Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

S. N. Dube
Department of History and Indian Culture
University of Rajasthan
JAIPUR

MANOHAR
1980
With Reverence

to

Professor G.C. Pande
ABBREVIATIONS

BB    Bibliotheca Buddhica.
BDVI  Baudhā Daṁma ke Vikāsa ka Itiḥāsa,
BST   Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series.
CHI   Cambridge History of India.
CII   Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum.
DPPN  Dictionary of the Pāli Proper Names.
EBM   Early Buddhist Monachism.
EI    Epigraphia Indica.
EMB   Early Monastic Buddhism.
ERE   Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
HOS   Harvard Oriental Series.
IHQ   Indian Historical Quarterly.
IA    Indian Archaeology—A Review.
Ind. Ant. Indian Antiquary.
JA    Journal Asiatique.
JBBRAS Journal of the Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic Society.
JDL   Journal of the Department of Letters.
JPTS  Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JRAS  Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.

Kathāvatthu- Aṭṭhakathā

Kathāvatthu-ppakarana-Aṭṭhakathā.

MM    Mahāmahopādhyāya.
MSS   Manuscripts.
PHAI  Political History of Ancient India.
PTS   Pāli Text Society.
RE    Rock Edict.
SBB   Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
SBE   Sacred Books of the East.
ZDMG  Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
PREFACE

Buddhism, during the age of Asoka, was characterised by a reassessment of the meaning, significance, implications and presuppositions of the traditional Buddhist ideas. Diverse hypotheses were advanced to elucidate and harmonise them internally within the context of Buddhist thought as also with the ideas which were then current in the general intellectual milieu of the times. The Kathāvatthu is the leading document of this age, an age when repeated schisms had rent the original unity of Buddhism and produced an atmosphere seething with many-sided reflections, doctrinal debates and controversies. It presents a broad cross-section of Buddhist thought in an age of critical transition when some of the conflicts and obscurities latent in the earlier doctrines emerged openly and when in the course of their discussion ground was prepared for future development. The Kathāvatthu, thus, presents a watershed in the development of Buddhist thought. Before the emergence of the controversies, recorded in this text, Buddhism still presented, more or less, an ecumenical aspect, but not long afterwards the beginnings of the Mahāyāna are clearly traceable. The Kathāvatthu, thus, is a magnum opus for any reconstruction of the history of early Buddhism, especially for understanding the figurative transition from the earlier historical forms to the later developed systems.

Despite the importance of Kathāvatthu, little work has, however, been done so far to understand and elucidate its admittedly difficult and often obscure, even enigmatic, contents. A.C. Taylor brought out the first Roman edition of the text as published by the Pali Text Society, London in two volumes, respectively in the years 1894 and 1897. The learned society, again, did great service to the Buddhist studies, by publishing the English translation of the text in the year 1915 completed by S.Z. Aung and Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids. In 1961, Bhiksu Jagdish Kashyap edited the text in Nāgari characters,
published in the Nālandā Devanāgarī Pāli Series. Buddhaghosa’s commentary (Aṣṭhakathā) on the Kathāvatthu, was edited by J.P. Minayeff and was published in JPTS 1889. B.C. Law translated this commentary into English in the year 1940. Owing to the endeavour of the translators some welcome light has certainly been thrown on the difficult text. Still its obscurities continue to require explanation. In fact the translators have often rendered the original quite literally and have glossed over the obscurities many a times. Scholars like W. Wassilieff, Max Walleser, Louis de La Vallée Poussin, J. Masuda, André Barelou, Nalinaksha Dutt, etc., have brought to light similar controversies from other Buddhist texts not traceable in their originals. They, however, appear to have largely contented themselves with recording the theses professed by the different sects. Thus, although, some amount of material has been made available for the study of Kathāvatthu still no comprehensive attempt has been made to analyse the world of thought presented in it. The present work is a modest attempt to proceed in that direction.

The Kathāvatthu undoubtedly forms the fons et origo of our study, yet, with a view to presenting a fuller account of the cross currents in early Buddhism almost all relevant sources have been tapped in extenso, such as, other Pāli canonical and non-canonical works, treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinitadeva on eighteen Buddhist sects, Chinese travellers’ accounts, extant works of the Buddhist sects etc. The present work seeks to elucidate the doctrines of the early Buddhist sects, as presented in the Kathāvatthu in the light of the historical development of Buddhist thought and its wider milieu. It not only seeks to analyse the original significance of the points discussed but to connect them historically with specific tendencies in the growth of the Buddhist faith, practice and organisation. It further seeks to correlate Buddhist developments with similar developments in other contemporary schools.

The work is substantially based on my Ph.D. thesis entitled, “Doctrinal Controversies in Early Buddhism” approved by the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur in 1968. The work is divided into three sections containing eleven chapters in all. Section A, “Genesis and Growth of Controversies” comprises
the first two chapters. Chapter I, “Kathāvatthu and its Controversies” deals with the nature and place of Kathāvatthu in the Buddhist Canon wherein it has been shown that the tenets and doctrines attributed to the different early Buddhist sects and doctrinal controversies arising therefrom, as recorded in this text, should be taken to belong generally to the age of Asoka. We have also analysed the philosophical and religious issues that were under constant debate from pre-Buddhist times in the background of which the Buddha delivered his own gospel leaving some gaps pregnant with possibilities of disputes and controversies to arise in future. The chapter is appended with a brief account of the methodology of debate employed in the Kathāvatthu in particular and in that age in general. In Chapter II, “Growth and Ramification of the Early Buddhist Sects and Schools”, an attempt has been made to analyse the origin, growth, stratification and affiliation of the different sects.

Section B, entitled “Controversies Reflecting Religious Development and the Mahāsāṃghika Impact” consists of the next five chapters. Chapter III, “The Ideal of Arahaṃ: Challenge and Defence” discusses the ideal of Arahaṃ (Arhat) as it was cherished and defended by the Theravādins. It seems that the liberal attitude of the Mahāsāṃghikas and their consequent impeachment by the Theravādins ushered in a movement in the opposite direction through which the Arahaṃ ideal could become liable for the charge of soteriological egoism. Some interrelationship may be hypothesised between this and a parallel movement in the course of which the concept of Buddhistahood was absolutised and the Buddha virtually deified along with the ideal of the Bodhisattva (Bodhisattva) which was also glorified and put almost at par with that of the Buddha. The Kathāvatthu presents the Theravāda polemics against the tenets elevating the Buddha and the Bodhisattva to a supernatural status which have been discussed in Chapters IV and V respectively. There are a number of issues under dispute relating to the Buddhist Path, spiritual stages and hierarchy which have been treated in Chapter VI. Chapter VII traces the historical growth of the Buddhist Sangha in the course of which there emerged a section of the monks which sought to affirm an idealized notion of the Sangha as nothing but an abstraction
identifiable with magga and phala and hence incapable of accepting or purifying gifts or paying back any rewards if a gift was at all made. The propounders seem to be more than indifferent to the disastrous effect the assertion would have had on the Buddhist community of monks in general and the authorities of the Samgha in particular who ran it, materially speaking.

Section C is devoted to the “Controversies Reflecting Philosophical Development and the Beginning of New Schools” and comprises the last four chapters of the present work. Chapter VIII deals with the controversy over the Soul theory (Pudgalavada). The Buddhist doctrine of anattā (no soul) seems to have implied apparently insurmountable difficulties with regard to karmān, memory and spiritual acquisitions. It was in the light of such difficulties that the controversial sect of the Vātsiputriya-Sammatiyas asserted the existence of prajñāaptisāt Pudgala (person or jīva). This tenet aroused condemnation from almost all Buddhist sects of which the relevant details, wherever available, have been analysed critically. Similarly the importance of the anicca (impermanence) doctrine presented some identical difficulties and thus came the Sarvāsvatīvāda doctrine of ‘sarvaṁ asti’, that is to say, the dharmas in their ideal or essential form exist always, past, present and future. Thus, the problem of existence and other modes of conditioned reality have been discussed in Chapter IX. The next chapter deals with the “Problem of the Unconditioned” wherein the nature of Nibbāna (Nirvāṇa) is sought to be redefined by certain sections of the Buddhist monks in the light of their own interpretations and reflections. Also a number of new items, e.g., “Assurance”, “Causal Genesis”, “Four Noble Truths”, “Space”, etc., are sought to be affirmed as unconditioned. This is a new development over older ideas. In the opinion of the Theravādins, however, there is only one unconditioned reality, which is Nibbāna. Chapter XI, the last, discusses a large number of psycho-ethical controversies recorded in the Kathāvatthu. Once again, we find here a conflict between, more or less, a common-sense view, on the one hand, and an idealistic tendency, on the other, to which certain sects of the Mahāsāṅghika groups were pulling powerfully.

I owe the deepest debt to my revered gurñ Prof. G.C. Pande,
formerly Tagore Professor of History and Indian Culture and Vice-Chancellor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur for the valuable guidance and kind supervision that I received from him all along the progress of this work. But for his keen interest and affectionate goading, all these years, this work may not have seen the light of the day.

I am also profoundly grateful to some of my eminent teachers from whom I always received inspiring encouragement and generous help during the course of the present study. Among them I must mention the names of Prof. G.R. Sharma and Prof. B.N.S. Yadava of the University of Allahabad.

I owe a deep sense of gratitude to late Professors Raj Bali Pande and Nalinaksha Dutt for their valuable comments on the present study. I am also grateful to Prof. Walter Ruben, formerly Professor of Indology, Humboldt University, Berlin, Prof. Heinz Mode, Director, Buddhist Centre, Martin-Luther University, Halle Wittenberg and other German Indologists for the fruitful discussions I had with them on certain aspects of Buddhism *vis-a-vis* Indian Thought during my stay in the G.D.R.

I take this opportunity to record my gratitude to the authorities of the Indian Council of Historical Research, New Delhi and the University of Rajasthan for selecting the present work in their respective grant-in-aid schemes of publication. It is the latter grant which has been utilised in its publication.

I am deeply thankful to all my colleagues and friends for their help and cooperation, especially Dr. M.R. Singh, Shri G.S. Tiwari and Shri H.S. Sharma. I must also thank my publisher Shri Ramesh Jain for his painstaking interest in the publication of this work.

Jaipur

S.N. Dube
CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS viii

PREFACE ix

SECTION A ... GENESIS AND GROWTH OF CONTROVERSIES

CHAPTER I ... THE KATHĀVATTHU AND ITS CONTROVERSIES 1

CHAPTER II ... GROWTH AND RAMIFICATION OF THE EARLY BUDDHIST SECTS AND SCHOOLS 37

SECTION B ... CONTROVERSIES REFLECTING RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT AND THE MAHAŚAMĪGHika IMPACT

CHAPTER III ... THE IDEAL OF ARAHANT: CHALLENGE AND DEFENCE 90

CHAPTER IV ... THE APOTHEOSIS OF THE BUDDHA 120

CHAPTER V ... THE IDEAL OF THE BODHISATTA 151

CHAPTER VI ... SPIRITUAL STAGES AND HIERARCHY 174

CHAPTER VII ... THE BUDDHIST SAMĪGHYA—ITS SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION 199

SECTION C ... CONTROVERSIES REFLECTING PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE BEGINNINGS OF NEW SCHOOLS

CHAPTER VIII ... CONTROVERSY OVER THE SOUL THEORY ‘(PUDGALAVADA)’ 229
CHAPTER IX ... EXISTENCE AND OTHER MODES OF CONDITIONED REALITY 261
CHAPTER X ... THE PROBLEM OF THE UNCONDITIONED 288
CHAPTER XI ... PSYCHO-ETHICAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE KATHĀVATTHU 318

BIBLIOGRAPHY 343
INDEX 359
The Kathāvatthu and its Controversies

NATURE AND PLACE OF KATHĀVATTHU IN THE BUDDHIST CANON

Traditionally, the Kathāvatthu is believed to be the fifth of the seven books that form the third collection known as the Abhidhamma Piṭaka of the Buddhist Canon. Sometimes, however, it is also said to be the third of the seven books. This discrepancy in the early traditions becomes confusing when we notice that, on the one hand, the Kathāvatthu quotes from the Dhammasaṅgāṇi, the Vibhaṅga and the Paṭṭhāna, i.e., the first two and the last books of the Abhidhamma and, on the other, it is given to understand that Yamaka, the sixth book of the Abhidhamma was compiled to clear up the difficulties left by the Kathāvatthu. It is difficult to ascertain the reliability of these various traditions as also the exact chronological position of this text among the Abhidhamma works. However, in the light of their evidence, it may be assumed that the Kathāvatthu was compiled when at least some parts of the Dhammasaṅgāṇi, Vibhaṅga and Paṭṭhāna were already accepted as authoritative (orthodox doctrines) within the Sāsana.

As regards the phrase ‘Kathāvatthu’ the two terms Kathā
and Vatthu roughly denote ‘discourse’ and ‘subject’ respectively in the Buddhist context and hence the literal meaning should be ‘subjects of discourse’. In the light of its text, however, the name has been translated ‘Points of Controversy or Debate’, which is in line with the usage of the term Kathā in Nyaya (cf. M. Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary).

The text of the Kathāvatthu consists of twenty-three chapters, each containing a number of discussions and refutations from the Theravāda standpoint of the heretical and unorthodox views belonging to various early Buddhist sects on matters connected with several problems of theology, philosophy, cosmology, psychology and so on. It may be aptly remarked that the Kathāvatthu is a treasure-house of the doctrines of different early Buddhist sects and schools which emerged in the course of schisms and dissensions growing after the death of Lord Buddha. In all there are 216-217 such doctrines discussed in the Kathāvatthu. The work presents a lively cross-section of Buddhist thought in a period of critical change. The style of the discussion is that of formalized debate which is presented in a set manner. This elaborate and formal debating invests the work with a unique methodological significance in the development of Indian and Buddhist logic. In its contents as well as style, the Kathāvatthu, thus, appears as a highly important source for the reconstruction of the pattern and tendencies of Buddhist thought in the fourth and third centuries B.C. The controversies represent sensitive points along which Buddhism was restructured up to the time of Asoka.

COMPILATION OF KATHĀVATTHU AND ITS DATE

The Kathāvatthu is the only individual compilation in the early Buddhist Canon, the date and authorship of which is traditionally recorded. However, the authenticity of the traditional date of its compilation is disputed. Mrs. Rhys Davids characterizes the Kathāvatthu as a work of ‘patch-work-quilt’ appearance having grown slowly by accretions. It is necessary, therefore, to examine critically the available evidence on the date of the Kathāvatthu.

According to the Sinhalese traditional accounts, the con-
troversies embodied in the Kathāvatthu took place in the third Buddhist Council held at Pataliputra in the seventeenth regnal year of King Aśoka and that the compilation of this text was also completed in the Council by Moggaliputta Tissa, and was included in the Canon among the Abhidhamma treatises. The traditions further maintain that the outlines or heads of these discussions were laid down by Buddha himself in anticipation of the disputes that would arise eventually within the Saṅgha and threaten it with disruption.

So far as the laying down of the outlines of Kathāvatthu by the Buddha is concerned, it seems that by its very nature the authority of this text was unacceptable to other sects and they rejected it on the ground that it was set forth 218 years after the demise of the Buddha and was only the utterance of a disciple. It was, thus, perhaps with a view to authenticating the text that the commentator Buddhaghosa laid down that the mātikā or the lists of subjects taught in the Kathāvatthu were drawn by the Buddha himself. The Kathāvatthu may be regarded as the utterance of the Buddha in the same sense as the Madhu-Piṇḍika-Sutta which was preached actually by Mahākaccāna but was considered as Buddha's teaching.

Thus, even the Buddhist tradition may be said to admit, in effect, that it is only in its essential and seminal principles that the Kathāvatthu may be said to hark back to the personal teachings of the Buddha.

Coming to the actual date of the compilation of the Kathāvatthu, the tradition, as noted, has it that Moggaliputta Tissa filled out in the third Council the full details of the outline heads devised by the Buddha. Mrs. Rhys Davids is not prepared to accept this as a historical fact for she thinks that 'no work put together for a special occasion, or to meet an entirely new need, could conceivably have assumed the 'patch-work-quilt' appearance of the Kathāvatthu. Thus, in her opinion, the text grew slowly by accretions. The strongest argument against the traditional date, she maintains, lies in the asymmetry of the text and: "If we imagine that (1) each Kathā (or, at times, each two or more Kathās) was framed by, or by order of, the heads of the Saṅgha at the time when each seceding school newly systematized and taught this and..."
that heresy, or gave it occasional and special prominence, and that (2) such a new Kathā, or sub-group of them was added, by memorial or scriptural registration, to the existing stock of the Kathās, then the puzzle of Kathāvatthu's asymmetry resolves itself into a simple matter."

Looking to the form of the Kathāvatthu, Mrs. Rhys Davids's surmises appear to be probable. But the suggestion that the wealth of ideas and views contained in it does not belong to any recognizable historical age such as the age of Aśoka seems to proceed too far in a sceptical direction. It may be pointed out that the entire evidence at our disposal suggests that the bulk of the theses and assertions discussed in the Kathāvatthu had emerged as thorns (kantaka) to the Sāṅgha by the time of Aśoka. The internal evidence of the text, when scrutinized closely, would sustain this hypothesis.

The Ceylonese chronicles, as also, the Āṭṭhakathās informs us that about 200 years after Buddha's death a large number of pseudo-Buddhists entered the Sāṅgha. The result was that the most important Uposatha ceremony was held in abeyance and it could not be performed for seven years as the orthodox monks refused to participate in it in the company of those whom they considered as heretics and unorthodox. Aśoka is said to have deputed one of his ministers to persuade the monks of the monastery of Aśokārāma to perform the Uposatha. The minister, however, miscarried the orders and beheaded several monks. Aśoka was shocked to learn about it and remorsefully approached Moggaliputta Tissa, the oldest and the most learned monk of the time, for solace. The latter consoled and convinced Aśoka on the ground that he had harboured no deliberate intention to have the monks beheaded. Next, the order was purged jointly by Aśoka and Moggaliputta Tissa of all those monks who did not subscribe to the Vibhajjavāda doctrine. Such monks were compelled to give up yellow robes and were clad in white clothes. After purging the order of the unorthodox and non-conformist elements, a Council was held at Pataliputra under the presidency of Moggaliputta Tissa. The Piṭakas were recited as was done in the earlier Councils. However, the
most outstanding product of the deliberations of this synod was the composition of the Kathāvatthu with a view to refuting the various doctrinal views held by the non-Theravādins. In a late Sinhalese work, viz., Nikāya Saṅgraha, we have the additional information that the monks who were expelled from the Saṅgha of the Theriya Nikāya (i.e., the Theravādins) became members of non-Theravāda sects.

The historicity of the Third Buddhist Council is now generally accepted by the scholars. It has been observed, for example, that the third Council did take place although it was a sectarian affair. Aśoka, it is true, does not directly refer to the Council, yet Dr. Bhandarkar seems to be right in thinking that some of his inscriptions appear to presuppose some such event. That Aśoka is not clearer over the Council may be explained by the supposition that he was not as intimately connected with the Council as the Pāli tradition would have us believe. Thus, from the details of this Council it is fairly plausible to assume that during Aśoka’s time, conditions were such that the compilation of a work like the Kathāvatthu had become a desideratum for the survival of true doctrine as the orthodox viewed it. Indeed, it is interesting to observe that the historical perspective in which the Kathāvatthu is said to have been compiled seems also to be preserved in some of the edicts of Aśoka. He issued some interesting orders to his officers which were engraved on pillars at three different places, Sarnath, Sanchi and Kausambi. Through these orders, he sought to preserve the unity of the Buddhist Saṅgha by putting down all attempts tending to create schism. According to Aśoka’s order: ...indeed that monk or nun who shall break up the Saṅgha be caused to put on white robes and to reside in a non-residence. Thus this edict must be submitted both to the Saṅgha of monks and to the Saṅgha of nuns.

The contents of the Sarnath-Sanchi-Kausambi edict amply reflect that Aśoka was bent upon eradicating all apostasy and division in the Buddhist Order. Aśoka is so apprehensive of the schismatics, as to fear that, having been removed from the Saṅgha, they might win over some lay-devotees; so he orders that a copy of this edict be so placed as to be accessi-
ble to the laity who may come and see it on every Fast day. The Sanchi edict sums up the wish of Aśoka in all these efforts which is that the Sangha should be united and lasting. The earnest, almost severe tone of the edict and the fact that copies of it are found at places of important Buddhist monastic establishments presupposes that in his time the Buddhist Church was at least threatened with disruption, to prevent which he was straining every nerve.

If we analyze the evidence gleaned from these Aśokan inscriptions, we notice three significant points which are extremely helpful in the dating of the Kathavatthu. Firstly, it cannot be a mere incident that the punishment prescribed by Aśoka to the schismatics is the same that was given to them at the time of the third Council, i.e., depriving them of the yellow robe and expelling them from the Order. Such an extreme step on the part of Aśoka presupposes an already set practice in the Order. Secondly, the above edict of Aśoka was issued only after the convention of the Council, i.e., after the seventeenth regnal year of Aśoka. The edict has been ascribed to the period between the twenty-ninth and the thirty-eighth regnal years of Aśoka. Now, the keenness of Aśoka to check the schismatic tendencies during this period becomes understandable if we suppose that although schismatic sects had been expelled on the occasion of the third Council, there was still some apprehension that they might threaten the unity of the Sangha. The third point which emerges is as to what was to guide the royal officials in deciding whether any particular monk or nun was creating a schism in the Order. It may be suggested that the guiding authority perhaps lay in a compilation, such as the Kathavatthu, which tradition reports to have been composed on the occasion of the third Council and which refutes all those views which were unorthodox, heretical and schismatic. It may be noted here that the hypothesis of the Kathavatthu having been composed during the time of Aśoka is also indicated by the suggestion that this text seems to have influenced the IX R.E. of Aśoka.

Now coming to the problem of the sects and schools, whose views and tenets are said to be contained in this text, Buddha-
ghosa, the commentator of the *Kathāvatthu*, informs us that the Buddhist Order in India had been, in the course of the second century after the Buddha's demise, divided into eighteen schools.\(^{30}\) This is confirmed by the Ceylonese chronicles *Dīpavaṁsa* and *Mahāvaṁsa*.\(^{31}\) Generally agreeing with this, the northern or Sanskrit traditions of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinitadeva serve to corroborate that a good number of these sects had originated in the second century of the Nirvāṇa era.\(^{32}\) As would emerge from the following discussion most of the important early Buddhist sects and schools appear to have arisen within the second and the early third centuries of the Nirvāṇa of Buddha. It may be observed that some of them may not have really crystallized as well-knit schools at the time of the third Council but there is nothing to contradict the hypothesis that they were in the formative stages of their evolution and such a hypothesis will easily square into the traditional assumption. When these tendencies became powerful enough to threaten to disrupt the Saṁgha completely, the orthodox Church, apparently helped by a favourable ruler, held the third Council somewhat like the Council of Trent and compiled the text of the *Kathāvatthu*, refuting all those doctrines which they considered as alien.

