LINGUISTIC APPROACH TO
BUDDHIST THOUGHT

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PREFACE

The idea for this short treatise is drawn from several previous articles published in various journals, papers read at a number of international conferences and a collection of articles written especially for publication in this volume.

Owing to a vast amount of creditable works in the field of Buddhism, especially during the last half century, a remarkable contribution has been added to our knowledge of the parts as well as the whole. Yet further investigation remains to be done on the linguistic, epistemological, and doctrinal points of difference that have developed over the long span of centuries. The eighteen different schools of Abhidharma Buddhism, for example, cultivated a vocabulary and labyrinth of philosophical concepts found in much earlier teachings, though often clothing them with new and amended implications. Moreover, these implications were seldom worked out until after the conclusions arrived at were in general favor among scholastic contemporaries.

Through the use of linguistic and epistemological methods of research the author has sought to establish a connection with Sarvāstivāda on the one hand and the multitude of meanings provided by Mahāyāna texts on the other. Notwithstanding the author’s intentions, however, much yet remains to be done. Indeed many problems connected with Buddhist thought, with the doctrines peculiar to the various Abhidharma schools, and with the multitude of technical terms still await further research.

In consummating the realization of this work a word of acknowledgement is in order. The late Professors I.B. Horner (The Pāli Text Society, London) and E. Conze (Lancaster University) were kind enough to encourage me with especial interest and care in carrying out my endeavors. Indeed without their gracious encouragement this present work might not have been realized. Also, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor P.V. Bapat (Poona, India), who offered his unfailing help and inspiration in pursuing a linguistic approach to the study of Buddhist thought.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A. Aṅguttaranikāya, The Pāli Text Society (PTS), London
A. Com. Aṅguttaranikāya-Āṭṭhakathā.
AKBH. Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna, 1975
AK. Chinese tr. Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, Taisho Edition
AAV. Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932-35
Asl. Āṭṭhasālīnī, ed. P.V. Bapat, The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1942
AKV. Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932-34
ASP. Chinese tr. Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā, Taisho Edition
BSOAS. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University
BHSD. F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, London University
CPD. A Critical Pāli Dictionary, Copenhagen, 1948-82
Dhp. Dhammapada, PTS
Dhp. Comm. Dhammapada-Āṭṭhakathā, PTS
Dhs. Dhammasaṅgiti, PTS
Divy. Divyāvādāna, Cowell and Neill, Cambridge, 1886
D. Dīghanikāya, PTS
D. Com. Dīghanikāya-Āṭṭhakathā, PTS
J. Jātaka, PTS
JPTS. Journal of the Pāli Text Society, PTS
Kvu. Kathāvātthu, PTS
Kvu. Com. Kathāvātthu-Āṭṭhakathā, PTS
Laṅk. Laṅkāvataṭāra-sūtra, ed. B. Nanjio, Kyoto, 1923
M. Majjhimanikāya, PTS
M. Com. Majjhimanikāya-Āṭṭhakathā, PTS
MVP. Mahāvyutpatti, ed. Sakaki, 2 vols., Kyoto, 1916-25
Netti. Nettipakarana, PTS
Ny. Chinese tr. Abhidharmarājaśrīnāma-sūtra, Taisho Edition
P. Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. N. Dutt, London, 1934
Pā. Pāli
SN. Suttanipāta, PTS
SN. Com. Suttanipāta-Āṭṭhakathā, PTS
SED. Monier-Williams, Sanskrit English Dictionary, Oxford, 1899
SWT. S(Sung Dynasty), W(Wei Dynasty), T(T’ ang Dynasty)
Th. Thera-Therigāthā, Pāli Text Society, PTS
List of Abbreviations

Th. Com.  Therigāthā Āṭṭhakathā, Pāli Text Society, PTS
U. Udāna, Pāli Text Society, PTS
Vism. Visuddhimagga, 2 vols., Pāli Text Society, PTS
Vibh. Vibhaṅga, Pali Text Society, PTS
Vibh. Com. Vibhaṅga-Āṭṭhakathā, Pāli Text Society, PTS
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CHAPTER I
EARLY BUDDHIST CONCEPTS

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEGATION IN BUDDHISM
\textit{nekkhamma} and \textit{naiskramya}

India had many schools of philosophy which developed their own systems of thought, based on the logic of negation. Buddhism was one of these schools of thought.

The purpose of Buddhist negation is not merely negation as such, but the positive goal of pointing towards the Absolute. In other words, the Absolute is approached through the logic of negation. Negation is simply an expression of the Absolute.

The how and why of the Absolute, which can not be expressed directly in words, can be expressed by the philosophy of negation. Generally, negation presupposes observation of the world with two perspectives: first, to deny the already known; and second, to give a positive expression by means of the opposite concept.

The first category, or the negation of the already known, can be found in Abhidharma philosophy in various words which reflect negation by the use of three prefixes, namely \textit{a}, \textit{na}, and \textit{vi}. This negation refers to the negation of the experimental.

The second category means the positive expression of the super-experimental (the religious experience) by means of negation of the experimental (the mundane world). This positive expression of the opposite comes late in the development of Buddhism. At that time the positive expression was in the form of negation with the prefixes \textit{nir}, \textit{vi}, and \textit{sama}.

The development from \textit{a} to \textit{nir} may be traced not merely in this Abhidharma school, but also in the historical development of Buddhist philosophy. This is clearly shown in the development of \textit{nekkhamma} in Pāli and its evolution of meaning from Abhidharmik to Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Evidence clearly indicates that the term \textit{nekkhamma} and \textit{akāma} are one and the same; only the implication is different. Both terms are derived from the common root \textit{kam}, meaning “to desire,” according to Pāli literature.
In Sanskrit Buddhist literature, nekkhamma is Sanskritized as naiśkramya. For example:

kāmeṣu bhayam okāraṁ sankilesaṁ naiśkramyānsāṁsāvyava-
dānaṁ prakāsayati (Mahāvastu III. 357).
kāmānaṁ ādinaṁ kāraṁ sankilesaṁ nekkhamme ānīsaṁsaṁ
pakāsati (D.I. 110, Aṁbatthasutta. I.148. etc.).

Here naiśkramya corresponds to nekkhamma in Pāli. Again in Mahāvastu:

nāpi ye dharmaḥ grhāśritas te naiśkramyāśritā iti deśayāmi;
nāpi ye dharma naiśkramyāśritas te grhāśritā iti deśayāmi (MV.
I.173.13).

The Sanskrit compound naiśkramyāśritas again corresponds to the Pāli term nekkhammasita, meaning ‘based on (a holy life) free from desire,’ which is contradictory to the term gehasita, meaning ‘connected with a worldly life’ (S. IV.233).

Naiśkramya is derived from nis-kram, meaning ‘not to approach’ or ‘not to go towards,’ whereas nekkhamma, is derived from niskam, meaning ‘not to desire’; hence, etymologically neither term can be used interchangeably.

As for the etymology of nekkhamma, Childers gives an unconvincing and hypothetical interpretation. He takes into consideration two different etymologies: naiśkāmya and nīśkram.

According to Childers, if nekkhamma had been derived from naiśkāmya, it would have been nekkamama, but not nekkhamma. Childers thus preferred nīśkram to naiśkāmya. But it is just as possible that nekkhamma is derived from naiśkāmya, as the syllable k is frequently transformed into kh in Pāli, e.g., prakṛanta (Skt.)—pakkanta (Pā.) or kānti—khanti etc. There should be no doubt about the derivation from naiśkāmya to nekkhamma. The above should suffice as examples showing the derivation of nekkhamma.

The Sanskritization of naiśkramya for nekkhamma need not be a problem to us. It is only necessary to refer to the Pāli and Sanskrit Buddhist texts, where naiśkramya is directly Sanskritized from nekkhamma (Pāli). Moreover, in the Pāli texts we have, in relation to nekkhamma, the word nikkhamma, meaning ‘going out of.’
Nikkhamma is obviously derived from nis-kram, which is common to the root of naiškramya.

Now, in what sense is nikkhamma employed in the Pāli canon? To answer that we need to understand the meaning of nikkhamma as expressed in the Pāli canon:

nikkhamma gharā panujja kāme
kathāṃ bhikkhu sammā so loke paribbajeyya (SN. 359).

‘How should bhikkhu, going out of the house, giving up desires, rightly wander about as a Buddhist mendicant in this world?"

Commenting on nikkhamma Buddhaghosa says: vatthukāme pannudita gharāvasā nikkhamma (SN. Com. I. 362).

From the above we see that nikkhamma means ‘going out of,’ derived from nis-kram, which should more accurately be Sanskritized as naiškramya. Hence, nikkhamma is different from nekkhamma, derived from nis-kam, meaning ‘not to desire.’ But we can, nevertheless, often find naiškramya used as equivalent to nekkhamma:

dānakathāṃ śilakathāṃ svargakathāṃ...naiškramyānusamāvaya-vadānāṃ samprakāśayati (MV, III. 375).

This Sanskrit passage is equivalent to that in the Ambattha-sutta (D.I.110. 148), in which the Pāli term for naiškramya is not nikkhamma, but nekkhamma.

In other passages the same Sanskritization occurs, e.g., ‘naiškramyam anuvarnayanti kāmesu dośadarśināḥ’ (MV. I. 107), and also ‘adya te saphalan janma lābhodya sumahams tava/yasya kāra-rasajñasya naiškramya astukaṃ manah’ (Saundarananda, XII.21).

According to Pāli Buddhist tradition there existed two terms differentiated from each other, nekkhamma and nikkhamma, which should rightly be Sanskritized as naiškāmya and naiškramya. In the Sanskrit Buddhist tradition, both terms are indistinguishably Sanskritized as naiškramya.

For the purpose of this article one needs to remember that nekkhamma retains its initial meaning derived from nis-kam (‘not to desire’), and not from nis-kram (‘to go out of’), according to the Pāli Buddhist tradition.

It should be pointed out that the confusion between nekkhamma and nikkhamma rests upon the problem of Sanskritization, and not upon the implications of these terms involved in the
The following quotation from Abhidharma-makosāvyākhya of Yaśomitra should give evidence to the fact that naiśkramya implies both senses, nikkhamma (‘going out’) and nekkhamma (‘not desiring’).

\[ \text{naiśkramya} \text{s'āśravo'nāśravo mārgāḥ.} \]
\[ \text{dhātōḥ samsārād vā nīṣkramenaḥ vairāgyam ity apare (AKV. 96).} \]

‘Some say: naiśkramya means the evil and non-evil paths. It means “going out of the transmigration of various realms of existence” and also “being free from lust.”’

One can readily see how naiśkramya may include both the meaning derived from nis-kram and the implication contained by nekkhamma, meaning ‘being free from desire’. We can easily see that some Abhidharma scholars might take naiśkramya to refer explicitly to the derivation from nis-kram, and implicitly to the involvement of nis-kam, meaning ‘not to desire.’

Since our chief concern is with the development of the meaning of negation, we shall return to the distinction between \( a \) and \( \text{nir} \) in the Pāli literature.

Nekkhamma, as mentioned above, means the negation of kam, meaning ‘to desire’. The connotation of \( kāma \) is felt in the connotation of \( \text{nir} \). This is shown in various passages where a play of words exists between \( \text{nir} \) and \( kāma \) (cf. Rhys Davids, Pāli English Dictionary, 213), i.e., ‘\( kāmānaṃ \) \( \text{etam} \) \( \text{nissaranam} \) \( \text{yad idam nekkhmanam} \)’ (It. 61; Vin. I. 104; A. III. 245; M. I. 115). It means that nekkhanna denotes ‘the giving up of desires’. A play of words with the prefix \( \text{nir} \) is also found expressed in Cullanid-desa, 340, SNA. 605, meaning ‘without desire’.

Now, the meaning of negation in relation to \( kāma \) is also shown by words with the prefix \( a \), akāma (‘without desire’).

It is said in the Jātaka:

\[ \text{akāmanaṃ kāmehi icchasi (J.V. 295).} \]
\[ \text{akāmanaṃ sakāmanaṃ naro labhate piyam (J.V. 295).} \]

These passages represent the negation of \( kāma \) used in the noun form with the prefix \( a \), namely, akāma. It is also used in the adverbial form akāma, meaning ‘unwillingly’:

\[ \text{akāma kāratabbaṃ (Vin. III. 205)} \]
\[ \text{akāma vyākātabbo (D. I. 94)} \]
It is clear from these quotations that words with the prefix a mean simply ‘lacking’, ‘devoid of’, and ‘deficient’; in other words, there is nothing positively implied in the prefix. Words with the prefix a represent the negation of the opposite.

Nekkhamma, however, does not always negate the opposite, as is the case with a-kāma, but also implies something positive. Nekkhamma, used in the same sense as a-kāma, is found in the Suttanipāta, e.g., ‘nekkhamma daṭṭhu khemato, uggahitaṃ nisattam vā mā te vijjitthā kīṃcanaṃ.’ (SN. 1093). In this passage nekkhamma represents the negation of the opposite, as a-kāma does.

Nekkhamma carries the negation further; the five elements of deliverance (nissaranīya dhātuyo) are enumerated (D. III. 239-240; A. III. 245; A. III. 290). Kāmānaṃ nissaraṇaṃ in the five nissaraṇaṃ (deliverance) means ‘to settle in the state of non-desire’ (nekkhamme cittena pakkhanti). Further elaboration also occurs in the Dighanikāya:

nekkhammaṃ kho pañassa manasikaroto nekkhamme cittaṃ pakkhanti pasīdati santiṭṭhati vimuccati, tassa taṃ cittaṃ sugataṃ subhāvitaṃ suvuttohi taṃ visamuttaṃ kāmehi, ye ca kāma-paccayā uppaṭjanti āsavā vighata pariṭṭha, mutto so tehi, na so taṃ vadanaṃ vedeti, idam akkhātaṃ kāmānaṃ nissaraṇaṃ (D. III. 239-240).

The different qualities of deliverance are defined by nekkhamma, the spiritual situation of non-desire, without any substantial difference in meaning. Such qualities as suvuttohi, suvimutta, visamyutta, for example, depict one and the same spiritual situation, that of non-desire, modified by the prefixes su and vi. Nekkhamma refers to the spiritual situation being well-balanced (subhāvitaṃ), arising out of (suvuttohi taṃ) and being separated from (visamyuttaṃ) the desires (kāmehi). The positive element in the spiritual situation of non-desire (nekkhamma) is apparent from these synonyms modified by the prefixes su and vi. The spiritual situation of non-desire (nekkhamma) is differentiated from the five other nissaraṇa (deliverance) according to what is regarded as spiritual tranquility, and whether nekkhamma is considered to be solely negative. And finally, according to how nekkhamma is to be conceived positively.

Whatever else it means, nekkhamma is here thought of as the
spiritual end of Buddhist training and is thereby given a positive content.

The positive content of nekkhamma includes not merely the negation of kāma (a-kāma), but also the negation of all evils (akusala). The Dvedhāvitakkasutta, for example, reads:

*kusalānāṃ dhammānāṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsāṃ vodānapakkaṁ* (M.I.115).

The connotation of nekkhamma is implied in *kusalānāṃ dhammānāṃ*, meaning ‘meritorious qualities’; and means the deliverance from evils. It is further stated in the Cariyāpiṭaka:

*bhavāṁ disvāṇa bhayato nekkhammam abhinikkhammaṁ* (Cariyāpiṭaka, 2.4.1.2).

‘Having seen a being, being devoid of, and getting rid of (eliminating) fear...’

Here the connotation of nekkhamma is implied in *abhinikkhamma*, which is derived from *abhi-nir-kram*, meaning ‘to go out of’.

Nikkhamma is often used in parallel to the phrase showing the negation of kāma (desire). For example, in the Suttanipāta:

*nekkhamma gharā panujja kāme kathāṃ bhikkhu sammā so loke paribbajeyya* (SN. 359).

‘Having gone out of the household, given up all desires, how should Bhikkhu rightly lead life as a mendicant in this world?’

Both nikkhamma and nekkhamma refer to the fact that one gets out of his household and gives up all desires in order to lead a life as mendicant. Nekkhamma, here, means to give up all desires (kāme) completely, and not merely a desire (kāma).

In the Pāli commentaries, nekkhamma is exemplified in a broad sense, involving not only a kāma, but also various kāmas, which means evil (akusala) in contrast to meritorious (kusala).

In a broad sense nekkhamma in the Pāli commentaries probably represents three kinds of modification:

1. Identification between nekkhamma and kusala. This can be found in the Majjhimanikāya commentary which explains the phrase nekkhamma-vitakka, saying *kāmehi nissatāṃ sabbaṃ kusalaṃ* (M.Com.II.79), and also *kāmato nissatugunakkhammato nissatage ṭhitenā puggalena* (Ibid. IV. 1974), etc. These passages represent explicitly the identity between nekkhamma and kusala, which is implicitly noticeable in the Dighanikāya (D.III.239-240; Vibh. p. 86).
2. Modification of nekkhamma.

Here the meaning of nekkhamma acquires a positive content. The Dighanikāya Commentary reads:

\[ \text{nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ pakāsesi pabbajjāya guṇaṃ pakāseti ti attho (D.Com.I.473).} \]

‘To expound advantages of a state of non-desire means to expound virtues of a Buddhist mendicant.’

The identity between nekkhamma and pabbajja is also revealed in the commentary on the Āṅguttaranikāya (cf. an explanation on pabbajja in the passage ‘nekkhamme cittam pakkhandati ti pabbajjāya cittam ārammanānasena pakkhandati’ (A.Com.IV.204).

Nekkhamma also represents anāgāmin (one who does not return), i.e., ‘ettha nekkhamman ti anagāminaggo adhippeto, so hi sabbaso kāmānan nissaraṇāṃ’. The identification with anāgāmin is found in the commentary on the Dhammapada 272, in which nekkhamma means anāgāminsukha.

Furthermore, nekkhamma is connected with nibbāna, meaning ‘liberation’, i.e., ‘nibbāne khemabhāvanā disvā’ (Vimānavatthu Cm., p. 348; A. Com.III.242), ‘nibbānaṅ ca nibbanagāmiṇī ca pātipadoṁ khaman ti disvā’ (Suttanipāta Com.II. on SN. 1098), and ‘nekkhammantī kilesūpasamanḍ nibbāṇaratiṁ pana sandhāy’etam vuttan’ (Dhammapāda Com. 181), etc.

Sometimes a distinction is drawn between pabbajja, meaning ‘to lead a life as a mendicant,’ and nibbāna, meaning ‘liberation.’ In this case nibbāna represents nekkhamma. But it does not represent pabbajja, i.e., ‘ettha pabbajja nekkhamman ti na gahetabham’.

All of these interpretations quoted above refer to the positive content of nekkhamma given by Buddhaghosa, the brilliant commentator on Pāli canons.

According to another commentator Dhammapāla, nekkhamma includes three kinds of mental situation, viz, nibbāna (liberation), samathavipassanā (tranquility), and pabbajja (the leading of a life as a mendicant (Cariyāpiṭaka Com.2.4.1.2). Accordingly nekkhamma develops in Abhidharma literature a positive content, which is modified by such expressions as anāgāmin, pabbajja and nibbāna. We must not forget though that all of these positive elements are extended to nekkhamma (lit., nis-kam, meaning ‘not to desire’), but are not extended to nikkhamma (lit., nis-kram, mentioned before, is differentiated from nikkhamma.
It is important to note that the Tibetan translation employs naiṣkramya, incorrectly Sanskritized from nekkhamma. For example, nes par ḡbyun ba la brten pa=naiṣkramyāśrita, MVP. No. 6755; spags pa=naiṣkramya, No. 644; mṇon par ḡbyun=naiṣkramya, No. 7554. The Tibetan nes par ḡbyun ba also stands for niḥsarāṇa (‘coming forth’) (cf. Prasannapādā nāma Mādhyaṃkaviṭṭi, XIII. 8). ḡbyun clearly stands for kram (‘to come out’) (Laṅkāvatāra, p. 307). An emphatic prefix mṇon par stands here for nir (–kram), which means ‘entirely’ or ‘clearly.’ Thus mṇon par ḡbyun pa stands for naiṣkramya. If one could reduce mṇon par ḡbyun pa to the Pāli word, he would have modified abhinik-khamma with an emphatic prefix abhi (cf. J. I. 61; Petavatthu Aṭṭhakathā’ p. 19). Now it is clear that the Tibetan translation follows the Sanskrit naiṣkramya and not the Pāli nekkhamma.

As for the Chinese translation we find two different renderings:

1. Chinese renderings, which seemingly stand for the Sanskrit naiṣkramya (nīkkhamma in Pāli), are as follows:

   Chʻu yao meaning ‘getting out of’ (Dirghanikāya, fasc. 13. T. I. 82), chʻu li meaning ‘being separated from’ (Ibid. fasc. 8. T. I. 51b).

2. Chinese renderings, which stand for the Sanskrit naiṣkāmya (nekkhamma in Pāli) are as follows:

   Wu yu meaning ‘non-desire’ (Mādhyaṃnikāya, fasc. 25. T. I. 589); chʻu yū meaning ‘getting out of desire’ (Mahādharmaṃsgraha, fasc. 2. T. I. 230b).

Nissaraṇa is translated into Chinese words such as chʻu yao (D fasc. 8. T. I. 51b; M. fasc. 26. T. I. 591b) chʻu li (Mahādharmaṃsgraha, fasc. 2. T. I. 230b) and also yūan meaning ‘condition’ (Ibid.). All of these Chinese words stand for naiṣkramya.

Nissaraṇa and naiṣkramya together mean ‘getting out of’. It seems reasonable, therefore, to reduce such Chinese words as chʻu yao, chʻu li etc., to naiṣkramya (‘getting out of’), and not naiṣ-kāmya (‘non-desire’).

The precise readings of the Daśabhūmikā-sūtra and its Chinese translations suffice to show us the fact that such words as chʻu yao, chʻu li, yūan li stand for naiṣkramya. On the other hand, naiṣkramya is rendered as chʻu chia meaning ‘getting out of the household’ by Dharmarakṣa (West Chin Dynasty, A.D. 265-316), neng chʻu li meaning ‘completely getting out of’ by Siladharmā (Tang Dynasty, A.D. 618-906), ching chʻin hsiiu hsing meaning ‘earnestly
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to endeavor’ by Buddhabhadra (East Chin Dynasty, A.D. 317-417) and Bodhiruchi (Northern Wei Dynasty, A.D. 386-534), and chʻin hsiu chʻu li meaning ‘to practice to get out of’ by Śīkṣānanda (A.D. 695-699).

Naiśkramya, however modified, is translated into all of the above Chinese words. The Tibetan translation of naiśkramya in the Daśabhūmikasūtra is ḡāḍḥ byuṅ meaning ‘getting out of’, and has the same meaning as in Chinese.

To judge from this enumeration of Chinese words, the Chinese tradition seems to have confused naiśkramya with naiśkāmya or nekkhamma with nikkhamma. Those scholars who correctly translate naiśkāmya into the Chinese words such as wu yū or chʻu yū are Saṅghadeva (East Chin Dynasty, 317-420 A.D.) and Dānapāla (Northern Sung Dynasty, 960-1127 A.D.), for the Chinese words correspond to the original meaning of nekkhamma i.e., ‘non-desire’. Both scholars, Saṅghadeva and Dānapāla, distinguish nissaṇa or naiśkramya and naiśkāmya, giving different Chinese words to each of the Sanskrit terms. Saṅghadeva renders nissaṇa into chʻu yao and naiśkāmya into wu yūan, while Dānapāla renders nissaṇa into chʻu li or yūan and naiśkāmya into wu yūan.

Scholars who misinterpret naiśkāmya as naiśkramya are Buddhayaśa and Chu Fu Nien (later Chin Dynasty). The original Sanskrit, which they render into Chinese words like chʻu yao, chʻu li and yūan li, meaning ‘getting out of’, ‘being separated from’ and ‘being secluded from’, would be naiśkramya, meaning ‘getting out of’. The first of these three renderings, i.e., chʻu yao, is given to nissaṇa, meaning ‘getting out of’ as well. Nissaṇa is a synonym of naiśkramya.

In the Chinese tradition chʻu yao, chʻu li and yūan li often refer to naiśkramya, in the same sense, representing ‘getting out of’. Yet the concept of naiśkramya is quite different from that of naiśkāmya, an equivalent to nekkhamma, meaning ‘non-desire’.

An even better example of incorrect Sanskritization occurs in one passage of the Lankāvatārasūtra (p. 307) and represents exactly the same passage as in the Pāli. The Pāli passage reads: ‘nikkhamma gharā panujja kāma’ (SN. 359). Nikkhamma in this passage means ‘getting out of’. On the other hand, naiśkramya in the Lankāvatāra-sūtra also means ‘getting out of’. In this case, of course, naiśkramya would be the correct Sanskritized word for the nikkhamma. Nevertheless, naiśkramya is always misinter-
interpreted as the word corresponding to nekkhanna. The Chinese *ch'u chia*, meaning ‘getting out of household’ corresponds to *naiśkramya*. It would be correct, if *naiśkramya* always corresponded to *nikkhamma*. But in reality it corresponds to *nekkhamma*. Hence, the Chinese also would rightly be *li yū*, meaning ‘getting out of desire’.

The Buddhist Sanskrit translators seem to disregard the importance of the Pāli original meanings of *nikkhamma* and *nekkhamma*. The primary concern is that *naiśkramya* means the negation of all kinds of defilement or worldly things (cf. also a concept of *ch'u chia* in the Paramārtha’s Chinese translation of Buddhagotraśāstra, fasc. 4. T. 31.810c).

In other words, the Sanskritized word *naiśkramya* in the passage corresponding to the Pāli is an incorrect translation of *nekkhamma*. However, it should be remembered that, philosophically speaking, the meaning of *naiśkramya* refers not only to a verbal word but also to the connotation of the word in wide perspective, and extends to the negation of all things profane inclusive of *kāma* (desire). The single word *naiśkramya* includes, in its connotation, both the words *nekkhamma* (a negation of *kāma*) and *nikkhamma* (a negation of all things profane). The reference to the connotation of *naiśkramya* in wide perspective is given in the Uttaratantra7 and its Chinese and Tibetan translations as follows:

Skt. jantahpuraratikṛdāṃ naiśkramya duḥkhaçārīkām

Tib. btsum moхи ḍkhar gyis dgyes rol dañ, des ḍbyun dhaḥ bspyod pa dañ.

Chin. “Being born in the Palace, giving up all kinds of desire, Kumāra (Buddha) gets out of the household to lead an ascetic life.”

There seems to be no doubt here that *naiśkramya* corresponds to ḍbyun and *ch'u chia*, meaning ‘getting out of household’, and that ‘giving up all kinds of desire’ (*yen li chu yū hsiang*) finds its equivalent neither in Sanskrit nor in Tibetan translation.

It seems possible that the Chinese term *yen li chu yū hsiang* could be a compound intentionally added by the Chinese translator to modify the word *ch’ü chia*. If so, the reason will have a double aspect:

1. *Yen li chu yū hsiang* is simply a modification of *ch’ü chia*, added by the translator from the aspect of the literal comparison of different translations.
2. Yen li chu yü hsiang is formed by an extension of the original meaning of nekkhamma, which means ‘non-desire’.

In other words, it is only by an extension of the original meaning that ch'ü chia meaning ‘getting out of the household’ can be modified by yen li chu yü hsiang meaning ‘giving up all kinds of desire’.

In general, though ch'ü chia (‘getting out of the household’) stands for various terms such as pravrajyā, naiskramya, naiskāmya and āraṇya, āraṇya which literally means ‘forest.’ Connotatively āraṇya represents ‘getting out of the household’ (ch'ü chia). Another verse in the Uttaratantra reads:

Skt. ratikṣāraṇyapravacarana (mārapramathanam)
Tib. dgyas ral pa dañ dben par sbyod (dañ bdud bcon dañ)
Chin. hsi lo chi yü hsiang ch'ü chia hsian ku hsian.

Here ch'ü chia stands for āraṇya meaning ‘forest’, but it also stands for naiskramya meaning ‘getting out of’ in the same Chinese translation of the Uttaratantra (p. 88). Thus, ch'ü chia actually corresponds to āraṇya, pravrajyā and naiskāmya, but not to naiskramya. But yen li chu yü hsiang meaning ‘getting out of all kinds of desire’ also means to deny desire (kāma). In other words, it represents the original meaning of nekkhamma (non-desire), which also stands for ch'ü chia.

It is evident from the above that ch'ü chia, meaning ‘getting out of the household’, is modified by the compound yen li chu hsiang meaning ‘getting out of all kinds of desire’, and that this modification is an extension of the original meaning of nekkhamma, meaning ‘non-desire’. The most extra-ordinary confusion has resulted from the incorrect Sanskritization of nekkhamma into naiskramya.

We may generalize from the above and say that if nekkhamma is Sanskritized into naiskramya, or rendered into ch'ü chia, nekkhamma means the abolition of all things profane. In other words, the relative negation in later Buddhism transposes into the negation of the whole. Pāli Buddhism referred to the simple negation of the opposite, as expressed in the form and meaning of nekkhamma derived from nis-kāma (non-desire), while later Sanskrit Buddhism refers to the positive expression of experience as is expressed in naiskramya, which represents not only ‘getting out of’,
but also ‘getting out of the household’, ‘getting out of all kinds of desire’, and even *nirvāṇa* meaning ‘liberation’.

This change in the process from the logical or relative negation (in Pāli Buddhism) to the positive expression of experience (in Sanskrit Buddhism) is significant. The metaphysical basis of Sanskrit Buddhism (Mahāyāna Buddhism) is thoroughly experimental. This may be seen in the dissatisfaction of Mahāyāna Buddhism with only the original meaning of words. The Sanskrit Buddhist tries to push further back, to explain the religious experience implied in the words.

To clarify the point let us note a few examples. The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* (trl. by Kumārajiva) reads:

Vimalakīrti said: “Then, you will give rise to the highest Enlightenment. It is nothing but ‘getting out of the household (ch'u chia).’” (Śrīvimalakīrti-nirdeśa. fasc. 2.T.14. 541c).

Moreover the commentary on *Daśabhūmi-sūtra* by Hui yüan reads:

“As for ch'u yao (naiśkramya), ch'u means ‘result’, while yao means ‘important path’ [to the Enlightenment].” (fasc. 10. Dainippon Zoku Zokyo, 71.244b)

And the *Daśacakrakūtigarbha* (trl. by Hsüan Tsang) says:

“Ch'u yao (naiśkramya) of the three vehicles means the truth, such as the fourfold noble path (caturṣatya), and so on.” (T. 13.752a).

It is not the purpose here to determine whether ch'u yao and ch'u chia correspond to naiśkramya and pravrajyā or not. However, on the basis of Chinese tradition we can assume that ch'u yao stands for naiśkramya while ch'u chia for naiśkramya or pravrajyā.

Ch'u yao literally means ‘getting out of’, and metaphorically it suggests an important path to the result (the Enlightenment) in the positive sense. Another Chinese word ch'u chia literally means ‘getting out of the household’ and metaphorically it suggests ‘to give rise to the highest Enlightenment’, again in the positive sense.

The interpretation of the above in China differs entirely from the original meaning of nekkhamma in India. The Chinese interpretation does not even suggest a negative expression. It actually transforms the negative into the positive.

What is perhaps more important is that negation in Chinese
Buddhism, developed in the widest perspective, is the concept nekkhamma with a prefix nir, and not a. The two aspects of the negation of kāma (desire), as we have examined earlier, are nekkhamma and akāma, of which the latter simply means the relative negation, or the negation of opposites. Hence, the latter is not a concept to represent the Mahāyānistic trend of thought, namely, the positive expression of experience.

In general, the prefix nir stands for an emphatic prefix inherited in the Buddhist tradition. The Abhidharmakośa reads:

Skt. na te nirviśeṣā bhavanti (AKV. p. 176. ed. by Wogihara)
Chin. wu to ts‘u pieh (There are no various distinctions).

Nirviśeṣā in this passage is viśeṣa modified by nir, but not the negation of viśeṣa. Hsuan Chien endeavoured to render nir into to in Chinese, meaning ‘various’ as used in a positive expression.

We have so far seen that, in the Buddhist tradition, nekkhamma, meaning ‘non-desire’, whether Sanskritized as naiškramya or nais-kāmya, has to express the positive content of experience. Therefore, it has been rendered into such words as nieh p‘an meaning ‘liberation’, ch‘u chia meaning ‘getting out of (all things profane)’.

In the Buddhist tradition naiškramya represents two aspects of negation.

First, naiškramya represents the relative negation of the opposite, as is the case with nekkhamma, meaning ‘non-desire’. Wu yüan meaning ‘non-desire’ corresponds exactly to nekkhamma as discussed above.

Second, naiškramya represents the positive content of the religious experience, as it is found exemplified in such words as ‘liberation’, ‘getting out of all profane things’ etc.

An adequate comprehension of such a tradition will suffice to show us that nir is not only the relative negation of the opposite—the negation of the experimental (kāma)—but also the positive expression of the religious experience beyond the realm of the experimental.

This is to say that the negation indicated by the prefix nir positively points out the absolute religious experience; and yet it is not abstract from the realm of the experimental.

This concept of negation, expressed by the prefix nir implicitly denotes the positive content, and explicitly retains the negative form. It is simply because one can finally get the positive content,
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i.e., the realm of super-experimental of the religious experience by and through the negation of the experimental.\textsuperscript{11}

In other words, negation in the Buddhist sense represents two dimensions, the negation of the realm of the experimental and the expression of the realm of the super-experimental (nirvāṇa).

II. A Linguistic Approach to the Beginningless Circle of Life: anamatagga and anādikālika

A Survey of Etymological Analysis

We have a Pāli term anamatagga, meaning 'without beginning', which is very often used in compound with saṃsāra (the human life). We shall examine its etymological analysis and its distinction from anādikāla, a Mahāyānist expression translated into the English 'without beginning'. The same English stands for a Pāli 'anamatagge'.

With regards to this term the Pāli Text Society's Pāli English Dictionary (PTSD) gives an etymology—\textit{ana-mata-aggā} (pl.).

The prefix \textit{ana} is here taken as a negative one. \textit{Ana-mata} points to the denial of \textit{mata}. However, there is no prefix like \textit{ana} in Pāli.

Childers gives an interpretation. In his view, anamatagga indicates a Sanskrit term a-amṛta-agra. It means that [saṃsāra] does not end in nirvāṇa (amṛta). (Childers, Dictionary of the Pāli Language. p. 32.) Childers could be right when he quotes Rogers's translation of the Pāli phrase anamatagge saṃsāra saṃsaranto. This phrase is translated by him as follows: 'Revolving in a revolution of being in the countless existence that have no beginning'. (Buddhaghosa's Parables. 1870, London, p. 56.) Irrespective of Rogers's translation Childers takes anamata as an-amata. However, anamata could be a double negation of mata. It should mean 'non-unthinkable', i.e., 'thinkable'. If being so, anamatagga denotes the beginning thinkable. 'It will be rightly opposed to its original significance.

Another etymology is given by Pischel in his \textit{Grammatik des Prākrit-Sprachen} (Strassburg 1900, Section 251).

Pischel takes it as a-amat-aggā. Further, he takes the root of namat as nam. This etymology, however, could be of no sense.

Further, A Critical Pāli Dictionary (CPD), the most exhaustive
Dictionary of Pāli, analyses it by *an-amat ‘agga* (CPD, p. 156) just as it is the case with PTSD and DPL, giving thereby the meaning ‘without top and bottom’. But, there is no word equivalent to ‘top and bottom’ in the compound *anamatagga* as such. Hence, this analysis indicates its implication, but not the etymological significance.

In relation to Ardhamāgadhī Edgerton reduces *anamatagga* in Pāli to *anavaraṇa* (Buddhist Hybrid Dictionary), quoting ample of original sources such as Divy. 197.15 (*anavaragra saṃsāra*) and Śikṣāsamuccaya 170.2 (*anavarāgre jātiṃṣāsāra*), etc.

According to Edgerton a Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit term *anavaragra* is derived from *an-avara-agra*. It means a negation of *avara* (bottom) as well as *agra* (top). It is translated into English as ‘without top and bottom’, which is also adopted by CPD, as mentioned before.

A Tibetan translation of it is also the same as this English rendering. That is, *thog ma daṇ tha ma med pa* (‘without top and bottom’).

However, all these English translations and a BHSD *anavarāgra* literally do not correspond to *anamatagga* in Pāli.

All we can say here is that whatever *anavarāgra* in BHSD or the English translation it is merely a connotation or an implication of *anamatagga*, but not an etymological meaning.

Edgerton offers another etymology in terms of Ardhamāgadhī. The Ardhamāgadhī term *anavaragra* is, he presumes, a Hyper-Sanskrit for *anavadagga* (BHSD. New Haven, 1953, p. 21). He is inclined to connect *anavaragra* with *anavadagga* or *anavayagga* rather than with *anamatagga* in Pāli.

Another attempt would be conceivable. Pischel’s Grammatik (Section 251) indicates a phonetic change: A syllable *m* followed by *n* turns into *n*. If so, *anamatagga* in Pāli could closely be related to *anavadagga* in Ardhamāgadhī.

But, this attempt seems not to be fair unless the relationship between *an* and *an* will sufficiently be explained. Moreover, a particle *an(an)* is wrongly taken as a negative particle as seen in all other etymological expositions.

Anamatagga and its Etymology in Pāli

At first it may be given as a conclusion that a Pāli term *anamatagga* is adequately derived from *anu-a-mata-agga*, but not
from *an-a-mata-agga*, and that a prefix *anu* indicates an emphatic particle, which means ‘complete’ or ‘absolutely’.

The prefix *anu* followed by a vowel *a* (*amata*), in here *u* being deleted due to the vowel sandhi, has turned into *an*, ample examples of which will be found in compound with verbs.

They are: *anoloketi* (‘precisely observes’) is rightly derived from *anu-ava-loketi* (Cf. Sammohavinodani, PTS, Ed. p. 355), which is wrongly Sanskritized by *avalokayati*. *Anu* (‘complete’) is replaced by *ava* (‘above’). This Sanskrit term *avalokayati* is often intermixed with *apaloketi*.

It may here be remarked that the intermixed use of *apa* and *ava* is found in such examples as *apalokitehara-avalokites’vara*, *apavāda-avavāda*, etc. The meaning of *ava* is probably not important.

Regarding *anu* and *an* we have another example: *anostdhati*, which means ‘to settle down’. It comes from *anu-ava-sad* (Sammohavinodani, p. 108).

For these reasons, a particle *an* in a term of *anamatagga* is not a negative particle.

A particle *anu* in Pāli has also an emphatic meaning. It will be proved by the following examples.

In general the prefix *anu* is fertile in Sanskrit compounds, most of which make the following meanings clear: ‘after’, ‘along’, ‘in consequence’, ‘near to’, ‘behind’, ‘gradually’, ‘beneath’, ‘less than’, and ‘according to’.

In a complex of meanings, as enumerated above, is an emphatic meaning of *anu* missing. The emphatic meaning, however, plays an important role in terms of *anamatagga* in question.

We have ample examples of Pāli terms formed with *anu*, indicating the emphatic meaning. They are:

- *anupakkhadati* ‘(He) eats into’
- *anupabbajati* ‘(He) gives up the world’
- *anupariyātī* ‘(He) goes round and round’
- *anuparidhāvati* ‘(He) runs up and down’
- *anusānacarati* ‘(He) goes round about’
- *anusaṅgito* ‘changed together’

Clearly does Buddhaghosa, great Pāli commentator, comment on *anu* as an emphatic particle, when he refers to *anusaya*, one of the most important Buddhist terms. In his *Āṭṭhasālinī*, the commentary on Dhammasaṅgani defines *anusaya* and says:
Because of harping on [an idea] persistently it is termed the 'latent bias'.

Other commentaries also read:

Anusayo bhavuppattiyā mūlam.²
(The latent bias is a basis to give rise to life)
Anusayā akusalamūlāni.³
(The latent bias is a basis of the unwholesome)

Thus, the prefix anu is to be taken as an emphatic particle meaning 'strongly', 'persistently' and 'completely'.

Further, it is also not fair to take anu as ana; Otherwise the original meaning will be negated, as for example, anappameyya and so on.

Anappameyya in turn comes from anu-appameyya ('complete unmeasurable'), but never from ana-appameyya, which means a negation (ana) of immeasurable (appameyya), i.e., 'the measurable' which negates its original implication.⁴

There is one example, which has a correct English rendering, but not an etymological basis. It is the term anabhāva translated into English as 'the utter cessation of becoming', which can hardly be traced back to its own etymological analysis, for this English translation has no Pāli word equivalent to 'utter'. 'Utter' in English could not be equivalent to ana.

Supposing a prefix ana being a negative, the meaning of anabhāva will become the reverse say, 'the not-cessation of becoming'.

Moreover, it is a problem to be solved in the future that ana could be in itself a negative prefix. That is beyond the present issue.

In a similar manner, anu, the prefix expressing completeness, plays certainly a prominent part in the analysis of anavaya which remained unexplained in PTSD, in which it has been given no etymological analysis.

In regard to anavaya Childers gives its derivation from a-avaya. However, avaya being a negation of vaya, a-avaya could be the doubled negation of vaya, namely, 'privatio', which is rightly opposed to its original meaning 'non-privatio' or 'completeness'.

Strange enough is the fact that, his English rendering, despite the wrong etymology, seems to be quite adequate. He rightly
renders it: ‘perfectly acquainted with’. Probably he translated it in view of its implication.

Because of the vowel sandhi—*anu*+*a*=*an*—this term *anavaya* clearly can be taken as derived from *anu-a-vaya*, literally meaning ‘complete non-want’ or ‘completely no-lacking’.

The same is the case with *anavajja* rendered into non-fault, the etymology of which also is found neither in PTSD nor in DPL at all. In this case also its etymology is not *an-a-vajja*, which indicates the doubled negation of *vajja* (fault), but *anu-a-vajja* rightly meaning ‘complete’, ‘faultless’.  

So we must say that these interpretations are based on a misunderstanding of the prefix *anu*, as even in cases where the emphatic meaning of *anu* is clearly used in Pāli, the interpreters take it in the sense of *an* or *ana*.

But, fortunately there exists a passage, also, where the prefix *anu* is interpreted as ‘complete’ by Buddhaghosa. He gives his interpretation in his commentary on Saṃyuttanikāya. It runs:

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anamataggo’ti anu-amataggo, vassa-sataṁ vassa-sahassam ṇā-
ñena augantvā pi amataggo aviditaggo, nāṣa sakkā ito vā eto
vā aggam jānitum, aparicchinna-pubbāpara-kotiko’ti attho.  
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(Complete cessation of beginning means ‘complete unthinkable beginning’. Even if one thinks of it one hundred years or one thousand years long, its beginning is unthinkable and unknown. It is impossible to know the beginning here and there, its beginning and end cannot be determined.)

We clearly have here *anu-amata-agga* for *anamatagga*, thus, leaving no doubt at all about the ‘complete cessation of beginning’.

**Anamatagga and its implication in Pāli**

The Pāli term *anamatagga*, literally meaning ‘the complete cessation of the beginning’, acquires not only a negation of the beginning (*agga*), but also a special shade of implication from ‘*amata*’ (*a-man*).

*Amata* in itself represents a negation of thinking (*amata* derived from *a-mata*). Beyond the range of thinking is the beginning (*agga*). *Agga* being not a sort of ultimate principle, its negation does not mean the mere denial of the process of inference. In other words, *agga* is not the object of inference. What is to be
denied, that is the way of ‘thinking’ agga as a real entity. It is ‘thinking’ (man, pp. mata) that counts.

Whether agga exists in reality or not is a problem far beyond the range of Buddhist inquiry. In contrast, important is whether ‘thinking’, the reasoning power, will succeed in finding an ultimate principle (agga) from which all things well commence.

According to the fundamental thesis of Buddhism any sort of thinking power is to be denied in its nature. This thesis is applied also to the Pāli compound amatagga, meaning ‘the beginning unthinkable’, being different from an-agga (a merely logical negation of agga). The Pāli conception of amatagga, we might say, corresponds in a sense to a Mahāyānistic concept of a negation of vikalpa, which is also the discriminative thinking or the discriminative knowledge.

Thus, amata being used in compound with samsāra it means that agga of samsāra cannot become even the object of thinking, not to mention ‘not exist’ as an entity. This is the reason why Pāli Buddhism lays emphasis upon the word amata prefixed with the emphatic particle anu.

In other words, the term anu-a-mata-agga does not represent the inferential inquiry into agga as entity, but the fully dynamic meaning on the empirical level. This is an attitude towards agga slightly different from the Mahāyānistic approach to agga (ādi in a Mahāyānist terminology), to which I will refer in the section on ādikāla.

Anādikāla and its implication in Mahāyāna

Anādikāla compounded with samsāra is not found in earlier stages of Pāli Buddhism except a few instances in later stages of Pāli Abhidhamma.7 Moreover, ādi is not discussed even in later Pāli Abhidhamma from the ontological angle.

