as it is the final release, it should be the release of an enlightened not only from his mental category but also from his physical category.

Within the early Pali canon, this compound was generally regarded as a descriptive (karmadhāraya) compound meaning ‘mental category’ as contrasted with ‘physical category’ (rūpakāya) in explaining the relationship between nāmarūpa and contact (phassa) in dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda).\textsuperscript{68} ‘Mental body’ here seems to mean the category of name (nāma). To be released from the category of name is the same as being released from the category of what is nameable. So this refers to the same as na upeti saṃkhāram: when a saint dies he cannot be referred to by language or conceptionalised. According to the Cullaniddesa, an enlightened one at this stage was already released from his physical category and about to be released from his mental category. The commentary explains this in the following way: ‘released from the category of name means the sage who, already, released from the category of form was eliminated by the abandonment through the opposite, through passing beyond and through repression’.\textsuperscript{69} That is to say, the Theravāda tradition regards this verse as explaining the final release of an enlightened one who has already been released from his physical aspect by meditation.\textsuperscript{70} This verse thus explains nirvana without a remainder of clinging through the image of a fire extinguished by the force of the wind.

However, this fire image could be quite different from the fire image used in the context of the last unanswered question. As we have seen above, a fire in that context goes out through lack of fuel.\textsuperscript{71} In order to explain nirvana
without a remainder of clinging (anupādisesānibbānadadhātu), it should explain why a fire will not reappear in the future, like the image of a fire’s going out through lack of fuel seen above.\textsuperscript{72} If a fire is extinguished by the force of the wind, it could easily reappear in the future when suitable conditions, such as tinder or friction, are given to the remaining fuel, such as oil or firewood. That is to say, this image could not be enough to explain why this particular extinction of a fire should be regarded as the final one.

Moreover, this image could fit the fire image in the later Upaniṣads, in which fire’s imperishable essential character (liṅga) is contained within its womb, ready to reappear by means of tinder.\textsuperscript{73} Earlier in this chapter, I showed that this could be the source of the common Indian view on the quenching of a fire: ‘an expiring flame does not really go out, but returns into the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire it had before its appearance as visible fire’.\textsuperscript{74}

Although this image, ‘a flame is tossed about by the force of the wind’, looks as if it is following the basic etymological meaning of nirvana, ‘going out’ (nir ṣvā (to blow)),\textsuperscript{75} its implication when used in the context of nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupādisesānibbānadadhātu) could be quite unexpected. Whether it is intended or not, this fire image in the Pārāyanavagga seems to open the way to interpreting the state of an enlightened one after death not simply as mere non-existence.

In fact, there is another clue in this verse that could be used to interpret this state as something existing separately (pāṭiyekka). Instead of saying there is no more rebirth in the future, as in the context of the last unanswered question, it says ‘a sage released from his mental body goes out (attha paleti) and no longer counts (as a sage)’.

According to PED, attha paleti is synonymous with attham gacchati, which usually appears as the noun attha gama in the early canon and as the participle attha gata in the Jātaka. Although the former, attha gama, generally meant ‘annihilation, disappearance’ as opposed to samudaya and synonymous with nirodha, the latter, attha gata, was used together with surīya to refer to the setting of the sun. As I show later in this chapter, this latter meaning seems to open the way to interpreting the state of an enlightened one after death as something existing separately (pāṭiyekka).

The Sanskrit equivalent of the word attha is asta, meaning ‘home, the western mountain (behind which the sun is supposed to set)’.\textsuperscript{76} Attha in this meaning is found not only in the Jātaka but also in the Aṅguttaranikāya\textsuperscript{77} together with the verb eti derived from the root ṣvī (to go). Thus, the literal meaning of attha paleti could be ‘going home to its resting place’. If we apply this meaning to this Pārāyana verse, it could mean that an enlightened person when finally released does not go to nothing but goes to somewhere, like home or the western mountain, as a kind of resting place.

Within the Theraṇāda exegetical tradition, this verse seems to be used for the two of the crucial interpretations that could almost determine what the
final nirvana may be. While the image of a fire tossed about by the force of the wind was used to interpret the verse believed to have been uttered by Anuruddha at the time of the Buddha’s final release at Kuśinagara, the literal meaning of *attha* _Nipaḷēti_ seems to be used as a secret weapon against disputants (*vitaṇḍavādins*) who insist that nirvana is mere destruction (*khayamatta*).\(^78\)

First, this verse was added at the end of the clarification in which Anuruddha’s verse was initially interpreted as the image of a fire’s going out through lack of fuel. The interpretation of Anuruddha’s verse became a kind of battleground between the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika on the ontological issue of nirvana.\(^79\) The Theravādins seem to step aside from this battle, yet they still needed to establish their own position on this issue.

According to the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* in the *Dīghanikāya*, Anuruddha uttered a verse when the Buddha was finally released at Kuśinagara:

> There was no sign of breathing in or out of such a one whose mind is stable. The sighted one who is free from desire and has attained peace has passed away. He with mind free from attachment bore his pain. His mind was liberated like the going out of a lamp.\(^80\)

The last stanza was among the most famous and was quoted, though slightly differently, even within two *suttas* in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*.\(^81\) Within the Theravāda exegetical tradition, this last stanza was interpreted expansively in the *Theragāthāṭṭhakathā*:

> ‘His mind was liberated like the going out of a lamp’: as a lamp or a lantern which is burning on account of oil and wick is extinguished when these give out, and when extinguished does not continue after going anywhere else but on the contrary disappears and becomes invisible, in that way the series of aggregates which continues by means of the operation of defilements is extinguished when they give out, and when extinguished does not continue after going anywhere else but on the contrary disappears and becomes invisible. Therefore it is said that ‘the steadfast are extinguished like this lamp’ and as a flame is tossed about by the force of the winds and the like.\(^82\)

Within the early canon, the cause of a fire’s extinction was not considered critically. This metaphor was not as specific, and in any language it is presumably possible to say that a fire is extinguished without specifying the cause. The word *nibbāna* is grammatically intransitive. It originally meant the going out of a smith’s fire when a smith stops blowing a wind on it. As suggested by Ēyāṇamoḷi, it was later extended to ‘extinction of a fire by any means’.\(^83\)
Apart from the above mentioned *Pārāyaṇa* stanza, this exegesis also quoted a stanza from the *Khuddakapāṭha* saying ‘the steadfast are extinguished like this lamp’. 84 Like Anuruddha’s stanza, it did not mention the cause of this lamp’s going out. It could go out either through the power of the wind, as in the *Pārāyaṇa* stanza, or through the lack of fuel such as oil and wick, as in the dialogue between the Buddha and Vacchagotta. Its commentary simply said, ‘It seems, one lamp among those that had been lit to honor the city deities on that occasion, actually went out, and it was with reference to that that he said “like this lamp”’.85

The *Pārāyaṇa* stanza was quoted, or could be added, at the end of the explanation in which the going out of a lamp was initially explained through lack of oil and wick. Whether a fire goes out through the power of the wind or through the lack of fuel, both cases can explain what happens when a fire goes out, yet their implications for ontology could be, as seen above,86 somewhat different.

If the Theravādins used this stanza, disregarding their dissimilarity, there must be a reason why they did so: they probably wanted to open the possibility of interpreting nirvana not as mere non-existence. This could be closely related to the doctrinal development of nirvana within the Theravāda *abhidhamma* together with an attempt to fill the silence of the Buddha.

**Nirvana and space in the Pali abhidhamma**

In Chapter 3, in the section titled ‘The Pali *abhidhamma* works’, we saw that the word nirvana was hardly mentioned in the Pali *abhidhamma* and the word unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*) was used instead. Within this *abhidhamma*, nirvana was established as the one and only unconditioned.87 It also is said to be the only thing that does not belong to the five aggregates (*skandha*),88 yet belongs both to the sphere of mental data base (*dhammāyatana*) in the twelve spheres classification89 and to the element of mental data base (*dhammadhātu*) in the eighteen elements classification.90

Apart from the number of unconditioned things,91 there was no conflict between the Theravāda *abhidhamma* and the Sarvāstivāda *abhidharma*.92 This unusual conformity suggests that the underlying position on nirvana may have been established at the early stage of the *abhidharma* literature before the separation of the Sarvāstivādins and the Vibhajjāvādins.93 In fact, it seems to be the starting point of the extensive and convoluted doctrinal developments on nirvana in Buddhist schools, since there clearly is a problem here.

This puzzling classification of nirvana seems to be established along with the two nirvana theory seen in Chapter 2. Nirvana cannot be classed under the five aggregates since nirvana without a remainder of clinging (*anupādisesanibbāna-dhātu*) was the cessation of the aggregates.94 By contrast, nirvana can be classified under mental data base (*dharma*) both in the
twelve spheres classification and in the eighteen elements classification, since it is an object of thought, or more explicitly a name given to the experience of being without the triple fires of passion, hatred and delusion that was realised by the Buddha at the moment of enlightenment; that is to say, at the moment of nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopādisesanībānadhātu).\footnote{95} Although this observation can make sense separately it cannot make sense when these three classifications are integrated.

Early Buddhists, especially the masters of the abhidharma, were busy at classifying psycho-physical phenomena. Classification requires a hierarchy of categories and the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve spheres (āyatana) and the eighteen elements (dhātu) are among the basics. Since these three were seen frequently in the early canon and sub-categories of them overlapped extensively, they started to explain how a certain sub-category in a category corresponds to sub-categories in other categories.

The mental data base (dhamma) in both the twelve spheres (āyatana) and the eighteen elements (dhātu), for example, corresponds to feeling (vedanā), apperception (saṃjñā) and volitional activities (saṃskāra) in the five aggregates. These correspondences are illustrated in Table 4.1.

The obvious dilemma that the masters of the abhidharma faced was placing nirvana without breaking the parallelism between sub-categories shown in Table 4.1. They could not simply place it under the mental data base (dhamma) in the twelve āyatana and the eighteen dhātu, since that would make nirvana automatically correspond to feeling (vedanā), apperception

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(sāmyjñā) or volitional activities (samskāra) in the five skandha. Placing it under the five skandhas also causes difficulty, because nirvana is said to be wholly different from them. In either case, there must be an explanation for how it is possible. This seems to cause tremendous difficulties among early Buddhist schools and each came up with its own solution to this dilemma.

The Sarvāstivādins, for example, seemed to stop puzzling over this predicament, and as a solution they introduced a new and more comprehensive category called pañcavastuka: the five categories of rūpa, mind (citta), mental states (caitta), states not associated with mind (cittaviprayukta), and the unconditioned (asamskṛta), which all together made up seventy-five dharma.

The Sautrāntikas, who stressed the value of the early canon (sūtra) against the abhidharma, were obviously against this new category of the Sarvāstivādins, since they could not find it in the early canon (sūtra). Vasubandhu seems to leave this dilemma unsolved in the first chapter of his Abhidharmakośa. He gave three explanations why unconditioned things should not be classed under the five aggregates, yet did not give an answer to the crucial question: how could unconditioned things form part of dhammāyatana and dharmadhātu while at the same time not forming part of the skandha.

Instead, he mentioned one opinion that insisted that unconditioned things could be neither āyatana nor dhātu from the simple reasoning: 'Just as the end of a pot is not a pot, so the end of aggregates is not aggregates'. By the same reasoning, the end of spheres is not a sphere and the end of elements is not an element. In fact this simile was initially presented by the Sarvāstivādins in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra as one of the ten reasons why unconditioned things cannot be under the skandhas. This suggests that there were discrepancies even among the Sarvāstivādins, despite their introduction of the new category. By mentioning this opinion Vasubandhu seemed to enjoy this internal conflict, since he, as a Sautrāntika, was not obliged to solve this predicament, a kind of side effect caused by abhidharma classification.

What was the Theravādins' solution to this dilemma? One simple answer could be their later introduction of a new category that consists of four fundamentals: rūpa, mental states (cetasika), mind (citta) and the unconditioned (asanākata), which all together are made up of eighty-two dhamma. But how did they deal with it earlier in the abhidhamma period?

L. S. Cousins in his article 'Nibbāna and Abhidhamma' has suggested that the unconditioned could be placed under nāma, a name given to the four mental aggregates. Based on the clarification given in the Dhammasaṅgani, the first book of the Pali abhidhamma, he explains this as follows:

The unconditioned is not matter, although like matter it is inactive from a kammic point of view and does not depend upon an object as a reference point. It is not any kind of mental event or activity nor is it the consciousness which is aware of mind and matter,
although it can be compared in certain respects with the mentality of the paths and fruits. The *Dhammasaṅgani* often classifies paths, fruits and the unconditioned together as ‘the unincluded (apariyāpanna)’, i.e. not included in the three levels. Later tradition refers to this as the nine supramundane dhammas. The unincluded consciousness, unincluded mental activities and unconditioned element are alike in that they are not able to associate with *upādāna* or with any kind of torment (*kilesa*), they are all ‘immeasurable’ and they are all ‘refined’. The unconditioned element is unique in that it is not classifiable in terms of arising or as past, present or future. Suggestively, however, it may be reckoned as *nāma* rather than *rūpa*.¹⁰²

The *Dhammasaṅgani* does explicitly class the unconditioned element along with the four mental aggregates under the name *nāma*.¹⁰³ Whether this was intended or not, it could have solved the above mentioned dilemma by putting it under one of the three traditional correspondents of the mental data base (*dhamma*): feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*) and volitional activities (*saṃskāra*). However, this is clearly contradicted by the *Dhammasaṅgani*’s earlier observation that the unconditioned element as ‘without condition’ (*appaccaya*) is different from the five aggregates as ‘with condition’ (*sappaccaya*).¹⁰⁴ This solution seems to be ignored in the third book of the Pali *abhidhamma*, the *Dhātukathā*, which explicitly and frequently points out that ‘the unconditioned is not classified as an aggregate’.¹⁰⁵

The contribution of the *Vibhaṅga*, the second book of the *abhidhamma*, on nirvana was, apart from its placement of the unconditioned under the sphere of mental data base (*dhammāyatana*)¹⁰⁶ and under the element of mental data base (*dhammadhātu*),¹⁰⁷ to establish a basic definition of nirvana: ‘What is the unconditioned element? It is the cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred and the cessation of delusion.’¹⁰⁸ This definition is not without textual evidence. It is quoted from a dialogue on nirvana between Sāriputta and the wanderer Jambukhādaka in the *Nibbānasutta*.¹⁰⁹ The same answer was also given to the question about being sainthood (*arahant*)¹¹⁰ in the next *sutta*. Although I discuss both *suttas* later in relation to the literal meaning of *attham paleti*, this latter *sutta* was actually used as textual evidence for the Theravādins against disputants (*vitaṭṭhavādins*) who insist that nirvana is mere destruction (*khayamatta*) on the basis of the *Nibbānasutta*’s dialogue.

This definition seems to reflect early Buddhist trends to put more weight on nirvana in this life than on nirvana after death. As I have shown in Chapter 2, nirvana is a name given to the experience of being without passion, hatred and delusion and is realised at the moment of enlightenment. For an enlightened one, his final liberation, *anupādisesa nibbānadhātu*, is already confirmed at the moment of the enlightenment, *saupādisesa nibbānadhātu*.¹¹¹

Since we can talk about it conceptually it can be included among the mental data (*dhamma*) in both categories. This definition and classification
of the unconditioned element given in the Vibhaṅga was so solid and widely accepted in their tradition that the Theravādins seem to have had no choice, unlike the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya seen above, but to find an explanation of how it could be classified as an āyatana and dhātu. We can find a small clue in the fifth book of this abhidhamma, the Kathāvatthu.

In Chapter 3 we saw that it is the ‘singularity’ of the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) that Pāli abhidhamma seeks to establish for nirvana. The Kathāvatthu was the book that established this aim and rejected plurality of the unconditioned. The decisive argument put forward from the Theravādins was as follows: ‘Of the two nibbānas, is one high one low, one excellent one deficient, one superior one inferior, and is there a boundary or difference, a line or interval between them?’ This argument is unique in the Theravāda. The question is: where does this unique argument come from? André Bareau pointed out that the Theravāda’s basic concept of nirvana came from the structure of space. He did not mean that this space was ‘smaller space’, or physical space, through which we arrive at the concept of nothingness. None the less, he insisted that the concept of space can be found at the bottom of the Buddhist concept of nirvana.

L. S. Cousins has suggested that the argument put forward in the Kathāvatthu is more subtle and is a reductio ad absurdum. Here is his reconstruction of the above passage with modern terminology:

The unconditioned is by definition not in any temporal or spatial relation to anything. Qualitatively it is superior to everything. If then two unconditioneds are posited, two refutations are possible. Firstly, either only one of them is superior to everything and the other inferior to that one or both are identical in quality. Obviously if one is superior then only that one is unconditioned. Secondly, for there to be two unconditioneds, there must be some dividing line or distinguishing feature. If there is, then neither would be unconditioned since such a division or dividing line would automatically bring both into the relative realm of the conditioned. Of course if there is no distinguishing feature and they are identical in quality, it is ridiculous to talk of two unconditioneds.

He is probably right to separate the concept of space from this argument. He, unlike André Bareau, may want to avoid one obvious outcome of this Kathāvatthu passage: that the Theravāda’s concept of nirvana was derived from the concept of space. This must be an unwanted result not only for him but also for the masters of the Pāli abhidhamma. They clearly rejected the view that space (ākāsa), among other things such as dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda), can be the unconditioned.

The space (ākāsa) rejected here is the space element (ākāsadhātu) seen in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi and the Vibhaṅga. According to the Dhammasaṅgaṇi,
the space element is *rūpa*; this is space, atmosphere, cavity, hole, aperture, gap and what is not touched by the four secondary elements (*asamphuttaṁ catūhi mahābhūtehi*).\(^{119}\) Later, in the *Vibhaṅga*, space was further classified into external (*bāhira*) and internal (*ajjhātika*), with the latter defined as *rūpa*, which is space, atmosphere, cavity, hole, aperture, gap and what is not touched by flesh or blood (*asamphuttaṁ maṁsalohitehi*), such as a cavity of the ear or the nose.\(^{120}\)

Although Karunadasa has made a comprehensive analysis of the Theravādins’ idea of matter, his remarks on space are not quite satisfactory. He has attempted to identify the above internal and external division of space with the Sarvāstivādins’ two kind of space: space (*ākāśa*) as an unconditioned thing and space element (*ākāsadhātu*) under form (*rūpa*).

He seems to ignore the fact that the former, *ākāśa*, for the Sarvāstivāda is a real existent (*dravya*) that by definition (*svabhāva*) does not obstruct (*anāvaraṇa*),\(^{121}\) while the latter, *ākāśadhātu*, is just a name given to cavity (*chidra*),\(^{122}\) which is visible matter since it is form (*rūpa*) next to other visible matter.\(^{123}\) For example, we can see space between walls because there are space elements at the end of, or next to, the visible secondary matter that forms each visible wall. One thing common to both is that it is something that occupies what we conventionally call space.

By contrast, the space element in the *Dhammasaṅgani* is by definition quite the opposite: it is what is not touched by the four secondary elements (*asamphuttaṁ catūhi mahābhūtehi*). Although the *Vibhaṅga* further divided it into internal and external, they are virtually the same. The internal is by definition absorbed into the external since flesh and blood are made up of secondary elements. In this respect, his assigning the space element, especially the internal space element, to the secondary elements (*upādārūpa*) was a bit far fetched. It was based on the fact that the space element is dependent on them. In fact, the opposite is also quite possible. Although space is classed under form (*rūpa*) owing to its close relationship with the element, it designates space where there is no secondary element at all. From another debate in the *Kathāvatthu*, we can actually see this is the case of the Theravādins.

As an argument against the idea that space is visible, the *Kathāvatthu* asks if it is possible to say that ‘with the visual faculty and space as condition, visual consciousness arises’; are there any *suttas* that have said that?\(^{124}\) What is meant here is that when we see space, what has arisen is not visual consciousness (*cakkhuviññāṇa*) but mental consciousness (*manoviññāṇa*).

Later in its commentary, this was reckoned as mind-door consciousness (*manodvāraviññāṇa*) under the influence of the Theravādin’s unique fourteen activities of consciousness (*viññāṇaṅkicca*).\(^{125}\) For example, when we see space between walls, our recognition of space results from the mental image of two walls we have just seen. Although there is no *rūpa* between the walls, the cavity between them can be known through the mind. This could further
suggest that, since our recognition of space is not visual consciousness but mental consciousness, there must be a corresponding idea of space inside our cognition, or more precisely in our mental data base. When we see sky, for example, we cannot see its infinity visually yet we can imagine it mentally. Thus, space for the Theravādins could have two distinctive characters: space from a physical perspective does not exist, yet can be classified as rūpa skandha as its initial cause; space from a mental perspective exists as the idea of space in the mental data base in both the twelve spheres (āyatana) and the eighteen elements (dhātu). While the former seems to be rejected as the unconditioned in the Kathāvatthu, the latter in an absolute sense seems to be utilised, together with the mystique tendency of the Theravādins, to establish their unique argument for the one and only unconditioned.

How does this double aspect of space (ākāśa) relate to the effort to solve the above mentioned abhidhamma predicament. This double aspect of space (ākāśa) seen in the Kathāvatthu could give us a vital clue to understand how the Theravādins avoid this predicament. Although nirvana for them was the one and only unconditioned, space was regarded as something very close to the unconditioned. In the Milindapañha, space was, together with nirvana, regarded as one of the two dhammas that are born neither of action (akammajā) nor of causes (ahetujā) nor of seasonal change (anutujā) and was described as infinite (ananto), boundless (appamāno) and immeasurable (aparimeyyo). In other words, space could at least have some qualities of the unconditioned.

Just as space is classed under rūpa skandha owing to its close relationship with them, whereas it actually designates the place where there is no secondary matter at all, so nirvana can be said to have a close relationship with the skandha, whereas it actually designates the state where there are no skandha at all. Our recognition of both space and nirvana comes inwardly from their elements in the dharmāyatana and the dharmadātu. This could be one of the reasons why the mental aspect of space underlies the Theravādins’ unique argument concerning nirvana.

**Influence of the Buddhist theory of momentariness**

While the Theravādins maintained this unique position on the unconditioned, Northern Buddhists accepted a number of dhammas as unconditioned things that include their equivalent of nirvana: extinction through knowledge (pratisamīkkhyānirodha). Apart from the Theravādins, the Vātsiputrīyas are the only school that insisted that nirvana was the one and only unconditioned. Most schools accepted this new concept and according to the Mahāvibhāyāsastra the Vibhajyavādins, presumably the northern counterparts of the southern Theravādins, were one of them.

It is not clear whether the Vibhajyavāda mentioned in the Chinese abhidharma traditions is the same school as the Theravāda, yet it is still
possible to say that all Theravādins are Vibhajyavādins but not necessarily vice versa. The Vibhajyavādins at least share the same ideology against the Sarvāstivādins who insisted on the existence of all dhammas in the three time periods. As their name suggests, they made a distinction between dhammas and then said that some exist while some do not. The best description to explain their position is in the Abhidharmakośabhaṣya:

Those who affirm the existence of past, future and present are regarded as the Sarvāstivādins. Those who affirm the existence of the present and a part of the past, namely the existence of action that has not given forth its result, and the non-existence of the future and a part of the past, namely the non-existence of action that has given forth its result, are regarded as the Vibhajyavādin.134

This difference, according to the Theravāda traditions, could have played a major role in the great separation during the period of King Ashoka.135 For the Vibhajyavādin all dhammas will eventually pass into non-existence, since existing past action, when it has produced its result, will become non-existent. That is to say, there is no need for nirvana to exist in the three time periods to work as a deterrent, or an antidote (pratipakṣa), as for the Sarvāstivādins seen above.136

The name Vibhajyavādins (分別論者) in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, the extensive commentary on the last book of the Chinese abhidharma, the Jñānaprasthāna, is a bit obscure. It is not yet clear whether this name refers to a historical school or a generic term for their methodology. The latter possibility seems to be unlikely since a different term was used in this treatise: an analytic interpretation (分別說). In the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, detailed, separate, analytic, progressive methodologies were sometimes contrasted with brief, comprehensive, non-analytic, simultaneous methodologies.137

What cannot be ignored is the fact that the fen-bie-lun-zhe (分別論者), which is the Chinese word for the Vibhajyavādins, and was used frequently in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, was actually different form the translation of the word Vibhajyavādin (分別說部, fen-bie-shuo-bu) appearing in Xuan-zang’s translation of the Abhidharmakośabhaṣya. He translated both treatises and the Chinese word applied to the Vibhajyavādin in the Abhidharmakośabhaṣya was not the fen-bie-lun-zhe but the fen-bie-shuo-bu.138

In fact, the latter term appeared only once in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, where the nature of the three karmas, bodily, verbal and conscious actions, is discussed.139 While the Sautrāntikas insisted that they are by nature intention (cetanā), the Vibhajyavādin maintained that the nature of karmas is passion, hatred and delusion. This seems to suggest that the term Vibhajyavādin could be used in a narrow sense to refer to an early historical school who contested against the Sarvāstivādins, while the term could be used in a broad sense to refer to schools including the Vibhajyavādin that are
against the existence of all dharmas in the three time periods through their distinctive methodology, especially that of making distinctions between dharmas. This could be the reason why doctrines attributed to the Vibhajyavādins are agreed to by many ancient schools, such as the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Mahīśāsakas, yet none of them agree with the Sarvāstivādins.