As regards the internal evidence of the text with regard to its compilation, attention has been drawn to the fact that it contains the views of some late schools such as the Vetulyakas and the Hetūvādins. For the Vetulyakas, it has been said that they cannot be pre-Christian.\(^{33}\) Some of the tenets belonging to Vetulyakas undoubtedly remind us of the Mahāyāna doctrines. Nevertheless, it is in the very nature of these tenets which suggest that the Vetulyakas and similar other Mahāsaṁghika group of sects were precursors and forerunners of the Mahāyāna.\(^{34}\) And if the evolution of Mahāyāna proper is to be placed in the first century B.C.\(^{35}\), there is no reason why its essentials should not have originated in the third century B.C. The northern or Sanskrit tradition on the history of early Buddhist sects and schools informs us that one of the sub-sects that emerged in the second century of the Nirvāṇa era within the Mahāsaṁghika group was the Lokottaravāda sect.\(^{36}\) The proto-Mahāyānic tenets of the Vetulyakas are nothing but their postu-
lations about the supernatural (lokottara) aspect of the Buddha. In fact, it has been shown subsequently that a number of early Buddhist controversies are in the nature of a conflict between two tendencies of evolution which crystallized as Hinayāna and Mahāyāna in Buddhist thought. It follows, as a natural corollary, that some prominent so-called un-orthodox doctrines disputed in the Kathāvatthu should reflect a ‘half-way house’ and a transitional stage from Hinayāna to Mahāyāna. As regards the Hetuvādins, Mrs. Rhys Davids does not specify as to why they should be regarded as late. In fact, the origin of this sect is extremely obscure. Bhavya has identified the Hetuvādins with the Sarvāstivādins, which is rendered doubtful in the light of the fact that out of the ten theses belonging to them in the Kathāvatthu, two are certainly contrary to the views of the Sarvāstivādins, viz., (1) insight is not for those in the world and (2) that five spiritual faculties do not function in worldly matters. However, as we analyze the various theses attributed to them, we find that they do not represent any break from the general range of controverted theses in the text. To cite an example, their assertion that all, save the Path, is pain and sorrow seems to form a connected group with such theses as ‘the fruit of recluse-ship is unconditioned’ or ‘attainment (patti) is unconditioned’.

In his commentary on the Kathāvatthu, Buddhaghosa uses a significant term etarahi while attributing a number of theses. Buddhaghosa often mentions that such and such a thesis is held etarahi, i.e., ‘at present’ or ‘now’ by this or that school. The theses attributed in this manner belong to such sects as the Sammatiyas, the Sarvāstivādins, the Andhakas, the Gokulikas, the Bhādayānikas, the Uttarāpathakas and the Vetusyaikas. Similarly, there are two other terms icchanti, i.e., ‘accept’ or ‘incline to’ this or that belief used in case of sects such as the Vātsiputriyas and the Mahāsamghikas and maññanti, i.e., ‘imagine’ or ‘deem’ applied in the case of the Kāśyapiyas. All these three terms are in the present tense, by using which, Buddhaghosa seems to be suggesting that the theses in question were living doctrines during his time. He does not use these terms uniformly for each and every thesis discussed in the Kathāvatthu, which may also mean that certain theses were no more current doctrines. By implication, this means that the sects
holding the second type of theses were either amalgamated with more powerful units or had disappeared completely by the time of Buddhaghosa. The most significant phrase, however, out of these is etarahi, by affixing which in certain cases, the commentator wants to affirm that this or that opinion is at present held by such and such a sect.

All these factors clearly lead to the hypothesis that the theses and doctrines discussed in the Kathāvatthu generally belong to an age to which the compilation of the Kathāvatthu is ascribed by the tradition, i.e., roughly about the middle of the third century B.C. It is likely that in the beginning, a number of theses constituted only the minor tenets of the earlier sects, but in the course of time, when further dissensions arose within the larger units, they became divided into different subsects. As the case with the early sects, the new sects also seem to have developed mainly owing to interpretative difficulties regarding the original teachings of the Buddha. The result was that different sections of monks within a larger unit happened to lay emphasis on some tenets more than others so much so that in the course of time they became almost completely identified with the same views and grew as independent sects.

As regards the problem of asymmetry in the Kathāvatthu, one may point out that this feature of the text would in fact sustain its antiquity as given in the traditional accounts. Supposing that different Kathās were inserted into the existing stock, in course of time, in different stages, one might expect that at the time of the final compilation the person or persons doing it would adopt some system in presenting the controversies, e.g., they may be classified according to their themes or sects. As to the idea of the sanctity of the text obstructing its proper systematization, such an idea would arise only if the text were taken to have been compiled at some sacred congregation as was the case with the Sutta and the Vinaya Piṭakas. Alteration in such texts was regarded as an heretical act by the orthodox monks as were Mahāsāṃghikas impeached by them for such alterations in the Canon. Thus, the asymmetry of the Kathāvatthu seems, in fact, to support the presumption of its early growth. The controversies are haphazardly strung together for the simple reason that some sections of the Buddhist
monks had not, perhaps, as yet formulated all their views in a clear-cut sequence and their views had not so far crystallized into well-knit doctrines. Otherwise, they might have, like the Mahāsāṃghikas, parted company earlier instead of continuing in the Saṅgha to be expelled only in the Third Council. It seems that once the doctrinal disputes began openly in the Saṅgha, these sections came out with their assertions one after another, even as the orthodox Theravādins claimed to have refuted the earlier ones already.

The textual evidence of the Kathāvattthu goes in favour of its traditional antiquity. Attention may be drawn to a particular controversy where a Mahāsāṃghika thesis, viz., ‘generally speaking the Ariyan Path is Five-fold only’, is disputed by the Theravādins. It may be observed that the Mahāsāṃghika assertion reflects an early state of the Buddhist history when its doctrines had not yet been systematized and crystallized under detailed formulae. It was a stage of Buddhist history when the idea of the Eight-fold Path had not yet become institutionalized and a certain section still entertained the doubt that the Path could be Five-fold only.

The antiquity of the Kathāvattthu is also sustained by a certain reference where Therī Khemā, chief of the Buddha’s women disciples, is described as being Kathāvattthu-Visārada. Although this reference occurs in the Aṭṭhakathā, it probably embodies an ancient tradition. And lastly, it may be observed that the Kathāvattthu is the only one of the several early Buddhist scriptural texts, of the individual compilation of which, the date and authorship are specifically mentioned in the tradition. There is hardly anything convincing to disbelieve this tradition. It seems thus that the controversies recorded in the Kathāvattthu should be taken to have flourished about the time of the Third Buddhist Council held in the age of Aśoka and there is reason to believe that its text was composed by Moggaliputta Tissa in the course of these deliberations.

THE ISSUES DEBATED

As early as the Rigvedic times, spiritual quest had to face the challenge of religious scepticism such as is evidenced when
it is asked: 'where is Indra?' Similarly, there are sceptical remarks about the efficacy of sacrifices and rituals. Beginning with the conception of many deities indwelling natural and human phenomena, Vedic religion gradually evolved to a sublime and rarified monotheism, pantheism and monism. This development was made possible by a rational and tolerant outlook which took account of doubts and misgivings and encouraged discussion—Vākōvāya, Brahmodya.

During the Upaniṣadic period, this tendency of seeking to know more through discussion and debate becomes increasingly prominent. We have many instances of discussion and debates on philosophical and religious issues recorded in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. The famous 'symposium' in the time of Janaka recorded in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad is the most celebrated instance of these. The result is that the Upaniṣads evince a series of expositions of a number of problems related to the cosmical and psychical aspects of reality. Some of the problems discussed in the Upaniṣadic texts deserve notice. In the sphere of cosmology, the thinkers from ancient times in India, as in Greece, were trying to discover the source of visible nature; whether it is one or many, that is to say, whether this source lies in the unity of many gods or in one Person (puruṣa) or one substance such as asat, viz., undifferentiated matter. Speculations over this problem are frequently encountered in the Upaniṣads. The Brhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya Upaniṣads discuss the nature of sacrifice and its significance as symbolizing the central process of the universe. Its culmination is reached when it is said that life itself is a sacrifice. The cosmological enquiries culminate in the concept of the Puruṣa or Ātman as the immanent as well as the transcendent ground of the universe. The Upaniṣadic doctrine tracing the universe to a spiritual source came to be sharply distinguished from other doctrines which sought to trace it to some insentient or dependent principle. At the same time, eschatological enquiries lead to the concept of Karman, rebirth and the two different ways—Devayāna (way of gods) and Pitṛyāna (way of the fathers)—for the ascent of the souls of the dead. In fact the doctrine of Karman still has the aspect of a novel mystery. Psychological problems too are dis-
discussed at some length. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad speculates over the mind (citta) and the states of consciousness. The Upaniṣadic thinkers also seek to establish the relationship between manas and prāṇa. In fact, the emphasis that came to be laid on self as the divine principle of knowledge (jñāna) and karman, necessitated enquiring into its nature more closely and attempts were made to locate it in the manas or prāṇa. A significant transcendental problem is posed when it is asked as to what is the power behind the manas (mind). The Kena Upaniṣad focuses the epistemological quest when it seeks the difference between Vidita and Avidita. Also, we have the famous dialogue of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad on epistemology occurring between Yaññavalkya and Maitreyī. Ethical enquiry is contained in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad where the difference between śreyas and preyas is brought out. Death and the life beyond me the central problems of this Upaniṣad. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the importance of dayā, dāna, dharma, brahmacarya, satya, etc., is laid down. Mystical enquiry is intimated in the expositions about supernatural experiences such as in the Munḍaka, the Kāṭha and the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣads. The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad contains theological enquiry in the form of such problems as the number of gods. These are roughly the various facets of enquiry which draw the attention of the Upaniṣadic thinkers who appear to be seeking to discover the real and the ultimate along all possible avenues.

The basic problem of the Upaniṣadic enquiry is, thus, the age-old enigma of cosmology which they seek to unravel. This quest ultimately finds its fulfilment in the conceptualization of the cosmical reality, i.e., Brahman, which is identical with the psychical reality i.e. Ātman, the divine principle in man, the source of karman as also of knowledge. The enquiry about the self is, thus, by and large, the most absorbing subject of the Upaniṣadic philosophy, in the process of which cosmological, epistemological and psychological problems are ultimately combined. The Upaniṣadic approach seeks the universal and the permanent and its notion of reality may be most aptly expressed in a later phrase 'yat sat tannityām'. The real is an infinite spiritual principle (satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantam, ātmarūpa). It can be approached only through
-dedication, knowledge and devotion. Apart from self, another important problem of enquiry is the principle of karman, although this doctrine, as it is set forth in the Upaniṣads, appears to be in its nascent stage. As noted previously, the self was characterized also as the principle of karman and hence the importance of the doctrine was bound to come up. Thus, the Upaniṣads do not totally reject karman and maintain an optimistic view of life and nature.

Another problem, with which the Upaniṣads are frequently concerned, consists in the growth of doubt and scepticism regarding the various solutions and hypotheses that are offered by the thinkers of the age. This tendency is evident from the various dialogues contained in the Upaniṣadic texts in the course of which the enquirer keeps putting one question after another and the interlocutor goes on revealing the subtler aspects of the reality in the same order.

Epistemological problems form another important set in the Upaniṣads. In the Kena and the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads we come across certain dialogues wherein the problem of knowing the knower has been raised.

In contrast to the Vedic view were many other doctrines which the Sramanas and the Parivrājakas are reported to have held in Buddha's time. The age of Buddha has been aptly described as an age of thought-ferment in the religious history of India. The religious leaders and thinkers of the age speculate over such problems as the nature of the soul and the world and the ultimate mission of man's life. Their views, though preserved but briefly in scattered reference in the Buddhist and Jain Canons, reflect, nevertheless, a remarkable variety of religious and philosophical formulations. The galaxy of thinkers which emerges in this age definitely shows a departure from the past, a transition from the winding highway of Vedic tradition into the new byways of heterodoxy essaying intellectual and spiritual adventure. These thinkers are sometimes compared with the Greek Sophists. In point of intellectual vigour and variety, the parallel is apt. The first two suttas of the Dīgha Nikāya throw a welcome light on the various theories and doctrines prevalent about the age of Buddha and occasionally they also enlighten us about the names of certain contemporary
thinkers of which the most famous were the six heretical teachers (*Tīṭṭhiyas*), viz., Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesakambli, Pakkuda Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Belatthiputta and Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta. Also, there is a reference to sixty-two doctrinal views current about this time. In the Jain Canon, however, the number of these cults is raised to 363. Among these teachers, as reported in the Buddhist *suttas*, there were materialists, sceptics, agnostics, atheists, fatalists, pessimists and so on. The accounts preserved in Jain literature also speak of a number of contemporary philosophical dogmas, viz., (1) Kālavāda, (2) Svabhāvavāda, (3) Niyativāda, (4) Yadrcchāvāda, (5) Íśvaravāda, etc.

A number of modern writers have sought to explain these views and doctrines by extensively tapping the information availab ing in the Jain and Buddhist sources. We would, therefore, merely indicate here the principal tendencies of the age which produced and furthered controversies affecting future development.

The first category of views that we come across in this age concerns the ancient problem of cosmology and cosmogony wherein the thinkers seek to discover the origin of the world and the soul as also the nature of the two. An interesting variety of views was held over these problems. Some of the thinkers subscribed to eternalism (*sassatvāda*) upholding the eternal existence of the world and the soul. Others were semi-eternalists (*ekaccasassaiaivāda*), advocating both the eternalist and non-eternalist views. In their opinion, the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly non-eternal. Further, there were extentionalists or limitists and unlimitists (*Antānantiκa*). They held the view that the world is neither finite nor infinite. Also there were fortuitous originists (*Abhīcacamuppāνnīkā*) holding that the world and the soul arise without a cause. Regarding the views of the second category, it may be mentioned that, apart from discussions on the soul as a part of cosmogony, there was a tendency to speculate over the nature of the self exclusively. There was a doctrine of conscious soul after death (*Uddhānāghātantiκaśaṅhīvāda*) wherein belief in the existence of a conscious soul after death was subscribed in sixteen different ways. Contrary to this, there was also a theory-
of unconscious soul after death (Uddhamāghātanikasāṇīnīvāda)\textsuperscript{102}. Another doctrine upheld a nihilistic view on soul (uccedavāda) which sought to establish a nihilistic end for the living being.\textsuperscript{103}

The third category consists of views which speculated on the possibility of liberation in this life (Dīṭhadhammanibhānavāda). This type of speculation led to the formulation of five different ways conceiving the possibility of liberation.\textsuperscript{104}

There was another category which consisted of agnostic and sceptic thinkers. Such thinkers took to equivocation when they were confronted with a situation requiring them to draw a distinction between good and evil actions, and they refused to give their own verdict.\textsuperscript{105}

Thus, Makkhali Gosāla is said to have been the most prominent heretic and Akriyāvādins who upheld the doctrine of Sāṁsāra but rejected altogether the possibility of individual initiative in gaining final liberation.\textsuperscript{106} Pūraṇa Kassapa\textsuperscript{107} and Pakudha Kaccāyana\textsuperscript{108} were the other Akriyāvādins. As against this Niganṭha Nāṭaputta was the most rigorous teacher of Kriyāvāda.\textsuperscript{109} Saṅjaya Belīṭhiputta, according to the Buddhist accounts, was an agnostic teacher, who did not really try to find out the truth and declared it to be undiscoverable.\textsuperscript{110} Similarly, Ajita Kesakamlī was a materialistic thinker of the time.\textsuperscript{111}

The age of Buddha, thus, seems to have been a period of vigorous mental exercise in theosophy and philosophy. The phenomenon of a great variety and diversity in religious speculation and philosophical disputation features no doubt as a marked characteristic throughout the various phases of Indian thought—true to this are the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas, the Upaniṣads—yet this passion for knowledge seems to have been writ large during the period under review. It was against this background that the Buddha embarked his own religious movement. His originality lay in the fact that he did away with cosmological and epistemological enquiries, i.e., purvānta and aparānta, and also eschewed speculations on theosophy. As the supreme healer of suffering humanity, he concentrated mainly on the psychological and ethical enquiries which were directly concerned with the beings of this world.

Buddha distinguishes himself from his forerunners, as well as contemporary thinkers insofar as his teachings do not
encourage the metaphysical hankering for the conceptualization of the transcendent, nor encourage the fear of some supernatural being, who may be supposed to be the cause and controller of all things. The gospel of Buddha avoids all hypotheses regarding the unknown and concerns itself only with the facts of life in the present work-a-day world, and seeks to transmute it by a moral and spiritual alchemy. Buddhism has always been marked by its intensely practical attitude. Brushing aside ritualism, theology and metaphysics, Buddha shifted the emphasis in religion to man's inner life. He had a system of thought by which this inner life could be purified and its powers cultivated so that it would be immune from all dukkha, from all sorrows, that outer life, the life of flesh and the world, inflict upon it.\(^{112}\)

Buddha repeatedly expressed himself against dogma or belief. He holds that dogma does not make men pure nor does it end the ill existing in the world. It is the Path that brings purity.\(^{113}\) He declares in the *Sutta-Nipāta*: 'I preach no dogmas drawn from all the divers views.'\(^{114}\) He is reported to have once told a Brāhmaṇa that there are many Śramanas and Brāhmaṇas who maintain that night is day and day is night, but he maintains that night is night and day is day. Theories, according to him, bring controversies and strife amongst the saints and thinkers but it does not harm those who have withdrawn from the world and have been cleansed.\(^{115}\) Buddha's aversion for theories is asserted in clear terms in the *Majjhima-Nikāya*. Vacchagotta is said to have asked him as to whether the Buddha has any theory of his own or not? The Buddha affirmed that he is free from all theories. The predecessors and contemporaries of the Buddha claimed to possess knowledge through a variety of means. A list of ten such ways of knowing is referred to in the Pāli texts and is criticized and rejected as unsatisfactory.\(^{118}\) In the said list, six of the items are such which claim knowledge on the basis of some sort of authority and the remaining four base their claim on some kind of reasoning.\(^{117}\) There are other references in the *Nikāyas* to show that Buddha vehemently condemned speculative views. For instance, in the *Sānghaṭī Nikāya* while dealing with indeterminate questions, he said, the
Tathāgata does not indulge in such unwarranted extensions, he does not spin speculative theories.\textsuperscript{118} Buddha's disapproval of dogma and theory appears to have been caused by the clear perception of the fact that the Truth is essentially one and surpasses the intellect. Besides, dogmas and theories are bound to be accompanied by wrangles and strife. The wise, therefore, do not engage themselves in vulgar theories.\textsuperscript{119} The Buddha's antipathy to cosmological and metaphysical speculation differentiates him from the Upanisadic as well as the contemporary thinkers. This, in effect, implied two things. Firstly, no attempt was made to discover any substance, person or God. Therefore, instead of a quest for the underlying substance as real, the Buddha formulated the three marks of phenomenal actuality, viz., \textit{dukkha}, \textit{anicca} and \textit{anatta}. And secondly, the search for a law governing phenomena replaced the search for the substance itself. The Buddha, thus, sought to emphasize psychological, moral and spiritual rather than logical, metaphysical and cosmological problems.

Steering his way clear of all dogmas, the Buddha laid down the doctrine of \textit{madhyamā pratipad}. The starting point of the Buddha is universal suffering, \textit{i.e.}, not merely the suffering of the poor and the lowly but also of those who seem to live a life of luxury and affluence. It was his reasoning that, if a man was struck by an arrow, he would not refuse to have it extricated before he knew who shot the arrow, whether that man was married or not, tall or short. All he would want is to be rid the arrow.\textsuperscript{120}

The \textit{Dhamma} which flashed into the mind of Buddha at the time of his enlightenment (\textit{Sambodhi}), consisted of \textit{Pratītyasamutpāda} and \textit{Nirvāṇa}.\textsuperscript{121} The principle of \textit{Pratītyasamutpāda} has been called the 'Middle Way' and its discovery has been likened to that of an ancient city.\textsuperscript{122} In the \textit{Jātakas} also, the \textit{Dhamma} has been characterized as the 'good old rule'.\textsuperscript{123} The comparison is remarkable, since it points out Buddha's objective and impersonal attitude towards his \textit{Dhamma}. Unlike the Vedic seers, Christianity and Islam, Buddha did not consider the \textit{Dhamma} to have been revealed to him by some supramundane power. Rather, he took it as an ancient highway of higher life continuing from the hoary past. That there
was nothing obscurantist in the thought of the Buddha is amply clear from one of the statements made in his last moments. He is said to have told Ānanda that he preached the Truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine, for, in respect of Dhamma, there is no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher.\textsuperscript{124}

Centuries later, the Mādhyamikas are said to preserve exquisitely the essential features of the original gospel of the Buddha, although a subtle and sophisticated philosophical tinge has been added. The Mādhyamika standpoint of criticism and rejection of all theory as constituting the highest wisdom is in fullest accord with the Buddha’s rejection of all speculative philosophies as dogmatism. It seems that the rejection of theories is itself the means by which the Buddha is led to the non-conceptual knowledge of the absolute.\textsuperscript{125} Buddha is supposed to have specified four possible siddhānta, i.e., standpoints for knowing anything, viz., (1) laukika siddhānta, (2) pratipauruśika siddhānta, (3) pratipāksika siddhānta and (4) paramārthika siddhānta.\textsuperscript{126} While explaining the paramārthika siddhānta, i.e., transcendental standpoint, comparison has been drawn in three verses of the Aṭṭhavargīya sūtra and five verses of the Aṭṭhaka vagga of the Sutta-Nipāta (i.e., 878-882).\textsuperscript{127} The central idea of these verses is that a view is plausible because we prize it, we are enamoured of its externals. We hold fast to it as the truth and consider others as fools. This is actually the starting point of dogmatism and the Mādhyamikas make it a point to deal a severe blow to all such dogmatizations on the basis of their dialectic. The Mādhyamikas use only one weapon. By drawing out the implications of any view, they show its self-contradictory character. The dialectic removes the constrictions which our concepts, with their practical or sentimental bias, put on reality. The Mādhyamika dialectic, however, was vigorously criticized and it was pointed out that śūnyatā which criticizes all theories is but another theory. Equally prompt came the reply from the Mādhyamikas and they observed, śūnyatā (the awareness of the hollowness) of all views is preached by the Jinas (Buddhas) as the way of deliverance; incurable indeed are they who take śūnyatā itself as a view.\textsuperscript{128}
Thus, the attitude that Buddha appears to have adopted implied a complete rejection of metaphysical speculation, since, in his opinion it was absolutely unhelpful in the spiritual growth and salvation of man. It seems that, if Buddha’s advice had been followed strictly by his disciples, some of the controversies which emerged in Buddhism may not have arisen at all. They emerged ultimately on account of an attempt to reconcile Buddha’s salient teachings with some of the fundamental metaphysical problems which continued to persist as living issues of enquiry and speculation. Thus, in spite of Buddha’s injunction to the contrary, efforts were made to probe and search the nature and reality of the substance. Attempts were also made to interpret the intricacies of the problems on which the Buddha chose to be silent. It was also sought to logically elaborate and systematize his teachings. Some of the controversies discussed in the Kathāvatthu go to indicate that such tendencies contributed in a considerable measure to the growth of doctrinal disputes in early Buddhism.