In contrast, Mahāyāna Buddhism has to treat a problem of ādi from the standpoint of realism in revolt against the heretic view, in which ādi is in the form of existence or entity (dravya).

In line with this antagonistic orientation Mahāyāna Buddhism also follows tentatively the realistic view of the heretics. Ādi taken as an entity by Mahāyānist as well as heretics denotes a finite period of time from which all events will take place in succession up to the end.

Anādi, the negation of ādi, means consequently a logical nega-
tion of ādi as an entity. Mahāyāna Buddhism, holding its own view of non-reality (śūnyatā), has to deny the reality of ādi also. For this reason the existence or the non-existence of ādi has been discussed by both, Mahāyānist and heretics, from the viewpoint of realism. This realistic implication is indicated by the term anādikāla (beginningless).

The purpose of setting the anādikāla conception is described in a Mahāyāna text as follows:

[A theory of] anādikāla is for the purpose of denying a realistic view of hetu (saheputvāda) and also for the purpose of destroying a realistic view of non-hetu (ahetuvāda).  

_Hetu_ in this passage is equated with ādi as far as the latter is considered as a real entity; both saheputvāda and ahetuvāda are of the realistic view. The denial of hetu denotes the denial of ādi, both of which are based on the theory of non-reality of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Thus, ādi is considered as an entity on the ontological level.

**Ādi and Abhidharmic interpretation**

_Anamatagga_ in Early Buddhism being a negation of ‘thinking’ of agga, the term agga should not be taken as a prima causa, but a dynamic condition, upon which our present life (saṁsāra) develops.

This ideation has been preserved up to the time when the Abhidharmic interpretation takes place in terms of ādi. Buddhaghosa, the Pāli commentator, for instance, interprets ādi as a term paṭṭhāna, which means ‘importance’, being quite different from ‘beginning’ (ādi). He, differentiating ādi (paṭṭhāna) from ādimatta (a time period), gives a detailed exposition as follows:

“avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā saṅkhārapaccayā viññānanā ti evaṃ hetuphalaparamparāya pariyośānaṃ n’atthi.”

(Depending on ignorance karmic formation [form-energies] will take place; depending on karmic formation, consciousness will take place. This fact represents the endless series of the cause-effect relationship.) (Vism. II. p. 577.)

In connection to ādi, which is set forth at the beginning of the twelvefold Dependent Origination, is avijjā. What does ādi mean in terms of the Dependent Origination? Should it be a realistic...
concept of prima causa? In response to it, Buddhaghosa proposes:

“The objection might be raised: If being so, this theory that depending on ignorance (avijjā) karmic formulation will take place would be opposed to [the realistic concept] of prima causa (ādimatta). But, this is not a theory of [realistic or heretic] prima causa. Because among three circles [kamma-vatthu, kilesavatthu, vipāka-vatthu] the important is ignorance. Namely, when ignorance will be acquired, then, the other circles such as defilement, desires, [results], also will draw back efficiency.” (Ibid.)

Ādi, as described in this passage, is taken by Buddhaghosa not as prima causa, but as ‘the important’ (patthāna), for ādi, as represented here by avijjā, is rightly the fundamental basis, upon which the human life (as illustrated by the twelvefold links of paṭiccasamuppāda) develops. If one, otherwise, takes it as a prima causa, this would lead him to a prima causa of prima causa and that to another ad infinitum.

Buddhaghosa, for this reason, objecting to ādimatta-conception of the heretics, clearly interprets ādi as paṭṭhāna.

A concept of ādi, as Buddhaghosa presumes, is considered as the period of time or a real entity. This way of understanding is common to both Buddhism, Abhidharma and Mahāyāna, the system of which is formulated in line with the negation of ādi as entity.

Ādi and Paṭiccasamuppāda

A concept of ādi is inclined to be taken as an entity, for it usually represents a realistic idea of the heretics. For this reason, Buddhism, whether Abhidharma or Mahāyāna, does not employ at all or critically use it, discriminating itself from the heretic concept of reality (dravya).

To Pāli Buddhists the twelvefold links of paṭiccasamuppāda aims at the mutual dependency of any mental or physical phenomenon for its own object, being thereby not interested in any sort of reality of ādi. For this purpose is a specific term employed to define the unthinkable of sansāra. It is a Pāli term anamatagga at issue. They do not use anādikāla, for ādi easily could be confused with a real entity.

Instead of a real ādi, Pāli Abhidharmikas insist on the func-
tional relationship of the twelvefold links in view of paccaya (condition). *Saṃsāra* can be found only in a way that it would pass from one moment to the next moment, so also there is no enduring entity.

“[No consciousness] passed from the former life to this life, and yet this present embryo could not have entered into existence without the preceding causes.”

Thus, everything whatever in the world is said to be determined by conditions. Further, it is allegorically illustrated as follows:

“Many things may serve to illustrate this fact, as for example, the echo, the light of a lamp, the impression of a seal, or the image produced by a mirror. On account of continuum of *khandha* (the individual existence) neither single nor multiple causes exist.”

According to Pāli Abhidharma (the Theravādins), everything mental or physical happens in accordance to laws and conditions (*hetupaccaya*): If it were otherwise, there would reign a realistic entity, i.e. the Creator or *ādimatta* (the period of time.).

As far as the critical attitude toward a realistic concept of *ādi* is concerned, there would not be any distinction between Pāli Abhidhamma and Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Moreover, the same idea as that of Mahāyāna is expressed in a definite form in the following lines:

“Who understands the [twelvefold] Dependent Origination, understands the Law (*dhamma*); and who understands the Law, understands the Dependent Origination.”

This idea of the Pāli Abhidhamma is also found in a Mahāyāna text. The Śālistamba runs:

“yo bhikṣavah pratityasamutpādam paśyati, sa buddham paśyati, yo buddham paśyati sa dharman paśyati.”

Thus, there would not be any distinction between Mahāyāna and Hinayāna in a point that the realization of both doctrines, *pratityasamutpāda* and *dharma*, could be unified into one.

It is the same with the interpretation of *ādi*, which points to an entity. As Hinayāna takes *ādi* as a real entity, just so Mahāyāna also interprets it as a reality to be denied.

The Mahāyānistic logic of negation, however, concerns itself
not only with ādi, but also anādi as well, for both ādi and anādi, as they presume, are merely the constrictions, which our concept have put on. This is called the absolute negation or śūnyatā going far beyond the range of dualism or the two extremes of assertion –ādi or anādi –.

In contrast, Pāli Ābhidhammikas, rejecting also ādi as entity like the Mahāyānists, do not, however, deny the anādi. Because to them the anādi, meaning ‘without beginning’, is rightly that which they imply.

To the Pāli Ābhidhammikas is it sufficient to show how the present suffering, but not the epistemological inquiries, has come about, and how through extinction of ignorance no more rebirth will follow, and thus the process of existence will have been realized and therewith the extinction of the human suffering.

Ādi, therefore, is not an object of epistemological concern, but simply a concept to imply an ‘important’ (paṭṭhāna) factor upon which other mental or physical phenomenon, being dependent, will arise.

In this manner, to the Pāli Ābhidhammikas the issue of ādi, going beyond the epistemological concern, has been turned into the problem of human existence in suffering. Hence, anādi, a negation of ādi, has not been set forth by them unlike the Mahāyānists.

Having supposed conditions (paccaya), they have realized how the twelvefold factors—from avijjā to jāriyāmarana—are conditioned by each other, and how through non-ignorance the standstill of suffering existence will have been realized.

The Pāli Ābhidhammikas, for this reason, carefully keeping away from the Mahāyānistic usage of anādi, would have substituted anamatagga (samsāra) for anādikālikā (samsāra).

Anamatagga differentiated from ādi does not simply mean a logico-epistemological negation of ‘beginning’ (agga), but it implies ‘the complete cessation of thinking (anu-amata)’ of whatsoever beginning or end in terms of samsāra.

However, the Mahāyānist logic of negation, going to its farthest extent, denies both ādi and paccaya (conditions) as entity on one and the same basis of śūnyatā. The Mādhyamika system, as for example, equates pratītyasamutpāda with śūnyatā—the conventional validity of entities (i.e., Hinayāna view) and their absolute non-entity (i.e., Mahāyāna view).
In Hinayana tradition of Pali and Sanskrit literature the twelve-fold Dependent Origination (paticcasamuppada) occupies an important place but Mahayanaists do not attach much prominence to it. The reason will be in a fact that paccaya (pratyaya) has been re-interpreted by the Mahayanaists on an epistemological level, having been denied as a real entity.15

III. KAMMA AND ANATTA THOUGHT IN EARLY BUDDHISM

I

In this article, I will examine one of the most vehemently debated questions in connection with Buddhist Philosophy, viz. whether or not there is an inconsistency between the theories of anatta (not-self) and kamma (action). Dr. M. Falk refers to this problem also saying that the real antinomy is atmankarman. "(Nairitmya and Karman", Indian Historical Quarterly, 1940, p. 429-64).

When we consider the thought of kamma in Oriental Philosophy as indicating a continuum after death or the law of causality between good and evil actions, such a way of thinking has never been indigenous to Oriental Philosophy. This has many elements in common with the thought of transmigration, which had prevailed ever since the Orphic Order or Pythagorean philosophy. As compared with Buddhist thinking, however, the latter referred transmigration to its ethical meaning.

In the Orient, as we shall discover to the contrary, transmigration had never been restricted to its ethical meaning, but had been much more deeply considered from the religious viewpoint, and this is the theoretical construction which will be presented here in detail. Since Buddhism began with clarifying wisdom towards the reality of worldly beings, it is naturally true that the Buddhistic theories are founded not only upon the investigation of human beings, but also upon objective reality binding those human beings.

II

In this respect, some scholars admit of an incongruity between nonself (anatta) and action (kamma) in doctrine, while others say that the Buddha preached his dhamma by adopting the kamma
Early Buddhist Concepts

doctrine prevailing at that time because of the mental tendencies, spiritual aspirations, and general behaviour characteristic of the people.

Concerning the importance of the historical background with respect to the kamma-doctrine's introduction into Buddhism, little need be said here.

However, by taking the further development of the Abhidhamma theories into consideration, we shall find a more deeply underlying relation between the two theories.

Now, the concept corresponding to "substance" and in use in the Pāli canon is the five-aggregates (khandha). The five aggregates are transitory and not real, as properly understood. A substance as five aggregates in reality is merely a stream of thought. It contains nothing permanent or substantial; it is nothing but non-self (anatta). This definition of five aggregates takes away the presupposition of a deep-rooted, permanent entity, and shows that there is nothing in the world which we can cling to as real and permanent. If there is no permanent entity in the world, such as creator, substance, or agent of action, etc. then who is it that performs action and receives its results? Or does the not-self receive the results of his own action? This is meaningless. Such a conception has no meaning apart from a specifically formulated theory of kamma, having developed in the Abhidhamma-philosophy ever since the very beginning of the introduction of the kamma doctrine into early Buddhism. And what then is the specifically formulated concept of kamma?

In the Nikāya it is stated thus: "So then you say that body is not the self; that feeling is not the self... Then what self can those acts affect which are not self-wrought?"

As this passage indicates, the question, "If kamma from the Buddhist point of view should take place, then what is the substance of this kamma?" has been answered by saying that "The five aggregates are not-self". That is to say that "what" has been answered by "how", but not by a substance of some sort. The question as to the incongruity between the not-self and kamma-doctrines has never been answered in the true sense of the word, but only by the reiteration of the meaning of not-self, as it is. If this is the case, what bearing does this argument have upon the unique relationship between the anatta and kamma doctrines?

We have the same argument concerning the incongruity bet-
ween them in the *Milindapañha*, which says that if these five aggregates should not transfer to another world, or, that they should not transfer as they are, then does not transmigration take place? In response to this question, Nāgasena replies by saying:

"Thus, O King! These five aggregates do not come into existence, and also the natural aggregates do not go to another world. Relying on these five aggregates, the beings are born in the mother-womb in their qualification of good and evil, just like the shadow in the round mirror."³

In this answer it is implied that if substance or the five aggregates should be admitted, evil would necessitate evil, and good necessitate good without the merit of religious purification whatever, and thus the basic reason for religious practice would be denied. If this were so, Nāgasena refutes the affirmation of substance with respect to transmigration as it would end in negation of moral values. The negation of moral values would be contrary to the right view of life, which is repeatedly preached by the Buddha. Thus the relation between the two doctrines, *anatta* and *kamma*, is to be interpreted positively rather than negatively.⁴

### III

Those who affirm that the Buddhist view is non-self (*anatta*) are more or less incorrect if they are referring merely to the negative standpoint, in which one may consider the non-self as having no positive contents, "in vain" and "non-real" alone; but they are quite correct if the implication of non-self has reached a much more positive standpoint in which both doctrines, i.e. *anatta* and *kamma*, will be co-related, integrated, and positively interpreted.

It is to be noted that such an implication has found expression in the following passage in the *Milindapañha*:

"O Great King! These five aggregates do neither transfer to another world, nor do the five aggregates take place in themselves. By *kamma*, good and evil, shall sentient beings be born in the womb, depending upon these five aggregates just like the image in the mirror".⁵

This explanation given by Nāgasena implies that there is no valid reality in any way but for the five aggregates, and that it is not due to a substance which can transmigrate, but only to the nature of *kamma*. That there is no substance by which transmigration will be possible has been repeatedly argued, as above
stated. However, what is meant by the idea that transmigration depends upon the nature of kamma, instead of depending upon substance? What are the positive components? The image in the mirror is nothing but sentient beings themselves, nothing but the five aggregates which are transitory and unreal. The subject of the image has already been characterized by the term rujiati or “to be decayed”6. The mirror in this simile corresponds to the “womb” of the mother. Thus the explanation which ended with an emphasis upon the not-self theory in relation to transmigration has come to mean that the five aggregates depend upon the five aggregates and come into existence in “the womb of the mother”. In other words, “energy forces (saîkhāra) observe only energy forces”7. We may well say then that “the five aggregates observe only the five aggregates”.

This explanation, however, refers only to the possibility of substance in relation to transmigration, but not to the positive determination of the relation between the anatta and kamma doctrines.

Therefore, we must direct our attention to the carefully formulated expression “by kamma” in the above quoted passage. It is not only due to the five aggregates but also according to kamma that birth takes place in the womb of the mother. Here we have two important factors:

1. “depending upon” the five aggregates, and 2. “according to” kamma. The first of these concerns the relation between the not-self and transmigration. This has already been explained. An examination of the evidence relevant to this first factor forces one to make a negative formulation, that is to say, the question “What is the substance of transmigration?” was answered by the postulation of the not-self doctrine: “There is only the five-aggregates” (and no valid reality as substance). This seems to be reduced to the following argument; we may say that the “what” had been answered by the “how”. In this case, there was no argument on substance whatever, but only the way of transmigration of sentient beings.

On the contrary to all this, the second factor, “by kamma”, seems to point out the positive and effective relation between the not-self and action doctrines. This effective relation between both becomes clear if certain very elemental considerations concerning the nature of questions in Buddhist Philosophy be noted. Before entering into the discussion on the implication of “by kamma”,
let us see what is meant by formulations such as “what”, “how”, and “by what” from the Buddhistic point of view.

IV

As pointed out by many scholars, it is not really true that the chief object of the Buddha’s preaching was to realize complete cessation of all impurities and to attain the realization of Nirvāṇa. It is for this reason that the Buddhistic question refers only to practical problems, but not to the fixed, unchangeable, and ultimate essence. This is especially true of the philosophy of the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras, where we very often come across the expression and refutation of dualistic conceptions. This explains why Buddhistic inquiries do not assume the formula “what is it?” and thus prefer the formula “how is it?”. It was in this manner that the query concerning a transmigrating substance was answered and explained, i.e. by indicating the transference by kamma.

Nevertheless, in order to explain the meaning proper of the question “how”, the essential to be exemplified by “what” must become much more distinctive to a certain extent. The explanation or description can only be meaningful when the essential becomes revealed and described. A mere description without the essential or subject, for all its merits, is quite inadequate in accounting for the fact or question itself. This is only because without the subject, there is no description of it. Hence, in order to describe anything, the subject should be implicitly contained or manifested through a medium of some sort. To explain or to describe means in its part the manifestation of a subject in some way. The subject will at least manifest itself in this manner so far as it concerns the description.

What the five aggregates themselves reflect on themselves by kamma should not only explain why they are devoid of any real entity, but also the ground of which they are a non-entity, or by what and through what they are said to be a non-entity. Without grounding of the non-reality or non-self doctrine, the question as to the substance of transmigration is only accidentally answered and inadequate to explain completely substance itself. That the answer was meant to demonstrate not only the not-self doctrine, is at once apparent by the expression “by kamma” (kammena), as the former can be tested by the latter. We may therefore say that the substance of transmigration has not only been affirmed acci-
dentally from the viewpoint of not-self in the answer, but also more implicitly from the viewpoint of the *kamma* doctrine in order to ground the not-self doctrine in its nature. In order that the five aggregates may reflect the five aggregates (as an image in a mirror), they can not do so but for “through” or “by” *kamma*. Hence, the explanation by the not-self doctrine must be preceded by that of the *kamma* doctrine, i.e. we may say that “how” should be preceded by “by what”.

V

That which is said to transmigrate, the human being, would be impossible to describe merely as having no validity, no reality and no self without any medium whatever; it would only be possible “through” or “by” *kamma*, as it is. The non-selfness, though it actually indicates the character of the human being, can not be immediately manifested, actually grasped, and only through *kamma* as such can it reveal itself to man. This is simply because “by what” must be given precedence to “how” as above mentioned.

Thus, we may say that in the formula of argument we can already discover a close connection, integration, and cognizance between the two doctrines of *anatta* and *kamma*. Thus *kamma* has come to carry the positive meaning and to play the role through which the not-self doctrine can be expressed.

This fact is so important that it may be worth our while to indicate precisely how *kamma* carries the positive role. Now, concerning the fact that *kamma* itself is not a real entity, nothing need be said. *Kamma* is a function which always continues to exist. That *kamma* continues to exist uninterruptedly does not mean to continue indefinitely in time. The reason for this is that the limit in time is one of the categories to be applied to a real entity. Nevertheless in so far as *kamma* is recognized as a non-entity real, such a limit in time would also be impossible to apply to *kamma*. That *kamma* is a non-entity real means that it transcends the limits of time and space.

In the *MilindaPañha* it is said: “When the continuum can not be interrupted, it is impossible to point out that these *kammamas* exist here and there”\(^{16}\). The meaning is that it is impossible to indicate that the *kamma* be uninterrupted and that they are un-indicable in space; in other words, *kamma* transcends any defi-
nition of time and space whatever. In these circumstances, we have to admit that the karmic continuum does not present an indefinite continuation in time, but in view of the fact that *kamma* is non-entity in its nature, we are entitled to expect from it a concrete, functional situation. In other words, there is no real subject behind *kamma*.

Subject, in Buddhism, is not a selfsame permanent entity, but merely a transitory state of karmic continuum. Not only the subject, which accepts the result of *kamma*, but also *kamma* itself is not some sort of permanent substantial reality, which the subject will receive. Subject and object, agent and action, are each in a phase of karmic continuum. They are not parts of a valid entity in an endless series which we choose to regard as a karmic continuum. In this case, the subject or agent receiving the result of *kamma* is to be called the karmic receiver (*dīyādā*).

VI

These considerations make it evident that when discussing the problem of karmic continuum, we must be perfectly clear about the meaning of "continuum", since it has not the meaning of infiniteness and indeterminateness in time and space. This consideration suggests that "continuum" is only to be realized within one's own self. Consequently, although "continuum" in the sense of a substantiality must be discharged, "continuum" in the sense of non-substantiality, or some other word denoting self-realization must be retained.

At this point the *Milindapañha* explains "continuum" thus:

"Just so, O King, is the continuum of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and it is like a thing that has no preceding, no succeeding existence. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness".

This passage indicates that it is impossible to grasp this "continuum" by such concepts as "uppaṭṭhāti", "nirujjhati", "apubbam", "acariyam", etc.; and that, despite this, "continuum" is to be the object of consciousness. In other words, these two facts are reduced to the following effect: "Continuum can not become a subject of consciousness as a real entity, whereas it is alone an object itself. This meaning is formulated thus: "Continuum" can be objectified by itself, but can not be subjectified at all.
What is meant by this?

Generally speaking, the object of consciousness is naturally not the subject of consciousness. Even if this were the case, the conception of object need not necessarily presuppose a concept of the substance of consciousness as a reality. The concept of continuum is just something to be experienced within ourselves. Paradoxically speaking, it is to be objectified, and yet without a substantiality which is to be objectified in any way. And that it can not become a subject means, as in the case of the essential nature of kamma, to have no limit in time and space.

"It has come to be included in the consciousness", as quoted in the above passage does not mean that the consciousness is like a storeroom in which something can be kept; the correct meaning is that it is to be considered as a formal unity or a phenomenal unity, in so far as it is concluded in the consciousness or it is experienced in ourselves. It is not in itself a real entity.

Some one may object and say, "In the classification of mental factors, the Abhidhamma Philosophy assumes a realistic orientation in such a way that each mental factor corresponds to each of the real entities". But after more detailed consideration, we shall come to understand that all the factors within a single moment of consciousness do not last a moment. That is to say, the mental factors are far from being self-contained units. From this we can guess the highly dynamic nature of the processes going on within a single moment of consciousness. The consciousness is the ground (vatthu, Skt. vastu) where the mental factors take motion and only so far; it is not a substance as a real entity. If one is going to affirm the doctrine of a real substance underlying saṃsāra, that known real must not be identified with a substance as given with intuitive immediacy, but with an indirectly inferred substance. The Mahāyāna-karma-siddhi-śāstra puts it in this way; "The substance (of the six consciousnesses) is only the resulting consciousness. This is because the verification of consciousness takes place by inference only". If this be the case, then such an inferred unseen concept must be denied by the Buddhist as an illusory concept arrived at by logical methods only. It is merely an abstraction, its only reality is that of a constructed concept.

All these considerations indicate that the "continuum" and "consciousness" do not represent the Prima Essentia, but only
a fleeting moment of the world, and that both do not stand alone, but in relation one to the another.

The "continuum", we are told, is represented as a subject in our consciousness, but only so far as it is included in, or goes on to the last phase of consciousness. Since the consciousness is deprived of entity, the continuum also is a non-substantial.

VII

The clue to the method by which the positive or most adequate theory is selected from the problems of the relation between anatta and transmigration should now be obvious. It has been noted that the question as to the substance of transmigration was answered by the karmic continuum. It is of course obvious that the implication of that answer is the doctrine of anatta. But such a doctrine needs the so-called medium of the kamma doctrine, which has the capacity to include the relation leading to a constructive formulation of the anatta-doctrine and also the hidden implications.

But the concept of kamma in this answer is meant that the basic initial question is answered in the affirmative, and therefore the anatta-doctrine is to be interpreted as affirmative.

In the entire foregoing analysis, therefore, we called attention to the implication of the kamma concept answer. This combination of anatta and kamma occurs because it is impossible to formulate the philosophy of self-negation (anatta) in a positive way without making some assertions as to the nature of this concept, as will be seen below.

The formula "transitoriness, painfulness, not-self", is very often repeated in the Pāli canon or Nikāya. Many scholars, who have dealt with this formula, have attempted to elicit from it the Buddhist viewpoint as Pessimism. Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the positive interpretation of a way of life in Buddhism, have been disappointed and have condemned it as incongruous and pessimistic. This formula, however, could not anticipate that the illustration in a series would give rise to such a pessimism. This fact has already been seen in the concept of anatta. "Not-self" is not only meant to demonstrate one of the three aspects, but also to indicate that together with the other two aspects (painfulness and transitoriness) the not-self implies the absolute, ultimate essence, i.e. the Śūnyatā (Non-Substantiality) of Mahāyāna Philosophy.
Nevertheless, we can not deny that such a word as “not-self” must have a negative sense of some sort. For this reason, the full definition of a negation-concept in Buddhism must now be dealt with.

Generally speaking, the concept of negation is to be analysed as follows:

1. The negation of the possibility of existence.
   We can find no such negation in the Buddhist canon. It means the impossibility of being or existence like the horn of a hare.

2. The positive negation.
   This is the case of Buddhist epistemology. In Buddhist epistemology it is emphasized that object (ālaya) and subject (viśṇa) must be mutually integrated, that they can not stand separately, but must exist in relation to other elements. In this case we speak of “nothing” in such a way as “without the object” or “without the subject”. These expressions mean that the object without the subject or the subject without the object can not formulate the concrete situation of cognition. The fact of cognition centers in the epistemic correlation between the subject and the object. This may be called the positive negation i.e. the lack of one of the elements which would make concrete cognition possible.

3. The logical negation.
   This is the negation by which the clinging to denial or affirmation is to be removed completely. The Buddhist proposition, “All things are not-self”, would seemingly be a negation of the part of the entire fact, which includes another part not to be denied but to be affirmed as real. But with the Buddhist our clinging to such discriminative way of thinking as denial or affirmation should be completely excluded. Hence, no positive provision is made for the constructive construction. It is only the clinging which is to be denied. If we understand by the formula “all is not self” its replacement by some other thing excluding the self, this non-self will not be different from the thing replaced. If we understand it as simple non-existence, then it is a negation in the literal sense of the word. Hence, according to the Buddhist view, “nothing” is neither the lack of anything nor an entity separate from the non-self itself. Thus what is actually provided in these arguments is neither a simple negation nor a proposition of something, but a negation of both the denial and the affirmation on which the clinging to logically discriminative knowledge would be based.
What this analysis of negation has thus far overlooked is that there is more to negation than its three modes as above summarized. We might say that such a negation can be called negation through *kamma* or through realizing the conformity between *kamma* and *anatta*.

4. The realized negation, or the negation arrived at through the realization of the congruity between *kamma* and *anatta*.

This is the mode of negation which implies the fact that "not-self" should be considered as a positive factor rather than as a negative entity.

What then is this positive entity just mentioned? It is nothing other than *kamma* in its nature.

VIII

This fact that the positive entity is nothing other than *kamma* becomes clear if certain logical inferences concerning the meaning of "negation" are noted. In order that this clarification be made, we had best begin by distinguishing the Buddhistic thesis from the judgement formulation proper.

Now, the Buddhist proposition, "All things are not-self", would seemingly be a case of the infinite judgement; "S is non-A". In this judgement, however, only A is completely excluded, that is, the possibility of all other realms, such as B, C, D, etc. are implied in non-A. Hence, the judgement does not become absolutely established since no positive provision is made for the remaining realms, B, C, D, etc.; consequently, when it is said that "All things are not-self" then not-self should be considered as different from infinite judgement. Though similar in form, the Buddhist formula and infinite judgement must be distinguished.

When we said, "All things are not-self," the concept "not-self" or "is not self" never implies an entity which could be considered as existing in reality to the exclusion of the "self" itself. With the Buddhist, even if the extension of not-self, i.e. B, C, D, etc. might be conceived besides the self in itself, then, it should be nothing but a being of some sort, which is denied by the Buddhist as having a permanent entity. According to the Buddhist view, there is nothing at all, which is included in the unlimited, infinite extension, excluding the "self".

This is just because, as far as the not-self, in its turn, should exist in reality, could it be considered also as a real entity or valid
“self”; but the non-self as conceived in this manner is also to be denied in every way (just as in the case of the “self”). From these considerations it will become clear that the Buddhistic proposition “All things are not-self” is to be distinguished from both the negative judgement, which is based upon the affirmation of “self” in some way, and the infinite judgement, which does not make the positive provision whatever for the remaining realms, such as B, C, D, etc. The infinite judgement makes no positive, determined provision for any remainder at all. Hence, the infinite judgement does not become absolute or established in any way. And then the judgement of negation, in its turn, would be impossible without the presupposition of a “substance” of some sort.

Thus, it goes without saying that the Buddhistic judgement, “All things are not-self”, must be more than a philosophical one; it is a practical, even an immediately apprehended factor. The not-self does not mean a separate reality at all (as it would in the case of an infinite judgement), since a separate reality, as we mentioned repeatedly, in any sense of the word is denied by the Buddhists. Not-self would have no reality and hence no validity.

In any event, certain things are clear. There is no negative meaning or factor in the nature of “non-self”, which constitutes the fundamental component of the Buddhist doctrine. And we may go further to say that the positive something implied means that man knows himself as being bound by kamma. Not-self reveals itself to man only because he is conscious of kamma. The fact that man knows himself as being bound by kamma performs a much more positive function than just negatively understanding it deterministically. In other words, “not-self”, in revealing itself to man, takes on the form of kamma.

Although we are conscious of this fact, the process is not such a simple intuitive conception that the “not-self” directly reveals itself.

How is it possible that it reveals itself in kamma? There is only one effective answer to this question. This can best be obtained from the consideration of kamma in relation to Buddhistic psychology or mentality.

IX

Psychologically speaking, the essence of kamma is said to be “thinking” (cetanā). “Cetanā” is derived from two root forms,
“cint” and “cit”, of which the former plays the most significant part in the psychology of Pāli Buddhism, the latter in the Sarvastivāda School. “Cetanā” (thinking) as designated by “to think” is never a hypothetically formulated entity whatever, as it has been repeatedly argued. If it were a hypothetical entity, it should be merely a form of consciousness only. In the Dhammapada Attha-kathā, Buddhaghosa says: “Seven or eight minds, though in one group, can not take place in only one moment. When coming into existence, they take place one by one; when going out, they go out one by one”. Each of them is subject to the law of appearing-disappearing separately, but not together in a group. And further, “cetanā” is not merely “thinking” proper, but much more a function, especially when regarded as “to think”, “intend to do”, and “to occupy”. In the Saṃyutta Nikāya, it is said: “That which we think, and that which we intend to do, and that which we all are occupied with—this becomes an object for the persistence of consciousness”.

What, then, is meant by “cetanā” being a function without being a real unity?

It may be useful for the consideration of “function with no real entity” to know some of the meanings in which the psychological illustration is used in Pāli Buddhism. Such a specific explanation refers to the fourteen modes of functional minds. We have only to explain this “function with no reality” along the theory of the fourteen modes of functional minds. These modes denote a circle, to fulfil all of which constitutes a psychological process, beginning with the subconscious (bhavaṅga) and ending in the same. The subconscious is one of these modes and is considered to make the continuum of all minds possible. As far as it concerns a function, it may be understood as a reality making possible the unification of all minds, just as latter Buddhism established “impressions” (vāsanā) as a theory for that purpose.

The subconscious (bhavaṅga) is an unreal factor acting upon the other mental factors. Though not “real”, bhavaṅga is actual in so far as it is presently active. It is the potency or potentiality of a situation, comprising its unmanifested possibilities. That is to say, this potentiality is the codetermining factor of what may be called the fourteen mental modes, or subject-object as considered Buddhistically.

The subconsciousness situation is just a result of function but
not a functional mind in itself. It has all the functional minds as an object merely. Although the fourteen modes of functional minds are mental functions, those should be different from that of epistemological discrimination between subject and object. This is because, according to the Buddhistic view, there is no dichotomy such as subject and object, and therefore, to be known is the same as to be. In other words, the fourteen modes of functional minds are nothing but the forms, in which both subject and object should be represented as they are. Even though we should presuppose something as a real entity underlying the functional minds, then it is only one of the objects and not a real subjective entity in any way.

Thus, we must realize that in the conception of the subconscious (bhavafiga) the supposed objective reality or real entity of being, in itself, is not admitted. The polarization maintained by metaphysical dualists, as subject and object in a dualistic separation, should be replaced by the Buddhistic bi-polar or multi-polar subject-object distinction in a perspective which, as a matter of fact, is usually achieved through those fourteen modes of functional minds. The function of these minds is to externalize, to objectify. The function of these minds does not impose arbitrary forms on the object; rather, its art consists in specifying in what way objective entities are formed dependently of the modes of functional minds.

At any rate, even the subconsciousness “bhavafiga” in the fourteen modes of mind is not anything to be conceived as a real entity whatever.

Such are the consequences of initiating inquiry by analyzing the problem of the relation between kamma and anatta, and by following this analysis step by step to its solution. Namely, this analysis of minds leads us to the relevant fact that kamma is not founded upon any substantial reality as it was the same in the case of cetanā, the essential nature of kamma.

It appears that this step by step procedure can lead us to the following explicit state: the discovery by analysis of the basic theoretical root of the activity of kamma, which has no real entity whatever.

This kamma (action) is considered not merely as non-substantiality, but also as activity, which is dynamic rather than static. As it is said in the Visuddhimagga by Buddhaghosa:
“For the activities are causes through commission of deeds, not because they are existent or non-existent.”

We may interpret the term “saïkhāra” (activities) as kamma, as it is properly well known.

“Kamma” will become a cause just at the time when it has taken place or has come into activity, and not merely by its own existence in itself. If kamma could exist alone and produce a result, then in the very moment of existence a result should have been produced in advance. In the above passage it is implied that kamma is not to be conceived of as a permanent entity at all, which might lead one to negate the activity of kamma. The reason for this is that, generally speaking, the permanent entity is nothing but a concept as superimposed over a real entity, which had already been rejected by the Buddhist, and that, accordingly, kamma should be the negation of such permanent entity, i.e. it should have an active meaning or activity of some sort. In order to clarify this meaning, we may call our attention to the following passages in the Suttanipāta. It is said thus: “The person is Brāhmaṇa not owing to his birth (jāti); he is also non-Brāhmaṇa not owing to his birth. He is Brāhmaṇa owing to his kamma (acting). He is also non-Brāhmaṇa owing to his kamma.”

The meaning of this passage is this, that the variation of birth or character does not depend upon an a priori condition, but just upon kamma a posteriori. It can possibly be reduced to the “Ordnung” or acting by which each sentient being may exist as he is. This “Ordnung” is nothing but kamma itself, as distinguished from birth (jāti). Consequently, such a conception of kamma does not indicate any determining factor whatever; even more, it represents activity as making possible the transcendence of transmigration. The kamma is not passively determined but always creates itself positively, since it is nothing but the “Ordnung” of active behaviour.

There is good kamma, there is bad kamma, and as the wheel of life moves on, the old kamma is exhausted and again fresh kamma is created. We would like to say that kamma is the man, that is, kamma is his own action.

Nothing is more important, therefore, than to realize that kamma constitutes the self-consciousness of activity by itself, with a specific theory appropriate to itself and different from the analytical method appropriate to the Sarvāstivāda School, which
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entertains an idea-continuum, that is, a concept of "non-intimation" (avijñāpati)\textsuperscript{31}.

All these considerations lead to the following conclusion:

The basic concept of kamma in relation to anatta has two references, the one a prescriptive reference by way of theoretical reasoning to non-substantiality, the other an empirical cognitive reference by way of the ethical postulates of activity. It is the former of these two references which corresponds to the non-substantiality of anatta: it is the latter which is in compliance with the postulate for the positiveness of anatta (not-self).

Thus, the two references of kamma have come to correspond to those of the anatta concept. This fact indicates that both concepts of kamma and anatta are actually a genuine unity: kamma, in turn, usually finds itself involved in the experience of not-self, which could, as we have seen, not appear but through kamma; kamma is first of all tested in anatta; kamma is not separated from not-self (anatta), but it is the categorical form of not-self. Therefore, we may say that the kamma-concept may be postulated but nothing else. The thought of not-self can then be interpreted as effectively as the concept of kamma.

Let us examine this genuine relation between both by quoting several passages from the original texts. In the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa says:

"So fruit is not in kamma or out of it; kamma is devoid of (fruit).
Nor is the fruit in kamma to be found,
But it is kamma and nought else
By which the fruit is reproduced\textsuperscript{32}." }

The meaning of this passage is this, that kamma does not merely mean "to act" without being conscious of the ground upon which kamma can rest, as really it is. This kamma is to be founded upon the non-substantiality or not-self. The paradoxical expression, "Nor is the fruit in kamma to be found, but it is kamma and nought else" vindicates the fact that the ground of kamma should be deeply related to the not-self conception\textsuperscript{33}.

Kamma is the field, where the not-self reveals itself to man. Not-self reveals itself to man only because he is conscious of kamma.

There is a congruity between both kamma and anatta; not only
that, but the self-consciousness of *kamma* takes place simultaneously with that of *anatta*. Therefore, it may be added that just like the *not-self* essentially transcends over the time-level, just so should *kamma* be even more over the time-level. The conception of both *kamma* and *anatta* refers to one and the same fact, differently viewed.

With respect to the relation between *kamma* and time, we have in the *Visuddhimagga* the following passage:

“There is no separate division of matter set up by *kamma*, such as past, and so on, by way of continuity. But such a division is to be understood as giving support to matter set up by the caloric order, by nutriment, by consciousness.34"

The time conception is to be attributed to the things, such as forms (*rūpanāṇī*) set up by *kamma*, but not to *kamma* itself. This vindicates the statement that *kamma* is beyond the time-level. It is generally believed that *kamma* of the past determines the way of existence of all things. Strictly speaking, however, the determination of all things in the present is accomplished through the forms (*rūpa*) only and not through the characteristic nature of *kamma*. It is simply because *kamma* itself is timeless and beyond the time-level35. In Buddhist Philosophy we can discover the theory of the momentariness of time, such as the past, present, and future. This explains why such a theory of momentariness is often repeated, and why *kamma* is here considered as timeless. The reason for this is that the momentariness of time may be reduced to the timelessness of *kamma* on the one side, and the timelessness of *kamma*, in turn, may be reduced to that of *anatta* on the other. As we have seen before, *kamma* is nothing other than the plane where the timeless *anatta* will reveal itself to man.

X

As we have seen above, the strongest relation of necessary connection between any two concepts, such as *kamma* and *anatta*, is that of logical implication. This is a case of the striking characteristic of the epistemological analytical systematization, the *kamma* concept has been classified in detail.

But the important point from the religious bearing on the analytical classification, however, is that the analysis should not restrict itself to *kamma*, but points even more to “not-self”. The analysis of *kamma* does not mean a merely conceptual designation,
but much more the revelation of “not-self” in the karmic formulation. In other words, the analysis of kamma presupposes the anatta assumption, which can not reveal itself but through kamma or karmic analysis. The not-self doctrine underlies the karmic analysis. The positive counter-part of “not-self” is “self”. The positive basis of this negation is, however, not the “self”, but the kamma, through which “not-self” reveals itself and on which there is “not-self”.

This congruity is according to the Buddhist understanding which is different from the merely ethical meaning of the non-Buddhistic schools.

It is of course certain that the concept of kamma has been introduced from non-Buddhistic schools into Buddhist Philosophy. However, it has been done in a different sense in that the former articulated kamma in its ethical aspect only, whereas the latter did so in its own philosophical aspect or in its necessary relation to the not-self doctrine, which is indigenous to Buddhism.

Our conclusions may now be summarized.

First, a distinction must be drawn between the infinite judgement and the Buddhist proposition “All things are not-self”, though similar in form. Second, the positive entity, which is not involved in the infinite judgement, is nothing other than kamma. Third, kamma is not separated from not-self, but it is the categorical form of not-self.

These two doctrines were not preached from the philosophical point of view only. Therefore, more important than the admission of incongruity between the two doctrines is the fact that both are concentrated in the experience of the person as a genuine unity. It is only the human being who is able to involve both concepts of kamma and anatta as a genuine unity.

Certainly, these conclusions, if true, are important for the history of Buddhist Philosophy in the meaning that the strong necessary connection between both kamma and anatta would not require any medium between them whatever, whereas the Sarvāstivāda School has constructed the concept of avijñapti (non-information) in that direction. Not only the Sarvāstivāda School, but also most of the other Buddhist schools, such as Sautrāntika,
Yogācāra, etc. have considered concepts corresponding to “avijñapti”, while Pāli Buddhism has no such equivalent concept, but instead lays its emphasis upon the congruity between kamma and anatta.

This I take to be its fundamental character, which would indicate its difference, not only from the thoughts of the non-Buddhist Schools, but also those of almost all the other schools of Buddhism.

It is not our business at present to make a detailed statement and a comparative estimate of Oriental and Western achievements in this branch of thought. We leave this to more competent hands. We can not leave without notice of a remarkable characteristic, as well as a great difference, in a specific problem of epistemological logic, between Pāli Buddhism and the Sarvāstivāda School or later Mahāyāna Buddhism.

All the methods in the methodology of comparative study are well known. Many books have been published on this subject. But what needs to be done at the outset is to find out what indigenous items and methods are to be chosen and used. This is indispensable towards overcoming the difficulties in the scholarly examination of the original texts. This paper presents a systematically arranged way of thinking in respect to the relation between kamma and anatta. In exact text-research, the so-called difficulty experienced in comparative philosophical study is ascribed to the Oriental way of thinking and its terminology. This paper provides a step towards clarification in this direction.

IV. KARMA AND FATALISM IN MODERN SETTING

Hinduism in India has spread widely among the urban and rural areas, and among the intellectual and lay masses.

The Hindu way of life includes the worship of numerous gods, magic and animistic cults. The people believing in Hinduism also have various views and different attitudes towards Hinduism.

In order to clarify all these regional, personal and traditional varieties of Hinduism we should like to divide it into two classes; universal and parochial Hinduism.

Universal Hinduism

Universal Hinduism means here Sanskritic Hinduism, which is
sanctioned in Sanskrit texts, traditional rituals and beliefs. Even a belief in *karma* and transmigration represents a different form than that of peasant Hinduistic belief.

In most cases an Indian concept of *karma* misunderstood in a way that all human beings are predestined and bound by *karma*, result of action, in the previous life, and that they will be born in another world after death according to different *karma*. If so, the *karma* idea could not leave any room to admit freedom and responsibility for actions.

Modern Indian scholars are inclined to hold the Universal Hinduistic views, being critical not only of their own traditional interpretations, but also of the European views. They think that some of the misinterpretations in Europe are derived from the inaccurate European translations of the Sanskrit and other original texts. At the 26th International Congress of Orientalists, 1964, Professor L. Rocher of Belgium, read his paper on *The Concept of Time in Hinduism*, in which he mentioned an Indian conception of “transmigration” referring to “avatāra”. Some of Indian pandits and scholars objected to the use of this English term, referring to other European terms. They took it as opposed to the orthodox Indian view in its significance. Apart from the scholarly point of view, this debate amply shows us that modern scholars in India are critical and sceptical of the European translations in an attempt to shed new light on orthodox Indian views.

According to the traditional belief, the *karma* idea has been developed in the course of time into two directions.

First, the sacrifice compulsion which can be seen in the Vedic period. One can compel a supernatural god to give one power through ascetic life and sacrifice. The Vedic sacrificial institution is still being maintained particularly in South India, even if in a restricted and slightly modified form in spite of the rapidly changing circumstances.

In the earliest portions of the Brāhmaṇas the *karma*-conception appears of small account, which was not much applied to the life. It simply referred to morality in a way that the person who has led an immoral life may be condemned to a miserable life in the future. The *karma* doctrine is thought to be formulated in the Upaniṣads for the first time.

According to this Upaniṣadic idea, one ignorant of the true nature falls into the vortex of life (*samsāra*). Then he must under-
go successive rebirths (punarbhava). If ignorance is removed then he will return to unity. It is salvation.

Secondly, the devotion-compulsion, which was emphasized in the medieval bhakti movements. Rāmānuja, one of the bhakti preachers, taught that through devotion the karmic results could be changed by the grace of God.¹

However, neither compulsions, sacrifice or devotion prevail among the contemporary intellectuals in India.

In terms of karma, metaphysical Hinduism insists on the activity of human beings in the modern society. They attempt to draw sources of activities from another aspect of the philosophy of karma. To quote the Bhagavadgītā:

“One should not give up the activity to which one is born, even though this should be attended by evil, for all undertakings are enveloped by evil, as is fire by smoke.” (18.48)

‘The duty incumbent on one’ means here duties predestined by birth, caste and profession. Although the freedom of social status like caste and birth are not mentioned here, karma is considered as activities.

In the later period, the potentiality of human action has come to appear. To witness Vedānta, which distinguishes three kinds of karma: (1) Sañcita-karma, the seeds of destiny already as a result of former acts. It refers to the past. (2) Agami-karma. The seeds that would be stored if one were to continue in the path of ignorance basic to the present life. It refers to the present. (3) Prārabdha-karma. The seeds collected and stored in the past. They have actually begun to grow. It refers to the karma bearing fruit in the shape of actual events referring to the future.

Thus, the activity and potentiality of karma have been drawn attention to and re-interpreted by the contemporary Hindus to emphasize social values in Hinduism.

In terms of freedom of action the concept of duty in Gītā and its philosophy have been discussed by modern scholars. However, there are some scholars who criticize the Gītā’s conception of freedom of action. To quote V.P. Varma’s view: “The Gītā tends to exaggerate the concept of divine determinism.” Further he says; “When it uses such phrases as ‘both fame and ignominy proceed from me’ it prepares the foundations of the supreme importance of human action for individual life and historical movement.”
Yet almost all the intellectuals attempt to evaluate Hinduism in all its activities. S. Nikhilananda says: “The Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata, and other secondary scriptures stress the ideal of filial piety, chastity of women, friendship, and kingly duties.”