The doctrines attributed to the Vibhajyavādins, especially concerning the unconditioned things, overlapped extensively with the Mahāsāṃghika list of unconditioned things. They accepted dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda),¹⁴¹ the way (mārga),¹⁴² and the characteristic of conditioned things (svalakṣaṇa),¹⁴³ together with the extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyānirodha) and extinction without knowledge (apratisamkhyānirodha).¹⁴⁴

In the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, the difference between the Sarvāstivādins, the Sautrāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins on the last three dharmas was explained as follows:¹⁴⁵

This is in order to refute other systems and to clarify the correct opinion [of the Vaibhāṣikas]. In other words, one wrong view, that of the Dārṣṭāntikas, holds that extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyānirodha), extinction without knowledge (apratisamkhyānirodha), and extinction as impermanence (anityatānirodha)¹⁴⁶ are not real existents (dravya). In order to refute this opinion the author makes clear that all three extinctions are real existents. Another wrong view, that of the Vibhajyavādins, holds that all three extinctions are the unconditioned (asamskṛta). In order to refute this opinion the author makes clear that while the first two are unconditioned things (asamskṛta), the last, extinction as impermanence, is a conditioned thing (samskṛta).

Here, the Vaibhāṣika was the name given to a group of the Sarvāstivādins who were involved in composing and maintaining this vast treatise, the Mahāvibhāṣāstra. The difference between the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas according to the Chinese tradition was chronological, the earlier term Dārṣṭāntikas being replaced by the term Sautrāntikas in the later period.¹⁴⁷ This view is, however, contested by the view that they simply represent different perspectives from which the same group can be seen: the Dārṣṭāntikas has a negative connotation and is used by opponents, such as the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins, to suggest the group’s reliance upon the invalid authority of conventional examples; the term Sautrāntikas has a positive connotation and is used by the group itself to refer to its own views.¹⁴⁸

What could be the reason why many Buddhist schools accepted a new concept, extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyānirodha)? The doctrinal development of the Buddhist theory of momentariness seems to be the reason
for this *abhidharmic* introduction of it among Northern Buddhists. This new development seems to cause the later conceptual change of the word *nirodha* (extinction). We need to see briefly how this *abhidharmic* system, which became dominant among Northern Buddhist schools, works in the Sarvāstivāda.

The Sarvāstivādins on the one hand insist on the existence of all dharmas in the three time periods, while on the other hand they accept the momentariness of conditioned dharmas. What changes momentarily is not the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of a dharma but its activities – arising, duration, decay and ceasing – through its inherent characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) of impermanence. As long as a conditioned dharma is connected to the series of aggregates through an acquisition (*prāpti*), it renews its four activities until the connection is finally cut. This continual ceasing is one of four characteristics of impermanent conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) dharmas and is technically called extinction as impermanence (*anityatāniruddha*).

Whereas for the Sautrāntikas all three extinctions are not real existents, for the Vibhajyavādins they are unconditioned things. Later in the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*, the Vibhajyavādins insisted that if the nature of four characteristics is a conditioned thing, it could be too weak to continue its four activities. For the Sarvāstivādins, this repeated extinction was different from the two unconditioned extinctions: extinction without knowledge (*apratisamkhyāniruddha*) and extinction through knowledge (*pratisamkhya nirdhāna*). For them the former is the perpetual non-existence of the future dharmas within a series of aggregates, while the latter is the perpetual separation of an impure dharma from a series of aggregates through the antidote, ‘acquisition of disjunction’ (*visāmyogaprāpti*).

This latter extinction is the Sarvāstivādins’ equivalent of nirvana and is paradoxically not an eventual extinction or non-existence of a dharma but an acquisition of a dharma, technically ‘the acquisition of disjunction’ (*visāmyogaprāpti*). Since all dharmas exist for the three time periods, this dharma that arises from knowledge (*pratisamkhya*) works as an antidote (*pratipakṣa*) to prevent henceforward any connection between defilement and this series.

Thus, the Sarvāstivādins should explain how extinction could in reality have the opposite meaning. The Sarvāstivādins seem to use the genitive case to solve this paradox. The position of the Sarvāstivāda was explained in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* in the following way: “The cessation (niruddha) which is acquired through the cutting of the acquisition of a defilement, even in another existence, is designated as “of that [thing]”.” We can see a similar explanation of the Sarvāstivādins in the *Nyāyāṇāsārastra* and in the *Prasannapadā*. What has been explained here is that niruddha is only a name given to a dharma that consists of the non-existence (*abhāva*) of something. As long as it is the final extinction of a dharma, it should mean that
the end of its activities – arising, duration, decay and ceasing – within its series. That is to say, it could be achieved not by its inherent continuous extinction but by non-arising or non-existence of that dharma within its series.

We can see almost the same approach to the word nirodha in one of the best known treatises of the Theravādins, the Visuddhimagga: ‘But it is because the kind of destruction called “cessation consisting in non-arising” [that is, nibbāna] serves figuratively speaking as decisive support [for the path] that [nibbāna] is called “destruction” as a metaphor for it.’ One could blame Buddhaghosa, a northerner, for introducing this into the Theravāda. In fact, the expression ‘cessation consisting in non-arising’ (anuppattinirodha) was not seen earlier in the Theravāda tradition and is confined to quite late materials. This could suggest that the Theravādins accepted the Buddhist theory of momentariness in a fully developed form later than the Northern Buddhist schools.

Under the influence of the Buddhist theory of momentariness, the Theravāda concept of nirvana seems to have changed: it is the cessation consisting in non-arising and exists separately (pāṭiyekka) from the mere destruction of passion, hatred and delusion. Although nirvana for them is the one and only unconditioned, it is explained through the two different concepts of nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopādisesanībhāna) and nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupādisesanībhāna), with different definitions: the cessation of defilements for the former and the cessation of the aggregates for the latter. The Theravādins need to explain how both nirvana images could be united as one. This problem had not been solved even at the time of Buddhaghosa.

Apart from the Kathāvatthu, the presentation of doctrines in the form of debates between Buddhist schools is rare in the Theravāda tradition. In the Visuddhimagga, problems concerning nirvana were presented exclusively in the form of debates. The following occurs in the middle of the argument:

[Q.3.] Then is the absence of present [aggregates] as well nibbana?
[A.] That is not so. Because their absence is an impossibility, since if they are absent their non-presence follows. [Besides if nibbana were absence of present aggregates too,] that would entail the fault of excluding the arising of the nibbana element with the result of past clinging left (sopādisesanībhānadhātu), at the path moment, which has present aggregates as its support. [Q.4.] Then will there be no fault if it is non presence of defilements [that is nibbana]? [A.] That is not so. Because it would then follow that the noble path was meaningless. For if it were so, then, since defilements [can be] non-existent also before the moment of the noble path, it follows that the noble path would be meaningless.
If nirvana is the absence of the present, past and future aggregates as in 5 the case of nirvana after death, nirvana with a remainder of clinging (saupādisesanibbāna) is not possible since it has present aggregates as its support; whereas if nirvana is the absence of defilements as in the case of nirvana at enlightenment, not only is the noble path futile but also it excludes nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupādisesanibbāna). The Therāvadins’ answer seems to be that nirvana exists separately (pāṭiyekka) from both cessations.

In the Sammohavinodanī, the commentary on the Vibhaṅga, the Therāvadin argument was presented in the form of debates between the Therāvadin and a disputant (vitaṇḍavādin) who insists that nirvana is mere destruction (khayamatta). The argument for the latter was presented in the following way:

But a disputant (vitaṇḍavādin) has said: ‘There isn’t anything existing separately called nibbāna. Nibbāna is just the cessation of the defilements.’ And when he is asked to quote a sutta, he quotes the Jambukhādaka-sutta: ‘It is said, o friend Sāriputta, nibbāna, nibbāna. Then what is indeed, o friend, nibbāna? The cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, and the cessation of delusion, O friend, that is indeed called nibbāna’, and says ‘Through this sutta it should be understood that there isn’t anything existing separately called nibbāna. Nibbāna is just the cessation of the defilements.’

The Theravādins’ answer to this disputant (vitaṇḍavādin) is that nirvana is defined as the cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred and the cessation in the Vibhaṅga, not because it is mere destruction but because ‘passion etc. cease on coming to this (tam āgamma) [nibbāna]’. Later in the text, the disputant (vitaṇḍavādin) came back to this point and said: ‘You say “on coming to, on coming to”. From where have you got this “on coming to”?’ The passage given by the Therāvadin is ‘thus ignorance and craving, on coming to this, are destroyed in this, are abolished in this, nor do they do anything anywhere’. A key phrase, ‘on coming to this’ (tam āgamma), was also applied in the Visuddhimagga: ‘because craving fades away and ceases on coming to that, it is therefore called “fading away” and “cessation”’. However, neither a sutta corresponding to this passage nor the phrase ‘on coming to this’ (tam āgamma) can be found within the Theravādins’ four nikāyas. Where could this answer of the Sammohavinodanī originate from? In my opinion, it could have originated from the literal meaning of attham paleti seen in the above mentioned Pārāyana stanza. The use of the locative case in this quoted sutta seems to suggest that it could have been influenced by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika’s use of the locative case in explaining the
existence of nirvana: ‘because it does not appear in that, it [nirvana] is non-appearance’.

As explained earlier, attha paleti in the Pārīyāna stanza is synonymous with attha gacchati or atthaṅgama. Although these words usually refer to ‘annihilation, disappearance’ as opposed to samudaya and synonymous with cessation (nirodha), they can also refer to the setting of the sun in the sense that it goes to asta, the Sanskrit equivalent of the Pali attha, meaning ‘home, the western mountain behind which the sun is supposed to set’.

If this literal interpretation of these words is applied to the Pārīyāna stanza, it could further mean that the Tathāgata after death does not go to nothing but goes to somewhere, like home or the western mountain, as a kind of resting place. Although it is impossible to explain grammatically how the phrase tam āgamma derived from attha paleti or atthaṅ gacchati, its literal meaning fits perfectly with the Theravādins’ later position on nirvana: it is the cessation consisting in non-arising and exists separately (pāṭiyekka) from the mere destruction of passion, hatred and delusion.

In other words, the underlying idea behind the phrase ‘on coming to this’ (tam āgamma) in the Sammohavinodani could have been inspired by the literal meaning of attha paleti, which was applied to nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupādisesanībbāna) in the Pārīyāna stanza.
In the previous chapter, we saw that the nirvana concept found in the later Theravāda exegeses was of cessation consisting in non-arising and of existing separately (pāṭiyekka) from the mere destruction of passion, hatred and delusion. Apart from numbers, their concept seems to come close to that of the Sarvāstivādins that had been established from their unique position: insisting on the existence of all dharmas in the three time periods while accepting the momentariness of conditioned dharmas.¹ As seen briefly in Chapter 3, under ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’, their equivalent of nirvana was called extinction through knowledge (pratīṣṭhikhyādabha), which was a single perpetual separation of an impure dharma from a series of aggregates through the antidote, ‘acquisition of disjunction’ (visaṃyogaprāpti).

This positive interpretation of nirvana could not satisfy the Sautrāntikas because nirvana for them was not a real existent but a mere designation (prajñaptisa)² and was non-existence succeeding existence (paścādbhava).³ Because the Sautrāntikas were critics of the Sarvāstivādins, how to interpret nirvana became a subject of a debate between them. We can see such a debate in the Abhidharmakoṣa,⁴ in the Nyāyānusārasastra⁵ and even in the Prasannapadā, the commentary on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.⁶ The interpretation of Anuruddha’s simile mentioned in Chapter 4 seems to be at the centre of the disputes in all three treatises.

In this chapter, I discuss ontological issues of nirvana, especially between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas, by exploring the later development of the two nirvana theory seen in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, by checking the Sautrāntika’s concept of nirvana that appears in the Abhidharmakośabhaṣya and by dealing with ontological issues surrounding Anuruddha’s simile in the above mentioned three treatises.

The development of the two nirvana theory in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra

According to the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, one of the reasons why nirvana with and without a remainder of clinging was explained in the Jñānaprasthāna
was that there was no complete explanation of the two nirvanas in the early canon (sūtras) apart from simply mentioning their names: nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhīṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu) and nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhīṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu). The exegesis of the Jñānaprasṭhāna starts its explanation of the two nirvana theory as follows: 7

Although the early canon (sūtras) says that there are two nirvana elements: nirvana with a remainder of clinging and nirvana without a remainder of clinging, it does not fully explain their meaning. Thus, ‘what is nirvana with a remainder of clinging?’ and ‘what is nirvana without a remainder of clinging?’ were fundamental questions for that treatise. 8 Since they are not clarified [in the early canon], they are explained [in the Jñānaprasṭhāna].

There are two things we cannot ignore in this explanation. First, this seems to suggest that the above mentioned sūtra in the Chinese Ekottara-āgama 9 explaining the two nirvana theory differently from the Itivuttaka 10 was neither accepted as an authority nor included within the early canon of the Sarvāstivādins. That is to say, we could say from this passage that that problematic sūtra in the Chinese Ekottara-āgama was presumably not part of the Sarvāstivādin sūtra collections, even though the whole collection of their early āgama has not survived.

Second, despite the detailed explanation of the two nirvanas in the Itivuttaka, that clarification was not accepted as authoritative by the Sarvāstivādins. As seen in Chapter 3, 11 the authenticity of the Pali Khuddakanikāya was not universally accepted among early Indian Buddhists; and the Itivuttaka was translated into Chinese only by Xuan-zang in the late seventh century CE. 12 The Itivuttaka may have been known to the northern Buddhists not as a sūtra but as the chanted verses and the author of the Jñānaprasṭhāna probably knew this particular chanted verse since there was a strong internal relationship between them. 13

In fact, the explanation of the two nirvanas in the Jñānaprasṭhāna does not seem to be linked closely to the dharma theory of the Sarvāstivāda in its fully developed form. For example, it prefers vitality (āyus), which can easily be found in the early canon, to the vital organ (jīvetendra), which is an abhidharmic word, especially for the Sarvāstivādins, one of the fourteen dharmas not associated with the mind (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra). Moreover, there was no clear clarification of the relationship between two nirvanas and extinction through knowledge (pratisaṃkhyānirūḍha), the Sarvāstivāda equivalent of nirvana, in its explanation. Thus, the Mahāvibhāṣāstra was interpreting the two nirvana theory in the Jñānaprasṭhāna in accordance with the fully developed form of their dharma theory.
What was the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas’ interpretation for ‘with a remainder of clinging’ (saupadhisēṣa)? While it was vitality (āyu) alone in the Jñānaprasthāna,14 it was both life faculty (jīvitendriya) and homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga)15 in the Mahāvibhāṣāsāstra.17

When saying vitality, the life faculty (jīvitendriya) is meant here. Question: why is homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) not mentioned [in the Jñānaprasthāna]? Answer: the author intended to do so and so on. Alternatively, it is not mentioned as that meaning is surely understood from the word with a remainder (sa-śeṣa). Alternatively, both the life faculty and homogeneous character of the group are the result of action that projects existence (āksepakakarman).18 As the vital organ is exclusively maturation (vipāka), it19 is mentioned alone here [in the Jñānaprasthāna].

One of the obvious steps forward for the Sarvāstivāda abhidharmic systematisation was to interpret vitality (āyu) as life faculty (jīvitendriya), since it was defined as ‘vitality (āyu) of the three spheres of existence’ in the Abhidhamakośabhāṣya.20 This interpretation could not be an isolated phenomenon within the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas in Northern India, since life faculty was appeared in the context of the two nirvana theory in the Pali Peṭakopadesa, which is said to date from around first century CE somewhere in South India.21 However, adding homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) along with life faculty may have been an isolated phenomenon within the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika tradition, and this seems to show some characteristics of their abhidharmic systematisation.

Apart from the definition given above, life faculty (jīvitendriya) was said, like vitality (āyu), to support warmth (usmā) and consciousness (vijñāna) according to the Abhidhamakośabhāṣya.22 This function seems to have originated directly from the Phenāsutta stanza23 together with the dialogue between Mahākottitha and Sāriputta in the Mahāvedallasutta in the Majjhimanikāya24 mentioned in Chapter 3.25 In this dialogue, vitality was said not only to be interdependent with warmth but also to stabilise the five faculties. This role of supporting the five faculties (indriya) in the early canon seems to influence the later expansion of the life faculty’s function in the Mahāvibhāṣāsāstra.

Life faculty (jīvitindriya) first appeared in the Pali sutta grouped with two controlling faculties of masculinity (purisindriya) and femininity (itthindriya).26 These three are included in the well known set of twenty-two controlling faculties in both Northern and Southern Buddhist traditions.27 Within early sūtras in the Northern tradition, the character and function of life faculty (jīvitindriya) is not clearly explained, while its reference to death and the termination of a given life was frequently noticed.28 This situation was hardly changed when the life faculty (jīvitindriya) was listed and explained as one
of the twenty-two controlling faculties in the Dharmaskandhapādaśāstra, one of the early abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivādins. Life faculty (jīvitindriya) here was said to work as a faculty that persists, continues, maintains, animates and operates what we called sentient beings.

The attempt to link life faculty (jīvitindriya) with vitality (āyu) first appeared in the Prakaraṇapādaśāstra, one of the middle-period abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivādins. Although the same definition was given in the Abhidharmakośabhaṣya, here it was not listed as one of the twenty-two controlling faculties (indriyas) but as one of the fourteen dharmas not associated with the mind (cittaviprayuktasamkāra).

Finally, in the Mahāvibhaṣaśāstra this same definition, ‘vitality (āyu) of the three spheres of existence’, was given to the life faculty listed both as one of the fourteen dharmas not associated with the mind (cittaviprayuktasamkāra) and as one of the twenty-two controlling faculties (indriyas). That is to say, unifying the life faculty with vitality was completed in the Mahāvibhaṣaśāstra, and the character and function of the life faculty thus came from the character and function of vitality (āyu).

The Mahāvibhaṣaśāstra offered two explanations of the character and function of the life faculty (jīvitendriya). While the first was presented as a formal opinion of this treatise, the second appeared as an alternative. In the first case, it was said to have predominating power over our notion of possessing controlling faculties (indriya) and to have predominating power to cause other controlling faculties not to be terminated. Here the function of the life faculty (jīvitindriya) was restricted to the other twenty-one controlling faculties and this function seems to have originated from the role of vitality (āyu) as support for the five faculties (indriyas) in the above mentioned dialogue between Mahākoṭṭhita and Sāriputta.

In the second opinion, the life faculty (jīvitendriya) was said to have predominating power to form a connection to the homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga), supporting the homogeneous character of the group, protecting and nourishing the homogeneous character of the group and causing the homogeneous character of the group not to be terminated. Here the function of the life faculty was limited to the homogeneous character of the group, which was not part of the twenty-two controlling faculties (indriyas) but part of the fourteen dharmas not associated with the mind (cittaviprayuktasamkāra). In fact, this alternative opinion became a formal explanation of the life faculty (jīvitendriya) listed as one of the twenty-two controlling faculties (indriyas) in the Abhidharmakośabhaṣya.

This seems to suggest that the role of the life faculty (jīvitendriya) was in the process of change in the Mahāvibhaṣaśāstra, from the earlier explanation oriented to controlling faculties (indriyas) to the later explanation oriented to dharmas not associated with mind (cittaviprayuktasamkāra). According to the second opinion, the life faculty (jīvitendriya) without the
homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) would be useless and this could be the reason why the relationship between them was sometimes said to be inseparable. Despite three reasons given above in the text, this shift of the life faculty’s role seems to be the real reason behind adding homogeneous character of the group in the interpretation of ‘with a remainder of clinging’ (saupadhiṣeṣa) in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra. That is to say, the inclusion of homogeneous character in the two nirvana theory was mainly responsible for the Sarvāstivādins’ abhidharmic systematisation, especially for the shift of the life faculty’s function along with their doctrinal development of the fourteen dharmas not associated with the mind (cittaviprayuktasamāskāra).

How did this change affect the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas’ interpretation of ‘with a remainder of clinging’ (saupadhiṣeṣa)? It seems to let them to interpret clinging (upadhi) differently from the conventional meaning of the word. In the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, clinging (upadhi) is glossed as follows:39

When saying ‘as there still is a remainder of clinging’, clinging is of two kinds: clinging as defilement (kleśopadhi) and clinging as birth body (janmakāyopadhi). An arahant no longer has the first, the clinging as defilement, but he still has the second, the clinging as birth body. Alternatively, clinging is of two kinds: defiled (kliṣṭa) clinging and undefiled clinging. An arahant no longer has the first; while he still has the second.40

Here the word clinging refers to two different things: defilement and birth body (janmakāya). In ‘Etymology of upādi’ in Chapter 2, I focused on the double aspect of the word upādi: subjective and objective. In the subjective sense, it denotes defilements in general as the main cause of continuous rebirth and is used in the context of the four noble persons; in the objective sense, it means the ‘fuel’ of a fire underlining ‘the five aggregates’ in a metaphorical structure and is used in the context of nirvana. At this late stage, when the Mahāvibhāṣāstra was composed, its objective meaning seems to have been long forgotten. This seems to have caused one serious problem to later masters of the abhidharma.

Two nirvanas, nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiṣeṣanirvān-adhātu) and nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhiṣeṣanirvān-adhātu), could not be differentiated simply by the existence of defilement, the subjective aspect of the word clinging (upadhi), since both nirvanas no longer had any defilement left. Although what clinging (upadhi) refers to is supposed to make a difference, ‘defilement’, the widely circulated meaning of the word upadhi at that time, could not differentiate between the two nirvanas. In the first opinion, the difference between the two was made not by the existence of ‘defilement’ but by the existence of ‘birth body’ (janmakāya). In
my opinion, this new exegesis only became possible through the inclusion of ‘homogeneous character of the group’ in the content of ‘with a remainder of clinging’ (saupadhiśeṣa).

In the early abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivādin, the function of homogeneous character of the group was linked exclusively to the rebirth process and was described as a dharma that determines the specific rebirth state of sentient beings. Although homogeneous character (sabhāgata) was described later in the second chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya as an abstract principle of universality or homogeneity by which entities are recognized as members of the same category or class, its original usage was retained in the fourth chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in the discussion of whether one action (karma) projects one birth or many births. The formal answer for the Sarvāstivādin was ‘one [action] projects one birth’ (ekam janmākṣipatyekam) and ‘birth’ here was glossed as the homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga).

We can trace this back to the lengthy discussion in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra of whether an action (karma) of a moment projects one or many homogeneous characters of the group. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika answer was that ‘an action (karma) of a moment projects only one homogeneous character of the group’. If an action can project many homogeneous characters of the group, one should admit that the same action (karma) could result in both birth as a human being and birth in hell and the same maturation (vipāka) could lead to both birth as a human being and birth in hell. If many actions can together project one homogeneous character of the group, the projection of existence would take place in parts, since some actions lead to birth in hell while some actions lead to birth as a human being.

We can see the same position taken in the third option for the inclusion of homogeneous character of the group in the context of ‘with a remainder of clinging’: ‘both the life faculty and the homogeneous character of the group are the result of an action that projects existence (ākṣepakakarman)’. This identification of birth (janman) with homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) could allow the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas to distinguish nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu) from nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu) by the word ‘birth body’ (janmakāya).

In ‘The Sarvāstivāda interpretation in the Jñānaprasthāna’ in Chapter 3, I showed that the Jñānaprasthāna explanation of the two nirvanas could be half way between the old clarification by the existence of the five faculties (pañcindriyāni) in the Itivuttaka and this new distinction by the existence of vitality (āyu) in the later systematisation. Later in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, the author went a step further to remove all remaining traces of the old Itivuttaka explanation.

The Mahāvibhāṣāstra presented an anonymous opinion of the two nirvana theory at the end of both exegeses on nirvana with and without
remainder of clinging. It was based on an unidentified sūtra saying ‘As body (kāya), faculty (indriya) and intellect (buddhi) are not yet extinct, it is called nirvana element with a remainder of clinging’. According to the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, these three were already mentioned in the Jñānaprasthāna with different names: body (kāya) refers to primary elements and secondary matter, faculty (indriya) refers to the five faculties and intellect (buddhi) refers to the mental series. Nirvana with and without a remainder of clinging was thus explained here as follows:

The complete cessation of all fetters (saṃyojana) is obtained while the series of body, faculty and intellect are not yet extinct. That is why it is called nirvana with a remainder of clinging.

The complete cessation of all fetters (saṃyojana) is obtained when the series of body, faculty and intellect, or the material body, the mind and mental states, have already become extinct. That is why it is called nirvana element without a remainder of clinging.

In this explanation, what was not extinct was not vitality (āyu), or technically life faculty (jīvitendriya) and the homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga), but the material body, the five faculties and mental series, which together can explain the continuation of the cognitive process. In this respect, this explanation comes close to the old one in the Itivuttaka. Although the Mahāvibhāṣāstra did not mention whose opinion it was, this clarification seems to be very close to the position taken by the Theravādins and, possibly, by their northern equivalent, roughly called the Vibhajyavādins.