The development of Buddhist thought in India may be described in two phases—original Buddhism and scholastic Buddhism with three distinct sub-phases in the latter, viz., (1) Abhidhamma, (2) Mahāyāna and (3) Buddhism after Dignāga. It may be observed that it is the original doctrine of the Buddha which is really the fountainhead of all the later thought. The Abhidhamma seems to have developed from the māṭikās and the beginnings of analysis. The later Buddhist tradition would have us believe that Lord Buddha had set into motion the wheel of the law thrice, first at Banaras, next at Grāhrkūṭa hill and finally at Dhanyakaṭaka. According to these traditions, the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra and Vajrayāna doctrines were preached respectively at Grāhrkūṭa and Dhānyakaṭaka. This is more an esoteric than a historical tradition but there have always been some claimants for whom such intimations are at times revealed in spiritual and mystical experiences. It seems that it is the Mādhyamika scholars who have discovered the true perspective in which to understand Buddha’s teachings. According to them, Buddha had discoursed on two Truths—the Empirical and the Ultimate or Samyrti satya and Paramārtha satya. While the Paramārtha is the ultimate objective, the-
former is the way or the means for its realization. It may be observed that the doctrine of Upāyā Kauśalya\textsuperscript{133} which was elaborated later, appears to have had an early origin.\textsuperscript{134} It is granted even by the Pāli tradition that Buddha’s teaching differed according to the intellectual level of his listeners.\textsuperscript{135} While the traditional account of the differentiation of Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna appeals to a common original inspiration, the emergence of the eighteen Hīnayāna sects is attributed by the tradition itself to the labours of individual monks. A complex of many factors appears to underly the latter development of which the Kathāvatthu presents a final conspectus.

There is a group of problems over which the Buddha refrained from expressing any opinion, viz., the ten points not determined.\textsuperscript{136} When he was asked to explain his silence over these issues, he pointed out that they were not only non-conducive to enlightenment, but were potent with the possibilities of anguish and misery.\textsuperscript{137} The silence of the Buddha has puzzled modern scholars and has led some to ascribe agnosticism to the Buddha.\textsuperscript{138} It must have appeared equally enigmatic to the early interpreters and may have led them to various interpretations. We know that the Buddha had laid down, as a basic tenet, the unsubstantial and transitory nature of all things in his doctrines of anatta and anicca. He had also barred discussion on some other questions:

1. Is the world permanent or impermanent?

2. Is the world finite or infinite?

3. Are the body and the soul indentical or different?

4. Does the Tathāgata survive death, or not, or both or neither?\textsuperscript{139}

In spite of this attempt, on the part of the Buddha, to contain metaphysical speculation, there emerged in Buddhism sects of the Puggalavādins and Sarvāstivādins. This is hardly surprising since the ‘indeterminate problems’ were of such a fundamental import as to have captured the attention of the philosophically minded Buddhists even while the Master was alive and more so after he had passed away. They continued, therefore, as live
metaphysical issues even after the decease of the Buddha and, in spite of his injunctions to the contrary. As such, they naturally tended to receive different interpretations and thus help the growth of controversies. One of the major sets of Kathāvatthu controversies centres round the nature of the Buddha, a problem the Buddha had refused to discuss fully and had partly included among the indeterminates. Similarly, the nature of the soul is the principal theme with the Puggalavādins while the Sarvāstivādins essay to resolve the issue between permanence and impermanence.

The Buddha made it clear to his disciples that his teachings should not be accepted just because they were his words. He insisted that his teachings must be thoroughly analyzed and understood before they were accepted. After the passing away of the Buddha, when his followers were left with the Dhamma as their sāstā, there were attempts to systematize and elaborate his teachings. The first major attempt of such a systematization was made in the course of the First Buddhist Council. Although the deliberations of the Council were approved by a majority of the monks present, still there were some, who refused to recognize it. There seem to have been similar attempts by the dissenting groups to systematize the teachings in their own way. The Mahāsaṃghikas, for example, were impeached by the Theravādins just on this count. We also notice that some of the early Buddhist sects compiled their own individual Vinaya as also other works. The process of systematization also implies interpretation and development. The brevity as also the variety of Buddha's sermons, delivered from time to time, opened avenues for interpretation and development in the course of which new concepts were likely to emerge. It may be noted that most of the controversies discussed in the Kathāvatthu arise owing to a difference of opinion over the interpretation of the Buddha's own words.

Another factor leading to differences was the scholastic specialization among the monks. As was the case with the Vedic literature, the early Buddhists also relied on memory and recitation for preserving the words of the Buddha. This made it necessary for different groups of monks to specialize
in specific fields of Buddhist studies, a process which was helped further by the growth of particular traditions. In the Pāli Canon, we very often come across such classes of monks as Dhammadharas, Vinayadharas, Mātikadharas, Dhamma-Kaṭhikas, Dīghabhānakas, Majjhimaṁbānakas, Abhidhammikas etc. These phrases denote a kind of specialization in different branches of the Buddhist literature, e.g., Sutta, Vinaya, Mātikā and the sub-branches thereof. Upāli and Ānanda seem to have been the recognized masters of Vinaya and Dhamma of their age as indicated by the account of the First Buddhist Council. We find mention of the differences between the Dhammadhara and Vinayadhara monks of Kausambi assuming sectarian postures even in the lifetime of the Buddha. It is likely that these separate bodies, which existed for a particular function necessary for the whole Buddhist community, e.g., the preservation of a particular portion of the Piṭaka by regular recitation, imbibed, in course of time, doctrines which could be looked upon as peculiar to the body holding them and in this way the body developed into a separate religious school of Buddhism. According to a tradition of Paramārtha, Gokulikas were experts in the Abhidharma, Sautrāntikas in the Sūtra, Sarvāstivādins in the Abhidharma, Haimavatas in the Sūtra and Sammatāyas in the Vinaya.

The most significant injunction laid down by the Buddha that eventually proved to be instrumental in the development of ecclesiastical cleavages in Buddhism was the absence of a central authority unlike the system of Papacy in Christianity or the Khalifate in Islam. Before he passed away, the Buddha laid down finally: “Yo mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto, so vo mami’ accayena Satthā.” But it also appears from some other Nikāyaic references that Buddha was perhaps not absolutely decisive on this point since the beginning. At some stage he seems to have been inclined to think that Sāriputta or Moggallāna could lead the Order. Finally, however, he did not nominate any one as his successor to head the Order. Buddhism, in fact, tended to repudiate the force of mere authority in the quest of knowledge. For want of a supreme authority, it was possible for the monks to interpret
the terse expressions of the Teacher in different ways, introduce additional material and pass them in the name of the Buddha.

Some scholars have discussed some of the external and circumstantial factors that contributed to the rise of sectarianism and new doctrines in Buddhism. While Przyluski and Hofinger have dealt mainly with the sociological and geographical factors, N. Dutt and Demieville have emphasized the religious causes. We may briefly note some of other factors which helped the process of proliferation of new doctrines.

The expansion of Buddhism was a remarkably swift process and after Aśoka started taking an active interest in Buddhism, it took still faster strides. On the contrary, due to the difficulties of communication, it was hardly possible to maintain any constant intercourse between the various communities stationed at far-off places. In fact, since the very beginning, Buddhist monks were required to stay at one place during the rainy season, which gradually gave rise to monastic communities. Thus, there was a growing trend towards geographical dispersion which also increased due to economic causes. There was circumstantial variety in these places as reflected in the social, traditional, cultural and religious temperament and behaviour of the people. This favoured the manifestation of local particularism which sometimes became a ground for more pronounced divisions. Sometimes, the hostile attitude of certain sections and kings such as Pusyamitra necessitated localisation of the various communities. It seems most likely that this localisation of the communities, due to various reasons, ultimately started bearing fruit in the form of varied manifestations of the Buddhist doctrines in the upholding of which various sects and schools came to the surface. Frauwallner, however, maintains that the Sarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Kaśyapīya, Mahīśāsaka and Theravāda sects owe their origin to the communities established by the missions of Aśoka. He has made two important observations in the support of his hypothesis: (1) except for the Kāśyapīyas, all these sects preserve their own Vinayyas, and, although these works have been handed down quite independently, they are closely related; (2) the rise of various schools, thus, seems to be due to differences of opinion on points of dogma. Frauwallner's suggestion
that the process of localization started with the missions sent by Aśoka seems to be untenable on the testimony of the Kathāvatthu. If we accept his suggestion it would be difficult to explain how the tenets of most of the sects mentioned by him were disputed in the time of Aśoka and were included in the Kathāvatthu. Even the process of localization on which he seeks to lay so much emphasis seems to have started earlier with the spread of Buddhism to distant places. Sometimes, individual masters of Buddhism seem to have played a major role in contributing to new doctrinal directions and this appears to be valid, particularly, in the case of most of the schools illustrated by Frauwallner. In schools such as Vātsīputriya, Dharmaguptaka, Kāśyapiya, it seems that Vātsīputra, Dharmagupta and Kāśyapa were the respective teachers who played the key role so much so that these sects came to be named after them. Similarly, the amount of influence exerted by Mahādeva, Kātyāyaniputra, Mudgalyāyana in the development of Mahāsamghika, Sarvāstivāda and Vibhajyavāda, respectively, is well-known. It is also difficult to sustain too far the observation of Frauwallner that differences in dogma were the chief dividing lines between the sects, and that Vinaya rules were almost uniform in them. In fact, we come across, from a very early stage of the Buddhist history, a powerful confrontation between the champions of laxity on the one hand, and the advocates of rigorism, on the other, in the sphere of discipline. Buddha allowed a certain amount of latitude in the observance of Vinaya rules which was opposed by Devadatta. The Council of Vaiśāli appears to have deliberated solely on the Vinaya confrontation, which, instead of being reconciled, proved to be the background of the first schism in Buddhism. Even later, if we analyze the minute details of the disciplinary code prescribed by the various sects, we find that there was a considerable amount of difference. For example, I-tsing refers to the differences of dress among the schools.

Another important factor providing a congenial atmosphere towards the development of a diversity of views in Buddhism appears to be the influx of all sorts of people into the order, particularly, a large number of disciples of heretical teachers of the age of Buddha. Although we have no direct evidence-
about the interchange of thought between the Buddhists and the non-Buddhists at this early age, some contact may be surmised from certain parallelisms which can be noticed in some of the Buddhist and non-Buddhist developments. The close resemblance between Puggalavāda and Ātmavāda, Sarvāstivāda and the Sāṁkhya, especially, its Pariṇāmavāda, Lokottaravāda and Avatāravāda, suggests that there was undoubtedly some influence of non-Buddhist thought on the growth of Buddhist sects and controversies in this age. It may be noted that the Arthaśāstra of Kautilya notices the philosophical schools of the time and Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Lokāyata are included among the schools of ānvikṣakī.

METHODOLOGY OF DEBATE IN THE KATHĀVATTHU

The Upaniṣads present many examples of discussions and debates on theosophical and philosophical issues. Most of them are in the form of earnest enquiries made by those desirous to know from those who are held to know, i.e., in most cases the discussion takes the form of a philosophical dialogue between a student or students and their teacher. The Praṇānapaniṣad, for example, tells us that Sukeśa Bhāradvāja, Śaibya Satyakāma, Sauryāyani Gārgya, Kausalya Āsvalāyana, Bhārgava Vaidarbhī and Kabandhī Kātyāyana approached the revered Pippalāda seeking to know the highest Brahman. The Upaniṣad records their questions and answers. The Kathopaniṣad records a dialogue between Naciketā and Yama. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad records several such dialogues, for example, that between Jānaśruti and Raivaka, Satyakāma and Gautama, Śvetaketu and Uddālaka, Sanatakumāra and Nārada, etc.

In these dialogues the teacher reveals a profound truth and seeks to explain it with the help of analogies and parables. The disciple listens with faith and earnestness. The method of this type of enquiry is best summarized in the words of the Gita:

तेहू विद्या प्रिणपतेन परिप्रश्नेन सेवया ।
उपदेश्यति ते ज्ञान ज्ञानिन् न स्तत्वदशिनः ॥ १७१
On the other hand, there are examples in the Upaniṣads of debates between rival claimants to philosophical knowledge. The most famous example of this is the symposium organised by Janaka which is referred to in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. The king wishes to know as to who was the most learned among the assembled Brāhmaṇas of Kuru and Paścāla. Even here, in the course of the many debates recorded between Yājñavalkya and his interlocutors, the method adopted is that of simple questions and answers as if the issues were all factual and the truth of the answers discernible on inspection. No logical issues appear to be debated; at least no logical argumentation has been resorted to. It is only very rarely, such as in the debate between Yājñavalkya and Gārgī, that an appeal is made to what is basically a logical principle, viz., regressus ad infinitum. Similarly, in the discussion between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī, an apparently transcendental argument is used at the end, viz., ‘Vijñātāram vā are kena vijñānyāt’ i.e., how to know the knower? Thus, despite the prevalence of discussions and debate and the fact that we have reference even to a discipline called Vīkovākya in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the general method followed in the Upaniṣads is essentially pedagogic and dialectical in the original sense of the word, rather than that of logical argumentation between rival disputants. The atmosphere is one of seeking the truth with earnest humility rather than that of defending a thesis or opinion with scholastic ingenuity and logical subtlety.

A considerable difference of atmosphere is visible in this respect in the age of the Buddha. We meet here with wandering ascetics and teachers who are comparable to Greek Sophists in their debating skill and sophistries. They have neither humility nor simple earnestness. They hold specific opinions on diverse questions and defend them by argumentation. The oppositions of faith and reason, the positive and the transcendent, the decidable and the undecidable have clearly emerged in the course of this debating. We have, thus, materialists, atheists, sceptics and agnostics. The commonest kind of reason given is an appeal to observation, while counter-examples are used for verification. An attempt is also made to tie the opponent in a knot of contradictions.
The most important development in logical argumentation occurs through the formulation of the four-valued logic of the sceptics. This was adopted with more elaboration by the Niganthas and with a difference by the Buddha himself.\textsuperscript{178}

Buddha's own dialogues and expositions, while reminiscent of the Upaniṣads are somewhat more developed in their logical aspect. They evince an attempt not merely to express and illustrate a deep truth but also to persuade and disarm a neutral or even hostile audience. The Buddha had the capacity to preach his doctrines persuasively.\textsuperscript{179} Still, on the whole, the Buddha gives the impression not of a logician but of a seer who is seeking to communicate beyond the oppositions and dilemmas generated by more logical argumentation. The Buddha thus condemns contentious opinions (\textit{diṭṭhi})\textsuperscript{180} and indicates that truth lies beyond perennial antinomies such as of existence and non-existence.\textsuperscript{181} This is the true Madhyamā-pratīpāda or \textit{Pratīyasadupāda}, the original dialectical method of the Buddha, which was grasped and developed by the Mādhya-mikas.\textsuperscript{182} Buddha, thus, (1) appeals to experience in contradistinction to any appeal to mere tradition or faith in the transcendent, (2) he subjects experience to analysis seeking to show that experiences stand for contingent phenomena subject to a Law, (3) he declares spiritual truth to be beyond logical antinomies, (4) on certain metaphysical issues he declares speculative reasoning futile.

It is clear, however, that speculative reasoning and logical debating grew apace among the followers of the Buddha after his passing away. The very effort to interpret the words of the Master was a fertile source of debate and controversy. The effort to carry further the analysis of phenomena initiated by the Buddha was another source of the growth of divergent opinions. Some of the controversies suggest that the effort to include or exclude non-Buddhist doctrines was still another source of controversy.

The method of debate in the Kathavatthu shows considerable formal development.\textsuperscript{183} Here the thesis is stated, reasons advanced, refutations and counter-refutations presented, examples and counter-examples given, the conversion of propositions is regularly done in an effort made, in effect, to test the distribu-
tion of the middle term. Instead of any direct appeal to experience, here reason functions by appealing to commonly accepted premises and to principles affecting the formal validity of conclusions. The typical structure of a debate in the Kathāvatthu is developed in the form of a defence and attack. The style of debate runs as follows, as may be illustrated from the example of the first Kathā or controversy.

First of all, the thesis is presented for discussion by the disputant, i.e., the Theravādins in the direct order (anuloma)—'Is 'Puggala' known in the sense of a real and ultimate thing?' This is called thāpanā or formulation of the issue. The Puggalavādins affirm the Puggala thus questioned. The Theravādins ask further, 'Is the puggala known in the same way as a real and ultimate thing?' This is called pāpanā which raises a crucial implication that would really take the form of a hypothetical syllogism. The denial of the Puggalavādins as regards this identity leads the Theravādins to affirm that the former's thesis is refuted, for, if they maintain the first premise they must also accept the implication as put forth in the second question. This is called ropanā.

Now the advocates of the thesis come forward with a rejoinder (paṭikamma), 'Is the puggala not known in the sense of a real and ultimate thing?' The Theravādins affirm that it is not so known. The Puggalavādins argue further, 'Is it unknown in the same way as a real and ultimate thing is known?' The Theravāda refusal to accept this leads the Puggalavādins to affirm that if the disputants admit the first premise they must also accept the second.

Next follows the third phase of the debate called niggaha in which the Puggalavādins claim the defeat of the disputants on the basis of their rejoinder.

Then follows an application of the reasoning of the disputant to his own case (upanaya), i.e., the Puggalavādins observed that (1) the puggala is known in the sense of a real and ultimate thing, but (2) unknown in the same way as a real and ultimate thing is known. At this, the Theravāda objection was that if the statement (2) is not admitted then statement (1) cannot be admitted either. And now they maintain that (1) the puggala is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate thing but not...
unknown in the same way as a real and ultimate thing is known. Following the same logic as applied by the Theravādins the Puggalavādins also point out that if they do not admit the statement (2) they cannot admit (1) either.\(^{190}\)

Thus, the Puggalavādins draw the conclusion (niggamana) that refutation of their thesis as proposed by the Theravādins is not sound whereas their own rejoinder is sound.\(^{191}\)

This is the first defeat on refutation (niggaha) followed by four more. In the second defeat which is in the adverse manner (paccanīka-niggaha), the respondents being the Theravādins, the argument of the preceding one is accordingly repeated. In the third, fourth and fifth defeats we have the modification of the first niggaha by insertion of the words, 'everywhere', 'always', and 'in all cases'. In the sixth, seventh and eighth defeats ‘not known’ replaces ‘known’ in the question.\(^{192}\) Thus, these eight niggahas seem to comprise a dialectical whole where-in we ‘find a five-fold argument pro, a five-fold argument contra, three modes of the pro argument, and three modes of the contra argument’.\(^{193}\) It has been pointed out that the use of the word niggaha only up to the number eight is arbitrary, since the subsequent discussion also constitutes refutations.\(^{194}\)

The preceding is, in short, the stereotyped style of debate in the Kathāvatthu. However, the mention of such technical terms as anuyoga (enquiry), āharana (illustration), paṭīṇhā (proposition), upanaya (application of reason), nigghha (defeat or refutation), presupposes a science of logic in the middle of the third century B.C.\(^{195}\)
REFERENCES

1. Atthasālīni, pp. 3-6, Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā, pp. 1, 7; Mīlindapañho, pp. 13-14; Samantapāsādikā, I, p. 53; Mahāvamsa, V, 279; Dīpavaṁsa, VII, 41, 56-58.


5 Points of Controversy, Prefatory Notes, p.xxxi; Malalasekera, DPPN, Vol. I, s.v. Kathāvatthu, p. 505. (It may be noted that sāsana and such other words are here generally used in their Pāli form.)

6. Cf. T.W. Rhys Davids & W. Stede, Pali English Dictionary, s.v. Kathā and Vatthu, pp. 184, 598. In the ordinary usage, the compound term Kathāvatthu means themes of conversation. Cf. Majjhima Nikāya, I, p. 266; II, pp. 47, 356; Aṅguttara Nikāya, IV, p. 202; Mīlindapañho, p 13, etc. But the term Kathāvatthu is generally employed to mean subject of discourse or discussion or argument. Cf. Majjhima Nikāya, II, p. 47. (It may be noted that for the Pāli Tripiṭaka, the Nālandā Devanāgari Pāli series edited by J. Kasyapa, published by the Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra, Nālandā has been utilized here except where stated otherwise.)

7. The English translation of the Kathāvatthu has been captioned Points of Controversy by C.A.F. Rhys Davids and S.Z. Aung and the Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā has been rendered as Debates Commentary by B.C. Law.


9. T.W. Rhys Davids, History and Literature of Buddhism, p. 44.


14. Ibid., p. 505. It may be noted that the Chinese Mahābījā ṣāstra begins with a similar questioning about the relationship of Mahākātyāyanīputra to Buddha over the authorship of the Āṣṭāvaṁsa.


16. Ibid., p. xxxii.

17. See Dīpavaṁsa, Chapter VII; Mahāvamsa, Chapter V; Samantapāsādikā, 31, 46; Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā, p. 5f.

18. Mahāvamsa, Chapter V.


see also B.M. Barua, *Asoka and his Inscriptions*, p. 333; R.G. Basak,
*Asokan Inscriptions*, pp. 146-49.
25. 'Ichā hime kinti saṁgha samage cilathitika styāti'.
See R.B Pandey, op. cit., p. 183.
27. See R.B. Pandey, op. cit., p. 15.
28. Asoka is the jealous guardian of the unity of the Buddhist Saṁgha
and yet the tolerant helper of all the sects. He discouraged the criticism of other sects as also the attempts to disrupt ones own; Cf. R.B.
Pandey, op. cit., R.E. VII, XII and Schism Edicts i.e., Sanchi, Sarnath and Kausambi Minor Pillar Edicts.
Kathāvatthu, p. 505; B.M. Barua, op. cit., p. 337.
31. *Dipavānsa* Chapter V; *Mahāvamsa* Chapter V.
33. J.P. Minayeff, *Recherches sur le Bouddhisme*, p. 82.
34. Cf. Chapters II, IV and V.
37. See infra, Chapters II, IV and V.
40. Ibid., XX, 2.
41. Ibid., XIX, 5
32 Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

42. Kathāvattu, XIX, 3.
43. Ibid., XIX, 4.
44. Kathāvattu-Aṭṭhakathā, pp. 42, 60.
45. Ibid., pp. 43, 58.
46. Ibid., pp. 52-8, 60, 62-5, 67-8, 71-2, 78-9.
47. Ibid., pp. 57-8.
48. Ibid., pp. 58.
49. Ibid., pp. 73-7.
50. Ibid., pp. 167, 171.
51. Ibid., p. 35.
52. Ibid., p. 50.
54. See Dipavamsa, Chapter V.
55. Cf. later picture preserved in the Chinese traditions wherein it is given to understand that Buddhist monks of different denominations lived together in the same monastery.
56. See Kathāvattu, XX, 5.
58. See Therīgāthā Commentary, 135; Cf. also Udāna Commentary, 94.
59. Rgveda, II, 12.
60. Cf. ‘na tatra dakṣiṇā yanti nā vidvāmsastapasvinah’, Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, II, lIII, see also II. 1473; Mundaka Upaniṣad, I.2.7ff, III, 1,8; Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VIII. 1.6; Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, VI. 4.
61. Cf. e.g., Rgveda, X. 90. X. 129.
63. Cf. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, XI. 5, 6, 8; See also SBE, XLIV, p. 98.
64. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, III, lff.
65. e.g., Praśna Upaniṣad, I. 3; Aitareya Upaniṣad, I. 3; Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. 2.1; Taīttrirīva Upaniṣad, III, 1. 1; Māndūkya Upaniṣad, I. 1. 7.
68. Cf. ibid., III. 16.
70. Cf. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, V. 10. 2; VIII. 2.1; Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, I. 5. 16.
72. Taīttrirīva Upaniṣad, II. 3-4; III. 4.
73. Kena Upaniṣad, I. 1.
74. Ibid., I. 4.
75. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II. 1. lff.
76. Katha Upanishad, I. 2. 1ff.
77. Chāndogya Upanishad, III. 23. 1.
78. Muṇḍaka Upanishad, I. 1.6ff; II. 1.2; III. 2.5ff.
80. Śvetāsvatara Upanishad. I.1; II.8, 14-17; III. 1, 10,11; IV. 1. 11 etc.
82. Cf. e.g.; Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad, I.4-10; Chāndogya Upanishad, III 13.7; III, 14, 2-4; See also P. Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, pp. 38ff; S. Radharishnan, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, pp. 45-49.
83. Śankarācārya, Commentary on the Gitā, II. 16.
84. See Iṣa Upaniṣad, 15-18.
85. See Chāndogya Upaniṣad, IV. 14. 2-3; V. 24. 1-4; Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II; 3-5; III. 5.1.
86. See Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, II. 14, 16-17; Kātha Upaniṣad, II 3.9; II. 3. 12ff.
88. Iṣa Upaniṣad, 3; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, II. 2. 2ff.
90. Cf. G.C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, Chapters VIII-IX.
93. Brahmajāla and Sāmaññaphala.
95. O. Schrader has utilized the Jain sources fully in discussing these views in his valuable work, Über den Stand der Indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahaviras und Buddhas; See G.C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, pp. 338ff for a brief outline of these systems as known from the Jain sources.
96. Cf. B.M. Barua, Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, Chapter XIII, ff; G.C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, pp. 327ff; Also BDVI, pp. 31-40; N. Dutt, EMB, Vol. I. pp. 34ff; see also B.C. Law, Historical Gleanings, pp. 21ff, Buddhist Studies, pp. 73ff. K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., Chapters II-III.
98. Ibid., I, 17-21.
99. Ibid., I, 21-3.
100. Ibid., I, 27.
101. Cf. Ibid., I, p. 28.
34 Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

103. Cf. Ibid., I, pp. 30-2.
104. Ibid., I, pp. 32-4.
110. Ibid., I, pp. 51-2.
111. Ibid., I, pp. 48-9.
115. Ibid., pp. 309ff.
127. Ibid., pp. 39-41.
130. *Mātikās* are the list of dhammas which we find sometime enumerated in the *Vinaya Pitaka* (Cf. *Mahāvagga*, pp. 120, 324, 368; *Cullavagga*, pp. 421-423). It may be noted that three Abhidhamma texts, viz., *Dhammasaṅgani*, *Puggalapaññatti* and *Dhātukāthā* start with a’*mātikā*.
133. The ability to adjust sermons to suit the temperament of the listeners or skill to convert people. Cf. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, s.v. *Upāyakausalya*.
pp. 257ff; IV, pp. 374-403.