In modern times, the Brāhma Samāj, the Ārya Samāj, and the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda movement have been emphasizing the ability of individuals relating to karma on various occasions.

The modern social reformers and philosophers are convinced that Hinduism is neither anti-social nor otherworldly, the vitality of Hindu society being proved by its survival through a thousand years of foreign domination.

With the independence of India this trend of thought is advancing into the masses through the temples, sadhus, institutions, etc.

A report of the famous Lakshminarain Temple, New Delhi, states:

“Man must reap the fruit of actions (karma) performed during this life and in the previous births. Karma does not mean fate, but it means the actions performed by man. To sit idle, relying on fate, is condemned by Hindu religion. The theory of karma is based on the principle that a person is himself responsible for his good and bad deeds. Hence, every man should work with sincerity. Our happiness and sorrow are the results of our actions in this life or in the past birth. This is the eternal principle of their religion. Fate is also nothing but the result of our past actions.”

Hindus’ attitude toward the responsibility for action is derived from the strong conviction of karma. They reconcile in harmony the two apparently inconsistent elements of karma: fatalistic and unrestricted elements.

We should like to quote a letter from K.M. Shah, a princess of the former kingdom of Tehri, Delhi. She is a high-caste Hindu managing a social welfare association in her territory. Her letter runs: “Working as an instrument of God is a very agreeable task, life being worth living if our services are used by the needy. Perhaps it is God’s will that my trip to Japan has not yet been matured as I should not yet leave the work here. When we plan things, little do we realize that all is predestined and we are only following the programme laid out by Him. We take the credit of planning it.”

The highly evolved responsibility for karma is reflected in the preoccupation with the personal horoscope and destiny. In social
activities there is much concern with this religious sentiment which is operative in the development of modern India.

There is no doubt that if Hindus confine themselves to those Community Development plans which can be approached not through religious sentiment but through non-religious social structure, much of the complexity of their traditional socio-religious thought will be lost.

Parochial Hinduism

Theoretically ‘Parochial Hinduism’ represents a mixture of elements from the metaphysical traditions of Hinduism and folk elements of the rural areas.

Practically ‘Parochial Hinduism’ is concerned with relieving tortures and misfortunes in this society. It has no salvation, nor the happy life after death for its purpose. It is mainly due to the difficulties of environments which they were living in and are undergoing.

In terms of the religious attitude of peasants, Lewis gives an interesting report. He interviewed twenty high-caste Brahmins and Jats, and five low-caste Potters and Chamars. He asked to identify a list of Sanskritic, traditional gods and the incarnations of Vishnu. He also asked their ideas of heaven, hell, reincarnation, salvation, God, soul, illusion, the cosmos and life.

Some, mostly Brahmins, showed a traditional knowledge of karma, mokṣa and transmigration, while others, mostly Jat farmers, did not affirm belief in mokṣa in this world, reincarnation and the life after death, emphasizing the happy life (mostly economically) in this world. The concepts of heaven and hell are to them meaningless.

Harijan Castes and Theory of Fate

Harijan castes in villages look quite different from a group of sweepers in the urban areas. Let me take one example. Members of Sevagram in Maharashtra are living under the influence of Gandhian economy, or ‘self-sufficiency’. All their requirements, especially in necessities, are of local production. Their living standard is far better than we had expected. Economically, they believe that the remedy for them lies in decentralization; spiritually they are confident that economic self-control and production are the sure solution to lead the country to freedom, peace and well being.
Politically this village was the centre of the Gandhian Independence Movement, keeping still the pride with the socio-religious structure of the village. The pride is represented by the new movement ‘Nava Baudhha’ (the new Buddhist movement), which provides for the liberation of the Harijan for its various activities.

They are provided with school and fields. They are intelligent and critical of the Government schemes and even the Gandhian polity and idea. Gandhi’s simple residence is well kept for display and worship. Quite a few visitors come from neighbouring villages and also from foreign countries.

Under these circumstances, the villagers are so cultivated and refined as to show an example of Indian village improved in the future. They criticize even their own leader Gandhi by saying that Gandhi recognized the caste system, leaving it as it was in the medieval period. This criticism points out one of the difficulties embodied in metaphysical Hinduism, however properly it may be re-interpreted or modified in accord with the demand of modern society.

Accordingly the views of villagers are Buddhistic and Hinduistic. They believe that such results as serious illness, length of life, sex of children are derived from individual karma. But the other elements, birth, occupation, poverty and human virtues are not predestined by karma; they are to be changed and transformed into a better state. This notion is typical of Buddhism, not to mention the contemporary interpretation of Hinduism. However, they are never interested in any discussions of heaven and salvation in the next life. In this respect, they point towards the development of the character of the individual.

They emphasize the benefit of all beings, animal and non-animal; they want to be treated as a group of poor men, but not as Harijans differentiated from higher ranks. Nevertheless, they say, the Government schemes intend to make Development Plans under the name of the Harijan-Rehabilitation, which they do not like at all.

Earnest and strong is the conviction that if an individual can be highly trained and disciplined, he will find it easy to live within the economic society. Hence, many Harijans in this village have their own sons studying at the colleges.

The high standard of interest in education is rapidly changing.
and transforming fatalistic karma into active human conduct. Education is of prime importance for rehabilitation.

The villagers believe in the existence of God or Goddess, regardless of its number in singular or plural. Even Arya Samajists, reformed religionists, do not doubt it, believing only in one God. They also think that men must follow the fate destined by God. On this point all the villagers have one and the same belief. Only different are the ways by which they liberate themselves from the misfortunes on earth.

P.M. Kolenda mentions an example of the women of Khalapur. The villagers in Khalapur do not acquiesce before the hand of fate. Instead, mothers perform acts of a magical and religious nature which they believe to be helpful in preserving the health of their children. Further, Kolenda points out the religious anxiety embedded in mothers’ mind; they as members of a social community feel themselves incompatible with the Hindu philosophical teachings of non-attachment and of stoic acceptance of one’s fate. In order to control the illness of children mothers in this village are not content with the philosophical acceptance of stoic contemplation; instead they appeal to the magical power or the devotion-compulsion to mother goddesses at Kankhal and Raiwala suburbs of Hardwar.

The sweepers, Kolenda similarly points out, attempt to reduce the responsibility for individual deeds to a caste history. Namely, they explain the rank of the caste not as a synthesis of multiple individual rebirths for deeds in past-lives, but rather in terms of a caste history. To them a low caste is simply a historical accident which should be changeable.

There might be a conflict between caste dharma and virtuous behaviour. To quote an example: caste dharma may include himsā (violence) while virtuous behaviour requires ahimsā (non-violence). Kolenda reports on Gopalpur villagers who tend to avoid dilemmas about virtue by shifting the responsibility for decision to the headman of the village. But in my experience in Mehrauli area around New Delhi (1964) the villagers seem to believe in conformity to caste duty and human virtue. This socio-religious attitude, although it is apparently vague, may be derived from the tolerance for religio-ethical amalgamation or harmony.

The harmony between caste duty and virtue can be traced back to the Upaniṣadic period. The Upaniṣads put forward mean-
ings on Dharma, namely the duties of the particular castes and orders. It says: “There are three branches of Dharma, one is (constituted of) sacrifice, study and charity (i.e., the state of the householder); the second (constituted of) austerities (i.e., the stage of being a hermit); the third is the brahmacārin dwelling in the house of his teacher and staying with the family of his teacher until the end (of his life); all these attain the world of meritorious men; one who abides finally in Brahman attains immortality.” (Chāndogya Upaniṣad, ii, 23).

The meaning of Dharma sanctions a gospel of socialization as well as criteria of individual virtuous behaviour. It is clear that the Upaniṣads deepened Dharma by extending its meaning to the organic community and individual self-discipline. Thus the conflict between caste duty and human virtue is brought into unity in the Hindu mind in a way that the social interdependence (by caste system) should be based upon one’s own virtue.

However, another difficult problem may arise. If a person’s present fate is predestined by actions in his past life, then how can he test whether a misfortune is really the result of a bad karma?

The mental attitude towards karma is of a particular kind. One accepts karma and fate of life, however ugly or beautiful they may be, with indifference or non-attachment. Man on earth must acquiesce in the determinate, transitory and earthly state of affairs or karma in so far as he is living with attachment. On the other hand, man must dedicate himself to the indeterminate, timeless and all-embracing immediacy which is Brahman. In other words, man is in the muck of karma, but not of it.

Thus, Indian villagers accept karma or misfortune. But they do not resign themselves to misfortune. They try every method to avoid it, whether magical rites or Western medicine in case of illness. They are not really fatalists.

Now it would be clear that parochial Hinduism is concerned with preventing misfortunes in this karmic world, but not with a better life after death. Its purpose is common with Universal Hinduism. It is a product of the Indian genius that the people, low and high, are concerned with this world.

Only different is the attitude towards salvation. Parochial Hinduism is concerned only with the real world and material improvement rather than with the spiritual salvation. In contrast,
Universal Hinduism puts forth spiritual salvation on earth as its highest goal.

The emphasis on the reformation of this world, which is embodied in both types of Hinduism, accounts for the cooperation of the villagers with the Government Development Plan. The peasants are ready to be taught that their every act, irrespective of karma, affects others.

**Karma and Principle of Activities**

There is no doubt that *karma* is a fruit of action performed during the previous births. Man is destined by *karma*. This is true in terms of religion. The modern interpretation of *karma*, as stated above, is to emphasize another side of *karma* philosophy, in which *karma* is interpreted as a principle of activity performed by man. This is, however, a religious interpretation, which is the basis of mystical experience.

What is needed today is to give social value to a wide-spread religious sentiment. One cannot deny the fact that a fatalistic implication of *karma* is so completely accepted by all. This personal sentiment can be found in their attitude toward a social system of caste. Caste, predestined by birth and *karma*, is so tacitly accepted by all, including those who are most opposed to caste discriminations, that it is still in modern India the unit of social activity. There are thousands of communal bodies based upon castes and sub-castes. Moreover, these communal bodies are striving for economic and social uplift. Therefore, the communal bond cannot be dubbed as harmful. The radical action condemning caste-discriminations could be theoretically accepted, but practically it would confuse a traditional social order and result in ignoring the activities of communal bodies.

Under these circumstances, it appears suggestive that while retaining a religious sentiment for *karma*-destiny the contributions of caste-communities to the industrial development would receive due attention. In this connection a report seems to be relevant. According to this report, the leader of caste conferences urged “to seize the opportunities afforded under the Five-Year Plan to the fullest advantage and contribute their share to the industrial development (of the country)”. It is also reported Shri S. Chenniah, President of the Mysore Pradesh Congress Committee, gave a similar statement at the conference of a particular caste in
Nanjanagud in October 1955: "Human psychology being what it is, it often was the communal bond which urged them to action." Thus, modern India is facing a real dilemma. The people who want that a religious sentiment for karma-destiny would be retained are at the same time aware of social activities of caste bonds. This dilemma, however, is not incapable of being overcome. The way to solve the dilemmas facing India is to recognize a traditional, human sentiment for karma-destiny and to extend help and patronage to caste and communal organizations. By and through the communal bond and caste fraternities karma's widespread sentiment and implication will tacitly be realized. In other words, the masses will be able to understand that their every act, irrespective of karma, can affect others through the caste and communal organizations they belong to. It is the basis that accounts for the cooperation of the masses with the social development issue.

V. An Analysis of Ego-Concept: māna, asmimāna, ātmamāna

Three Sanskrit words, māna, asmimāna, ātmamāna, are respectively translated in Chinese by men, vu men and tze men. All of these Chinese words, make etymologically no distinction from each other, meaning simply ‘pride’.

Sanskrit equivalents, however, being not confined to ‘pride’ or the psychological sphere, are based on the etymological meaning and concerned with the logical sphere. Going beyond the meaning of pride they point to the reality of the self, whatever pride or humility may be. Moreover, with the development of Buddhism old etymology of the words is forgotten or deliberately lost sight of.

Māna, Pride, Conceit

Māna generally means ‘pride’, under which the Theravādins divide its types of manifestation into seven. They are: māno, atimāno, mānātimāno, omāno, adhimāno, asmimāno, micchāmāno.1

If one takes māno simply as a concept meaning ‘pride’, how can he understand omāno (ūna-māno in Skt.) meaning inferiority-complex? It should not be māna (pride), rather an opposition to pride. The same is true with asmimāna, literally meaning ‘I am’ conceit. But how could the self-awareness (‘I am’) be ‘pride’?
Because the self-awareness as such should be neither pride nor inferiority-complex. Further, micchāmāno (a wrong conceit) should be common to all māno, when the latter could mean only pride. All māno, as far as it is concerned with the Buddhist idea-
tion, should not be good, but evil, that is, miccha (wrong). Thus, a wrong conceit is not to be limited to micchāmāno only. The other three, i.e. māno, atimāno, mānātimāno, respectively corres-
ponding to conceit, arrogance, pride and conceit, will be appeal exactly to the English ‘conceit’ or ‘pride’. Having a double meaning implied, i.e. superiority-conceit and inferiority-complex, māna has been divided into 7 types (vidhā), as shown above. In other words, both superiority-conceit and inferiority-complex, being involved in one and the same concept of māna, are in reality based upon ‘imagination’ or ‘conception’, whatever superior or inferior, which is rightly the original mean-
ing of māna derived from the root ‘man’, ‘to imagine’, ‘to think’, ‘to conceive’. This is denoted in the Mahāniddesa as follows: Yo evarūpo māno maññana maññatattām uṇṇati uṇṇamo dhaio sampaggāho, ketukamyatā citta so, ayaṃ vuccati māno. (Māno means conception [imagination], the state of conception, haughti-
ness, loftiness, mark, assumption, the desire for prominence). This is a designation of māna from the psychological point of view, for these qualities refer to citta as indicated in the quoted passage. Summing up these designations, it is said to be cittassa uṇṇati meaning the rising up of the mind, which represents the logical point of view, for ‘the rising up of the mind’ or stirring up of the mind will take place at anytime when the mind is compared with others or when one conceives of oneself in relation to others, superior or inferior.

Māna, derived from the root man, originally means conception, assumption, imagination, and also Meinung, Vorstellung in view of Böhltingk und Roth, having come to mean cine hohe Meinung, die Achtung. A Chinese rendering men is remarkable on the variety of mean-
ing such as ‘to neglect, to despise, to be proud of’ all of which are, just like the various implications in Pāli, rightly manifesta-
tions of māna with the basic meaning of ‘the conception of one-
self in relation to others’ or with the etymological meaning of the root man in Pāli.
Asmimāṇa

Asmimāṇa (asmi-māṇa) really implies ‘to conceive that I am the five aggregates’ (rūpa, vedanā, saññā, sankhāra, viññāna). It is exemplified: Thale uṣsādeti kho bhikkhu asmimāṇasse tam adhi vaka nam (Oh! Bhikkhu high, raising, this is synonym of ‘I am’) Saṃyuttanikāya 5.180. The compound ‘I am’ denotes the high attitude towards the individual existence. What, then, is asmi ‘I am’? Rūpavantam vā attānam attām vā rūpaṁ rūpaṁ vā attām. Iti ayam ceva samanupassanā asmi ti cassa avigatam.5 (I have rūpa, rūpa is I myself, I myself is rūpa. The obervation such as ‘I am’ is not yet removed.)

The conception of ‘I am’, therefore, indicates that I am the five aggregates, and attach to them as real entities. Thus, the Buddhistic genuine attitude is: Api ca me āvuso pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu asmi ti adhi gatam ayam aham asmi ca na sananupassāmi. S III.130. ([The Buddha says], Oh friends, I do not observe that I am the five aggregates to be attached.)

The implication of asmi has faithfully been inherited in the Abhidharma philosophy as is often explained: Rūpe asmi ti māno ti aham rūpaṁ ti uppannamāno. (Sammohavinodanī p. 490). (That which I am in rūpa means the conception arisen (uppannamāna) that I am just right rūpa itself.) The asmi, thus, is nothing but an abbreviation of asmi ti māna (to conceive I myself as the five aggregates).

On the other side, this logical consideration of asmi is often used together with other psychological terms such as chanda and anusaya: Atha khavassa hoti yeva pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu anusahagato asmi ti māno asmi ti chando asmi ti anusayo asamūhato. (Conception ‘I am’, desire ‘I am’, latent bias ‘I am’, all these are bound by the five aggregates of clinging and not yet removed.)

Three terms here, māna, chanda, anusaya, represent a psychological process in a way that one will conceive at first, when he wants to do, then, proceed to desire, and finally he will be captured by latent bias— the most strongest affection in a Buddhist sense. Chanda and anusaya originate from māna. Māna, meaning the conception of the five aggregates of clinging, is the self-awareness of the individual existence, which is in itself neither pride nor humiliation but simply yathābhūtaṁ (‘to see the things as
they are’) or the non plus ultra of the teachings expounded by the Buddha.

In this connection, the English translation ‘pride’ for māna is of the secondary meaning or the psychological aspect of it as derived from the original, logical significance. The meaning of ‘pride’, I venture to say, is the connotation which occurs at the turning-point from the logical to the psychological sphere.

We have, though rare it is, another Pāli term equivalent to asnimāna. That is attamāna which means ‘thinking on the self.’ The Suttanipāta runs: Anattani attamānaṁ passa lokāṁ sadeva-kaṁ nivṛtham nāmarūpasmiṁ ‘idam saccaṁ ti māññati. Thinking on the self in the non-self, the world of men and gods dwelling in name and form, he thinks: “This is true.”

In connection to attamānam K.E. Neumann gives in his Die Reden Gotamo Buddho (Leipzig: 1905, p. 244) the following rendering: eigen gibt es hier, and says:

“Uneigen, eigen gibt es hier,
Der Welt mit ihrer Göttesschar,
Gegründet in Begriff und Form,
Im Wahne, dass da Wahrheit sei.”

[Attal-māna, a term quite clear in its meaning of ‘thinking on’ [the self], is equal to asmi-māna, and suggests that māna in both compounds is taken for the primary meaning (‘thinking on’), but not the secondary (‘pride’).

Of the translations to be found in attamāna, some misunderstand it and confuse with the Hybrid Buddhist Sanskrit āttamana or āptamana, which means ‘delighted’ or ‘satisfied’. Suffice to quote an example of E.M. Hair’s translation. The same verse in Suttanipāta is rendered:

“See how the worlds,
Content with what is not the self,
Convinced by name and form,

Hold it as true!” (The Woven Cadences, 2nd. ed. PTS. 1946) Attal-māna] is wrongly taken as the past participle of ā-pā or āp. It is really a noun ātman. If it connotes ‘content’ or ‘delighted’, it should be attamana, but not attamāna.

Further, this Pāli term attamāna usually means, as mentioned above, ‘thinking on the self’, while ātmanāna, a term sanskritized
in Mahāyāna Buddhism, distinct from the Pāli attamāna, denotes simply ‘the self-conceit’ or ‘the self-pride’, going beyond the primary meaning of ‘thinking on’. With respect to a Sanskrit ātmamāna it will be again discussed in detail.

The Sarvāstivādins have three Sanskrit terms for conception such as māna, asmimāna and also asmitā, all of which are rendered by Hûen Chien as wu men. This sense of māna is found in AKV. p. 303, while asmimāna and asmitā are found respectively in AKV. p. 456, 457, 463, and in AKV. p. 457.

Moreover, all three terms retain the original meaning of the root ‘man’, namely, conception or assumption. Vasubandhu, commenting on Abhidharmakośa, Anuśaya-nirdeśo, Kārikā 11: ‘drṣṭipuṣṭatvāt’, says as follows.

“satkāya-drṣṭipūṣṭā hi mānavidhā asmimānasca” (Abhidharma-kosā-bhāṣyam, p. 286)

(Asmimāna, one of māna, grows up with a wrong view of the self-existence.)

Asmimāna does not merely connote ‘pride’ but the ‘self-conception in the non-self’ based on a wrong view of satkāya-drṣṭi. Further, māna is said to be a process of conception, for Vasubandhu explains the basis of [seven] classifications of māna as given below: sa pravṛttibhedhāt saptadhā bhavati (Seven kinds of [māna] depends upon the difference of process).

The conception of the self is a common nature of seven māna. Therefore, māna can represent itself sometimes as a process of conception raising up the self (atimāna) and sometimes as a process of turning down the self (ūnamāna) in adverse. The case is the same with mithyāmāna, which is not ‘a wrong pride’ but rather a wrong conception, as is explained by Yaśomitra as follows: a-guṇānivatasya guṇavān aham asmiti viparita-viṣayo māno mithyāmānāḥ (AKV. p. 456) (a wrong conception means a conception contrary to the following fact. That is, with no virtue man wrongly thinks, ‘I am respectable’).

Thus, the common nature of seven māna is a self-conception in the non-self or an assumption associated with a wrong view (drṣṭi), however śreyān or hino the conception may be. The AKV. reads: ‘kathāṃ śreyān aham asmiti māna-vidhā drṣṭi-saṃniśrito’ limānāḥ. Regarding to ‘hino’ (self-piety) it reads: hino’ smitti māna-vidhā drṣṭi-saṃniśrita ūnamānāḥ. (AVK. p. 456). With the original meaning of the ‘self-conceptions’ of māna alone the con-
trary concepts of atimāna (self-pride) and ānātmanā (self-piety) can be subject to the one and the same category of the seven kinds of māṇa.

Another speciality to be noted with regard to the original meaning of māṇa is the Bhadantadharmatrāta’s interpretation, which is quoted by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakoṣa-bhāṣya p. 142: asmītī sattvamayatā’vidyeti Bhadantadharmatrāta: kā punarasmītāmānādanyā mayatā. (Ignorance denotes man’s delight in that I am [pañcaskandha as an entity]. Delight is not different from the [conception] of ‘I am’.) Hūen Chien renders it as follows: ‘This ignorance (avidyā) is the nature of the human beings relying upon the self. What is the nature different from the self-conception?’ A Sanskrit term mayatā (delight) is rendered here in this passage as nature hsin, while asmimāṇa as self-pride wu men. On the other hand, a Chinese term hsin commonly stands for bhāva or svabhāva. In either case no Chinese term equivalent to mayatā is found at all. Delight (mayatā) in that ‘I am’ seems hardly to be an etymology of māṇa, but rather a derivative meaning from the root man (‘to conceive’).

Asmimāṇa, a compound-word of asmiti māṇa, is a synonym of asmitā, which is never found in the Pāli Abhidharma and Nikāya. Asmitā literally means the state of the self existence (asmi-tā), but philosophically it indicates the conception of the self as an entity (asmiti māṇa). Important is here māṇa (‘to conceive’ or the conception), but not ātman or aham as an object in itself, unlike a Mahāyānistic term ātmanā, of which ātman is a term objectified to be conceived. The following discussion will be centered around this term ātmanā, a term commonly current in Mahāyāna tradition.

Ātmanāṇa

We have mentioned so far a concept of asmimāṇa developed in the Early Buddhist texts, retaining the original meaning of asmiti māṇa.

We have, however, another term of ātmanāṇa used in the later Mahāyāna texts such as Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā and Trimśikā, etc. Accordingly such a Tibetan equivalent as bdag na rgyal also has taken place in later Tibetan commentaries.

In terms of the Chinese ideograph, asmimāṇa is commonly rendered as men, and ātmanāṇa as wu men in a different term.
Not only that, sometimes a term *māna* alone (not *asmimāna*) is translated by *wu men*, *wu* (the self) being added to *men* (*māna*) to meet the rule of stanza⁸ (Cf. Saddharmapuṇḍarika, ed. by Wogihara, p. 45 and its Chinese tr.).

*Asmimāna* is evidently replaced by *ātmamāna* in Mahāyāna texts. Five defilements, as for example, are enumerated in the Sthiramati’s Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā.⁹ Such are *ātmadrṣṭi*, *ātmamāna*, *ātmamohā*, *ātmasneha*, which stand respectfully for Pāli words: *attadīṭṭhi*, *asmimāna*, *moha*, *sneha*. The Mahāyāna literature attached importance to a term *ātman* in a form of the compound *ātmadrṣṭi* and others. The verbal compound *āsmimāna* also was easily replaced by the noun compound *ātmamāna*.

The concept of *ātmamāna* has the same meaning as that of *asmimāna*, retaining the early Buddhistic meaning, i.e., ‘to conceive that I am [pañcaśaṅkhā]’ or ‘the conception of the self as [pañcaśaṅkhā]’.

The Mahāyānist Sthiramati states in his Trīṃśikā: *asmimānaḥ pañcāśaṅkhāvātātmmanvaramityāśāvāmvātāmyāḥ bhīnivēśādyā cītasyonmatiḥ so’ asmimānaḥ.*¹⁰ *Asmimāna*, in his view, connotes the attachment (abhiniveśa) to a real entity of self, putting an emphasis on the psychological sphere, i.e. the elevation of mind (cittasyonnati). The commentator Vinitadeva, clarifying the distinction between *ātmamāna* and *asmimāna*, remarks: *bdag la ṇa rgyal ḷbyun ṇa gaṅ yin pa de ni bdag tu ṇa rgyal zes ḷyało ṇaho sṅam paḥi ṇa rgyal śis bya ba ḷdis ni de ṇid rab tu bsgrub paḥi rnam graṅs ston to.*

*Ātmamāna* (*bdag la ṇa rgyal*), meaning the conception of the self or the regarding the self as [pañcaśaṅkhā], is used in parallel to *asmimāna* (*bdag tu ṇa rgyal*), which connotes ‘conceiving that I am’ (*ḥaḥo sṅam paḥi ṇa rgyal*). Noticeable is the remark that *ātma* (*-māna*), transcending the psychological explanation, has come to be an object of the attachment, i.e., a *viśaya* (object) to be conceived. This remark is positively clarified by Sthiramati himself, who gives the definition to it and says: *ātma viśaye māna ātmamāno* (*ātmamāna* means conceiving the self as object). As the concept of *ātma* (*-māna*) is objectified by *viśaya*, it can tentatively be replaced by such a concept as *ālayavijñāna*, the view of which is termed *ātmadrṣṭi* (the wrong view of *ātman*). *Ātmadrṣṭi* is a concept expressing rather the philosophical sphere than the psychological one.
On the other side, from ātmadrṣṭi (the regarding the self as [pañcaskandha] or as [ālayavijñāna]) proceeds asmimāna, (the elevation of mind). The process from ātmadrṣṭi to asmimāna, or from the philosophical recognition to the psychological sphere, is concisely stated below: \( \text{tatrālayavijñānasvarūpe sammūdhah sannālayavijñāne ātmadrṣṭimutpādayati. ātmadarśanādyā cittasyonnatiḥ so’smimānah.}\) The wrong view of the self will arise at first and recognize it as ātman, a real entity, and then it will be followed by the elevation of mind (cittasyonnati), which will again give rise to such psychologically opposite elements as pride (atimāna) and self-piety (ūnamāna).

With regard to ātmanāna, as Monier-Williams SED., and others show, is found in the Vedic literature, meaning the regarding the self as [Brahman or others], which is strictly repudiated by Buddhists. For this reason is not used attamāna (Skt. ātmanāna) in the Early Buddhist literature. But, asmimāna (Pāli, Skt) took its place, completely altering the meaning of ātman as Brahman, turning it into ātman as pañcaskandha or the conception that I am (aham asmi).

This Buddhist tradition is pointedly expressed by Buddhaghosa in a passage of Papañcasūdani: \( \text{‘asmimāna iti rūpādisu asmīti māna.’} \) The connotation of this passage is inherited by Sthiramati, as we have discussed before. Not only that, a new interpretation of cittasyonnati (the elevation of mind) is added by Abhidhārmikas and the Mahāyāna commentators as well.

Although the Mahāyānists have introduced a new term of ātmanāna and twisted a new interpretation different from the Vedic one, they have deliberately done it, because they wanted to confirm the earlier tradition found in Pāli literature, substituting Brahman for ālayavijñāna (the store-consciousness) not eternal, but momentary and unreal.

We have also to remember that the nine māna, as enumerated in a series from māna to micchāmāna, now show the different types of conceiving the self, but not immediately pride as such.

VI. THE BUDDHA’S LAST WORDS: dipa and dvipa

In the Pāli Nikāya an important passage concerning the last teachings given by the Buddha says:
\"tasmiit ih\'Ananda atta-dipā viharatha atta-saranā anañña-sara\na, dhamma-dipā dhamma-saranā anañña-saranā.\"  
(D II. 100; III. 58, 77; V. 154.165.)

(Hence, Oh, Ānanda! Take refuge in your island, in yourself, not in others, in the island of truth, in truth itself, not in others.)

The Pāli term atta (self) in this passage implies dhamma. Geiger also equalizes atta and dhamma in his book, Pāli Dhamma (p. 79). K. Bhattacharya is inclined to recognize Geiger's view (Cf. L' Ātman-Brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien, p. 62). As far as the early literature is concerned, this view is lucid, for we have the following passages:

\"yo kho, Vakkali dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati, yo maṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati; Dhammaṃ hi Vakkali passanto maṃ passati, maṃ passanto dhammaṃ passati.\" (S III, p. 120)  
(He who seeth the Truth, Vakkali, he seeth me: he who seeth me, Vakkali, he seeth the Truth. Verily, seeing the Truth, Vakkali, one sees me: seeing me, one sees the Truth.)

In the later literature Buddhaghosa also recognizes the equivalence atta = dhamma. However, he adds an Abhidharmic interpretation, saying:

\"ko paṇ\'ettha attā nāma? Lokiya-lokuttaro-dhammo. ten\'evāha: dhammadipā dhhammasaranā anaññasaranā ti.\"  
(Sūratthappakāsini, II, p. 268; Sumaṅgalavilāsini, III, p. 846.)

In the Abhidharmic view, as quoted above, atta implies lokiya-lokuttaradhamma (mundane and supramundane states). The term dipa compounded with atta and dhamma, therefore, should be of one and the same meaning—'island' ('a resting place').

The Pāli term dipa in itself has two meanings, light (a light of lamp) and island. The former is found in J. II. 104; I. 226; III. 187; Mhv VII. 7.41; Sn 501; A I. 55; Dha II. 548. For instance, \"dīpa lokassa nibbuto\" (Mahāvaṃsa, p. 17. ed. Geiger, 1908). The latter is found in the Dha II. 49.94; ThA 154. For instance, \"so karohi dipam attano, Khippaṃ vāyama, paṇḍito, bhava.\" (Dhp. 236, 238).

In Sanskrit literature, however, two terms, dipa and dvipa, are different from each other. Sanskrit dipa, derived from di ('to shine') means light (a lamp), while dvipa, derived from dvi-āp
‘(‘double watered’) means island. Both meanings are included in
the Pāli term dipa.

Many scholars translated dipa in the Buddha’s last words into
‘light’, while another meaning was neglected. Confer to Rhys
Davids, Dialogues of Buddha (II. 110.), Fausbøll, English trans-
lation of Suttanipāta (verse no. 501), etc. Other scholars such as
Adikaram and Childers also follow this English translation, ren-
dering it as ‘lamp’.

Another meaning of dipa, ‘double watered’, can be seen in the
commentaries on the last words of the Buddha. Buddhaghosa
says:

“atta-dipa ti mahāsamugataṃ dipañ viya attānaṃ katvā vihar-
rathā.” (Sumanāgalavilāsini II. 548).

Atta-dipa in the Buddha’s last words means an island in the great
ocean (mahāsamugataṃ dipañ), certainly not ‘a lamp-light.’ More
examples can also be found in the Suttanipāta (stanza 1092, 1094)
and Dhammapada (verse 25, 236, 238) etc. Dhammapada (verse
236) reads: “so karohi dipañ attano. Khippan vāyama, pandito
bhava...”. Commenting on so karohi, Buddhaghosa says: “so
karohi ti so tvāṃ samudde nāvāya bhinnāya dipasamkhātapati-
ṭham viya attano kusalapatiṭṭham karohi. (DhA III. 336). A term
dipa in this passage implies dispasamkhāta-patiṭṭham (a resting
place called island.) Atta is a synonym of dipa, tāna, leṇa, gati,
parāyana, paṭītha, all of which mean ‘a resting place’ modifying
‘island’:

“atta-dipā ti, attānaṃ dipañ tānaṃ leṇañ gati parāyanam
patiṭṭham katvā viharathā ti attho.”
(Sāratthappakāsini, II, p 268.)

The sanskritized passage of the last words of the Buddha (D
II. p. 100) appears on the Mahāvastu:

“ātmadvipa bhikṣavo viharatha ananyadvipāḥ ātmasaraṇāḥ ana-
nyaśaraṇāḥ.” (Senart, Le Mahāvastu, I. p. 334.)

We have the same sanskritization of the Pāli passage in a Turfan-
Handschriften of Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra edited by Waldsch-
midt. It reads:

“[tasmād] ānandaitarhi mam (a vā) tyayād ātmādvipair viharta-
vyam ātmasaraṇair dharmaṃvipair dhā (maṣaṇair anayadvī-
pair anayaśaraṇaiḥ/tat kasmād dhetoḥ).” (p. 200).
The Pāli term *dīpa* is sanskritized as *dvīpa* (island). Its Tibetan equivalent is also island (*glin*), but not ‘*mar-me*’ (light).

Further, a Sanskrit ‘*dvīpa*’ is used as compounded with such terms as *taṇa*, *leaṇa*, *sarāṇa*, all of which demonstrate ‘a resting place, reliance, basis.’ We have the same example in Pāli literature (D II. p. 100; S IV, 315; V. 154, 163-5 etc). This word is also a synonym of *patiṭṭha*:

“*atta-dīpā ti mahāsamuddagataṃ dīpaṃ viya attānaṃ patiṭṭham katvā viharatha.*” (DA. II. p. 548).

‘*Dīpa*’ in Pāli is also expounded by *atta-saranā* and *atta-gatikā*:

“Atta-saranā ti atta-gatikā va hota, ma aṅkā-gaṅkā” (ibid.)

All synonyms of the Sanskrit ‘*dvīpa*’ are equal to that of the Pāli ‘*dīpa*’, as far as the Buddha’s last words are concerned.

Even in the Mahāyānist texts we have the equalization of *dvīpa* with ‘a resting place’ (or ‘island’) The Mahāyānist Sanskrit texts (AAV. pp 595-6; P.p. 351.) read:

‘lokasya trāṇaṃ bhavisyāmo lokasya śraṇaṃ bhavisyāmo lokasya layaṇaṃ bhavisyāmo lokasya parāyaṇaṃ bhavisyāmo lokasya dvīpā bhavisyāmo lokasya ālokā bhavisyāmo lokasya parināyakā bhavisyāmo ‘nuttaraṃ samyaksambodhin abhisambudhya loka-sya gatir bhavisyāma ity evamṛupaṃ anuttarāyaṃ samyaksambodhāu viryam ārabhyante.’

The Sanskrit text as quoted above deals with a Mahāyānistic concept of Bodhisattva, while the Pāli texts such as Dhammapada and Dīghanikāya, in keeping with the Hinayānist idea, deal directly with the disciple of the Buddha. Besides the difference of topic there is no distinction between the Sanskrit and the Pāli sentences at all.

‘*Parināyakā*’ in Sanskrit appears on the Milindapanha in Pāli (Miln 257): “dhamma-dīpa-gati parāyanātā.” Another term, newly added to the Sanskrit passage, is ālokā. If a term ālokā (light) could be equal to ‘*dvīpa*’, then, ālokā and *dvīpa* would have been redundant.

There is really a case, in which both *dvīpa* and ālokā are differently used in meaning:

‘lokasya dvīpā bhavisyāmo lokasyālokā bhavisyāmo.’

(AAV. p. 586).
In this passage, *dvIPA* and *āloka* are different in meaning, the former being 'island', the latter being 'light'.

Further, the Sanskrit text *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* (AAV. pp. 599-600) comments on it, saying:

"tad-yathā'pi nāma Subhūte ye pradeśā udaka-paricchinnā bha-vanti nadiṣu vā mahodadhiṣu vā tā ucyante dvipā iti."

The term *dvIPA* in this commentary denotes a land (*pradeśa*) either in the river or in the ocean, which is limited by the water (*udaka-paricchinnā*). Hari bhadra, commentator on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, also finds it as a place limited by water (*udaka-parikṣipta-sthala*) (AAV. p. 600).

With the Chinese literature the term *dIpa* has been translated as both 'a lamp-light' and 'island'.

Sāṅghadeva in the Hou Ch’in Dynasty (384-417 A.D.) wrongly rendered it into 'a lamp-light' in the *Mādhyamāgama*, which reads:

"Make yourself 'a lamp-light' " (T.I. 645c).

This passage is just the same as one in the Pāli *Dīghanikāya* (*atta-dIpa viharatha*) and also one in the Pāli *Dhammapada*, where *dIpa* meant island.

We have also another Chinese mistranslation by Buddhayaśa and Chu-fa-nien in the Former Ch’in Dynasty (351-394 A.D.). It is translated as follows:

"Oh Ānanda, therefore, make yourself a light, and *dhamma* a light, but not others. Make yourself a resting place, and *dhamma* a resting place, but not others." (T.I. 15b.)

With the suggestion of Dr. P.V. Bapat we can point out another misinterpretation in the Chinese version of *Dhammapada* (25, 238). The Chinese translator of the *Dhammapada* 25, as Bapat suggested, presumably did not realize the difference between *dIpa* and *dvIPA*, having rendered *dIpa* into a light of lamp. The comment on the Dhp. 236 exactly says:

"samudde nāvāya bhinnāya dIpa-saṅkhātām patiṭṭham viya at-tano kusala-patiṭṭham karohi." (Dhp. Com. p. 336.)

(Just as a shipwreck finds a resting place in an island, so also you find a resting place or refuge in your own action.)

Guṇabhadra in the Liu Sung Dynasty (420-479. A.D.), how-
ever, rightly rendered it into ‘island’ in the Samyuktāgama (T.2. 8a), which represents a translation:

“At that time the Buddha said to the disciples. Take refuge in your island, in yourself, not in others, in the island of truth, in truth itself, not in others.”

Further, Buddhayaśa in the Hou Ch‘in Dynasty (384-417. A.D.) used dipa as a synonym of sarana (a resting place), grha (house) and parāyana (the absolute path) (T. 19.1c). The same is found in the Chinese sūtra Chi-shi-yin-pa-chin by Dharma gupta in the Sui Dynasty (581-618. A.D., T.I. 328b.)

Tibetan renderings are also ‘island’ (gliṅ), but not ‘a light of lamp’ (mar me).

In the last I would like to refer to Dr. Brough’s suggestive view as expressed in his Gāndhāri Dharmapada (pp. 209-210), in which he mentioned my view. 2

Fortunately, Brough also has come to the same conclusion that “in many places the sense of ‘island’ is quite unambiguous.” On the other hand, he leaves a subtle doubt of accepting the rendering ‘lamp’ as simply a mistake. To prove it, he comments as follows: “The phrase dipam karoti presumably recalled the name of the former Buddha Dipamkara, who is understood in Sanskrit as well as in Pāli to be a ‘light-bringer’, not an ‘island-maker’”. What I presumed, however, concerned with a Pāli ‘dīpa’ only in the Buddha’s last words, not ‘dīpa’ in proper. I quite agree with Professor Brough’s view, in which he takes the former Buddha Dipamkara as a ‘light-bringer’, not an ‘island-maker’. But it is beyond the range of my topic concerned.

Referring to the Chinese translation in terms of ‘light’, Brough also presents a suggestive presumption, saying: “This was the sense primarily intended by the author of the verses (Dhp 235-8). A translation with ‘island’ reads rather quaintly.” Thus, he presumes that “if forced to continue walking through the night, a sensible man will doubtless find a lamp more serviceable.” This metaphorical interpretation will be suggestive and valuable, if more textual evidences will be provided.

What I am mainly concerned with is simply a limited sense of dipa in the last words of the Buddha and nothing more.
NOTES TO CHAPTER-I

SECTION I

1. We should not overlook the fact that the terminology employed by those Buddhist philosophers who wrote in Sanskrit easily lends itself to misunderstanding. For example; *khanti* meaning ‘to be willing to,’ derived from *kam* (‘to desire’) is Sanskritized as *kṣānti* (‘to bear’), which should (at some places in Pāli) be *kānti* in Skt. All of Pāli texts follow this etymology *kam*. It is also true of Mahāyāna Sanskrit texts: the philosophical term *anupattikadharmaṃksānti* suggests the willing acceptance that nothing has been born or created in this world. In this connection, *kṣānti* does not always mean ‘to bear’ indicated by the root *ksam*. It means ‘to be willing to the notion that nothing has been born’ (cf. G.H. Sasaki, *A Study of Abhidharma Philosophy* [Kobundo, Tokyo], pp. 580-603.

2. The association of *nekkhamma* with *sabbe kusalā dhammā* is inherited in *Pāli Abhidharma*, i.e., *sabbe pi kusalā dhammā nekkhhammadhātu* (Vibh. p. 86). However, it does not mean the identification of *nekkhamma* with *nibbāna*, although Chinese Buddhist translators often render it as *nieh p’an* (liberation). Thus, the field of Indian Buddhism is already prepared for the identification of *nekkhamma* with *nibbāna* by the equation of *nekkhamma* to *sabbe akusalā dhammā*.

3. *Nekkhamma* is catalogued as the opposite concept of *kāma*, which itself is subject to the six qualities (*chatudhātuyo*). *Chatu-dhātuyo* (D. III. 215, 275; Netti. 97; Th. I. 378; Vism. 481) include six qualities such as *kāma*, *vyāpāda*, *vihiṃsā*, *nekkhamma*, *avvyāpāda*, *avhiṃsā*. *Nekkhammasankappa* (A. I. 111. 146; S. II. 152; Vibh. 104, 235) is also used as the opposite of *kāmasankappa* (A. III. 259; V. 31), while *nekkhammatitakka* (A. I. 275; II. 76, 252; III. 429; It. 82) is used in opposition to *kāma* (*kāmatitakka*, D. III. 226; S. II. 151; III. 93; A.I. 148, 274 sq; II. 16.117, 252; III. 390, 428.

4. *Sat* means ‘that which exists’ or ‘being’ (the adjective). *Sattā* (Skt. *sattva*) is the abstract noun formed from this, and etymologically means ‘being’, or ‘essence’. The Pāli word *nissattā* probably stands for *niḥsattva*, although it is not found in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts. Broad as the meaning of *sattā* is, it is the subject of contention. Philosophically *sattā* in Pāli Nikāya refers merely to human being, whereas in Abhidharma it refers to human and non-human beings. It is also true of the Sarvāstivāda school and Mahāyāna Buddhism. *Sattā* is in Indian logic defined as a generic character, the broadest of all such characters. It inheres three categories, viz., substances, qualities, and actions (Prof. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-nyāya Logic* [Benares, 1905], p. 53. *Nissattā*, a negative form of *sattā*, is in Pāli Abhidharma traditionally defined as one of the categories of *dhamma*. *Dhamma* means, according to Buddhaghosa, *guṇa*, *desanā*, *pariyatti* and *nissatta*. This definition of *dhamma* is inherited from Nikāya (D. I. 99). Buddhaghosa often uses the definition of *dhamma* in Nikāya (Aṭṭhasālīni, 33. ed., by Bapat; Dha. I. 22; Sasaki, *A Study of Buddhist Psychology*, p. 162, Tokyo, 1960.


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8. Āranya (Pā. arāṇīṇa) formed from aranā-ya (adj. and sust. nt.,) meaning ‘free from passion’ or ‘freedom from passion.’ In the Rig. Veda āranyā still means remoteness. In the Ath. V. it has come to mean wilderness or forest (Cf. Pāli Engl. Dict. PTS.). Ārāṇīṇa-gata means ‘gone into the forest’ as loneliness (M.I. 323; A. III. 353 etc.). The Pāli commentaries give a wider meaning to the word, saying every place is āranyā except a village and the approach thereto (Vin. III. 46; SnA. 83 etc). The meanings of āranyā (arāṇīṇa), i.e., remoteness, loneliness, passionless, are reasonably considered to be equivalent to the meaning of naiskramya (‘to get out of’) derived from niskram. Chinese translators render āranyā and naiskramya alike as ch'ü chia, meaning to get out of household’ from the point of view of the philosophy, and thereby letting the distinction between naiskramya and nekkhamma pass unnoticed.

9. In general, the principal meaning should not, in Indian philosophy, be separated from the expression in negative form (Betti Heimann, “Form not ‘a part’ but a ‘part’ of meaning as exemplified in Sanskrit literature,” University of Ceylon Review, Vol. V. No. 2 [1947]. In reality, negation can not point out the negative fact, for negation means to drive away all things which are denied (Cf. Chandra, Negative Fact, Negation and Truth [University of Calcutta, 1947], p. 14). Negation in the Indian sense does not mean negation as it is. It means the expression of positive content in negative form.

10. Negation in the Indian sense represents the possibility of manifold views (Cf. Heimann, “Significance of Negation in Hindu Philosophical Thought,” B.C. Law Volume, Part II [Poona, 1946]. Heimann refers to ‘implicit negation’ in the Indian sense. Prof. Raju refers to Buddhist Dharma, where he interprets Dharma as universal truth with which one can unite oneself. If that be so, would it not be contradictory to the implication of Buddhist negation?