The Mahāvibhāṣāstra criticises this view in an abhidharmic way. It asks, ‘Can anyone admit that a saint (arahant) resides neither in nirvana with a remainder of clinging nor in nirvana without a remainder of clinging?’ and answers, ‘It is impossible by reasoning, yet it is possible from the definitions given here’. According to this view, it is nirvana with a remainder of clinging when all three things, body (kāya), faculty (indriya) and intellect (buddhi), are present, whereas it is nirvana without a remainder of clinging when one of three things is not present. There could be three possible cases that cannot be determined from this definition of whether a saint is in nirvana with a remainder of clinging or in nirvana without a remainder of clinging:

[1] A saint who is born in the world of formlessness. He does not reside in nirvana with a remainder of clinging, since he cannot have a material body. As his mind is active, he does not reside in nirvana without a remainder of clinging. [2] A saint who is born in the world of form and has entered the absorption of extinction (nīrodhasamāpatti). He does not reside in nirvana with a remainder of clinging.
of clinging since his mind is not active. As he has a material body, he does not reside in nirvana without a remainder of clinging. [3] A saint who is born in the world of desire but lacks his faculty. He does not reside in nirvana with a remainder of clinging, since he cannot have the five faculties. As he has a material body he does not reside in nirvana without a remainder of clinging. 

This kind of definitional conflict frequently occurs in the abhidharma works and it sometimes becomes a kind of driving force for complex doctrinal development. A similar problem occurs when the support for the mental series is discussed. Due to the definition of the world of formlessness (ārūpyadhātu), body (kāya), which was said to be the support of the mental series (cittasamātāna) of living beings in the world of form, cannot exist in the world of formlessness. On this basis, the Sarvāstivādins insisted that the support of living beings in the world of formlessness was life faculty (jīvindriya), homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) and similar kinds of dharmas not associated with the mind (cittavipryuktasaṃskāra).

We do not know whether the definitional problem was taken seriously by other Buddhist schools or not, yet this seems to be enough for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas to dismiss the old explanation by the five faculties and to give their total support to the new explanation by the existence of vitality (āyu). The author of the Mahāvibhāṣāstra suggested his own opinion that whether nirvana was with or without a remainder of clinging was determined solely by the existence of vitality (āyu):

There is an opinion. The text should be written as follows: what is nirvana with a remainder of clinging? The complete cessation of all fetters (samyojana) is obtained (prāpta), possessed (pratilabdha), touched (sprṣṭa), and realised (sāksātkṛta) by an arahant while his vitality (āyas) alone exists. What is nirvana without a remainder of clinging? An arahant whose vitality has already come to an end destroys all fetters completely.

Although it was not presented as a formal opinion of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, it seems to be presented as a solution to the above mentioned definitional problem. While there still was some trace of the Itivuttaka clarification left in the Jānaprasthāna explanation of the two nirvana theory, there was no trace left in this newly proposed solution.

Despite the above modification, this newly proposed opinion continued to apply such terms as ‘obtained’ (prāpta) and ‘possessed’ (pratilabdha) only to nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhīṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu), as in the case of the Jānaprasthāna. The question arose why these terms were not applied to nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhīṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu). The following two answers were given in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra:
‘obtained and so on’ is used with reference to present acquisition (prāpti). It is not used when present acquisition ceases. Alternatively, ‘obtained and so on’ is conventionally designated (prajñapti) in respect of a person (pudgala). There is no person but dharma in itself (dharmatā) in [nirvana without a remainder of clinging], so it is not mentioned here.58

Whereas the first answer tells us why these terms were applied to the nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvānadhātu), the second answer shows how the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas understand the ontological state of nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhiśeṣanirvānadhātu).

In ‘Upādisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2, I showed that the significance of no-self (anātman) in terms of the cognitive theory could be that there is no need for a self (ātman) behind the five aggregates to explain our cognitive process. This did not mean that all early Buddhists had the radical theory presented in the simile of a cart in the Milindapanha against the Upaniṣadic notion of self (ātman).59 What Indian Buddhist schools said was that self (ātman), or person (pudgala), exists not as an entity (dravya) but simply as a designation (prajñapti).60 What was designated was, especially for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, the series of aggregates (skandhasamātāna).

As seen in ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 2, nirvana for them was extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyaṇirodha), which was further defined as disjunction (visaṇyoga). Nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvānadhātu) could be achieved by a person (pudgala), technically the series of aggregates (skandhasamātāna), who has terminated all connections with defilements and as a consequence has henceforward been protected from them through antidotes, the acquisition of disjunction (visaṇyogaprāpti) against all defilements existing in the three time periods.

According to the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, disjunction can be attained by an ordinary person (prthagjana), śāikṣa or aśāikṣa, yet nirvana with a remainder of clinging or nirvana without a remainder of clinging can be attained only by an aśāikṣa.61 Through terminating junctions with impure dharmas and attaining the acquisition of disjunction, a person can advance from laity to śāikṣa and to aśāikṣa. Thus, disjunction can only be nirvana with a remainder of clinging at the moment when the last defilement left is terminated, whereas disjunction can only be nirvana without a remainder of clinging at the moment when the last defilement left is terminated and at the same time his vitality (āyus), or technically life faculty (jīvitenḍriya) and homogenous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga), is destroyed.

As pointed out in the first answer,62 nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvānadhātu) can be the present acquisition (prāpti) of disjunction against the very last defilement left that was archived by a living saint (arahant), or the series of aggregates, and in this respect we can say ‘the complete cessation of all fetters (saṃyojana) is obtained (prāptā), possessed
(pratilabdha), touched (sprṣṭa) and realised (sāksātkṛta) by a saint. Since there is no person (pudgala) in the final nirvana, these terms cannot be applied to nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhisesaanirvāṇadhātu).

What could be the possible picture of the state of nirvana without a remainder of clinging? From the above expression, ‘there is no person but dharmas in themselves (dharmatā),’ we can assume that it was the disintegration of the series of aggregates (skandhasamātāna) owing to there being no more driving force, such as defilement, left to continue the series. That is to say, the series of aggregates that is conventionally designated as a person (pudgala) has been disintegrated, yet all dharmas that constitute that series of aggregates continue to exist because they are real existents in the three time periods.

Thus, if the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas were asked what happens to the Tathāgata after death, one of the unanswered questions, their technical answer could be that ‘The Tathāgata was only a designation for the series of aggregates in which all junctions with defilements have been terminated and thus acquisitions of disjunction with all defilements have been attained. When the life faculty and homogenous character of the group have been destroyed this series of aggregates finally disintegrates and only dharmas in themselves remain.’ This last point, the existence of dharmas, was the Sautrāntika’s main target when arguing against the ontological position of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas.

The Sautrāntika’s criticism of ontological issues around nirvana

Before going into the ontological issues around nirvana, we need to look at who the Sautrāntikas were and how they dealt with the two nirvana theory. An interesting comment on the chronology of the Sautrāntikas was given by Kui-ji (窺基), a principal disciple of a famous Chinese translator Xuanzang, in his Cheng-you-shi-lun Shu-ji (成唯識論述記), the Chinese commentary on the Vijñapātimātrasiddhiśāstra. According to him, the origin of the Sautrāntikas goes back to Kumāralāta, an influential Buddhist master based in the north Indian city of Takṣaśila around a hundred years after the death of the Buddha. Though he was one of the five Sauryodayikas, a name given to them because their emerging influence among Buddhists at that time was compared to the rising sun, he and his followers were called the Dārṣṭāntikas mainly because of his book, the Drśtāntamālāśāstra, and his tendency to explain Buddhist doctrines with similes. The name Sautrāntika only arose after the death of Śrīlāta, the second Sautrāntika master, believed to have lived four hundred years after the death of the Buddha and to have written the Sautrāntikavibhāṣā.

The plausibility of this late seventh-century comment by Kui-ji (窺基) has been strongly contested and a study by Kato suggests that the date of Kumāralāta cannot go back to a hundred years after the death of the Buddha,
but must postdate the composition of the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*, and that Kumāralāta was probably the teacher both of Harivarman and of Śrīlāta, who was the direct teacher of Vasubandhu. Kato has also contested the chronological view based on the above comment that the earlier term Dārṣṭāntika was replaced by the term Sautrāntika in the later period. He suggests that the name Sautrāntikas had a positive connotation and was used by the group itself to refer to its own views, whereas Dārṣṭāntikas has a negative connotation and was used by opponents, such as the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas.

Whether this group was called the Dārṣṭāntikas or the Sautrāntikas, we still do not know it was established as an independent sect with its own *vinaya*. As pointed out by Cox, it emerged just prior to the composition of the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra* not as a distinct ordination lineage or sect, but as a dogmatically defined group or school that objected to the Sarvāstivāda doctrinal interpretation.

**The Sautrāntikas and the two nirvana theory**

Although the Sautrāntikas may have produced their own exegetical treatises, such as the *Sautrāntikavibhāṣā*, none of them has survived in a complete form. From the citations attributed to Sthavira, possibly Śrīlāta, in Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra*, we assume that they may have systematically composed exegetical treatises to the *abhidharma* texts and treatises of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas. None the less, what we see from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is that they were vicious critics of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, especially of their dharma theory.

In his work, Vasubandhu was largely following the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika system, while making critical comments on points that he, or the Sautrāntikas, did not agree with. Since there is no complete explanation of the two nirvana theory in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, we can assume that he was roughly following the explanation of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas seen in the *Jñānaprasṭhāna* and the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*. However, there is a substantial difference from the detailed analysis of the characteristics of dharmas involved in the two nirvana theory.

The interpretation of ‘with a remainder of clinging’ (*saupadhiśeṣa*) has been the heart of understanding the two nirvana theory. For the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, it was, as seen before, both life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) and homogeneous character of the group (*nikāyasabhāga*), according to the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*. As far as the Sautrāntikas were concerned, this interpretation could not be accepted, since both dharmas belonged to the fourteen dharmas not associated with the mind (*cittaviprayuktasamskāra*), which they did not accept as real existents.

Although Vasubandhu denied that both dharmas were real existents, the way in which he rejected them was different. While the first, life faculty, he
regarded as a name (prajñapti) given to something else, the second, homogeneous character (sabhāgatā), he considered to be non-existent.

Although the homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) was virtually the same as homogenous character (sabhāgatā) according to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,72 the homogeneous character (sabhāgatā) described in the text was different from what we have seen in the Mahāvibhāṣāsāstra with the name of homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga). In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya it was understood not as a dharma operating exclusively in the rebirth process to determine the specific rebirth state of sentient beings,73 but as an abstract principle of universality through which entities are recognized as members of the same category or class.74

In this respect, it was more like the generality (sāmānya) or particular generality (sāmānyavīśeṣa) of the Vaiśešikas. This was pointed out by Vasubandhu in one of the five arguments against the existence of homogenous character in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.75 Among the five,76 the second argument seems to be a classic example to show how the Sautrāntikas refute the existence of this dharma. It reads as follows: ‘Neither can ordinary people (loka) see homogenous character, since it is without form (rūpa), and is not distinguished through knowledge (prajñā).’77

Despite the name Sautrāntika, which gives the impression that their argument depends largely on textual testimony (sūtra), they were also keen on using two other criteria used by traditional Indian scholars: direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna).78 Although seeing (paśyati) alone was mentioned, seeing here was used to stand for perception in general. As pointed out by Jayatilleke,79 seeing has been used predominantly over other forms of perception since the Upaniṣad, and this can be justified simply by the fact that the largest number of our perceptions are visual perceptions. Thus, the word for visual perception is extended to denote perception in general.

Although the word knowledge (prajñā) was used in the second negation, it represented, as glossed by Yaśomitra, the second criterion, inference (anumāna). In fact, both words, pratyakṣa and anumāna, are mentioned in the interpretation of this argument in his Śphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, the commentary on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.80 Thus, homogeneous character (sabhāgatā) was, as in the case of asaṃskṛta81 and pudgala,82 neither recognized through direct perception (pratyakṣa), like form (rūpa), nor inferred through inference (anumāna), like the faculty of sight.

Where does this abstract principle come from? The answer given from Vasubandhu was that it was simply non-difference of birth, or category (jātyabheda).83 The logic behind this answer was that homogeneous character (sabhāgatā) is not a separate existent but just the absence of difference, and the lack of something cannot be a real existent. Vasubandhu used similar logic to define the truth as ‘lack of contradiction’ (aviparītā), in order to interpret the third noble truth as non-existence.84
Since homogeneous character was regarded as non-existent, the Sautrāntika interpretation of ‘with a remainder of clinging’ (saupadhisēsa) depends solely on how they saw life faculty (jīvitendriya). Although it too was not regarded as a real existent, like homogeneous character (sabhāgataḥ), it was treated slightly differently in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. It said, ‘We do not say it does not exist at all, yet say it is not a real existent’. This means that it is not a real existent (dravya) but a name (prajñāpīti) given to a certain phenomenon.

Vasubandhu’s answer for that was as follows: ‘momentum (āvedha) at the time of placing homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) through an [previous] action in the three worlds’. Homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) mentioned here seems to retain its old usage, functioning exclusively in the rebirth process mentioned above, and is somehow different from the abstract principle that has just been rejected. It is the direct result of an action that projects new existence (ākṣepakakarman), and is glossed in the Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā as ‘it is saṃskārā of that kind that have the aggregates, such as material form, as their intrinsic nature’. What is said in this passage is that life faculty is not a real existent but a name given to a certain power of the series of aggregates (skandhānta) initiated directly by an action that projects new existence (ākṣepakakarman) at the moment of conception. We can compare the position of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas and of the Sautrāntikas through the simile of shooting an arrow seen in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

The former, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, believed that the destiny of an arrow and the time it will take to reach its destination can be determined by a certain sort of quality (guṇa), or possibly saṃskāra, that arises separately in the arrow through the impetus and the direction of the arrow at the moment of the shooting. As a consequence, the destiny and the duration of a sentient being, or technically a series of aggregates, are determined by separate dharmas, i.e. life faculty (jīvitendriya) and homogenous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga), which arise from an action that projects new existence.

By contrast, the latter, the Sautrāntikas, believed that the destiny of an arrow and the time it will take to reach its destination are initiated directly by the impetus and the direction of the arrow at the moment of the shooting. Thus, the destiny and the duration of a sentient being, or technically a series of aggregates, are initiated directly by the action that projects new existence (ākṣepakakarman) at the moment of conception. This seems to explain why the Sautrāntikas were also known as the Saṅkrāntivādins, those who maintain the transference of the aggregates (skandhas) seen in the Chinese translation of the Vasumitra’s Samayabhедo-paracanacakra. Within the Sautrāntika system, the transmigration from one world to the other can be explained exclusively by the series of aggregates.
Table 5.1 summarises the difference between the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. For the Sautrāntikas, there is no need to assume the existence of both dharmas not associated with the mind (cittaviprayuktasamkāra) to explain the process of conception, especially from the previous action to the present psychophysical series of aggregates (skandhasaṃtāna).

The outcome of this Sautrāntika criticism could not be ignored, since it could change the whole interpretation of the two nirvana theory that had been carefully established by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas in the Jñānaprasthāna and the Mahāvibhāṣāstra. The core of their interpretation of the two nirvana theory concerns what clinging (upadhi) in ‘with a remainder of clinging’ (saupadhiśeṣa) refers to. The answer given by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas was vitality (āyu) in the Jñānaprasthāna and both life faculty (jīvitendriya) and homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra.

Their answers did not represent either of the two aspects of the word clinging (upadhīturpi); in the subjective sense it denotes defilements in general; in the objective sense it denotes the ‘fuel’ of a fire underlining ‘the five aggregates’ in a metaphorical structure. That is to say, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika’s interpretation of the two nirvana theory was established under the heavy influence of their abhidharmic systematisation.

Although their possible reference for ‘with a remainder of clinging’ (saupadhiśeṣa) is the momentum (āvedha) of the series of aggregates (skandhasaṃtāna), this is not a separate existent, like life faculty and homogeneous character in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika, but a name given to a certain power that belongs to the series of aggregates. Whether so intended or not, the Sautrāntika criticism of both dharmas not associated with the mind (cittaviprayuktasamkāra) seems to turn this tide and let the interpretation of the two nirvana theory return to the metaphorical structure of nirvana in the early canon.

**Nirvana from the Sautrāntika ontological perspective**

In ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3, we saw that the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika understanding of nirvana was closely related to
their dharma theory, the existence of all dharmas in the three time periods and their acceptance of the momentariness of conditioned dharmas. Their equivalent of nirvana in this tradition was called extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyaśānirvādha) and was explained as the perpetual separation of an impure (sāsrava) dharma from a series of aggregates (skandhasamātāna) through the antidote called ‘acquisition of disjunction’ (visamvyogapratīpi).

By contrast, the Sautrāntika understanding of nirvana was closely related to their ontological position. For them, nirvana is not a real existent (dravyasat) but a mere designation (prajñaptisat), something spoken of conventionally, and is ‘non-existence succeeding existence (paścādabhāva), like a sound that is non-existent before and will be non-existent after its occurrence.’

Their definition of extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyaśānirvādha), or nirvana, occurs in the second chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, as follows: ‘The extinction through knowledge is, when latent defilements (anuśaya) and life (janman) that have already been produced are extinguished, non-arising of further such by the power of knowledge (pratisamkhya).’

Later, in Yaśomitra’s Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, the cessation of latent defilements (anuśayanirvādha) was glossed as nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu), while the cessation of life (janmanirvādha) was explained as nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu).

If we apply this explanation of Yaśomitra back to Vasubandhu’s definition, nirvana with a remainder of clinging for the Sautrāntikas could be, when latent defilements (anuśaya) that have already been produced are extinguished, the non-arising of further such by the power of knowledge; whereas nirvana without a remainder of clinging could be, when life (janman) that has already been produced is extinguished, the non-arising of further such by the power of knowledge. Two things in this analysis cannot be ignored.

First, the Sautrāntika’s use of the word nirvana seems to be quite different from that of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas. As we saw above, nirvana for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas was a single perpetual separation of an impure (sāsrava) dharma from a series of aggregates through the antidote called ‘acquisition of disjunction’ (visamvyogapratīpi) and, as a consequence, it could be used for every single perpetual separation. By contrast, nirvana for the Sautrāntikas could be used only for the traditional two cases: nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu) and nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu).

As seen in the definition above, nirvana was not described as a single extinction of a latent defilement (anuśaya) but as non-arising of further latent defilement when all latent defilements that have been produced have already been extinguished. In this respect, the Sautrāntikas seem to keep, like the
Theravāda exegetical tradition, the old usage of the word nirvana, which was applied to the two most important events in the Buddha’s life: enlightenment and final liberation at death.

Second, the word anuśaya (latent defilement) was used in the case of nirvana with a remainder of clinging, in contrast to the usual word ‘defilement’ (kleśalkīsa) or ‘impurity’ (āsraya) preferred by the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas. In fact, this small terminological shift seems to be the key to understanding how nirvana was explained in the Sautrāntika system.

In general, latent defilement was, according to Jaini, ‘always used in the sense of a bias, a proclivity, a persistence of a dormant or latent disposition of mind leading to all kinds of evil volitions’. While the terms kleśa and āsraya tend to designate defilements in general, anuśaya refers only to defilements in their latent state. In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, this latent defilement was explained as sleeping (prasupta) defilement, in contrast to paryavasthāna, which was explained as awakened (prabuddha) defilement.

The former was further commented on this: ‘in the non-manifested state, it persists in the state of being seed (bījabhāva)’, whereas the latter was commented on as ‘manifested state’ (saṃmukhībhāva). The relationship between these terms is summarised in Table 5.2.

What could be the reason why the Sautrāntikas, the followers of the sūtras, had to explain nirvana with a term, anuśaya, that was not at all common in the early canon? The answer seems to be closely related to one of the ontological problems they had to face, especially against the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, who insisted on the existence of all dharmas in the three time periods while accepting the momentariness of conditioned dharmas.

Within the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika system, these two apparently opposing views were skilfully reconciled by saying that what changes each moment is not the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of a dharma but its activities – arising, duration, decay and ceasing – through its inherent characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of impermanence. By contrast, the Sautrāntikas did not accept the idea that all dharmas exist in the three time periods and maintained that there is no difference between the intrinsic nature of a dharma and its activities. What changes momentarily is thus dharmas themselves: their existence is constituted by their activities.

The outcome of this Sautrāntika ontological perspective was that a causal relationship could be established only between a moment and the immediately preceding moment. In other words, causal efficacy from the more

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### Table 5.2 Kleśa and anuśaya from the Sautrāntika viewpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>kleśa</th>
<th>paryavasthāna</th>
<th>manifested state (saṃmukhībhāva)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>anuśaya</td>
<td>state of being seed (bījabhāva)</td>
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distant past could no longer be sustained, since no dharma can remain for more than a moment. This extreme ontological position of the Sautrāntikas seems to cause problems, especially in explaining the karmic process, from defilement to action and to its result. They have to explain how defilement can be sustained within and be abandoned from a series of aggregates, since it automatically ceases after coming into existence.

Within the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika system, this karmic process can largely be explained through a dharma called acquisition (prāpti), which is one of the fourteen dharmas not associated with mind (cittaviprayuktasāṃskāra). When there is an arising of the acquisition of the defilement, the acquisition (prāpti) makes the defilement renew its existence and continue its activity – arising, duration, decay and ceasing – until this acquisition is eliminated from the series.

The explanatory model applied by the Sautrāntikas was called the theory of seed (bīja). In the fifth chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the above mentioned 'state of being seed' (bījabhāva), or latent defilement (anuṣaya), was defined by Vasubandhu as follows:

What is here called the state of being seed? It is the power (śākti) of a body (ātmabhāva) to produce defilement which is born of [previous] defilement, just like the power to produce memory which is born of [previous] perception or knowledge and just like the power of a sprout and so on to yield rice which is born of [previous] rice.

Although this name and form (nāmarūpa), which is the support (āśraya) of that power, is momentary, they continue (saṃtati) by means of a causal relationship between a moment and the immediately preceding moment, and the current of these successive moments of name and form constitutes what we called the series of aggregates (skandhasaṅkāra). This power of the series of aggregates is conventionally called 'latent defilements' and in the Sautrāntika system is technically called ‘the state of being seed’.

As an answer to the first question raised above, how defilement can be sustained within a series of aggregates, the Sautrāntikas might well say that what has been sustained within a series of aggregates is not a separate dharma, or a certain defilement, which will cease immediately after existence, but the power of the series of aggregates to produce the defilement, which can continue as long as the series continues uninterrupted until it is manifested (paryavasthāna) when the right conditions are given.

As an answer to the second question, how defilement can be abandoned from a series of aggregates, the Sautrāntikas might well say that what has been abandoned is not a separate dharma, or a certain defilement, but the power of the series of aggregates that can produce the defilement. This process of abandoning defilements was described by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya as follows:
And by the two kinds [past and present] of defilements, the state of being seed (bījabhāva) is implanted in this series to arise in future. Through the abandonment of that [seed], that [defilement] too is abandoned. In the same way as through exhausting maturation (vipāka), action (karma) is exhausted. 115

Within the theory of seed, the mechanism of producing its result was explained by the special transformation of a series (saṃtānaparināmavīśeṣa). 116 It is applied within the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya to explain various phenomena that could be awkward to explain from the Sautrāntika’s extreme ontological position: for instance, the continuation of defilements in the form of anuṣaya seen above, the continuation of our memory 117 and the continuation of the efficacy of past action (karma) through its maturation (vipāka). 118

Vasubandhu seems to use it as a hidden weapon to defend the Sautrāntika’s position when asked how a past momentary cause can produce a present momentary result. In this respect, it mainly replaces the Sarvāstivāda-Vaiśeṣika’s theory of acquisition (prāpti). 119 In the second chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, these terms were glossed as follows:

What then is called seed (bīja)? It is name and form (nāmarūpa) capable of producing a result either immediately or meditatively through the special transformation (parināmavīśeṣa) of a series (santati). What is here called transformation (parināma)? It is continuing differently [from before]. What then is here called series (santati)? It is saṃskārā of the three time periods in the state of being cause and result. 120

When a certain cause was given, the latent capability to produce its result was implanted in121 the series of aggregates and passed along through the successive moments of the aggregates that continue the causal relationship between a moment and the immediately preceding moment until it produces its result. In other words, the original cause in the past is not a direct cause of the result because its role is initiating a long sequence of powers to produce its result in the future.

What makes this Buddhist transformation (parināma) different from the Sāṅkhya concept of transformation is that for the former transformation is a sequence of momentary phenomena arising differently from before, while for the latter transformation is a manifestation of material nature (prakṛti) that essentially remains the same.