138. A.B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, p. 63; see also Poussin, ERE, s.v. Nirvāṇa.

139. See e.g. Majjhima Nikāya, Aggivacchagotta sutta.


142. Cf. Cullavagga, Chapter XI.


144. See e.g., Majjhima Nikāya, I, pp. 147-8.

145. Cf, Mahāvagga, Chapter X; Mjhima Nikāya, Kosambisutta.

146. See Mahāvagga, pp. 120, 324, 368; Cullavagga, pp. 421-3; Āṅguttara Nikāya, I, p. 38; II, p. 145.

147. Sūmaṅgalaṇīsī, I, p. 15; Papaṇcasūdana, p. 79.


149. N. Dutt, EMB, II, p. 16.


154. S. Dutt Early Buddhist Monachism, op. cit., p. 102; see also infra. Chapter VII.

155. A. Bareau, op. cit., p. 46.

156. Cf. A. Bareau, op. cit., p. 44. The attitude of Pusyantra towards Buddhism is a controversial problem of Indian history.


158. See infra, Chapter II.

159. Cf. Ibid., See also N. Dutt, EMB. II, pp. 18-20; Demiéville, L’origine des Sectes bouddhiques après Paramārtha, op. cit., pp. 259-60.

160. Takakusu; I-tsing, pp. 66-76.


162. See Bhagavadgītā, IV. 9. See also Mahābhārata-Nārāyanīya section of the Śāntiparva.

163. Arthrsāstra, I. 2

164. Praśna Upaniṣad, I. 1

165. Cf. Ibid., I. 3ff

166. Kaṭha Upaniṣad, I, 1. 9ff

167. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, IV, I. 1ff

168. Ibid., IV, 4. 1ff

169. Ibid., VI, 1. 1ff

170. Ibid., VII, 1. 1ff

171. Bhagavadgītā, 4. 34

172. Bhādāranyaka Upaniṣad, III, 1. 1ff.
36. Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

173. Ibid., III, 8. 1ff.
174. Ibid., IV, 5. 2ff.
175. Cf. Dīgha Nikāya, Brahmajāla and Sāmaññaphala suttas; See also supra.
177. Cf. e.g., Majjhima Nikāya, the dialogue between Dīghanakha and Buddha.
178. Cf. K.N. Jayatilleke, op. cit., pp. 304, 344ff
182. See supra.
185. Cf. Sādhana and Upālānubha referred to in the Nyāyasūtra, I. 2. 1
186. `Soul' or 'person' Cf. infra, Chapter VIII.
187. See Kathāvatthu, p. 3.
188. See Ibid., p. 4.
189. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
190. Ibid., pp. 4-8.
191. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
192. Ibid., pp. 9ff.
Growth and Ramification of the Early Buddhist Sects and Schools

INTRODUCTION

Referring to Buddhist sects and schools it is difficult to always distinguish the precise extension of the two terms, viz., sects and schools. They seem generally to denote the same sets or groups since different sectarian communities can be distinguished doctrinally also. Andréau Bareau has, however, tried to draw some distinction in their connotation. In obvious semblance to sect and school we have two terms in Buddhism, viz., nikāya and ācariyakula or ācariyavāda.¹ In the opinion of Bareau, while Nīhāya stands for sect, ācariyavāda comes nearest to school. He would explain ācariyavāda as the oral (vāda) teaching of a master (ācariya).² It is difficult, however, to accept this interpretation. Ācariyavāda literally means teachers’ exposition. In the post-Canonical commentarial literature, the term is frequently employed to mean the body of expositions, interpretations and opinions of the well-known teachers of the past, i.e., orthodox and traditional commentarial matter.³ Curiously enough, it later came to denote varieties of teachings and interpretations of the Buddhist
doctrine considered heterodox from the Theravāda, point of view. This emerges from the fact that in the Pāli commentaries and Ceylon chronicles, which uphold the Theravāda tradition, all the Buddhist schools, except Theravāda, are called ācariyavāda. It seems likely that sometimes a prominent master of the Law was able to impose his interpretations over a certain community or section of monks so much so that they gradually drifted away to form a body or sect of their own. It is tacitly assumed in the Dipavamsa that a seceding group ought to have an ācariya or leader. Later, we know for certain that some of the Buddhist sects owe their names to individual teachers of different times. It is difficult, therefore, to hold that ācariyavāda exclusively denoted school as being something other than sect. A Nikāya is a group of persons holding the same beliefs and regulations. It is also a collection of objects like the sūtras which is called Nikāya. Thus, though ‘Nikāya’ and ‘ācariyavāda’ seem to correspond somewhat in connotation to the terms sect and school respectively, it is difficult to accept that by using two distinct terms the Buddhist implied the kind of practical distinction between them as suggested by Bareau.

The Ceylonese chroniclers inform us that within a couple of centuries of the Buddha's demise, the Buddhist community was split into eighteen sects or schools. As older works do not make a mention of these sects, scholars, like T.W. Rhys Davids, are led to observe that: Suddenly in the 4th and 5th centuries we have the famous lists of 18 sects supposed to have arisen and to have flourished before the Canon was closed. If we take all the evidence together, it is possible to draw only one conclusion. There were no sects in India in any proper use of that term. The number eighteen is fictitious and may very probably be derived from the eighteen causes of division set out in the Aṅguttara Nikāya. Poussin has, similarly, observed that "the Buddhist schools work on a common literary stock made up from mutual borrowings and they arrive at divergent conclusions even when they do not start from divergent dogmatical tenets. As a rule doctrinal contradictions do not disrupt the samgha. Thus if we consider the mutual relation of sects and their legal position as branches of the universal
Sāṅgha leaving out of account doctrinal divergences which are not as such of paramount importance—sects are not to be contrasted as hostile body, with closed tradition.”

In making these remarks, these scholars seem to have arrived at hasty conclusions without, perhaps, a sufficient analysis of the available material. They have mainly three contentions in their observations: (1) Older works do not mention the sects. (2) The so-called Buddhist sects are not so in the proper sense of the term. (3) They are branches of the universal Sāṅgha without distinctive organisations and without doctrinal divergences of any paramount importance.

As regards the lateness of the evidence, T.W. Rhys Davids has based his observation only on the literary evidence and that too merely of the Ceylonese chronicles and other later works. The texts of the Vinaya and the Sutta Piṭakas are, however, replete with terms and phrases which seem to imply an early tendency towards sectarian division in the Order. But we have, in fact more than a plausibility here. Rhys Davids has also overlooked those epigraphic sources which have an early bearing on the Buddhist sects. Curiously enough, we have direct inscriptive evidence datable to the early centuries of the Christian era where several early Buddhist sects are mentioned, and more indirect evidence going back to the second century B.C. In the Sāñchi rālic casket inscription there is reference to the Hemavatācariya Gotipāla Kassapa-gota. It is probable that we have here an early glimpse of the Haimavatās and perhaps the Kāśyapiyās. There is, therefore, no inherent implausibility in the traditional assumption that, by the time the Canon came to be closed, various sects emerged and provided an occasion for the compilation of the Kathāvatthu. It should also be remarked that there is common ground in the traditions of the different sects in holding that the differentiation of the sects had arisen early, mostly within the first two centuries of the Nirvāṇa era.

Regarding the second and the third observations, the position of the Buddhist sects cannot be said to be so arbitrary as these scholars would have us believe. It was owing primarily to the proliferation of a number of sects that Buddhist thought
was enriched to such a remarkable extent. Granting that some of the sects did not have outstanding differences with some others and were, consequently, absorbed into larger units, it has to be borne in mind that certain sects which became prominent in course of time stood steadfastly on the basis of their own specific traits. They formulated propositions which had a sharply individual character. Even in the sphere of rules and regulations, though there was sufficient homogeneity, one should not assume that they were same in all the sects. In fact, sometimes minor points of dispute over discipline divided the community in certain regions. Doctrinal controversies in which the various sectaries indulge in the Kathāvatthu is proof positive of the remarkable distinction in the points of view of the different Buddhist sects. C.A.F. Rhys Davids also calls the non-Theravāda schools dummies and asserts that the ancient treatises on them by Bhavya, Vasumitra and Vinītadeva offer us only the dry disintegrated bones of doctrine. Yet the dummies appear to have been once alive and the dry bones clothed with flesh and blood. The records, doubtless, present a dry conspectus because they are the products of scholastic activity.

The subsequent emergence of Buddhist sects is in conformity with the picture we have in the early Canonical literature where there are interesting details about the definition, causes and consequences of schism (saṅghabhedā) which sound like an intimation of the impending growth of the sects. Added to this, there are apprehensive remarks of the Buddha and some of the elders about the possibilities of schism as also some actual incidents referring to disruptive forces set into motion at an early date.

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF SCHISM AND ITS INFLUENCE

In the Dipavāinsa, where occurs the first complete list of the Buddhist sects, the key-words are saṅghabhedā (schism) and vāda (school or system). Earlier evidences of the term are, however, available in the Canon itself. Apart from some stray references in the Nikāyas, in the Cullavagga of the Vinaya
Pitaka there is one full chapter\textsuperscript{16} devoted to the problem of schism dealing with the various details. In the words of the Buddha, schism is the most hateful crime in punishment of which an aeon (kappa) of suffering is inadequate.\textsuperscript{17} In some cases he goes so far as to forbid the reordination of such monks who indulged in schism or followed the schismatics.\textsuperscript{18} Disputes over Dhamma and Vinaya were technically called vivāda.\textsuperscript{19} It was a specific type of vivāda, fulfilling certain pre-conditions that could cause a schism. A schism is properly initiated if at least nine or more than nine qualified monks are involved in it; a lesser number of monks can bring about only what is called dissension (saṅgharāji).\textsuperscript{20} Difference of interpretation over Dhamma, Vinaya and Prātimokṣa—in all eighteen points of difference of opinion,—provide valid grounds for the occurrence of schism.\textsuperscript{21} When the schism has occurred, the original Order would be divided into two saṅghas or communities, each holding its congregational ceremony in separate assemblies.\textsuperscript{22}

This, however, seems to be a strictly orthodox view of the Theravādins that every schism is initiated with an evil intention to disrupt the unity of the Order and false doctrines are deliberately propounded by the schismatics.\textsuperscript{23} In fact, the mere entertainment of a dissident view, which, in its turn, arises due to various reasons such as a difference of understanding or interpretation, was sufficient for a dispute to arise and thus give rise to a schism and doctrinal confrontation. Schism was perhaps rarely intended to be caused. It followed automatically if the confrontation was irreconcilable. Buddha's own verdict on this point seems to have been that initiating a schism in the Order is not condemnable in itself. What is to be condemned is the evil intention, the mere wilfulness to produce a schism without an adequate reason for it.\textsuperscript{24} It is only a dishonest and intentional schismatic who cannot be saved from the torture of the 'Niraya' (Hell) and not all schismatics. The desirability of unity in the Order is repeatedly emphasized in the Canon but the tacit assumption there is always that it should not be at the cost of the liberty of personal faith and conviction of the monks. Obviously, the restriction on the right to schism is only a moral, not a legal one.\textsuperscript{25}
EARLY NOTICES OF DISCORDANT NOTES IN THE ORDER

The Buddha seems to have taken a keen personal interest in the harmonious faring of the Order. In the Majjhima Nikāya, for instance, he asks Anuruddha as to whether or not the monks are living on friendly terms and as harmoniously as milk and water blend with each other.26 This statement, on the part of Buddha, tends to assume some extra significance if we take into account various other apprehensive remarks made both by him and his senior disciples. It would then give the impression of some intimations of disensions.

APPREHENSIVE REMARKS

The Samyutta Nikāya records the Buddha to have said that in the course of time his followers would fail to understand the subtle points of his teaching, such as Void and would rather take as authoritative the simplified version of his followers and thus his own utterances would disappear.27 To stem this tide, he exhorted the disciples to learn and grasp the doctrine as he had put before them.28 With his keen insight, he could foresee the specific realms where two monks might differ and give rise to a controversy. He had the apprehension that there might arise some differences of opinion on abhidhamma, ajjhā-jīva andadhi-pātimokkha. However, these would not be very significant. But in case there arose any dispute over the fruits (magga), path (paṭipadā) or the congregation (sāṁgha) it would be a matter of regret and harm.29 Should there arise such an occasion, he recommended the guidance of senior monks.30 Similarly, he once explained to Ānanda that he taught Dhamma according to classification,31 which, obviously, points to his analytical (vibhajjavādī) method of approach. He added in the same context that those of his followers who would not approve and agree with this would ultimately indulge in controversies and disputations. In an anticipation of such developments he seems to have devised certain measures for dealing with them.32 For verifying the correctness of his own teaching, when studied subsequently, he had suggested that it should be compared
with the Suttas and the Vinaya learnt by heart by the monks. A little before his passing away, he is said to have recommended abolishing the minor precepts and to have given an opportunity to the monks present to clarify their doubts if there were any about the Buddha, the Doctrine, the Path or the method, so that they might not have to repent afterwards. It was also perhaps in the light of this that he finally decided not to appoint any successor after him and laid down that the Dhamma and the Vinaya ought to be taken as the teacher thenceforth.

The apprehensive remarks of some of the senior disciples of Buddha are still more suggestive. Sāriputta pointed out at one place how there were several points which aroused jealousy among the monks and how things of this sort reflected upon the imperfection of those monks. The death of Nigaṇṭha Nāgaputta and the subsequent dissensions in his Order seem to have evoked much concern among the senior Buddhist monks. Sāriputta related the whole story before the Order and added that there was, however, no possibility of such developments in their Order for the simple reason that the Norm had been very well laid down by the Buddha. In the opinion of Mrs. Rhys Davids, this episode seems to have urged the elders to draw a summary of the kernel of the doctrine without losing much time. For want of any evidence to the effect that the Canon was compiled in an abridged form also, it is difficult to suppose that this was actually done during the lifetime of the Buddha. The Buddhist Canon is supposed to have been compiled for the first time after the death of the Buddha during the deliberations of the first Council. When Buddha was informed about the developments in the Jain Order he is said to have warned Ānanda to see to it that no such developments take place in the Order lest they should result in the woe of many.

DEVIATIONS AND PERNICIOUS VIEWS

There was a certain monk named Sunakkhatta who once approached the Buddha and informed him that he was going to leave the Order. Buddha allowed Sunakkhatta to go but
not before he personally tried to persuade him to change his mind. After leaving the Order, Sunakkhattha is said to have openly criticized the Buddha, which the latter, however, took as praise and not criticism.\textsuperscript{43} Similarly, thirty young disciples of Ānanda left the Order and turned to low things.\textsuperscript{44} The Buddha may have had such instances in mind when he observed that turning hostile to the teacher consisted in not listening to him, not lending a ready ear to what he says, not preparing the mind for profound knowledge but moving away from the teacher’s instruction.\textsuperscript{45} At a certain stage, the Buddha noted a tendency towards deviation even among the senior monks as they were not observing the ascetic life in the proper manner.\textsuperscript{46} There were occasions when certain monks came to hold pernicious views. Ariṭṭha, for instance, is reported to have said that: ‘So far as I understand the Dhamma, taught by the Lord, it is that following the stumbling-blocks there is no stumbling-block at all’.\textsuperscript{47} Other monks were naturally alarmed at this and tried to dissuade him from his view. Another monk Sāti similarly took it for granted that this consciousness itself runs on, and not another.\textsuperscript{48} By consciousness, Sāti meant that which speaks and feels everywhere, the fruition of deeds that are lovely and that are depraved.\textsuperscript{49} It is rather curious that the Buddha’s point of view should have been misunderstood and misrepresented in his own lifetime. King Prasenajit of Kośala sought the approval of the Buddha on a certain point which the former was given to understand to be the Buddha’s view, and the Buddha clearly pointed out that this was a misrepresentation of his contention.\textsuperscript{50}

**DISSENSION AT KAUŚĀMBĪ**

At Kauśāmbī, a very serious dissension is recorded to have ensued from a simple dispute amongst the monks. The story goes\textsuperscript{51} that there were two teachers at Kauśāmbī, viz., Dhammadhara and Vinayadhara, both expert in their respective fields, \textit{i.e.}, \textit{Dhamma} and \textit{Vinaya}. Dhammadhara once inadvertently committed a minor offence for which he expressed regret. This, however, was talked about much by Vinayadhara and his followers, which offended the Dhammadharas. As a result
of this, there developed a great rift not only between the two groups of monks but also between the lay-devotees of the two teachers. The Buddha, who was informed about it, tried to resolve the controversy but could not succeed. It was only when the Buddha retired to the forest, saying that he would better like to be served by elephants than by those quarrelling monks and lay-devotees, that the two warring groups realized their mistake and resolved the controversy.\textsuperscript{52} It appears from the \textit{Nikāya} evidence that there were other occasions when such confrontations between the monks took place; and their occurrence was reported to the Buddha without much delay.\textsuperscript{53}

**DEVADATTA EPISODE**

A more serious dissension in the early history of the Buddhist Order was due to Devadatta. He was opposed to the lenient rules in the Buddhist Order and pleaded strongly for a more stringent life for the monks. The Buddha refused to accept the suggestions of Devadatta. Thereupon Devadatta is said to have left for Gayāsīsa, perhaps, with a good following. It is added, however, that, at the instance of Buddha, Sāriputta and Mogallāna subsequently won the other monks over to the Buddha’s side.\textsuperscript{54} N. Dutt has rightly observed that “the episode of Devadatta is almost a \textit{Saṅghabheda} though it is not recognised as such in the \textit{Vinaya}.”\textsuperscript{55} That it was as good as a \textit{Saṅghabheda} is indicated by the fact that the followers of Devadatta appear to have survived in later times. \textit{Gotamaka} seems to be a class of such ascetics. In the opinion of Rhys Davids, \textit{Gotamaka} monks were almost certainly the followers of some other member of the Sākyan clan, as distinct from the Buddha, and it is quite likely that they were the followers of Devadatta.\textsuperscript{56} Fa-hsien noticed the existence of the followers of Devadatta in Śrāvastī. These monks made offerings to three past Buddhas except Śākyamuni.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, it is quite probable that Devadatta and some of his disciples did not return to the Buddha’s Order once they had deserted it.

**SUBHADRA’S REMARKS**

When the news of the Buddha’s passing away was communi-
cated to his disciples, some of them were grief-stricken and others who were passionless and mindful bore the calamity and reflected on the impermanence of all things. But a certain monk Subhadra expressed a sigh of relief at the Buddha’s demise. He remarked that it is not a matter to grieve and lament. The monks, according to him, were now free to do as they wished since the Buddha would not be there to dictate to them. This expression on the part of Subhadra was alarming to others, so much so that the First Buddhist Council appears to have been organized by Mahākāśyapa on this count.

**FIRST BUDDHIST COUNCIL AND THE DISSenting NOTES**

The historicity of the first Buddhist Council has been a keenly debated issue among the scholars. Oldenberg, followed by Franke, have doubted its historicity. Their objections had, however, been ruled out by Jacobi. Consequently, the scholars have since tended to agree that a Council did take place at Rājagṛha soon after the Mahāparinirvāṇa of the Buddha, though its transactions might not have been so comprehensive as to include the compilation of the Sutta and the Vinaya Piṭakas in their entirety. It seems, however, that the elders must certainly have tried to recite together the whole of the Dhamma and the Vinaya at the earliest opportunity in view of the Buddha’s last verdict that Dhamma and Vinaya would henceforth be their teacher.

According to the Cullavagga, the Council was held at Rājagṛha in the second month of the rainy season. Mahākāśyapa questioned Upāli on the Vinaya. It has been suggested that from the various details of the Vinaya recital it would appear that questions were mainly asked concerning the Prātimokṣa. Similarly, Ānanda was questioned by Mahākāśyapa about the Dhamma and in this process the five Nikāyas of the Suttapiṭaka were recited.