11. The paradoxical structure of the Absolute is not expounded in Early Buddhism (Nikāya Buddhism), e.g., evamdhāmman evampaṭṭhā evamvīmūtthā (D. II. 8. ff. 82; D. III. 99. 100 etc). Here dhāma represents the Absolute Truth in contrast to the Relative. The Absolute should not be separated from the Relative. In this respect, the idea of the Absolute (nībbāṇa) in the Abhidharmic sense forms the transition from Early Buddhism to Mahāyāna Buddhism. In other words, the Absolute in the Abhidharma considered as a reality looking beyond the Relative, Abhidharma separates the two in a dualistic way as do all other Hinayāna Sects. The Mahāyāna idea of the unity of the Absolute and the Relative is not found in Abhidharma. Although keeping basic thoughts developed in Early Buddhism, Abhidharma is the transitional step towards the Mahāyāna idea of the unity of the Absolute and the Relative. As for Early Buddhist Dhamma see I.B. Horner, “Early Buddhist Dhamma,” Artibus Asiae, XI, 115, where she refers to sa as sat as well as sva.

3. Nettipakaraṇa 18,300.
4. PTSD. 30.
5. SN. 263 (anavajjāni kammaṇī), Itivuttaka 102, etc., anabhāva (Vinaya 111.3).
6. Sāratthappakāsini III. 149.
7. Ud. Com. 366.12; Vism 194.24, etc.

Otani Catalogue.


13. Bodhicharyāvatāra-pañjikā p. 386; Prasannapadā p. 160: "yah pratityasamutpādaṃ paśyati sa dhammaṁ paśyati. yo dhammaṁ paśyati sa buddhaḥ paśyati." The doctrine of pratityasamutpāda leads the Hinayānists to the awareness of the successive origination (utpāda) of the twelfeold nidānas, which is rejected by the Mahāyānists. In contrast, the Mahāyānists interpret it as the 'mutual' relationship. The difference in view may perhaps be better expressed if we say that the former understanding is concerned with a dynamic view, while the latter with a static view of nature. The Sarvāstivādins, opponents of Nāgārjuna, hold the opinion that the anuloma order (the one-sided relationship) of the Dependent Origination only is valid. This opinion is easily to be objected, for the anuloma order requires a reality of each nidāna in a successive production (utpāda). The Sarvāstivāda school, however, has set forth, apart from the twelfeold Dependent Origination, the theory of 6 causes and 4 conditions to meet with the ‘mutual’ relationship. They are: kāraṇaḥetu, saṅhabhūḥetu, saḥbhāgahetū, saṃprayaṅkaḥetū sarvatragaḥetū, vipākaḥetū; adhipati-pratyaya, ālambanapratyaya, samanantarapratyaya, hetupratyaya. Nevertheless, these hetupratyayas also are rejected by Nāgārjuna as a realistic view formulated by the svabhāva ideation. In reality, a concept of svabhāva in the Sarvāstivāda school indicates kiriya (function), not only things material. Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra-śāstra says: “Sat (being) means that which becomes the object and gives rise to the consciousness.” (T. 29. 621 C.)

The case is the same with the Theravāda school, which recognizes the twelfeold Dependent Origination just as the Sarvāstivādins do. On the other hand, it sets forth the theory of the ‘mutual’ relationship in the Paṭṭhāna.
That is called the theory of 24 conditions (paccaya). They are: hetu, ārammaṇa, adhipati, anantara, samanantara, sahaṅgata, ariññamaṇña, nissaya, upaṇissaya, purejñā, pacchajñāta, āsevana, kamma, vipāka, āhāra, indriya, jhāna, magga, sampayutta, vippayutta, attī, natthi, vigata, avigata. All these paccaya relationship are nothing but a static view of nature or the ‘mutual’ relationship—parasparāpeksa in Candrakirti’s Mahāyānistic conception. The ariññamaṇña paccaya relationship, for instance, means the condition by way of mutuality, in which all mental phenomena, as well as the 4 physical elements, are at the same time conditioned by way of mutuality. Furthermore, the ariññamaṇña relationship is to indicate the voidness of sabhāva (a reality) or something real. The following passage seems to be important in connection of the denial of sabhāva (a real entity)—a concept taken from the Mahāyānist interpretation. The Visuddhimagga runs: “Tathā na anto kammassa vipāko upalabbhati, bhikkhū pi na kammassa na kammāṁ tathā vijjati. Phalena suññatam kammāṁ phalam kammena vijjati, kammā ca kho upādāya tato nibbattate phalam.” (p. 603). The ariññamaṇña relationship is clearly represented and illustrated by the relationship between kamma and phala. In view of Buddhaghosa: no kamma exists in vipāka, and no vipāka in kamma. A kamma is void of its vipāka which comes through kamma. Vipāka comes into existence on account of kamma. Subsequently each of them by itself is void (suññam), being deprived of sabhāva. For the Mahāyānists, philosophy starts with the negative judgement or the denial of something real (sabhāva, sabhāvā). But, the interpretation of svabhāva as something real is only subject to the Mahāyānistic ideation slightly different from the Hinayānist connotation. For the Hinayānists (Ābhidharmika), whether the Sarvastivādins or the Theravādins, svabhāva does not always mean something real or entity; Instead, it implies something, real and non-real. It may perhaps be better manifested with ‘a modus of existence’, which is associated with something material and non-material.

It may be suggested that both the 6-causes-and-4-conditions-theory of the Sarvastivāda school and the 24-conditions-theory of the Theravāda school indicate a striking similarity with the parasparāpeksa relationship of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, and that the Mahāyānistic interpretation of svabhāva as entity requires the re-examination of the connotation along with the Ābhidharmika philosophy. (Regards to svabhāva Cf. G.H. Sasaki, A Study of the Theory of Time in Buddhism pp. 148-189, 1977.)


15. An interesting but intricate problem concerns the interpretation of pratītyasamutpāda (Pāli, paṭiccasamuppāda), which varies even in Hinayāna Buddhism. It can, however, be shown that in particular, the Sarvastivāda school, one of the Hinayānist schools, was accused by Nāgārjuna of holding a realistic view. Accordingly, a term pratīyā (condition) even was condemned by him as a concept imposing a realistic idea. For this reason, Nāgārjuna and other Mahāyānist philosophers did not think much of the twelvefold Dependent Origination. By the following verses was his attitude toward the Dependent Origination clearly exemplified:

“avidyāyaṁ nirduddhayāṁ sanskārāṇāmasambhavah / avidyāyaṁ nirodha-
stu jñānanāsava bhāvanāḥ” (Prasannapadā p. 559. Ch. XXVI. Kr. 11.)
When ignorance [the first link of the twelvefold relationship] disappears, then, karmic formation (samskāra) also does not arise. But the cessation of ignorance is dependent upon the practice of cessation by jñāna (wisdom).

A term jñāna represented by Nāgārjuna does not imply the Hinayānistic awareness of causality depicted by the twelvefold links, but must impose the denial of links (pratyaya) as such, getting rid of all links as entities. When all links as entities are banished, then, the causality of the twelvefold links is subsequently impossible to be held. The Chap. XXVI. Kr. 12. reads:

“tasya tasya nirdodhena tatamābhāpravartate / duhkhasaṅkhāraj keva-lo’yamevaṁ samayagniruddhyate //”.

(By the cessation of [the twelvefold causality], each link [as entity] will not come into existence. Thus, the aggregate of suffering will be completely gone out.)

Upholding, thus, the sole reality of pratyaya against the Sarvastivāda realism, it however accepted the non-reality (niḥsvabhāvatva) of it, and led the Mādhyamika to the conclusion that causality cannot rationally be explained. The following verse will suffice to prove it. The Chapt. VII. Kr. 16 (Pra-sannapada pp. 159-160) runs:

“pratyā yadyadhāvatī tat tadchāntam svabhāvatāḥ / tasmāduḥkṣādāpyayamānan ca śāntamutpattireva ca //”.

(Whatever originates dependent [upon others] is nothing by itself. Hence, presently arising and origination also are rightly nothing by themselves.)

In this manner, Nāgārjuna rejected the causality of Dependent Origination. It is because causality is nothing but the uni-directional relationship or one-sided process of causation. That is the process from avijjā to jarāmaranā—avijjāpaccayaḥ saṅkhāraḥ, saṅkhāra-paccayaḥ viññānaṁ etc.—It means that by way of ignorance karmic formation arises, by way of karmic formation [saṅkhāra] consciousness arises, etc.; but not that by way of karmic formation ignorance arises, etc. The adverse cannot be set forth. This uni-directional relationship is termed by idappaccayaḥ (Skt. pratiyayatā), which has already been represented by the thought-patterns in the Pāli literature: “imasmim sati, idam hoti, imasاصアップpadda, idam uppajjati; imasmim asati, idam na hoti; imass nirodhā, idam nirujjhati.” (This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not becoming, that does not become; from the ceasing of this, that ceases.) This formula is the principle underlying the twelve-fold Dependent Origination or the uni-directional relationship of conditions (paccaya)—the process from A to B, but not from B to A—.

This uni-directional relationship, however, has to be denied by Nāgārjuna, for it is based on the presupposition of paccaya as entity. Therefore, the relationship as insisted by him is not this, but the ‘mutual’ relationship, in which both the processes from A to B as well as from B to A can be established. The latter relationship is called parasparāpeksā (the mutual relationship).

Although a direct argument of parasparāpeksā is not found in Nāgārjuna’s treatises, the following verse could be of the foremost importance to prove the
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implication of it. It runs: “pratitya kārakaḥ karma tām pratitya ca kārakaṁ / karma pravartate nānyatpaśyāmaḥ siddhikāraṇaṁ // Chapt. VIII. Kr. 12). It means: The doer is in relation to the deed (karma) and the deed to the doer. We cannot recognize any other cause for this establishment.

In this statement is the doubled relationship between doer and deed vindicated, i.e. the relation of doer to deed, and that of deed to doer. Candrakirti, commentator of the Vṛtti, clearly gives a definition by saying that this verse means idampratyayatā and also paraspara-apekṣīti siddhiḥ (the establishment of the mutual dependency). But, idampratyayatā (idappaccayatā in Pāli), as has been discussed, can be found in the Pāli literature, meaning the uni-directional relationship, but not the ‘mutual’ relationship. It is not a concept genuine of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Unique is a concept of parasparāpekṣā, meaning the mutual relationship, for the latter alone will lead the Mādhyamikas to the complete voidness of entities, i.e. śūnyatā. Parasparāpekṣā is simply a conventional notion. Hence, pratityasamutpāda in a sense of parasparāpekṣā is also a conventional notion (prajñāpātha) as shown in the following verse (Chap. XXIV. Kr. 18). “yah pratityasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṁ tāṁ pracakṣmahe / sā prajñāpāthupādāya pratipāsāvayā madhyamānā /". (We declare that Dependent Origination is śūnyatā and that the conventional notion (prajñāpātha), depending on each other (upādāya) is indeed the middle path.)

With regard to this puzzling verse we take upādāya as a concept showing the ‘mutual’ relationship of the counterpart such as kāraka-karma, janya-janaka, pratyanga-darśana, lokṣya-laksana, upādāya-upādāka, avayava, avayavin, guṇa-guṇin, pramāṇa-prameya, etc. (Prasannapadā p. 190).

A word sā in this Kārika 18 is replaced by yā by Murti. Cf. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism p. 8. K. Inada renders sā by it. Cf. Inada’s Nāgarjuna p. 149. However, Murti’s amendment (yā) could be preferable.

Turning back to the problem at issue, the conclusion of the paper is that the term anamatagga (-samsāra) in the earlier Pāli texts suggests an observation of life from the conventional and experimental point of view, while anādikāla (-samsāra) from the logico-epistemological point of view as represented by Nāgarjuna.

SECTION III

1. The word aggregates or khandha (Skt. skandha) the group of bodily and psychical states which are immediate with us and are divided into five classes: (1) rūpa (the four elements, the body, the senses; the so-called sense data), (2) vedanā (feeling), (3) saññā (conceptual knowledge), (4) sankhāra (synthetic mental states and functioning of sense-affections), (5) viññāna (consciousness). Samyutta Nikāya Vol. III. 86 etc. Zo-agon Vol. II. 13 (Tuishô-Zō-Kyô II. 13. c; SN. 22, 48. (Vol. III, p. 47).

2. SM. Vol. III. pp. 103—104 “Iti kira bho rūpaṁ anattā, vedanā, saññā, sankhāra, viññānaṁ anattā annaṭṭakatāni kannmāni kaiṭamattānaṁ phusissanti”.

3. Milindapañha, Siamese Edition, p. 120. (There is no trace of this in the Royal Asiatic Society Edition).

“Evam eva kho Mahārāja nāpi ime pañcakkhandhaṁ upajjanti imaimeva pañca-kkhandham upanissaya katakasalākusalakhaṇena ādāsamanḍale chāyā viya satto mātukucchiyaṁ patisamkhādhatāti”.

5. Milindapañha, Siamese Edition, p. 120.

6. Rūpa among the five aggregates is derived from the root rup, to form, to figure, to mould. The Buddhist modified this term to ruf, to break to pieces. It means the impermanent nature of things. The Buddhist uses this word in varied modifications:—“ruppanato rūpam”, “ruppanatthena rūpam”, “rupapaya ti rūpam”. Since we have the original designation in S. Vol. III. p. 86: “ruppate tasrnā rūpam ti vuccati”, we may say that the Buddhistic etymology of this word has already appeared a long time ago. Chinese equivalents for the Pāli rūpa are 3/4.


8. It is certainly true that the Buddha referred only to Nirvāna and not to metaphysical problems. But it is not simple because metaphysical problems go far beyond analytical discriminative knowledge. Analytical knowledge should be applied to the true nature of worldly things, though confined to the specific Buddhist meaning. In other words, analytical knowledge should be directed towards anattā, dukkha, and anicca (impermanence, painfulness, and not self of all sentient beings). The negation of metaphysical problems is to place analytical knowledge within its own limits so as not to have it go beyond its own capacity. It is for this reason that we may often find the “how” manner of questioning rather than the “what” which leads one to discriminative analysis only. It is true that in later Buddhism, such as the Praṇāṇāmitā doctrine, we can come across such expressions as “katham” rather than “kim”, however, even when “kim” is used, it is used in the implicit sense implied in Prima Essentia inquiry. But in this article, I would like to insist that “by what” is much more positive than the more proper “how” of the later Mahāyāna Buddhism.


10. Milindapañha, p. 120 (Siames Ed.).

11. According to the Indian tradition, Agent (ka.tā) is that factor which makes proximate instruments operate for an effect. This notion of Agent coincides in greater extent with that of the Vedānta philosophy. According to the inner faculty of Agent, a threefold Agency is depicted in Gītā (XVIII/26-28). Cf. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, “Kinds of Agents as depicted by Pāṇini”, “Vāk”, Number 3, December 1953, Deccan College, Poona, India.

12. Kathāvortu p. 552 says that kamma and its accumulation are not different. See also MN Vol. I. p. 390.

13. Milindapañha p. 40 (Trenckner) T.W. Rhys and Hardy render this differently. On the phrase “no preceding (apubbam) and no succeeding existence”, see Dr. Morris’s note on p. 101 of the Pāli Text Society’s Journal, 1887, and the passages he quotes there.

14. The concept of kamma has come to be referred to as a “continuum” (santati, or substances) in Buddhist Philosophy. Dr. S. Dasgupta says, “It is curious that though all dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that
they were all strictly momentary (kṣanika, i.e. existing only for a moment) was not emphasized in early Pāli literature". (A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 161). But the epistemology of Pāli Buddhism is to be distinguished from the salvation theory which it expounds. We may discover passages referring to Nirvāṇa as a reality (sahāva). In this instance, the meaning of "reality" is far from the realistic view, and it purposes only to deny the wrong view with respect to Nirvāṇa, i.e. the negation of Nirvāṇa. Cf. Paramattha-mañjasū, Vol. III, p. 200 (Siamese Edition).


17. Rhys Davids points out the incongruity between the kamma and anatta doctrines as does La Vallée Poussin: "Even in the days of the Buddha, there were heretics who insisted on the consistency between both". Early Buddhism. p. 77. See also: S. 22, 82, 14-15 (Vol. III, pp. 103-104; Zō-agon II, 26 (T. II, 15a).


19. This positive relation between anatta, kamma, and paticcasa-muppāḍa had already been implied in the Nikāya in such passages as: SN. 12, 37 (Vol. II, p. 64-65). Zō-agon XII, 13 (T. II, 84 ff.). Ibid. 12, 24, 8 (Vol. II. p. 33). Ibid. 12, 25, 1 (Vol. II. p. 38), Zō-agon CIV (Taishō II, 93c).

20. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I., p. 382: "It would be natural to surmise that negative knowledge must be the product of absence of reality. Such is the view of many philosophic schools in India and in the West. But this is an error".


22. The Chinese term wu or fei is equivalent to the Pāli "a" or "ni". Those terms have the same meaning, there being no distinction between them in so far as it concerns the Chinese version of the Pāli Nikāya. The Sanskrit prefix "nir" indicates a stronger meaning than "a". Sometimes the prefix "nir" illustrates a quasi-explosive function of dispersion. (R. Heimann: The Significance of Prefixes in Sanskrit Philosophical Terminology, 1951, p. 54).

In Sanskrit Buddhism the nihsvabhāva has a general logical meaning, as well as a psychologico-eschatological significance. In the Chinese Buddhism, the prefix "nir" holds fast to a psychologico-eschatological significance. We
must draw our attention to the fact in Pāli Buddhism there is no equivalent term for “nīḥsvabhāva”, while in the Mahāyāna Buddhism the negative prefix of svabhāva is almost all “nir”, i.e. “nīḥsvabhāva”. The other negative prefix “a” in connection to svabhāva is very rarely found in the Texts of Vījñānavāda school. (Cf. My article “The problem of Lakkhaṇaṭṭaya”, Journal of Philosophical Studies Kyōto University. Nr. 332.)

23. Sylvain Lévi translates his cetanā by “la pensée pure”, which seems to be inadequate from the standpoint of activity of karma. See Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 32.


27. Vism., Vol. II, p. 556. “Katattā yeva hi saṅkhārā attano phalassā paccayā honti, na vijjamānattā avijjamānattā vā”. The saṅkhārā should be interpreted as kamma according to the traditional connotation in the Pāli commentaries.

28. SN 650 (PTS).

29. Kamma is said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and mind. The core of this kamma is thinking (cetanā) and the states associated with it. See Ajṭhasālīni, p. 73. Edited by P.V. Bapat, Poona, 1942; Mahāsaṅgahaṇāṇa Sutta, Dialogues of the Buddha, II, p. 340. The Pāli Buddhism lays stress upon this point much more than does the Sarvāstivāda School. Compare Ajṭhasālīni, pp. 73-78 with Abhidharmakośa, Chapter VI, Karma-nirdesā.

30. “Kicca” in Pāli Buddhism is different from “kṛtyā” which is refuted by Nāgārjuna in his Madhyamaka-śāstra, XVII, as a dravyatic (realistic) view; and similar to “vyūyāmika” kamma (actual doing) in the Sāutrāntika School for the reason that the function (kicca) or core of kamma (cetanā) involves three kinds of function i.e. vibhāga, gati, and niccaya; different from “cetanā” in the Sāutrāntika School for the reason that in Pāli Buddhism body and speech are regarded as the door of kamma (Ajṭhasālīni, p. 67).

Now we are able to know that the concept of “vījñāpti” in Pāli Buddhism is to be distinguished from that of the Sarvāstivāda School. The “vījñātti” in Pāli means to make known or intention, which can be recognized through any sign of body or speech. It is kāyika kamma, which might be identified with “vyūyāmika kamma” in the Sāutrāntika-School. The Karṇadīhiprapakaraṇa (Peking Edition, Bstan, Mdo. LVIII, 163b) says: “risol ba can gyi las ci yin she na / byed pa bohi yin mion par hdu byed pa gan yin paho // (The opponent might ask by saying, “What is the efforting action?” We will say in response: “It is thinking (cetanā), which would bring into practice the will of the person in acting”).

31. From the subjective standpoint, the substance of transmigration is taken into consideration although not as a substance-like entity (dravya). See Abhidharmakośa XXX. (T. 29. 156a). The concepts like bija or avijñāpti might be accounted for by such a suggestion.
Early Buddhist Concepts

"Tathā na anto kammassā vipāko upalabbhati tānaṃ tattva vijjati. / phalena suññan taṃ kammaṃ phalaṃ kammena vijjati, / kammaṃ ca kho upādāyo tato nibbatte phalaṃ” //

33. The paradoxical expression is made possible on the basis of the anattā doctrine, which rests upon the concept of continuum (santāna). “evam kamma-paccayā vipāko vipākapaccayā kammān ti anādikālikattā kammāvipākasantānassa pubbā koti na paññāyatai”. Paramaṭṭhamañjusā by Dhammapāla. Vol. III, p. 442 (Siamese Ed.)

35. Dhammapāla says: “kammam aitam eva kammaśamudānassa rūpassa paccayo ti”. Paramaṭṭhamañjusā, Vol. III, p. 433. In this passage we should draw our attention to the phrase, “kammaśamudānassa rūpassa14”. The time concepts, such as present, past, future, will be recognised as attributes subject to the things themselves (rūpāni), and yet kamma itself does neither determine the time, nor is it determined by it. Kamma determines the things in themselves which have resulted from the kamma-function alone, while it is itself beyond the time-level.

37. The Buddhist formula “Khinnā jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ katam karaṇiyaṃ nāparam itthattāyati” (D. Vol. I, p. 84) indicates the state of enlightenment in Pāli Buddhism. The brahmacariya in this formula means not only the ethical core but also the Buddhistic nirvāṇa transcended beyond the worldly good and evil. Hence, Buddhaghosa, commentator of this text, explains the itthattāya from two kinds of etymological meaning, such as the ablative and dative case. Both cases represent the attainment of ethical merits, which are dependent upon the not-self doctrine. See Sumarigalavilāsini, I. p. 226.
38. The fundamental indication of “avijñāpatti” is provided in the Abhidharmakosa, Chapter I, (T. 21.3a).
39. The concepts corresponding to viññāpatti in the Sarvāstivāda school are (Sammitiya School), (Mahāsaṅghika), (an unknown school), (Sāttrāntika). The conceptions of cetanā as the core of kamma are not so different with respect to the interpretation, but vary according to kāya and vāg-kamma. The concept corresponding to “avijñāpatti” is not found in the Nikāya. Hence, it will make the consideration between kamma and anattā more adequate, as has been done here. See Abhidharmaniyāyanuṣūra-śāstra by Saṅghabhadrā (T. 9. 625c).

SECTION IV


6. Ibid., p. 75.
7. Silver Jubilee of the Nadar Mahajana Sangam at Virudhanagar. The Hindu, May 29, 1956. This is quoted also in the Caste in Modern India and Other Essays (M.N. Srinivas, London, 1962, p. 41.)

SECTION V

1. According to the various kinds of the mind-elevation (cittassa unññati), mãno is divided into 10 kinds. Mahâniñdesa 1.80.
2. The words maññanâ maññitattam exactly show the etymology of mãna derived from the root man (op.cit.).
7. On asmitâ and its usage see the following passage: vibhavecchâ na càr-yasya sambhavanti vidhâdayah nà’smitâ dṛśipustvatvâ kâukryatam nàpi càsabhâma (AKBH. p. 286). Commenting on it Vasubandhu explains: satkâya-ḍrśtipustâ li mânavidhà asmunânasca. Thus, a term asmitâ, like asmimâna, does not simply connote ‘pride’, but a wrong view of the self-existence, i.e., the ‘thinking of the self in the non-self’. The latter is exactly the same as the meaning implied in the Pâli literature.
8. The Chinese terms distinguish sometimes asmimâna and ātmanâna in a way that tze men stands for asmimâna, while wu men stands for ātmanâna (MVP).
11. Ibid. p. 23.
12. Ibid. p. 23. In other words, asmimâna will give rise to a wrong view of the self, or the recognition of the self in the store-consciousness (âlayavijñâna), exciting one's own mind.
13. Papañcasûdanî 3.141. In the Buddhist sense the negation of asmi ('I am') is the denial of the equation of 'I' with pañcaskandha, not to mention the equation with brahm. 'Le bouddhisme; qui condamne la "notion: 'je suis' "(asmimâna), ne peut pas accepter qu'on dise: "Je suis le brahman". Cf. K. Bhattacharya, L'âtman-Brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien (Paris: École Française d'Extreme-Orient, 1973), p. 73.

SECTION VI
I. THE MEANING OF TRUTH IN ABHIDHARMA PHILOSOPHY: paramārtha-sat, saṃvṛti-sat, dravya-sat

The division of knowledge of truth (Satya) into three forms, paramārtha, saṃvṛti and bhāva, is one of the important subjects of discussion in all schools of Buddhism throughout the history. There is the variety of views and interpretations of these three forms of truth. The various interpretations, however, have been motivated by the two processes: the etymological evolution and the philosophical development. The Buddhist epistemology can be considered a complex of these two processes.

Paramārtha

Parama in Pāli means, according to the commentators, uttama (ultimate). The Abhidhānappadipikā-sūci defines uttama as that which has achieved its highest situation (ubhūto atyattham uttamo). Further, Dhammapāla defines parama in his Kathāvatt-thu-anuṭikā, as paṭṭhāna, meaning ‘pre-eminent’ or aviparitabhāva meaning ‘irreversibility’.

Attha in Pāli, in a general sense, signifies ‘meaning’. But in the compound paramattha it denotes not only ‘meaning’ of a word, but also it refers to svabhāva (self-existence) or viśaya (object). Attha represents in this connection things which are to be achieved by those who seek for genuine insight. Paramattha, thus, means things which are obviously intelligible to one’s own mind or truth in the absolute sense intelligible to one’s own self.

This definition of paramattha by the Theravāda commentators also is expressed by the Sarvāstivāda school, i.e., the Abhidharmadīpa reads: ‘yadidam pratyuktaṃ vastuhetupratyātpratityotpantam paramārthato vidyate pratyatmavedaniyatvāt; (the object caused by conditions can exist in view of the absolute truth, for it is to be realized by one’s own self).1

While paramattha means the absolute truth, sammuti means...
'acceptable agreement' or 'conventional truth'. Both terms, paramattha and sammuti, are used not only in Mahāyāna, but also in early Buddhism, i.e., 'buddhānaṃ pana dve kathā sammutikathā ca paramatthakathā cāti tattha sātto puggalo devabrahmā ti ādikā sammutikathā nāma, aniccaṃ dukkham anattā khandhā dhālūyo āyatanaṁ satipaṭṭhānā sammappadhānā ti ādikā paramatthakathā nāma.'2 Paramattha represents a Buddhist doctrine such as āyataṇa, dhātuyo and the like, all of which are intelligible to one's own self. In this connection paramattha is defined as follows: 'paramatthavacanam saccaṃ dhammānaṃ tathā lakkhaṇaṃ ti.'3 On the other hand, sammuti is defined as follows: 'sahāketavanam saccaṃ lokasammutikāraṇam'.4

Paramattha is a true nature of things (dhammānaṃ bhūta-lakkhaṇaṃ), which are considered existing, but not empty. The realization of a true nature anticipates the existence of things (svabhāva), which can not be denied.

In contrast, Mahāyāna does not permit any thing to exist in its nature. Hence Paramārtha is a true nature of things, which really does not exist. In view of paramārtha, as Mahāyāna teaches, nothing exists, all things are devoid of self-nature such as āyatana, dhātu and the like. A Mahāyāna text, the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, explains: 'sarvaṃ vidyate saṃvṛtyaṃ paramārthe na vidyate, dhammānaṃ nihsvabhāvatvam paramārthe'pi dṛṣyate, upalabdhi-nihsvabhāve saṃvṛtistena ucyate.' In view of the conventional truth all things exist, but in view of the absolute truth nothing exists; in absolute truth one realizes that all things are devoid of self-nature; there is, however, the conventional truth where there is no mental fancy.5

According to Mahāyāna Buddhism, both paramārtha and saṃvṛti are diametrically opposed to each other. Paramārtha is śunyatā (emptiness), while saṃvṛti is like an illusion or an echo. Paramārtha can be realized only by those who can transcend the distinction of subject and object or the knower and the known.6 Therefore, a true nature of things such as dhātu, āyatana is considered śunyatā (emptiness). Both paramārtha and saṃvṛti have no common ground with each other. Both are entirely opposed to each other. This is also true of the Sautrāntika school. According to this school, paramārtha and saṃvṛti refer to the entirely different knowledges. The former refers to anāśravajñāna (wisdom of non-defilement) or prṣṭhaladbhajñāna (prominent wisdom
attained by Enlightenment), while the latter means the discriminative knowledge distinguished from wisdom.

Thus, both the concepts, *paramārtha* and *sāṃvṛti*, are used in Mahāyāna as well as Abhidharma (Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools in this context). But the approaches to these concepts are not similar. Mahāyāna approaches to them from the point of view of śūnyatā, anticipating no existence of things (*svabhāva*), while Abhidharma approaches to them from the point of view of *svabhāva* or the permanent existence of things.

**Sammuti**

The Pāli term *sammuti* is used in contrast to *paramattha*, meaning thereby ‘the conventional’. Further, it is derived from *sam-man*, meaning ‘to think together’ or ‘to think rightly’. A compound *sammutisacca* is not used in Older Pāli, as Edgerton suggests in his *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*.

The Pāli root *man* phonetically transfers into *mur*, i.e., ‘diṭṭham sutam mutam’ (*Suttanipāta* 887). *Mutam* is obviously derived from the root *man*.

It is not unnatural to think that the etymological meaning of *sam-man* (‘to think together’) implies the mutual communication between man and man or the mutual relatedness. Therefrom is derived the variety of applied meanings: ‘consent’, ‘general opinion’, ‘a mere name’, ‘fixing’, ‘statement’, ‘declaration’ and ‘convention’.7

Thus, *sammuti* (the conventional) is found in such early texts as *Suttanipāta* and *Milindapañha* and the like used in contrast to *vidvā* (the wise man) and *paramattha* (the absolute).8

Further, *sammuti* stands for a Sanskrit term *sāṃvṛti*. Suffice it to show a few examples of this. A verse in the Pāli text *Suttanipāta* is found sanskritized in the Sanskrit text *Bodhisattvabhūmi*:

‘ya kāc’imā sammutiyā puthujjā, sabbā va elā na upeti vidvā, anupāyo so upayaṁ kim eyya diṭṭhe sute khantim akubbamāno.’

(SN. 897)

‘yāh kāścana samvṛtayo hi loke sarva hi tā munir nopaithi anupago hy asau kenopādādita drṣṭa-ṣrute kāntim asamprakur- van. (Bodhisattvabhūmi,’ P. 48-49)

We have also another example:

‘yathā hi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti’
evam khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti'. (S. i. p. 135)
(ji ltar yan lag tsogs rnams la|hrten nas shiṅ rtar brjod pa ltar/ de bṣīn phuṅ po rnams brten nas[kun rdsoḥ sems can śes byaho/ Candrakirti, Madhyamakāvatāra. p. 258. Bibliotheca Buddhica, IX.)

A Tibetan terms kun rdsoḥ always corresponds to a Sanskrit term samvyṭī. There is, thus, no ambiguity for the correspondence between samnuti and samvyṭī.

It is customary to assume that in the Buddhist Sanskritization of the Pāli, some of the phonological changes appear as follows: m and u change to v and r respectively. For example, a Vedic Sanskrit śramana becomes śravana, while muddha in Pāli changes to mrddha, puthujana to prthajjana and the like. The Vedic Sanskrit is much closer to the Pāli than the Buddhist Sanskrit. Thus, sammuti has been sanskritized to samvyṭī.

It is, however, worth noting that this Sanskritization caused a great change of meaning, for a Sanskrit term samvyṭī, derived from the root sam-vṛ, indicates ‘covering’ or ‘hiding’ quite different from the original meaning of sammuti (statement or convention). The Pāli root sam-man is disregarded and replaced by the Sanskrit root saṃ-vṛ, meaning ‘to cover’ or ‘to hide’. It may be noted in passing that samvyṭī (spelled with two ts) is a misreading for saṃvyṭī, as Böhtlingk and Macdonell reported. (Böhtlingk, Sanskrit Wörterbuch; Macdonell, Sanskrit Dictionary.) Hence it would be unfair for some scholars to follow this misreading in an attempt to distinguish samvyṭī from saṃvyṭī in its connotation.

But Abhidharma, both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools, did not take care of this etymological meaning of samvyṭī, instead, took up the philosophy of samvyṭī, confining thereby its significance merely to ‘the conventional’ in contrast to paramārtha (the absolute). According to the Sarvāstivāda school, Substance consists of such elements as rūpa (material), vedanā (feeling), saṃjñā (notion), saṃskāra (mental activities) and vijnāna (consciousness). If Substance is analyzed into an inter-play of these five elements or impersonal forces, the notion of Substance disappears. Then, Substance is called Conventional Existence (saṃvyṭī), as is stated in the Abhidharmakośa:

“If Substance is analyzed by discriminative knowledge, then the very notion of Substance disappears. Substance is termed Conventional Existence”

Commenting on this passage, Yaśomitra says:

"Conventional Truth (saṃvṛti-sātya) is that which is grasped by the daily activities of this world or by discriminative knowledge, defiled or non-defiled."

From this passage it is clear that saṃvṛti-sātya refers to daily activities (saṃvyavahāra), which implies the original meaning of the Pāli term sānñātī (the conventional).

Moreover, Yaśomitra, drawing no attention to the meaning of the root sān-vr, extends its literal meaning further to his own philosophy, classifying it into two-categories.

1. Saṃvṛtyantara-vyāpāśrayā (Conventional Truth based upon another Conventional Truth). All realities have their separate existence as differentiated from others, presuming this differentiation from others (bheda). Every existing thing exists by and through the denial of the others. It means that all realities can exist only in relation to others. Thus, existence is relative (anyāpoha).

2. Dravyantara-vyāpāśrayā (Conventional Truth based on another Reality). When a dravya, according to the Sarvāstivādin, originates without leaving its own nature, it is called a self-existence (svalakṣanāsat). Dravya is permanent, remaining unchanged in both the conditions, viz., origination and decay. It is neither created nor destroyed, being eternal and changeless. The essential nature of dravya remains unchanged among its various modes. But dravya’s existence is possible only through the denial of the others, as is the case with saṃvṛtyantara-vyāpāśrayā.

Thus, saṃvṛti is that which is always in relation to other things, interrelated and co-related.

Epistemologically speaking, saṃvṛti means ‘to understand simply the general character of things’ while paramārtha means ‘to understand the special character of things’. Both the concepts, saṃvṛti and paramārtha, are the two aspects of the one and the same object differently viewed. We can find herein a slightly different aspect from Mahāyāna, in which paramārtha can be realized only through the complete denial of saṃvṛti. In Abhidharma, as the definition of both these concepts, as represented above, is given from a positive point of view, which is based upon the positive or affirmative point of view of epistemology of the Sarvāstivādin. In other words, the Sarvāstivāda school interprets saṃvṛti and paramārtha as a parallel form of existence to dravya.
Sammuti and Paññatti

All the contents of sammuti are involved in, and expounded by, a term paññatti in the Theravāda school. That is, the meanings such as ‘consent’, ‘general opinion’, ‘a mere name’, ‘fixing’, ‘statement’ and ‘conventional’ can be easily derived from the original meaning of paññatti (indication). A Pāli paññatti is usually equal to a Sanskrit praṇāpti and noted only in Mahāvyutpatti as praṇāpti (Edgerton, BHS, p. 359).13

The Puggalapaññatti-Atthakathā represents a comprehensive definition of paññatti. According to this Atthakathā, term paññatti means ‘to tell’ (ācikkhāti), ‘to explain’ (deseti), ‘to make known’ (paññāpeti) and ‘to establish’ (paṭṭhāpeti). The relative assumes always a limited form or a form of limitation. Even the absolute takes a limited form, for the absolute cannot manifest itself as a whole. The absolute reveals itself by and through limited things. It can be said that paññatti is the self-limitation of the absolute.

Nibbāna, asankhata, kusala-okusala dhamma, all these things are thought to arise and exist in reality, being established from the viewpoint of paramattha (the absolute truth). As all of them assume a form of existence (vijjamāna) or a form of limitation, they are also called paññatti (indication). This is implied in a terminology vijjamānapaññatti (indication of existence).

On the other hand, the relative represents the things which are considered as existents from the viewpoint of conventional usage (lokaniruttī), but not in reality. These things are relative and transitory. They assume a form of limitation also. They reveal themselves as the relative. The relative is a form of manifestation or indication (paññatti).

Both the things, absolute and relative, are thus involved in paññatti. Paññatti in the Theravāda school refers to the absolute as well as the relative. In the relationship of paññatti and paramattha one is not distinguished from the other; the former includes the latter. In the Theravāda school a term paññatti, as indicated above, has broader sense than sammuti, which is used only in contrast to paramattha.

In contrast, praṇāpti in Mahāyāna refers to the mundane world or the relative. In Mahāyāna there are sharp distinctions between both the absolute and the relative. There is no intermediate stage
between prajñāpti and paramārtha at all. The absolute (paramārtha) reveals itself in the relative (prajñāpti), while the relative represents the skillful means (upāyakāusalya) by which one can arrive at the absolute reality. Prajñāpti is termed upādāya prajñāpti (the relative indication), which is synonymous to samvṛti (the conventional).

The reason why the Theravāda school has given to paññatti a broader sense than sammūti, including thus paramattha is based upon the Abhidharmic realism. They attempt to designate everything existing, material and immaterial, real and ideal, objectively from an epistemological standpoint. For this reason also, the Theravāda school does not give any sharp distinction between the absolute and the relative.

Bhāva

According to the Sarvāstivādin, bhāva (being) is classified into the two: dravyasat (substance) and prajñāpti-sat (indication).

Bhāva denotes that which becomes objectified on the one hand, and produces perception on the other. Dravyasat means a self-existent thing producing perception, i.e., rūpa, vedanā etc. Prajñāpti-sat is defined as a provisional existence producing perception.

The existence is termed dravyasat in view of paramārtha (the absolute truth) and prajñāpti in view of samvṛti (the conventional). The following table will show the scheme:

| Bhāva | dravyasat...paramārtha-satya | prajñāpti-sat...samvṛti-satya |

Bhāva, as stated above, means at first a thing which becomes objectified. Therefrom is derived the realistic attitude toward the being. That is, the Sarvāstivāda school is based upon the realistic viewpoint, believing the separate and independent existence of the objective world. On the other hand, bhāva denotes a things producing perception (buddhi). Therefrom is derived the subjective attitude toward the being. That is, the objectified, abstract world cannot describe truth as it exists by itself apart from us. Instead, the objective world will be recognized as partially imposed by man's buddhi (perception) and not just passively mirrored within it.

Thus, bhāva is the basis upon which dravya and prajñāpti are
based. In other words, when *bhāva* is revealed to the conventional, impermanent, it is called Conventional Truth (*saṃvytisatya*); when *bhāva* is revealed to the absolute, permanent, it is called the Absolute Truth (*paramārthasatya*); when *bhāva* is revealed to the essential, substantial, it is called Substance (*dravyasat*). *Bhāva* as such is neither the absolute nor the conventional, but a synthesis which is different from both, embracing them in its fold. Both *dravya* and *prajñapti* or *paramārtha* and *saṃvyrti*, are not different from *bhāva* as such. Both of them are in the form of *bhāva* or rather perhaps *bhāva* is in the form of them. This existence is *bhāva*.

Both *paramārtha* and *saṃvyrti* are not opposed to each other in an exclusive manner, but embraced in the form of *bhāva*.

According to Mahāyāna, however, *paramārtha* is absolutely different from *prajñapti*, *prajñapti* different from *paramārtha*, having nothing underlying them to bind them together.

As the Sarvāstivāda is based upon the epistemological viewpoint, it attempts to define everything existing, real and ideal, in an objective manner, as does the Theravāda school. Therefore, the Sarvāstivāda school defines *bhāva* as a basis upon which the three-aspects are based. The three aspects, *paramārtha*, *saṃvyrti* and *dravya*, are the different manifestations of *bhāva*, which is considered as a reality, objectified and producing perception. *Bhāva* is a reality objectified and partially imposed by us. Yaśomitra describes these three aspects as the three types of *sat* (existence). In the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, Yaśomitra comments:

"trividhāṁ hi yogācārānāṁ sat. paramārtha saṃvyrti-sat
dravyasac ca dravyataḥ svalakṣaṇataḥ sad dravyasad iti."  

(For the Yogācāra there are three kinds of existence; the absolute, the conventional and the substance. Substance means that which exists in view of substance and its own essential nature.)

**Saṃvyrti and its Evolution**

In view of the historical development of Buddhism, however, subsequent philosophical evolutions were inevitable. The seeds of unrest sown at an earlier Abhidharma period were to grow and blossom in more abundance at a later Mahāyāna period, bearing fruit which Mahāyāna Buddhism was to reap. Mahāyāna represents effective attempts to return to the thought of Early Buddhism.
There is, however, many an instance, in which a Mahāyānist interpretation is derived from the wrong Sanskritization of a Pāli word or the intentional amendment of the original meaning. It means that the Mahāyāna philosophy had been accompanied by the linguistic amendment and it is such a combination that spells out the Mahāyāna period in philosophy’s search for new direction and purpose.

This type of linguistic and philosophical amendments and upheavals marks out also a new interpretation of *sāṃvṛti* in the search for the Mahāyānist thought.

When a Pāli *sammuti* is sanskritized as *sāṃvṛti*, it has lost its etymological meaning, for the former is derived from the root *sam-*man (‘to think together’), while the latter is derived from the different root *sam-*vṛ (‘to cover up’).

The interpretations based upon the root *sam-vṛ* can be found in the various Mahāyāna texts, e.g., Candrakīrti defines *sāṃvṛti* as ‘Samantādvaraṇam sāṃvṛtih’, meaning ‘completely covering’.18 Haribhadra comments on *sāṃvṛti*: ‘...yāyā buddhyā tattvaṃ sāṃvṛyate yasyām vā buddhau sā tādṛśi loka-pratitiḥ sāṃvṛtir iṣṭā.’19 *Sāṃvṛti* denotes, as Haribhadra comments, the discriminative knowledge (buddhi), by which truth (tattva) is covered up (*sāṃvṛyate*).

This etymological interpretation is included in the Candrakīrti definition of *sāṃvṛti*, which has the following three aspects:

1. *Avacchādana* (covering).


3. *Lokavyavahāra* (daily activities) or *saṃketa* (agreement).20

The meaning of *sāṃvṛti* is given with a term *avacchādana* (covering) similar to *samantādvaraṇam* (completely covering), which he designated before.

Further, the second aspect of *sāṃvṛti*, namely, *anyonyasamāśraya* (mutual relationship), is implicitly maintained in the sense of a Pāli term *sammuti*, meaning ‘to consent’. It is explicitly derived from the fundamental thought of the Madhyamaka school, which identifies *sāṃvṛti* with the things dependently originated (*pratityasamutpannam vasturūpam*).21 *Sāṃvṛti* is subject to cause and condition, for a self-existent thing cannot have origin and decay. In other words, a thing which is caused and conditioned is *sāṃvṛta* (covered up) or phenomenal.

According to Nāgārjuna as well as Śāntideva, the concepts in
common usage, e.g., skandha, atman, loka, etc., are dependently originated. There is nothing self-existent; a thing can exist only in relation to others. Therefore, the existence of dhatus and aytanatas is conventional and not real. Thus, the mutual relationship characteristic of samvrti is the fundamental basis for sunyatä. This idea stands, however, in contrast to the Hinayânist conception that the existence of dhatus and aytanatas is established in reality.

This aspect of anyonyasamâsraya (mutual relationship), therefore, indicates a Mahâyânist interpretation of a Pâli sammuti (‘to consent’) with modification or variation.

The third aspect of anyonya, namely, lokavyavahâra or samketa is exactly the same as the meaning of a Pâli sammuti, which means ‘statement’ and ‘acceptable agreement’.

A term vyavahâra compounded with loka clearly represents ‘speech’ or ‘statement’, as is shown below:

A Pâli lokiya-vohâro (general way of speech, Suttanipãta-Âtiha-kathâ, p. 382=a Sanskrit lokavyavahâra; ariya-vohâro (proper mode of speech). D.III. 232, etc.= ārya-vyavahâro; vyavahâra in all the following compounds means ‘speech’; aṣtau vyavahâra-pada-caritâni. Bodhisattvabhûmi, 389, 13; saḍ vyavahâra-pada-caritâni. ibid., 19ff; samvrti-vyavahâra. Sukhavativyûha, 42, II, etc.

It is also rendered by the Chinese-i-shao (speech), which will be discussed later on in detail.

It would be interesting, especially in view of the Sanskritization of Pâli, to investigate the relationship between vohâra and vyavahâra before studying the philosophical evolution in later Buddhism.