Although this original cause ceased momentarily in the past, its result will be realised at the last special (viśeṣa) moment of the transformation (parināma). 122 This is explained in the last chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya as follows:
What then are ‘series’, ‘transformation’ and ‘special’? Series is the current of successive moments of mind [initiated by] former action. Transformation (parināma) is arising of that [series] differently [from before]. Further special transformation (parināmaviśeṣa) is the capacity of producing a result immediately because of being the distinctive last transformation.\(^\text{123}\)

In this transformation the final result was produced from the last moment of the transformation, which has a special and distinctive power to produce its result immediately. The whole process of this special transformation of a series (saṃtānaparināmaviśeṣa) was likened to producing a final fruit that is not a direct result of a seed but an indirect result of its long transformation from a seed to a sprout, from a sprout to a flower and finally from a flower to a fruit.\(^\text{124}\)

One important question still remains to be answered in this theory: why does the uninterrupted conditioning of successive moments stop at one point and not continue for ever? In other words, why does a new cause that has just been produced by the special transformation not repeat the same transformation again? The answer given by Vasubandhu was a kind of ancient Buddhist equivalent of a modern scientific experiment:

In a way that a red fibre (keśara) appears on the fruit which is born of the special transformation of the series [initiated] by a citron tree’s flower coloured with red-dye-liquid, but no other [red fibre] appears again from that [red fruit], in that way there is no other maturation (vipāka) from the maturation which is born of action (karma).\(^\text{125}\)

It has been said by some old Chinese and Korean monks that some black peas are produced by planting a pea coloured with Chinese black ink, but planting these black peas will not produce other black peas again. What is being said here is that the efficacy of the original cause lasts once only and does not continue again and again, and this can be applied to such phenomena as the maturation of an action, the latent defilement and memories mentioned before. This seems to make a big difference in the character of nirvana between the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas.

One thing we should remember is that Vasubandhu’s theory of seed (bīja) and the special transformation of a series (saṃtānaparināmaviśeṣa) seen in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya was still in its provisional form. After explaining them extensively at the end of the Pudgalaviniścaya, the ninth chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu simply hid behind the shadow of the Buddha by quoting the following stanza ascribed to Rahula: ‘The cause even of a single eye in the feather of peacock cannot be understood in all its
aspects by non-omniscient ones. For it is knowledge which is the power of the omniscient.\(^\text{126}\) His uncertainty seems to come from the possible interruption of a mental series, especially in nirodhasamāpatti,\(^\text{127}\) which will automatically halt the continuum of powers (śakti) conveying future results. This interruption could be the reason why he in the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa introduced latent consciousness (ālayavijñāna),\(^\text{128}\) which will continue uninterrupted even in nirodhasamāpatti. In that text his uncertainty disappeared when he had explained latent consciousness (ālayavijñāna).\(^\text{129}\)

As we saw in ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3, nirvana for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas is a real existent (dravya) to protect a series of aggregates perpetually from past, present and future defilements, and is clearly contradicted by the Sautrāntika’s definition of nirvana seen above.\(^\text{130}\) In the second chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas made the following objection:\(^\text{131}\)

> Then if nirvana is only non-arising, how are we to interpret this statement in the sūtra:\(^\text{132}\) ‘these five faculties if practised, cultivated and developed conduces to the abandonment of past, future and present suffering (duḥkha)? As nirvana [for the Sautrāntikas] is abandonment and is the non-arising only of the future, it cannot be of past and present!

For the Sautrāntikas, there is nothing to be done with past defilements because they cease automatically after awakening (paryavasthāna) and their efficacy cannot last any more. A present defilement cannot last more than a moment. All they need to do is to remove sleeping defilements (anuṣaya), in the state of being seed (bījabhāva), which had been planted in a series of aggregates (skandhasūttana), have been sustained in that series through transformation and will be manifested by the special transformation of the series (samtānaparināmaviśeṣa). The answer given by Vasubandhu to the above objection was as follows:

> Further, abandonment is the absolute non-arising of future suffering or defilement because of the absence of the state of being seed (bījabhāva). Otherwise what of past and present defilement is there to be abandoned? Indeed there is no profit in making an effort concerning what has already ceased and what is on the point of ceasing.\(^\text{133}\)

Once anuṣaya, the state of being seed, was destroyed by the power of intuition (darśana) and the noble path (mārga), name and form (nāmarūpa), which are the support (āśraya) for the anuṣaya, become special (viśeṣa); that is to say, move from a normal state of having the power to produce a defilement to a special state of lacking power to produce a defilement.\(^\text{134}\)
When there is no more anuśaya remaining in a series of aggregates and no more arising by the power of knowledge, it can be called nirvana with a remainder of clinging. Vasubandhu explained the importance of acquiring this special base in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya as follows: ‘It is said that nirvana is attained through acquiring the basis (āśraya) which prevents completely the arising of defilement (kleśa) and rebirth (punarbhava), by acquiring an antidote (pratipakṣa).’

Nirvana without a remainder of clinging for the Sautrāntikas was, as seen above, non-arising of further life (janman) by the power of knowledge when life that has already been produced is extinguished. Life here seems to refer to vitality (āyu), which was explained by Vasubandhu as ‘momentum (āvedha) at the time of placing homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) through an action in the three worlds’, and was glossed in the Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā as ‘saṃskārā of that kind that have the aggregates, such as form (rūpa), as their intrinsic nature’.

Since this momentum (āvedha) was likened later in the text to the power given to the sprout by which the plant develops to maturity, the continuation of this momentum during life could also be understood by the Sautrāntikas as the state of being seed (bijabhāva), which when manifested finally at the moment of death will work as dissociated force. That is to say, it will terminate a given life (janman) from the action that projects existence (āksepakakarman) at the moment of conception.

Therefore, the Sautrāntikas’ claim that nirvana is non-existence seems to be connected to their own abhidharmic systematisation. As seen here, their understanding of nirvana was closely connected to their theory of karmic mechanism, which was based on the theory of seed (bijabhāva) and the special transformation of a series (saṃtānapariṇāmavīṣa).

Interpretation of Anuruddha’s verse

In Chapter 4, I briefly mentioned Anuruddha’s verse in the context of the Theravāda exegetical tradition. Although they are not directly involved in a debate on the interpretation of Anuruddha’s verse between Northern Buddhist schools, their later exegetical position on nirvana – that it is cessation consisting in non-arising and exists separately (pāṭiyekka) from the mere destruction of passion, hatred and delusion – seems to support the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāsika position. A similar approach to the view that nirvana is mere extinction is found in the Pali Sammohavinodanī of the Theravādins and in the Nyāyānusārasāstra of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāsikas.

The interpretation of Anuruddha’s verse, believed to have been uttered when the Buddha was finally released at Kuṇinagara, became a kind of battleground between the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntika. Vasubandhu used this stanza in a debate on the ontological issue of nirvana against the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas in the second chapter of
the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*¹⁴³ and his opinion was later contested by Śaṅghabhadra in his *Nyāyānasāraśāstra* from the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihbhaṣika perspective.¹⁴⁴ This stanza was later quoted and explained by Candrakīrti in the *Prasannapadā*, the commentary on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.¹⁴⁵ Vasubandhu quotes this stanza in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* as follows: ‘His mind was liberated like the going out of a lamp.’¹⁴⁶ After quoting this verse, he comments ‘as the going out of a lamp is non-existence (*abhaśa*), in that way the mind of the blessed one too was liberated’.¹⁴⁷

Within the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the core of the debate on issues surrounding Anuruddha’s stanza between the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihbhaṣikas and the Sautrāntikas is grammatical. What the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihbhaṣikas tried to establish by grammatical analysis was that nirvana is, as seen in Śaṅghabhadra’s effort in the *Nyāyānasāraśāstra*, a real dharma existing separately from phenomenal extinction, which is likened in Anuruddha’s stanza to the going out of a lamp.

First, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihbhaṣikas used the genitive case to insist that nirvana is a cessation (*niruddha*) which is acquired through the cutting of the acquisition of defilement:¹⁴⁸

[Vaibhaṣikas] How is the genitive case understood in the sentence, ‘This is the cessation of that thing (*vastu*)’? [Sautrāntikas] There is indeed no relationship of this [cessation] with that [thing] because there can be no state of being related as the result of a cause and the like. But mere negation, ‘the non-existence of that’, is applicable! [Vaibhaṣikas] The cessation (*niruddha*) that is acquired through the cutting of the acquisition of defilement, even in another existence, is designated as ‘of that [thing]’. [Sautrāntikas] In that case, what is the cause of limiting the acquisition of that [thing]? [Vaibhaṣikas] The sūtra talks about ‘a monk who has attained nirvana in the present life’.¹⁴⁹ In that case how could he have the acquisition of non-existence? [Sautrāntikas] It is said that nirvana is attained through acquiring the basis (*āśraya*), which completely prevents the arising of defilement and future life, by acquiring an antidote.

Since a defilement exists in the three time periods in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihbhaṣika system, its cessation is done by cutting, or technically ‘disjoining’ (*visamyoja*), its connection with a series of aggregates (*skandhasaṃtāna*) through the power of knowledge (*pratisamkhya*). As a result of this cutting there arises ‘the acquisition of disjunction’ (*visamyojaprapta*), which serves as an antidote (*pratipaka*) to prevent perpetually the reconnection between that defilement and this series.¹⁵⁰

Within the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihbhaṣika system, ‘ceasing a defilement’ could only be possible by the arising of a dharma, ‘the acquisition of disjunction’, against the defilement; as a consequence, there are no more activities, arising,
duration, decay and ceasing, of that defilement in this series. This dharma is the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihāśikā’s equivalent of nirvana and is explained as ‘cessation (nirodha) that is acquired through the cutting of the acquisition of defilement’. Thus, this cessation exists separately from defilement (kleśa) in this system. In other words, cessation is one thing and defilement is another in the compound ‘the cessation of defilement’ (kleśanirodha).

By contrast, ‘destroying a defilement’ in the Sautrāntika system could only be done by destroying the corresponding latent defilement (anuśaya), which is in the state of seed (bīja), that is to say, the power (śakti) of a series of aggregates (skandhasamātāna) to produce this defilement in the future, a power that has been conveyed through the causal relationship between a moment and the immediately preceding moment.151 As said above, this kind of Sautrāntikan causal relationship cannot be established between cessation and defilement and thus this compound, ‘the cessation of defilement’, can only mean mere negation, i.e. the non-existence of that defilement.

Stopping the conveyance of a power to produce defilement in the future means that the Sautrāntika equivalent of ‘the cessation of defilement’ is future non-arising of a defilement. The obvious question put forward by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihāśikā will be, ‘How can one acquire cessation, or nirvana, at the present time?’ That is to say, how could we know whether a certain defilement is destroyed by destroying the corresponding latent defilement?

The answer from the Sautrāntikas was, as seen before, that it could be done by changing the support (āśraya), the series of aggregates, from a normal state of having a power to produce a defilement in the future to a special (viśeṣa) state of lacking that power to produce a defilement.152 Therefore there is no need for the Sautrāntikas to accept a separate dharma apart from defilement in the compound ‘the cessation of defilement’ (kleśanirodha).

Second, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihāśikas used the locative case to insist that nirvana as non-appearance exists separately:153

[Vaihāśikas] Why do you not want to interpret as ‘because it does not appear in that, it is non-appearance’? [Sautrāntikas] We do not consider this locative case possible. [Vaihāśikas] What is meant? [Sautrāntikas] If when one says ‘It does not appear in that [nirvana]’ it is further meant that ‘that [nirvana]’ exists, then it would follow that attachment permanently does not appear, since nirvana is permanent. When one says, then, ‘obtained’, that is to say, ‘that [nirvana] was obtained’ is referred to, you should admit ‘the non-appearance of suffering’ when the noble path is attained.154

Under the influence of the Buddhist theory of momentariness,155 the concept of nirvana was changed dramatically: it prefers non-arising to cessation or extinction. When saying momentary dharma, it means that this dharma is in the state of arising, duration, decay and ceasing constantly. Ceasing simply
means immediately following a new arising. Nirvana should be different from this kind of constant ceasing and is, thus, achieved only by the stopping of the new sequence of arising, duration, decay and ceasing. This is why non-arising is paradoxically preferred as the meaning of nirvana by later Buddhists: the Theravādin\textsuperscript{156} and the Sautrāntikas.\textsuperscript{157}

What the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas tried to establish here was a link between the word non-appearance, which is the same as non-arising above, and ‘the acquisition of disjunction’ (\textit{visaṁyogaprāpti}), their equivalent of nirvana, with the locative case. In this system, ‘the acquisition of disjunction’ works as an antidote (\textit{pratipakṣa}) to prevent perpetually the reconnection between a certain defilement and a series of aggregates (\textit{skandhasamātana}). If there is ‘the acquisition of disjunction’, which works against a certain defilement in a series of aggregates, there is non-appearance of that defilement in the series of aggregates. That is to say, this \textit{dharma}, ‘the acquisition of disjunction’, exists separately from non-appearance of a certain defilement.

The objection from the Sautrāntikas is that such non-appearance of a certain defilement is obtained not by a separately existing \textit{dharma}, the acquisition of disjunction’ that arises as a result of cutting the junction of the defilement through the power of knowledge, i.e. the noble path, but directly by the presence of the noble path. Although this locative case was defended by Vasubandhu in this way, it was actually a weak argument. In fact the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika’s argument using this locative case seems to have been sustained by Candrakīrti in the \textit{Prasannapadā}, the commentary on \textit{Mūlamadhyamakakārikā}.\textsuperscript{158} This may be why Vasubandhu quoted Anuruddha’s stanza to defend the Sautrāntika position.

There are three counterarguments in the \textit{Nyāyānusāraśāstra} against Vasubandhu’s use of Anuruddha’s stanza. In the first, his tactic was to show other \textit{sūtras} that support the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position on nirvana, while accepting briefly the negative meaning of Anuruddha’s stanza. It reads as follows:\textsuperscript{159}

\begin{quote}
Masters of \textit{Abhidharma} have already gone through these texts. In other words, when one says the cessation of suffering (\textit{duḥkha}), the meaning is of two kinds: there is no separate entity apart from suffering and there is a separate entity apart from suffering. The Buddha saw various mental dispositions of those who are to be trained (\textit{vineya}). That is why he taught two different meanings of cessation. He sometimes taught that there is no separate entity; for example, in the two \textit{sūtras} mentioned above.\textsuperscript{160} By contrast, he sometimes taught that there is a separate entity, for example, in the \textit{sūtra} saying there is certainly a place where there is no birth; the \textit{sūtra} saying there is a sphere (\textit{āyatana}) and there is an escape (\textit{nīṣaraṇa}); the \textit{sūtra} saying I saw that there really is a thing (\textit{padārtha}), the unconditioned (\textit{asaṃskṛta}), that is to say nirvana; and the \textit{sūtra}
\end{quote}
saying that cessation is spoken of only by reason of the cessation of five aggregates as fuel. The sūtras of these kinds are so numerous that our system cannot be contradicted by the holy teaching.

Although we cannot identify all the sūtras mentioned by Saṅghabhadra, the first two sūtras mentioned here to support the view that there is a separate entity apart from suffering (duḥkha) seem to be the suttas in the Udāna in the Pali Khuddakanikāya,\(^{161}\) which have been quoted by modern scholars to insist that nirvana cannot be mere non-existence.

The Chinese translation of the interpretation of Anuruddha’s stanza by Xuan-xang reads slightly differently yet shows what the point in this simile is: ‘Just as the going out of a lamp could only be regarded as the extinction of fire without any separate existent (dravyāntara), in that way the liberation attained by the mind of the blessed one is only the extinction of all aggregates.’\(^{162}\) That is to say, it is about whether there can be a separate entity apart from the going out of a lamp or not. If there is a separate entity apart from the lamp’s going out, as argued by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, we can say that nirvana is a real existent existing separately from the mere cessation of the aggregates. By contrast, if there is no separate entity apart from the lamp’s going out, as argued by the Sautrāntikas, we can say that nirvana is not a real existent existing separately but is the mere cessation of all aggregates.

The first alternative was taken by Saṅghabhadra to defend the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position in the second counterargument in the Nyāyānusārasāstra:

In addition, the going out of a lamp is mentioned in the sūtra because there is a separate entity apart from the lamplight, that is to say, the characteristic of impermanence (anityatālakṣaṇa). How the example given by the [Sautrāntikas] can be contradicted [by us] by this meaning! Moreover, even if there is no separate entity, it is not non-existence. It is due to the fact that all conditioning factors (saṃskāra) have the characteristic of impermanence (anityatālakṣaṇa). Its intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is not non-existence. By considering this, there is no fault [in our system].\(^{163}\)

Saṅghabhadra here presents two possible explanations to support the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika’s position. His explanation depends heavily on the fully developed form of the Sarvāstivāda dharma theory.

In the first argument, he insisted that there can be a separate dharma apart from the lamplight and that is the characteristic of impermanence (anityatālakṣaṇa), which is one of four characteristics, arising, duration, decay and ceasing, and is one of the fourteen dharmas not associated with mind (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra). Within the Sarvāstivāda system, a dharma in which these four characteristics are found is a conditioned dharma, while
a dharma in which they are not found is an unconditioned dharma. Since the lamplight is a conditioned dharma, there must be four characteristics existing separately from this lamplight.

However, this argument given by Saṅghabhadra cannot be sustained even from his own ontological position. Since these four primary characteristics (lakṣaṇa), arising, duration, decay and ceasing, which arise with a conditioned dharma such as lamplight, are also conditioned dharmas, they also have in their turn four secondary characteristics (anulakṣaṇa). These secondary characteristics, which are already sixteen in number, also have in their turn four characteristics and in this way arises an infinite regress.

The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika’s answer to this dilemma was that secondary characteristics (anulakṣaṇa) arising together with a conditioned dharma and four primary characteristics are not sixteen but four in number, as in the case that a hen lays many eggs and each egg causes the birth of only one other chicken. Their view is summarised in Table 5.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>dharma</th>
<th>A conditioned dharma</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lakṣaṇa</td>
<td>Arising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anulakṣaṇa</td>
<td>arising of arising</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whether this awkward explanation of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika was accepted by the Sautrāntikas or not, Saṅghabhadra’s first explanation could not be sustained. Although the characteristic of impermanence (anityatālakṣaṇa) can be said to exist separately from lamplight, it is just one of either eight primary (lakṣaṇa) and secondary (anulakṣaṇa) characteristics according to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika system, or of infinite characteristics according to their definition of conditioned dharmas. That is to say, Saṅghabhadra’s comparison cannot really fit Anuruddha’s simile.

His second argument utilised the relationship between the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of a dharma and its activities: arising, duration, decay and ceasing. That is to say, the going out of a lamplight is only one of the activities of the lamplight’s intrinsic nature (svabhāva), which exists in the three time periods. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, thus, can say that just as lamplight has an intrinsic nature apart from its activity of ceasing, so there is nirvana existing separately from the cessation of the aggregates. However, this argument cannot be sustained from the Sautrāntika ontological perspective, since there is no difference between the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of a dharma and its activities and as a consequence what changes momentarily is the dharma itself.

Although we cannot easily determine the validity of these two arguments, since they are based on their own ontological perspectives, we can still
examine which argument represents the original meaning of the image of a fire extinguished in the context of the Tathāgata after death. As seen before, the image represents a fire’s going out due to lack of fuel and is different from a fire image seen in the early Upaniṣads. The latter predicates that when a phenomenal fire is extinguished, the essential character (liṅga) of fire is not extinguished but hidden in its latent state, which could be the origin of the so-called Indian view suggested by F. Otto Schrader.

The second argument put forward by Saṅghabhadra seems to be based more on the Upaniṣadic image of a fire than on the image of a fire extinguished in the context of the Tathāgata after death. Although the Buddha seems to have argued precisely against this kind of Upaniṣadic view in his dialogue with Vacchagotta, its influence on Buddhism is apparent from the position taken by Saṅghabhadra’s second argument. By contrast, the Sautrāntika argument explained by Xuan-zang specifically represents the original meaning of the image of a fire extinguished in the context of the Tathāgata after death. When he says that the fire goes out through lack of fuel, fuel refers to the five aggregates, as is clearly pointed out by his saying ‘the liberation attained by the mind of the blessed one is only the extinction of all aggregates’.

What is the position taken by the Theravāda exegetical tradition on this simile? Although its initial interpretation of Anuruddha’s stanza seen in the Theragāthāaṭṭhakathā confirms that the fire goes out through lack of fuel, its quotation of the Pārāyana stanza at the end of the clarification seems to suggest wanting to keep open the possibility of interpreting nirvana not as mere non-existence. As seen in Chapter 4, nirvana for the later Theravāda exegetical tradition is cessation consisting in non-arising, and exists separately (pāṭiyekka) from the mere destruction of passion, hatred and delusion. The Sammohavinodani, the commentary on the Vibhaṅga, summarises this later position of the Theravādins as follows:

And when it is said in the exposition of the mental sphere, ‘What is here the unconditioned element? It is the cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, and the cessation of delusion’; this means that the unconditioned element is nirvana whose intrinsic nature is unconditioned. But because passion etc. cease on coming to this [nirvana], it is said, ‘It is the cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, and the cessation of delusion.’ This is the teachers’ common explanation of this matter.

What has been said here is that the cessation of passion, hatred and delusion is only a phenomenon that appears on the attainment of nirvana, which itself exists separately (pāṭiyekka) from this mere destruction.

As seen before, they quote the unidentified sutta to support this position: ‘thus ignorance and craving, on coming to this, are destroyed in this, are
abolished in this, nor do they do anything anywhere.\textsuperscript{179} The use of the locative case in this quoted sutta could be closely linked to that of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas seen above. They use the locative case to explain that nirvana, or non-appearance, exists separately from the cessation of defilements, which was likened to the going out of a lamp in the Anuruddha’s stanza.

Although it is slightly different, a similar interpretation is found in the last counterargument put forward by Saṅghabhadra in the Nyāyānusāraśāstra. In this counterargument, he said: ‘This sūtra\textsuperscript{180} only represents the moment of entering nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhiśeṣanirvānad-hātu)’\textsuperscript{181} That is to say, he regarded this final extinction that was likened to the going out of a lamp as a phenomenon that appears only at the moment of the final liberation, whereas nirvana itself is a real existent separate from this phenomenon.

One thing in common in both approaches that refuse to see nirvana as mere non-existence is that such mere destruction is only a phenomenon appearing at the moment of attaining nirvana. Their concept of nirvana, however, is quite different: for instance, nirvana for the Theravādins is the one and only unconditioned,\textsuperscript{182} while for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas there are as many nirvanas as there are possible connections to impure dharmas.\textsuperscript{183}

Table 5.4 shows briefly the developments of the nirvana concept and the two nirvana theory in terms of the differences between schools seen so far.
Table 5.4 Summary of the doctrinal development of nirvana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nirvana with a remainder of clinging</th>
<th>Nirvana without a remainder of clinging</th>
<th>Exegeses and treatises (śāstras)</th>
<th>Theravādins</th>
<th>Sarvāstivādins</th>
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<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Reference of upādilupadhi</td>
<td>The five aggregates</td>
<td>The five faculties (indriya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theravādins</td>
<td>Sarvāstivādins</td>
<td>Sautrāntikas</td>
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<tr>
<td>SN IV pp. 251–2. Cf. ‘The cessation of passion, hatred, delusion and cankers (āsaval)’ in the Chinese equivalent of this sūtra.</td>
<td>Extinction through knowledge was the equivalent of nirvana in Northern abhidharma, while in Southern abhidhamma nirvana was regarded as the one and only unconditioned.</td>
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</table>
We have traced the early doctrinal history of the nirvana concept and the two nirvana theory that depended on the image of a fire extinguished, while challenging two seemingly solid opinions that seem to be outcomes of the lack of comprehensive understanding of nirvana and its metaphorical structure. The first opinion was related closely to the interpretation of nirvana with a remainder of clinging, while the second opinion was associated with the state of nirvana without a remainder of clinging, the state of the Tathāgata after death.

First, what clinging (upādi/upadhi) refers to is supposed to differentiate between nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sa-upādisesanibbānadhātul sopadhišeṣanirvānadhātu) and nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupādisesanibbānadhātulnīrlan-upadhišeṣanirvānadhātu), yet ‘attachment’, the generally accepted reference of the word, could not make that distinction, because there is no more attachment or defilement left in either nirvana during life or nirvana at death.

Although there is little trace left in the early canon, this problem can be solved if we consider ‘fuel’, the objective meaning of the word upādi or upadhi, which seems to have been used to refer to the five aggregates in a metaphorical structure that embraces Enlightenment and its opposite. However, if we simply assemble quotations we may easily arrive at a different conclusion: nirvana with a remainder of clinging could not originally mean enlightenment or sainthood (arahant), but meant non-returner (anāgāmin), a state in which there still were some attachments left (saupādisesa) to be perfected, and as a consequence the two nirvana theory was initially referred to the state of non-returner and saint. Not only did this confusion occur among modern scholars; it had already been recorded in one of the sūtras in the Chinese Ekottara-āgama. Although it is not yet clear whether this sūtra was accepted within the mainstream Buddhist schools, this sūtra seems to be the earliest sign of unintentional literalism even within the early canon (sūtra).

The close relationship between the non-returner and the saint (arahant) could be another example of the Buddhist reaction against the Upaniṣad.
The term *anāgāmin* was often replaced in the early canon with the expression ‘of a nature not to return from that world’ (*anāvatti-dhammo tasmā lokā*),\(^4\) which refers to ‘liberation’ in the early *Upaniṣads*.\(^5\) That is to say, this term seems to have been used as a kind of metaphor for the lay equivalent of the renunciate saint.

When the word clinging (*upadhi*) was interpreted later in the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*, the objective meaning of the word, the fuel of a fire underlying the five aggregates in a metaphorical structure, seems to have been long forgotten, while defilement, the widely circulated meaning of the word, could not satisfy the masters of the *abhidharma* because it did not differentiate between the two nirvanas. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas ended up by introducing ‘birth body’ (*janmakāya*) as a new referent for ‘with a remainder of clinging’ (*saupadhiśeṣa*).\(^6\) Although it can differentiate between the two nirvanas, this interpretation could only be justified through their own *abhidharma* system.