The subsequent course of the first Buddhist Council seems to be permeated by controversial notes and dissenting tendencies. When Ānanda informed the councillors about the Buddha’s
instruction that minor rules of discipline could be abolished by
the Order, there was a stirring controversy as to which rules
should be taken as the minor ones.66 This controversy was,
however, resolved by Mahākāśyapa who proposed that no un-
known rule should be laid down and no known one should be
abrogated, lest they incur the disrespect of the outside people.67
Then there was some rift among the members about the admis-
sion of Ānanda to the Council.68

A greater disagreement about the deliberations of the Council
was still in store. At the end of the Council Mahākāśyapa and
others sought the approval of senior monks such as Gavāṃpati
and Purāṇa over the texts settled at the Council as Buddha-
vacana.69 Gavāṃpati preferred to remain neutral,70 which is
interpreted as his hesitation to accept the Canon recited by the
members of the Council.71 Purāṇa, on the other hand, straight-
forwardly refused to accept the recited text as the word of the
Buddha. He, instead, expressed himself in favour of believing
as the word of the Buddha what he himself had heard and
learnt from the Buddha’s own mouth.72 This dissent on the
part of Purāṇa must have deepened further as a result of his
insistence that eight rules relating to food be incorporated into
the Vinaya, which was, however, not done. As pointed out
by Przylucki and N. Dutt, these rules were not only upheld by
the Vinaya of the Mahāsākās but they also recognized Purāṇa
as a distinguished teacher of his time.73

SECOND BUDDHIST COUNCIL AND THE GREAT
SCHISM

Unlike the preceding Council, there seems to be hardly any doubt
left about the historicity of the second Buddhist Council.74
The essential details are also almost fairly known. But there
is a central controversy involved in this Council about the
problem of the first schism in Buddhism, that is to say—
did the great schism in Buddhism take place in this Council
itself or was it a subsequent development to be associated with
some other Council? The controversy arises owing to the two
sets of mutually disagreeing traditions which we have at our
disposal. The earliest notices about this Council are available-
in the Cullavagga of the Pāli Vinaya and Vinayakṣūdrakavastu, the Tibetan translation of the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya. While the subsequent Pāli tradition about the Council is derived from the Cullavagga, Bu-ston and Tārānātha owe their information to the Vinayakṣūdrakavastu. The Pāli tradition seems to imply that the first schism as also the rise of the Mahāsaṃghikas occurred in the second Council held at Vaiśāli. There are scholars who take this tradition at its face value and suggest that the Mahāsaṃghikas arose in the second Council itself. Contrary to the Pāli tradition, however, we have a second set of tradition consisting of the treatises of Bhavya, Vasumitra and Vinitadeva who also refer to a Council in their respective works and give an entirely different account of the first schism and the rise of the Mahāsaṃghikas. Amongst other sources, Yuan Chwang's comments on this Council are also important in the sense that they are based upon the Chinese version of the Vinayas of Mahāsaṃghika and other schools. Apart from the works mentioned, some later works of the Buddhists, which make a mention of the Council, are Mahāvastu, Saṃādhi-rāja, Mañjuśrīmālakalpa, etc. The origin of first schism and the rise of the Mahāsaṃghikas is thus caught up in an inextricable tangle of traditions. It would be in the fitness of things to outline briefly the main traditions and analyse them for tracing the probable course and the origin of the great schism.

FIRST SET OF TRADITIONS

According to the Pāli tradition, a senior monk from Kauśāmbī named Yaśa noted at Vaiśāli that the Vajjian monks allowed as lawful ten rules which were against the Vinaya. On the Uposatha day he found them asking the lay-disciples to give Kārśāpana, Ardha-kārśāpana, Pāda-kārśāpana, etc., to the Saṅgha. Yaśa protested strongly against this on which the Vajjian monks were so infuriated that they expelled Yaśa from the Saṅgha. Failing to find any support at Vaiśāli, Yaśa left for Kauśāmbī and from there he started mobilizing opinion against the un-Vinayic acts of the Vajjians. He sent messages to the monks staying at Pāvā and Avanti that unlawful activities were being practised at Vaiśāli. Yaśa himself went to
Ahogaṅga to acquaint Sambhūta Sāṇavāśi about it. The latter consented to participate in the settling of the dispute. Yaśa was then joined by sixty theras from Pāvā, eighty-eight from Avanti and various others from different places.\(^8^0\) It was decided to approach and win over to their side Revata of Soreyya who was the chief of the Samgha there. Yaśa requested Revata to participate in the dispute and the latter agreed.\(^8^1\) In the meantime the Vajjian monks, apprehending the moves of Yaśa, unsuccessfully attempted to win over the support of Revata by trying to appease and gratify him with various monkish presents.\(^8^2\) They, however, succeeded only in persuading Uttara, a young monk attendant of Revata to accept one robe and declare before the Samgha that the Buddhas are born in the eastern countries whose monks conform to Dharma while that of Pāvā do not do so.\(^8^3\) Uttara tried to make Revata say the same, but he refused. The Vajjians are also supposed to have attempted to convince King Kālāśoka of Pushpapura that the monks of the western countries were making a sinister move to get possession of the Teacher’s Gandhakurī Mahāvihara at Vaiśāli. The king is said to have given up the idea of supporting them due to the intervention of his sister who was a bhikkhunī.\(^8^4\) On the other hand, Sālha of Sahajāti and therā Sarvakāmi of Vaiśāli, a disciple of Ānanda, also seem to have decided to support Yaśa.\(^8^5\)

They all assembled at Vaiśāli to hold a Council for settling the points under dispute. As the deliberations of the Council started there was unusual uproar. It was decided to refer the issue to a select body of referees, in all eight in number, out of which four were selected from the orthodox party of the west and four from the unorthodox party of the east.\(^8^6\) Elder Ajita was requested to preside.\(^8^7\) This was done in accordance with the Ubbāhikā process as enjoined in the Pātimokkha.\(^8^8\) The ten points of the Vajjjians were all found to be against the principles of Vinaya, save for the sixth which was sometimes permitted and sometimes not.\(^8^9\) The unanimous resolution of the select body was put to the larger body of the Council and was confirmed.\(^9^0\)

The Ceylonese chronicle Dipavamsa carries the story further.\(^9^1\) The Vajjian monks of Vaiśāli did not accept the resolution
passed by the Council. They held a separate Council, called Mahāsaṅgīti, without making any discrimination of Arahants and non-Arahants. In view of the high number of attendance at the Mahāsaṅgīti, which is given as 10,000, it seems likely that no such discrimination was really made. In this Council, the Vaijjan monks are supposed to have carried out things according to their own wishes. They altered the course of the sūtras in the Vinaya and the five Nikāyas, removed some of them and interpolated new ones. It is also added that they refused to accept the authenticity of Parivāra, Paṭisambhidāmagga, Niddesa, certain Jātakas and six texts of the Abhidhamma. But it is difficult to assume that these texts had really been compiled by that time.

SECOND SET OF TRADITIONS

The second set of traditions, preserved by Bhavya, Vasumitra and Vinītadeva, gives an entirely different account of the first schism in Buddhism and the rise of the Mahāsaṃghikas. Bhavya has recorded two traditions on the issue. According to the first, which is supposed to represent the Sammatiya viewpoint, an assembly was held at Pāṭaliputra 137 years after the decease of Buddha in the reign Nanda or Mahāpadmananda to settle a controversy over the five points of Mahādeva and it resulted into the rise of the Mahāsaṃghika school. The second tradition, supposed to be that of the Sthaviras, asserts that the assembly was held 160 years after the Lord’s decease at Pāṭaliputra under Aśoka and the controversial issues involved in this Council gave rise to the Mahāsaṃghikas.

Vasumitra, almost corroborating Bhavya, says that an assembly was held at Pāṭaliputra under the patronage of Aśoka a 100 years after the demise of Buddha to discuss the five points of Mahādeva. As a sequel to this controversy, the schism took place and the Mahāsaṃghika school originated. Vinītadeva also associates the great schism as well as the rise of the Mahāsaṃghikas with the controversy created by the five propositions of Mahādeva. The mention of Aśoka as the ruling king of Pāṭaliputra at the time of this controversy seems to be:
due to some confusion as indicated also by the record of Yuan Chwang.

According to Yuan Chwang, Aśoka convened an assembly which was represented by 500 Arahants and 500 followers of Mahādeva. The five points of Mahādeva were voted out by the Arahants, but a large body of ordinary ordained members supported these propositions. Elsewhere, Yuan Chwang mentions that the 10,000 ousted monks of the Council of Kāśyapa held a Mahāsaṅgha where they recited Saṁyutta Piṭaka and Dhāraṇī Piṭaka beside the Tripiṭaka. He refers to both the controversies, the one created by the ten un-Vinayic acts of the Vajjians and the other created by the five points of Mahādeva. Yuan Chwang obviously seems to have mixed up the episodes of the three Councils as we know that the 10,000 monks who later held a Mahāsaṅgha were ousted from the second Council of Vaiśāli and not the first organized by Kāśyapa at Rājagṛha. Similarly, he seems to have mistaken Aśoka for Kālasoka and altered the details of the second Council of Vaiśāli and the subsequent Mahāsaṅgha that was held at Pāṭaliputra.

It is gathered from the Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣālūn (Chapter 99) that Mahādeva was a brāhmaṇ from Mathurā and he received his ordination at Kukkutārāma in Pāṭaliputra. His zeal and abilities crowned him with the headship of the Saṅgha there. With the help of the ruling king who was his friend and patron, Mahādeva succeeded in ousting the senior monks from that monastery. And thereupon he started propagating his five propositions which are given as follows:

1. The Arahants are subject to temptation.

2. The Arahants may have residue of ignorance.

3. The Arahants may have doubts regarding certain things.

4. The Arahants gain knowledge through others’ help.

5. The Path is attained by an exclamation (as aho).
These five points of Mahādeva, according to the second set of traditions, gave rise to a serious dispute leading, ultimately, to the first schism in Buddhism and the division of the Order into two schools, i.e., the Mahāsāṃghika and the Theravāda. In the opinion of Lamotte, the tradition, which holds the five points of Mahādeva as responsible for the schism, is evidently suggestive of a critical attitude of the emerging sect towards the elders who claimed Arahantship to be the highest attainment.¹¹⁰

Thus, we get two mutually disagreeing traditions about the great schism and the secession of the Mahāsāṃghikas. A close scrutiny of the traditions, however, brings to light some remarkable points which help us reconcile the two traditions. As regards the first tradition, the Vinaya does not make any mention of the schism or the rise of the Mahāsāṃghikas. This significant development is alluded to only by the Ceylonese chronicle Dīpavaṃsa which would have us believe that discontented Vajjians, the upholders of the ten un-Vinayic points, proceeded to hold another convention of their own known as the Mahāsāṃgha.¹¹¹ Even this statement of the Dīpavaṃsa implies that the great schism and the rise of the Mahāsāṃghikas took place only after the second Council.¹¹² If we take the Council of Vaiśāli merely as the background of the great schism, the account of the other Ceylonese chronicle also becomes tangible. According to the Mahāvaṃsa, Kālāśoka was the Magadhan king at the time of the second Council, whose support the Vajjians had tried to enlist. Their move was foiled due to the intervention of the sister of king Kālāśoka.¹¹³

On the basis of the preceding it seems to follow that there were two Councils held in the second century of Buddha’s Nirvāṇa. The first was the Vaiśāli Council attended by 700 monks held during the reign of Kālāśoka to discuss the ten un-Vinayic practices of the Vajjian monks. It was followed after some time by another Council known as the Mahāsāṃgha or Mahāsāṃgīti attended by 10,000 monks. The great schism as also the rise of the Mahāsāṃghika school seem to have occurred here. It appears that it was in this subsequent Council or the Mahāsāṃgha that the first doctrinal controversy arose
in the Buddhist Order, due to the five propositions of Mahādeva resulting in the great schism and the birth of the Mahāsāṃghikas. This will be in agreement with the traditions of Bhavya, Vasumitra and Vinitadeva that the original schism arose due to the five points of Mahādeva and not because of the ten un-Vinayic acts of the Vajjians. It may be noted that the mutual discrepancy of the two sets of traditions is reconciled if we accept the above hypothesis.

It may be recalled that the second Buddhist Council was held at Vaiśāli to discuss the ten practices of the Vajjian monks for which not only recognition was categorically refused but these acts were unanimously declared to be un-Vinayic. From the metaphysical point of view, the acts of the Vajjians hardly appear significant. But they do indicate the more liberal attitude of the eastern monks. The Vajjians were a people thoroughly imbued with the democratic traditions and were unlikely to submit to the exclusive powers and privileges claimed by the Arahants. Mrs. Rhys Davids remarks that the real point at issue was the rights of the individual, as well as, those of the provincial communities as against the prescriptions of a centralized hierarchy. Undoubtedly as the Vajjian monks’ liberal views were not acceptable to the orthodox majority, they must have been severely impeached by the latter as indicated by the details of the second Council. Naturally the liberal minded eastern monks were likely to drift away from the orthodox group and their conservative tradition. In Mahādeva they seem to have found an able leader and champion of their viewpoint. Discomfitted, thus, in the second Council, the eastern monks seem to have started, as a reaction, their campaign against the very same Arahants by calling in question their claims and authority and seeking to prove their fallibility. In order to assert their views, it was in the fitness of things for the Vajjian monks to convene a Mahāsāṃgha at Pāṭaliputra where they could uphold their innovations with regard to the Vinaya and the Dhamma. This was most likely to give rise to a major controversy and to originate a schism in the Order. As a result of this, the Order became divided into two sections. On the one hand was the large bulk of the eastern monks
with its stronghold at Vaiśāli and Pāṭaliputra and, on the other, was the section of the western monks stationed at Kauśāmbī, Mathurā and Avanti, a group in which the influence of the old Sthaviravas was predominant. These two sections respectively became known as the Mahāsamghika and the Theravāda sects of Buddhism. Thus, the ecclesiastical cleavage that started in the Council of Vaiśāli due to the Vinaya controversy of the Vajjians was ultimately completed after some years in the Council of Pāṭaliputra over the doctrinal controversy initiated by Mahādeva. The Council of Pāṭaliputra was in all probability the same as the Mahāsaṅgha of the Dīpavaniṇa tradition or the assembly, held some hundred and odd years after the Mahāparinirvāṇa, as borne out by the testimony of Bhavya, Vasumitra, Vinītadeva and Yuan Chwang. It is perhaps due to some confusion and discrepancy that the name of the ruling king is sometimes given as Asoka; otherwise as the first tradition of Bhavya informs us, Nanda or Mahāpadmananda should have been the ruling king of Pāṭaliputra at that time.

**EVOLUTION OF THE EARLY BUDDHIST SECTS**

The century that rolled in between the second and the third Councils seems to represent one of the most significant phases in the development of Buddhism. In the evolution of the Buddhist sects and schools it is noticed that the 'great schism' in the Saṅgha resulting in the rise of two sects, i.e., Theravāda and Mahāsamghika, was followed by a series of schisms leading to the formation of various new sects. The traditional accounts would have us believe that eleven sects originated from the Theravāda and seven sects from the Mahāsamghika.

The genesis of these sects as also their inter-relationship has always posed a problem to the scholars. That is so because, 'inset in miscellaneous undated Buddhist works, there are traditional lists of schools and sects, each school supposed to have its own Canon'. These traditions are confused and, at times, contradictory. Some attempts have been made to ascertain the stratification and affiliation of these sects but the problem still seems to be far from clear. It is desirable, therefore, to
analyze the various traditions and attempt an outline of the stratification and affiliation of the early Buddhist sects with the help of other sources, literary or epigraphic, wherever available.

A STUDY OF THE TRADITIONS

On the sects and schools of the Buddhists, different traditions are preserved in the literature of the Theravādins the Sammatiya, and the Mahāsaṃghikas as also in the subsequent Chinese and Tibetan works and translations. They give divergent accounts about the origin, name and the order of secession of these schools.

The traditional lists, referring to the early Buddhists sects and schools, may be classified into four groups on the basis of two things: (1) generic identity among the concerned sects and (2) general conformity in their traditions: (Group A) Theravāda traditions consisting of (i) Dīpavaṁsa tradition; (ii) Sammatiya tradition as preserved by Bhavya in his third list; and (iii) Buddhaghosa’s tradition as found in the Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā. (Group B) Mahāsaṃghika traditions consisting of (i) Sāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra and (ii) the tradition preserved in the second list of Bhavya. (Group C) Sarvāstivāda traditions consisting of (i) Vaśumitra’s Samayabheda-paracana-cakra and (ii) the tradition preserved in the first list of Bhavya. (Group D) Mūla-Sarvāstivāda traditions consisting of (i) I-tsing’s and (ii) Vinitadeva’s traditions.

GROUP A—THERAVĀDA TRADITIONS

According to Dīpavaṁsa,129 the first schism divided the Order into two schools, viz., Mahāsaṃghika and Theravāda. The Mahāsaṃghika school was subsequently divided into Gokulikas and Ekabyohārikas. From the Gokulikas emerged the Bahussuttikas and the Paññatattis, i.e., Bahussuttikas and Paññattivādins respectively.

Another school named Cetiya emerged from the Mahāsaṃghika line. From the line of the elders, i.e., the Theravāda school, arose the Mahāsakas and the Vajjiputtakas. Fourfold
dissension arose among the Vajjiputtakas resulting in the rise of the Dhammattarikas, Bhaddayānikas, Channagarikas and Sammitis. The Mahīśāsakas were subsequently divided into the Sabbatthivādins and the Dhammaduttakas. From the Sabbatthivādins originated the Kassapikas, the Saṅkrāntivādins and the Suttavādins. Thus, seventeen schools originated from the original order, six of the Mahāsaṃghika line and eleven from the Theravāda. All these seventeen schools are described as schisms while the Theravāda is said to be the orthodox school.¹³⁰

The third list of Bhavya, which is said to constitute the Sammatiya tradition, agrees fully with the Dīpavaṃsa as regards the Mahāsaṃghika group of schools.¹³¹ So far as the Theravāda or Sthaviravāda school is concerned, it was divided, according to the Sammatiya tradition, into two schools, viz., the Mūlaśthavira and Haimavata. The Mūlaśthavira gave rise to the Sarvāstivāda and the Vātsiputriya. From the Sarvāstivāda emerged the Vibhajjavāda and the Saṅkrāntivāda. The Vibhajjavāda further became divided into the Mahīśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka, the Tāmrasatiya and the Kāśyapiya. The Vātsiputriya, on the other hand, gave rise to the Mahāgirika and the Sammatiya. From the Mahāgirika three other sects originated, viz., the Dharmottara, the Bhadrayāniya and the Sannagarika.¹³²

In the Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā of Buddhaghosa, beside the eighteen names enumerated in the Dīpavaṃsa, we have reference to certain new sects, viz., the Rājagirika, the Siddhatthika, the Pubbaseliya, the Aparaseliya, the Hemavata, the Vajjariya, the Uttarāpathaka, the Hetuvāda and the Vetullaka.¹³³ The first four of the above appear to have been the sects of the Andhakas whose names occur in the inscriptions found from the region round about Amarāvati. The names of the first six sects occur in the Mahāvaṃsa as well.¹³⁴ The Dīpavaṃsa also informs us that six sects, viz., the Hemavatikas, the Rājagirikas, the Siddhatthas, the Pubba and the Aparaselikas and a new Rājagirika arose successively.¹³⁵

GROUP B—MAHĀSAṂGHika TRADITION

The Mahāsaṃghika tradition about the early Buddhist sects:
seems to be partly represented in the Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra. This text was translated into Chinese in between A.D. 317 and 420. According to Tārānātha, the Mahāsaṃghika tradition is also preserved in the second list of Bhavya.

According to Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra, the first division resulted in the rise of the Mahāsaṃghika and the Theravāda. Whereas from the Mahāsaṃghika emerged four sects, viz., the Ekavyavahārika, the Lokottaravāda, the Bahusruti and the Prajñāaptivāda, the Theravāda gave rise to the Vātsiputriya, the Kāśyapīya, the Śūtravāda or the Saṅkrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda. From the Vātsiputriyas further emerged four sects, viz., the Dharmopaka, the Bhadrayānika, the Sammatiya and the Sannagarika. Similarly from the Sarvāstivāda there emerged three other, i.e., the Mahīśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka and the Suvarsaka.

According to the second list of Bhavya, the original Order became divided into three schools, viz., the Sthaviravāda, the Mahāsaṃghika and the Vibhajjavāda. From the Sthaviravāda emerged the Sarvāstivāda and the Vātsiputriya. Whereas the Sarvāstivāda gave rise to the Sautrāntika, the Vātsiputriya divided into four sects, i.e., the Sammatiya, the Dharmottariya, the Bhadrayāniya and the Sannagarika. The Mahāsaṃghikas, in their turn, gave rise to the Pūrvaśaila, the Aparaśaila, the Rājagirika, the Haimavata, the Chaitika, the Saddharthika and the Gokulika. From the Vibhajjavāda originated the Mahīśāsaka, the Kāśyapīya, the Dharmaguptaka and the Tāmraśaṭṭiya.

A comparison of the two lists would show that, while, according to Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra, there were two initial divisions, the second list of Bhavya suggests three divisions. Apart from this, there is substantial agreement between the two lists regarding other Theravāda sects, save for the insertion of some new names. So far as the Mahāsaṃghika sects are concerned, the tradition of Bhavya mentions some more names which are conspicuous by their absence in the Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra. These additional sects of Bhavya tradition, however, reflect its completeness as also its lateness. This also might be true in the case of new names of the Theravāda line. The mention of
Sautrāntika instead of Sūtravādin or Saṅkrāntika seems to reinforce the suggestion.

**GROUP C--SARVĀSTIVĀDA TRADITION**

The *Samayabhedoparacananacakra* of Vasumitra preserves the Sarvāstivāda tradition on the evolution of Buddhist sects, which is very well-indicated by the fact that champion as Vasumitra was of the Sarvāstivāda sect, he assigns it a significant position and derives from it all the subsequent sects of the Theravāda line.\(^{142}\) The texts is available in the Tibetan and Chinese translations, the oldest of which may be assigned to sometime between A.D. 351-431.\(^{143}\) Bhavya has preserved three lists out of which we have already discussed the second and the third. His first list seems to conform with the Sarvāstivāda tradition as preserved in the *Samayabhedoparacananacakra*.\(^{144}\)

According to the *Samayabhedoparacananacakra*, the first schools to originate from the Order were the Mahāsaṃghika and the Sthaviravāda. The Mahāsaṃghika school gave rise to the Ekavyāvahārika, the Lokottaravāda, the Kukkutika, the Bahu-śrutiya, the Prajñāpativāda, the Caitika, the Aparaśaila and the Uttarāśaila. From the Sthaviravāda arose the Sarvāstivāda and the Haimavata. The Sarvāstivāda became divided into the Vātsiputriya, the Mahiśāsaka, the Suvarsaka, *i.e.*, the Kāśyapīya and the Sautrāntika or the Saṅkrāntika or the Uttarīya. The Vātsiputriya school further gave rise to four others, *i.e.*, the Dharmottariya, the Bhadrayāniya, the Sammatiya and the Sannagariya.\(^{145}\) It is interesting to remark that the tradition of Vasumitra is in substantial agreement with the *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* and Bareau has actually grouped it within the Kashmir tradition.\(^{146}\)

The first list of Bhavya also makes the earliest division into the Mahāsaṃghika and the Sthaviravāda. The Mahāsaṃghika gave rise to the Ekavyāvahārika, the Lokottaravāda, the Bahu-śrutiya, the Prajñāpativāda, the Caitika, the Purvaśaila and the Aparaśaila. And the Sthaviravāda in their turn became divided into the Sarvāstivāda, the Vātsiputriya, the Dharmottariya, the Bhadrayāniya, the Sammatiya (*i.e.*, the Avantaka or the Kurukulāka), the Mahiśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka, the Dharmasuvar-
saka and the Uttarīya or the Saṅkrāntivāda.\textsuperscript{147} Bhavya omits the Gokulika sect of the Mahāsaṃghika line which seems to have been referred to by Vasumitra as the Kukkuṭika. Bhavya has instead mentioned some new sects of the Theravāda line such as the Muruntaka, the Avantika and the Kurukullaka.