A Pâli term vohâra means 1. speech and 2. business or daily activities. If it is sanskritized by vydhâra, it indicates merely ‘speech’. If it is sanskritized by vyavahâra, as shown in a compound lokavyavahâra, then, it represents only ‘daily activities’. Both the concepts, vyâhâra and vyavahâra, have no common ground to bind them together.

Nevertheless, vyavahâra in all the Buddhist Sanskrit texts enumerated above denotes not ‘daily activities’, but ‘speech’. If it could mean ‘speech’, it should have been vyâhâra, but not vyavahâra. If so, vyavahâra would be a wrong sanskritization of vohâra. The same type of sanskritization can be found also in a Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit vyavasthâna equivalent to a Pâli votthapana, which is rightly sanskritized by vyâsthâna.
From the philosophical point of view also the narrow issue of this concept vyavahāra as ‘speech’ is less adequate. Instead, there are some broader issues involved in this concept. That is, the Mahāyānists held that Buddha has two types of teaching, absolute (paramārtha) and conventional (saṃvṛti), and that all what he preached about pratītyasaṃsārupāda and āryasatyas were conventional, although they were considered absolute by the Hīnayānists. The Mahāyānist absolute truth, namely, āryasatyas and pratītyasaṃsārupāda, are by reasons appreciated by the Mahāyānists as the method of analysis of all things existing, resulting in the cardinal tenet sūnyatā (non-existence). The Mahāyānists, particularly the Mādhyamikas, extended the conception of sūnyatā to such concepts as Tathāgata, Nirvāṇa and Ākāśa. Not only the Mādhyamikas, but also the Viṭānavādins held the view that there was a discrepancy between saṃvṛti and paramārtha diametrically opposed, e.g., ‘saṃvṛtih paramārthas ca ıṣṭitaṃ nāstihetukam, kalptam saṃvṛtir hyuktā tacchedi āryagocaram’ (There are the conventional and the absolute truths, but by no means the third truth; the conventional means the inferred; cutting it out one enters into the sublime sphere).22

Thus, both the truths, saṃvṛti and paramārtha, are indicated as having radically differed. Therefore, vyavahāra equalized to saṃvṛti cannot be confined only to ‘speech’; instead, it should denote all the existing things in the world in contrast to the absolute truth.

This basic position of the Mahāyāna thought has received adequate recognition by traditional exegetists. For example, Sthiramati has noticed the three of the broader issues involved in this concept of saṃvṛti. The Madhyāntavibhāgaśīkā23 refers to the three. They are:

1. Prajñāptisaṃvṛti (the conventional truth as indication). Referring to prajñāpti Sthiramati comments as follows: ‘saṃvṛtirvyavahāraḥ, prajñāpti ity abhidhānam. arthābhāve’ bhidhānanātena vyavahāraḥ prajñāptisaṃvṛthiḥ.’ (The conventional represents ‘daily activities’[vyavahāra]. The indication means ‘a mere name’. If there is only a name without any object at all, then, vyavahāra denotes the conventional truth as indication.)

2. Pratīpattisaṃvṛti (the conventional truth as admission). Further, he says, ‘avidyamāne’rthe’rthābhinitvesaḥ pratīpattisāya vyavahāraḥ pratīpattisaṃvṛti.’ (The adherence to the object not
existing means 'admission'; Its vyavahāra (daily activities) is termed the conventional truth as admission.)

3. Udbhāvanāsamanvṛti (the conventional as manifestation). The Tīkā runs, 'tathatādiśabdair nirabhilāpyasya dharmadhātoryā sam-

sūcanā sodbhāvanā. tayā dharmadhātor vyavahāra udbhāvanāsaman-

vṛtih.' (The manifestation is to express the inexpressible realm of ideas in such a technical term as 'suchness' and so forth; the daily activities or common usage (vyavahāra) is termed the conventional truth as manifestation.)

All of these three meanings of samvyrti do not represent merely 'speech'. But they are no other than the contents of a Pāli sammuti which is defined as 'permission', 'a mere name', 'communication' and the like. All of the contents of a Sanskrit samvyrti and its exegetical explanation are clearly involved in a Pāli sammuti. The following table will show the correspondence between sammuti and its Mahāyānist exegesis.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The three meanings of samvyrti</th>
<th>The aspects of a Sanskrit samvyrti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A mere name</td>
<td>praṇāpatti (indication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Permission, acceptable</td>
<td>pratipatti (admission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Communication</td>
<td>udbhāvanā (manifestation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the three aspects of a Sanskrit samvyrti are eschewed from all the etymological and philosophical implications of sammuti in Pāli.

Further, 'speech' (abhidhāna), as Sthiramati mentioned above, indicates not the whole content of vyavahāra, but a part of it. Moreover, Sthiramati designates vyavahāra in his Tīkā as samvyrti, which has a broader sense than 'speech'.

Even more important is the fact that vyavahāra is different from vyāhāra (speech). That is, it is vyāhāra but not vyavahāra that means 'speech'. In this context, it is worth noting that both vyavahāra (daily activities) and vohāra (speech) are involved in a Pāli concept of vohāra. The former meaning is found in the Pāli Nikāyas (M. II. 300; S. 614, etc.) and the latter is found also in Pāli (D. III. 232; Vin. IV. 2; Vbh. 376, 387; A. II. 246; IV. 307; Paramatthajotikā, 382, etc.)

In view of this etymological parallelism with the Sanskrit, there
will appear the following alternative as mentioned before. If vyavahāra means simply ‘speech’, as the Chinese rendered, it seems to be a wrong sanskritization of a Pāli vohāra, which is rightly to be sanskritized into vyāhāra. If vyavahāra represents ‘daily activities’ or ‘performance’, it does not mean ‘speech’. In the latter case it indicates merely one of the two meanings involved in the concept vohāra in Pāli.

From the linguistic and philosophical point of view, however, there would be no ambiguity for the fact that Sthiramati designates vyavahāra not as ‘speech’, but as ‘daily activities’, ‘performance’ or ‘business’ which is no other than one of the meanings of the Pāli vohāra.

It may be remarked in passing that the Sthiramati’s conception of śaṃvyāti identifies itself with the Sarvāstivāda view, e.g., Yaśomitra defines śaṃvyāti in his Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (p. 520): ‘saṃvyāti-sad iti samvyavahāreṇa sat’ (the conventional means the being (truth) of daily performance.). The term saṃvyavahāra stands for the Pāli samvohāra, meaning ‘business’ or ‘traffic’ (A. II. 187; S.I. 78; A. III. 77; SnA. 471; Vin. III. 239, etc.), which clearly represents one of the two meanings of vohāra. There is, therefore, no doubt that vyavahāra does not mean ‘speech’. Such a conclusion obviously carries with it the suspicion that the Chinese translator had no clear conception as to the distinction between vyāhāra and vyavahāra.

From what has been discussed above regarding the term saṃvyāti and its evolution it will not be difficult to understand the significance of the traditional Buddhist exegesis, which is two-fold: one is due to conservation and the other due to evolution. While the conservative element shows the original meaning of the term common to both Abhidharma and Mahāyāna, evolutions correspond to the peculiar elements of thought developed in the Mahāyāna Buddhism, and thus help us in determining the mutual relationship between Abhidharma and Mahāyāna to a greater degree than pure conservations and evolutions.\(^\text{25}\)

Concluding Remarks

Historically speaking, the Buddhist conception of truths (sat, satya) assumes the following three aspects:

First, in Early Buddhism the absolute truth refers only to the Buddha and his teachings, while the conventional truth refers to
the daily activities such as human life, common usage of term, custom and so forth.

Second, in Abhidharma it is emphatically asserted that all existing things should be viewed as real (svabhāva); things are considered as having their own natures. According to the Abhidharma a real existence has its own nature (sva lakṣaṇena sat), and it becomes the object of pratyakṣa (visible perception). In contrast, the common appearance (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) is merely a by-product of the discriminative knowledge or a constructed object (saṁapaya-saṁy建军 rm), being an object of inference (anumāna). With this basis the concept of truth has come to include the three: bhāva, paramārtha and saṃvṛti. Bhāva denotes a thing producing perception (buddhi). Both paramārtha and saṃvṛti are in the form of bhāva differently revealed. All things conceivable, ideal and real, live in the bosom of bhāva; they are not different from bhāva (existence) as such.

Third, in Mahāyāna the idea of bhāva has been denied; it cannot be viewed as real in any sense; nor can it be considered as having its own nature. Thus, only the two aspects, paramārtha and saṃvṛti, have become the basic point of view of the philosophy.

Moreover, these terms, going far beyond the epistemological approach, are applied to the religious experience, in which spiritual progress takes place, as implied by the expression śūnyatā (nothingness). Thus, śūnyatā is identified with paramārtha (the absolute) radically differed from saṃvṛti (the conventional).

II. THE THREE MODES OF KNOWLEDGE

jñāna, prajñā, prajñāpāramitā

Generally speaking, knowledge refers to the analysis of an object, and such knowledge we can call objective knowledge. This type of knowledge can be accumulated. It cannot, however, be termed Buddhist knowledge as far as it concerns objective analysis.

Even in our daily life we sometimes make a distinction between scientific knowledge and religious knowledge (wisdom). If one possesses scientific knowledge, it does not mean that he has wisdom. We are aware of our respect for wisdom more than for
objective, scientific knowledge. Buddhism prefers wisdom based on religious intuition more than accumulated scientific knowledge. Wisdom in the Buddhist sense is divided into two concepts: transcendental knowledge (ñana) and the knowledge-to-exercised pañña. The study of these two concepts is an intricate and intriguing problem in the history of Buddhism. Almost all scholars today use these terms in the same meaning as intuition or insight, etc. According to their views, both concepts denote mysterious faculties, just as intuition is a transcendental knowledge. Without understanding the slightly different meaning of these concepts, however, the interpretation of intuition will easily give birth to confusion among their views.

It appears, therefore, that the key to understanding the true meaning of intuition is to define these concepts in their historically different periods and theoretically varied meaning. In the history of Buddhist thought the following periods can be taken into consideration: The Early (Nikāya) Buddhism (ca. 431-271 B.C.), Abhidharma (ca. 271 B.C.-1 A.D.) and the Early Mahāyāna Buddhism (ca. 100 A.D.).

By taking particularly the development of the Abhidharma theories into consideration, we shall find a more deeply underlying relation between the two concepts. Concerning the importance of the Abhidharmic background, somewhat neglected in the research field, with respect to the Buddhist intuition, little need be said here.

The Early Buddhism

Nāna and Paññā are not distinctively differentiated from each other. Nāna means just knowledge “in either a next to hand or a lofty sense.” On the other hand, paññā, as Mrs. Rhys Davids pointed out, is not a mere intellectual “convulsion” of thought. It represents, “coming-to-know” and “coming-to-be”. Paññā is not a dialectic or desultory referie, but an exercise of thought on matter of practice. The Rhys Davids’s distinction between both concepts appears rather to rest upon the Abhidharmic interpretation than upon the Nikāya view. The distinction is not really found in the Nikāyas. However, her detailed investigation of paññā is suggestive enough to lead to further development of Abhidharma study. Paññā is not mere insight or intuition, but conduct accompanied by insight; it is a term of practical import.
Based upon the implication of *paññā* in the Nikāya we shall especially examine the Abhidharma interpretation in connection with the Nikāya.

**The Abhidharma Philosophy**

In this Abhidharma period we may find a multi-polar distinction between *ñīnā* and *paññā*. Here I would like to confine my discussion of the schools to only two as follows.

**The Theravāda School**

Both concepts, *paññā* and *ñīnā*, are derived from the same root *jñā*, 'to know'. The prefix *pa* indicates ‘forward’, ‘forth’, ‘fore’, and it is a dynamic particle. This particle implies in itself the dynamic practicality. In relation to *viññāna* (consciousness) Rhys Davids refers to this dynamic connotation by saying it means ‘coming-to-be’.

In early Buddhism, however, this distinction was not so clear, as sometimes both terms were used as synonymous. Such lack of clarity stimulated the Abhidharma schools to give specific definitions to these terms.

The dynamic implication of *paññā* can evidently be found in the Mahāvedalla Sutta (M.43), where *paññā* is considered as the knowledge to be practised (*bhāvetabbā*). *Paññā* does not merely mean the final goal to be reached.

This implication came to be clarified in the Abhidharma period. In Pāli Abhidharma, *paññā* came to mean the subject’s knowing (*pañjīna*). In contrast, *ñīna* came to mean the object to be known (*ñīta*). Thus, *ñīna* is the object, while *paññā* belongs to the subject. The endeavour to obtain *ñīna* presupposes *paññā*. In other words, *paññā* has a broader sense than *ñīna*. This latter understanding will become clearer in the Sarvāstivāda school.

In the Pāli text, Atthasālīni (ca. the fifth cent. A.D.) designates *ñīna* as product or result, and *paññā* as the way to gain a product. The Atthasālīni, 3.29; 3.30, discusses the problem of the wholesome (*kusala*), referring to both *ñīna* and *paññā*. This passage discusses at first about three meanings of *kusala*. According to this passage the wholesome (*kusala*) has three meanings: the non-ill (*ārogya*), non-sinful (*nāvajja*) and the skilfully completed (*kosallasambhūta*).

*Nāṇa* is called the wholesome because it includes all three mean-
Abhidharmic Concepts

ings, while Pañña is also called the wholesome because it means 'the skilfully completed'. This term denotes the way to the final goal or the result to be attained. On the other hand, non-ill and non-sinful, are merely attributes of ñāna to be attained by means of one's own practice. When the way is 'skilfully completed', then, these attributes spontaneously will arise. They are the products of the practical way.

In terms of the practicality of Pañña we have another passage in the same text: "paññā is the superior, fundamental and foregoer." (Asl., 3.44.). Practice denotes a forward movement, which is expressed in its synonymous use with pajāñana '(to know)'. This distinction between the static and dynamic becomes more lucid during the commentarial period.

According to the commentary on Vibhaṅga, Sammohavinodani, pañña operates by virtue of function (kicca) and object (ārammaṇa) while ñāna has for its object dhamma. It means that in order to operate pañña must first have action on the subjective side and the object on the objective side. With the object alone, pañña cannot work at all as it requires action (kicca) on the subjective side. Ñāna consists in the object to be known and practised by pañña. Thus, ñāna is considered as the static product and ideal to be obtained, while pañña is subjective, dynamic and functional.

The commentator Buddhaghosa is aware of this distinction as he compared pañña with sañña (notion) and viññāna (consciousness). In his view, sañña refers to the perception of a colourful object, while viññāna means the perception of a multitude of appearances. These two terms concern the analytical perception of the object. On the other hand, pañña means to distinctively know (pajāñana) the [religious significance] of the object. Buddhaghosa explained also in the Atthaśālinī in the following manner:

Pañña has two meanings: to make known or to indicate (paññāpana) and to know the object from the viewpoint of impermanency, suffering and non-ego.

Referring to this explanation, Buddhaghosa gave further two etymological interpretations of pañña: paññaṇamaṇa (to make known) and pakārena jānāti (to know from the viewpoint of impermanency, suffering and non-ego). These two types of meanings are related to each other and refer to the same fact, namely, that by virtue of pañña the nature of existing things will be made clearly
known. This understanding of *pañña* as practicality, verified for us by the etymological significance of the term, may be regarded as the philosophical principle underlying the essence of human existence.

The essence of human existence also will be clearly made known by virtue of *pañña* as it is exemplified in one of the Pāli treatises, *i.e.*, Puggalapaññatti. The title of this treatise literally represents 'the indication of types of human existence'. However, indication (*paññatti*) is etymologically derived from the root *jñā* (to know) and *paññatti* means 'to make known' or 'to indicate' (*ñāpana*). This explanation exactly corresponds to the etymological significance of *pañña* as pointed out above. This treatise analyses in fact the variety of types of human existences from the religious standpoint in compliance with their state of meditation. It is really the indication of different types of people in accordance with their stage of spiritual knowledge of *pañña*. Indication (*paññatti*) concerns the different religious practices or experiences. Thus, the Pāli treatise Puggalapaññatti may be regarded as the indication of different types of human existence based upon their own spiritual knowledge to be exercised. This basic notion has already been referred to since the time of Early Buddhism, in which *pañña* implied the functional knowledge to be exercised. This title of Puggalapaññatti is doubtless viewed in the way of early Buddhist time, depending upon the degree of spiritual development of the practitioners.

So far as *paññatti* refers to 'making known one's own character to others', Puggalapaññatti represents itself the treatise in which persons are variegated and classified in compliance with their own nature of making themselves known to others. Hence, the criterion of classification in this text is nothing but *pañña* itself.

This notion of *pañña* further brings up another question of the relationship between *pañña* and *ñāṇa*. In terms of spiritual exercise, the important thing is not merely the ideal or result, but rather the way to approach the ideal. In this respect, *ñāṇa* designated as only a static consequence, will be of significance only when it is considered in relation to the functional *pañña*. The ideal must be achieved by the practical: *ñāṇa* must be achieved by *pañña*. *Ñāṇa* is assimilated in *pañña*. In this context, Buddhaghosa refers to the assimilation of *ñāṇa* by *pañña* in the Visuddhi-magga. He gave *pañña* three categories: basis (*bhūmi*), faculty
(indriya) and essence (śāra). Nāṇa is here subject to the category of essence. The ideal, namely nāṇa, is included in the practical knowledge (paññā) or the knowledge to be exercised. Whether the achievement of the ideal is realized or not rests on the ability of the practitioner. Nāṇa can be obtained only by paññā which is to be cultivated by human beings.

This distinction between the two concepts is also found in the Visuddhimagga, which is systematized on the basis of this distinction. Referring to the practice of nāṇa the Visuddhimagga analyses nāṇa into the following three classifications: stage of consciousness (bhūmi), basis (mūla) and actual (sarira). These three are considered fundamental conditions for the practice of paññā.

1. Stage of consciousness (bhūmi) includes khandha, āyatana, dhātu, indriya, sacca, patīccasamuppāda, etc. All these concepts denote the fundamental theories of Buddhism concerning human beings, truth, dependent origination respectively. A commentator Dhammapāla, commenting on the term ‘bhūmi’, refers to these different types of theories, which are practised in conformity with the different stages of consciousness, i.e., the theory of khandha (the five aggregates) is the practice for those people ignorant of human existence (rupa), that of āyatana (sphere) for those people ignorant of material (ruparūpa) and that of dhātu (realm) for those ignorant of both the human existence and the material. In this manner the stage of consciousness depends upon the different types of human beings.6 This state is explained by Dhammapāla as a functional stage (pavattitthāna).7 It is not a static object, but a dynamic process of human consciousness to be cultivated. This functional stage represents the nature of paññā as described above. Therefore, this stage means one of the three aspects of paññā.

2. Basis (mūla) means a fundamental ground upon which nibbāna will be attained. Both Dhammapāla and Buddhaghosa gave it a synonym patīttthāna, meaning a fundamental basis (Dhammapāla, Prarammatthaamañjusā. III. p. 19). Basis includes precept (sīla) and mind (citta). It means that both precept and mind or concentration are the fundamental elements for the practice of paññā. In other words, paññā is considered as one of the three fundamentals to be practised for the attainment of the final goal, namely, the enlightenment.

3. Actual (sarira) means the quality which anything possesses of having realized possibilities. The dynamic process of conscious-
ness (pañña) is used in reference to a state of possibility rather than actuality (sarira). In the Visuddhimagga, therefore, actual (sarira) includes the five kinds of nāṇa. The five are:

(a) Beauty of right theory (dīṭṭhivisuddhi).
(b) Complete purification in consequence of the removal of doubt (kankhāvitaranavisuddhi).
(c) Actual knowledge concerning the right and the wrong road (maggāmaggañāṇāṇadassana).
(d) Actual knowledge of the practice (paṭipadāñāṇāṇadassanavisuddhi).
(e) Actual knowledge (nāṇadassanavisuddhi).

It is noticeable that the term sarira, denoting nāṇa, is used as a consequence or a product of the practical knowledge (pañña). Nāṇa is a quality, to which no temporal, possible position can be assigned. It is the absolute goal to be attained by practical knowledge.

This nāṇa as a consequence is, according to Dhammapāla, termed 'quality' (āvayava) or 'multitude' (samudāya), while pañña (the practical knowledge) is designated as a practice to be cultivated (paribrūhetabba) or as a practice continuously functioned (santānavasena pavattamāna). 8

Regarding this distinction we have another definition in the commentaries. The Pāli commentators used to give definitions to each psychic function from the four aspects:

1. Characteristic (lakkhana) is to penetrate into the true nature of state.
2. Function (rasa) is to dispel the darkness or bewilderment which covers the true nature of states.
3. Manifestation (paccupāṭṭhāna) is not to be bewildered.
4. Proximate cause (padacchāna) means concentration, because of the statement: "A brother, who is concentrated, Oh Brethren, knows a thing as it really is." (S.v. 414).

Referring to nāṇa the Visuddhimagga explains as follows: "Nāṇa means insight-knowledge (vipassanā-nāṇa). It is said that in him who weighs, scrutinizes the states of matter and of non-matter there arises nāṇa of unfaltering speed, sharp, heroic, exceeding clear like Indra's discharged thunderbolt." 10

The Atthasālini presents a slightly different definition. Pañña has illuminating (obhāsana) and understanding (pajānana) as characteristic (lakkhaṇa).
Regarding 'illuminating' the Elder’s saying is expanded:

“Hence, the Elder has said: Just as when a man, your majesty, introduces an oil-lamp into a dark house, the lamp so introduced disperses the darkness, produces light, sheds lustre, makes objects visible, so, your majesty, pañña as it arises dispels the darkness of ignorance, produces the light of understanding (vījñā), sheds the lustre of ānā, makes plain the Ariyan Facts. Thus, your majesty, pañña has illuminating as its characteristic.”

In terms of ‘understanding’ (pajñānana) the Elder further explains, thus:

“And this was said by the Dhammasenāpati (Sāriputta): ‘It knows; thus, brother, it is in consequence called pañña. And what does it know? This is ill,’ and so on. Thus it should be expanded. And thus knowing should be regarded as the characteristic of pañña.”

This explanation includes in itself the three aspects of pañña designated in the Visuddhimagga; its characteristic is ‘illuminating’, its function is to disperse the darkness, and its manifestation is to shed the lustre of ānā or to produce the light of understanding (vījñā). In this passage, we can notice that ānā is considered analogous to something to be shed or to be produced. Namely, ānā is considered as a consequence of pañña, which is to produce the former.

The practicability of pañña is illustrated by Buddhaghosa in a skilful simile which refers to the distinction between pañña and viññāna. Buddhaghosa applies a simile to this distinction in his Visuddhimagga as follows:

“Because it seizes just the appearance of an object as blue-green and so forth, saññā (perception) is like the seeing of the coins by the undiscerning child. Because it seizes the appearance of the object as blue-green and so forth, and also leads to penetration of the characteristics, viññāna (consciousness) is like the seeing of the coins by the peasant. Because it seizes the appearance of the object as blue-green and so forth, leads to the manifestation of the Path (maggapā tubhāva), paññā (apprehension) is like the seeing of the coins by the banker. Therefore, this pañña is to be understood as the knowing in various ways as distinct from perceiving and being conscious.”

Thus, pañña is different from viññāna not only in its epistemological approach, but also in its practical sense. The former, go-
ing beyond the realm of perception, leads one to the manifestation of the Path to Enlightenment.

Circumstantial evidences point out that the distinction between paññā and न्यया in the Early Buddhism probably had a long existence underground, before, in the Theravāda school, it rose, as paññā ‘the subject’s knowing’ and न्यया ‘the object to be known’ to the surface. Probably both meanings were in the Abhidharma period fully developed.

The Sarvāstivāda School

The Early Buddhism and the Theravāda school, as mentioned above, regard न्यया as a consequence and paññā as a means. This distinction is found also in the Sarvāstivāda school.

According to the Abhidharmakośa and its commentary, Abhidharmakośa-vyākhya by Haribhadra these two concepts are dealt with in the following manners.

1. ज्ञान and Prajñā as related to Psychology

From the psychological viewpoint, prajñā (apprehension) is subject to the common stage of consciousness (mahābhūmi). Apprehension (prajñā) in this sense is only treated as a psychic factor. Therefore, this concept is even used synonymously with a Sanskrit mati (view) as a psychic factor.

It is to be noted that even in this sense prajñā does not lose its spiritual meaning of apprehension to be exercised. This concept here means ‘to investigate’ (pravicaya) the true nature of a thing investigation concerns the psychological function of analyzing the realities (dharma), which is a means leading to the final goal of nirvāṇa.

Hence, this analytical apprehension is not purely scientific knowledge but rather a practical means to attain nirvāṇa and as such participates in religious experience. In other words, prajñā is immanent and refers to the way to be cultivated, while ज्ञान is transcendental and a consequence or a result to be attained.

2. ज्ञान and Prajñā from the Viewpoint of Value

The Abhidharmakośa deals with both concepts in the two chapters, Pudgalanirdeśaḥ and Jñānanirdeśaḥ. The former chapter deals with prajñā from the standpoint of psychology; the latter from the standpoint of practice.
According to the Jñānanirdeśa, the realization of prajñā consists of four kinds of apprehension: hearing (śrutamayī), thinking (cintamayī), exercise (bhāvanāmayī) and inherence (utpāda). These apprehensions (prajñā) are termed ‘defilement apprehension’ (sāśrava prajñā), which observes the created and the non-created. These are in contrast to ‘non-defilement apprehension’ (anāśrava prajñā), which observes the truth of the three worlds and the four noble truths.

It is noticeable that three of them are repeatedly explained in the Abhidharmakośa, while ‘inherence apprehension’ is only found once in the first chapter of the Abhidharmakośa. Moreover, there is no mention of any form of ‘inherence apprehension’ by the commentator Yāsomitra. ‘Inherence’ is not mentioned in the Pāli Abhidhamma texts at all.

We might question why ‘inherence’ is neglected and what is the relationship between ‘inherence’ and other three apprehensions?

It is due to the characteristic of the Sarvāstivāda school in dealing with prajñā. Prajñā is dealt with in both its psychological and religious aspects. ‘Inherence’ (utpāda prajñā) is prajñā to be inherently obtained. This type of prajñā is considered as inherent or a priori from the psychological viewpoint. Confer to the following diagram.

The other three, however, concern religious practice; śrutamayī prajñā means the apprehension produced by hearing, cintamayī prajñā is produced by thinking of the truth, and bhāvanāmayī prajñā is produced by exercise. Thus, these three prajñā concern only the apprehension a posteriori to be cultivated and exercised.

For this reason the Abhidharmakośa divided first prajñā into four forms in the chapter of Jñānanirdeśa and later only the three forms are discussed in detail, excluding ‘inherence’ (utpāda prajñā) for it represents merely a psychological function. To the Yogācārins the important thing is the religious practice, which alone depends upon the religious attitude of the practitioner.

In the Theravāda school, as we have seen, jñāna and paññā take a different position: the former is a consequence, while the latter the exercise-to-be developed. This distinction is also retained in the Sarvāstivāda school. In this school, however, the relationship between both becomes closer and intertwined. In other words, jñāna in this school is considered as one of the qualities of the
Prajñā—
three features
1. kṣānti
2. jñāna
3. dṛṣṭi
anāśravaprajñā—

sāravaprajñā—saṃvrajñāna

1. upapattiprātilambhika
2. šrutamayi
3. cintamayi
4. bhāvanāmayi

duḥkhajñāna

anitya, duḥkha
śūnya, anātmaka

duḥkha

samudaya

hetu, samudaya
prabha, pratyaya

nirdha

nirodha, śānta
pranīta, niḥśaraṇa

maṛga

maṛga, nyāya
pratipad, nāiryānika

maṛga

hetu, samudaya
prahāna, pratyaya

anvaya

nirdha

nirodha, śānta
pranīta, niḥśaraṇa

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maṛga, nyāya
pratipad, nāiryānika

maṛga

hetu, samudaya
prahāna, pratyaya

anvaya

nirdha

nirodha, śānta
pranīta, niḥśaraṇa

maṛga

maṛga, nyāya
pratipad, nāiryānika

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dynamic and functional *prajñā* being thus assimilated by and intertwined with *prajñā*. The diagram appearing on p. 100 attempts to clarify the interrelationship between both.

As for the three features the Sarvāstivādin suggests the following connotations. *Kṣānti* means recognition (of the fourfold noble truth) which functions to eliminate defilement. *Kṣānti* does not mean here ‘forbearance’ or ‘endurance’ for the following reasons.

The Sanskrit term *kṣānti*, derived from the root *kṣam* (‘to endure’), has the two aspects involved: endurance and acceptance (‘willing to’). The former meaning is always described as the opposite of *dveṣa* (hatred), *pratigha* (repugnance), *krodha* (anger) and *vyāpāda* (malice). It is this fundamental meaning that is employed in *kṣānti-pāramitā*, one of the ten *pāramitās* popularized in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts.

But it is also used in another subsidiary sense: ‘willing to’ (acceptance) of the truth in a positive way. A Mahāyāna text, *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, for instance, mentions about the great powers of a *bodhisattvā*, who acquires *anutpattikadharma-kṣānti*. This form of *kṣānti*, however, does not mean ‘endurance’ in a negative way, instead, it points out simply that existence as a whole is beyond all predicable attributes, and no definition whatsoever is, therefore, possible, and all that we can designate of it is voidness or unbornness in view of the ultimate truth. The sense of *kṣānti* in this respect should mean the positive mental disposition or a willing acceptance of the truth. The Chinese translation ‘jen’ for *kṣānti* is sometimes taken for ‘ti nien’ (recognition); but, the implication of this form of *kṣānti*, going a step further, is a positive acceptance of the Buddhist truth or a willing inclination to the ultimate truth. In other words, it denotes the mental state capable of the willing acceptance of all things existing through the denial.

As for the Pāli *khānti* (Skt. *kṣānti*) we have once discussed in detail. The Pāli *khānti* is also considered as derived from the two roots, *kṣam* (‘to endure’) and *kam* (‘to be willing to’).

With this basis, we take the word *kṣānti*, one of the three features of *prajñā*, as ‘acceptance’ or ‘willing to’. If so, there should be no difficulty in the Yaśomitra’s interpretation. According to Yaśomitra the functions of *prajñā* consist of three types: *kṣānti*, *jñāna* and *dṛṣṭi*, which correspond to *upanidhyāna*, *niṣcātam* and *saṃtīraṇa* in order. *Prajñā* performs its function as acceptance of the truth (*upanidhyāna*) at the first stage, as the decision (*niṣcī-
tam) as the second, and as the investigation (saṃtiraṇa) as the last one. It is noticeable that these three kinds of functions have a connecting link between each other, representing the stepping-forward of prajñā in function from acceptance to decision or kṣānti to saṃtiraṇa.

The second feature of prajñā, namely, prajñā equalized with jñāna, means decision (niścitam), which refers to the realization of the truth. It is an object to be cultivated, and still it is assimilated by and included in the functions of prajñā. In the Theravāda school niśaṇa is also described as niśata (the object to be known), and as the final goal to be reached. But the relationship between niśaṇa and paññā is not so explicitly described as in the Sarvāstivāda school. A connecting link between kṣānti, jñāna and drṣṭi is not represented in the Theravāda school.

The third feature of prajñā demonstrates the dynamic exercise of the truth by prajñā. In this respect, prajñā is viewed as a religious factor which differs from the psychological function. As a psychological factor it is subject to the mental factors (cetasikā). On the other hand, as a religious factor it refers to the functional and dynamic religious exercise. This diagram also shows how prajñā assimilates its product (jñāna), retaining thereby its original meaning as ‘exercise to be developed’ or ‘knowledge to be cultivated’.

The Theravāda school, as we have mentioned before, distinguishes between both prajñā and jñāna. But this school does not attempt a combination of the two concepts. The Sarvāstivādin, however, attempts a combination and formulates the philosophy of ākāra (model form), by which prajñā and jñāna come into unity.

The Sarvāstivādin lays stress on the concept of ākāra and the combination of the two concepts. The diagram as illustrated above, will clarify the combination of the two concepts.

Dharmajñāna, as enumerated in the diagram, is a product of prajñā, observing the fourfold noble truth bounded by this material world, while anvayajñāna is a product of prajñā, observing the fourfold noble truth in the immaterial, spiritual world. This diagram shows how the knowledge-to-be-cultivated (prajñā) is combined and unified with its product (jñāna). This unification is termed ākāra (model form).

Åkāra in an Abhidharmic sense does not simply mean a phenom-

enonlal appearance that will disappear with the object. This term
refers to something that will remain even after the disappearance
of the object.

According to the Pāli a concept of åkāra means a type of form
(rūpa) which remains after the disappearance of the object.16 It
might be interesting to note that the Theravādin also employs the
same term with the same meaning. In Pāli this term is used in
opposition to rūpa-rūpa meaning matter as matter. Åkāra in Pāli
references also means the thing which remains after the object
disappears.

This model form (åkāra) represents the mental disposition in
which prajñā and jñāna come into unity. In other words, prajñā
denotes the essential nature of åkāra and the basis of jñāna. The
AK. states that “the essence of åkāra is prajñā.”17 Moreover, the
four kinds of jñāna (duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha, mārga) are based
upon prajñā, as it is demonstrated in the diagram. Thus, åkāra
is a model form, in which prajñā and jñāna come into unity.
Åkāra consists of these two counterparts.

An adequate comprehension of the Sarvāstivāda tradition will
suffice to show us that prajñā includes both functions, psycho-
logiccal and philosophical. It is a psychological function, when
prajñā is taken as a knowledge to determine (pravicaya) the
characteristics of dharma. One must first of all understand what
a dharma is and what the world is as distinct from a thing or a
person, as it is stated in the Abhidharmakosa-vyākhyā.18

On the other hand, it is a philosophical function, when prajñā
is taken as a knowledge to be exercised. In this context jñāna is
the last goal to be obtained by prajñā. Prajñā is the way by which
a consequence (jñāna) will be obtained. It has a wider perspective
in its nature than the psychological factors, namely, mind (citta)
and mental properties (cetasikā). The Sarvāstivādin says, “The
difference between prajñā and the mental factors lies in the fact
that the essence differ in their width of perspective.” Prajñā in-
cludes the active and the passive functions as well as the model
form (åkāra),19 while the mental factors include simply the former
two functions, excluding the last, i.e., the model form. This means
that prajñā in a philosophical sense represents a knowledge to be
cultivated, going beyond a simply psychological function. It is a
means by which one can remove defilements and reach the final
goal. The Mahāsanghika school, preceding Mahāyāna Buddhism defines this concept as a means to remove defilements: "Prajñā is a means (prayoga) for removing the suffering of the sentient beings, giving them the spiritual pleasures." (I-pu-tsun-lun-lun by Vasumitra, Chapt. II. 36b). This notion has been developed into the Mahāyānist philosophy.

Mahāyāna Buddhism

With the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism the concept of prajñā has come to light. Its original meaning 'the knowledge to be exercised', has come into focus with the basis of the Bodhisattva idea, which emphasises the human activities.

The ideal of the Bodhisattva in Mahāyāna Buddhism, in the light of the history, encouraged altruism and universal compassion. Real participation in its higher stage is in Mahāyāna Buddhism increasingly open to the layman. Thus the path of the Bodhisattva is substituted for that of the self-centredness and lack of universal compassion in the Hinayāna schools. No longer is Buddhism primarily the faith of monks and nuns. The Mahāyānist experience provided the basis for the identification of the Buddha with ultimate reality (prajñāpāramitā). Moreover, the quest for that prajñāpāramitā experience is identical with the quest for Buddhahood (Buddhatva). Prajñāpāramitā represents in this context the devotee's recognition of his own potential Buddhahood, which is cultivated by the practitioner himself. A Bodhisattva must practise the six or ten pāramitās.

That is to say, with the Mahāyāna, as we have seen, there was the development of the Bodhisattva ideal, and with it a considerable growth of dynamic exercise. It may be noted that the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, the foundation of the Mahāyāna, appears with the title of prajñā. This title itself reveals exactly the new aspect emphasized in the Mahāyāna as distinct from the Hinayāna. It need not be pointed out how much the development of later Buddhism depends on the idea of prajñāpāramitā.

The Mādhyamika school developed the intellectual self-training through knowledge, emphasizing thereby the theoretical structure built round prajñā. On the other hand, the Vijñānavāda school developed the inner experience through yoga accruing upon the treading of jñāna. According to the Vijñānavāda school, jñāna represents the pure knowledge realized by the Enlightenment
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(pṛṣṭhalabdhijñāna). This is the spiritual attendant in which discriminative knowledge is converted into non-discriminative knowledge. Therefore, prṣṭhalabdhijñāna means a conversion (para-vṛtti) from the experimental world based upon discriminative knowledge into non-discriminative knowledge.21

With the basis of the prajñāpāramitā-idea there is some contrast drawn between the Mādhyamika and the Vijnānavaśa, between intellectual and-experiential self-training (the training of prajñā). But relevant investigation of the genesis of prajñā in the Early Buddhism, as we have seen before, shows that it is an expression merely of different emphasis. That is, there are two sides to Buddhist experience—the theoretical and the inner experiential. In other words, Buddhist experience involves not only seeing that the reality is ‘emptiness’ (śūnyatā) or an unknown, but also seeing this in inner experience, the ‘mind-only’ (vijñaptimārtatā). But as we have mentioned this was only a difference of emphasis, and the two schools rarely clashed with one another.

Thus, the two schools hold, in line with the idea of prajñāpāramitā, possibly to its origin in the Early Buddhism, that prajñā means the knowledge-to-be-exercised.

III. THE TIME-CONCEPT IN ABHIDHARMA PHILOSOPHY: Theravāda Versus Sarvāstivāda, Predominance of Pratyaya

In Early Buddhism, the concept of time did not hold great significance, but later in Abhidharma it became increasingly important and was frequently discussed in relation to its psychological aspect. The time concept in Buddhism is also suggestive for the problem of human relations. Buddhism in its experimental sense is the investigation of the entirety of human relations and the human organism for coherence and meaning in all phases of being, human and non-human. Man is made for wholeness, rather than for fragmentation. Human beings are interrelated with each other in the form of the reciprocal relationship (pratyaya) of lives and they are not content merely with uni-directional relationships (hetu-phala anubandha) having no real coherence.

Theravāda School

Time is represented in the Theravāda school by the term samaya, meaning both ‘condition’ and ‘time’. Among the many com-
mentaries, the one referring most often to the problem of time is Buddhaghosa’s *Atthasālīni*, the commentary on *Dhammasaṅgani*, in which samaya is divided into the following five classifications:

1. *Kāla* (time) represents the continuity of a situation, such as the time of coldness or of an illness, etc. This term is again classified into nine sub-divisions: (a) momentary (mental) time (*cittakara*); (b) the *dhamma* of beings, memory of *dhamma* or *dhamma* in the past, present and future; (c) the orderly process of things (*dhammapatti*), i.e., the time when seeds sprout; (d) the appearance of things (*dhammalakkhaṇa*), i.e., the time of being born or of old age; (e) the time of reception or intimation (*dhammakicca*); (f) the action of human beings (*sattakicca*), i.e., the time of taking a bath or of eating; (g) the postures of movement (*iriyāpatha*), i.e., walking, standing, sitting and lying; (h) the proceedings of natural phenomena (*candimaśuriyādi, parivattana*) i.e.; the progress of the morning, evening or night and the day’s evolution; and (i) the divisions of time (*kālasaṅcava*), i.e., half-month, month and year.

2. *Samśa* (the group). A group in the sense of accumulation (*puñja*) of *dhamma* such as phassa (touch, feeling), utilized to deny the notion of an individual entity, and the single cause and effect theory since Buddhism maintains everything exists by means of conditions of causes and effects. This classification was directed against the incorrect view that one existence can arise independently of others, therefore it demonstrates mutual interdependence.

3. *Hetu* (cause) represents the mutual interdependence of existence. For example, in order to see, the eye consciousness is required as a sufficing condition.

4. *Khāna* (momentariness) refers to the connected situation of consciousness from the past to the present and pertains only to the meritorious mind and not to the non-meritorious. As momentariness is constantly flowing from moment to moment into the past, it is difficult to attempt to catch the moment itself. The mind itself is considered to exist in the manner of momentariness. Just as momentariness is difficult to grasp, so it is difficult for the meritorious mind to arise and remain static. This classification refers to Buddhist morality or practice, because momentariness is considered only in relation to the meritorious mind. The ethical stress is to utilize the moment in the practice of good deeds.

5. *Samavāya* (combination refers to a concord among the condi-
tions (*paccaya-sāmaggi*) and is intended to demonstrate that the consciousnesses have a mutual coordination in the present. In other words, it shows that time is dependent and interrelated (*aṅña-maṅgaṇi upakkaṇhā*). Time is shown to have no reality and the existence of a Creator is denied. These five above-mentioned classifications can be reduced into following two aspects in the nature of time.

(i) The objective aspect of time.—What we designate to be time divisions such as day, night and other phenomena exist apart from our consciousness but what we consider to be objective time actually arises in relation to our attitude. It is only by means of counting the changes in natural phenomena and accumulating these changes into designated groups that we arrive at a notion of time. The sub-human level also experiences the change of natural phenomena but there is no concept of time. We can say that without any relationship to our consciousness none of the apparently objective aspects can exist as such, for their categorization as time concepts are a product of the human reason. Or as the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p. 49) reads:

‘Time may be clearly shown as an intimation abstracted by mere conventional usage from this or that [event].’

(ii) The subjective aspect of time.—Since time is created by the subjective mind, lacking its own reality or an independent creator, time is therefore dependent upon the psychological factors. The dependency of time corresponds to the dependency of consciousness, which consists of many different psychological factors. Buddhaghosa quotes in one passage of the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* that Buddha said, ‘time is intimated by consciousness’ (*tāṃ tāṃ upādāya paññatto kālo, Asl. p. 48*). Time is considered objectively as a category. It is due to the following three processes: arising (*uppaṭta*), preservation (*thitti*) and decay (*bhaṅga*). Even if we consider time as existing separately from our consciousness, still time belongs to these three categories. Time exists only momentarily, which means ‘to connect’ (*sandahana*) one conscious moment with the next conscious moment.

We can find a similarity to this Pāli concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism; The *Mahāprajāpāramitāśāstra* (Chap. 16. T. 25, 65c-66a) refers to two concepts of time, *kāla* and *samaya*. They call the former concrete time (*dṛavya*) and the latter intimated time (*prjaṇapta*). In Pāli, *samaya* is a concept which includes *kāla* and
refers to the process of consciousness but not to concrete time (dravya).

The Theravāda school drew attention to the subjective aspect. According to this school time is shown as being dependent on other things and interrelated to them. The dependency of time corresponds to the dependency of consciousness, which is based upon the Dependent Origination Theory (paṭiccasamuppāda). The paṭiccasamuppāda formulates a uni-directional relatedness. On the other hand, the Twenty-Four Sarvāstivāda-School Conditions Theory formulates in this school a reciprocal relatedness.

The Sarvāstivāda School deals with two aspects of relationship, uni-directional and reciprocal, in relation to time. The time concept has according to this school, also two aspects, one the causality and the other the actuality. The former aspect is represented by the Dependent Origination (pratītya-samutpāda), which according to Samghabhadra, is confined merely to the transmigration of the body. It thus refers to the uni-directional relationship. The latter is represented by the Six-Causes-and-Four Conditions theory, which is based upon the concept kārttīra (actuality) of time. It thus refers to the reciprocal relationship.

The causality of time denotes the cause and effect relationship between the past, present and future. According to this conception, chronological time is considered to flow from past to present and into the future. The concept of causality is static, a uni-directional relatedness between past and present in which case the flow does not return to the source.

The activity (kārttīra) of time, on the other hand, refers to a simultaneous relationship among the time divisions, and concerns the activity of living things in mutual relationship. These two extensive aspects of time underlie Samghabhadra’s interpretation of the systematic view of human life, which is expounded by two theories: the Dependent Origination and the concept of the relativity of phenomena (the Six-Causes-and-Four-Conditions theory).

The formula of pratītya-samutpāda (the Dependent) Origination is generally summarized in the following manner: when this (cause) exists, then that (effect) disappears. Based upon this logical formula the twelve links of Dependent Origination are enumerated as follows: upon ignorance (avidyā) depend the karma-formations (sāṅskāra); thereon consciousness (vijñāna), thereon mentality and corporeality (nāma-rūpa); thereon the six sense-
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bases (saḍāyatana); thereon sense (or mind) impression (phassa); thereon feeling (vedanā); thereon craving (trṣṇā); thereon clinging (upādāna); thereon the process of becoming (bhava; here karma-bhava); thereon rebirth (jāti); thereon old age and death (jara-marāṇa).

Traditionally, the process of these twelve links is interpreted by Abhidharmika according to the three time divisions as follows. Ignorance (avidyā) and the karma-formations (saṁskāra) exist in the past; consciousness (vijñāna) through to the process of becoming (bhava) is in the present; rebirth (jāti), old age (jara) and death (marana) are in the future. This is termed the three lives’ interpretation.