Second, ever since the state of the *Tathāgata* after death became one of the unanswered questions, there have been numerous attempts to fill ‘the silence of the Buddha’ by gathering relevant passages in the early canon (*sūtra*). Most plausible claims so far have been made through clarifying the image of a fire extinguished, either from the Brahmanic or from the Buddhist sources. The argument depends largely on the logic that to the Buddha’s audience this image could not have appeared as annihilation, as it does to modern eyes equipped with the image of scientific combustion. Those equipped with the allegedly common Indian view, which could be traced back to the *Upaniṣads*,\(^7\) may have thought that a fire when extinguished does not really go out but goes back into a non-manifested or invisible state. Some scholars accordingly have insisted that the state of *Tathāgata* after death could not be any kind of annihilation. What has been lacking in this apparently solid argument seems to have been attention to the methodological and historical context of the image of a fire extinguished, especially as used in the dialogue between the Buddha and Vacchagotta.\(^8\)

Unlike in the *Upaniṣadic* methodology, where things were explained through the hierarchical relationship between essence and phenomenon, or subject within and object outside, the Buddha explains things according to their causes (*yoniso manasikāra*). That is to say, he explains things through the causal relationship between phenomena and, as a consequence, there is no room for any essence, like *Brahman*, or subject, like *atman*, that is beyond the range of this causality. Behind this allegedly common Indian view, there is a hierarchical relationship between the imperishable essential character (*liṅga*)\(^9\) and phenomenal fires. When the Buddha asked Vacchagotta, “This fire that has gone out in front of you, in which direction – to the east, west, north or south – has it gone from here?”,\(^10\) he seems to have been arguing specifically against such a view by asking how we could justify anything beyond the range of phenomenal causality.
The intended deduction from this image of a fire extinguished was, as seen in Chapter 3, that just as it goes out through lack of fuel, there will be no more rebirth due to lack of cause. As far as the early canon (sūtra) was concerned, this much could be the best possible account of the state of the Tathāgata after death, or nirvana without a remainder of clinging, according to the Buddha’s method, yoniso manasikāra.

This does not mean there was no influence at all on Indian Buddhism from the above Upaniṣadic view. The Sarvāstivādins were unique in insisting on the existence of all dharmanas in the three time periods, while accepting the momentariness of conditioned dharmanas. Two apparently irreconcilable views were reconciled by saying that what changes momentarily is not the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of a dharma but its activities: arising, duration, decay and ceasing. Although the Sarvāstivādins explain things through the horizontal relationship between dharmanas, the relationship between the intrinsic nature of a dharma and its activities seems to be hierarchical. This became apparent when Saṅgabhadra used this relationship to explain the existence of a separate dharma behind the lamp’s going out in the last stanza of the Anuruddha’s verse.¹¹ In fact there is little difference between the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and the imperishable essential character (liṅga) in terms of their relation to phenomenal fires.

Even in this case, the Sarvāstivādin interpretation of nirvana without a remainder of clinging, or the state of the Tathāgata after death, was quite different from the Upaniṣadic liberation. It is, as seen in Chapter 5, the disintegration of the series of aggregates.¹² Thus, the whole picture of nirvana cannot be revealed, as seen in these two opinions, without considering its metaphorical and historical contexts together with its early developments in the abhidharma as well as its later developments among Buddhist schools.

Although the explanations of nirvana in the early canon (sūtra) were contingent (ābhiprāyika), explanations in the abhidharma were definitive (lākṣaṇika). This abhidharmic trend continued in the exegeses and treatises that represent specific Buddhist schools, so let us compare each Buddhist school’s position on the concept of nirvana and the two nirvana theory.

Although there is no text left to explain systematically what the Sautrāntika’s two nirvana theory is, we can still reconstruct their possible position from the scattered interpretations seen in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in comparison with the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika position. Comparing three major Indian Buddhist schools’ opinions can reveal the whole development of the concept of nirvana. It also allows us to observe whether the Sautrāntikas really revitalized the forgotten value of nirvana’s early metaphorical contexts. That is to say, are they, the Sautrāntikas, worthy of their name, the followers of the sūtras? As seen in Table 5.4, their positions on the nirvana concept and the two nirvana theory were different according to school. Although they seem to have known the basic definition of nirvana, the cessation of
passion, hatred and delusion, they all abandoned this definition in due course owing to the doctrinal development of their *abhidharma* systems.

Despite developing other explanations of the word *nībāna*, the Theravādin was perhaps the only school that made an effort within its *abhidhamma* to retain its original value: this definition was applied not only to nirvana but also to the one and only unconditioned. However, at the end it became a fragile spot in their positive interpretation of nirvana and was challenged by the disputants (*vitaṇḍavādins*). Their solution was to devalue this definition as referring to a temporary phenomenon that appears on one’s going to (*tam āgama*) nirvana. Thus, nirvana for them existed separately (*pāṭiyekka*) from the mere extinction of passion, hatred and delusion, and on this point the Theravādins were not alone: the Sarvāstivādins insisted that the cessation, like the going out of a lamp, appeared only at the moment of entering nirvana without a remainder of clinging (*nirupadhīseṣanirvāṇadhātu*).

For the Sarvāstivādins, the word *nirvāṇa* is not in their list of seventy-five *dharmas* that exist in the three time periods. Extinction through knowledge (*pratisamkhyaṇiruddha*), one of the three unconditioned *dharmas*, is their equivalent of nirvana. Part of the reason why they use a different name for their nirvana concept seems to be its application: while nirvana in the early canon was applied to the extinction of all defilements represented by the triple fires of passion, hatred and delusion, extinction through knowledge was applied to the single perpetual separation of an impure *dharma* from a series of aggregates. This could be the reason why the above basic definition of nirvana appeared only as one of ten explanations of the word *nirvāṇa*.

In this respect, the state of nirvana within the Sarvāstivāda tradition was interpreted positively: it is a real existent (*dravya*) that exists in the three time periods. However, this does not mean, as mentioned above, that this interpretation can be applied to the state of the *Tathāgata* after death, which is the disintegration of the series of aggregates. When the series of aggregates has disintegrated, personal identity no longer continues, even if *dharmas* that constitute that series of aggregates continue to exist.

Under the influence of the Buddhist theory of momentariness, the nirvana concept seems to have changed: it prefers non-arising to cessation or extinction. Since a momentary *dharma* is constantly arising, enduring, decaying and ceasing, ceasing or extinction simply means that a new arising follows immediately. Non-arising in this case means the stopping of any new sequence of arising, duration, decay and ceasing. All three schools in fact accepted this change and used it to strengthen their *abhidharmaic* systematisation. The Theravādins used it to support their positive interpretation of nirvana by saying that nirvana is ‘cessation consisting in non-arising’, whereas the Sarvāstivādins used it to reinforce their equivalent of nirvana, extinction through knowledge, by saying ‘the cessation (*niruddha*) that is acquired through the cutting of the acquisition of a defilement’.
The Sautrāntikas were among the most enthusiastic to utilise this change. In fact they applied it to their definition of nirvana: ‘the extinction through knowledge is that, when latent defilements (anuṣaya) and life (janman) that have already been produced are extinguished, non-arising of further by the power of knowledge (pratisamkhyā).’ Their interpretation of the state of nirvana, or the state of the Tathāgata after death, was negative: for them, nirvana is not a real existent (dravyasat) but a mere designation (prajñaptisat), something spoken of conventionally, and is ‘non-existence succeeding existence’ (paścādabhāva), like a sound that is non-existent before and will be non-existent after its occurrence.

Although their definition of nirvana agrees with their ontological position, it is far away from its original definition: the cessation of the triple fires of passion, hatred and delusion. However, their understanding of ‘with a remainder of clinging’, the core of interpreting the two nirvana theory, came close to what we have seen in the metaphorical structure of nirvana in the early canon (sūtra).

While the Theravādin interpretation seems to retain its metaphorical usage, the ‘fuel’ of a fire underlining the five aggregates, the Sarvāstivādin interpretation seems to be the outcome of their systematisation. Vitality (āyu) first appeared in one of their seven abhidharma texts, the Jñānaprasthāna. Vitality (āyu) seems to have been used first in the context of nirvana without a remainder of clinging and only then applied to nirvana with a remainder of clinging. Later in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, it was interpreted as both the life faculty (jīvitendriya) and the homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga), purely due to their abhidharmic systematisation.

The possible position of the Sautrāntikas can be deduced from their criticism of both the life faculty (jīvitendriya) and homogeneous character (sabhāgatā). The former was interpreted as a name given to the momentum (āvedha) initiated by action (karma) in the series of aggregates at the moment of conception, while the existence of the latter was denied. Although this interpretation came from the Sautrāntikas' criticism based on their ontological perspective, their reference for the word upadhi, the momentum of a series of aggregates, could at least come close to its metaphorical reference: the five aggregates.

Because the Buddha was silent on the question of the state of the Tathāgata after death, we cannot say whether their negative interpretation of nirvana really represents the intention of the Buddha seen in the early canon (sūtra). However, their use of the image of a fire extinguished, as in Anuruddha’s last stanza, did agree with what was said in the dialogue between the Buddha and Vacchagottta. That is to say, they did not accept the existence of a separate dharma behind the lamp’s going out. In this respect, their understanding of the image of a fire extinguished could be a lot closer to its original meaning within the early canon (sūtra) than the Sarvāstivādin understanding, which was almost like the Upaniṣadic image of a fire extinguished.
The Sautrāntikas probably knew the diverse nature of the early canon and represented the meaning of the early canon better than the Sarvāstivādins. However, this does not mean they are worthy of their name, the followers of the sūtras. As seen in Chapter 5, they were not determined to revitalise the value of the early canon (sūtra), but instead used the early canon to defend their extreme ontological position and to argue against their opponents, such as the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas.

This attitude may further explain Vasubandhu’s later introduction of the Mahāyāna concept of latent consciousness (ālayavijñāna) in his Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, which seems to have been composed before his conversion to the Yogācāra school. His priority seems to have been not to go back to the teachings of the early canon but to protect or to complete their own extreme ontological position.

As noted in the Introduction, the Yogācāra school insisted on three or possibly four nirvanas. The task of comparing these nirvanas with the traditional two nirvana theory requires further understanding of relevant Mahāyāna materials from the doctrinal and historical perspectives. I hope the current study may serve as the foundation for further study of the Mahāyāna concept of nirvana and their equivalent of the two nirvana theory.
Part 2

ANNOTATED TRANSLATIONS OF THE RELATED TEXTS IN Pали, SANSKRIT AND CHINESE
SELECTED SOURCES FOR THE NIRVANA CONCEPT AND THE TWO NIRVANA THEORY

The unconditioned element (asankhata dhātu) in the Sammohavinodani

And when it is said in the exposition of the mental sphere that ‘what is here the unconditioned element? It is the cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, and the cessation of delusion’, this means that the unconditioned element is nibbāna whose intrinsic nature is unconditioned. But because passion etc. cease on coming to this [nibbāna], it is said that ‘it is the cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, and the cessation of delusion’. This is the teachers’ common explanation of this matter.

But a disputant (Vitaṇḍavādin) has said: ‘There isn’t anything existing separately called nibbāna. Nibbāna is just the cessation of the defilements.’ And when he is asked to quote a sutta, he quotes the Jambukhādaka-sutta: ‘It is said, o friend Sāriputta, nibbāna, nibbāna. Then what is indeed, o friend, nibbāna? The cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, and the cessation of delusion, o friend, that is indeed called nibbāna’, and says ‘Through this sutta it should be understood that there isn’t anything existing separately called nibbāna. Nibbāna is just the cessation of the defilements.’

He should be asked ‘But is there meaning as there is this sutta?’ Surely he will say, ‘Yes, there is no meaning apart from a sutta.’ Then, he should be asked ‘Now you have quoted this sutta. Quote the next sutta.’ ‘The next sutta’ says that “It is said, o friend Sāriputta, sainthood (arahant), sainthood. Then what is indeed, o friend, sainthood? The cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, and the cessation of delusion, o friend, that is indeed called arahatship”.’ This is the sutta immediately following. But when this one has been cited, they say to him that ‘The dhamma called nibbāna is a dhamma that is included in the mental sphere. Sainthood is the four [mental] aggregates. The general of the dhamma, Sāriputta who had witnessed nibbāna and dwelt there, when asked about nibbāna and about sainthood, said that it is just the cessation of the defilements. But are nibbāna and sainthood the same thing or different things?’
‘Let it be the same or different. What is the use of your grinding so exceedingly fine?’ ‘You don’t know whether it is the same or different.’ ‘But surely it is good if that is known!’ Being repeatedly asked such questions, he is unable to play tricks and says ‘Sainthood is called the destruction of passion, hatred, and delusion because it arises at the end of the cessation of passion etc.’ Then to him they say ‘You have done a great work. Even by giving a bribe one is getting you to say, he would get you to say just this. And just as you have said this by making a distinction, so you should notice this [next remark]. Nibbāna is said to be the cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, and the cessation of delusion, because passion etc. ceases on coming to nibbāna. All these three are terms for nibbāna alone.’

[The refutation continues in this form on the following subjects: ‘plurality of nibbāna’, ‘grossness’, ‘Change of Lineage (gotrabhū)’ and ‘the Noble Eightfold Path’, and finally the disputant (Vitaṇḍavādin) asked the kernel of the problem.]

This has been said, he (the disputant) says: ‘You say “on coming to, on coming to”. From where have you got this [word] called on coming to?’ ‘It is taken from a sutta.’ ‘Quote the sutta.’ ‘Thus ignorance and craving, on coming to this, are destroyed in this, are abolished in this, nor do they do anything anywhere.’ When this was said, the other speaker (the disputant) became silent.

The exegesis of the two nirvana theory in the Mahāvibhāṣāstrā
text

Introductory comment

According to the early canon (sūtra), there are two nirvana elements: nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu) and nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu) and so on.

Question: Why is this discourse composed [by the author of the Jñānaprasthāna]?

Answer: It is to clarify the complete meaning of the early canon (sūtra). Although the early canon (sūtras) says that there are two nirvana elements: nirvana with a remainder of clinging and nirvana without a remainder of clinging, it does not fully explain their meaning. Thus, ‘what is nirvana with a remainder of clinging?’ and ‘what is nirvana without a remainder of clinging?’ were fundamental questions for that treatise. Since they are not clarified [in the early canon], they are explained [in the Jñānaprasthāna].

Alternatively, we have seen above [in the Jñānaprasthāna] that ‘what is extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyaṇīrodha)? It is all extinction which is disjunction (visamyoga). Although this disjunction is nirvana, nirvana is of two kinds: with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣa) and
without a remainder of clinging (nirvan-upadhiśeṣa). The author [of the Jñānaprasthāna] here wants to establish the difference between the two.

Alternatively, it is to refute other systems’ opinions and to establish the correct theory. That is to say, [1] some say wrongly that nirvana with a remainder of clinging should be regarded as a real existent while nirvana without a remainder of clinging should not. The author refutes this opinion and makes clear that both nirvana elements should be regarded as a real existent. [2] Some say wrongly that the first is impure while the second is pure. The author refutes this opinion and makes it clear that both nirvana elements are pure. [3] Some say wrongly that the first is a conditioned thing while the second is an unconditioned thing. The author refutes this opinion and makes it clear that both nirvana elements are unconditioned things. [4] Some say wrongly that the first is good while the second is indefinable. The author refutes this opinion and makes it clear that both nirvana elements are in nature good. [5] Some say wrongly that the first is the path (mārga) while the second is the result of the path. The author refutes this opinion and makes it clear that both nirvana elements are the result of the path. [6] Some say wrongly that the first is the result of the path while the second is not. The author refutes this opinion and makes it clear that both nirvana elements are the result of the path. [7] Some say wrongly that the first is included in the noble truths (satyasamgrhīta) while the second is not. The author refutes this opinion and makes it clear that both nirvana elements are included in the noble truths. [8] Some say wrongly that the first is aśāikṣa while the second is naivaśāikṣanāśaikṣa. The author refutes this opinion and makes it clear that both nirvana elements are naivaśāikṣanāśaikṣa. For every reason mentioned above, the author [of the Jñānaprasthāna] made this discourse.

**Nirvana with a remainder of clinging**

What is nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu)? A saint (arahant) has completely extinguished his impurity (kṣīnāsrava); his vitality (āyus) alone exists; the series of primary elements (mahābhūtāni) and secondary matter (upādāyarūpa) have not yet become extinct; the mental series supported by the five faculties is active as there is still a remainder of clinging. The complete cessation of all fetters (saṃyojana) which is obtained (prāpta), possessed (pratilabdha), touched (sprṣta), and realised (sāksākṣita) [by this Arahant] is what is called nirvana with a remainder of clinging.

When saying vitality, the life faculty (jīvitendriya) is meant here.

**Question:** Why is the homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) not mentioned?
Answer: The author [of the Jñānaprasthāna] intended to do so and so on.

Alternatively, it is not mentioned as that meaning is surely known from the word ‘with a remainder’ (sa-śeṣa).

Alternatively, both the life faculty and homogeneous character are the result of action that projects existence (āksepakakarman). As the life faculty is exclusively maturation (vipāka), it is mentioned alone here [in the Jñānaprasthāna].

Depending on ‘with a remainder’, form (rūpa) and mind (citta) and so on are active (pravṛtti). As they have primary elements as their support, it is mentioned here first. From these primary elements, secondary matter is formed. From the secondary matter, mind (citta) and mental states (caitta) arise. As mind is a chief, it is mentioned alone here [in the Jñānaprasthāna].

‘Primary elements and secondary matter’ altogether designate the material body (rupakāya), while ‘the mental series supported by the five faculties’ designates mind (citta) and mental states (caitta).

Moreover there are the characteristics of arising and so on. They are not explained here since they are difficult to understand and they depend on the previous dharma.

The complete cessation of all fetters (saṃyojana) is obtained while the series of all dharmas becomes extinct. That is why it is called nirvana element with a remainder of clinging.

According to an opinion, primary elements and secondary matter are body (kāya), the five faculties are faculty (indriya) and the mental series is intellect (buddhi). The complete cessation of all fetters (saṃyojana) is obtained while the series of body, faculty and intellect becomes extinct. That is why it is called nirvana with a remainder of clinging. In this respect an early canon (sūtra) says, ‘As body, faculty and intellect becomes extinct it is called nirvana element with a remainder of clinging.’

When saying ‘as there still is a remainder of clinging’, clinging is of two kinds: the clinging as defilement (kleśopadhi) and the clinging as birth body (janmakāyopadhi). A saint (arahant) no longer has the first, clinging as defilement, but he still has the second, clinging as birth body. Alternatively, clinging is of two kinds: defiled (kliṣṭa) clinging and undefiled clinging. As a saint (arahant) no longer has the first while he still has the second, the complete cessation of all fetters (saṃyojana) is called nirvana with a remainder of clinging. The terms, obtained (prāpta), possessed (pratilabdha), touched (sprṣṭa) and realised (sākṣātkṛta), are different literally, but they are used in the same sense.

Nirvana without a remainder of clinging

What is nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa- dhātu)? A saint (arahant) has completely extinguished his impurity (ksīṃśastra); his vitality (āyus) has come to an end; the series of primary elements
(mahābhūtāni) and secondary matter (upādāyakūpa) has already been destroyed; the mind supported by the five faculties is no longer active as there is no remainder of clinging. The complete cessation of all fetters (ṣamyojana) is what is called nirvana without a remainder of clinging.29

When saying ‘vitality has come to an end’, it means that both the life faculty and homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) have already been destroyed, since both are the result of action that projects existence (āksepakarman). By saying the life faculty, moreover, one should know that it also implies homogeneous character.

‘The series of primary elements and secondary matter have already become extinct’ means that the series of material body has already been destroyed, while ‘the mind30 supported by the five faculties is no longer active’ means that the series of mind and mental states are no longer active.

It does not mention the characteristics of arising and so on. The reason is the same as before.

According to an opinion, primary elements and secondary matter are body (kāya), the five faculties are faculty (indriya) and the mental series is intellect (buddhi). The material body, the mind and mental states or the series of body, faculty and intellect have already become extinct. The complete cessation of all fetters (ṣamyojana) is called nirvana element without a remainder of clinging.

When a saint (arahant) is about to enter the state of nirvana (parinirvānakāle), wind31 in his body becomes an unhealthy condition (kalya). From the unhealthy condition, the internal fire weakens. From the weakening, food cannot be digested. From the indigestion, desire for food does not arise. Without desire for food, no more food is taken. Without food, the primary element is deteriorated (vipatti). From the deterioration, secondary matter and all faculties are also deteriorated. From the deterioration of faculties, mind and mental states no longer have their support32 and thus no longer continue. Without the continuation of mind and mental states, the life faculty and so on33 become destroyed. From the extinction of vitality and so on, he enters nirvana.

When saying ‘as there is no remainder of clinging’, no [remainder of] clinging is of two kinds: no clinging as defilement (kleśopadhi) or no clinging as birth body (jamnakāyopadhi). Alternatively, [no remainder of clinging is of two kinds:] no defiled (kliṣta) clinging or no undefiled clinging. As there is no remainder of clinging, the complete cessation of all fetters is called nirvana without a remainder of clinging.

*Question:* Why is ‘obtained (prāpta), possessed (pratilabdha), touched (sṛṣṭa) and realised (sākṣātkṛta)’ not mentioned here?

*Answer:* ‘Obtained and so on’ is used with reference to present acquisition (prāpti). It is not used when present acquisition ceases. Alternatively, ‘obtained
and so on’ is conventionally designated (prajñapti) in respect of a person (pudgala). There is no person but dharma in itself (dharmatā) in [nirvana without a remainder of clinging],34 it is not mentioned here.

Discussions of the two nirvana theory

Question: Can anyone admit that a saint (arahant) resides neither in nirvana with a remainder of clinging nor in nirvana without a remainder of clinging?35

Answer: It is impossible by reasoning, yet it is possible from the definitions given here. According to them, it is nirvana with a remainder of clinging when all three things are present, whereas it is nirvana without a remainder of clinging when one of three things is not present. [1] For a saint who is born in the world of formlessness, he does not reside in nirvana with a remainder of clinging since he cannot have a material body. As his mind is active, he does not reside in nirvana without a remainder of clinging. [2] For a saint who is born in the world of form and has entered the absorption of extinction (nirodhasamāpatti), he does not reside in nirvana with a remainder of clinging since his mind is not active. As there is a material body, he does not reside in nirvana without a remainder of clinging. [3] For a saint who is born in the world of desire but lacks his faculty, he does not reside in nirvana with a remainder of clinging since he cannot have the five faculties. As he has a material body he does not reside in nirvana without a remainder of clinging.

There is an opinion.36 The text should be written as follows: what is nirvana with a remainder of clinging? The complete cessation of all fetters (samyojana) is obtained (prāpta), possessed (pratilabda), touched (spṛṣṭa) and realised (sākṣātkṛta) by a saint while his vitality (āyus) alone exists. What is nirvana without a remainder of clinging? A saint whose vitality has already come to an end ceases all fetters completely.

In this way, when a saint is born in one of three worlds, whether he has a material body or not, whether his mind is active or not, whether he has the five faculties or not, he resides in nirvana with a remainder of clinging if his vitality exists. He resides in nirvana without a remainder of clinging if his vitality has come to an end. Although it should be written in this way, it is not written. That is why the author of this treatise37 gave this opinion for the sake of all disciples to understand [the two nirvana theory] easily.

Question: When disjunction (visamyoga) is attained by a pṛthagjana or śaikṣa, which nirvana elements does it belong to?38

Answer: It does not belong to either of the two nirvana elements. [1] When disjunction is attained by a pṛthagjana, it can only be called abandoning
SELECTED SOURCES FOR THE NIRVANA CONCEPT

(prahāna), detachment (virāga), cessation (nirodha) and noble truth (satya). However, it cannot be called the complete knowledge (pariṇāma), the result of religious life (śrāmāntyaphala), nirvana with a remainder of clinging, or nirvana without a remainder of clinging. [2] When disjunction is attained by a śaikṣa, it can only be called abandoning, detachment, cessation and noble truth. It can be called the complete knowledge and the result of religious life in some cases, while it cannot in other cases. However, it cannot be nirvana with a remainder of clinging, or nirvana without a remainder of clinging. [3] When disjunction is attained by an aśaikṣa, it can only be called abandoning, detachment, cessation, noble truth, the complete knowledge and the result of religious life. In a certain moment it can be called nirvana with a remainder of clinging. In a certain moment it can be called nirvana without a remainder of clinging.

The debate on nirvana in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

[Vaibhāṣikas] Then if nirvana is only non-arising, how are we to interpret this statement in the sūtra:40 ‘these five faculties if practised, cultivated and developed conduce to the abandonment of past, future and present suffering’? As nirvana is abandonment and is the non-arising only of future, is it not of past and present?41

[Sautrāntikas] This is true.42 However, the abandonment of suffering is caused by the abandonment of the defiling passions towards their objects:43 the blessed one said ‘Abandon desire and passion for form (rūpa). When desire and passion have been abandoned, then what is form will be abandoned by you and comprehended [by you. The same is said in turn of feeling, apperception, mental formations] and consciousness.’44 In this way, the abandonment of suffering in all three times is applicable.