**GROUP D—MŪLA-SARVĀSTIVĀDA TRADITION**

I-tsing and Vīṇītadeva are said to represent the Mūla-Sarvāstivāda tradition.\textsuperscript{148}

According to I-tsing, the first division resulted in the rise of four schools, viz., the Ārya-Mahāsaṃghika, the Ārya-Sthavira, the Ārya-Mūla-Sarvāstivāda and the Ārya-Sammatiya. From the Ārya-Mūla-Sarvāstivāda school emerged four schools, viz., the Mūla-Sarvāstivāda, the Dharmaguptaka, the Mahiśāsaka and the Kāśyapīya.\textsuperscript{149}

Vīṇītadeva also divides the original order into four schools, i.e., the Mahāsaṃghika, the Sarvāstivāda, the Sthavira and the Sammatiya. The Mahāsaṃghika school gave rise to the Purvaśaila, the Aparāśaila, the Haimavata, the Lokottaravāda and the Prajñāptivāda. The Sarvāstivāda gave rise to the Mūla-Sarvāstivāda, the Kāśyapīya, the Mahiśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka, the Bahuśrutīya the Tāmrasatiya and the Vībhajyavāda. The Sthaviravāda gave rise to the Jetavanīya, the Abhayagirivāsin and the Mahāvihāravāsin. And the last one, i.e., the Sammatiya gave rise to the Kurukullaka, the Āvantaka and the Vātsiputriya.\textsuperscript{150}

With the help of the list furnished by Vīṇītadeva, it is possible to complete the list of I-tsing which does not mention the sub-sects of others except the Mūla-Sarvāstivādins. In Vīṇītadeva’s tradition, however, Haimavata has been included in the Mahāsaṃghika line as we find in the tradition of the Mahāsaṃghikas themselves.

The tradition of the Mahāvyutpatti seems to be almost the same as that of Vīṇītadeva, though there is some difference of opinion about the reading of certain names in the Mahāvyutpatti.\textsuperscript{151} In the eleventh century Tibetan recension of the Varsāgrāpracchāsūtra, we have a similar tradition about the evolution of various sects, except for the minor alteration in the
cases of the Tāmraśātiya and the Bahuśrutīya which are place-under the Sammatīyas instead of the Sarvāstivāda.\textsuperscript{152}

**STRATIFICATION AND AFFILIATION OF SECTS**

The stratification and affiliation of Buddhist sects is rendered obscure due to divergent traditions recorded above. There have been attempts, both early and late, to group and stratify the various sects. An early attempt was made by Tārānātha\textsuperscript{153} who would have us believe that (1) the Kāśyapiya and the Suvarsaka were two names of the same sect, (2) the Sānkṛantivādin, the Uttariya and the Tāmraśātiya were identical, (3) Mahādeva’s followers, the Pūrvaśailas and the Caitikas were also identical, (4) the Lokottaravādin and the Koukkutika represent two names of the same sect, (5) the Ekavyāvaharika was nothing but the Mahāsamghika, (6) the Kourukullaka, the Vātsiputriya, the Dharmottariya, the Bhadrayāniya and the Channagrika all represent almost identical doctrines. These groupings, as suggested by Tāranatha appear to be arbitrary. He has generally identified those sects which emerged from a common source. But the fact that they emerged from a common source does not imply that they were identical among themselves. Their mention as specific sects speaks of their individuality which is substantiated by their theses and tenets discussed in the Kathāvatthu. Among the recent researches, the work of A. Bareau deserves special mention\textsuperscript{154} There is, however, some difficulty in commending all his groupings. According to him, (1) the Mahīśāsakas, the Mahāsamghikas, the Vibhajavādins (described in the Vibhāṣā), the Dharmaguptakas and the Andhrakas appear to be mutually affiliated, (2) the Theravāda of Ceylon and the Sarvāstivāda of Kashmir form another group, (3) the Vātsiputriyas and the Sammatīyas have great similarities, (4) Drśṭāntikas and the Saurāntikas are mutually affiliated as also with the sects of group one.\textsuperscript{155} In fact Bareau’s affiliation of various sects is based upon his defective methodology in the analysis of the doctrines of various sects; otherwise he would have hardly suggested a relationship between the Mahāsamghikas and the Mahīśāsakas.\textsuperscript{156} We know it for certain that the Mahīśāsakas
arose from the Sthaviravāda or the Theravāda and their doctrines differ from that of the Mahāsamghikas, although there are one or two theses in the Kathāvatthu which, according to Buddhaghosa, were shared by the two sects.\textsuperscript{157}

Similarly the Japanese scholar Yamakami Sogen, who has attempted a classification of the systems of Buddhist thought, appears to be arbitrary in his conclusions. It may be observed that all his methods of classification lead to two divisions, \textit{i.e.}, the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna, although he calls them by different names. Even in his classifications, he makes the matter more confusing by dividing the Mahāyāna into partially developed and fully developed groups placing the Mādhyamikas and the Vijñānavādins in the first and the Avatamsaka, the Dhyāna and the Mantra Schools as well as the Tien-Tai School of China in the second.\textsuperscript{158} However, Sogen's defence lies in the fact that he deals with the developed and later stage of Buddhism identifying the Sarvāstivāda as the sole representative of early Buddhism.

THE MAHĀSAṂGHIKAS AND THEIR SUB-SECTS

From the account of the great schism and the genesis of Buddhist sects, as presented here, it may be concluded that dissensions over the ten points of the Vinaya, which shook the Order at the time of Second Council of Vaiśāli, found fulfilment ultimately at the Mahāsaṃgiti of Pātaliputra. The Saṅgha became divided into two groups, \textit{viz.}, the Mahāsaṃghikas and the Theravādins.\textsuperscript{159} Emerging as a sect, the Mahāsaṃghikas carved out a significant place for themselves by their zeal and enthusiasm. They made alterations in the arrangement and interpretation of the Sūtra and Vinaya texts.\textsuperscript{160} They refused to recognize some portions of the Canon as the Buddha's word \textit{viz.}, Parivāra, Abhidharma, Patisambhidā, Nīddesa and parts of the Jātaka.\textsuperscript{161} Historically, these adjustments were, perhaps, necessary in view of the new interpretations they sought to make in matters of doctrine and discipline. We gather from Yuan Chhwang that the Mahāsaṃghikas had a complete Canon of their own which they divided into five parts, \textit{viz.}, Sūtra, Vinaya, Abhidharma, Dhārani and Miscellaneous.\textsuperscript{162}
In the beginning, the Mahāsāṃghikas appear to have established centres at Pāṭaliputra and Vaiśāli and from there they spread towards the north and the south. I-tsing found the Mahāsāṃghikas in Magadha and a small number of them in Lāṭa and Sindha (western India) so also in northern, southern and eastern India. The earliest epigraphic evidence about this sect is found in the Mathurā Lion Capital inscription of the time of Śaka Kshatrapa Sudāsa which records that a teacher named Buddhila was given a gift so that he might teach the Mahāsāṃghikas. Some other inscriptions of a later date, recovered from the area of the Mathurā, make a mention of this sect. Inscriptions recovered from Nāgārjunikoṇḍa and the cave temples of Karle in Maharashtra suggest these places to be Mahāsāṃghika strongholds. The Mahāsāṃghikas differed widely from other sects on doctrinal matters as also in their rules of discipline, e.g., they wore a yellow robe, the lower part of which was pulled tightly to the left.

However, as the Mahāsāṃghikas were the first seceders from the Order, this tendency appears to have operated further among them and they seem to have soon divided into two sects, viz., the Ekavyāvahārikas and the Gokulikas or the Kukkuṭikas. According to the northern traditions, this happened within the second century of the Nirvāṇa of Buddha.

EKAVYĀVAHĀRIKA

According to Paramārtha, the Ekavyāvahārika sect originated due to a dispute over the Mahāyāna-sūtras. It is, difficult, however, to accept the existence of Mahāyāna-sūtras within the second or the third century of the Nirvāṇa of Buddha. Bhavya informs us that the Ekavyāvahārikas were thus known because they believed that the Buddha understands all things (dharmas) with a moments mind. It has been suggested that the term vyavahāra in the Vyāvahārika is, in fact, speech-oriented (vāk-paraka) and it implies those who believed in the comprehensibility of Dharma or all Dharmas by one or one word alone or by each word. The Kathāvatthu-
Atthakathā does not attribute any views to this sect out of the Kathāvatthu theses.

GOKULIKAS OR KUKKUṬIKAŚ

The Gokulikas of the Theravāda tradition and the Kukkuṭikas of the northern tradition appear to be the same sect. It seems likely that this sect acquired the denomination Kukkulika or Kukkuṭika owing to the Kukkuṭārāma monastery of Pātaliputra which was an early centre of the Mahasamghikas. Gradually, the term appears to have been distorted from Kaukkutika, Kaukkulika, Kukkulika to Gokulika. It is gathered from the testimony of Tārānātha that the Gokulikas disappeared in between the fourth and the ninth centuries. It is possible that this sect was assimilated completely in the Mahāyāna. The Gokulikas are attributed only one thesis in the Kathāvatthu by the commentator, i.e., all conditioned things are like an ‘inferno of ashes’ (anodhikatvākukkulā).

LOKOTTARAVĀDA

The Śāriputrapariprcchāsūtra and Samayabhedoparacanacakra suggest that the Lokottaravāda also had its rise with the Ekavyāvahārikas and the Gokulikas, i.e., within the second century of the Buddha’s Nirvāṇa. The Theravāda tradition, however, while it does refer to the last two sects, is silent about the Lokottaravāda. The Sammatiya tradition does not distinguish between the doctrines of the Lokottaravāda and the Ekavyāvahārikas. It is, in fact, difficult to distinguish the main tenets of the Lokottaravāda from the doctrines of other Mahāsaṃghikas. It is probable, therefore, that instead of any doctrinal distinction from other Mahāsaṃghika sects, the Lokottaravādins acquired a separate denomination due to geographical reasons. While the Mahāsaṃghikas originated in the region of Magadha, the Lokottaravādins are known to havē flourished in the north-west. In the tradition of Vasumitra and Vinñādeva, the doctrines of the Lokottaravāda, the Mahāsaṃghika and the Ekavyāvahārika appear to be mutually associated. This appears to strengthen Tārānātha’s.
view that the Lokottaravāda was identical with the Kaukkutikā and the Ekavyāvahārika. Bareau and Dutt have identified the Lokottaravāda with the Ekavyāvahārika and the Caityaka respectively. It is likely, therefore, that the Mahāsāṃghikas themselves came to be known subsequently as the Ekavyāvahārika and the Lokottaravādin. Although the Kathāvatthu discusses certain theses, which lay down a supernatural conception of the Buddha, the Kathāvatthu-Āsthakathā attributes them to different Mahāsāṃghika schools and does not refer to the Lokottaravādins.

BAHUŚRUTĪYAS AND PRAJÑAPTIVĀDINS

The Mahāsāṃghika school vigorously advocated the supramundane nature of the Buddha and the Bodhisattvas and propounded the fallibility of the Arahants. It was logical to ask then for an explanation for such statements in the Sūtras which stood against the conception of a supramundane Buddha. In view of this, a distinction between nītārtha (profound) and neyārtha (superficial) was drawn which laid the basis of the doctrine of a duality of Truth, i.e., relative and Absolute. According to Paramārtha, thus, emerged a controversy among the Mahāsāṃghikas which gave rise to two new sects, i.e., the Bahuśrutīyas and the Prajñapativādins. According to the Śāriputra-prārāpanḍuṣṭāra and Samayabheda-paracanacakra, this division took place in the second century of the Nirvāṇa of Buddha, which, however, appears too early a date for their origin. The Bahuśrutīyas are referred to in the inscriptions recovered from the regions of Gandhāra and Andhra. The Kathāvatthu does not contain any doctrines of the two schools. According to Paramārtha, the Bahuśrutīyas attempted a syncretism between the doctrines of the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna, whereas the Prajñapativādins, in order to distinguish themselves from the Bahuśrutīyas, preferred to be known as the Bahuśrutīya-Vibhajyavādins.

CAITIKĀ

According to the northern tradition, this sect emerged about
the end of the second century or in the beginning of the third century of the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha. 190 It has been suggested, however, that the origin of Caitikas should be placed in the second century B.C. 191 We owe it to the tradition of Paradatttha that a certain Mahādeva, who was different from the famous Mahādeva, the champion of five points, noted some new tendencies among the Mahāsāṃghikas and retired to the hills along with his followers. 192 Buddhaghosa includes them among the Andhakas or Andhrakas which name seems to have gained currency owing to their stronghold at Amarāvatī in Andhra. The lay-followers of Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunikonḍa were hospitable enough to provide them a large number of caityas of which the Mahācaitya of Amarāvatī was the foremost. It seems that these Buddhists, the followers of a second Mahādeva, acquired the designation of Caitika due to their association with these caityas. Although the Kathāvatthu contains the doctrines of the Pūrva and Aparaśailas, as also that of the Andhakas, no thesis is attributed to the Caitikas as such. The school, however, finds mention in several inscriptions. 193

PŪRVAŚAILA AND APARAŚAILA

The Pūrvaśaila and Aparaśaila sects are known from sufficiently old traditional references. 194 As in the case of the Caitikas, the inscriptive reference to the Pūrvaśailas has also been found at Nāgārjunikonḍa. 195 N. Dutt is inclined to identify the Caitikas and the Pūrvaśailas, on the one hand, with the Caityaśailas and the Uttaraśailas, on the other. 196 It may be observed, however, that apart from the Caitika, the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila sects, the very supposition of the existence of the Caityaśailas and the Uttaraśailas seems to be doubtful. It is only the tradition of Vasumitra which refers to the Uttaraśailas, but then it identifies the Aparaśailas with the Pūrvaśailas. 197 This seems to be a mistake arising out of some confusion as Bhavya took no time in correcting it by distinguishing the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila sects. 198 So far as a separate Caityaśaila sect is concerned, it is not mentioned by any other tradition. What appears to be most
 plausible in this case is that the Caitikas themselves became known after some time by these two names, *i.e.*, Pūrvaśaila and Aparaśaila due to their geographical location.\(^{199}\)

Among the Mahāsāṃghikas of Andhra also emerged the champions of the Vetulyaka, the Rājagirika and the Siddharthika sects, the last two sometime in the third or the fourth century A.D.\(^{200}\) Thus, the Mahāsāṃghika school and its doctrines initiated by the eastern monks at Pātaliputra in the fourth century B.C., reached the country of Andhra by the end of the third century B.C., and flourished there subsequently in the form of various sects. In the course of this evolution, the famous Mahāyāna originated from the Mahāsāṃghika line in about the first century B.C. The Pūrvaśailas, the Aparaśailas, the Rājagirikas, the Siddharthikas and the Vetulyakas appear to have been important sects of their time as would be evident from the fact that the doctrines of all of them are discussed in the *Kathāvatthu*.\(^{291}\)

THE THERAVĀDA SECTS

Different traditions, as noted here, disagree more over the development of this group of sects as compared to the Mahāsāṃghikas. They differ over the names, genealogy and affiliations of the various sects that branched off from time to time off the Theravāda mainstream. The Theravāda school was the earliest opponent of the unorthodox Mahāsāṃghikas. Subsequently, while from the Mahāsāṃghika group of schools evolved such doctrines as the supramundane concept of Buddha and Bodhisattvas as also the doctrine of Śūnyatā of the Mahāyāna, the Theravāda schools became absorbed into the explication and upholding of the existence of *sāṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta* Dharmas and thus kept on developing the cardinal points of the *Abhidharma*.

VĀTSIPUTRĪYA

The first schism in the Theravāda school, giving rise to the Vātsiputriyas, seems to have occurred at a place not very far from Kausāmbi. It appears from the confrontation of
the Dharmadhara and Vinayadhara monks of Kauśāmbī, which came to pass during the lifetime of the Buddha, that the monkish community of that region was prone to schismatic tendencies.202

The name Vajjiputtaka of the Pāli tradition is still obscure. It is likely, however, that the Vatsīputriya may be a mis-sanskritization from the Pāli Vajjiputtaka, or else, the process may have been the other way round. Thus, the sect arose either among the Vajjis or in the Vatsa territory. Their secession from the Theravāda school marks the first schism in this line. The Vatsīputriyas’ central thesis consisted in their upholding the temporary existence of a self (prajñāpatissat-pudgala) apart from the five skandhas.203 The first controversy about the pudgala discussed in the Kathāvatthu may be the earliest controversy on pudgala and the main concern of Moggaliputta Tissa seems to have been to criticize and refute the Vatsīputriya standpoint at the third Buddhist Council. It would follow logically that Vatsīputriya sect originated sometime before the third Council which finds support also from the traditional accounts as they establish the rise of this sect within the second century of the demise of the Buddha.204

BHADRAYĀNIYA, DHARMOTTARIYA AND SANNAGARIKA

Different traditions, noted previously, are almost unanimous on the point that from the Vatsīputriyas arose four sects, viz., the Bhadrayāniya, the Dharmottariya, the Sammatiya and the Sannagarika. Out of these, the Sammatiya appears to have achieved special distinctions. References to the Bhadrayāniya and Dharmottariya sects occur in the inscriptions, datable to the second and third centuries A.D., recovered from places like Karle, Sopāraka, Junnār Nasika and Kanheri.205 The Tarkāvāla of Bhavaviveka makes a combined reference to these sects and says that the Vatsīputriya Bhadrayāniya, the Dharma-guptas and the Samkrāntivādins admitted the reality of the individual.206 Vasumitra informs us that Dharmottariya, Bhadrayāniya and Channagarika differed regarding the attainments of an an Arhat and consequently also on the chances of his fall from
Arahanthood.\textsuperscript{207} The Kathāvatthu, records only one doctrine of the Bhadrayānikas and is silent about the others.\textsuperscript{208} The geographical location of these sects strengthens the supposition that the Vātsiputriya school developed and evolved in the process of the spread of Buddhism from Kauśāmbī towards the Aparānta.\textsuperscript{209}

SAMMATĪYAS

Most of the traditions hold that this was the third sect to originate from the Vātsiputriyas. Barcau attributes the rise of the Sammatīyas to the schism that occurred on account of a dissension over the Abhidharmapiṭaka of the Vātsiputriyas and dates this development somewhere in the first century B.C. or A.D.\textsuperscript{210} The followers of this sect regarded Mahākātyāyana to be its propounder. This seems to be the same Mahākātyāyana, who had established the first Buddhist Order in Avanti (Dakṣināpanha) and had considered changes in the Vinaya to be inevitable in view of the differences in the discipline and behaviour of the local monks.\textsuperscript{211} The spread of the Sammatīyas, however, was not localized. Two inscriptions referring to it have been recovered from Mathurā and Sārnāth respectively.\textsuperscript{212} The second one, which is a Gupta inscription, states that this school replaced the Sarvāstivādins at Sarnath, who had established themselves there supplanting the Theravādins.\textsuperscript{213} According to Yuan Chwang,\textsuperscript{214} I-tsing\textsuperscript{215} and Vinītadeva,\textsuperscript{216} this was the most prominent sect in the Vātsiputriya group about the seventh century. It is also gathered from Bhavya and Vinītadeva that about this time the sect became divided into two sub-sects viz., Avantaka and Kurukullaka.\textsuperscript{217}

MAHIŚĀSAKAS

This is a disputed issue as to which of the two, viz., the Sarvāstivāda and the Mahiśāsaka, was the older sect that subsequently gave rise to the other. While the Dipavāmaṇa affirms the Mahiśāsaka to be the original sect the Śūrīputrapariścēvakāsūtra and Samayabhēdoparacanacakra put it the other way round\textsuperscript{218} N. Dutt has pointed out that there were in fact two Mahiśāsaka
schools, one earlier and the other later. According to Przyluski, the early Mahīśāsaka sect followed Purāṇa, which seems to find support from the fact that special importance was attached to Purāṇa in the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya. N. Dutt also suggests that the earlier Mahīśāsakas had emerged as a distinct sect soon after the first Council and hence were anterior to even the Mahāsāṃghika sect. There is, however, no basis to believe that the dissent of Purāṇa about the recital of the Canon in the First Council originated a sect. In fact, the silence of Śāriputraparāśāsūtra and Samayabhedoracanacakra about early Mahīśāsakas would be contrary to this supposition. The Mahīśāsakas seem to have got this name due to their geographical location in Mahisamandala or Mahismati, i.e., modern Maheswara on the bank of Narmada. Their reference occurs in the inscriptions found at Nāgarjunonāḍa and Vanavāsi. Fa-hsien discovered their Vinaya Pitaka at Ceylon. I-ting did not notice them anywhere in the proper sense of the term. It is gathered from the traditions that the Dharmaguptikas originated from the Mahīśāsakas. The commentator of the Kathavatthu has attributed one of its theses to the Mahīśāsaka school and has associated it with several others. Curiously enough, Kathavatthu is silent about this sect.

SARVĀSTIVĀDA

The origin and rise of the Sarvāstivāda is a disputed subject. There seems to be reason in the hypothesis of Przyluski that the groups of monks, belonging to Kauśāmbī, Avanti and Mathurā, who joined Yāśa during the second Council probably project the basis of the subsequent evolution of the Theravāda, the Mahīśāsaka and the Sarvāstivāda sects. It may be noted that these places eventually turned out to be the centres of the three sects respectively. Mathurā seems to have become the first seat of the Sarvāstivādins not long after the second Council and it was from Mathurā that its influence spread over northern India, particularly in Gāndhāra and Kashmir. During the reign of Asoka, the famous monk Upagupta was the chief of the Sarigha at Mathurā, and in Kashmir it was Madhyāntika who had introduced and propagated Buddhism in that region.
The geographical expansion of Sarvāstivāda was not limited towards the north only. There is inscriptional testimony to show that it had its centres as far east as Sārnāth and Śrāvasti. The Sarvāstivāda sect finds mention in the Kamasi and Set-Mahet Image inscriptions as also in the inscriptions on the Mathurā Lion Capital. In the Sārnāth inscription, it is stated that the Sarvāstivādins ousted the Theravādins there and that they in turn were replaced by the Sammatīyas in A.D. 300. Fa-hsien noted the existence of this sect at Paṭaliputra and Yuan Chwang discovered them at far-off places such as Kashgar, Koucha, Tamavāsana (Sialkot) and several other places on the northern frontier, in Matipur, Kanauj, a place near Rājagṛha, etc. I-tsing found them in Lāta, Sindha, southern and eastern India, Sumatra, Java China, Central Asia and Cochin-China. It is interesting to note that early traditions are silent about the Mūla-Sarvāstivāda sect and that I-tsing is our first informant about it. This seems to suggest that this sect acquired a status only after the seventh century. The fundamental assertion of the Sarvāstivāda school, viz., ‘sarvān asti’ has been discussed at a great length in the Kathāvatthu.