In Early Buddhism this interpretation applied to the human structure alone and was not yet extended to include the relativity of phenomena. Saṁghabhādra, an exponent of the orthodox doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda school, followed the traditional psycho-physiological interpretation (the three lives’ interpretation) on the one hand. Namely, he interprets it according to the three time divisions as noted above. On the other hand, he expounded the theory from the view point of time. In his own exposition the psycho-physiological interpretation of the Dependent Origination is based upon the causality of time. He also proposed a new interpretation, which is based upon the actuality of time. In regards to the latter, he divided the aphorism ‘when this exists... when this occurs’ into two distinct aspects for analysis. First he defines the meaning of exist (asti) and secondly the meaning of occurs (utpadyati).

First ‘exist’, to Saṁghabhādra, has a dual connotation which in one sense is applicable to the past and in another to the present. ‘Something exists now because something existed in the past.’ In this case the present and the past are connected by chronological time or causality, and we can say that chronological time or causality belongs to the domain of conventional truth.

Secondly the term ‘occurs’ concerns the relationship between the present and the future, for only if there is a present potentiality, can there be a future occurrence. If conditions (pratyaya) gather together in the present, then they can give birth to things in the future. This explanation alludes to potentiality and can be termed Absolute Truth (paramārtha-satya).

We can say that the first portion of the aphorism ‘when this
exists' relates to the realm of conventional truth (saṁvrti-satya) which does not include potentiality. The latter part of the aphorism 'when this occurs' represents Absolute Truth (paramārtha-satya) because potentiality is present. Thus, in his interpretation of pratītyasamutpāda, Saṃghabhadra followed the traditional Abhidharmika's view from the standpoint of causality on the one hand. But he also drew attention to the potentiality of time on the other. It is a feature of the time aspect, namely the actuality. In regards to the actuality he entitled it paramārtha and gave it prime emphasis. Existent in terms of conventional truth are the opposite of actuality, in so far as all existents exist without conditions (pratītya). Existent in terms of Absolute Truth are the actuality which occurs from conditions. In other words, nothing new occurs without conditions and all entities possess actuality. Saṃghabhadra's emphasis on the actuality of time as superseding the causality of time can also be found in his interpretation of ādi (the beginning), which refers to avidyā (ignorance), one of the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination. We can summarize his view of avidyā as found in the Nyāyānusārasāstra (fascil. 28, T. 29, 499a²⁸-502⁵) as follows.

1. Avidyā is derived from the prefix a and vidyā, the negation of vidyā, but we cannot confine, its connotation merely to a negation vidyā (knowledge). In the Orthodox (āgama) sūtras we find sufferings such as samyojana, sambandha, anusāya, etc., used as synonym for avidyā. These synonyms are defined as real (dravya-sat), therefore, avidyā also must be considered as real.

2. Avidyā in its nature is impossible to discern. It is a reality from which we must be emancipated in order to attain Enlightenment, thus as a positive obstacle to Enlightenment avidyā is not merely the logical negation of vidyā.

3. Avidyā is a reality which is clearly perceived and comprehended (upalabdhya) in that it is analogous to the comparison between darkness and light. Darkness is not merely a logical negation of light, but rather a positive affirmation of the object of the eye consciousness since we are capable of perceiving darkness as well as light. In the same way avidyā is the positive affirmation of the object of consciousness as far as it relates to the sufferings in consciousness. It is in this sense that avidyā can be considered as real.

4. Avidyā is said to be a cause (hetu) in so far as it produces
suffering. Both cause and effect are considered real since the product of suffering is apparent, thus avidyā is real.  

5. Avidyā is that which is to be destroyed by the arising of vidyā, just as wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi) will be destroyed by right view (sammādṛṣṭi).

6. Avidyā is said to be a real thing (eka-dharma) as Saṅghabhadra gave a quotation from the Āgama reading: ‘If a Bhikkhu destroys a thing (ekadharma), he is declared by me to be a man who has completed all his Buddhist obligations’. This thing (dharma) is called avidyā.

This explanation of avidyā demonstrates that it is a real element producing suffering. It is not a simple negation of the real for it is considered as an independent actual dharma just as vidyā is an actual independent dharma. Thus the two terms vidyā and avidyā exist separately and in opposition. Avidyā possesses a specific function as the cause of suffering and it is in this capacity that avidyā is termed ādi, meaning ‘from the beginning’ since it represents the beginning of the Twelve Links.

The theory of Dependent Origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is commonly divided into the three divisions of past, present and future. This interpretation is based upon the causality of time. This conventional truth Saṅghabhadra termed ‘acceptable agreement’ (dharmaniketa) to distinguish it from paramārtha (absolute truth). In the NY., he says ‘it is said in the Paramārthaśunyatāsūtra (T. 2. 920c) that dharmaniketa means the causal chain of the Twelve Links, namely, saṃskāra originates from avidyā... jarāmarāṇa from jati. In other words, dharmaniketa denotes the causal relationship between cause and effect (hetu-phala-anubandha).’ (Ny. T. 29, 428c). This causal relationship Saṅghabhadra also termed ‘intimation’ (prajñāpti) since it relates to the domain of conventional truth.

Since the time of Early Buddhism the things are considered to arise by means of pratītyasamutpāda, depending upon conditions. We cannot actually determine which is the beginning and which is the end. The mutuality and conditionality of these things are, according to Saṅghabhadra, based upon the actuality of time. From this standpoint there can be no beginning and no end. This conception can be properly termed by him paramārtha (the absolute truth). Saṅghabhadra stated that the Twelve Links had a beginning (ādi) and were also beginningless. The former state-
ment is due to the time aspect of causality, which is termed dharmasaṅketa, while the latter due to another aspect of actuality, which is termed paramārtha. In his philosophy the latter, namely, paramārtha, receives prime importance. We will not find any inconsistency in his double statements that the Twelve Links had a beginning and that they are also beginningless.

From these two viewpoints we can realize also that ādi does not mean a causa prima nor is it equivalent to the prakṛti of Sāṃkhya philosophy. The idea of causa prima is held up by the cause-and-effect relatedness in progression or causality. We normally are inclined to consider the regressive causes until we finally arrive at the last cause which we term ‘the first cause’. Avidyā was placed at the beginning of pratityasamutpāda merely because it is considered to be the most effective and mighty among the other defilements producing suffering, not because it is the last cause where we arrive by inference. It does not refer to the origin or beginning of life in the cosmic sense, but rather refers to the fundamental principle from which all the other links of pratityasamutpāda come into existence. As it is the principle of defilement in actual existence, so it is real and actual in its existence although negative in form (a-vidyā). In Saṅghabhadra’s7 interpretation the beginning of the psycho-physiological process still remains, but it is merely dharmasaṅketa in lieu of the Absolute Truth. When he considers avidyā to be the most important factor in the psycho-physiological process, he takes it as the actuality beyond the causality of time. He further suggested in his writings that actuality (kārita) is the conditions (pratyaya) through which all things should be observed for no existent can exist as such without conditions.

Kārita and Pratyaya.—The Buddhist Sanskrit term kārita (actuality) plays an important role in Saṅghabhadra’s epistemology. Kārita is used as synonym of such words as karma, kriyā and puruṣakāra. Saṅghabhadra also distinguishes kārita from vyāpāra (an efficient function) which means the ability concerning a definite object or the ability arising for a definite object, i.e., the eyes have vyāpāra only when they have contact with the object, the ears have it only when they encounter the sound. Kārita, however, is used only in reference to the time divisions. Saṅghabhadra designated kārita as the ‘ability to draw forth’ (ākṣepa-śakti) the effect but not to ‘produce’ (janana) it. (Ny. 51. T. 29,
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631c; Tattvasaśringraha p. 506. Gaekwad Oriental Series; no. xxx. 1926, Baroda). This means that when the effect comes into existence, kārita is not the direct cause but rather an indirect or helping cause (Ny. 52. T. 29, 631d). According to this concept of kārita in reference to the time divisions, the future means the situation in which kārita has not yet arisen, the present signifies that kārita has just arisen and the past denotes a situation in which kārita has arisen and passed away (Ny. 52, T. 29, 633a). The three time divisions are dependent upon the rise of kārita and are not a category of reason since the time concept in the category of reason excludes experience while the time concept of kārita includes it. In other words, the time divisions express kārita experienced in concrete form. It is not time as a category of reason that gives us the conception of phenomena but rather time as kārita. Buddhist time in this sense is experimental.

The arising of any single existent requires the grouping of conditions (pratyaya). Without the necessary conditions no existent can come into being. Kārita, as we have noted, is also an auxiliary cause in its function as ‘drawing forth’. The question then arises as to the difference between these two types of auxiliary causes, pratyaya and kārita.

Regarding this distinction, Sarngabhadra said in his Ny., ‘Even if both do not completely differ, nevertheless, kārita comes into existence relying upon pratyaya because the dharma itself does not come into existence depending upon pratyaya (Ny. 52. T. 29, 633a). Kārita comes into existence depending upon conditions, therefore, conditions are the basis of the arising of kārita. Even if there are many conditions present, kārita does not necessarily come into existence. It is analogous to the relationship between the eye-consciousness and the conditions. Namely, even though there are such existing conditions as the eyes, object of the eye and so on, the eye consciousness does not necessarily come into existence. The reverse, however, is not true, for when kārita arises, the necessary conditions must be present. Pratyaya as such is not equivalent to kārita but rather a requirement for the arising of kārita. Pratyaya can be called kārita only when it has an efficient function (vyūpāra). Sarngabhadra says, ‘where kārita exists, pratyaya exists’ (ibid., 633a). He also attempted to relate the kārita concept in combination with pratyaya. He applied
kārita in combination with pratyaya in his explanation of the relativity of the phenomenal world. This latter theory is represented in Abhidharma philosophy by the Six-Causes-and-Four-Conditions theory, which will be discussed later.

In the distinction between both concepts there is an apparent difference between the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools. Saṁghabhadra maintained that pratyaya is related to kārita but not equivalent. He gave both terms a separate reality. This attitude demonstrates the character of his realism. The Sarvāstivāda position was inclined towards an analysis of reality while the Sautrāntika held a contrary position, negating and denying reality to stress the momentariness of existence. With regard to pratyaya, the Sautrāntika gave precedence to pratyaya over dravya-sat. Saṁghabhadra in protest against the Sautrāntika’s equivalency of kārita and pratyaya stated: ‘If [Sautrāntika] says that conditions (pratyaya) are considered to exist, hence, kārita as arising can be said to exist, this notion is false’ (ibid., 632a). He also quoted the Sautrāntika standpoint: ‘Our school [Sautrāntika] admits that continuity (saṁtati, skandha) is transposed and relies upon pratyaya, hence, saṁtati will give rise to effect. If so [because pratyaya exists] we must admit that kārita also exists,’ (ibid., 632c). This means that wherever pratyaya exists there kārita also exists. In other words pratyaya and kārita are one and the same thing. Thus Sautrāntikas considered kārita and pratyaya to be equivalent while Saṁghabhadra merely considered the two terms as related in the sense that pratyaya is the basis of kārita. The former does not have actuality (kārita) but when the former functions, then at that moment the latter comes into existence. Kārita cannot come into existence merely through the grouping of conditions alone.

The Predominance of Pratyaya.—Even in Saṁghabhadra’s psycho-physical interpretation of pratitvyasamutpāda he gave predominance to pratyaya. This direction was assimilated and extended by Abhidharmika in the Six-Causes-and-Four-Conditions theory. Principally this theory dealt with the predominance of pratyaya. The predominance of pratyaya over hetu in line with Early Buddhist thought can be demonstrated by an analysis of this theory. In terms of time, the theory concerns simultaneity and continuity as can be seen in the following diagram.
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Six causes (ṣādhetavah)

Simultaneity

\[\begin{align*}
\text{kāraṇahetu (active cause)} \\
\text{saḥabhūḥhetu (accompanying cause)} \\
\text{saḥbhāgahetu (corresponding cause)} \\
\text{saṃprayuktahetu (associated cause)}
\end{align*}\]

Continuity

\[\begin{align*}
\text{saṃvatrāgahetu (common cause)} \\
\text{viṣṭakahetu (resultant cause)}
\end{align*}\]

Four-conditions (caturpratya)

Simultaneity and Continuity

\[\begin{align*}
\text{hetupratiyāya (effective condition)} \\
\text{saṃantarapratiyāya (immediate conditions)} \\
\text{ālambanapratiyāya (the object as conditions)} \\
\text{adhipatiyāya (eminent conditions)}
\end{align*}\]

In this diagram we can observe that hetupratiyāya of the Four-Conditions can embody in its contents all the Six-Causes with the exception of kāraṇahetu. The other three pratyayas (saṃantarā, ālambana and adhipatī) are a diffusion of kāraṇahetu. In reference to time, these four pratyayas are based upon simultaneity as well as continuity. The former can be considered as equivalent to the actuality of time, while continuity is equivalent to the causality of time. The other five kinds of causes in the diagram (saḥabhū, saḥbhāga, saṃprayuktā, saṃvatrāga and viṣṭaka) illustrate the reciprocal relationship from A to B and vice versa. They also represent the relationship of pratyaya (hetu-pratyaya).

The above explanation shows us that the cause-effect relationship is included in the category of pratyaya, and reveals a predominance of the pratyaya-relationship over hetu-relationship. It has been a primary characteristic of Buddhist philosophy from the beginning, and continues to influence present Buddhist thought. In Early Buddhism, hetupratiyāya was inseparable in definition and connoted a mutual relationship (saḥakāra). In the Abhidharma period, however, Buddhist thought concerned itself with the concept of hetupratiyāya not merely as a combined term, but also established a distinction between the two. Thus the distinguished hetupratiyāya were represented in the theory, namely, the Six-Causes-and-Four-Conditions of the Sarvāstivāda school.

In Early Buddhism intellectual thought was concerned only
with the human structure and not with the phenomenal world. Abhidharma, in broadening this concept to include the latter, subsequently reduced hetu into pratyaya, or cause into condition. In the process of historical development pratyaya has come to include hetu. In other words, the reciprocal relationship has come to assimilate the uni-directional one. We can notice here that the concept of pratyaya in the Buddhist sense is much more important than the concept of hetu. The idea of assimilation is extremely important and cannot be overlooked in analysing the time concept in Buddhism. From the point of view of time the diagram can be summarized as the relationship between the actuality and causality of time, and a demonstration of how the uni-directional relationship has been included in the reciprocal one.

Dravya and Time.—According to the Sarvástivāda school, all existing things, both material and non-material, possess a permanent entity (svabhāva) and are termed real (dravya). Sarvástivāda philosophy is usually designated as Buddhist realism. When they consider time, however, they did not include time in the category of reality as is evinced in the Mahāvaibhāṣika-śāstra. The question then arises, why time is not included in the dravya category as an entity

If we examine this realism from the view point of time, we will discover that reality is based upon the relationship between cause and effect, for it comes into existence by the law or causality from future to present, and from present to past. Causality can be possible only when cause and effect may exist in a degree of reality. The permanent reality of existents (svabhāva) and causality (hetuphala-anubandha) are interrelated on a mutual basis and this is one of the characteristics of existents as svabhāva. In terms of time existents (svabhāva, dravya) are considered as existing ‘at all times’ (sarvasmin kāle). ‘At all times’ differs from ‘permanency’ (nitya), which usually means eternal existence passing through the three divisions of time. The concept nitya can be possible only when dravya exists passing through the three divisions of time. Namely dravya can be considered as nitya, when it is observed from the view point of chronological time or the causality of time. ‘At all times’, however, means the absolute at this moment because existents in this respect are in the present moment which includes the past and future. Only in this sense existents are said to exist at all times (sarvasmin kāle or sarvadā). Namely dravya
(svabhāva) can be considered as existent at all times, when it is observed from the view point of the actuality of time, but not from the causality of time. The concept nitya can be said to refer to horizontal time while sarvasmin kāle refers to vertical time.

Existents (dravya, svabhāva) are in Abhidharma considered permanent or impermanent. The difference of terminology is not a discrepancy, but merely related to the aspects of time as viewed from different phases. Saṃghabhadra in his Ny. explains these two view points as follows.

The reason is this: Even though created things (saṃskṛtadharma) exist permanently, they nevertheless have variations according to their own situations (avasthā). These different situations come into existence according to conditions (pratyaya). After one moment no existent can remain (sthiti). For this reason dharma-svabhāva are impermanent for their svabhāvas do not differ (vyatirikta) from the variations of [the situations] (Ny. 52. T. 29, 633a).

Dharma as such is considered as permanent, but in view of its variety of situations, it is impermanent. Dharma depends in its nature upon the variation and changeability of situations (avasthā) in terms of time, these situations (avasthā) imply the actuality of time. Here we can note that it is in view of the actuality of time that permanent dharma can be termed impermanent. Therefore, the two expressions ‘dharma is permanent’ and ‘dharma is impermanent’ are not inconsistent as they are based upon two different standpoints. When dharma (svabhāva) is considered from the causality of time it is believed to exist at all times (sarvadā, sarvasmin kāle), while when it is considered from the actuality of time, it is impermanent (anitya). This logical construction of dharma-svabhāva is the concept upon which Buddhist realism is based.

Practically speaking, we can consider that in the future there exist multitudes of existents receiving their causes and conditions to those which momentarily arise in the present. The existents which now appear in the present will disappear momentarily and flow to the past. This type of realism demonstrates that all existing things are based upon the present moment which includes both the future and the past. All existent creatures have the past behind them and future potentiality before them.
Linguistic Approach to Buddhist Thought

IV. Samghabhadra and Sahantabhadra: Nyāyānusāraśāstra and its Author

According to Hsi yü chi (Memoirs of eminent priests under the Than dynasty) and the Memoirs of the venerable Vasubandhu, a Sanskrit treatise, Abhidharmakośa-śāstra by Vasubandhu, follows faithfully the traditional doctrines of Vāibhāsika, and all of which are well condensed into 600 metrical kārikas.

However, Abhidharmakośa-śāstra (AK.) does not always coincide with the Vāibhāsika’s view; instead, it criticizes the latter from the Sāutrāntika’s point of view in its prose.

Against Vasubandhu’s AK. the opponent Samghabhadra composed the Nyāyānusāra-śāstra (NY.) in an attempt to criticize Vasubandhu’s AK. The opponent Samghabhadra attempted to amend even the kārikas in some cases and to expound the prose in a wider perspective. It might be well to say that the NY. is an important exposition of the AK., because the Vasubandhu’s implication is explicitly interpreted. Moreover, the NY. quotes the names of many works and schools such as Jñānapraśthāna, Sāutrāntika, Vijnānavādins etc.

As to the translation of the NY. it was rendered by Hui'n Tsang in Chinese. The NY., however, does not exist neither in Tibetan nor in Sanskrit.

Samghabhadra also composed the Abhidharmasamayapradipikā (ASP.), which is extant in Chinese. It is a compendium of the NY., consisting of 40 fasciculi. The ASP. is listed in some catalogues as extant in Tibetan. That is, the Otani Catalogue, Mdo 64.109-304; the Tohoku Catalogue pp. 621-22, Tanjur, Mñon-pa, Vol. Khu, folios 95b1-266a7. Examining precisely, however, the Tibetan could not be the translation of the original Sanskrit treatise of the ASP.

The ASP. exactly follows the order of the chapters of the NY. except an introductory chapter as distinct from that of the NY.

It should be noted that the composer of the NY. is called by two names: Samghabhadra in most cases, and Sahantabhadra in a few cases.

In the Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasamgraha (Vol. I. GOS. XXX. p. 506, 508; Engl. Tr., by G. Jha, II. p. 866.869. GOS. LXXXIII. 1939), Samghabhadra is described as Sahantabhadra. The discussion on a philosophical term kāritra (function), for instance, can be found in both Tattvasamgraha and NY. being one and the same in content.
Futher, in the NY., we have both names, Samghabhadra and Sahantabhadora, which are reconstructed from the equivalent Tibetan, that is: ḥdus bzaṅ or ḥdus bzaṅs (Samghabhadra) and ḥdul bzaṅ, ḥdul bzaṅs (Sahantabhadora).

In the Yaśomitra’s Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (AKV.) and its Tibetan version, the name Samghabhadra is employed in the three chapters, namely, dhātu, indriya and loka nirdeśas. On the other hand, the name Sahantabhadora is used in the five nirdeśas: karma, anuśaya, pudgala, jñāna and samāpatti.

As to the Tibetan equivalents one thing is questionable. In Cordier’s Catalogue (Mdo-Ugrel 64) the composer of the Samaya-pradipikā is described as both ḥdus-bgan (Samghabhadra) and ḥdul-bian (Vinitabhadra). Further, in this catalogue is given a Sanskrit name Binayabhadora reconstructed from the Mongolian. But, a Tibetan ḥdul-bzaṅ, as mentioned previously, could be Sahantabhadora rather than Vinitabhadra or Binayabhadora.

Besides the two śāstras as composed by Samghabhadra: the NY. and the ASP., we have the Abhidharmadīpa by Dipakāra. As to the author of the Abhidharmadīpa (AD.) the editor Dr. Jaini, for convenience, refers to him by the descriptive title Dipakāra, which is used in Vṛtti. Although Dipakāra is said to be the disciple of Samghabhadra, he does not mention the name of his teacher in the AD. However, the AD. surely is an able exposition of the basic philosophical concepts of the orthodox Sarvāstivāda school, and it alludes to the central tradition of Samghabhadra’s views.

In respect to the name of Samghabhadra we see, as mentioned above, the two names, Samghabhadra and Sahantabhadora, as used in both the Tibetan and the Sanskrit treatises. It may be noted that the original Sanskrit texts of the Chinese NY. might have been titled with the two different names, having been handed down to the Tibetan and Sanskrit Buddhist tradition.

V. THE BUDDHIST CONCEPT OF SIN AND ITS PURIFICATION: avidyā, karma, saṃsāra

In Buddhism there are various terms analogous to the Western term sin. These are, however, conceived slightly differently from that for the following reasons.
Buddhism, being non-dogmatic, admits different concepts and interpretations of its terminology. Being an empirical and affirmative religion, Buddhism has combined with the indigenous cultures of such different countries as India, Tibet, China, Japan, South Asian Countries. It has entrenched to produce in each case a unique form; its forms often differ in philosophy. Buddhist conscience, thus, is not aware of the guilt-feeling of Western man, although it acknowledges human misconduct. Oriental people do not confess before the Sacred. The Buddhist conception of sin and guilt is outlined in the following historical and terminological analysis.

We have various terms equivalent to sin in ancient philosophy, too. In the Veda, for instance, we can find pāpa, pāpman, pāśa, amhas, enas, āgas, hedana, anṛta, viloma, kilvisa, etc.

All of these terms, however, indicate a type of sin which refers to external offence such as physical actions or ritual mistakes. An offence against the highest god can be removed by the prayer for forgiveness, as the Rgveda remarks:

“If we as magisters cheat at play, if we have done wrong unwittingly or a purpose, thou, O Varuṇa, cast all these sins away like loosed fetters and let us to thine own beloved” (V. 85).

In the Brāhmaṇas also, sin refers to the external sacrifice (yajña) and its magical efficiency. Sin indicates here the ritual misbehaviours. But these sins can be consequently removed simply by a ceremonial confession or by a public declaration (nirukta).

Sin in the Brāhmaṇas and the Vedas, as indicated above, refers to something physical and external rather than moral and internal. It is simply a stain which can be taken away by prayers or even by water (Ṛg, I, 23, 22) or fire (X, 164.3). The transgression of divine law or sacrifices are more important than the internal awareness of human nature.

Further, with the growth of the Upaniṣadic idea, the interpretation of sin in India has been turned into a philosophical one. Sacrifice has become secondary, losing its primary significance. The ultimate purpose of the Upaniṣads is the realization of the unity of Brahman and Ātman. Sin (evil) means any obstacle to the realization of this unity. Sin is considered as avidyā (ignorance), kāma (desire) and karma (action or deed). Neither offences against Varuṇa nor mistakes in sacrificing are considered as moral transgressions. What then is important? To attain perfect knowl-
edge or the unity of Brahman and Ātman. Hence, where perfect knowledge exists, there is no notion of sin. Man who has attained perfect knowledge, has been freed from sin, from impurity and doubt. He becomes Brāhman. The difference between good and evil seems to have been destroyed. The emphasis on this transcendence is accurately expressed in the following passages: “He is not followed by good, he is not followed by evil, for then he has passed beyond all sorrows of the heart.” (Bṛhad-Āranyaka Up. 4.3.22).

This passage points out that sin can be reduced to a consequence of ignorance. Every action, whatever good or evil, becomes deprived of the absolute value. What is valued is knowledge. This Upaniṣadic sin can be said intellectual. This Indian intellectual genius has been taken over by Buddhism.

**Hinayāna Buddhism —anātman—**

With the development of Buddhism a concept of sin came to denote demerit (pāpa). A term pāpa is one of the Buddhistic terms representing a sin concept. In view of sin we have a set of terms in Sanskrit literature. They are:


These terms of sin can be classified into two types in view of human psychology.

The first type is a reaction to external standards. That is, when one violates the Buddhist precepts, he is said to commit *vipatti* (moral failure). But this *vipatti* can be removed simply by changing his behavior. This kind of *vipatti* is described in the Vinaya Pitaka as follows:

“The four offences involving defeat, the thirteen offences entailing a formal meeting of *sangha* (monks)—this is a moral failure; an offence of expiation, an offence which ought to be confessed, an offence of wrong doing, an offence of wrong speech—this is a failure of right conduct; a wrong view taking up a false view—this is a failure of right conduct.” (Vinaya. I. 171; V. 98).

These failures, however, will be removed by converting one’s mind and behavior.
The second type is a reaction to an internal awareness of human nature. Ignorance (avidyā), as considered sin, is opposed to knowledge (vidyā). Both ignorance and knowledge concern the intellectual, but not the offence against any kind of external law. Because knowledge means, according to Buddhist view, a religious insight. That is an insight to see things as they are, which is termed yathā-bhūtānā 'to observe things as they really are'). In contrast, avidyā points out the unawareness of things in reality. This is the fundamental basis of defilements. Moreover, defilements are not to be purified by others, but by one's own self. The Buddhist view acknowledges neither absolute good nor absolute evil. The two are relative. Human beings exist in a world of good 'and' evil action, but not good 'or' evil actions. Buddhist thinkers in India did not say much about the conflict between the forces of good and evil. Thus, knowledge (vidyā) is a recognition of reality and the non-recognition is termed ignorance (avidyā).

Mahāyāna Buddhism — Śūnyatā—

With Mahāyāna Buddhism we have a second type of sin, an internal awareness of human nature, emphasized and extended to its limits. In Mahāyāna Buddhism also, two fundamental trends of thought can be distinguished.

The first trend of thought is to equate human defilement (sin) with its purification. This idea is expressed by the famous passage Chandrakīrti's. That is 'saṃsāranirvāṇayorvriśesasyābhāva' (the identity of the life-cycle and the Enlightenment. Cf. Prasannapadā, p. 535, ed. by L. de la Valée Poussin).

This Mahāyāna idea of the unity of the absolute (nirvāṇa) and the relative (saṃsāra) is not found at the early stage of Buddhism. The early Buddhism separates the two in a dualistic way as do all other Abhidharma Buddhist sects, How is, then, the unity of the two considered possible? What is the process from the early Buddhist idea to Mahāyāna Buddhist conception?

Saṃsāra (life-cycle) is, in view of Early Buddhist conception, transitory (anītya), suffering (dukkha) and egolessness (anātman). Through a long span of history the former two, transitory and suffering, have been remained without changing significance and content, being accepted by Early Buddhists as well as Mahāyāna Buddhists. The latter, namely, egolessness (anātman), has largely been expounded and amended by Mahāyānists, having finally
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become synonymous with śūnyatā, the super-natural experience. This concept of śūnyatā is in Mahāyāna Buddhism nothing but nirvāṇa (Enlightenment).

Egolessness (anātman) originally meant a negation of substance. At the time of Early Buddhism there were many heretics who insisted on a reality of substance. In their views a substance originates without leaving its own nature. This kind of substance is represented by such concepts as Brāhma, vedagū, dravya, prakṛti, etc. Permanent is the essential characteristic of a substance which remains unchanged in any conditions, viz., origination and decay. A substance in any sense of the words is to be denied by the Buddhists, for it is that which binds us to this world and which we cling to. The negation of a permanent substance, this is a liberation of mind from the bondages. Thus, the negation of substance, viz., an-ātman, is the relative negation, which requires something to be denied. In other words, this negation is to deny the already known or to deny the realm of the experimental.¹

With the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism the significance and the content of egolessness (anātman) have been expounded in a wider aspective. It has been provided with the following expressions: śūnyatā (emptiness), avitathatā (not-untruth), dharma-dhātu (totality of things), dharmasthiti (substratum of things), tattva (the essence), ananyatathatā (uniqueness), aviparyāsatathatā (irreversible), paramārtha (the absolute), acintyadhātu (incomprehensible substance), suprasānta (perfectly calm), advaya or advaitikāra (non-separable or non-divisible), nirvikalpa (an-discrimination), nirvṛtti (disappearance), nirodha (cessation), nirvāṇa (enlightenment), tathatā (suchness), tattva (truth), svasiddhānta (self-realization), anupattī or anupanna (unborn), aniruddha (non-destruction) and others.

The positive counter-part of anātman, as enumerated above, is tathatā, paramārtha, śūnyatā and nirvāṇa; The concept of anātman in its implication does not merely mean a negative side of the truth. On the contrary, it points out the absolute, ultimate essence. That is also śūnyatā. Śūnyatā represents the positive content, i.e., the realm of super-experimental, religious experience, but not simply ‘emptiness’ as it is usually rendered. An English term ‘emptiness’ literally means a lack of substance, a negative side of the truth, which is the Early Buddhistic connotation, but not the Mahāyānistic.
The Mahāyānistic conception of śūnyatā has been developed into tathātā (suchness) or the positive aspects of the truth, which can be called a mystic truth. Suffice to quote a passage from the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra. It runs:

“When erroneous views based on the dualistic notion of assertion and negation are gotten rid of, and when the viññānas cease to rise as regards the objective world of names and appearances, this I call ‘suchness’ (tathātā). Mahamati, a Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who is established on suchness attains the state of imagelessness (nirabhāṣagocara) and thereby attains the Bodhisattva-stage of Joy (pramūdita).”

The implication of this passage is that all things existing in this world are essentially of the same nature, for they are all devoid of their own entities (śūnyatā).

The Diamond sūtra developed this conception of śūnyatā into nirvāṇa and made no distinction between śūnyatā and nirvāṇa. The sūtra states:

“As far as any conceivable universe of beings is conceived, all these should be led by me into nirvāṇa, into that realm of nirvāṇa which leaves nothing behind.”

Linguistically speaking, the positive implication of a term śūnyatā, as expounded by Mahāyānists, is contained in its own etymology. Śūnyatā is derived from the root śvī, to swell. The root śvī, according to Dr. Conze, seems to have expressed the idea that something which looks ‘swollen’ from the outside is ‘hollow’ inside.

Śūnyatā, whatever hollow or swollen, is interpreted by Mahāyānists as possibilities to be filled up, to be realized in full. It is the totality of things as they are (dharma-dhātu), the substratum of things (dharma-sthiti) and the self-realization (sva-siddhānta); it is not simply the voidness or the emptiness anymore; instead, it is something positive and super-experimental in content.

In the life-cycle (samsāra) there is no entity permanent (anatman), as mentioned in Early Buddhism; at the same time, life-cycle is full of possibilities to be filled up (śūnyatā), as interpreted by Mahāyānists. In other words, anatman or the relative negation of entity has been evolved into the absolute negation or a mystic truth (nirvāṇa). Thus, between samsāra and nirvāṇa does no distinction exist anymore. The evolution of anatman—śūnyatā corresponds to that of the relative—the absolute negation. With the
basis of terminological evolution the thought of the *samsāra-nirvāṇa* unity has been expounded and developed in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

**Japanese Buddhism — karma —**

The first trend of thought is, as discussed above, to equate human defilement (*samsāra*) with its purification (*nirvāṇa*). In contrast to that, the second trend of thought has been developed in China and Japan in a form of the Pure Land Faith. This is a thought in which defilement or sin originally is the fact of paradoxical human nature as such.

In this respect, Shinran (1173-1262 A.D.) made an original contribution to Buddhist philosophy with the interpolation of faith between *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. The Pure Land Sect retains Indian devotionalism, and provides it with a Buddhistic foundation of compassion (*maitri-karunā*). In contrast, Buddhism in India concentrated on wisdom (*prajñā*), which had, in view of Shinran, few effective means of saving less well-endowed human beings. Shinran’s belief was that perfect intercommunion of the Absolute (Amitābha) and all sufferers and, thus, the salvation of all could be achieved through the mere calling of the name of Amitābha—a symbol of intercommunion—.

This faith is motivated by the self-awareness of the root of all human existence. In this view, the root is a mist of paradox. Shinran calls it the karmic existence; *karma* in here denotes the paradoxical human existence, but not merely means a man’s treason against his action. *Karma* in an Indian sense is the object of moral judgement, being divided into three differences, good, evil and indeterminate.

*Karma* in Shinran’s view denotes man’s inability to rid himself of the dualistic notions of good and evil, love and hate. There cannot be determinate, eternal rules of ethical conduct, for all determinate things are transitory. We are living in a stream of paradoxical elements, good *and* evil, but not good *or* evil, for any ethical judgement cannot hold at all times for all men under all circumstances. His ethics are admittedly human and relative, not divine and absolute. Shinran said to his disciple Yuien:

“I do not know whether it is good or evil, or which is good or evil. I know neither good nor evil.”

In the light of the depth of human existence, he equates *karma*
as an ethical conduct with sin as the limitation of human abilities. Karmic life-cycle represents the human world of sin (isumi in Japanese). He states in his Kyōgyōshinshō thus:

“One is an ordinary person full of evil, living in the life-cycle. He is one who, since the beginning, persistently scuttles himself and wanders around, having no means to liberate himself from the karmic world.”

The awareness of karmic and sinful human existence requires the devotional attitude toward the absolute. By and through the vital faith to the absolute (Amitābha) man can attain salvation, overcoming his original sin. Thereby does the awareness of sin precede the leap of faith.

The karma doctrine, having been taken as the sin-awareness, has been carried by Shinran, founder of the Shinshū school in Japan, into its farthest extent.

**Conclusion — anātman, śūnyatā, karma —**

Anātman is a negation of permanent entity (ātman). But, the judgement of negation, in its turn, would be impossible without the presupposition of an entity of some sort. Early Buddhism took all kinds of permanent things, whatever Brāhmaṇa, puruṣa, prakṛti, as entity to be denied. It means that ātman is the object of contemplation at the stage of Early Buddhism. Its negation is also logical and relative, as discussed above.

On the other hand, śūnyam, a counterpart of anātman, also points to non-substance. Both concepts, śūnyam and anātman, are considered synononum. This logical and relative negation is represented by śūnyam and anātman. According to Early Buddhist reasoning both concepts of anātman and karma are actually a genuine unity. It is just because karma usually finds itself involved in the recognition of anātman, which could not appear but through karma; karma is not separated from anātman, but it is the categorical form of anātman. The thought of anātman can be interpreted as effectively as the concept of karma. The basis of karma should be deeply related to the anātman conception. We might say that karma is the realm, where anātman reveals itself to man; anātman reveals itself to man just because he is aware of karma.

With the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism anātman or śūnyatā (not śūnyam in Early Buddhism), going beyond the range of
the relative negation, has come to mean the absolute negation, extending further its significance to nirvāṇa.

With Shinshū school of Buddhism karma, being deeply related to anātman, has been taken up and emphasized more stronger than anātman. Finally, karma, going beyond the ethical judgement, has been taken as sin deeply rooted in the paradoxical structure of human beings.

The Buddhist concept of sin has been evolved into the two trends of thought, external and internal; the former is a reaction to external standards, the latter being the awareness of human nature. These trends, however, have not been left in a state of abstract inaction. Instead, they fit together, making up a great ethics of the human life.

VI. BUDDHIST MORAL CONCEPTS: karma and avijñānti

1. Early Buddhism

The Karma theory plays one of the most important roles in the history of Buddhist thought. In Early Buddhism the emphasis is put on the human mind (cetanā). Mind precedes all actions and serves as the principal element both in performing and in assessing deeds. It is mind that rules and shapes action. Words (vācika-karma) and deeds (kāyika-karma) are also produced by the mind.

The Dhammapada reads:

“manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomaya, manasā ce paduṭṭhena bhāsati vā karoti vā, tato naṃ dukkham anveti cakkam va vahato padam.” (Cf. Dhp. I.)

(Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; everything is mind-made. If one speaks or acts with a wicked mind, because of that, suffering follows, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox.)

Karma is divided into three types, i.e., physical (kāyika), vocal (vācika) and mental (manas).

2. Theravāda School

The definition, “mind is karma”, was peculiar to Early Buddhist thought. The Theravāda school faithfully followed this
3. Sarvāstivāda School

The Sarvāstivāda school followed the Early Buddhist texts (Nikāyas) as the Theravāda school did also. But this approach to the *karma* theory is different from the Theravāda. The former interpreted the *karma* theory in view of epistemology rather than psychology. It established a unique formulation in terms of *karma*. Epistemologically this school analysed the relationship between cause and effect (*hetu-phala-sambandha*). That is the concept *avijñapti* (the unmanifest faculty) peculiar to this school. It is not found in the Pāli canonical texts.

4. The Analysis of *Vijñapti* and *Avijñapti*

*Vijñapti* is derived from *vi-jñā-āp*, “making known”, which is the equivalent of Tibetan *rnam par rig byed*. It means intimation, which is distinguished by *kāyavijñapti* (intimation by body) and *vācavijñapti* (intimation by speech). Thus it denotes “the manifest gesture”. *Avijñapti* means an unseen faculty of an action, which is the morally potent aspect. This concept is found in the *Jñānaprasthāna* (cir. 200 B.C.) by Kātyāyaniputra, and *Sāriputra-Abhidharma-Śāstra*. It denotes “the unmanifest faculty”.

5. Saṅghabhadra’s view of *Vijñapti*

(A) A dynamic function of mind (*cetanā*) is not underestimated in Saṅghabhadra’s philosophy.

According to his view, *karma* consists of three types, i.e., *kāya*, *vāca*, *mānasāṃ*. *Kāyikakarma* (bodily action) in its nature is *kāyavijñapti* (bodily gesture), *vācikakarma* (vocal action) being “vocal gesture” (*kāyikavijñapti*). But, “mental action” (*mānasāṃ karma*) in its nature is not *vijñapti* (gesture), but mind (*cetanā*).

There is “the unmanifest faculty” (*avijñapti*) only in *kāya* and *vāca* karmas, but not in *mānasāṃ karma*. Vasubandhu assumes a critical attitude to this definition, saying that this definition is opposed to the Buddha’s teaching, i.e., the priority of mind to body and speech. The unrecognition of *avijñapti* in mind could be inconsistent to the system.

But, Saṅghabhadra’s *Ny. offers considerable evidence showing the importance of mind (*citta*). For example:
“There is a specific bodily form (kāyasya saṃsīdhāna) associated with the intensive mind (cittaprayogena). [This bodily form], a result of the four elements continuously functioning, will give rise to the eye-consciousness without any outward appearance.”

(Ny. 35. T. 29, 533c 18–19).

This passage is an exposition of a sentence quoted by Vasubandhu in his A.K.,—“cittavaśena kāyasya tathā tathā saṃsīdhānaṃ kāyavijñāpti” (The bodily gesture means such and such a bodily form associated with mind. AKBH. p. 192; Chinese tr., T. 29.67b6).

Let me quote another example:

“Karmajām lokāvicāryam cetanā tatkṛtāṃ ca tat.
cetanā mānasaṃ karma tajjatvā vākkāyakarmaṇā. [Kr. 1]

(AKBH. p. 192).

(The differences in this world are produced by karma. It [karma] consists of mind (cetanā) and its result (tatkṛtam). [The nature] of mental karma is mind, its [result] being speech and bodily karma).

Bodily karma and speech karma are materialistic, as far as their natures (vijñāpti) are based upon the four kinds of materialistic elements (earth, water, fire, wind). They are considered to be real and immediately unchangeable. But, when bodily and speech karma are performed, then, the unmanifested faculty (avijñāpti) will remain. Avijñāpti also is real and unchangeable.

Mind (cetanā), however, should be dynamic, free and changeable in accordance with any situation to come. Therefore, mind has no avijñāpti (a materialistic impression). Avijñāpti does not effect mind at all. The Buddha says that mind is just like a monkey moving from tree to tree. Mind is never a fixed entity. If mind were a fixed entity, one could not change his evil mind into a good mind in the future. If so, it will be opposed to the Buddha’s preaching. There should be no meaning of morality, which requires the transformation of an evil mind to a good mind.

Samghabhadra does not recognize the avijñāpti of mind, but claims instead to follow the Early Buddhist tenet of morality. Thus, Samghabhadra’s view of avijñāpti is not inconsistent to the Early Buddhist thought—the function of mind.
(B) Based on the realistic point of view, Samghabhadra attempted to give a concrete, real form to karma.

He just addresses the importance of outward appearance (vijñā-upti). In order to complete a karma, he thought, karma should be associated with outward appearance. Even mental karma, if it is sincere, will bring with it outward appearance such as bodily and vocal actions. In reference to this, Ny. metaphori-cally explains:

"[The Buddha is coming to a village; one will be pleased to welcome him.] He (who is welcoming the Buddha) has a pleasant mind and a mental action (mānasamkarma). This action, however, is only temporary; it will soon disappear [for mind is momentary in its nature]. If so, there should be no mental growth [which the Sautrāntika school maintains]. Therefore, we [the Sarvāstivādin] maintain that man has in this case both actions, bodily and vocal, together with [mental karma]."

(Ny. 35. T. 29, 542c7–10).

"It is because [he will naturally bring into practise the following actions]: Looking out on the Buddha he will speak reverent words, cause a wholesome manifested gesture (punya vijñāpti) and a wholesome unmanifested faculty (punya avijñāpti), dress up and want personally to greet the Buddha."

(Ny. 35. T. 29.542~~~).

These passages show us the spontaneity of mental karma in a way that it will manifest itself with outward appearance (kāya-vācika-karma) and will not remain in itself without realization.

Samghabhadra explains further in a positive way:

"Without an unmanifest faculty (avijñāpti) should not an action (karma) be completed. [Why is it?] In case one wants to make the other perform this and that, his manifest gestures [vocal order, hand-raising, etc.] alone would not be enough to complete his action, for a manifest action in itself does not mean the completed action. If he could completely make the other perform this and that, then, an unmanifest faculty (avijñāpti) will come into existence."

(Ny. 35. T. 29.542c10–13).

(C) Avijñāpti (an unmanifest faculty) does not continue after death. Avijñāpti is very often misunderstood as bīja (saktiviśeṣa),
which is an inherent power to link cause (*karma-hetu*) with effect (*karma-phala*) continuing from existence to existence (*santati- parināmavāśa*).

According to Saṃghabhadra, a link between cause and effect is of no use: when *karma* has taken place, then, effect in the present is set up. There is no link between the two.

"When [bodily and vocal actions have been performed and] *avijñapti* (an unmanifest faculty) has been remained, then actions, bodily and vocal, give rise to effect in the present [without any kind of intermediary]."

(*Ny. 35. T. 29.543a*7–8*).

What, then, is the process that gives rise to effect? Saṃghabhadra explains the process of causing effect without an intermediary as follows:

"A mental action (*mānasam karma*) which has arisen in the past will become a cause to induce the wholesome effect (*phalākṣepa*) and complete, realize, make it up, and bring it finally into completion."

(*Ny. 35. T. 29.543a*9–10*).

In short, there are seven terms to complete an effect:

1. Mind-arising (*cetanā-utpatti*).
2. A manifest action (*vijñapti*) occurs.
3. An unmanifest faculty (*avijñapti*) produced by *vijñapti* remains.
4. A cause to induce (*phalākṣepa*) functions.
5. The realization of *karma* (*karmapathabhuta*)—but not yet complete.
6. [*mānasam karma*] co-operates (*sahakārin*).
7. Effect is definitely produced (*janana*).

(*Ny. 35. T. 29.543a*9–10*).

**Conclusion**

Both Saṃghabhadra and Vasubandhu, being critical of each other, followed faithfully the Early Buddhist thought. The only difference was their approach. With his different interpretation Vasubandhu has gone over to the Mahāyāna Buddhism (the universal emptiness doctrine) by emphasizing the *bijā* idea. On the other hand, Saṃghabhadra's interpretation is realistic and epistemological. Considered of various interpretations given by ācārya-s, Saṃghabhadra would be regarded as the orthodox of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine.
In this field Samghabhadra’s Ny. requires much more attention than Abhidharmakośa by Vasubandhu.

NOTE

A SIMILARITY BETWEEN BUDDHAGHOSA AND SAMGHABHADRA

Kamma Doctrine

“Productive (janakam) karma may be either meritorious or demeritorious. It produces both form and the other fruition-groups, not only at the time of conception but as long as they continue.