[Vaibhāṣikas] Then, could one say ‘to the abandonment of past, future and present defilement’?

[Sautrāntikas] Here also the interpretation is the same. Alternatively this is the intention: past defilement would be of former lives and present defilement would be of the present life, just like the eighteen speculations of craving among the speculations of craving:45 ‘in view of past time’ is said with regard to past life, and the same with regard to present [life]. And by the two kinds [past and present] of defilements, the state of being seed,46 is planted in this series to arise in future. Through the abandonment of that [seed], that [defilement] too is abandoned. In the same way that through exhausting maturation (vipāka), action is exhausted. Further, abandonment is the absolute non-arising of future suffering or defilement because of the absence of the state of being seed (bījabhāva). Otherwise what of past and present defilement is there to be abandoned? Indeed, there is no profit in
making an effort concerning what has already ceased and what is on the point of ceasing.47

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[Vaibhāṣikas] While the blessed one said ‘some dharmas are conditioned and some unconditioned, detachment is called the best of them’,48 if unconditioned things simply do not exist, how can there be a non-existence best of non-existent things?

[Sautrāntikas] We do not say that ‘the unconditioned does not exist at all’. This is, however, such a thing in the way we said. For example, it is said that ‘there is prior non-existence of sound’ and ‘there is non-existence after its occurrence’.

Moreover, the existence of the non-existence is not proved. The unconditioned should also be seen in that way. And a certain non-existence becomes the most commendable thing; that is to say, the absolute non-existence of all trouble. It should receive praise as the highest thing of all in order to enamour trainees of it.

[Vaibhāṣikas] If unconditioned things were mere non-existence, [the third noble truth of] cessation would not be a noble truth.49 For are you saying that that [truth] is nothing?

[Sautrāntikas] What is, then, the meaning of truth? Surely meaning what is not contradicted.50 And both these uncontradicted things have been seen by the noble ones that suffering is suffering and that the non-existence of suffering is non-existence. How does this contradict the fact that these are noble truths?

[Vaibhāṣikas] How could something be called both non-existence and the third noble truth?

[Sautrāntikas] It is said that it was seen and taught immediately after the second, so it becomes the third.

[Vaibhāṣikas] If unconditioned thing is mere non-existence, the consciousness that has space or nirvana as its object would have non-existence as its object.

[Sautrāntikas] We will be concerned with this when we are dealing with the existence of past and future.51

[Vaibhāṣikas] But if when is unconditioned were considered as a real existent (dravya), what would happen?

[Sautrāntikas] Well, what would happen?
[Vaibhāṣikas] The Vaibhāṣikas’ opinion would be protected.

[Sautrāntikas] If protection is the concern, gods will protect it (the Vaibhāṣikas’ opinion). Moreover, it would be falsely imagined.

[Vaibhāṣikas] Why is that?

[Sautrāntikas] Because neither is an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) perceived, like the form (rūpa), feeling and the like, nor is an activity perceived, like that of the eye and the like.52

* * *

[Vaibhāṣikas] How is the genitive case understood in the sentence, ‘This is the cessation of that (vastu)?’53

[Sautrāntikas] There is indeed no relationship of this [cessation] with that [thing] because there can be no state of being related as the result of a cause and the like. But mere negation, ‘the non-existence of that’, is applicable!

[Vaibhāṣikas] The cessation that is attained through the cutting off of the acquisition of defilement, even in another existence, is designated as being of that [thing].54

[Sautrāntikas] In that case, what is the cause of limiting the acquisition of this [thing]?

[Vaibhāṣikas] The sūtra talks about ‘A monk who has attained nirvana in the present life’.55 In that case how could he have the acquisition of non-existence?

[Sautrāntikas] It is said that nirvana is attained through acquiring the basis (āśraya)56 that prevents completely the arising of defilement and future life, by acquiring an antidote.

Moreover, an āgama57 shows clearly that it is mere non-existence. It indeed says thus: ‘That which is entire abandonment, relinquishment, coming to an end, exhaustion, detachment, cessation, tranquilization, disappearance of [even] the smallest suffering, and non-connection, non-arising, non-appearance of other suffering, that is lovely, that is excellent – that is to say, abandonment of all conditions, perishing of desire, detachment, cessation, nirvana.’

* * *

[Vaibhāṣikas] Why do you not want to interpret it as ‘because it does not appear in that, it is non-appearance’?

123
[Sautrāntikas] We do not consider this locative case possible.

[Vaibhāṣikas] What do you mean?

[Sautrāntikas] If when one says ‘It does not appear in that [nirvana]’ it is further meant that ‘that [nirvana]’ exists, then it would follow that attachment permanently does not appear, since nirvana is permanent.

When one says, then, ‘obtained’, that is to say, ‘that [nirvana] was obtained’ is referred to, you should admit ‘the non-appearance of suffering’ when the noble path is or attained.58 [In other words, the non-appearance of suffering is obtained by a separately existing dharma called nirvana, but by the presence of the noble path.] And this simile is thus well adduced. ‘Like the going out of a lamp, his mind becomes liberated.’59 As the going out of a lamp is non-existence (abhāva), in that way the mind of even the blessed was liberated.60

The interpretation of Anuruddha’s verse in the Nyāyānusāraśāstra61

In addition, you should admit that nirvana is mere non-existence from the following well explained sūtra: ‘His mind was liberated like the going out of a lamp.’ The [Sautrāntikas] think that as the blowing out of a lamp should only be admitted as the extinction of fire without any separate entity, the liberation attained by the mind of blessed one is only the extinction of all aggregates without any [separate entity].

The first counterargument

Masters of Abhidharma have already gone through these texts. In other words, when one says the cessation of suffering (duhkha), the meaning is of two kinds: there is no separate entity apart from suffering and there is a separate entity apart from suffering. The Buddha saw various mental dispositions of those who are to be trained (vineya). That is why he taught two different meanings of the cessation. He sometimes taught there is no separate entity: for example, the two sūtras mentioned above.62 By contrast, he sometimes taught there is a separate entity: for example, the sūtras saying there is certainly the place where there is no birth; the sūtras saying there is sphere (āyatana) and is escape (niḥsarana)63; the sūtras saying I saw that there really is a thing (padārtha), the unconditioned (asamskṛta), that is to say nirvana; and the sūtras saying the cessation is said only by reason of the cessation of five aggregates as fuel. The sūtras of these kinds are so numerous that our system cannot be contradicted by the holy teaching.

The second counterargument

In addition, the going out of a lamp is mentioned in the sūtra because there is a separate entity apart from the lamplight; that is to say, the characteristic of
impermanence (anityatālakṣaṇa). How the example given by the [Sautrāntikas] can be contradicted by this meaning! Moreover, even if there is no separate entity, it is not a non-existence. It is due to the fact that all conditioning factors (saṃskāra) have the characteristic of impermanence (anityatālakṣaṇa). Its intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is not a non-existence.64 By considering this, there is no fault [in our system].

The third counterargument

The sūtra mentioned above cannot be enough to establish that the going out of a lamp is mere non-existence. The sūtra only represents the moment of entering nirvana without a remainder of clinging (nirupadhiṃśeṣanirvāṇadhūtu).65 Thus, it is to inform people of the fact that there is a cutting without a remainder of all clinging through abandoning one by one and so on. Thus, there is no contradiction.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 Akb-h pp. 133, 185, 235, 331, 333. Also see Sa-d p. 254, Sa-w p. 172.
2 Mv (TD27 403a):
3 Vin I p. 10, MA (TD1 468b).
4 SA (TD2 88b).
5 tasmād ābhīprāyikah sūtraṃ nirdeśo lākṣanikas tv abhīdharme, Akb-h p. 333.
6 See also ‘Upādisesa within the context of nirvāṇa’ in Chapter 2.
7 See La Vallée Poussin (1923: 908–10).
10 The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and Its Western Interpreters by Guy Richard Welbon.
12 Vibh pp. 72–3, 89, SN IV pp. 251–2.
17 Lamotte (1973: 8).
18 La Vallée Poussin (1928: 670–1).
19 Oldenberg (1882: 427–45).
20 Lovejoy (1898).
21 Masefield (1979).
22 EA (TD2 579a).
23 BUCD, CSCD and PTSCD.
24 SLTP.
25 CETSCD.
26 Schrader (1905: 167–70).
27 Harvey (1990: 66–7).
28 DN II p. 157, MN I pp. 487–8, SN I p. 159, AN I p. 236, AN IV p. 3, Th p. 84,
   Thī p. 116, Sn pp. 41, 206 and so on.

1 NIRVANA AND ITS REFERENCE

1 ‘We know what nirvāṇa is as well as the Buddhists themselves did, and it is not our fault if we are not able to give an unambiguous statement. The Buddhist felt satisfied with a description which does not satisfy us, because, whereas we have been for centuries trained to make our ideas clear, this was not the case with the
Indians; and also because we look at the Buddhist doctrines from the outside, without in the least believing in them: whereas nirvana is for us a mere object of archaeological interest, it is for Buddhists of paramount practical importance. Our business is to study what nirvana may be; the business of a Buddhist is to reach nirvana – a very different thing.’ ERE p. 376.

2 He suggested nir vr (to cover) from the fact that nibbuta (sk. nivrta), the past participle of nir vr, is widely used in the meanings, such as extinguished (of fire), cooled, quenched, desireless, appeased, pleased and happy (PED pp. 362, 366).

3 The root vr takes the suffix -na either for the past passive participle or to make adjectives and nouns. There seems to be in Pali no example yet discovered of nibba or parinibba used as a past passive participle or an adjective (Collins 1998: 195).


5 Norman (1993: 221–3).

6 Thomas (1927: 187).

7 MN I p. 140, SN III p. 109, see also Thomas (1933: 125–6).

8 Although ‘the idea that nibba applies to an experience in life whereas parinibba applies to the experience at death is widespread’, the latter is in fact just the synonym of the former and the difference between the two is simply a grammatical one: ‘pari compounded with a verb converts the verb from the expression of a state to the expression of the achievement of an action’, and thus the former is ‘the state of release’; the latter is ‘the attaining of that state’ (Norman 1993: 216–17).

9 I discuss this in detail in ‘Upadisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.

10 Thomas (1933: 123).

11 ERE 7, p. 468 (quoted from Thomas 1933: 119).

12 For the difference between Jainism and Buddhism. See ‘Upadisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.

13 Zaehner (1973: 10).

14 Tr. from Edgerton (1952: 57). ‘24 Yo ’ntahsukho ’ntarārāmas tathā ’ntariyotīr eva yah sa yogi brahmānirvāṇam brahmabhūto ’dhibacchati. 25 Labhante brahmānirvāṇam ṭayaḥ kṣīnakamasaḥ chinnadvaḍīḍhā yatātmānaḥ sarvabhūtahite ratāḥ. 26 Kāmakrodhaviyuktānāṁ yatātmānaḥ yatacetasāṁ abhito brahmānirvāṇam varitāte viditātmām.’


17 See ‘Upadisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.


20 Vin I pp. 34–5, SN IV p. 19.

21 See ‘Upadisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.


24 SN IV pp. 251–2.

25 Vibh pp. 72–3, Vibh p. 89.

26 See also ‘The Pali abhidhamma works’ in Chapter 3.

27 SN IV pp. 251–2.

28 SA (TD2 126b).

29 Mv (TD27 147b): 閛以何義故名曰涅槃。答照行滅故名為涅槃。復次火息故名為涅槃。復次相寂故名為涅槃。復次離臭穢故名為涅槃。復次離諸趣故名為涅槃。復次離名雜林故名涅槃。復次離名顯林故名涅槃。復次離名義林。涅名為出。出離雜林故名涅槃。復次離名義林。涅名為不。以不義名為涅槃。如是有義照行者便為涅槃。無為不然。如是若有照行者便為涅槃。無學
NOTES

無有業煩惱故不識生死。故名涅槃。復次槃名後有。涅名為無。無後有故名為涅槃。復次槃名繫縛。涅名為離。離繫縛故名為涅槃。復次槃名一切生死苦樂。涅名超度。超度一切生死苦樂故名涅槃。See also Mv (TD27 163a–b): ‘Question: why is extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhya-nirodha) is also called nirvana? Answer: vāna means destiny (gati) and nir means exit. As it is the absolute exit from all destinies, it is called nirvana. Vāna means bad odor (durgandha) and nir means negation. As being absolute without all bad smelling action (karma) and defilements (kleśa), it is called nirvana. Vāna means forest and nir means absolute separation. As being absolutely separated from the forest of the aggregates covered with all triple fires and three characteristics, it is called nirvana. Vāna means weaving and nir means negation. As being absolutely without action (karma) and defilements (kleśa) one does not have to be woven into life and death through the result of maturation (vipāka). This is why it is called nirvana.’

33 Dhp-a III 424.
34 See also this chapter, note 29.

2 THE TWO NIRVANA THEORY IN THE EARLY CANON

1 See Oldenberg (1882: 437), Lovejoy (1898: 133–4) and Norman (1993: 215).
3 Th-a I p. 46, Dhp-a II p. 163.
4 Th-a I p. 46, Dhp-a II p. 163.
6 Oldenberg (1882: 427–45).
7 Lovejoy (1898).
8 Masefield (1979).
9 In AN IV pp. 74–9, two kinds of a saint, ubhatobhāgavimutta and paññāvimutta are described as anupādisesa, while kāyasakkhin, dīṭṭhipatta, sādhi-vimutta, dhammānusārin and anīmittavāhārin are described as saupādisesa. In AN IV pp. 379–81, five sub-divisions of non-returner, i.e. antarāparinibbāyin, upahaccararipinibbāyin, asaṅkhārāparinibbāyin, sasaṅkhārāparinibbāyin and akeniṭṭhagāmin; a once-returner (sakadāgāmin); and three kinds of stream-enterer (soṭāpanna), i.e. ekābhiṣin, koḷan̄kola and sattakkhattuparama are described as saupādisesa.
10 In the early canon, aṭṭhā is sometimes used where the word arahant is expected (MN I pp. 445, 465, 466, SN II p. 224). See also BD p. 17, Horner (1936: 161), Katz (1982: 19–20).
11 One of two fruits is to be expected: perfect knowledge (aṭṭhā) in this very life, or if there is a remainder of clinging (upādisesa), the state of non-return (dvinnam phalaśānam aṭṭhataram phalaṃ pāṭikaṃkham: dīṭṭhe va dhamme aṭṭhā, sati vā upādisese anāgāmita, DN II p. 314, MN I pp. 62, 63, 481, SN V pp. 129, 181, 236, 313, AN III pp. 82, 143, AN V p. 108. It pp. 39, 40, 41). This passage was used as major textual evidence by Oldenberg (1882: 435), Lovejoy (1898: 134) and Masefield (1979: 221).
12 Masefield (1979: 224).
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13 Huzita (1988: 8).
15 Thomas (1927: 190–1).
17 Modern scholars tend to agree on this point. See Cone (2000: 482) and Lovejoy (1898: 134).
18 PED p. 149.
20 Such scholars as Böhtlingk, Childers and Rhys Davids regard upadhi as the Pāli representative of Skt. upādhi, which is a technical term in the Nyāya and in the Sāṃkhya, where it signifies the elements of phenomenal existence (Lovejoy 1898: 134) or, particularly in Indian logic, ‘a condition with the help of which an invalid argument may turn valid’ (Hidenori 1966: 436).
21 Dhs pp. 212–13. Also see BD p. 228.
22 CPD p. 453.
23 PED p. 142.
26 CPD p. 453.
28 Mv (TD 27 168a). See ‘The development of the two nirvana theory in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra’ in Chapter 5.
32 AN IV pp. 379–81.
33 See this chapter, note 20.
34 Vin I pp. 34–5, SN IV p. 19.
36 ābhīprāyiko hi sūtraṇirdeśāḥ, no lākṣanikāḥ, yathā abhidharmāḥ (Sa-d p. 254, Sa-w p. 172). Also see Akb-h pp. 133, 185, 235, 331, 333.
37 Part of the reason why a fire image is used could be that his audience had practised the fire cult (jaṭīlas); he wanted to make ‘a deep impression on them to hear fire spoken of in this profound philosophical sense’ (Schumann 1989: 87).
39 ‘The fires number three because the Buddha was alluding to a set of three fires which the brahmin householder was committed to keeping alight and tending daily, so that they came to symbolise life in the world, life as a family man’, Gombrich (1996: 66).
40 See Table 2.1, p. 22.
41 SN III p. 71.
43 Nyānamoli (1962: 26 note 78/2).
44 MN II pp. 256–60.
45 Oldenberg (1882: 436–7) in fact used this simile to prove that the word upādi has a moral sense, like fetters, rather than a physical sense, i.e. the aggregates.
46 ... sallam abbaheyya apaneyya visadosaḥ sa-upādisesaḥ anupādiseso tī maṇṇamāno ... apanīto visadoso anupādiseso, analaṅca me antarāyāti ... MN II p. 257.
48 The Ben-shi-jing ([/*null/nonmarkingreturn]: TD17 667–8).
50 Huzita (1988: 8).
51 SN IV pp. 19–20. In the Ādittapariyāya, all six faculties are mentioned as the sermon is applied to ordinary monks, whereas in this case, only the sense faculties are mentioned as it is applied to a saint who has achieved a firm control of his mind.
54 Typically stated as ‘birth is destroyed, the holy life is fulfilled, what should be done is done, there is no more [birth] in this world’ (SN II p. 22, III pp. 45, 53, 71, 90, 224, IV pp. 2, 3, 20, 24, 26 etc.).
55 piṭṭhī me āgilāyati tam aham āyamissāmīti, SN IV p. 184.
56 SA (TD2: 71c9, TD2: 87c–88a). For more information, see Lamotte (1988: 60, 110 note 80).
57 cakkhu ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjatti cakkhuviññā; tīṇYNAM samgati phasso; phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā tanhā ... (MN III p. 282, SN II pp. 72–5, SN IV pp. 32–3, 87, 90).
59 yaṃ vedeti tam sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti tam vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi tam papañceti, MN I pp. 111–12.
60 Hamilton (2000: 30).
63 Bronkhorst (1986: 95).
64 cetanāhāṃ bhikkhave kammas vaddā; cetayitvā kammas karoti kāyena vācāya manasā, AN III p. 415. Peter Harvey takes cetanā to mean ‘will’ so that it will be translated as ‘It is will that I call action. Having willed, one acts through body, speech or mind.’
65 See Bronkhorst (1986: 31).
66 Horner (1936: 64–74).
67 In general, see BD pp. 23–6.
68 AN IV pp. 379–81.
69 AN IV pp. 74–9.
NOTES

72 I am largely following Dutt (1960: 252–71), Katz (1982: 83–95) and BD.
73 Whether this is the highest of the puthujjana or the lowest of noble persons is still problematic. See Dutt (1960: 253–4), Katz (1982: 92–3).
74 The spiritual faculties are five: faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and insight.
75 According to Gombrich (1996: 107–10) these two terms originally referred to the same person. Also see Katz (1982: 93).
76 The pure faculties (anāsavindriyā) are anuññātānīnassāmūtindriya, aṁnāndriya, and aṁnātāvindriya. See Horner (1936: 161–77).
77 Katz (1982: 94) regards kola and ekabhin as sub-categories of a once-returner (sakadāgāmin).
78 In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, antarāparinirvāyin is interpreted as ‘one who obtains nirvana in the intermediate existence’ (La Vallée Poussin 1923: 966). For antarāpaṁparinibbāyin, see Somaratne (1999: 121–54).
79 In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, upapadāparinirvāyin is interpreted as ‘one who obtains nirvana immediately after being reborn’ (La Vallée Poussin 1923: 966).
80 For these two releases, see Gombrich (1996: 110–34).
81 The old list of the seven noble persons can be found in MN I p. 477. See also Gombrich (1996: 96–107).
83 It does not mean that the person has acquired the faculty of faith only, but means that he is also under the impulse of another four faculties (La Vallée Poussin 1923: 1016).
84 In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (La Vallée Poussin 1923: 977–9, 1016), kāyasākṣin is the one who has realised nirodhasamāpatti. See this chapter, note 69.
85 AN IV (tr. Hare) p. 45 note 5. See also Gombrich (1996: 104).
86 The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (La Vallée Poussin 1923: 1016) does not specifically mention the faculty of insight. If we follow the traditional list of the seven noble persons, it could be saddhānusārīn.
87 AN IV p. 75 note 2 (tr. Mrs E. M. Hare in PTS edition).
89 See this chapter, note 20.
90 AN IV p. 75. See also Gombrich (1996: 104).
93 See this chapter, note 20.
98 Pp p. 17.
99 Ds (TD26: 463c). It also shows the old explanation of a once-returner: the attenuation of passion, hatred, and delusion (Ds TD26: 465a).
100 SN V p. 200. See also SN V pp. 193–4, SN V pp. 204–5.
101 See also Katz (1982: 87).
102 SN V pp. 204–5.
103 See Table 2.2, p. 25.
NOTES

104 yato kho bhikkhave ariyasāvako imesām channam indriyānaṁ samudayaṁca atthagamaṁca assādaṁca ādinavaṁca nissaraṁca yathābhūtaṁ pajānāti; ayaṁ vuccati bhikkhave ariyasāvako sotāpanno . . . SN V p. 205.

105 SN V p. 207.

106 yato kho bhikkhave bhikkhu imesām channam indriyānaṁ samudayaṁca atthagamaṁca assādaṁca ādinavaṁca nissaraṁca yathābhūtaṁ viditvā anupādā vimutto hoti; ayaṁ vuccati bhikkhave bhikkhu arahāṁ . . . SN V pp. 205, 206.

107 SN V p. 208.

108 BD pp. 78–9.

109 For the three pure faculties, see Horner (1936: 161–77).


112 SN V pp. 222–3.

113 Jp (TD26: 994b–c).


115 See Table 2.2, p. 25.

116 Lovejoy (1898: 136).

117 Oldenberg (1882: 438).


119 It p. 38.

120 SN II p. 83.

121 DN III p. 135.


123 Sn 354 (p. 64).


128 dvimmam phalānaṁ aṁhātarāṁ phalaṁ pāṭikaṁkhaṇaṁ: diṭṭhe va dhamme aṁnā, sati vā upādīsesa anāgāmitā, DN II p. 314; MN I pp. 62, 63, 481; SN V pp. 129, 181, 236, 313; AN III pp. 82, 143; AN V p. 108; It pp. 39, 40, 41.

129 See Figure 2.

130 Horner (1936: 225–6).


132 See this chapter, note 96.

133 SN V pp. 69–70.

134 SN V p. 237.


136 SN V p. 314.

137 SN V pp. 69–70.

138 Paṭikāca given from the PTS edition could not be the right reading since it does not make sense. It is instead paṭikācca given by CSTD and BUCD to mean ‘earlier, beforehand, previously’.

139 DA (TD1 75a), SA (TD2 196b).

140 AN pp. 71–2.

141 MA (TD1 427b–c).

142 See this chapter, note 124.

143 SN V p. 285.

144 SA (TD2 196b–c).

145 See this chapter, note 49.
3 DEVELOPMENTS OF THE TWO NIRVANA THEORY

NOTES

3 DN III pp. 207–71.
4 DA (TD1 49b–52c).
6 Dhs pp. 192–3, Vibh p. 89, Dhātuk p. 7. See also Bareau (1951: 23–9).
8 MN III p. 63. It is also seen in DN III p. 274.
9 Bareau (1951: 22–35).
11 Dhātuk p. 5: asaṅkhatam khandhato ṭhapetvā.
12 Vibh pp. 72–3.
13 Vibh p. 89.
14 SN IV pp. 251–2.
15 Vibh pp. 72–3, 89.
16 Kv pp. 225–7. According to the Pali commentarial tradition, the opponents were the Mahīṃsāsakas and the Andhakas (Aung and Rhys Davids 1915: 136). Thus, both sects regard the two extinctions as nirvana, while only patisāṅkhānirodha (extinction through knowledge) is the equivalent of nirvana in the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma.
17 Kv p. 226: attī dvīnam nibbānānam uccanīcatā hiṇapaṇītatā ukkaṃsāvakaṃso sīmā vā bheda vā rājī vā antarīkṣā vā ti?
18 See also Cousins (1983: 104).
20 EOB p. 149.
21 buddhādināṃ niṭṭhāya visesābhāvato ekā va niṭṭhā . . . Vism p. 432.
22 Pk (TD26 723c, 766b), Mv (TD27 65b–c, 662a). I discuss the placement of the unconditioned in ‘Nirvana and space in the Pali abhidharma tradition’ in Chapter 4.
24 Frauwallner (1995: 4–5, 135–47). The Theravādins also established that unconditioned elements are different from the five aggregates (Cousins 1983: 102).
25 The author of the Ju-she-lun-ji (俱舍論記), one of the Chinese commentaries on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.
29 Pk (TD26 692b).
31 Ds (TD26 505a). It says that while conditioned things (samskrta) constitute five aggregates, unconditioned things (asamskrta) are space (ākāśa) and two extinctions: extinction without knowledge (apratisamkhyānirodha) and extinction through knowledge (pratisamkhyānirodha), which is the same as nirvana.
33 Pk (TD26 692b–c).
34 Paṭīs II 178.
37 Mv (TD27 163a–b).
38 Pk (TD26 694b), Jp (TD26 923b).