VIBHAJYAVĀDA

About the Vibhajyavādins it is noteworthy that they are not uniformly recorded by the traditions as a distinct sect for any considerable period of time. The Kathāvatthu is silent about the Vibhajyavāda school. Some important traditions which refer to them are those of the Sammatīyas and the Mahāsāṃghikas, i.e., the third and second lists of Bhavya. While, according to the Sammatīya tradition, Vibhajyavāda like Śrāvakantivāda, developed from the Sarvāstivāda sect, the Mahāsāṃghika tradition (second list of Bhavya) would truncate early Buddhism into three schools i.e., the Sthavira, the Mahāsāṃghika and the Vibhajyavāda and would trace the origins of the Mahīśāsaka, the Kāśyapiya, the Dhammachakka and the Tārāsatiya from the last school. It is well-known that at the time of the third Buddhist Council, all true Buddhist are described as Vibhajyavādins. On the contrav, the Vibhāṣā of the Sarvāstivādins informs us that the Vibhajyavādins
were heretics opposed to the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas.²³⁹ It is
given to understand that they rejected the Sarvānā asti thesis of
the Sarvāstivāda and instead held the view that the past which
has not yet produced its fruits and the future do not exist.²⁴⁰ It
was possibly due to their analytical attitude within the general
framework of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine that they got the name
of Vibhajyavādins or Sarvāstivāda-Vibhajyavādins.

KĀŚYAPIYAS

It appears from the traditional list that the Kāśyapīya sect
arose about the third century of the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha
from the Sthavira line precisely from the Sarvāstivāda sect.²⁴¹
The tradition of the Sarvāstivādins identifies the Kāśyapīyas
with Suvarsaka (Vasumitra) and Dharmasuvarsaka (Bhavya's
first list). Inscriptional evidence suggests their existence at
Taxila and Bedali, i.e., about 200 kilometres north-west of
Taxila during the third century A.D. and at Pālātu-Dheri-Jars
near Peshawar during the fifth century.²⁴² In the seventh
century, however, Yuan Chwang and I-tsing noted their frag-
mentary survival in Uddiyāna, Kharachara and Khotān,²⁴³
which suggests that they had perhaps degenerated and passed
into the Mahāyāna school. The Kathāvatthu (1.8) discusses
their basic assertion that some of the past and future exist.

SANKRĀNTIKA OR SAUTRĀNTIKA OR ŚUṬRAVĀDIN

Almost all traditions in their final analysis derive the
Saṅkrāntikas from the Sarvāstivāda, though there is some
discrepancy about the order of their rise as also about their
identity with the Sautrāntikas and the Śuṭravādins.²⁴⁴ Vasu-
mitra informs us that in the fourth century of the Nirvāṇa of
the Buddha originated the Sautrāntika school which also
became known as Saṅkrāntika and Uttarīya.²⁴⁵ Poussin is
inclined to identify the Saṅkrāntikas and the Dārśtāntikas,²⁴⁶
but A. Bareau has cited the references of Vasubandhu and
Vaibhāṣā where the two sects have been placed distinctly.²⁴⁷
The Kathavāṭṭhū is silent about this school. The Abhidharma-
kośa and the treatise of Vasumitra, however, record a number
of doctrines of this school. As the name of the sect suggests, they believed in the transmigration (Sānkṛānti) of a substance from one life to another. According to them, out of the five skandhas of an individual, there is only one subtle skandha which transmigrates, as against the whole of the Pudgala of the Vātsiputriyas and the Sammatiyas.

TĀMRAŚATĪYAS

The Sammatiyas (third list of Bhavya) and the Mahāsamghikas (second list of Bhavya) traditions classify this sect along with three others, viz., the Mahīśāsakas, the Dharmaguptas and the Kāśyapiyas and derive it from Vibhajyavāda. Thus, according to Bhavya, the Tāmraśatiya was a sect distinct from the Saurāntika. Vinitadeva, however, places it with the Sarvāstivāda group of sects along with the Mahīśāsaka, the Dharmaguptaka etc., and says that the Tāmraśatiya was identical with the Saurāntika. The former classification seems to be untenable. In fact, it is doubtful to assume that Vibhajyavāda developed as a full-fledged school like the Mahāsaṃghika and Theravāda at an early date. It may be added that Tārānātha considered the Tāmraśatiyas as identical with the Saṅkrāntivādins, the Uttarīya, the Saurāntikas and the Dārśāntikas.

DHARMAGUPTAKAS

All traditions noted here agree that the Dharmaguptakas branched off from the Mahīśāsakas, possibly in the third century of the Nirvāṇa of Buddha. It seems that they originated due to a controversy about the nature of the gift given to the Buddha and the Saṅgha. According to Paramārtha, they revered Dharmagupta, a disciple of Mudgalyāyana as their propounder. They also maintained a Canon that had four to five Piṭakas including a Bodhisattva Piṭaka and a Dhāraṇī Piṭaka. We gather from the Abhidharmakośa that Dharmaguptakas did not accept the Prātimokṣa rules of the Sarvāstivāda as authoritative on the contention that the original teachings of the Buddha were lost. Przybiski has located this sect in the north-west. Yuan Chhwang and
I-tsing noted their existence in Uḍḍiyāna and Central Asia: but not on the mainland of India. The Kathāvatthu does not notice any doctrine of this school.

**THERAVĀDA**

It seems from the traditional lists that one of the two earliest schools of Buddhism was known by the name of Thera or Sthaviravāda from which seceded the various sects and schools. Pāli tradition would go as far as to assert that Theravāda was not schismatic. An alternative name that is sometimes given to Theravāda is Vibhajyavāda. Moggaliputta Tissa, the key-figure of the third Council, seems to have been instrumental in the development of this school. His compilation Kathāvatthu represents the Theravāda point of view wherein it sought to refute the tenets of other schools.

Theravāda is still a living sect in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Cambodia and Laos. As regards the Ceylonese Theravāda some of the sects of which are referred to in the traditional lists enumerated here, it is difficult to agree with the opinion that the Ceylonese Theravāda was a late derivative from the original Theravāda. In fact, the Ceylonese Theravāda appears to be a very ancient school and reflects the Mūla-Sthaviravāda tradition to a remarkable degree. They reckon their history from the time of Aśoka which is supposed to be the period of the introduction of Buddhism in Ceylon.

It is in the list of Vinītadeva that three sects of the Ceylonese Theravāda, viz., the Jetavaniya, the Abhayagirivāsi and the Mahāvihāravāsi have been enumerated. Yuan Chwang designated the Mahāvihāravāsins as the Hīnayāna Staviras and the Abhayagirivāsins as the Mahāyāna Staviras. It is likely that the monastery of Abhayagiri remained for some time a centre of the Vetulyakas, the immediate forerunners of the Mahāyāna.

**OTHER SECTS MENTIONED BY BUDDHAGHOSA**

Buddhaghosa in his commentary on the Kathāvatthu refers to certain sects which are conspicuous by their absence in other traditional lists. Beside the eighteen sects mentioned in
the Dipavamsa, Buddhaghosa has also mentioned the Rājagiri, the Siddhatthika, the Pubbaseliya, the Aparaseliya, the Haimavata, the Vajjiriy, the Uttarāpathaka, the Hettuvāda and the Vetullaka. He has assigned the first four in the group of Andhaka sects, which is corroborated by the inscriptive evidence suggesting their existence in the region of Amaravati in the Andhra. Of these, we have already discussed the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila sects. The rest may be discussed here excepting, however, the Vajjiriy about whom nothing is known beyond their name. It is probable that Vajjiriy stands for a compendious reference to ‘Vajra’ sects.

RĀJAGIRIKA AND SIDDHATTHIKA OR SIDDHARTHIKA

Buddhaghosa has put them under the four Andhaka sects. In the Mahāsamarghika tradition the Rājagirika and the Siddharthika, along with certain others, form the group of sects which is said to originate from the Mahāsamarghikas. The Rājagirika sect seems to have derived its name from the monastery of Rājagiri which may have been situated somewhere close to Amaravati. Siddharthika, on the other hand, possibly denotes Lord Buddha’s personal name Siddhārtha. Buddhaghosa has attributed to the Rājagirika and the Siddharthika certain doctrines discussed in the seventh part of the Kathāvatthu.

UTTARĀPATHAKA

Save for its name, Buddhaghosa does not enlighten us with any other detail about this sect. In the opinion of Bareau, the Uttarāpathaka region should be taken to signify the areas of Thaneswara and the whole of the Indus basin, i.e., the mountainous tract of the north-west. N. Dutt and B.C. Law would suggest that Uttarāpathaka denoted originally the high road running from Magadha to the north-west but that later on it implied the area west of Prthūḍaka (Peoha near Thaneswara) and Punjab including the regions of Kashmir and adjoining hill states beyond the Indus. The Uttarāpathaka appears
to have been an eclectic school upholding doctrines taken from both the Mahāsaṃghika and the Theravāda groups. An analysis of the tenets of this school, as contained in the Kāthavatthu, would show that a number of these tenets reflect a tendency towards the Mahāyānic concept of the Buddhist doctrine. On the one hand, the school seeks to elevate the nature of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva, and, on the other, it affirms the shortcomings of the Arahant ideal. It is this school which raises the problem of the nature of 'thusness', i.e., tathatā in the Kathavatthu. It seems to us that Buddhaghosa has given the name Uttarāpathaka to the same school that was earlier known as the Lokottaravāda which propounded the transcendental conception of the Buddha. Yuan Chwang noticed the Lokottaravāda school in Bāmiyān, which fact also strengthens the hypothesis that they should have got an alternative name, i.e., Uttarāpathaka in the course of time.

**HETUVĀDA**

Bhavya (first list) has identified the Hetuvāda with the Sarvāstivāda. Buddhaghosa, who refers to this sect in his commentary, attributes to them several theses recorded in the Kathavatthu. Though it is not possible to make out their origin clearly, it seems, however, from their tenets that the Hetuvāda was a sect different from the Sarvāstivāda.

**VETULLAKA**

Buddhaghosa mentions this sect as the Mahāsuññavādins. He has attributed a docetic thesis to this school as found in the Kathavatthu. The Ceylonese chronicles make mention of the Vetullakas as heretics whom the chroniclers noted at the Abhayagiri monastery of Ceylon. Their name Vetulyaka may be derived from 'Vaipulya' which seems to associate them with the Mahāyāna. The docetic theses of this school essentially tend to the Mahāyānic point of view.

**HAIMAVATA**

The name of this sect is conspicuous by its absence in some of the traditions such as Dipavaṇsa and Śāriputraparipṛchhāsūtra.
Vasumitra identifies Haimavata with the rest of the Sthavira-vāda after the secession of the Sarvāstivāda. Sammatīya tradition, however, believes that this was the first sect to have separated from the Sthaviravāda. A little later, Mahāsāṃghika tradition, preserved by Bhavya, as also the tradition of Vinitadeva place the Haimavata with the Mahāsāṃghikas. Buddhaghosa also puts them with the Andhaka sects. Although Vasumitra thinks that the Haimavata doctrine was very much akin to that of the Sarvāstivāda, he attributes to the former, five propositions of Mahādeva which formed the basis of the Mahāsāṃghikas. An interesting reference occurs on a relic casket inscription recovered from Sāñchi wherein it has been said (1) sapurisasa Kāsapagotasa savahemavatācariyasa and (2) sapurisasa gotiputasa Kāsapagotasa savahemavatācariyasa. This speaks of a certain Gotiputa Kāsapagota as the ācariya of the Himalayan countries. Thus, the monks of Kassapa-gotta seem to have been responsible for the propagation of Buddhism in Himavanta. The preceding inscription appears to imply an early reference to the Haimavatas and perhaps to the Kāśyapīyas also.

On the basis of this, Przyluski has identified the Kāśyapīya and the Haimavata sects. Other scholars also support this identification on the ground that monks of the Kāśyapagotra were the teachers of the Haimavatas. As we analyze the doctrines of this school, as found in the treatise of Vasumitra, it seems, however, that the Haimavata was an eclectic school which upheld certain doctrines both of the Theravāda as well as the Mahāsāṃghika line.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion over the growth and ramifications of the early Buddhist sects and schools, some important conclusions that appear to follow, may be summarized here.

The first remarkable point about the Buddhist sects and schools is that there is an early growth of sectarianism in the community of monks (Sāṃgha). In fact, the seeds of these sectarian tendencies clearly go back to the lifetime of the Buddha himself. The episode of Devadatta is an event exem-
Sects and Schools 77

...plifying this tendency. As may be gleaned from the details of that episode, it seems to reflect the earliest confrontation of rigour versus laxity or latitude in matters of discipline which, as we know, subsequently developed into a consistent point of controversy among the different sects of Buddhism. Besides, the existence of the Devadattakas in later times seems to imply that the first actual schism in the Buddhist Order occurred due to Devadatta, i.e., in the lifetime of the Buddha himself. The Canonical account, though, it furnishes the details of the episode, does not, however, recognize it as a schism in order.

Similarly, if we scrutinize the details of the first Buddhist Council which followed soon after the demise of the Buddha, we observe that the attitudes of Mahākassapa and Purāṇa regarding the authenticity of the Canon reflect the conflict of personal opinion against Conciliar authority. The issue of dispute again relates to the points of Vinaya and perhaps foreshadows the later growth of the Mahāśāsakas, though not their explicit emergence at this time. It has been stated here that Purāṇa, who upheld a dissenting opinion over the recitation of the Canon in the first Council, is later accorded an eminent position in the Mahāśāsaka sect.

The happenings of the second Buddhist Council of Vaiśāli and the Mahāsaṅgīti of Pātaliputra appear to have ultimately resulted in the great schism in the Buddhist Order leading to its clear-cut division into the Theravāda and the Mahāsaṅgikā schools. Thus, roughly about 150 years after the passing away of the Buddha, the first two of the Buddhist sects originated and set into motion a process in the course of which as many as eighteen sects emerged in Buddhism. It seems to us, on the testimony of the Kathāvatthu, that most of the early Buddhist sects emerged by the second and third centuries of the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha.

The third Buddhist Council was occasioned by the growth of divergent views and tenets as also a great deal of diversity in the interpretation of the Buddhist doctrines, a development totally unacceptable to the orthodox sections of the monks, especially because it had deleterious repercussions over the actual functioning and organization of the Order which was virtually split up into many discordant elements. In view of
this, the Theravādins proceeded to dispute all those doctrines and tenets which they considered to be non-Buddhistic and alien. They sought to refute all such doctrines by compiling the famous book of the *Abhidharma Piṭaka* called the *Kathāvatthu*. How far the Theravādins succeeded in their venture it is difficult to assess, although, according to their own claims, no doctrine was perhaps left unfuted. However, it appears from the text of the *Kathāvatthu* that most of the so-called alien views, instead of accepting defeat, claim to have vindicated their own genuineness. Thus, the third Buddhist Council seems to have finally resulted in a parting of ways and to have helped the process of the crystallization of various early Buddhist sects and schools. It is interesting to note that the key sects appear to have arisen and established their strongholds at important Buddhist centres of that age. The Vātsīputriyas appear to have developed in the Vatsa country and the areas round about it, with Kauśāmbī as its main centre. The Sarvāstivādins found their growing centre at Mathurā and from there they spread to the northern and north-western regions. In the development of Buddhism from Mathurā to the northern and north-western regions, there emerged quite a few sub-sects such as the Kāsyapīyas, the Uttarāpathakas, the Haimavatas, etc., in the evolution of which geographical factors seem to have played a considerable role, as the names of some of these sects suggest. The Mahāsaṃghikas had their growth in the eastern region of Vaiśāli among the Vajjian monks and at Pātaliputra and appear to have later spread towards Andhra and Dakṣiṇāpatha. One of their sects found a location in Bāmiyān. The Theravādins appear to have flourished in the region of Avanti and moved southwards to Ceylon. The nearness of Pāli to the Girnar dialect of Aśoka may be recalled in this connection.

It is interesting to observe at this juncture that some of the theses discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* are attributed in the fifth century by Buddhaghosa to some such sects which seem to have emerged later than the time of the compilation of the *Kathāvatthu*. The Vetyalkas, the Hetuvādins, the Pubbaseliyas, the Aparaseliyas, the Rājagirikas, the Siddharthikas, etc., are generally held to belong to a later date. In fact, Buddhaghosa
himself points out that the Andhaka, the Pubbaseliya, the Aparaseliya, the Rājagirika and the Siddharthika schools emerged later. Buddhaghosa in his own time found the Pubbaseliyas, the Aparaseliyas, etc., as derived from the Andhakas. Elsewhere, he again says that six schools arose subsequently, viz., the Hemavatika, the Rājagirika, the Siddhatthika, the Pubbaseliya, the Aparaseliya and the Vajjiriya. It is significant to note that he does not include these sects among the eighteen sects mentioned earlier. Similarly, he does not include the Vetullakas among the eighteen sects. It may, however, be observed that these sects may very well have acquired specific names at a stage later than the emergence of the basic conceptions which were adumbrated by more comprehensive sects earlier. There is nothing to warrant against the hypothesis that the basic doctrines with which they became associated should belong to the actual time of the compilation of the Kathāvatthu. The most significant point about these sects lies in their being sub-sects and not principal sects as their parent bodies were. In all probability, the doctrines associated with these so-called late sects were in the beginning, i.e., about the time of the compilation of the Kathāvatthu, perhaps in an undifferentiated stage and were thus held by the main sects. Slowly, however, sections within these sects crystallized round the specific doctrines and paved the way for their separation from the parent body. Their existence as specific sects in the time of Buddhaghosa is, therefore, quite likely. It must be remembered in this connection that the Kathāvatthu was in any case compiled long before Buddhaghosa and the probable date of the emergence of the late sects named by him. Our hypothesis would reconcile the validity of Buddhaghosa’s attribution with the fact that the whole Canon was written down in Ceylon in the first century B.C. It would also, at the same time, go to validate the tradition about the composition of the Kathāvatthu.

As regards the problem of affiliation among the different sects, basically, two lines of development may be observed, viz., the Theravāda and the Mahāsamghika. The essential homogeneity in the basic tenets of the Theravāda sects seems to sustain the hypothesis that the seeds of some of them had be-
come manifest prior to the division of the Buddhist Order into the Theravāda and the Mahāsamghika sects. And the fact that they still happened to differ mutually owes its development to the inherent possibilities of difference in the interpretation of the Buddha’s gospel in the process of which they propagated cardinal doctrines of their own.

As regards the basic conformity in the attitude of the Mahāsamghika group of schools, it may be pointed out that they were tending towards the evolution of a new phase of Buddhism, viz., Mahāyāna, and thus a considerable number of their major doctrines are found to reflect a transitional stage from Hinayāna to Mahāyāna. The basic motivation behind this tendency was the apotheosis of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva and the corresponding abasement of the Arahant. This tendency has some parallel, emotive rather than conceptual, to the doctrine of Avatāra growing up in the Bhakti cults.

The doctrinal differentiation of the more orthodox sects appears to have occurred in the course of the effort to evolve more precise definitions and classification of ‘phenomena’ (‘dharms’). Such ‘analysis’ is the central task of Abhidharma of which the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda Canons give us perfected examples. The main cleavage between these two occurred over the ancient and inevitable problem of the relationship of change to permanence. It may be noted that the Mahāyāna (arising from the Mahāsamghikas) avoids this dilemma by refusing to concede the reality of the Dharma themselves. The Mahāsamghikas already evidence their idealistic tendency by emphasizing Dharmatā more than the Dharma, thus multiplying the number of asamkhaītas.

While accepting the more realistic tendency of the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, the Vātsiputriyas departed from this by seeking to be more consistent to the facts of experience on the subject of the Person (Puggala) without jettisoning the principle of impermanence as applied to ‘spiritual substance’ or psychic reality.
REFERENCES

1. The two terms i.e., nikāya and ācāryakula or ācāryavāda occur both in the literature as well as inscriptions. Cf. Malalasekera, Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Fas. 2, p. 163. s.v. Meariyavāda; PTS. Dictionary, s.v. ācārya.


4. Malalasekara, Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Cf Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭha kathā, pp. 2ff; Samantapāsādika, I, pp. 223-234; Dipavaṁsa, V. 51; Mahāvaṁsa, V.3ff, see also Eng. Trans. by W.Geiger, p. 26n.

5. After describing the succession of the different sects the Dipavaṁsa closes the account (V. 54) with the remark—ācāryavādām nīthitāṁ, i.e., 'here ends the section on the schools founded by the teachers'; see also Mahāvaṁsa, the comment at the end of V. 13.

6. Vasumitra and Bhavya have traced several sects from the personal names of the teachers such as Bahuśrutiyas, Dharmottariyas, etc.; See Points of Controversy, Prefatory Notes, p. XLIV.


10. The following sects are specifically mentioned in the inscriptions, Mahāsāṅghikas Bahuśrutiyas, Caitaka, Aparaśaila Pūrvaśaila, Rājaśīrika, Siddharthika, Sarvāṣṭivādin, Mahāsāka, Kāśyapīya. Vātśiprutriya, Sammatiya, Dharmottariya, Bhadrayāniya; for details see infra where individual sects have been discussed; see also Bareau, Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule pp. 34-40; E. Lamotte, Historie du Bouddhisme Indien, pp. 578-84.

11. See Sāñchi relic casket inscription in Lüders List Nos. 156, 158; Cf. Marshall, Monuments of Sāñchi. p. 295; JRAS, 1905, p. 691; D.R. Bhandarkar, Aśoka pp. 144-145; see also infra.


13. I-tsing refers to differences in clothing among the sects; see Takakusu, I-tsing, pp. 66-7.

14. Dipavaṁsa, V.

15. Cf. e.g., Diṣṭa Nikāya, I, p. 9, 58; Majjhimo Niākya, II, p. 47.

16. Cullavagga, chapter VII.


18. see Cullavagga, p. 307ff.


20. Ibid., pp. 305-6.
22. Such functions as Upasatha, Parivasa and Samghakamma would be held independently; Cf. Cullavagga, p. 306; see also, Mahavagga, p. 370.
27. Sanyutta Nikaya, II, p. 222.
28. Ibid., p. 222.
30. Majjhima Nikaya, III, p. 32.
31. Ibid., II, p. 73.
32. Ibid., III, pp. 44-5.
34. Ibid., II, pp. 118-19.
35. Ibid., II, p. 118.
40. Cullavagga, pp. 408-409; see also Mahavamsa, III, 30-6.
41. Majjhima Nikaya, III, p. 38
42. Digha Nikaya, III, pp. 4-5.
43. Majjhima Nikaya I, pp. 96-7.
47. Cf. Majjhima Nikaya, I. P. 174; see Middle Length Sayings, I. p. 167.
48. Ibid., I, p. 315.
50. Ibid., II, p. 374-5.
51. See Mahavagga, pp. 368ff; Majjhima Nikaya, Kosambisutta, pp. 393-8; Dhammapadathakathã-Kosambivatthu.
52. Cf. N. Dutt, EMB, II, p. 6n.
53. Cf. e.g., Majjhima Nikaya, III, pp. 46-47.
55. N. Dutt, EMB, II, p. 6.
57. H.A. Giles. The Travels of Fu-hsien (399-414 A.D.) or Records of the Buddhistic Kingdoms, p. 35-36.
59. Ibid.
60. On the first Buddhist Council see Cullavagga p. 411-12; Mahavamsa, III; Dipavamsa, IV; W.W. Rockhill, Life of Buddha, pp. 148ff; Thomas Watters, On Yuan Chwang’s Travels in India, II, pp. 159-161;

61. Cf. Oldenberg, ZDMG, 1898, 613-32; Franke, op. cit.


64. G.C. Pande, BDVI, p. 156.

65. Cullavagga, p. 409.

66. Ibid., pp. 409-11.


68. Ibid., pp. 410-11.

69. Ibid., p. 412.


72. Cullavagga, p. 412.


75. P.V. Bapat, (2500 years of Buddhism, pp. 41-4.

76. See Watters, op. cit., I, pp. 20-1.


78. See Cullavagga, p. 416; Mahāvamsa, IV. 9ff. Dīpavāṁsa, IV. 52; V 18.


80. Ibid. p. 420; Mahāvamsa, IV. 18.

81. Cullavagga, p. 423; Cf. Mahāvamsa, IV. 21ff.

82. Cullavagga, p. 424.

83. Ibid., pp. 424-5.


85. Cullavagga, p. 424.

86. Cullavagga, p. 427; Mahāvamsa, IV. 46-7.

87. Ibid., pp. 427-8; See also Mahāvamsa, IV. 48ff; Dīpavāṁsa, V. 21ff.

88. The process of Ubbāhikā or referendum is explained in the Cullavagga, pp. 180 see also Books of the Discipline, Pt. V, pp. 128-129.