Supportive (upatthambhaṇa) karma cannot produce fruit, but when rebirth has been given by other karma, and fruit has been produced, it supports the ensuing happiness or misery, and brings about its continuance.

Counteractive (upapīṭaka) karma, when rebirth has been given by other karma, and fruit has been produced, counteracts the ensuing happiness or misery, suppresses it, and does not suffer it to continue.

Destructive (upaghātaka) karma, whether meritorious or demeritorious, destroys other weak karma, and, preventing it from bearing fruit, makes room for its own fruition. The fruit which thus arises is called apparitional.”


(Visuddhimagga, pp. 601-602).

In this passage one of the four karma, upatthambhaṇa kamma,
is similar to a function of *mānasam karma*, which “arose in the past and will become a cause to induce the wholesome effect (phalākṣepa) and complete, realize, make it up, bring it finally into completion.”
(Ny. 35. T. 29.543a⁹-¹⁰).

VII. The Mental State of Enlightenment:
—*anuttpattidharmakṣānti*—

For clarifying the relation between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism, it is not always sufficient merely to compare their systems, which were developed in their own defence in refutation of other systematic schools. In the historical context one must deal not only with the Hinayāna texts but also with the later systems of the Mahāyāna commentaries. Attention must be given in particular to the general lines of Middle Indo-Āryan development, so far as the Buddhist terminology is concerned.

We find in these effects that some of the important Buddhist Sanskrit terms have been Sanskritized incorrectly from Pāli, and that they, in turn, have undergone a great change of meaning in themselves. This supposition can be established on the basis of the *khanti* (Pāli) –*kṣānti* (Skt.) relationship.

Sanskrit *kṣānti*, meaning ‘tolerance’, ‘forbearance’, plays an important role in Buddhist thought. Besides these, we have the following renderings. Edgerton gives the meaning ‘receptivity’ (BHS. Dic. 199b). It is also rendered into Tibetan as *bzod pas* and Chinese as *jen, ju*. Sylvain Lévi, following Kern’s view, translated it as acquiescence, and observed that ‘forbearance’, a philosophical connotation, has been added to the original. (Sūtrālām-kāraśāstra trs. p. 123). There is no doubt about its etymology —derived from *kṣam* (‘to bear’, ‘to be able to’), as far as it is concerned a Sanskrit term *kṣānti*.

Pāli term *khanti*, however, preceded the Sanskrit *kṣānti*. The former is evidently derived from *kam*, meaning ‘to be willing to’. Moreover, *khanti* has sometimes been Sanskritized into *kṣānti*. For instance, the Pāli term *dhammanijjhanakkhanti* has incorrectly been Sanskritized into *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* (Bodhisattvabhūmi, 195.10. Wogihara ed., 1930). It is also the same with the Sanskrit term *sarvadharmasvabhāvanidhyānaksānti* (Gandavyāha. ed. by Suzuki, 1934-36, 248.4.).
The Pāli *khanti* in this context is correctly Sanskritized as *kānti* (willingness), but not *kṣānti* (forbearance). Hence, the term *dhammanijjānakkhanti* should be translated as ‘willingness to the meditation on Truth’. It points out the mental state of Enlightenment. If it were rendered as *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* it would mean ‘forbearance for the meditation on Truth’. The meditation on Truth, however, is a Buddhist practice to be accepted, but not to be borne against one’s will. Such a translation would make little sense.

What is, then, the original meaning of *khanti*? How was the incorrect Sanskritization as *kṣānti* used in the Buddhist thought? Was this Sanskritization theoretical or practical in motivation? Let me trace the essential features of the multiple connotations of *khanti* through the following considerations.

As to the original meaning of *khanti* we have a passage in the Pāli canon Suttanipāta, which reads:

"yā kāc’imā sammutiyo puthujjanā, sabbā va etā na upeti vidvā. anūpayo so upayaṁ kim eyya diṭṭhe sute khantīm akubbamāno.” (Sn. 897)

[The opinions that have arisen amongst people, all these the wise man does not embrance; he is of no attachment. Should he who is not pleased with what has been seen and heard resort to attachment? ]

A Pāli term *upaya* in here is a synonym of *khanti*, meaning ‘attachment to the profane’.

There is another example:

"purāṇam nābhinandeyya, nave khantiṁ na kubbaye. hīyamāne na soceyya ākāsāṁ na sito sīvā. (SN 944.)

[Let him not delight in what is old, let him not take a pleasure in what is new, let him not grieve for what is lost, let him not give himself up to desire. ]

The phrase ‘nābhinandeyya’ (‘should not be delighted’) implies ‘khantiṁ na hīyamāne’ (‘does not take a pleasure in’). The same meaning can also be found in the Dhammapada:

"Khanti paramāṁ tapo titikkhā, nibbānam Paramāṁ vadanti Buddhā.” (Dhp 184 a-b).

In the above mentioned passage three kinds of the highest vir-
Abhidharmic Concepts

tue were declared by the Buddhas, e.g. willingness [to the highest achievement], patience, nibbāna. Rev. Adikararam rendered khanti as patience, and titikkhā as forbearance. (Adikararam. The Dhammapada, Colombo, 1955). It would, however, not be fair to take khanti as a synonym with titikkhā, for the Buddhas declared three virtues in this verse.

In the Pāli Nikāya also khanti represents a psychological function of inclination or willingness:

“anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgata.” (A III. 437, 441).

([Mind] is associated with [a psychological function] of suitability and inclination.)

In Pāli Abhidharma literature the same connotation is retained. The Dhammasaṅgani designates khanti as follows:

“yā khanti khamanatā adhivāsanatā accaṇḍikkaṁ anasuropo attamanatā cittassa—ayaṁ vuccati khanti.” (Dhs 1341). (khanti means tolerance, assent, no-anger, absence of abruptness, mind’s pleasure. This is termed khanti).

Thus, in Pāli Abhidharma literature also it connotes ‘to be willing to’ or ‘willingness’ which denotes a positive attitude towards action rather than ‘patience’.

The adjective form khantika makes its original meaning much clearer, as the Dighanikāya reads:


(Hard is it for you, Poṭṭhapāda, holding, as you do, different views, different willingness, setting different perfection, trained in a different system of doctrine, to understand this matter!).

A term aśāṇa-khantikeṇa is clearly expounded by a term aśāṇa-rucikeṇa (“under another’s free will”); kam, a root of khanti, is here explained by ruc (“to please”). Thus, it would be more accurate to render khantika as ‘willingness to do such and such a thing’ than ‘acquiescing in such and such a belief’ (PTSD). Khanti, therefore, is not limited simply to ‘belief’, but can be extended to something mental and material.

As indicated previously, the Pāli khanti corresponds to the Sanskrit kānti, while Buddhist Sanskrit texts usually Sanskritized
it as kṣānti, while kṣānti in its turn denotes ‘forbearance’, ‘patience, as it is derived from ‘kṣam’.

Nevertheless, in Pāli Abhidhamma the meaning of ‘forbearance’ can not be found in the term khanti. Khanti faithfully follows the original meaning of ‘willingness’.

In Sanskrit Abhidharma a concept kṣānti plays an important role in the psychological process of Enlightenment. In these cases kṣānti, losing its etymological meaning (‘forbearance’), has come to represent its implied meaning (‘willingness’). Let me select a few of Abhidharma’s examples.

The various functions of prajñā (the Highest Knowledge) are discussed in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa (Cf. the chapter on jñāna). According to his interpretation, jñāna (intuitive knowledge) is to understand definitely the Fourfold Noble Truth, that is, niṣ-citam (decision), while kṣānti is the function of judging (saṃtirana). Kṣānti in its turn is a synonym of upanidhāna. (Yaśomitra’s Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed., by Wogihara, p. 612). This term is derived from upa-ni-dhā (‘to put down near’ or ‘to lead near to’). It is the Sanskritized equivalent of the Pāli upanijjāna or upanij-jāyana (Edgerton, BHSD. p. 137b). Implicitly it connotes ‘inclination to’ or ‘willing to’. This will become clear by noting carefully its definition by Samghabhadra: “Kṣānti means to give rise to judgement (saṃtirana) and inclination (adhyādaya). It is not included in the function of jñāna (intuitive knowledge), for its psychological function affects [the religious practitioner] more stronger than jñāna in preparation for [the Enlightenment]” (Abhidharmayāñusāra-śāstra, 72. Taisho. 29.735b).

As indicated above, kṣānti implies judgement as well as inclination, but neither forbearance nor patience.

The understanding of kṣānti as ‘willingness’ will help much to realize a logical and integral nexus between psychological functions and religious practices. With regard to this nexus let me take an example.

Referring to anāśrava-jñāna (the intuitive knowledge free from intoxications), Vasubandhu gives three kinds of functions. The Abhidharmakośa reads:

“nāmālā kṣāntayo jñānam
tatprāheyasva vicikitsānuśayasyāprahāṇatvāt / dṛṣṭyastu tāh
sntirṇatmakatvāt yathā ca kṣāntayo dṛṣṭirna jānemavām punah
kṣayānupādadhirna dṛk /
The knowledge of Fourfold Truth (anāśravajñāna), as described in this passage, is obtained through three kinds of psychological transition, that is, kṣānti, drṣṭi, and jñāna. At the psychological stage of kṣānti a latent bias of doubt (vicikitsā) still remains. One can not definitely determine the certainty of the Truth; One’s mind is simply inclined toward it. It means that kṣānti indicates ‘will’ or ‘inclination’, but not ‘patience’ in any case. At the next stage of drṣṭi (view) one thinks of the truth and judges it to be true. At the last stage one reaches the spiritual tranquility beyond inclination and judgement, that is, jñāna (intuitive knowledge).

We can establish an integral relationship between these three stages only when we take kṣānti not as patience, but as willingness or inclination. In other words, kṣānti in this case rightly corresponds to a Sanskrit term kānti (khanti in Pāli).

There is another example, in which kṣānti is clearly used as a synonym of rocate, meaning ‘to be pleased’.

“adhimāтра satya-kṣamanād iti uṣmagatāvasthāyam mṛdu satyam kṣamate rocate.” (AKV. p. 533).

A Sanskrit term kṣamaṇa is rendered by the Chinese ‘jen ko’ (recognition). This Chinese term, however, sounds intellectual, and is not appropriate to indicate a voluntary inclination toward the Fourfold Truth (the fact of suffering, cause, cessation, path). The commentator Yasomitra, by putting kṣamaṇa together with rocate (‘to be pleased’), correctly indicates this intentional willingness toward the stopping of profane attachment for the sake of reaching liberation or spiritual tranquility.

The term kṣamaṇa in the following passage also can be taken in the same sense. The passage reads:

“kṣamaṇa-rūpeṇa ca kṣantaya utpadyante.” (ADV. p. 611).

(Willingness takes place because of taking pleasure.)

Now I turn to Mahāyāna Buddhism which will be dealt with in relation to Hinayāna tradition. Specially I will examine the term kṣānti Sanskritized incorrectly from khanti and its philosophical amendment.

For clarifying the Mahāyāna philosophy we shall consider one of the fundamental spiritual experiences described in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. This sūtra refers to a spiritual value, e.g., anutpattika-
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dharmakṣānti (the recognition of nothing born in this world), which is a spiritual experience of the ultimate truth of Buddhism. It runs:

“...trāidhātukam paśyanto’dhyātmabāhhyasarvadharmānupalabdhibhirniḥsvabhāvadarśanādutpādādṛṣṭivinivṛttāu māyādīdharmsvabhāvānugamānunātpannikautpattikadharmakṣāntiṃ pratilabhante.’ (Laṅk. p. 80-81).

(They [Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva) find that all things, inner and external, are beyond predicability, that there is nothing to be seen as self-nature, and that (the world) is not to be viewed as born; for this reason, when a wrong view to take the world as born will disappear, thereby, they will conform themselves to the insight that things are of the nature of an illusion, etc., and attain to the willing acceptance that things are unborn.)

As to a term anutpattikadharmakṣānti there are various European translations such as: acquiescence in the eternal law (Kern, Saddharmapundarīka, Engl. Tr. XXI. p. 134), resignation to the idea of not being reborn (W.H.D. Rouse, Śāntideva’s Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 297), resignation to consequences which have not yet arisen (Max Müller, Sukhavativyāha, Engl. Tr. XLIX. pp. 39-40, p. 51), the recognition that things are unborn (D.T. Suzuki, Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Engl. Tr. p. 71), etc.

A transliteration ‘resignation’ by Max Müller is denied by Sylvain Lévi (Sūtrālaṃkāra, French Tr. p. 123). In any case, these renderings would be much more accurate than ‘patience’ for kṣānti, as far as a philosophical connotation is concerned, for anutpattikadharmakṣānti, as it will be explained later, is a spiritual, positive experience, in which one willingly accepts the ultimate truth. This understanding can come only from the root kam of kānti (willingness), but not from kṣam of kṣānti (patience).

In connection with kṣānti it may be necessary to say a few words about the religious experience of anutpattikadharmakṣānti, which appears quite often in Mahāyāna sūtras. It represents the fact that emptiness or the absolute experience is beyond the thinkable, and therefore in the failure of intellect, designation is impossible. One can only refer to being unborn (anutpattika) in the absolute sense. The inclination or willingness to make this absolute statement is called kṣānti. If kṣānti would mean simply ‘patience’, as it literally connotes, what has patience to do with this absolute
experience that is to be defined as unborn? Rather, patience implies unwillingness and opposition to this absolute experience of emptiness or unborn-ness. Buddhist kṣānti, however, is a willing acceptance of the unborn, which determines the whole attitude of mind keeping it serene.

In the Sukhāvatīvyūha (S.B.E. XLIX, p. 51) three kinds of kṣānti are mentioned. They are:

1. Ghosānugā-kṣānti, meaning to listen to the Buddha’s teaching.
2. anulomikā-kṣānti, meaning to penetrate into the truth of non-self (anātman).
3. anutpattikadharmakṣānti, meaning a state to be attained when one completely realises the truth of emptiness.

Further, the Avataṃsaka-sūtra enumerates seven kinds of kṣānti as follows:

1. The knowledge of things as like māyā (huan jen), 2. a mirage (yen jen), 3. a dream (men jen), 4. an echo (hsiāng jen), 5. a shadow (ju men), 6. a phenomenon (hua jen), 7. empty (k’ung jen). (Chapter XXIX. Cf. Suzuki’s Lankāvatāra sūtra, p. 127).

This Mahāyānistic interpretation of kṣānti is also the same as kānti, which is a correct Sanskritization of Pāli khanti.

Quoting another example we shall examine the positive sense of kṣānti. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Śāstra describes two kṣānti, e.g. utpatti-kṣānti (willingness to arising) and dharmakṣānti (willingness to realize the truth). The sūtra explains as follows.

“Owing to the practice of utpatti-kṣānti one gives rise to compassion for the sake of the sentient beings, destroys sins present from the unmeasurable time, and gains on the unmeasurable merit. Owing to the practice of dharma-kṣānti one breaks ignorance of realities, and gains on the unmeasurable knowledge. Having completed these two practices, why should one not achieve whatever he wants.” (T. 25.276a).

A term dharmakṣānti in the above sense is apparently an abbreviation for anutpattikadharmakṣānti, which is attained when he fully realizes the absolute truth and recognizes that all is deprived of entity.

Further, the Daśabhūmika says:

“Those that have no self-substance are unborn and in their
nature are like the sky; dharmas sought outside the concatenation are the products of discrimination by the ignorant. There is, however, an unborn reality other [than those just mentioned] which is the one attained by the wise; its birth consists in not being born, and in this not being born, there is their kṣānti.” (Dasabhūmika, ed. by Rahder, p. 203, pp. 108-109; Suzuki, Lankāvatāra sūtra, pp. 227-228).

In the same sūtras we have another passage:

“The triple world thus has nothing to depend upon, either inside or outside; seeing this existence unborn there is the kṣānti of no-birth.” (Ibid., p. 273, 67; Suzuki, Ibid., p. 228).

All these quotations adequately describe the Mahāyānistic way of thinking and feeling in a positive manner. The experience of anuttāpikā-dharma-kṣānti referred to in the Mahāyāna texts is precisely the highest object of the Buddhist life which all Buddhist practitioners are willing to reach. From this point of view it is unambiguous that kṣānti means willingness toward the state even of ‘not-being-born’ (anuttāpikādharma-kṣānti).

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

SECTION I

3. The Buddhas did not preach first the paramatthakathā, which might sound rough to the disciples. Hence they preached first the sammutikathā, i.e., ‘Pakatiyā pana paṭhamam eva paramātthakathān kathentassa desanā lūkhākārā hoti tasmā buddhā paṭhaṁ sammutikathāṁ katheva pacchā paramātthakathāṁ kathenti’. (Ibid.)
4. Both paramatthā and sammuti are the means, in which the Buddhas preach the truth (saccam, saṁbhāvam). In Abhidharma saṁbhāva is synonimous with saccā. Saccā reveals itself in the form of saṁbhāva. It is said in Kvu. Com. (p. 34): ‘Te sammutikathān kathentā pi saccam eva saṁbhāvam eva amasā ‘va kathenti. Paramatthakathān kathentā pi saccam eva saṁbhāvam eva amasā va kathenti.’
6. Yogācārayabhūmi-sāstra. 75, T. 30,713c; The Tibetan Otani Photographed Edition, 97,205,5, I. This sāstra enumerates the five of the transcendental characteristics of paramārtha: I. inexpressible, 2. non-dual, 3. indisciminative, 4. neither different nor identical and 5. equality of all things.
7. Vin. I. 123; A. IV. 347; VbhA. 164; Miln. 28. PTS.
8. The Suttanipāta reads:
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"Yā kāc'īmā sammutyō pathujjā, sabbā va etā na upeti vidvā, anūpayo so upayānī kim eyya diṭhe sute khamitī akubbhamāno." (897)

"Sakaṁ hi dharmam pariṣțṇam āhu aḷḷaṇassa dharmam pana hīnam āhu evam pi viggayha vīvādhyantī sakāṁ sakāṁ sammutim āhu saccaṁ" (904)


Sammuti is equated with samaṇaṇa paññatti, vohāro and nāmamattam. The Milindapaññha runs further: ‘sādhu kho tvarī mahaṛīja rathāṇī jānūsti, evam eva kho mahaṛīja mayham pi kese ca paṭicca lome ca paṭicca—pe matthalingaṇī ca paṭicca ruṇaṇi ca paṭicca vedanaṇī ca paṭicca saṅkhaṇī ca paṭicca sankhāre ca paṭicca viññhānaṇī ca paṭicca Nāgaseno ti sankhā samaiṇaṇa paññatti voharo nāmaṁ maitarī paṭavatī paramathala paṇ’ettha puggalo niippalabbhitī’. (Miln., pp. 27-28).

Macdonell and Keith. Vedic Index of Names and Subjects; N.S. Sonatakke and C.G. Kashikar. &vedmarphitī, Vol. V. Indices. The meaning of samvṛti used in the Vedic literature is quite different from the Buddhist sense. In this respect I am indebted to Dr. Belvalkar of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.


13. Puggalapaññattī-Atthakathā. JPTS. 1913-1914, pp. 171-175. A Sanskrit equivalent prajñāpti is translated into such Tibetan as brtags (rtags), gdags and gtags, meaning ‘sign’ or ‘symbols’. These meanings are in Pāli subject to the classification of dasana-pakāsanā-paññatti, which is paired with thapanānikkhipanāpaññatti. Regarding the variety of paññatti in Pāli texts see my book, A Study of Abhidharma Philosophy, Tokyo: Kobundo, 1958, pp. 1-9; Sylvain Lévi. Mahāyānasūtraśāstra. Paris: 1911, p. 274-275. A Tibetan term gdags stands for a Sanskrit prajñā also. Both prajñāpti and prajñā seem to be considered derived from the same meaning ‘to make known’.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


24. The *Lāṅkāvatāra-sūtra* explains samvṛti in such technical terms as saṁśītā, pratiṣṭhā and vyāvahāra. These terms can be equated to prajñāpatti, pratipatti and udbhāvanā respectively as Sthiramati enumerates. (T. 30.824c).

A term vyāvahāra in this classification exactly denotes ‘speech’ in a narrow sense, but ‘speech’, as noted before, does not represent vyāvahāra as the whole. In case of vohāra as ‘speech’ this Pāli term is explained as abhīlāpa, bhāsā-vohāra and māyādhiṣṭayo bhāsā and the like. (D. Kosambi. Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha of Anuruddhācāya with Navañātikā. Banaras: Mahabodhi Society, p. 155). Another example for limited sense of ‘speech’ is found in a text of logic: ‘kathānicidupalabhyavam anyathā na hi sidhyati. vyavahārasya sādhyatve prasiddham syān nidarsanam.’ (A. Kunst. Probleme der Buddhistschen Logik in der Darstellung des Tatvasaṅgraha p. 32). Vyavahāra in this passage indicates ‘der konventionelle Sprachgebrauch’ equivalent to one of the two meanings of a Pāli vohāra.

25. There is many an instance, in which conservations and evolutions...
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interwoven in India have come to formulate a particular system of philosophy in China.


26. Arnold Kunst. *Probleme der Buddhistschen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṅgraha* Krokow: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1939, p. 33, 36. According to the Abhidharma the Absolute or a real existence must have its own nature (svaśāṣaṇaṇa sañi). All other things are considered relative. Hence the Mahāyāna idea of the synthesis of the Absolute and the Relative is not found in Abhidharma.

The major purpose of Abhidharma is not simply religious, inward experience, but the becoming conscious of reality (svabhāva), which is epistemology to us only as long as we have not experienced it. Regarding the metaphysical and empirical character of Abhidharma confer to the relevant description of the L. Anagarika Govinda’s work, *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy*. London: Rider and Company, 1961. pp. 38-41.

**Section II**


5. Buddhaghosa, *Vism.* p. 443. PTS.


7. “bhūmi salakkanādiṭṭhagahanavasena pavattitthānabhāvato” (Ibid., p. 18).


17. AK. (chi. Abhidharmakośa, T. 29.137c, line 2.)

18. *Ibid.* Regarding a psychological function, i.e., determination (pravicaya) Yaśomitra comments, “dhammapravicaya iti. pravicinotiti pravicayāḥ pravaciyante vā anena dhammā iti pravicayāḥ, yena saṁkīrṇā iva dhammāḥ puspāntva pravaciyante ucciyanta ity arthāḥ. Ime sāsravā inte'nāsravā, ime
19. Yasomitra, clarifying the definition of *prajñā* as *sākāra*, introduces in his work the Sautrantika’s view: “ālambana-grahaṇa-prakāra ākāra iti. naitrukta vidhir iti darśayaty ālambana śabdād ākāram grhitvā prakāra-śabdāe ca kāra-śabdām. śesavarṇa-lope ca kṛte ākāra iti rūpam bhavati. tad evaṃ sati prajñāpi sākāra bhavatii siddhaḥ.” (AKV., p. 629).

20. There have been various linguistic approaches to the term ‘prajñāpāramitā’ among the scholars, ancient and modern. Haribhadra interprets this term in his *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* as a compound ‘pāramit-tā’, meaning thereby ‘to get to the other shore (of this life).’ Such scholars as Böhlhingk, Burnouf, M. Vassilieff seem to take this view. The Tibetan equivalent ‘pha-rol-tu-phyin-pa’ also follows this wrong interpretation. On the other hand, such scholars as F.W. Thomas, T.W. Rhys Davids, W. Stede, H. Dayal, seem to confirm the view that *pāramitā* is derived from *pāra*, meaning simply ‘highest condition, highest point’. (Cf. H. Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., LTD, 1952, p. 166). The forms *pārami* and *pāramitā* are found in Pāli, i.e., in the Suttanipāta, the Nettipakaraṇa and the jātaka and others, as Dayal mentions in his work. Dayal also remarks further, “The earlier and alternative form *pārāmi* also points to the derivation from *pāra*...”. He did not mention about the phonetic change of *i* (a long vowel) into *ī* (a short vowel), i.e. *pāramitā* (ita to ita). A long vowel *i* preceding the consonant is as a rule changed to *ī*. We have, in this context, the example of *pāramipatta* found in such various Pāli texts as Majjhim Nikāya, III. 28; Nd. 475; Miñ. 2, etc. There is, however, an example in which both vowels occur. For example, the Atthasālinī, the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Edition (ed. by Bapat), has a Pāli ‘pāramibhūva’ (p. 85) for ‘pāramitabhūva’ found in the Pāli Text Society Edition of the same text.

21. According to the investigation mentioned above the term jñāna concerns the knowledge, transcendental and consequential, while *prajñā* concerns the knowledge, immanent and existential. It is for this reason that the knowledge of the Buddha is always represented by the Sanskrit original, ‘Buddha-jñāna’ but not by ‘Buddhaprājñā’. It is because *prajñā* concerns the exercise of the practitioner, retaining thus its original meaning, immanent and existential. As far as the Chinese translation concerns, *Buddhajñāna* is rendered by ‘chi’, ‘wei’ and also ‘chi wei’ in a compound form. All these Chinese renderings are also applied to *prajñā*. Thus, the Chinese translation has no rigid distinction between jñāna and prajñā. Jñāna stands for ‘chi’ and sometimes for ‘wei’ in Chinese. It is the same with *prajñā*.

From this historical point of view we can throw a new light upon the modern Buddhism in Japan. There have been the two trends of thought developed in Japan: zen Buddhism and Shinshu Pietism. The former, in this respect, emphasises *prajñā* (to be exercised), while the latter emphasises jñāna attributed simply to the Amida Buddha. The Shinshu Pietism has become paramount in Japan, so that faith in the Amida Buddha or the knowledge of
Amida Buddha (Buddhajña) is the sufficient condition of salvation, and the concept of prajñā fades into second place or rather disappears. Both Zen intellectualism accruing on prajñā and Shinshu Pietism accruing on jñāna play considerable roles in the development of modern Buddhism in Japan. Zen intellectualism is recognized as part of the preparation of the ultimate jñāna. It is preparatio mystica. On the other hand, Shinshu Pietism is an ancillary to prajñā (meditative knowledge). We might characterize this relation between intellectualism and pietism by assigning the different weights to the two forms of knowledge: prajñā and jñāna, as we have described above.

SECTION III

1. Asl. (ed., by P.V. Bapat, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1942) reads ‘kālasamayćaya’, while the Pāli Text Society Edition (London, 1897) reads ‘kālasamaya’. The former is preferable to the latter, for the concept of samaya is in this passage defined by other terms.

2. It is interesting to note that these three processes, uppāda, thiti and bhaṅga, are analogous to the three principles of trimūrti: arising (Brahmā), preservation (Viśnu) and decay (Śiva). These three also correspond with catvāri laksanāni or the four characteristics of the created (sanskṛta) in the Sarvāstivāda School, namely, jāti, sthiti, jāra and anityatā. The Pāli concept thiti includes anyathā (jāra in the Sarvāstivāda school) in a compound term thiti-anyathā. This implication is exemplified by the Sarvāstivāda, which takes sthiti (sthiti in Pāli) as a synonym for jāra, i.e., ‘tathā jārayā sthityanyathātvam paryāya iti’, (Yaśomitra, AKV. ed., by Wogihara. p. 171-172; Abhidharmakośa, Chinese version, V verse 46cd).


4. In Mahāyāna this formula is dealt with from the view-point of śānta-vāda (Madhymaka-kārikā XXIV. kr. 18), which does not distinguish this formula, ‘imāsmiṁ sati, idaṁ hoti......’ from the passage: ‘Upon ignorance depend the karma-formations......’. Madhyamika’s interpretation of the twelve links is transformed into examinations of pratīyaya (ibid., L) and Dvāśaśānga (ibid., XXVI). Nagārjuna’s interpretation reduced the twelve links into pratīyaya (the Relativity) in the light of śānta idea. It is experimental. It concerns merely the notion of relativity (parasparāpekṣa or anyonyāpekṣa).

In other words, in Mahāyāna Buddhism ‘pratītyasamutpāda’ denotes sam-vṛti, a state converted by ignorance, as opposed to paramārtha. Candrakīrti criticizes the Sarvāstivāda view that pratītyasamutpāda means creation (utpāda) by one cause or with no cause (Prasannapadā, Bibl. Bud. IV, ed. L. Vallé Poussin, pp. 10-11). Later Mahāyāna Buddhism interprets this formula ‘When
this exists, that exists... as the ‘dependence of things’ confining the concrete application of the formula ‘upon ignorance depend the karma-formation...’ only to the Hinayânic idea. Sañghabhadra’s analysis of Pratityasamutpâda is worthy of note.

5. This idea can be found also in the Theravâda’s interpretation. ‘Naydham âdîmattakahanam; paññhânadhammakatharanam pan’etam.’ Tiññan hi vâttânam avijjâ paññhânâ; avijjâgahañena hi avasesa-kelesavaññi ca kam- mâdhi ca bâlani patibedhentí...Iti yah gahhato bandho muccato ca mok-kho hoti, tassa paññhânadhammassakatharanam idam, na âdîmattakahanan ti. Evam idam bhavaçakakarni aviditâdi ti veditabbaññi ‘(Vism, p. 577). Avijjâ as âdi is distinguished from pakati (prakrti) in Sâmkhya: ‘kasmâ pan’etthâ avijjâ âdito vutta. Kim, pakatiâdham pun pakati viya, avijjâ pi akârâññi mudâkâraññi lokassá ti? Na akârâññam; âsavasamudayâ avijjâ samudayo ti hi avijjâya kâraññam vuttaññi’ (Vism, p. 525).

6. The application of the two concepts (paramârtha and dharmasanketa) to âdîva is a product of the genius of Sañghabhadra. It is possibly due to the critical attitude of the Sarvâstivâda school against heretic views. We can not overlook that the Sarvâstivâda views have been systematized and formulated to meet the heretic ones. (Cf. Chatterjee ‘Problems of Knowledge and the Four Schools of later Buddhism’, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Vol. XXII, part iii.) In contrast, the Theravâda school faithfully followed the early Buddhist tradition, interpreting it from the point of view of psychology rather than epistemology.

7. Sañghabhadra (5th century A.D.) composed two śâstras: Abhidharma-nyâyânasûra and Samayapradâkîpa, which are extant both in Chinese and Tibetan. The former has also the French translation for the three chapters (50-52 chapters) out of 80 chapters (translated by La Vallée Poussin, Mêlanges chiffres et Bouddhique, 1936-1937). Poussin’s translation corresponds to the Chinese ‘Shun-Can-li-lun’ (Nyânusûrasâstro), but not to the Chinese ‘Chontcheng-luen’ (Samayapradâkîpa), which he himself wrongly identified. In these texts and commentaries the author’s name is differently described. The texts mentioning the name ‘Sañghabhadra’ are Yasomitra’s Abhidharma-kosavyâkhya, and possibly the original Sanskrit śâstras of the Chinese Pradîpa and Nyânusûra; the texts mentioning ‘Sahantabhadra’ are Sântiraksita’s Tatvasaṃgraha (Gaekwad Series. No. XXX. 1926, Baroda) and possibly the Sanskrit original of the Tibetan Pradîpa; the Tibetan translation of the Abhidharma-kosavyâkhya mentions both Sañghabhadra (hdus bz’an) and Sahantabhadra (hdul bz’an). The former is found in three chapters, dhâtunirdeśa, indriya and loka, while the latter in two chapters, karmanirdeśa and Samâdhi’. Cordier’s Catalogue (mdo-Hgrel64) gives two Tibetan names to the author of Pradîpa: hdus-bz’an and hdul-bz’an; the latter is considered to stand for the Sanskrit name Vinitabhadra, which perferably stands for Sahantabhadra. It would not be unfair to consider the original Mongolian name as an equivalent to the Sanskrit Sahantabhadra. Cordier gives Binayabhadra to the Original Mongolian.

8. Kâritra apparently is based on Skt. cāritra blended with forms of ka r-, kār- (Edgerton, Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, p. 179, Yale University Press, 1953). The Pāli cārīta stands for the Skt., cāritra, ‘yāvad antaśo māloguna-
parikṣipta api tadārūpa (su ha sahasa) cādirātmisāpadya (nie) (Waldschmidt, 51).
—Das Mahāparinirvānasūtra, Teil II, S. 112, Akademie-Verlag, 1951. The change of a single consonent, c>k can be found in numerous cases: eiketa (aor.), keta (derivative), cāru-kālu (Asoka edict. Queens Edict no. I, line 5), katuḥhi (i) = kāresu = kṛtābhicāresu (Girnar Rock Edict V), a queen kālu-vāki = cāruvāki (C.D. Chatterjee, ‘Studies in the Inscriptions of Aśoka’ no. I (c). Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, XXXVII, 1956, p. 232) etc. The Pāli cārītta, derived from car, to move, to proceed, means cārītta-vārītta (the manner of acting and avoiding. J. iiii. 195; Th. 591. etc.). Cārītta denotes merely ‘to move’ and is not a positive term such as ‘to produce’, or ‘to create’, Saṃghabhādha designated kārītra as the ‘ability to draw forth’ (ākṣepaṣaktiḥ) the effect but not to ‘produce’ (janana) it. (Ny. 51. T. 29, 631c; also see Tatvasaṅgraha, p. 506, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, no. XXX, 1926, Baroda). This means that when the effect comes into existence, kārītra is not the direct cause but rather an indirect or helping cause, (ibid., 52. T. 29, 631d). Kārītra is used as synonym for puruṣākāra; puruṣa is used as a compound puruṣākāra-phala, one of the six causes (AKV., p. 201). The meaning of puruṣa is considered as a difficult word, but it does not denote ‘strong power’ as is commonly believed. It means ‘human effort, manly virility (M. Williams, SED) or manly performance’ (Edgerton, BHD., p. 348b). The meaning of the Pāli puriṣaṅkāra also is the same as the Skt. puruṣākāra. (D.I. 53; Miln. 96). Puruṣākāra denotes merely the conventional usage to express the humanly performance just like the foot of crow, the medicinal herb, the drunken elephant and the general, (Abhidharmakośa, 19 T. 29. 35b). Thus, puruṣaṅkāra represents the manner of moving, which is the original significance of kārītra.


Kāvya mīmāṁsā, Rājaśekhara, gives a suggestion; kārayitri......pratibhā (creative), bhāvayitri......pratibhā (reflective; kārayitī-kārītra, meaning ‘to draw forth’ (thanks to Dr. Chatterjee, Calcutta, who gave this suggestion on the occasion of the XXVI International Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi. 1964).

9. About the Sautrāntika’s equivalency of Kārītra and pratyaya see Ny. T. 29.632 b10-12. This idea is based upon the theory of momentariness. According to this theory all dharmas have the ability to interrelate with each other in a form of pratyaya; all of them have sarūpya (conformity). This notion of the relatedness has been expounded by Dharmakirti, who established a presupposition: ‘Sambandha is help up by paratantrya’. (Frauwallner, ‘Dharmakirti’s Saṃbandhaparīksā’, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XLI Bd. 265-300 SS.). Tibetan version, of Peking Ed. 95. 357a-358b; 358-364b and also Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya, Patna, 1953.
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According to the Sarvastivāda school Dharmas are interrelated with each other by means of sabhāga-hetu and nisyanda-phala.

10. The Theravādas gave predominance to prataya since the beginning of this tradition, which concerned merely the human relationship. Hence they did not have to distinguish between hetu and prataya. A psychological attitude was applied to the concept of paticcasamuppāda; each of psychological factors arising is related to the twelve lines of dependence: ‘When [the unwholesome mind] arises, sankhāra depends upon avijjā, etc, (Vibh. p. 165) Buddhaghosa explains the momentariness of the Dependent Origination: “Ekacittakhane ca bahū cetanā na santīti sankhārā ti avatāva sankhāro ti vut-tam. (Sammohavinodani p. 201). “Yasmā ca ekacittakhaṇṇapariyāpanno eko v'etthā phasso, tasmā tass'ānurāpaṃ paccayabhūtam āyatanam gāhanto salāyata nāma-paccaya chaṭṭhāyatanan ti ekaṃ manāyatanam yeva āha. (ibid).

11. The Vaibhāsikas hold the view that the four pratayas have their own natures, which correspond to svabhāva or bhāva. (Pradīpa, T. 29.822a). The Vaibhāsika’s equivalency of svabhāva to bhāva sometimes gives rise to the controversy between the Sarvastivāda and the Sautrāntika. According to the Vasubandhu’s interpretation, approximating the Sautrāntika, the concept hetuprataya is considered to be bija, which is based upon alayavijñāna. Alayavijñāna, in its turn, has a double aspect: phalabhāva and hetubhāva. Bhāva in this sense implies šakti or function. Nevertheless, Sarīghabhadrā interprets it as a reality or entity, for Bhāva in his sense is equivalent to svabhāva (reality), (Ny. T. 29, 440b20-21; 440b4-4).

12. Both schools, Theravāda and Sarvastivāda, call the syllogism ‘imasmin sati idān hiti…..’ idappaccayatā (idapratyayatā), and the formula ‘upon ignorance depend the karma-formations…..’ paticcasamuppāna-dhamma (pratityasamutpādadharma). But the Theravādin does not discuss the syllogism separated from the formula, taking both of these as two different aspects of the one and same thing. Namely, the former refers to paticcasamuppāda in view of kāraṇa (causing), while the latter in view of dhamma (the caused). Sammohavinodani reads, idappaccayatā ti sankhārādhami kāraṇāni avijjādīni angāṇi. Paticcasamuppānadhammā ti avijjādihi nibbattā saṅkhārādayo dhammā (Sammohavinodani, p. 139).

13. The time concept is not considered as drava (Mahāvaibhāsyaśāstra. T. 27. 141b; 183; 919b. etc. also cf. the Chinese commentary on the Mādhyamaka-kārikā, T. 42. 130c).

14. The A.K.V. mentions three kinds of sat: trividhāni hi yogācāraṇāṁ sat. paramāṁrtha savāyati-satdravya-sacca. dravyatā sva-lakṣaṇatāḥ sad dravyasad iti (A.K.V., p. 524; L de la Vallée Poussin, L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu VI. 4. p. 141, note 1; IV, p. 18, n. 1.) The concept svalakṣaṇena sat (the being its own nature) is the characteristic common to these three sat. Buddhist realism distinguishes between svalakṣaṇa (abstraction and generality), placing the emphasis upon the former (cf. Arnold Kunst, ‘Probleme der Buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des des Tatvasaṅgраha Krokow, 1939, p. 33).

15. Yaśomitra mentions the distinction between sarvāsmīn kāle and nitya: svabhāvah sarvadā cāṣṭiti. yad rūp’ādeḥ svalakṣaṇāṁ, tat sarvasmīn kāle viḍyatā ityāya. yadi rūp’ādeḥ svabhāvah sarvadāsti tena rūp’ādeḥ bhāvo nityaḥ prāpnoti. ata āha. bhāvo nityaḥ ca nesyaṭe. (A.K.V., p. 472). The fundamental
standpoint of the Sarvāstivāda school is clearly shown in the principles: sva-bhāvah sarvadā cāsti as well as sarvadharmah nityāḥ santi. To understand these apparently inconsistent principles we must deeply investigate the two aspects of time: actuality and causality. I have got an opportunity to discuss about two modes of time with Professors Lousi and Margaret Chandler, Illinois University, U.S.A. who gave me kind suggestions.

16. The Theravāda also came to the same conclusion as the Sarvāstivāda through a different approach toward the time. The present (paceuppanna) in the Pāli sense, derived from prati-uppanna, refers to the potential future. Uppanna is classified into the four divisions: vattamāṇa, bhūtāpagata, okāsakata and bhūmiladdha (Vism., p. 687). Beginning with vattamāṇa uppanna (‘things presently arised’), the other three divisions follow in an order of a decreasing degree of actuality (Nyanaponikā, Abhidhamma Studies, p. 83). We would like to consider it as the transformation of reality from the objective to the subjective; vattamāṇa uppanna refers to things objectively existing, while the last division bhūmiladdha uppanna to the human defilement existing in our mind, which may be conquered and overcome, or more accurately speaking, may be changed in conformity with the world of immediate phenomena. The Pāli concept of the present implies momentary actuality representing the Early Buddhist tradition. It implies also the effort to attain Nirvāṇa in the present. The Digha Nikāya reads: khīnā jāti, vasītām brahmacariyām, karaṇīyām, nāparam itthattāyāti abbhaṁnāsi (D. i. p. 203). This passage corresponds to the Suttanipāta 729. Buddhaghosa interpreted itthabhāva in the Suttanipāta as the human state (SN. Com., II. 2. p. 505) meaning the Arhat attaining complete Enlightenment will not again return to this present state to remove remaining defilements because he has already removed himself from all defilements. Nāparam itthattāya in the Digha Nikāya is translated in the Chinese version as ‘not to enter another birth’. This translation easily misleads us to the notion of a transmigration of life after death. Buddhaghosa points out two cases, the dative and the ablative. In both cases it means there no longer exists a state in which we must do further practices (DN. Com. I. p. 226). The usage of the concept nāpūram itthattāya in the ablative case can be found also in the Samyutta Nikāya (S. II. p. 104); paccuddavattati kho idaiṁ viṁśatam nāmarūpamhā nāparaṁ gacchati. We can amend the former sentence into itthattāya nāparaṁ gacchati. The PTSD gives idha as an equivalent to ittha. However, this could also be an equivalent to etta. We like to take it as iha, derived from the i-tra, meaning ‘just now’ or ‘present state’. Nāparam itthattāya refers to the present state and can similarly be applied to Nirvāṇa in the present, but not to the life after death.

SECTION IV

1. a-tan-si-yu-ki-Taisho 51.891c-892b.
2. Ibid. 50.190ff.


6. As a provisional hypothesis, the period between 705-763 A.D. is given to the date of Sántaraksita. Cf. Bhattacharya's article in the Tattvasamgraha, Gackward XCVI. GOS XXX. 1926. Proof. K.B. Pathak, however, suggests the 9th century A.D. Cf. his article Dharmakirti and Brāhmaṇa, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, VIII. p. 372.

7. The following table will show how two names of Samghabhadra and Sahantabhadra are employed in both versions, Sanskrit and Tibetan, of the Yasomitra's Abhidharmakośavyākhyā.

**Tib. AKV. Peking Ed., Tanjur 65**

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(Peking Ed. ācārya; Narthang Ed. ācārya Saṃghabhadra)

| 334b | 1    |               | 657  | 28   |               |
| 363a | 7    |               | 682  | 9    | (samāpattinirdeśa) |
8. The central tradition of the Sarvāstivāda school took its origin from the six works of the Abhidharma, from Kātyānānīputra’s Jñānaprasthāna to the Mahāvibhāṣāsūtra. This tradition can be said to be represented by Saṁghabhadrā rather than by Vasubandhu. On the relationship between the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda confer to E. Frauwallner, The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature, p. 40. Serie Orientale Roma VIII. Roma 1956, and to A. Bareau, Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule p. 154. École Française d’Extrême-Orient, Saigon, 1955.

SECTION V

3. Śūnyatā is used as a synonym of such concepts as pratītyasamutpāda, madhyapratipad and saṃsāra. Cf. Prasānnapāda, p. 503; p. 535.
5. Yuien (Shinran’s disciple), Tannishō (a collection of the Shinran’s oral teachings and critique on the heretic views), Chapt. 18.
8. The external reaction against sin, one of the types of sin, is also found in Shintoism in Japan. A concept of sin (Jap. tsumi), in contrast to Buddhistic conception, denotes something like dirt accumulated on surfaces of things. This concept of sin includes all malformations and all natural accidents. We have Shintoist terms such as amatsu tsumi (sins of heaven), kunitsu tsumi (sins of land), kokutagu no tsumi (miscellaneous sins), magagoto (bad things causing annoyance or pain). Shintoist sins are derived from a natural process and no matters to be made into cases for ethical judgement. All sins are, in terms of purification, to be carried off (harai) to the ocean, which is only the way of transforming them into purification. With respect to the comparison between Japanese and Indian tsumi and culture, Cf. G.H. Sasaki. Social and Humanistic Life in India, Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1971, pp. 176-180; 219-226.
APPENDICES
Appendix I

ZWEI LEHRWEISE DES GOTAMO BUDDHO
—pariyāya und nippariy āya

1. Die Bedeutung des Problems

Im folgenden möchte ich ein Problem des buddhistischen Denkens behandeln und mich dabei auf zwei verschiedene Begriffe beziehen: pariyyāya und nippariyāya (in Pāli). Ich stütze mich dabei auf buddhistisches Material; entnommen dem Pāli, Sanskrit, tibetischen und chinesischen Quellen.

Ein Charakterzug, der für die Pāli-Philosophie (Theravāda-Philosophie) bezeichnend ist, ist die Unterscheidung zwischen pariyyāya (alternative Bestimmung) und nippariyāya (definitive Bestimmung). Der ältere der beiden Begriffe wird auch Sutta-naya genannt, d. h. die Methode, die in den Suttas gebraucht wird; der jüngere Abhidhammanaya, d. h. die Methode, die im Abhidhamma gebraucht wird.