134
39 yaḥ sāsravair dharmaṁ visaṁyogaṁ sa pratisaṁkhyaṁ niruddhā duḥkhādīnāṁ
āryasyatvānāṁ pratisaṁkhyaṁ nāma prajñāvīśesaṁ tena pāpyo nirodhāṁ
pratisaṁkhyaṁmadhyapadaloḍhaṁ gorāvahat, Akb-p p. 4.
40 Oxcart is a cart pulled by an ox. Thus the middle word ‘pulled by’ is said to be
elided in the compound. Likewise, extinction through knowledge is extinction
attained by knowledge. The middle word ‘attained by’ is said to be elided.
41 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 206–19).
42 This example is not found in the Abhidharmapiṭakas of the Sarvāstivādins but is
in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra (Mv TD27 164b), the exegesis of the Jñānaprasthāna,
and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Akb-d p. 5, La Vallée Poussin (1923: 60)).
45 Mv (TD27 333c–334a), La Vallée Poussin (1923: 949–50).
46 I deal with this matter in detail in ‘Nirvana in Northern Buddhist schools’ in
Chapter 5.
47 Mv (TD27 162a).
48 For the relationship between extinction through knowledge and two nirvana
elements, see ‘The development of the two nirvana theory in the
Mahāvibhāṣāstra’ in Chapter 5.
51 See ‘The Theravāda exegetical position on nirvana’ in Chapter 4.
52 Jp (TD26 923b): 云何有餘依涅槃界, 答若阿羅漢諸漏永盡. 命命猶存. 大種造色
相續未斷. 依五根身心相續轉. 有餘依故. 諸結永盡得獲證名有餘依涅槃界. 云
何無餘依涅槃界. 答即阿羅漢諸漏永盡. 命命已滅大種造色相續已斷. 依五根身
心不復轉. 無餘依故. 諸結永盡名無餘依涅槃界.
53 It p. 38.
54 See ‘The Theravāda exegetical tradition’ in this chapter.
55 Pe p. 124.
56 Pe p. 124.
57 It p. 38.
58 See ‘The Theravāda exegetical position on nirvana without a remainder of cling-
ing’ in Chapter 4.
59 See ‘Upādisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.
60 See this chapter, p. 00.
61 Mv (TD27 p. 169b).
64 Jp (TD26 923b).
65 MN I p. 295. See also Jaini (1959: 539).
66 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 233).
67 āyu usmāca viṁśatāṁ, yadā kāyaṁ jahantimaṁ, apaviddho tadā seti, parabhattam
acetanaṁ, SN III p. 143.
68 Although this stanza uses the word ‘food for others’ (parabhattam), the quoted
stanza in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Akb-h p. 73) uses the word ‘like a piece of
wood’ (vathā kāṣṭham) which could be originated from a dialogue in the
Mahāvīrālasutta (MN I p. 296).
69 See ‘Upādisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.
70 Mv (TD27 168a). For the life faculty and homogeneous character see Cox
71 Th-a I p. 46, Dhp-a II p. 163.
72 Masefield (1979: 217).
NOTES

73 See this chapter, note 21.
75 See this chapter, note 46.
78 uddhāṃ pavattikhhandhānaṃ amuppādaṇaṃ uppannānaṃ ca antaradāhāna, Vism p. 432.
79 The variants Kaccāna, Kaccāyana and Mahā-Kaccāyana can be disregarded (Nyānamolī 1962: xxvii).
81 Ud p. 57.
88 yā nītanthātā ayam saupādisesā nibbānadhātu. bhedā kāyassa ayam anupādisesā nibbānadadhātu, Nett p. 38.
89 Mv (TD27 169a).
90 ettāvatā bhikkhu katakicco bhavati. esā sopādisesā nibbānadhātu. tassa āyupārīdānā jīvitindriyassa uparodhā idaṁca dukkham nirujjhati, aṇṇaṁca dukkham na uppajjati. tattha so imeṣam khandhānaṃ dhātu-āyatanaṃ nirodho vūpasamo aṇṇesaṅca khandhādhatu-āyatanaṃ appatīsandihi apātubhavo, ayam anupādisesā nibbānadadhātu (Pe p. 124).
91 Jp (TD26 923b).
93 It p. 38.
94 uddhāṃ pavattikhhandhānaṃ amuppādaṇaṃ uppannānaṃ ca antaradāhāna, Vism p. 432.
95 Sn p. 84 (tr. Norman 1992: 51).
96 samyojanakkhayantena cettha saupādisesā nibbānadhātu, jātikkhayantena anupādisesā vuttā, Sn-a II p. 410.
97 See ‘Nirvana from the Sautrāntika ontological perspective’ in Chapter 5.
98 parinibbutoti dve parinibbāṇi kilesaparinibbaṇa, yā saupādisesanibbānadhātu, khandhaparinibbāṇa, yā anupādisesanibbānadadhātu, Th-a I 45.
99 Dhp-a II p. 162.
100 upadhiṣābdenātmaprajñātipinimittāh pānopādanānaskandhā ucyyante, Mmd-p p. 519. For the compound, the five aggregates as fuel, see ‘Upādisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.

4 NIRVANA IN THE THERAVĀDA BUDDHIST TRADITION

1 Schrader (1905: 167–70).
2 Schrader (1905: 167).
3 [‘The paramātman is like] a fire, the fuel of which has been consumed’ (Svētāsvatara Upaniṣad 6, 19); ‘that self is pure spirit, like fire after it has burnt what it had to burn’ (Nṛsinhottaratātipī Upaniṣad 2); and ‘as fire for want of fuel comes to rest in its own birthplace, so for the cessation of its motions the thinking principle comes to rest in its own birthplace’ (Maitrī Upaniṣad 6.34). See Schrader (1905: 167–8), Thanissaro (1993: 15–20).
4 AN III 340–1.
NOTES

36 MN I p. 484.
37 MN I p. 487: sace te Vaccha purato so aggi nibbāyeeya jāneeyyāsi tvam: ayaṁ me purato aggi nibbuto ti. sace me bho Gotama purato so aggi nibbāyeeya jāneeyyāham: ayaṁ me purato aggi nibbuto ti. sace pana tam Vaccha evam puccheyya: yo te ayaṁ purato aggi nibbuto so aggi ito katamaṁ disam gato, puratthimaṁ vā pacchimaṁ vā uttaram vā dakkhiṇam vā ti, evam puṭṭho tvam Vaccha kinti byākareyyaṁiti. na upeti bho Gotama. yaṁ hi so bho Gotama aggi tinakaṭṭhupādānam paṭicca ajali, tassa ca pariyādānaṁ aññassā ca anupahāra anāhāro nibbuto teva sākanhaṁ gacchatīti. evam eva kho Vaccha yena rūpena tathāgatam paññāpayamāno paññāpeyya tvam rūpaṁ tathāgatassā paññānaṁ uccinnamūlam tālāvatthukatam anabhāvakatam āyatim anuppādadhāmannā...
38 See ‘Buddhist methodology’ in this chapter.
39 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 284).
40 See this chapter, note 23: soul (ātman) is presupposed within the question of Moliya Phagguna.
41 SN II p. 12, SA (TD2 102a).
42 SA (TD2 246a).
43 Rahula (1967: 42).
44 See ‘Upādiseṣa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.
45 SN IV pp. 399–400: alaṁ hi te Vaccha kankhashiṁ atām vicikhiṁ chiṁ. kankhāniye ca pana te thāne vicikhiṁ chā uppannā. suapādanassa kkhāham Vaccha upapattim paññāpemi no anupādanassa. syyathāpi Vaccha aggi sa-upādāno jalati no anupādāno. evem eva kkhvāham Vaccha sa-upādānassa upapattim paññāpemi no anupādanassā ti. yasmim pana bho Gotama samayeacci vātena khittā dūram pi gacchati. Imassa pana bhavām Gotamo kim upādānamassim paññāpeeti ti. yasmim kho Vaccha samayeacci vātena khittā dūram pi gacchati tam ahaṁ vātupādanān vaddūmi vato hissa Vaccha tasmiṁ samaye upādānam hoti ti. yasmim ca pana bho Gotama samayema imaṁ ca kāyam nikkhipati satto ca aṁnataram kāyam anuppanno hoti. imassa pana bhavām Gotamo kim upādānamassim paññāpeeti ti. yasmim kho Vaccha samaye imaṁ ca kāyam nikkhipati satto ca aṁnataram kāyam anuppanno hoti. tam ahaṁ taṁhupādanān vaddūmi. taṁhā hissa Vaccha tasmiṁ samaye upādānam hoti ti.
48 MN III p. 245 (quoted from Collins (1998: 191)).
49 See this chapter, note 37.
50 See this chapter, note 23.
52 Schrader (1905: 167–8).
53 See this chapter, note 3.
54 SU I 13 (tr. Olivelle).
56 In the later thought the term liṅga has the technical meaning of ‘subtle form’ (Olivelle 1996: 387).
57 BAU I 4 6 (tr. Olivelle).
59 SU I 15–16.
61 Vin I p. 196.
NOTES


67 PED p. 350.


69 Cul p. 181: nāmakāyā vimutto ti so muni pakatiyā pubb’ eva rūpakayā vimutto tadanā samatikkamā vikkhampanapahānena pāhino . . .

70 The commentary of the Cullānidesa also confirms this point (Sdp III p. 32).

71 MN III p. 245, SN II pp. 399–400.

72 See this chapter, notes 37, 45.

73 SU I 13 (tr. Olivelle): ‘When a fire is contained within its womb (yoni), one cannot see its visible form and yet its essential character (liṅga) is not extinguished; one can grasp the fire once again from its womb by means of tinder.’

74 See ‘The image of a fire in the early Upaniṣads’ in this chapter.

75 The noun nibbāna is derived from the negative prefix nir plus the root vā (to blow).

76 MWD p. 122.

77 AN II p. 51.

78 Nyāṇamoli (1976: 577 note 16). I discuss this matter in detail at the end of this chapter.

79 The stanza used in Sanskrit was Pradyotasyeva nirvāṇam vimokṣas tasya cetasa iti. It was used by Vasubandhu in a debate on the ontological issue of nirvana against the Sarvāstivādins in the second chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Akb-p p. 94, La Vallée Poussin 1923: 285). His opinion was later contested by Saṅghabhadra in his Nyāyānaśārasāstra (Na TD29 pp. 432c–433a). This stanza was also quoted in the Prasannapadā, the commentary on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Mmd-p p. 525, Stcherbatsky 1968: 201). I discuss this ontological issue in ‘Interpretation of Anuruddha’s verse’ in Chapter 5.

80 DN II p. 157, SN I p. 159, Th p. 84, Thī p. 116:nāhu assāsapassāso thiṭacittassa tādino, anejo santimārabba cakkhumā parinibbuto. asallīnena cittena vedanam ajjhavāsayi, pajjotasseva nibbānaṃ vimokkho cetaso ahu.

81 AN I pp. 235–6, IV 3: pajjotass’ eva nibbānaṃ, vimokkho hoti cetaso ti.

82 Th-a III p. 71: pajjotass’ eva nibbānaṃ, vimokkho cetaso ahu ti yathā telaṅca paticca vaṭṭhika paticca pajjulanto pajjoto padīpo tesam parikkhay e nibbāyatī, nibbuto ca katthaci gantvā no tiṭṭhati, aṇṇadatthu antaradhāyatī, adassanam eva gacchati, evam kilesābhisaṅkārāni nissāya pavattamāno khandhasantāno tesam parikkhay e nibbāyatī, nibbuto ca katthaci gantvā na tiṭṭhati, aṇṇadatthu antaradhāyatī, adassanam eva gacchati ti dasseti. tena vuttaṃ nibbanti dhirā yathāyam padīpo ti acci yathā vātavegena khitthā ’ti ādi.


84 Khp 5, also in Sn 41.

85 Nyāṇamoli (1960: 216).

86 See this chapter, note 65.


89 Vibh pp. 72–3, Dhātuk p. 7, no. 58.

90 Vibh p. 89, Dhātuk p. 5 no. 58.

91 For the Sarvāstivādins, nirvana is not the one and only unconditioned but one of three unconditioned things. See ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3.
NOTES

92 Pk (TD26 723c, 766b).
93 Bareau (1955: 168).
94 See ‘The image of a fire extinguished in Vacchagotta’s question’ in this chapter.
95 See ‘Upādisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.
96 See ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3.
98 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 81–2).
99 Akb-h p. 15, Sa-w p. 49: yathā ghaṭoparamo na ghaṭāḥ, evaṁ skandhoparamo na skandhāḥ.
100 Mv (TD27 385b).
103 Dhs p. 226 no. 1309.
105 Dhātuk p. 5: asaṅkhatam khandhato ṭhapetvā.
106 Vibh pp. 72–3.
107 Vibh p. 89.
108 Vibh pp. 72–3, p. 89.
109 The Chinese equivalent of this sutta was slightly different. The answer given here was ‘The cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, the cessation of delusion and the cessation of cankers (āsavas), that is called nirvana’ (SA TD2 126b).
110 SN IV pp. 251–2.
111 See ‘Upādisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.
112 See this chapter, note 97.
113 Kv p. 226: atthi dvīnaṃ nibbānānam uccanīcatā hīnapanītata ukkāṃsāvakāṃso sīmā vā bheda vā rājī vā antarīkā vā ti? According to the Pali commentarial tradition, the opponents were the Mahiṃsāsakas and the Andhakas (Aung and Rhys Davids 1915: 136). Thus, both sects regard the two extinctions as nirvana, while only paññānākhānirodha (extinction through knowledge) is the equivalent of nirvana in the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma.
114 Bareau (1951: 31).
115 EOB p. 149.
118 Dhs p. 144, Also see Vibh pp. 84–5.
119 yo ākāso ākāsāṅgatām agham aghagatāṃ vivaro vivaragatam asamphutthāṇa catūhi mahābhūtehi idam tam rūpam ākāsadhātu (Dhs p. 144).
120 Vibh p. 84.
121 Akb-h p. 3.
122 Akb-h p. 18. This space element is not a real existent (dravya).
123 aghasāmāntakarūpa meaning according to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (La Vallée Poussin 1923: 89), a type of matter next to (sāmāntaka) solid agglomerated matter (agha). It was quoted from the Mahāvibhāṣāstra (Mv TD27 388b).
125 Kv-a p. 93.
128 Mil p. 268.
129 Mil p. 388.
131 Mv (TD27 161a).
See ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3.

Vism p. 431 (tr. Ñyāna): see ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3.

Mv (TD27 104b, 237b, 910c): the reference is to Mv (TD27 161a). according to Louis de La Vallée Poussin (1923: 140 note 91), Vasubandhu recognises five kinds of extinction (nirudhā): lakṣananirodha, samāpattiniruddha, upapattiniruddha (=āsāṃśāhika), pratisāṃśāhānirodha and apratisāṃśāhānirodha. Extinction as impermanence (anityatānirodha) here means extinction by virtue of the impermanence which is the characteristic of conditioned dharmas: i.e. the characteristic of ceasing (lakṣananirodha).


Mv (TD27 198b).


See ‘Nirvana and space in the Pali abhidhamma tradition’ in this chapter.


Vibh-a p. 51: pāṭiyekkam nibbānam nāma na atti, kilesakkhayo va nibbānan ti. suttam āharā ti ca vutte ‘nibbānaṁ nibbānan ti āvuso Sūriputta vuccati, katamaṁ nu kho āvuso nibbānan ti? yo kho āvuso rāgakkhayo,
NOTES

dosakkhayo, mohakkhayo, idaṃ vuccati nibbāna' ti etam Jambukhādaka-suttam āharitvā imīna suttena veditabban pātiyekkaṃ nibbānaṃ nāma na atthi, kilesakkhayo va nibbānan ti āha.

160 Vibh pp. 72–3, 89.
161 Vibh-a p. 51: yasmā pan' etam āgama raṅgādayo khīyanti.
162 Vibh-a p. 54; evam avijjā ca taṇhā ca tam āgama tamhi khīṇaṃ, tamhi bhaggāṃ, na ca kiñci kadāci ti.
163 Vism p. 431 (tr. Ñyānamoli 1976: 577–8).
164 For this passage Nyānamoli (1976: 577–8 note 16) comments: ‘“On coming to that (tam āgama)”: on reaching that nibbana by making it the object’ (Pm. 533). Āgama (ger. of āgacchati – to come) is commonly used as an adverb in the sense of ‘owing to’ (e.g. at M.i., 119). Here, however, it is taken literally by the commentators and forms an essential part of the ontological proof of the positive existence of nibbana. The Sammohavinodanā (commentary on the Āyatana Vibhaṅga Abhidhamma-bhājaniya) refutes the suggestion of a disputant (Vitaśavacchāna) who asserts that nibbana is ‘mere destruction (khayamatta)’. The arguments used are merely supplementary to those here, and so are not quoted. The conclusion of the argument is worth noting, however, because of the emphasis on the words ‘tam āgama’. It is this: ‘It is on coming to nibbana that greed etc., are destroyed. It is the same nibbana that is called “destruction of greed, destruction of hate, destruction of delusion’ These are just three terms for nibbana. When this was said, he asked: You say “On coming to (āgama)”; from where have you got this “on coming to”? It is got from the Suttas. Quote the sutta. “Thus ignorance and craving, on coming to that, are destroyed in that, are abolished in that, nor does anything anywhere . . . (evam avijjā ca taṇhā ca tam āgama tamhi khīṇaṃ tamhi bhaggāṃ na ca kiñcī kadāci . . .).” When this was said, the other was silent.’ The quotation has not been traced.

165 Sn 206–7. See this chapter, note 65.
166 See ‘Interpretation of Anuruddha’s verse’ in Chapter 5.
167 Akb-h p. 94.
168 See this chapter, note 77.

5 NIRVANA IN NORTHERN BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

1 See ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 2.
3 Akb-h p. 92.
4 Akb-h pp. 92–4.
5 Na (TD29 pp. 431–3).
7 Mv (TD27 167b): 謂契經説，有二涅槃界。一有餘依涅槃界，二無餘依涅槃界。契經雖作是說而不廣辨。云何有餘依涅槃界。云何無餘依涅槃界。彼是此論所依根本。彼所不分別者今皆應分別之
8 Here ci-lun (此論) means the Jñānaprasthāna. The word ben-lun (本論) is used to designate the Mahāvibhāṣāstra (Mv TD27 168b).
9 EA (TD2 159a). See also ‘The non-returner and the two nirvana elements’ in Chapter 2.
10 Ip p. 38. See also ‘Upādisesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.
11 See ‘The Theravāda exegetical position on nirvana’ in Chapter 4.
12 TD17 pp. 667–8.
13 See ‘Sarvāstivāda interpretation in the Jñānaprasthāna’ in Chapter 3.
14 Jp (TD26 923b).
NOTES

15 Life faculty is one of the twenty-two controlling faculties as well as one of fourteen dharmas not associated with the mind (citāvīprayuktasāmskāra) in the Sarvāstivāda system. See Cox (1995: 125–31).

16 Homogeneous character of the group is one of fourteen dharmas not associated with the mind (citāvīprayuktasāmskāra) and is said to determine the specific rebirth state of sentient beings. See Cox (1995: 107–12). According to the Abhidharmakośa, homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga, 翻同分) and homogeneous character (sabhāgatā, 同分) were virtually the same (La Vallée Poussin 1923: 219). Cox translates the former as ‘homogeneous character of the group’ or ‘the homogeneous collection of components’, the latter as ‘homogeneous character’ (Cox 1995: 109).

17 Mv (TD27 167c): 此中壽命者。謂命根。問何故不說眾同分耶。答是作論者意欲爾故。乃至廣說。復次應說而不說者。當知此義有餘。復次以命根眾同分俱是牽引業果。命根一向是異熟故。此中偏說。

18 Action that projects existence (ākṣepakakarman) designates an action that will project one new existence. For the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, it projects life faculty (jñānendriya) and homogeneous character of the group (nikāyasabhāga) at the moment of conception, whereas for the Sautrāntikas it initiated the momentum or power (āvedha) into the series of aggregates to last for a certain lifetime. Later in the Yogācāra system, ākṣepahetu is one of ten causes and is used when good or bad action eventually projects its results in one of the three worlds, the world of desire, the world of form and the world of the formlessness (DBT p. 326d).

19 It designates vitality (āyus) mentioned above.

20 Pk (TD26 694a), La Vallée Poussin (1923: 233).

21 See ‘The Theravāda exegetical tradition’ in Chapter 3.

22 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 233).

23 SN III p. 143.

24 MN I p. 295. See also Jaini (1959: 539).

25 See ‘The Sarvāstivāda interpretation in the Jñānaprasthāna’ in Chapter 3.

26 SN V p. 204.


29 See Table 3.1, p. 39.

30 Ds (TD26 499a).

31 See Table 3.1, p. 39.

32 Pk (TD26 694a).

33 Mv (TD27 657c).

34 Mv (TD27 732b).

35 Mv (TD27 731c).

36 Literally, it says ‘it allows us to say we are possessed of controlling faculties’.

37 MN I p. 295. See also Jaini (1959a: 539).

38 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 154).

39 Mv (TD27 169a): 有餘依故者。依有二種。一煩惱依。二生身依。此阿羅漢雖無煩惱依而有生身依。復次依有二種。一染污依。二不染污依。此阿羅漢雖無染污依而有不染污依故。

40 Cf. clinging (upadhi) in the context of ‘without a remainder of clinging’ (amupadhiśeṣa) was glossed in Mv (TD27 169a): ‘When saying “as there is no remainder of clinging”, no [remainder of] clinging is of two kinds: no clinging as defilement (kleśopadhi) or no clinging as birth body (jannmakāyopadhi). Alternatively, [no remainder of clinging is of two kinds:] no defiled (kliṣṭa) clinging or no undefiled clinging.’
NOTES

41 Sap (TD26 415c), Ds (TD26 512c), Jp (TD26 921c), Mv (TD27 138a).
43 Akb-h p. 258, La Vallée Poussin (1923: 677).
44 Mv (TD27 99a).
45 Mv (TD27 100a).
46 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 678).
47 Mv (TD27 169a). See this chapter, note 18.
48 It p. 38.
49 Mv (TD27 167c–168a): 身根覺未斷名有餘依涅槃。
50 Mv (TD27 167c): 此身根覺相續未斷諸結永盡。名有餘依涅槃界。
51 Mv (TD27 168a): 或身根覺相續已斷諸結永盡。名無餘依涅槃界.
52 It p. 38.
53 Mv (TD27 168b); 頗有阿羅漢不住有餘依涅槃界。及餘依涅槃界耶。答理雖無
有而依此中所說亦有。
54 Mv (TD27 168b): 生無色界阿羅漢。無色身故非住有餘依涅槃界。有心轉故。非
住無餘依涅槃界。生有色界阿羅漢入滅盡定。已無心轉故非住有餘依涅槃界。有色
身故非住無餘依涅槃界。生欲界不具根阿羅漢。不具五根故非住有餘依涅槃界。
有色身故非住無餘依涅槃界。
55 Jp (TD26 921c), Mv (TD27 137a).
56 Later in the text, it says 'The author of the treatise (the Mahāvibhāṣāstra)
gave this opinion for the sake of all disciples to understand [the two nirvana
together] easily.'
57 Mv (TD27 168b): 有說。此文應作是說。云何有餘依涅槃界。答若阿羅漢壽命猶
存諸結永盡得獲勝果。云何無餘依涅槃界。答即阿羅漢壽命已滅諸結永盡。
58 Mv (TD27 168a); 答依現在得說得等言。現在得斷是故不說。復次依補特伽羅故
施設得獲勝果。此中無有補特伽羅唯惟有法性。是故不說。
59 Mil p. 27.
61 Mv (TD27 169b).
62 Mv (TD27 168a). See this chapter, note 58.
63 Mv (TD27 168a). See this chapter, note 58.
64 Vs-c (TD43 274a). See Masuda (1925: 67), La Vallée Poussin (1928: 48), Lamotte
(1936: 19).
65 Cox (1995: 40–1).
66 Cox (1995: 37–9). See also ‘The Theravāda exegetical position on nirvana’ in
Chapter 4.
68 Cox (1995: 40–1).
69 Jp (TD26 p. 923b).
70 Mv (TD27 pp. 167b–168b).
71 See this chapter, note 14.
72 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 219). See this chapter note 16.
73 Sap (TD26 415c), Ds (TD26 512c), Jp (TD26 921c), Mv (TD27 138a).
75 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 220–1).
76 Cox (1995: 109): ‘(1) homogeneous character is not different from the nature of
an ordinary person; (2) since homogeneous character has no form and cannot
be directly perceived, its activity cannot be known; (3) the homogeneous charac-
ter of insentient objects should also be admitted; (4) since another homogeneous
character is required to account for the similarity among all varieties of homo-
genous character, infinite regress would result; and (5) homogeneous character
is nothing other than the Vaiśeṣika categories of generality (sāmānyā) or of
particular generalities (sāmānyavīśeṣa).’
NOTES

77 Akb-h pp. 67–8.
78 According to Jayatilleke (1980: 57), four criteria mentioned in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka were ‘pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), sūrti (scripture) and aithīya (tradition)’.
80 Sa-w p. 158.
81 Akb-h p. 93, La Vallée Poussin (1923: 284).
82 Akb-h p. 461, La Vallée Poussin (1923: 1313).
83 Akb-h p. 67.
84 Akb-h p. 93, La Vallée Poussin (1923: 283).
85 nahi nāṣṭīti brūmo nātu dravyāntaram, Akb-h p. 94.
86 traidhātukena karmanā nikāyasabhāgasya sthitikālāvedhah, Akb-h p. 94.
87 See ‘The development of the two nirvana theory in the Mahāvibhāṣāsāstra’ in this chapter.
88 Akb-h p. 258. See also La Vallée Poussin (1923: 677).
89 tathābhūtās sanāskārā rūpādiskandhasvabhāvā, Sa-w p. 168.
90 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 234–5).
92 Masuda (1925: 66).
93 Jp (TD26 p. 923b).
94 Mv (TD27 p. 167b).
95 See ‘Upādiṣesa within the context of nirvana’ in Chapter 2.
98 na hi tasya rūpavedanādīvat svabhāva upalabhyahe no cāpi caṣṭuṣādīvat karma, Akb-p p. 93.
99 uppannāṃsāyajanmanirōdhhe pratisāṃkhyābaleṇānyasyaṇutpādaḥ pratisāṃkhyā nirōdhaḥ, Akb-h p. 92.
100 Sa-w p. 219.
101 See ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3.
102 See ‘The Theravāda exegetical tradition’ in Chapter 3.
103 See ‘The two nirvana theory in the early canon’ in Chapter 2.
104 Th-a I p. 46, Dhp-a II p. 163.
105 Jp (TD26 923b), Mv (TD27 167b).
108 See ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3.
109 See also Cox (1995: 93–4).
110 One reason why the Sarvāstivādins insist on the existence of all dharmas in the three time periods is causal efficacy of past action (karma). See La Vallée Poussin (1923: 818), Masuda (1925: 39), Lamotte (1988: 602).
112 See ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3.
113 ko’ayaṃ bijabhāvo nāma. ātmabharasya kleśajākleśotpādanaśaktiḥ yathānubhavajñaṇaṇaṃ śmrtyutpādanaśaktiḥ yathācāṅkurādānāṃ śālipalajā śālipalotpādanaśaktir, Akb-h p. 278. See also La Vallée Poussin (1923: 770).
114 Body (ātmabhra) was glossed as support (āśraya) in the Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmaśāstrāyākhya (Sa-w p. 444).
115 tena ca kleśadvayayāyam santatau bijabhāva āhito’nāgataṣṭopattaye. tasya prahānāt tad api prahinaṃ bhavati, yathā vipākākṣayāt karma kṣīṇam bhavati, Akb-h pp. 92–3.
117 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 770, 1339).
NOTES

118 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 1352–4).
119 See also Jaini (1959b: 243).
120 kiṃ punaḥ idaṁ bijaṁ nāma. yannāmarūpam phalotpattau samartham sākṣāt pāramparyaṇa vā santatiparīmāṇaviśeṣāt. ko’yam parināma nāma. santater anyathāravam. kā ceyam santati, hetupalabhūtās triayadhvikāh samśākārah, Akb-h p. 64. See also La Vallée Poussin (1923: 211), Jaini (1959b: 243).
121 Vasubandhu (Akb-h p. 92) used the word āhita derived from āndha (to place on).
123 kā punaḥ samatati kaḥ parināmaḥ ko viśeṣaḥ. yaḥ karmarpūrva uttarottararacittaprasasāḥ sā santatītasyā anyathopatīti parināmaḥ. sa punayo’ntaram phalotpādanasamarthah so’ntaparināmaviśiṣṭatvat parināma-viśeṣaḥ, Akb-h p. 477.
124 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 1352–3).
125 yathā lāksārasaraṇijitāt tātuḥkungapuspāt santatiparīmāṇaviśeṣaṇaḥ phale raktah keśara upajāyate na ca tasmāt punar anyāya evam karmajāt vipākāt na punar vipākāntarati iti, Akb-h p. 478.
126 sarvākāraṁ kāraṇam ekasya mayūracyandrakasyāpi nāsarvajñaiḥ jīneyaṁ. sarvajñabalaṁ hi taj-jñānaṁ, Akb-h p. 474.
127 See La Vallée Poussin (1923: 230–2).
130 See this chapter, note 99.
131 Akb-h p. 92.
132 SA (TD2 184a22–24). Cf. SN V 236 (according to Pasadika 1986): ‘Oh monks, five faculties if cultivated and developed conduce to the abandonment of bonds’ (pañcimāni bhikkhave indriyāni bhāvātītāni bahuliśkātiṁ samyojanānam pahānāya samviṭṭānti). Five faculties are the faculty of faith, of energy, of mindfulness, of concentration, and of wisdom.
133 Akb-h p. 92.
135 pratipakṣalābhena kleśapunarbhatopādāyanaviruddhāsrālayābhāt prāptaṁ nirvāṇaṁ, Akb-h p. 93.
136 tataḥkālokaṇa karmanā nikāyasabhāgasya sthitikālāvedhaḥ, Akb-h p. 94.
137 tathaḥbhūtās samśākāraṁ rūpādīskandhasvabhāvā, Sa-w p. 168.
138 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 234).
139 See ‘The Pārāyana stanza in the Suttanipāta’ in Chapter 4.
140 Vibh-a p. 41.
141 Na (TD29 433a).
142 DN II 157, SN I 159. Th 84, Thī 116.
144 Na (TD29 432c–433a).
146 pradhyotasyeva nirvāṇam vimokṣaṁ tasya cetasah, Akb-h p. 94.
147 yathā pradhyotasya nirvāṇam abhāva evaṁ bhagavato ‘pi cetasa vimokṣa, (Akb-p p. 94).
148 amasya ca vastuno ‘yaṁ nirodhaḥ iti saṣṭhiyavavasthaḥ katham prakalpyate. na hi tasya tena sārdham kaś cit sambandhah, hetupalādibhāvāsambhavāt, pratisedhamātraṁ tu yuyate amasyābhāva iti. bhāvāntaratve ‘pi yasya kleśasya prāptivicechedād yo nirodhaḥ prāpyate sa tasyeyi vyavadiśyate. tasya tarhi prāptiniyame ko hetuḥ? drṣṭadharmanirvāṇapraśāvau bhūṣhau ity uktam sūtre. tatra katham abhāvasya prāptih syāt? pratipakṣalābhena kleśapunarbhatopādāyanaviruddhāsrālayābhāt prāptaṁ nirvāṇaṁ ity ucyate, Akb-h p. 93.
149 SA (TD2 57c8), SN IV 109.
150 These two steps are compared to throwing out a thief and closing the door or the catching an insect in a jar and plugging the jar’s mouth, Mv (TD27 333c–334a), La Vallée Poussin (1923: 949–50). See also ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3.
151 See ‘Nirvana from the Sautrāntika ontological perspective’ in this chapter.
153 kim evaṃ neyyate nāsmin prādurbhāva ity ato prādurbhāva iti? asamarthām etāṃ saaptamīṃ paśyāmaḥ. kim uktam bhavati? nāsmin prādurbhavattī yadi satīy abhisambhadyate, nityam evāvāpṛādurbhāvaprasangah nirvāṇasya nityatvāt. atha pṛāpta ity abhisambhadyate yata eva tatprāptih parikāpyate tasmāṃ sati mārge pṛāpte vā dukkhasyesyatām aprādurbhāvah, Akb-h p. 94.
154 tasmāṃ sati mārge pṛāpe vā, Sa-w p. 221. Akb-h (p. 94) reads differently: when it [noble path] is at hand or attained’ (tasmāṃ eva saṃmukhībhūte pṛāpe vā).
155 See ‘Influence of the Buddhist theory of momentariness’ in Chapter 4.
156 Vism p. 432: nirvana is ‘cessation consisting in non-arising’.
157 Akb-h p. 92: the extinction through knowledge is, when latent defilements (anuśaya) and life (janman) that have already been produced are extinguished, non-arising of further such by the power of knowledge (pratisamkhyā).
159 Na (TD29 432c–433a): 對法諸師，已通此説，謂言苦滅。義有二途。一離苦外無別實體。二離苦外有別實體。佛觀中不欲異同。故說如斯二種滅義。謂或有處説無別體。如向所引二種契經。或復有處説有別體。如契經説。定有無生。又契經説。有處有離。復有處説我觀實有無為句義。所謂涅槃。復有經説。由五取蘊滅故言滅。此類眾繁。故我所宗。不離聖教。
160 Anuruddha’s stanza and one sūtra in the Saṃyukta-āgama (TD2 88a) quoted by Vasubandhu (Akb-x p. 94) to support his view: nirvana is mere non-existence: ‘That which is entire abandonment, relinquishment, coming to an end, exhaustion, detachment, cessation, tranquillization, disappearance of [even] the smallest suffering, and non-connection, non-arising, non-appearance of other suffering, that is lovely, that is excellent — that is to say, abandonment of all conditions, perishing of desire, detachment, cessation, nirvana.’ Cf. AN I 100, V 421, SN I 136.
161 Ud pp. 80–1. For these suttas, see Collins (1998: 164–75).
162 Akb-x (TD29 35a): 如燈涅槃唯燈焰謝無別有物。如是世尊心得解脫。唯諸蘊滅。
163 Na (TD29 433a): 又經所説燈焰涅槃。離燈別有無常相故。此之所喻。於義何違。或燈涅槃。雖無別體。而非非有。諸行皆是無常性故。其體非無。依此為言。亦無有過。
164 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 238).
165 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 239).
166 La Vallée Poussin (1923: 240), Mv (TD27 200c).
167 See ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3.
168 See also Cox (1995: 93–4).
169 SN IV pp. 399–400, MN III 245.
170 SU I 13.
171 ‘An expiring flame does not really go out, but returns into the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire it had before its appearance as visible fire’ (Schrader 1905: 167).
172 See ‘The image of a fire extinguished in Vacchagotta’s question’ in Chapter 4.
173 Akb-x (TD29 35a). See this chapter, note 147.
174 SN IV pp. 399–400, MN III 245.
175 See ‘The Pārīyāna stanza in the Suttanipāta’ in Chapter 4.
176 Th-a III 71.
NOTES

177 See ‘Influence of the Buddhist theory of momentariness’ in Chapter 4.
179 Vibh-a 54: evam avijjā ca tanhā ca tam āgamaṃ tamhi khīṇaṃ, tamhi bhaggam, na ca kiñci kaddāci ti.
180 DN II 157, SN I 159, Th 84, Thī 116.
181 Na (TD29 433a): 此經唯就入無餘依般涅槃時.
182 See ‘Nirvana and space in the Pali abhidhamma tradition’ in Chapter 4.
183 See ‘The Chinese abhidharma works’ in Chapter 3.

6 CONCLUSION

3 EA (TD2 579a).
5 BAU VI 2 15, CHU IV 15 5, VIII 15.
6 Mv (TD27 169a).
7 SU I 13.
8 MN I p. 487, SN IV pp. 399–400.
9 SU I 13.
10 MN I p. 487.
11 Na (TD29 433a).
12 Mv (TD27 168a).
14 Vibh-a p. 51.
15 Vibh-a p. 61, Vism p. 431.
16 Na (TD29 433a).
17 Mv (TD27 147b).
18 Vism p. 432.
19 Akb-h p. 93.
20 Akb-h p. 92.
22 Jp (TD26 923b).
23 Mv (TD27 168a).
24 Lamotte (1973: 8).
25 La Vallée Poussin (1928: 670–1).

SELECTED SOURCES FOR THE NIRVANA CONCEPT AND THE TWO NIRVANA THEORY

1 Vibh-a pp. 51–4.
3 Vibh pp. 72–3.
4 ‘On coming to’ also appears in the Visuddhimagga: ‘But because craving fades away and ceases on coming to that, it is therefore called ‘fading away’ and ‘cessation’, Vism p. 431 (tr. Nyānamoli 1976: 577–8).
5 The Theravādins of the Mahāvihāra.
NOTES

6 SN IV 251–2.
7 The Chinese equivalent (SA: TD2 126b) of the Nibbānasutta answers differently: ‘The cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, the cessation of delusion and the cessation of cankers (āsava)’.
8 According to Nīyāṇamoli (1992: 61), ‘But how? Is the meaning according to this sutta [literally] so?’
9 According to the Mūlaṭīka, ‘this means that the meaning is explicit (nīto attho) in just the words of the sutta’ (Nīyāṇamoli 1992: 66, note added by L. S. Cousins).
10 SN IV p. 252, SA (TD2 126b–c).
11 lañca BUCD, lañcha PTS.
12 The name of the sutta is not mentioned here.
13 Here the locative case was used to explain nirvana. A similar position appeared in the Abhidhamakośabhāṣya as a position of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas insisting that nirvana is non-appearance and exists separately from mere cessation: ‘because it does not appear in that, it is non-appearance’, Akb-h p. 94.
14 See Chapter 4, note 164.
15 MV (TD27 167b–168b, TK 32 19–25). This translation is helped tremendously by Louis de La Vallée Poussin’s French translation (La Vallée Poussin 1930: 24–8).
16 Jp (TD26 923b). Here ci-lun (此論) means the Jñānaparasthāna. The word ben-lun (本論) is used to designate the Mahāvibhāṣāstra.
17 Jp (TD26 923b). In the Mahāvibhāṣāstra, extinction through knowledge was further interpreted as: That is to say, it is the extinction of dharmas which is also attaining disjunction (visamyoga), the acquisition of disjunction (visamyogaprāpti). That is why it is called extinction through knowledge. In the Abhidhamakośabhāṣya, extinction through knowledge is defined as disjunction from impure dharmas (yah sāravair dharmaṁ viṣayogaṁ sa pratisaṁkhyanīrodhaḥ, Akb-d p. 4, Akb-p p. 4).

For the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, all dharmas exist as real existents in the three time periods. Thus, extinction could not mean that a certain impure dharma is actually destroyed. In this system, attaining a certain impure dharma does not mean that one, as a subject, possesses that impure dharma, as a object, but means that there is the arising of the acquisition (prāpti) of that dharma in one’s series (saṁtāna). Once there occurs the acquisition of the dharma, it renews its existence and continues its activity within the series until this acquisition is eliminated from the series. Since it is impossible to destroy this impure dharma, the elimination is referred to as a ‘separation’ from the series. That is to say, the acquisition of the defilement is negated, or technically ‘disjoined’ (visamyoga), through the power of knowledge which terminates the junction between that impure dharmas and the series of aggregates. ‘Attaining the acquisition of disjunction (visamyogaprāpti)’ mentioned in the interpretation in the Mahāvibhāṣāstra is regarded as the final step of this process. By reason of separating a certain dharma from one’s series, there is the arising of ‘the acquisition of disjunction’ from the dharma within the series and it serves as antidote (pratipakṣa) through which the junction between that dharma and one’s series is forever prevented. The respective activities of these two steps are compared to that of throwing out a thief and closing the door or catching an insect in a jar and plugging the jar’s mouth (Cox 1995: 89–92).
18 For the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, each dharma is unique as it is classified in terms of its intrinsic nature (svabhāva). Dharmas are classified under the five categories called pañcavastuka, and enumerated as seventy-five later in the Abhidhamakośabhāṣya. Extinction through knowledge is one of three dharmas belonging to the
unconditioned category. Thus, they seem to have had some difficulties in explaining how a unique dharma called extinction through knowledge could be of two kinds, nirvana with and without a remainder of clinging. In fact, the similar problem occurred when Buddhaghosa explained the two nirvana theory in the *Visuddhimagga* (Vism p. 432). Since nirvana is the one and only unconditioned thing in the Theravāda system, he had to make an excuse first, saying ‘The aim of the Buddhas, etc. [i.e. nirvana] is one and of no distinction’ before explaining the two nirvana theory.

20 Jp (TD26 923b).

21 The life faculty is one of the twenty-two controlling faculties as well as one of fourteen dharmas not associated with the mind (*viprayuktasamskāra*) in the Sarvāstivāda system. See Cox (1995: 125–31).

22 See Chapter 5, note 16.

23 See Chapter 5, note 18.

24 It designates vitality (*āyus*) mentioned above.

25 It designates mind (*citta*) in the mental series (*cittasamtāna*) mentioned above.

26 In the Sarvāstivāda system, there are four characteristics: arising, duration, decay, and ceasing. See Cox (1995: 133–58).

27 Later in this text, the author mentioned three things: the material body, the five faculties and the mental series.

28 It refers to homogeneous character of the group (*nikāyasabhāga*). When the Sarvāstivādins said ‘one [action] projects one birth’ (*ekam jānākṣiptayetkam*) in the *Abhidharmakośabhāsya* (Akb-h p. 258, La Vallée Poussin 1923: 677), ‘birth’ was glossed as homogeneous character of the group (*nikāyasabhāga*).

29 Jp (TD26 923b).

30 That is to say, the last mind of an arahant. In the canon, the last step towards the final nirvana was the cessation of the mind: ‘like the blowing out of a lamp, his mind becomes liberated’ (AN I p. 236, AN IV p. 3, Th p. 81, DN II p. 157, SN I p. 159, Thī p. 116, Sn p. 41). Mental series (*cittasamtāna*) was used in the case of nirvana with a remainder of clinging.

31 By ‘wind’ we could assume vital force or biological energy.

32 Mind and mental states have faculties as their support.

33 The life faculty and homogeneous character of the group.

34 That is to say, the aggregates that are conventionally designated as a person (*pudgala*) have been disintegrated, yet all dharmas that constitute the aggregates continue to exist since they exist as real existents in the three time periods.

35 This question raises a problem regarding the interpretation of the *Jñānapratsthāna* and suggests an opinion made by the author of the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*.

36 The author of the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra* suggests that it should be vitality (*āyus*) and not anything else through which we can distinguish nirvana with a remainder of clinging from nirvana without a remainder of clinging.

37 Here *ben-lun* (本論) is used to designate the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra*. The word *ci-lun* (此論) is used to designate the *Jñānapratsthāna*.

38 This question establishes the difference between disjunction and two nirvana elements. Although disjunction from impure dharmas is possible for all people, it cannot be called nirvana with or without a remainder of clinging. It is only possible for *āsāikṣa*, an arahant, in a certain moment: the first at a moment of enlightenment and the second at the moment of final death.

39 Akb-d pp. 322–7, Akb-p pp. 92–4, Akb-h pp. 92–4, Akb-pm (TD29 192a–c) and Akb-x (TD29 34a–35a). Although we have Poussin’s translation (1988: 282–6), it does not exactly agree with the Sanskrit text because it was translated mainly from Xuan-zang’s Chinese text. There also is Sakurabe’s Japanese translation.
NOTES

(1969: 378–82), which was made directly from the Sanskrit version. I have consulted both translations.

40 SA (TD2 184a2–4). Cf. SN V 236 (according to Pasadika 1986): ‘O monks, five faculties if cultivated and developed conduce to the abandonment of bonds’ (pāṭicīmāṇi bhikkhave indriyāni bhāvītāni bahuḥkātāni sāmyojānānāṃ pahānāya sāṃvattanti). The five faculties are faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom.

41 The Sautrāntika’s position on extinction through knowledge, or nirvana, was basically non-arising of further defilements and life: ‘It is said that nirvana is attained through acquiring the basis (āśraya) which prevents completely the arising of defilement (kleśa) and rebirth (punarbhava), by acquiring an antidote (pratipakaṣṭa), (pratipakaṣṭabhena kleśapunarbhasapādāvaitaviruddhāśrayalābhāt prātāṃ nirvāṇāṃ, Akb-h p. 93). Thus it could only be of the future and not of the past and present.

42 The same as Paramārtha’s (Akb-pm (TD29 192a)). Xuan-zang, however, gives a slightly different reading: ‘It does not necessarily conflict. Although there is that statement of the sūtra, its meaning is not contradicted’ (Akb-x (TD29 p. 34b)).

43 According to Yaśomitra (Sa-w p. 219, Sa-d p. 323), ‘their objects’ are past and present sufferings: ‘through the abandonment of the defiling passions for their objects which are past and present sufferings’ (aṅktrapratyanudāvik kleśaprahaṇāṃ). Thus, in a way the physically perceptible and the rest are abandoned by eliminating desire and passion for them, and in that way past and present sufferings are abandoned by eliminating defiling passions for them.

44 SA (TD2 19e26), SN III 27.

45 In the Tānhasutta (AN II pp. 211–12), the speculations of craving (altogether thirty-six in number) are classified into two categories: the eighteen speculations of craving concerning the inner self and the eighteen speculations of craving concerning what is external to self.

46 Literally, ‘the state of being seed’.

47 ‘And certainly there is no profit in making an effort at ceasing that which has already ceased in the past’, according to Sa-w and Sa-d.

48 SA (TD2 225c27), AN III p. 34.

49 The Theravādins could have similar position. See Collins (1998: 181–2).

50 Vasubandhu applied a similar logic to deny the existence of homogeneous character (sabhāgata), saying it is only the non-difference of birth (jātyābheda), Akb-h p. 67. That is to say, out of something cannot be a separate existent.


52 The same argument is applied to deny that pudgala, or ātman, is a real existent (La Vallée Poussin 1923: 1314). ‘In fact, unconditioned things are not known through direct perception (pratyakṣa), as is the case for physical matter, sensation, etc.; and they are not known through inference (anumāna), by reason of their activity, as is the case for the sense organs’, according to La Vallée Poussin (1923: 284). Neither direct perception nor inference is mentioned in any of the Sanskrit or Chinese versions, including Xuan-zang. Louis de La Vallée Poussin may have put those in because they are mentioned in Yaśomitra (Sa-d p. 325, Sa-w p. 221). We could also see this logic in the denial of homogeneous character (sabhāgata) in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Akb-h pp. 67–8). Both direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) are mentioned in the Sphutārth Nāṇa in the Abhidharmakośavyākhya (Sa-w p. 158).

53 While, for the Vaibhāvikas, the cessation or nirvana is one thing and suffering is another thing, cessation for the Sautrāntikas is just absence of suffering, i.e. nirvana is not a separate existent.
The defilement is a genitive related to the cessation.

Once anuśaya, the state of being seed, was destroyed by the power of intuition (darśana) and the noble path (mārga), name and form (nāmarūpa) which is the support (āśraya) for the anuśaya became special (viśeṣa); that is to say, from a normal state of being with a power to produce a defilement to a special state of being without a power to produce a defilement, Akb-h p. 63, La Vallée Poussin (1923: 209–10) and Cox (1995: 94).

Once anuśaya, the state of being seed, was destroyed by the power of intuition (darśana) and the noble path (mārga), name and form (nāmarūpa) which is the support (āśraya) for the anuśaya became special (viśeṣa); that is to say, from a normal state of being with a power to produce a defilement to a special state of being without a power to produce a defilement, Akb-h p. 63, La Vallée Poussin (1923: 209–10) and Cox (1995: 94).

The Chinese translation done by Xuan-zang (Akb-x TD29 35a) support the reading of Sa-w.

The Chinese translation made by Xuan-zang (Akb-x TD29 35a2) reads differently: ‘As the blowing out of a lamp could only be regarded as the extinction of a flame without any separate existent (dravyntara), the liberation attained by the mind of the blessed one could only be the extinction of all aggregates without any [separate existent]’; but the Paramartha’s translation (Akb-pm TD29 p. 192c) confirms the Sanskrit reading. Although such scholars as F. Otto Schrader and Peter Harvey have insisted that ‘the blowing out of a lamp’ does not mean absolute non-existence, Vasubandhu’s position on this simile is clearly against their opinions (Schrader 1905: 165–9; Harvey 1990: 66–7).

Anuruddha’s stanza and one sūtra in the Saṃyukta-āgama (TD2 88a) quoted by Vasubandhu (Akb-x p. 94) to support his view: nirvana is mere non-existence: ‘That which is entire abandonment, relinquishment, coming to an end, exhaustion, detachment, cessation, tranquilization, disappearance of [even] the smallest suffering, and non-connection, non-arising, non-appearance of other suffering, that is lovely, that is excellent – that is to say, abandonment of all conditions, perishing of desire, detachment, cessation, nirvana.’ Cf. AN I p. 100, V p. 421, SN I p. 136.

Both suttas seems to be those in the Udāna Ud pp. 80–1) in the Pali Khuddakanikāya that were quoted by modern scholars to insist that nirvana cannot be mere non-existence. For these suttas, see Collins (1998: 164–75).

In this argument, Saṅgahadra’s position on a fire extinguished is very close to the so-called common Indian suggested by F. Otto Schrader (Schrader 1905: 167): ‘an expiring flame does not really go out, but returns into the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire it had before its appearance as visible fire’. This view could have been originated from the essential character (liṅga) in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad: ‘When a fire is contained within its womb (yoni), one cannot see its visible form and yet its essential character (liṅga) is not extinguished; one can grasp the fire once again from its womb by means of tinder. In just the same way, one can grasp both within the body by means of the syllable OM’ (SU I 13, tr. Olivelle). What is the difference between intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and essential character (liṅga) in the image of a fire extinguished?

A similar position can be found in the Theravāda tradition. They explain nirvana existing separately (pātīye kka) as different from the mere cessation of passion, hatred and delusion. The Sammohavinodanī, the commentary on the Vibhaṅga, explains it as follows: ‘But because passion etc. cease on coming to this [nirvana], it is said that it is the cessation of passion, the cessation of hatred, and the cessation of delusion’ (Vibh-a p. 51).
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