Das Wort pariyyāya bedeutet im vedischen Sanskrit “arrangement“, während nippariyāya (nisparyāya in Skt.) nur in Bharatas Nātyasāstra gefunden wird und “out of order“ bedeutet. Für die Buddhisten haben jedoch diese beiden Begriffe einen anderen Sinn. Wie ich oben schon gesagt habe, werden sie im Pāli-Buddhismus (Theravāda) gebraucht, um zwischen Suttanta-naya und Abhidhamma-naya zu unterscheiden. Im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus dagegen drücken sie eine metaphysische Wahrheit aus: sie bezeichnen das Verhältnis zwischen Grund (parīyāya) und Tatsache (nisparyāya; Pāli nippariyāya).

Nach F. Edgerton’s Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary sind die verschiedenen Bedeutungen des Wortes pariyyāya: 1. arrangement, 2. way, 3. means, 4. alternative kind. Aber in diesem Wörterbuch findet man nisparyāya nicht. Im vedischen Sanskrit und in der buddhistischen Literatur des Pāli und buddhistischen Sanskrit findet man sehr oft die drei Bedeutungen arrangement, way und means. Die Bedeutung alternative kind findet sich jedoch nur in der buddhistischen Literatur aber nie in der vedischen. Im Folgenden werden wir die ersten drei Bedeu-
tungen außer acht lassen und unsere Besprechung auf die letzte beschränken. Denn sie ist der Schlüssel, der die Tür zum Verständnis der buddhistischen Philosophie öffnet.


2. Bedeutungen in den Pāli Texten


Außer diesen deskriptiven Bedeutungen gibt es aber auch noch andere, die die methodischen oder systematischen genannt werden können. Wir haben bereits festgestellt, daß pariyāya „Grund“ bedeutet, nippariyāya dagegen „Folge, Tatsache“. Wie das gemäß ist, macht uns folgendes Zitat aus der Atthasālinī klar, das das Verhältnis zwischen „magga“ und „suññatā“ behandelt. Die Atthasālinī sagt:

"tattha suttantikapariyāyena sagunato pi ārammanato pi nāmañ labhāti. pariyāyadesanā hesā. abhidhammakathā pana nip-"
Appendix

pariyāyadesanā tasmā idha saṅunato vā ārammanaṇato vā nāmaṃ na labhati, āgamanato va labhati.45


Hier möchte ich noch einige Zitate einfügen, um den Unterschied zwischen pariyāya (Grund) und nippariyāya (Tatsache) deutlicher zu machen. Die Sammohavinodanī sagt das Gleiche mit anderen Worten:

„[thapetvā dukkhadukkhaṃ sesaṃ] dukkhasaccavibhaṅge āgataṃ jāti-ādi sabbaṃ pitassa tassa dukkhassa vattthubhāvato pariyāyadukkhaṃ nāma. dukkhadukkhaṃ nippariyāydukkhaṃ nāma."46


In diesem Satz bedeutet „pariyāya“ den Grund, woraus etwas zur Existenz kommen kann; die Geburt u. s. w. ist der Grund, aus dem das Leiden entsteht. Der pariyāya enthält den Grund (vattvu), worauf dessen Folge oder Tatsache (d. h. das Leiden) beruht. Der nippariyāya bedeutet eine Tatsache oder Folge, die aus dem Grund hervorgeht.

Dazu noch einen weiteren Satz:

„tattha kāyikacetasikā dukkhā vedanā sabhāvato ca nāmato ca dukkhattā dukkhadukkhaṃ nāma". (Ibid. p. 93).

[Die körperlichen und geistigen Gefühle des Leidens werden Leiden als solches genannt, weil sie sowohl ihrer Eigenart als auch ihrem Namen nach Leiden sind].

Beide Begriffe in diesem Satz, Eigenart und Name, sind nichts anderes als die Begriffe, die ein reales Ding oder ein konkretes Ergebnis bedeuten, nämlich eine Folge oder Tatsache. Denn das,
Leiden als solches bedeutet einen wirklichen Tatbestand. Wir können diesen Tatbestand immer wirklich erleben. Deshalb sind Eigenart und Name das Leiden selbst. Auf diese Art sind Eigenart und Name nichts anderes als die Tatsache, d. h. nippariyāya.


3. Bedeutungen in der Sarvāstivāda-Schule

Um die methodische Bedeutung von pariyāya (Skt. paryāya) und nippariyāya (Skt. nisparyāya) in der Sarvāstivāda-Schule deutlich zu machen, möchte ich mich auf eine Diskussion im Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhus beziehen, die über das Leiden (duhkha) und dessen Analyse handelt.


An der erwähnten Stelle des Abhidharmakośa findet sich nun eine Diskussion über die Verschiedenartigkeit des Leidens zwischen Vasubandhu und einem Gegner, wie folgt.

Der Gegner protestiert gegen Vasubandhu und sagt:

„Der Buddha sagt einmal in einem anderen Sūtra, daß es drei Arten des Gefühls gebe. Diese sind sukha, duhkha und asukhāduhkha. Wenn alles leidhaft wäre, hätte der Buddha gesagt, Ich habe über die drei Arten des Gefühls nur aus innerer Absicht (adhyāśaya) gesprochen. Wir können jedoch eine solche Wendung in keinem anderen Sūtra finden. Darum muß nicht immer alles leidhaft sein, wie Sie (Vasubandhu) behaupten.“10

Vasubandhu versucht die Stellung des Gegners zu erschüttern und sagt:

Standpunkt, dem des Grundes (pariyāya), würde das angenehme Gefühl unangenehm erscheinen. Denn vom buddhistischen Standpunkt aus muß es unstet und veränderlich sein.\(^{11}\)


Nach einer weiteren Ansicht Vasubandhu's müßten wir, wenn man den Grund des angenehmen Gefühls überdenkt, das angenehme Gefühl als unangenehm erkennen, obwohl es als angenehm erscheint. Vasubandhu sagt, wie folgt:

„Sogar das angenehme Gefühl würde unangenehm genannt werden, sofern wir dessen Grund überdenken, denn das angenehme Gefühl muß eine andere Seite der Negation haben—alles muß vergänglich und veränderlich sein."\(^{12}\)

Das oben Gesagte zeigt uns, daß die beiden Begriffe pariyāya und nippariyāya in den Pāli-Texten der Theravāda-Schule den Begriffen paryāya und svabhāva\(^{13}\) in der Sarvāstivāda-Schule entsprechen, und daß ihnen in beiden Schulen die gleiche methodische Terminologie zukommt, Grund (pariyāya) einerseits, Tatsache (nippariyāya = svabhāva) andererseits.

4. Bedeutungen in den Mahāyāna-Texten

Die vorhergehenden Bemerkungen zeigten, daß die mittelindische Form „nippariyāya“, wie sie in der Theravāda-Schule erscheint, im buddhistischen Sanskrit fast ganz verloren gegangen ist, obwohl eine Andeutung des „nippariyāya“ in der Sarvāstivāda-Schule in der Form des svabhāva erhalten geblieben ist. Wie konnten sich aber dann die beiden Begriffe pariyāya und nippariyāya im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus entwickeln?

Was zunächst nispariyāya (Pāli nippariyāya) betrifft, so finden wir diese Sanskritform nur durch Rückschluß in einem erhalten gebliebenen tibetischen Text, der später besprochen werden wird (vgl. Anm. 14). Hier möchte ich nur bemerken, daß die Sanskrit-
form *nisparīyāya* aus dem tibetischen *rnam graṅs ma yin* erschlossen wurde. Dieses finden wir in Bhavyas *Dbu mahi don bsdus pa* (Madhyamakārthasamgraha)\(^{14}\). Historisch gesehen ist es ein Fehlschluss, "*aparyāya*" anstelle "*nisparīyāya*" zu rekonstruieren, wie es verschiedene Gelehrte tun.

Was ferner *parīyāya* betrifft, so liefert uns die Vijnānavāda-Schule bedeutungsvolle Bemerkungen über den Begriff des *parīyāya*. Auch in diesem Falle möchte ich mich auf die methodische Bedeutung der "alternativen Bestimmung" beschränken.

Nach der Lehre der Vijnānavāda-Schule sind nämlich die Mittel unserer Erkenntnis in drei Stufen zu klassifizieren.

Die erste Stufe der Erkenntnis ist die bloße Vorstellung in ihrer gemeinen Art. Diese ist nichts anderes als Illusion (*parikalpita*), denn sie hat keine Beziehung zur Wirklichkeit.


Die dritte Stufe der Erkenntnis, mit der wir die tatsächliche Existenz erkennen, ist das Absolute (*parinīpanna*). Sie erkennt die Dinge, wie sie tatsächlich sind; denn jenseits der Betrachtung über Sein oder Nichtsein, die zur analytischen Erkenntnis gehört, taucht sie ins Absolute, wo der Unterschied zwischen Subjekt und Objekt überhaupt nicht besteht.

Der Mahāyānasamgraha Asanga’s schildert die Beziehung zwischen diesen drei Stufen der Erkenntnis wie folgt:

„Im Hinblick auf den Grund (*rnam graṅs* im Tibetischen, *i-men* im Chinesischen) hat die abhängige Entstehung (*paratantra*) drei verschiedene Charakterzüge. Soweit die abhängige Entstehung als solche bestehen bleibt, kann sie mit anderem (d. h. *parikalpita* und *parinīpanna*) nicht vermischt werden.“\(^{15}\)

Flüchtig betrachtet bedeutet das Wort *rnam graṅs* (*parīyāya*) in diesem Zusammenhang nur die alternative Bestimmung, die schon im Pāli-Buddhismus erscheint. Aber ein tieferes Studium des
mahāyānistischen Denkens wird uns zu einer neuen Interpretation führen, einer Interpretation als Grund.

In seinem Kommentar zum Mahāyānasamgraha wirft Vasubandhu einen Lichtstrahl auf die methodische Bedeutung von paryāya als Grund. Er folgert:

"Es muß folgendermaßen kommentiert werden: 'Dies' bedeutet das, was schon deutlich gemacht worden ist Es (paratantra) ist nichts anderes als paratantra-selbst, da es von solchen Gründen abhängig ist, wie Fesseln des Samens und die Unreinheit u. s. w."18

In Bezug auf parikalpita kommentiert Vasubandhu diesen Punkt in gleicher Weise:

"Es (parikalpita) ist auch nichts anderes als parikalpita selbst, denn es ist von solchen Gründen abhängig, wie die analytische Erkenntnis der Realität und der Sonderheit."17

In ähnlicher Weise bezieht sich Vasubandhu auf parinispanna:

"parinispanna ist von solchen Gründen abhängig, wie die Vollkommenheit der Realität und Reinheit."18

Dieser Kommentar von Vasubandhu weist auf die Deutung von paryāya als Grund, wodurch sich paratantra und parinispanna zu parinispanna und paratantra verändern kann. Aber nicht nur der Kommentator Vasubandhu, sondern auch der Verfasser Asanga selbst läßt diese Interpretation zu. Asanga verdeutlicht den Grund, warum paratantra paratantra als solches bleiben soll, wie folgt:

"Aus welchem Grund (paryāya) soll paratantra paratantra als solches bleiben? Deshalb, weil die in unsere Seele eingeprägten Anlagen (bīja) zutage treten."19

Paryāya, wie es in diesem Text behandelt wird, ist gerade der Grund, warum paratantra paratantra als solches bleiben soll. Dieser Grund ist der, daß die in unsere Seele eingeprägten Anlagen zutage treten.


Unter diesen Umständen können wir verstehen, daß paryāya
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auch im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus die methodische Bedeutung als terminus technicus zukommt, so daß Paramārtha’s Übersetzung mit Grund (tao-li) lobend hervorgehoben werden muß. Denn damit wurde die inhärente Bedeutung ganz klar.

5. Chinesische und tibetische Übersetzungen

Die chinesischen Übersetzungen sind verschiedenartig. Man kann sie ihrer Bedeutung nach in zwei Gruppen einteilen:
1. In der Bedeutung „alternative Bestimmung“ eine Gruppe von fa-shu, i-men.

Wie wir früher schon gesagt haben, wurde die Bedeutung der ersten Gruppe, nämlich die deskriptive Bedeutung, in dieser Abhandlung nicht besprochen, weil sie in allen buddhistischen Systemen immer in gleicher Weise benützt wird. Nur die Bedeutung der zweiten Gruppe wurde hier behandelt; denn ihr gebührt das Verdienst, mit ihrer methodischen Bedeutung eine neue Betrachtungsweise hervorgebracht zu haben.

Auch die tibetischen Übersetzungen sind in zwei Gruppen zu teilen:
1. rnam graṅs (die alternative Bestimmung)
2. tshig bla dags (die konventionelle Bedeutung).


Das tibetische Wort tshig bla dags ist ein in der klasischen Periode gebräuchliches Wort und bedeutet „klar“. Außerdem wird es als terminus technicus gebraucht. In diesem Fall bedeutet es „Schluß“. Wird z. B. in einer Diskussion etwas entgegnet, so sagt man ṭses bya ba ni tshig bla dags (d. h. es bedarf keiner Diskussion mehr darüber, deshalb, Schluß!). Nach dem praktischen Gebrauch dieses Wortes möchte ich ihm lieber den Sinn: „die konventionelle Bedeutung“ geben.

Die Beschäftigung mit allen diesen Übersetzungen führt ganz eindeutig zu dem Schluß, daß paryāya nur mit „Grund (tao-li)“ übersetzt werden kann und daß der Parallel-Begriff nis-paryāya auf die definitive Bestimmung hinweist.
Das Bhäṣya dazu lautet:

Skt. \[abhikṣṇaṁ cātra śūnyatā kathyate] bahubhiṣ ca paryāyais teṣu teṣu sūtṝnteṣu. tasmād bhavīavyaṁ atīra mahatā pra-yojanena. (Mahāyāna-sūṭrālaṃkāra p. 6).


Prof. Lévi behandelt paryāya gleich men. Aber das chinesische Wort to-men ist gleich bahumukha in der Kārikā, und dieses Wort men wurde im Bhāṣya hinzugefügt. Behandeln wir paryāya gleich men, der Arbeitsweise von Prof. Lévi folgend, was soll dann im Sanskrit dem chinesischen i-shuo entsprechen? Also hätte es i-shuo sein müssen, das dem paryāya entspricht.

Wir haben damit den Beweis, daß paryāya gleich dem chinesischen i-shuo gesetzt werden muß. Wie schon in Abschnitt 4 erwähnt, wurde paryāya gewöhnlich mit yen-shuo oder häufig mit i-men übersetzt. Daher können wir uns paryāya möglicherweise aus i und shuo zu i-shuo zu-sammengesetzt denken.

Nach alledem ist klar, daß paryāya hier mit i-shuo gleichzusetzen ist, und nicht mit men allein, wie es Prof. Lévi tat.

Zum Schluße möchte ich noch meinen besonderen Dank Herrn Dr. Hermann Kopp, Heidelberg, aussprechen, der freundlicherweise die Mitkorrektur der vorliegenden Arbeit übernommen hat.

NOTES

1. Auf diesen Punkt hat mich Prof. S.K. Belvalkar (Poona) hingewiesen.
2. Vinayapiṭaka I, 16, 45; Dīghanikāya I. 174; Majjhimanikāya I. 24; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (ed. H. Kern und B. Nanjio) S. 110, 8; Mahāvastu I. 13 u. s. w.
3. Sammohavinodani S. 94.
4. Atthasāliṇī (ed. P.V. Bapat, Poona 1942) 3. 484, 486, 652; 4. 20; Visudhimagga S. 473, 499 u. s. w.
5. Atthasāliṇī 3. 484.
7. Das Gegensatzpaar pariyāya—nippariyāya erscheint in den Abhidhamma Kommentaren, aber im Kanon nicht, z. B. „magga-phalanihbānabheda hi navavidho pi lokuttaradhammo nippariyāyadhammo nibbatṭhitadhammo yeva, na kenacl pariyaṇe kāraṇena vā lesena vā dhammo“ (Papañcasūdanī I. 89);
   „āmiśaṁ pi duvidham: nippariyāyāmiśaṁ pariyaṁyāmiśaṁ ti “Ibid. I. 89”; „samassamo ti samo eva hutvā samo. Nippariyāya. sadiso te tuyham natthi“ Vimānavatthuṭṭhakhathā IV. 320);
   „Atha vā ti yathāvutten’eva nayena vihesaṁ bhāvitattanāṁ ‘karonto’ ti pāñhaseso vedītabbo, evan nippariyāyaṁ eva sāmi-vacanaṁ vijhiṭti“ (Paramatthajotikā II. 310).
Es erscheint auch in nichtkanonischen Quellen, wie „asesavacanan idam, nissesavacanan idam, nippariyāyavacanan idam na'thī aṅño navamo hetu mahato bhūmicalassā pātabhāvīya“ (Milindapañha 113 etc.). Vielfältig sind die Ausdrücke, die in den Übersetzungen von Pāli texten für pariyāya—nippariyāya gegeben werden. Diese Termini im Dipavamsa S. 38, „pariyāyadesiteñ cāpi atho nippariyāyadesitem, niythertha c' eva neyyattha am ajāntivāna bhikkhavo...“ sind von den verschiedenen Übersetzern folgendermaßen übertragen worden:


James d’Alwis: “general discourses” (pariyāya) und “discourses delivered on particular occasions” (nippariyāya). (An Introduction to Kachchhāyana’s Grammar, Colombo 1863, p. 66).


In Übereinstimmung mit diesen Übersetzungen von Trenckner und Kern wird unser Wort (nippariyāya) auch nur Bezeichnung für die definitive Bestimmung oder die absolute Methode verwendet.

Ich benütze diese Gelegenheit, um Herrn Prof. L.L. Hammerich, meinen Dank auszusprechen. dem Vorsitzenden der Kommission für „A Critical Pāli Dictionary“ (Königliche Dänische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Kopenhagen, Dänemark), der mir hiefür die materielle Basis geboten hat; ferner Herrn Möller-Kristensen, Frau Pauly aus Dänemark und Dr. Boliée aus Holland, die mir wertvolle Hilfe gewidmet haben.

8. Der Terminus sanskāra ist ein zentraler Begriff des Buddhismus und hat in den Pāli- und Sanskrit-Quellen mehrfache Bedeutung. Drei Bedeutungen für sanskāra gibt das Pāli-English Dictionary der Pāli Text Society an: 1. Aggregate of the conditions or essential properties for a given process or result... 2. One of the five khandhas... 3. Life, physical or material life...the world of phenomena... Die Bedeutung von sanskāra unter den drei Arten des Leidens ist „the world of phenomena“ oder Seinserscheinungen, aber nicht sanskāra als eine Eigenschaft der skandha, d. h. „Triebkräfte“. In Bezug auf sanskāra als Phänomen siehe Saṃyuttanikāya 55, 3, 8 V p. 345; Majjhimanikāya 115 III p. 64; Anguttaranikāya I, 15, 13. p. 26f.; 6, 98 III p. 441f. etc. Die Bedeutung von sanskāra unter den drei Arten des Leidens in der Sarvāstivāda-Schule ist dieselbe.

17. Ibid. p. 190 c 21ff.
18. Ibid. p. 190 c 25ff.
20. fa-shu, lui-shu, wu-shu, ming-mu, i-men (Mahāvyūtpatti, No. 1279, 1416, 2511 usw.); yen-shuo (Lankāvatārasūtra SWT. 43,73, usw.); i-ming (Ibid. 192, SW); pieh-i-chih,ming) (Ibid. 192 T.); i-shuo) (Taisho Vol. 31, p. 592 b; Mahāyānasamgraha (ed. G. Sasaki) p. 40 usw.; Abhidharmakośa, Taisho Vol. 29, p. 14 a p. 91 b, p. 115 b.)
22. Prof. Sylvain Lévi ist bestimmt ein Mißgriff unterlaufen, als er 'par-yāya' dem chinesischen 'men' gleichsetzte (siehe Mahāyāna-Sūtrālāṃkāra, tome II, S. 14, A). Der Absehnitt, der von ihm falsch aufgefaßt wurde, ist der folgende:
Skt. vicitrasyākhyānād dhruvakathana-yogād bahumukhāt
(Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra Kr. 15b. p. 6)
Chin. wu p’i-chung-chung-shuo-hsū-shuo-to
(Taisho Vol. 31, p. 592 a 25)
Appendix II

INDISCHE GRUNDLAGE DES JAPANISCHEN BUDDHISMUS


Jedoch ist der Zweck buddhistischer Negation weniger reine Negation als die positive Absicht, auf das Absolute hinzuweisen. In Übereinstimmung mit den historischen Notwendigkeiten brachte der spätere chinesische Buddhismus dieses System der Negation zur vollen Entfaltung, indem er bis zur Erklärung der in der logischen Negation implizierten religiösen Erfahrung zurückging. Im chinesischen Buddhismus hat die Negation die größte Entfaltung erfahren und so den Begriff der Leere (śūnyatā) im Zen-Buddhismus gefördert, wobei jedoch bemerkt werden muß, daß Zen der Karman-Lehre keine Beachtung schenkte.

Der Buddhismus schuf seine eigene Karman-Vorstellung in Übereinstimmung mit dem indischen Glauben an eine durch Karman bedingte Wiedergeburt. Hinsichtlich dieses Karman herrschten


Unser Versuch soll die enge Beziehung der beiden Gedankenströme zum indischen Buddhismus aufzeigen.

_Die ältere buddhistische Philosophie_


Die buddhistische Negierung des Nicht-Selbst ist keine logische


Die echte Einheit zwischen Karman und Anātman wird von Buddhaghosa, dem großen Kommentator des Abhidharma-Buddhismus, in seinem Werk Visuddhimagga erklärt:


Vielmehr ist es Karman und nichts anderes, wodurch eine Folge entsteht.

Der Ausdruck: „Noch auch ist eine Folge in Karman zu finden, vielmehr ist es Karman und nichts anderes“ deutet darauf hin, daß das Karman aus der Vorstellung des Anātman konzipiert wurde. Durch die Karman-Welt enthüllt sich Anātman dem Menschen, und zwar nur deswegen, weil er sich seines Lebens in der


**Zen und Anatman**

Wie vorher erwähnt, legt der indische Buddhismus großes Gewicht darauf, sich mittels Kontemplation praktisch des Anatman bewusst zu werden. Kontemplation erhielt sich bis in die heutige

Der indische Buddhismus befaßt sich mit dem Problem, wie sich menschliche Wesen verzeitlichen (anityata) oder entäußern (anatman). Zen-Buddhismus jedoch interpretiert in positiver Weise die Theorie des Anatman als einen Ausdruck der Emanzipation.7 Emanzipation wird in dem Zen-Ausdruck wu nien (Nicht-Bewußtsein), einem psychologischen Terminus, ausgedrückt. Er erläutert die Theorie des Anatman in psychologischer Weise, durch die der Mensch Einsicht in die geistige Welt gewinnen kann.8 Der chinesische buddhistische Mönch Hui-neng (?—713) erklärt „Nicht-Bewußtsein“ wie folgt:

„Was ist „Nicht-Bewußtsein“? Es bedeutet, alle Dinge zu sehen, so wie sie sind, und nirgends gebunden zu sein. Es bedeutet, überall gegenwärtig zu sein und doch nirgends verhaftet zu sein... Derjenige, der die Lehren des Nicht-Bewußtseins versteht, hat die gründlichste Kenntnis aller Dinge. Der, der die Lehren des Nicht-Bewußtseins versteht, sieht in den geistigen Bereich der Buddhäs.9"

Wir sehen hier, daß Zen nicht allein die Negation des Selbst lehrt, so wie in Indien, sondern das Eindringen in die geistige Welt. In China entwickelte Zen ein einzigartiges Konzept vom Nicht-Bewußtsein. Wenn es auch negativ klingt, ist es doch im wahrsten Sinne der positive Ausdruck eines geistigen Ziels: „den geistigen Bereich der Buddhänatur zu sehen.“

Der negative Ausdruck im Zen basiert auf der alt-buddhistischen Vorstellung, daß man die Dinge in negativer Weise von vier Aspekten aus betrachten solle: Unbeständigkeit (p. anicca), Leiden (p. dukkha), Selbstlosigkeit (p. anatta) und Unreinheit (p. asubha). Auf der anderen Seite ist der positive Ausdruck auf die (positive) Mahāyāna-Vorstellung gegründet, die jener ersten entgegentritt, daß man nämlich die Dinge unter vier Gesichtspunkten in positiver Weise sehen solle: Beständigkeit (nitya), Lust (sukha), Selbst (ātman) und Reinheit (subha). Es ist offensichtlich, daß die negativen wie auch positiven Zen-Ausdrücke
genau jenen beiden historischen Entwicklungen des Buddhismus, dem älteren Buddhismus und dem Mahāyāna, entsprechen.


Das Wort „Nicht-Bewußtsein“ ist jedoch vom psychologischen Terminus „unbewußt“ zu trennen. In der gegenwärtigen Psychologie ist „unbewußt“ ein psychischer Faktor, verborgen in den Tiefen des Geistes, der gewisse Naturinstinkte beinhaltet. Man
wird sich dieses Unbewußten selten bewußt, obwohl es große Teile unseres Benehmens beeinflußt. Im Zen-Buddhismus jedoch bedeutet „Nicht-Bewußtsein“ weit mehr. Wie oben ausgeführt, bedeutet es nicht weniger als Befreiung.


Der Begriff: „Alle Dinge zu sehen, so wie sie sind“ (p. yathā-bhūtaṃ pajānāti) kann bis zur altbuddhistischen Vorstellung von p. yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, „Dinge zu kennen, wie sie sind“11, zurückverfolgt werden. Letzteres bedeutet auch Selbstlosigkeit oder selbstlose Anstrengungen12 („anābhoga dhammatā“) Buddha definiert die Wahrheit (yathābhūtaṃ) als das Sehen der Dinge, so wie sie wirklich sind, das Gegenteil als Sehen der Dinge, so wie sie nicht sind.

Der Pali-Ausdruck „bhūtaṃ“, von der Wurzel bhū kommend, das „sein“, „werden“ bedeutet, bezeichnet die Vergangenheit. Zugleich bezeichnet er im Buddhismus die Wahrheit. Die letztere Bedeutung ist in vedischen Texten nicht zu finden. Das Aitareya Brāhmaṇa verwendet das Wort bhūtaṃ (Aitareya Br. 4, 6; 5, 30; 6, 9 etc.), aber es bedeutet nicht Wahrheit. Der Gebrauch von bhūtaṃ im Sinne von „Wahrheit“ in Pālitexten ist aus verschiedenen Stellen ersichtlich. (Sn 387; Pva 34 etc.). In buddhistischen Sanskrit-texten ist es synonym zu satya, was Wahrheit bedeutet (satyavādin, bhūravādin. Dbh 23 vl; Sp. 29.9; Divy 527.20; Mv iii.112.11 etc.). Weiterhin verwendet ein tibetischer Text den Satz dharmānāṃ bhūtapratyavekṣā (die richtige Beobachtung der dhammas)13. Bhūtaṃ wird ins Tibetische übersetzt als yan dag pa ji lta ba bṣin du. Yan dag entspricht dem Sanskrit samyak, in der Bedeutung „wahr“, „recht“.

So bedeutet der Palisatz yathābhūtaṃ „die Wahrheit sehen“ oder „die wahre Natur der Dinge sehen“. Er bezeichnet die
Erfahrung der Realität in der Soheit und könnte dem biblischen Ausdruck der Unschuld entsprechen.

Das Urteil eines Zen-Gläubigen basiert auf seiner eigenen religiösen Erfahrung, welche jedoch wiederum auf der der Zen-Meister aufbaut\textsuperscript{14}. Die buddhistische Tradition wird in sich selbst als ein Urteil und ein Kriterium verstanden. Weil es buddhistische Tradition ist, gibt man sich damit zufrieden. Daß der Tradition solch hoher Wert beigemessen wird, ist ebenso charakteristisch für Zen wie für seine wissenschaftliche Entwicklung im Laufe der Jahrhunderte. Schon in der alt-indischen Zeit finden wir wiederholt die Tatsache, daß Kommentatoren den Text in voller Länge zitieren und ihn dann auslegen, ihn aber nicht im Detail kritisieren. Dies ist das Merkmal der Tradition, wie sie von einem Kommentator, z.B. Hemacandra, definiert wird als \textit{ti\k{a} nira\-tar\`{a} vy\`{a}khy\`{a} pa\n{\=n}jik\`{a} padabha\n{\=n}jika} (zitiert in V\`{a}caspatyam). Trat ein Gegner auf und leugnete die Gültigkeit des Arguments, so wählte er die Aussage in einem feststehenden anerkannten Süttra als Basis seiner Ablehnung; denn das Axiom (die Buddha-Lehre) blieb immer bestehen. Was immer Maitreya gelehrt hat, ist das Wort Buddhas (\textit{yat kim cin Maitreya subh\={a}sita\-ma\-d buddhavaca-\=nam})\textsuperscript{15}.

\textit{Indischer Intellektualismus und Shin-Buddhismus}

Die indischen Metaphysiker gingen in eine philosophische Richtung. Alle existierenden Dinge wurden als nicht-substantiell, widersprüchlich und leer betrachtet. Selbst die letzte Realität wurde gleicherweise als leer, unbeschreibbar betrachtet. So war die Lehre des indischen Buddhismus oft als \textit{s\={u}nyav\={a}da}, Doktrin der Leere, bekannt. Diese philosophische Haltung gegenüber den Dingen wurde auch auf die Vorstellung von \textit{Karman} angewandt. \textit{Karman} war die Konstituente des menschlichen Geistes und Körpers, welche ihrerseits unsubstantiell und leer waren. Die \textit{Karman}-Theorie war lediglich eine Methode, um die Insubstantialität der Dinge aufzuzeigen\textsuperscript{16}.

Die intellektuellen Strömungen mündeten, parallel mit der Formalisierung religiöser Institutionen, im Glauben an ein Absolutes. Man glaubte, daß das Absolute die Essenz der phänomenalen Welt ausmache. Mit dem philosophischen Hintergrund und der Doktrin der Leere hielt man es für notwendig, ein Abolutes zu postulieren, das als Amitābha (das unbegrenzte Licht und
Leben) beschrieben wurde. Im Shin Buddhismus wird Amitābha mit Nirvāṇa und mit der essentiellen Natur der Buddhas identifiziert.


"Es ist ein großer Irrtum anzunehmen, daß ich [Shinran] andere Wege kenne, die zu Amitābhas Reinem Land führen als die Wiederholung seines Namens (nembutsu); und auch die Annahme, ich sei ein gelehrter Mann. Wenn ihr andere Wege zur Wiedergeburt in seinem Reinen Land kennenlernen wollt, dann geht besser in die Tempel in Nara und auf den Berg Hiei, wo viele gelehrte Leute leben. Indem ich dem Rat eines geistlichen Guru, Hōnen, folge, glaube ich ganz einfach, daß wir sicherlich durch Amitābha gerettet werden, wenn wir seinen Namen anrufen. Ich weiß nicht einmal, ob die Wiederholung seines Namens mich in die Hölle oder ins Reine Land bringen

Shin-Buddhismus hat eine starke Ausrichtung auf den Glauben; die Konzentration des Geistes auf die Gnade Amitābhas bringt diese Haltung gut zum Ausdruck. Eine solche Einstellung fehlt in der Tradition des indischen Buddhismus nicht, gewinnt aber allmählich größere Intensität im japanischen Shin-Buddhismus, wo sie sogar die Übung der formellen Verehrung und die eigene Anstrengung ersetzte, und sich auf das große Mitleid des Amitābha richtete.

Das Tannishō vermerkt weiter:

„Je mehr wir deswegen weiter fortschreiten, desto mehr kommen wir dahin, auf die erlösende Kraft des großen Gelübdes (des Mitleids des Amitābha) zu vertrauen; denn nur aus einem solchen Vertrauen heraus entsteht spontan eine Gesinnung der Hingabe und Nachsicht”. (Kap. 16).

Dieser Hinweis des Shin-Buddhismus stellt nicht nur einen metaphysischen Wechsel im Vergleich zu den Glaubensvorstellungen indischer Buddhisten dar, sondern auch eine Formalisierung religiösen Sehens, religiöser Intuition. Vom indischen intellektualismus, in welchem Gott im eigentlichen Sinne unbedeutend war, entwickelte sich der Shin-Buddhismus zu einer Religion, die der theistischen gleichkam, was beweist, daß eine Religion mit der intellektuellen Forderung nach Selbstentlösung schwerlich auf lange Sicht bestehen kann.

Auf der Grundlage der indischen Tradition scheint ein Widerspruch zu bestehen zwischen dem Shin-Buddhismus, der eine Haltung liebender Glaubigkeit zum Ausdruck bringt, und der indischen Doktrin von der Leere, worin die Inschaffbarkeit der Dinge betont wird. Es wird sich jedoch zeigen, daß in der Doktrin der Leere die Zerstörung der Substantialität lediglich eine Vorstufe


**Karman und die indische Sündenvorstellung**


In den Veden finden wir verschiedene Vorstellungen, die dem Bösen entsprechen, z. B. pāpa, pāpman, pāśa und aṁhas. Überdies gibt es noch spezifischere Begriffe, nämlich enas („falsch tun“) agas, -heḍana, anṛta, viloma, kilbiśa und andere. Alle diese Ausdrücke beziehen sich jedoch auf verschiedene Arten von Sünde, die aus physischen Taten oder rituellen Fehlern entstehen. Eine religiöse Vorstellung der Sünde als Beleidigung Gottes wird in der Beleidigung gegen Varuṇa, der die Welt regiert, gesehen. Der Mensch, der das göttliche Gesetz verletzt, beim Spielen betrügt oder in seiner Verehrung nachläßig ist, sündigt Es muß hier be-

In den Brāhmaṇas bezieht sich der Begriff der Sünde auf die Opfer (yajña) und deren magische Wirkung. Seitdem bedeutet Sünde rituelles Fehlbetragen und wird durch eine zeremonielle Beichte oder eine öffentliche Erklärung (nirukta) entfernt. Wir finden ebenso, daß die Sünde in den Brāhmaṇas etwas Physisches und Äußerliches bedeutet eher als Moralisches und Innerliches.


„Weder mit Gut noch mit Böse ist der zu bestimmen, der über alle Bedrücktheit des Herzens hinaus ist“. (Brhad-Āranyaka Up. 4.3.22).

jede Tat, ob gut oder schlecht, eines absoluten Wertes entbehrt. Dasselbe finden wir im Shin-Buddhismus, wenn das *Tannisho* sagt: "Ich weiß nicht, ob es gut oder schlecht ist, oder was gut oder schlecht ist. Ich kenne weder gut noch schlecht" (Kap. 14). Der Unterschied zwischen beiden Zitaten liegt jedoch darin, daß das erstere der kraftvolle Ausdruck der Transzendenz des *Atman* ist, während das zweite der Ausdruck des existentiellen Bewußtseins der vom *Karman* bestimmten menschlichen Begrenztheit ist.


Neben diesem indischen Intellektualismus spielt der japanische Shin-Buddhismus eine bedeutende Rolle bei der existentiellen Zurückführung der Sünde auf die essentielle Struktur des menschlichen Wesens, nicht aber auf eine bloße Folge des Nichtwissens. Das Wesen der Sünde kann so ausgedrückt werden: die menschliche Existenz ist in sich selbst widersprüchlich. Selbst wenn man andere nicht verletzen will, mag man verletzen. Das menschliche Leben ist voll von Widersprüchen, die auf den durch Karman der Vergangenheit bestimmten Existenzen gründen. Im Tannishō heisst es hierzu:


**Karman und Sündenvorstellung im Shin-Buddhismus**

Die Karman-Vorstellung im alten Buddhismus bezieht sich auf die Unterscheidung zwischen guten und schlechten Taten hinsichtlich der Moral und betont die Notwendigkeit der Besinnung.

Nach dem Shin-Buddhismus aber ist der Mensch nicht nur für sein Karman, gut oder schlecht, verantwortlich, sondern auch für seine Existenz als Mensch. Der Mensch hat nicht die Freiheit, sich selbst als gut und die anderen als schlecht zu betrachten; das wäre lediglich eine andere Form der Selbstverstrickung oder des Verhaftetseins. Die Betonung von Gut oder Schlecht stellt die Existenz des Menschen in Gefahr. Wir können die durch Karman bedingte Menschenwelt nicht verfluchen; noch können wir der Verantwortung des Menschseins entfliehen, indem wir etwa unser Karman anderen anlasten. Der Schüler Shinrans, Yuien, sagt im Tannishō:
“Selbst Sünden, gering wie ein Staubflecken auf der Spitze eines Hasen oder Schafhaares, sind nicht ohne Karman”. (Kap. 13).


Hierüber steht im Tannishō:

“Ich weiß nicht, ob etwas gut oder schlecht ist, oder was Gut und was Schlecht bedeutet. Ich kenne weder Gut noch Schlecht”. (s. o.)


Der vorstehend zitierte Abschnitt aus dem Tannishō zeigt uns ein weiteres Motiv des indischen Buddhismus, nämlich die mahāyānistische Vorstellung der Bedingtheit (pratyaya). Nach dem Tan-
nishö hängt das, was in der Zukunft moralisch ist, von den zukünftigen Umständen ab (pratyaya), die wir aber bis zum Eintritt der Zukunft nicht kennen. Determinierte Dinge sind relativ in bezug auf Bedingungen und Umstände. Sie sind insofern wahr, als sie provisorisch auf Sinneinhalten aufbauen, die von determinierten Fakten herrühren. Das ist im indischen Buddhismus der Begriff saṃketa (vereinbarte Wahrheit) oder saṃvṛtisatya (relative Wahrheit). Determinierte Regeln sind ein Kompromiß zwischen Gut und Schlecht. Der Shin-Buddhismus leugnet die Konzeptionen Gut und Schlecht, wie aus dem vorstehenden Abschnitt ersichtlich wurde. Die Negation basiert jedoch auf der Vermittlung oder dem mittleren Weg (madhyā pratipad), der über die Vorstellungen von Gut und Schlecht hinausführt.


vermeidlich mit sich bringt. Shinran (1173—1262) sagt in seinem Werk „Kyōgyōshinshō“:

„Ganz gewöhnliche Wesen (prthajana), voll von Schlechtem, die im Kreislauf von Geburt und Wiedergeburt leben. Seit dem Anfang irren sie beständig umher und wandern, ohne sich aus der Karman-bedingten Welt befreien zu können“.


„Je weniger ein guter Mensch für die Erlösung qualifiziert ist, desto mehr ist ein schlechter Mensch hierfür geeignet. Hierzu sagt das Volk meist: Sogar ein schlechter Mensch wird im Reinen Land wiedergeboren werden, wieviel mehr ein guter“. (Tannishō, Kap. 3).

Die Ethik des Shin-Buddhismus ist menschlich und relativ, nicht göttlich und absolut.


Deswegen ruhrt Sünde nicht von einem Mangel an Kenntnis (vidyā) des Brahman oder Atman her, wie es in der Philosophie der Upaniṣaden vertreten wurde: eher enthüllt sie die Begrenzung des eigenen Seins. Sünde kann nicht wie ein Objekt beseitigt werden. Während in der brahmanischen Philosophie die Sünde als eine Folge von Unwissenheit (avidyā) verstanden wurde, betrachtet der Shin-Buddhismus sie als eine Folge des Karman. Karman ist die Existenz eines jeden Individuums als solchen. Das Individuum ist geistig und ethisch leer; es erfährt Schmerz und Lust. Im übrigen ist es nicht einmal Quelle seines eigenen Wissens. Wie aber kam die Selbsterkenntnis der menschlichen Be-
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grenzung hier an die erste Stelle? Wie geschieht eine Befreiung aus der Welt des Karman?


„Wenn man an sein [Amitâbhas] Gelübde glaubt, dann wird man sich endgültig selbst zur Erleuchtung bringen“

Der Glaube an Amitâbhas Gelübde ist die hinreichende Bedingung für die Erlösung. Dieses Charakteristikum der Verehrung und Hingabe spricht besonders jene an, die eng mit den Geschäften dieser Welt befäst sind.


Der Zen-Buddhismus entwickelte die Vorstellung vom Anâtman zu voller Tragweite. Er geht weiter zurück, um die darin liegende religiöse Erfahrung zu klären. Das Anâtman des alten
Buddhismus hat sich zum Zen-Begriff der Leere (śūnyatā) entwickelt.


NOTES


Die erste Kategorie, die Verneinung des schon Bekannten, findet sich in der Abhidharma-Philosophie in Präfixen wie a, na und vi; die zweite, der positive Ausdruck religiöser Erfahrung, folgt in der Entwicklung des Buddhismus später. Der positive Ausdruck geschah in Form der Negation durch die Präfixe nir, vi und sama. Beide Perspektiven können auf das Verhältnis zwischen anātman und karman angewandt werden.

3. Atta (ātman) bezeichnete im älteren Buddhismus das empirische Selbst oder puggala und eine Seele (p. atta), welcher die Upanisaden letzte Realität hinter allen Phänomenen zuerkannt hatten. Im Mahāyāna bezeichnet die Ātman-Vorstellung ein beständiges Sein, belebt oder unbelebt, welches aber hinter nibsvabhāva (Nicht-Substantialität) zurücksteht. Im Zen-Buddhismus liegt diese Art von ātman vor. Im älteren Buddhismus bezeichnet atta sowohl puggala (pudgala) wie auch dhamma (dharma): Atta als puggala bedeutet die zu verneinende Existenz, während atta als dhamma oft für die Vorstellung des Bewußtseins gebraucht wird. Buddha sagte: „Stützt Euch nur auf Euch selbst als Eiland und Zufluchtsstätte und auf nichts anderes; auf dhamma als Eiland und Zufluchtsstätte und auf nichts anderes.“

(D. ii. 100 S v, 163, 164 etc.) Hier finden wir den Parallelismus von atta und dhamma (I.B. HORNER, „Early Buddhist Dhamma“ in: „Artibus Asiae“, vol. XI. 1/2, p. 119). Im Mahāyāna wurde ātman als dharma (Bewußtsein) zu dem


7. Die chinesische Negation wu und fei entspricht dem Pāli und Sanskrit a, ni und vi. In chinesischen Übersetzungen scheint keine Unterscheidung zwischen wu und fei zu bestehen. Manchmal bezeichnet das Sanskrit Präfix nir eine stärkere Negation als a. (Ein Präfix nir hat die Funktion einer starken Verneinung.)


9. Der Unterschied zwischen chinesischem Ch’an und japanischem Zen ist sehr gering; hierauf einzugehen übersteigt den Rahmen dieser Arbeit.

10. In der Pāli-Literatur kennen wir den Ausdruck suññā in der Bedeutung „leer“, „eitel“. Er beinhaltet lediglich das Fehlen von Sein und Nicht-Sein und hat keinerlei positive Bedeutung. Er ist eine relative Negation des Seins. Deswegen kennt man keine abstrakte Form wie śīnyatā in der Mahāyāna-Buddhismus, das die absolute Negation bedeutet. Im Mahāyāna bezeichnen drei Worte (śūnya, śīntyavat, śīnyatā) die Nichtheit, genau wie das Pāli-Wort suññā. Aber diese Mahāyāna-Begriffe meinen das reale Sein (dharma). Śīnyatā ist danach also gleichbedeutend mit dem, was ohne Ursache ist, was über Denken und Vorstellung hinausgeht, nicht geschaffen und ohne Maß ist. Seinem Inhalt nach ist der Gegenstand positiv; er bezeichnet die Abhängigkeit der Entstehung oder den Mittleren Pfad. Im Prasannapadā heißt es: yah pratityasamutpādaḥ śīnyatām taṃ prakāśmahe / sā prajñāpāradāya pratipatśāva madhyama (Prasannapadā, p. 503) Śīnyatā, mit nirvāṇa gleichgesetzt, ist so gleich dem samsāra (menschlichen Leben). Die Gleichsetzung von nirvāṇa (śīnyatā) mit samsāra (samsāranirvāṇayorvīśesasyābhāva. p. 503) ges-
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14. Charakteristisch für die buddhistische Philosophie—und hierin unterscheidet sie sich von der westlichen—is das Vertrauen in die Tradition. Ist einmal ein Gedankensystem aufgebaut, so wird derjenige, der mit dem erzielten Ergebnis nicht zufrieden ist, in der Tradition einen Schritt zurückgehen, und eine erweiterte Form zu entwickeln versuchen, ohne aber dabei die vorausgehenden Interpretationen zu zerstören. Das nennt man anuśāsana (die gläubige Interpretation). Im Abhidharma wurde diese Methode in zwei Aspekte gegliedert: āgama und nyāya. Ersteres erfordert die Hinzuziehung des Kanons, während letzteres die Zuhilfenahme von logischen Folgerungen fordert. Der Wert der Tradition wird im Shin-Buddhismus durch die Ermah-
21. Nach der Abhidharma-Philosophie ist Karman eine phänomenologische Beschreibung menschlicher Existenz. Menschliche Existenz kann als die fünf Aggregate (rūpa, vedanā, sañña, sankhāra und viññāna) betrachtet wer-


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