89. Cullavagga, p. 429; Cf. Mahāvamsa, IV. 53-5.

90. Ibid., p. 430.

91. Dīpavāṁsa, V. 30ff.
84 Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

92. Dipavaṁsa, V. 30ff.
94. Ibid., V, 37-8.
100. See Watters, op. cit., I, p. 267.
101. Ibid., II, pp. 159-60; see also S. Beal, op. cit., pp. 190, 380-1.
102. See author’s article on ‘Religious Conviction of Asoka’ in the University of Rajasthan Studies (History) 1965-66, pp. 12-13.
109. See Ibid., II, 5. 6; XI. 4.
111. Dipavaṁsa, V. 30-1.
112. See also Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 7.
113. Mahāvaṁsa, IV. 31ff.
117. Cf. Parihāyati arahā arahattā ti, Kathāvatthu, p. 77 ; see infra.
119. See Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhist Thought, op. cit., p. 5.
120. Dipavaṁsa, V. 30-31.
127. S. Dutt, The Buddha and Five After Centuries, p. 137.
130. *Dīpavāṃsa* V. 51.


132. The only minor alteration we notice is that instead of Cetiya, Bhavya refers to Caitika as the last seceder from the Mahāsaṅghika line.


134. See *Kāthāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 2-5.


141. The Ṣāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra tradition is also described as the Kashmir tradition. We have another Kashmir tradition in the Mahīṣṣūṭiparipṛcchāsūtra, See Bareau *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, ibid., pp. 17-19.


146. See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 15-17.


149. Cf. Ibid., pp. 24-25.


155. Ibid., Appendix II, pp. 290-95.

156. Ibid., pp. 291-92.


158. Y. Sogen, op. cit., pp. lff.


160. See *Dīpavāṃsa*, V. 36.


162. Watters, II. 1, p. 160; see also Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 4.

Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

174. Tārānātha op. cit., pp. 175, 274.
176. *Kathāvatthu*, II. 8; see also *Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā*, pp. 57-8.
196. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 15; see supra.
201. See infra.
202. See supra.
203. See infra chapter VIII.
204. See supra.
208. See *Kathāvatthu*, II, 9; *Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā*, p. 58.
218. See supra.
221. N. Dutt, *EMB*, II, p. 112.
222. Cf. *Cullavagga*, pp. 411-12; see also supra.
227. See *Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā*, pp. 60, 90, 92, 111, 123. 1(0), 173, 181, 186.
235. See Takakusu in *JPTS*, 1904-05, p. 71; Legge, op. cit., p. 99; see also *JRAS*, 1891, p. 420.
237. See infra.
241. See Masuda, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
244. See supra.
253. See Abhidharmakoṣa, IV. 39.
255. See Watters, op. cit.; I, p. 226; Takakusu, I-tsin, pp. xxiv, 7.
256. See Dīpavaṃsaja, V, 51; Mahāvaṃsa, V, 3ff; Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 2ff.
262. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 5.
263. See Bareau, Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, p. 16.
264. See Supra.
266. See Kathāvatthu, VII, 1-6, XVII. 2-3.
268. N. Dutt, EMB, II, p. 171.
269. B.C. Law, Geography of Early Buddhism, p. 85.
270. N. Dutt, EMB, II, p. 172.
271. See Kathāvatthu, IV. 6-7; XVIII. 3; XXIII. 3, etc.
272. See Ibid., XXIII-2.
276. See Kathāvatthu, XV. 5, 7, 10; XVI. 3, XVII. 4-5, XIX. 8, XX; Z, XXIII. 5.
277. Cf. Ibid., XVII. 6-10, XVIII. 1.
278. Dīpavaṃsaja, XXII. 45, Mahāvaṃsa, XXXVI. 46.
280. See supra for different traditional accounts.
282. See Sañchi Relic Casket inscription in *Luders List*, Nos. 156, 158.
    D.R. Bhandarkar, op. cit., pp. 144-5.
The Ideal of Arahant: Challenge and Defence

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The concept of Arahanthood forms a significant issue of debate in the Kathāvatthu. The text discusses several theses propounded by different sects. A close scrutiny would show that a remarkable number of these theses were in the nature of an impeachment of the Arahants. It seems that through these theses some of the early Buddhist sects were seeking to establish the possibilities of imperfection of an Arahant. It is interesting to go through the various misgivings that came to be woven round the ideal man of early Buddhism. Arahant is the title given to the perfect man in Buddhism. As regards the etymology of the term Arahant or Arhat (Sanskrit) the Buddhists seem to derive it from two words, viz., ‘Ari’, i.e., ‘enemy’ and ‘han’, i.e., ‘to kill’ and thus the term stands for ‘a slayer of the enemy’, the enemy obviously being the passions.\(^1\) Some modern scholars, however, prefer to derive this term from ‘Arhati’, i.e., ‘to be worthy of’ or deserving and worthy of worship and gifts.\(^2\) It seems that originally Arahant was a popular appellation given to the ascetics.\(^3\) In Buddhism, it assumed a technical significance as denoting only the fully and finally emancipated saints.\(^4\) The Buddha is generally called an Arahant. In the earliest Buddhist usage,
Buddhahood and Arahanthood were so closely allied that it is difficult to draw any significant distinction between the two. The Canonical texts lay down in various formulae the qualities which go to make Arahantship. An Arahant is described as one who is in possession of the excellent goal, free from attachment, hatred and delusion, in short all impurities, relieved of burden of khandhas, accomplished in all that is to be accomplished and devoid of any future existence. The Arahant is one in whom the intoxicants or outflows, i.e., sense desire, becoming, ignorance, wrong views are destroyed, who has lived the life, who has done his task, who has laid down his burden, who has attained salvation, etc. Similarly, it is said that an Arahant is ‘alone, secluded, earnest, zealous, master of himself’. He exerted himself and realized that the circle of ‘Birth-and-Death’ (jarā-marāna), with its ‘Five Constituents’ (skandhas) is in constant flux. He abandoned all the defilements and won Arahantship. On becoming an Arahant he lost all his attachment to the World. He has obtained ‘Gnosis’ the ‘super-knowledge’ and the ‘Powers of Analytical Insight’. Thus, he is supposed to be possessed of both Kṣayajñāna, i.e., the knowledge that he has no more kleśas and anuipūdajñāna, i.e., the knowledge that he will have no more rebirth.

This is, in short, the image of an Arahant as preserved in the early Canonical texts. It is this image of the Arahant which the Theravāda section of Buddhists cherished and commended. According to them, an Arahant has acquired the clear vision about the origin and destruction of things, got rid of all doubts (kaṅkhā) about the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, non-existence of soul and the theory of causation. He has seen things for himself unaided by others, and has attained bodhi which is, however, catumaggañāna (knowledge of the Four Paths) and not sabbaññutañāna (omniscience)—the bodhi of the Buddhas.

Gradually, however, there emerged several outstanding disputes over the concept of Arahant and the quality of perfection achieved in Arahanthood. It is borne out by the account of Kathāvatthu that a variety of such views came to be held by a section of Buddhists which postulated the possibilities of imperfection in the personality of the Arahants. This new movement was bound to tarnish the image of the ideal saint of the orthodox Buddhists for whom he was a perfect being with no
chance whatsoever of a fall from Arahanthood. It is in this
strain that the orthodox Theravāda Buddhists take up the
different theses about the Arahant for discussion and dispute
in the Kathāvatthu. Some of these so-called heterodox views
are recorded also in the treatises of Vasumitra,14 Bhavya15 and
Vinitadeva.16 Occasionally, the Abhidharmakośa17 provides
valuable insights into some of them.

The impact of the five points of Mahādeva on the early
Buddhist Order has been discussed previously.18 It may be re-
called that the very same points of Mahādeva as enumerated
in the accounts of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinitadeva gave rise
to the first doctrinal controversy among the Buddhists and
occupied the great schism in the Order resulting in its divi-
sion into two, i.e., the Mahāsāṃghika and the Theravāda. Four
out of the five points advocated by Mahādeva rendered a stun-
nning blow to the orthodox concept of Arahant as it appears in
the Nikāyas and other Pāli texts. Mahādeva, through these
points, formulated the significant failings of the Arahant.
Vasumitra's treatise enumerates the failings thus:19

1. Arahant can be tempted by others.
2. They still have ignorance.
3. They still have doubt.
4. They gain knowledge through the help of others.

Curiously enough, the Kathāvatthu picks up all these theses
for debate and discusses them in considerable detail. They are
recorded in the Kathāvatthu thus:

1. Arahant has impure discharge, i.e., he may be subject to
unconscious temptations.20
2. Arahant may lack knowledge, that is to say, one may be
an Arahant and not know it.21
3. Arahant may have doubts on matters of doctrine.22
4. Arahant is excelled by others, i.e., one cannot attain
Arahanthood without the help of others.23

The Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā attributes these views to the
Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas.24 In the treatise of Vasumitra,
however, these views are attributed to almost all the Mahāsām-
ghikas as also some of the Theravāda sects. Bhavya and Vinitadeva also corroborate the tradition of Vasumitra. It is tempting to deduce that the cause of Mahādeva’s movement may have subsequently become identified with the Mahāsāṃghikas in direct antagonism to the Theravāda upholding an authoritarian cult of Arahants.

This unorthodox movement was criticized and opposed with equal vehemence by the Theravādins who defended their notion of the perfection and supremacy of the Arahant ideal. It was not long after the heresy of Mahādeva that the disputes on Arahanthood assumed greater proportions and gave rise to certain deeper controversies of paramount importance. There emerged some central issues of debate, viz., whether or not an Arahant is liable to fall from Arahanthood? Again, is Arahanthood identical with lasting emancipation or not? Similarly, there arose some other vital controversies on Arahant, such as the comparison between the perfection of an Arahant and the omniscience of the Buddha and so on. We may discuss the basic arguments in the controversies on Arahant as they appear in the Kathāvatthu.

THESSES AND ARGUMENTS

FALLIBILITY OF AN ARAHANT

The first Arahant controversy in the Kathāvatthu rests over a significant assertion that an Arahant can fall away from Arahanthood. According to Buddhaghosa, this assertion was shared by the Sammitīyas, Vajjiputtiyas, Sabbatthivādins and some of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

As regards the identification of the fourth, viz., a section of the Mahāsāṃghikas there seems to be some confusion owing to different traditions at our disposal. In the treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinitadeva the theses about the four failings of the Arahant, as noted here, are attributed to the Mahāsāṃghikas as well as their sub-sects. But when it amounts to a more vital issue, viz., whether an Arahant can fall from Arahanthood, these treatises point out that the Mahāsāṃghikas and some of their sub-sects such as the Ekavyāvaharikas, the Lokottaravādins and the Kaukkuṭikas
did not subscribe to this view. Instead, according to Vasumitra, they held the opposite view that a Śrotāpanna has a chance to retrogress while an Arahant has not.33 Vasumitra however attributes the thesis about the fallibility of Arahants to the Sarvāstivādins and some other sects.33 It is likely that this general reference to some other sects denotes the Śālisa schools of the Mahāsaṃghika group.34 This surmise is strengthened by the argument that Śālisa schools broke away from the Mahāsaṃghikas owing to a second Mahādeva.35 This second Mahādeva seems to have carried the implication of the theses of first Mahādeva to their logical conclusion that the Arahant, who is subject to such basic failings, is ultimately liable to fall away from Arahanthood. As other Mahāsaṃghikas may not have assented to this vital assertion, the followers of second Mahādeva had to part company and move to the Śālisa hills. It is not unlikely that their leader became known as the second Mahādeva just because he carried out a campaign against the ideal of the Arahant as had been done by an earlier Mahādeva.36 It is probable, therefore, that Buddhaghosa had in mind this Śālisa group of sects when he refers to a section of the Mahāsaṃghikas.

In the Kathāvatthu, the Theravādins initiate the debate on the present issue and point out that the thesis that an Arahant may fall away must also imply the following: (1) that he may fall away everywhere; (2) at all times; (3) that all Arahants are liable to fall away and (4) that an Arahant is liable to fall away not only from Arahantship, but from all the four Path-fruitions.37 According to Buddhaghosa, the proponents make some discrimination in replying to these points. As regards the first point, they would not admit that an Arahant, who having gradually fallen, stands on the fruition of stream-winner, can fall away.38 But they would admit it with regard to one who stands on sensuous existence, because, his taking pleasure in worldly activity, and so on are of the nature of decay.39 The second point refers to time. The proponents do not admit the possibility of falling away when there is proper attention. But there may be falling away owing to distracted attention.40 Referring to the third question, they reject it because there can be no falling away unless the conditions thereof are combined.
but once the conditions are created, there may be a falling away.\textsuperscript{41} Similarly, with regard to the fourth point, they reject it in respect of acute faculties (tikhindriya) but admit it in respect of dull faculties (mudindriya).\textsuperscript{42} In short, the proponents do not hold the possibility of universal retrogression. They admit that the Arahant retrogresses only up to the Sotāpatthala and that the retrogression occurs only in the sphere of Kāmaloka and not in the two higher spheres, viz., Rūpa and Arūpa. And this retrogression too is confined only to the mudindriya or samayavimutia Arahants.\textsuperscript{43}

The Theravādins next point out that if an Arahant can fall away, then other three Ariyans (Ariya puggalas) belonging to the lower stages, viz., the Never-Returner (Anāgāmi), Once-Returner (Sakadāgāmi) and Stream-Winner (Sotāpanna), must also be held liable to fall away. And if they all fall away, it would mean that the Once-Returner after falling from his state is rendered as an ordinary man in society. And if an Arahant after falling away is established in the first stage, does he after regaining Arahantship spring from the first stage directly to the Arahantship?\textsuperscript{44} This last argument is rejected by the proponents.\textsuperscript{45} According to them, a Sotāpanna is niyato sambodhiparāyana and hence he is not subject to retrogression. But a Sakadāgāmi or Anāgāmi may retrogress but not farther than the Sotāpanna stage.

This position, as taken by the proponents, is untenable, according to the Theravādins. They point out that if an Arahant, who, as compared to the other three Ariya puggalas is supposed to have put away more corruptions (kilesa),\textsuperscript{46} who has cultivated more Path culture\textsuperscript{47} and who has seen each and all of the Four Noble Truths no less than the other three can fall away, then the other three Ariya Puggalas belonging to the lower stages may surely fall from their respective states.\textsuperscript{48}

Next, the Theravādins proceed to recount in detail the accomplishments of all the four stages and on that basis contend that one cannot maintain the fallibility of Arahants alone without maintaining the same about the three lower stages.\textsuperscript{49}

The Theravādins remind the proponents about their concurrence over the various accomplishments of Arahant hood and ask as to how could they then maintain that an Arahant is.
liable to decline from the state of his attainment which is identical with perfection.\footnote{50}

At this, the proponents concede that only samayavimutta Arahant, \textit{i.e.}, one who is intermittently emancipated, is liable to fall away, but not those Arahants who are asamayavimutta, \textit{i.e.}, emancipated for all time. According to the Theravādins, however, as there is no difference in their accomplishments, the question of occasional or constant emancipation does not affect the argument.\footnote{51}

Finally, the Theravādins put the crucial argument as to whether the proponents could cite any example where the Arahant may be supposed to have fallen from his state?\footnote{52}

The last thing that the Theravādins do to refute the proposition is to quote some Canonical passages\footnote{53} which highlight the state of Arahantship and suggest thereby that the Arahants cannot have a fall from their state. Also, these passages clearly assert that for an Arahant there is no necessity for treading the same path again.\footnote{54}

The proponents also take recourse to a similar device and bring in the reference of such passages which seem to lend support to their hypothesis.\footnote{55} They quote from the \textit{Aṅguttara Nikāya}\footnote{56} where the Buddha is reported to have said that there are five things which conduce to the retrogression of a bhikkhu who is intermittently emancipated. These five things are (1) delight in business (kammārāmatā), (2) in talk (bhassārāmatā), (3) in sleep (nīḍārāmatā), (4) in society (saṅganikārāmatā) and (5) the absence of reflection on how his heart is emancipated.\footnote{57} But the Theravāda argument is whether the Arahants really take delight in any of these things? The denial of the proponents would be inconsistent with their thesis and if they admit it, it would imply that an Arahant is subject to the trap of worldly desires which of course they cannot maintain. On similar other grounds, the Theravādins emphatically argue that the fallibility of Arahants from Arahantness cannot be upheld.

It is interesting to note that Vasubandhu incidentally remarks that an adept, who has attained the \textit{nīrodha-samāpatti}, \textit{i.e.}, the state of meditation in which perception ceases almost completely, cannot have a fall from the state.\footnote{58} It would appear
from the preceding controversy that the Theravādins undoubtedly admit the loss of merit acquired by such adepts who have attained only to the meditation limited to the worldly sphere. They are not prepared to concede this, however, with regard to the higher fruits of sanctification. On the contrary, the proponents conceive the possibilities of retrogression for the latter, but restrict it only to those Arahants who are samayavīmūtias, i.e., temporarily released.

According to Buddhaghosa 'falling away' (parihāna) is twofold—(1) from what is won and (2) from what is not yet won. He illustrates the first type by citing the example of Godhika who is said to have fallen away twice from his emancipation which was, however, intermittent only. It is this type of falling away which is meant by the proponents when they propose the above thesis. The story goes about Godhika that he attained temporary emancipation six times, but fell away. On attaining it the seventh time he cut his throat. According to the commentators, Godhika could not maintain the state of trance owing to sickness. The case of Godhika is also referred to by Vasubandhu who observes that although he fell from his state of temporary release, he did not fall from his state of Arahanthood. This particular reference in the Abhidharmakośa makes it highly doubtful to accept the attribution of the Arahan't's parihāni thesis to the Sarvāstivādins also as mentioned by Buddhaghosa.

The Kathavatthu refers to another thesis about the falling away of Arahants. It was held by the Pubbaseliyas and Sammatiyas that the fall of the Arahan't is sometimes due to the deeds of his previous lives, e.g., having calumniated an Arahan't. Theravādins, however, reject this and point out that sometimes impostors pass as Arahants and commit abrahamacariya offences.

DEFILEMENT OF ARAHANTS

The next thesis about the Arahan't disputed in the Kathavatthu seeks to lay down the possibility of his defilement. It has been noted previously that a certain Mahādeva advocated the thesis of four possible imperfections in an Arahan't. All
the four points have been debated in the Kathāvatthu. Thus, the first debate relates to the assertion that an Arahant has impure discharge. According to Buddhaghosa, this thesis was upheld by the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas who noticed incidents of impure discharge among those who claimed Arahantship. Vasumitra agrees with Buddhaghosa insofar as he also attributes this thesis to all the Mahāsaṅghikas, the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila included. Bhavya and Vinīṭadeva corroborate the attribution of Vasumitra.

To begin the argument, the Theravādins note the all-important denial by the proponents of there remaining any lust (kāmarāga), sensuous desire (kāmarāgapariyutṭhāna), etc., in the Arahant and point out the obvious contradiction between this and the stand taken by them that an Arahant has impure discharge. In the case of an average man, one may find both the desire and its physical manifestation (pariyutṭhāna). But in case of an Arahant, if it does not result from any such desire, what is then the source of his physical impurity?

The proponents point out that such an impurity is conveyed to the Arahant by the Devas of the Māra group who in their turn do not, however, have any such physical impurity.

This is unacceptable to the Theravādins for the reason that it is neither conveyed from any outside person nor is it there in the Arahants themselves.

The proponents suggest that the Devas do this motivated by their reflection: 'We shall cause doubt as to his attainment to be laid hold of it'.

The Theravādins now ask a direct question as to whether an Arahant has doubt? The proponents deny the possibility of doubt in an Arahant with regard to eight points such as the Teacher (satiha), the Doctrine (Dhamma), the Order (Sāṁgha), etc. Instead, they believe that there can be no definite conclusion on certain points, viz., about the name, family, etc., of a given man or woman and the like and hence on such matters there can be doubt in an Arahant.

According to the Theravādins an Arahant is said to have put away passion and cultivated the means for putting away the passions, etc., and realized the goal but the thesis in
question seeks to establish an opposite course of action. 81

On this observation of the Theravadins, the proponents make a distinction between two types of Arahants, viz.,
(1) Sadhamma-kusala Arahant, i.e., one who is ‘proficient in his own field’ and (2) Paradhamma-kusala Arahant, i.e., one who is ‘proficient in other things’. They point out that their assertion is made only with reference to the first type of Arahants. 82 According to Buddhaghoṣa, a Sadhamma-kusala Arahant is paññāvimutta, i.e., his knowledge is confined to his own personal attainments whereas a Paradhamma-kusala Arahant is ubhatobhāgavimutta, i.e., his knowledge is extended to others’ attainments also besides his own. 83 It is interesting to note that in the Milindapañha also it is said that there are Arahants who may not be aware of the name and gotra of any and every person, the various roads and so forth but there may be some conversant with vimuttis. 84 It has been suggested, however, that in the Pāli works the U bh atobhāgavimutta is not regarded as superior to the Paññāvimutta, and the only difference between the two is that the former has samathābhīnivesa 85 and realization of eight vimokkhas 86 while the latter has vippassanābhīnivesa 87 and realization of only four jhānas,
but so far as the question of rāga or āsavas is concerned, both the classes of Arahants must be regarded as completely free from them and hence the subtle distinction drawn by the proponents is of no avail. 88 The proponents, however, have a real point here because āsavakkhaya requires Paññā and mere practice of quiescence without insight into Āryadhama cannot produce it. Such practice may, however, well produce supernormal knowledge or iddhi.

Lastly, the Theravadins quote a passage which lays down that it is anomalous and unnatural that an Arahant should have impure discharge. 89

The proponents, however, stick to their view and contend that if it is possible for others to convey things like clothing, alms, bedding, etc., to the Arahants, then the conveyance of defilements is also possible. 90

The Theravadins enquire if the fruition of other stages of higher life can also be conveyed to an Arahant? If not, then the thesis cannot be maintained. 91 Thus, the Theravadins
emphatically deny that an Arahant who is free from attachment (vītarāga) can be subject to any temptation.

KNOWLEDGE OF ARAHANTS

The next two points that are in dispute about the Arahant relate to his knowledge. The two theses respectively are: (1) That an Arahant is liable to have ignorance, *i.e.*, *aṅñāṇa* and (2) that he is liable to get perplexed and hence can have doubt, *i.e.*, *kaṅkhā* or *vimati*. Buddhaqhosa attributes these theses to the Pubbaselīyas. Vasumitra, however, associates the theses with the Mahāsaṃghikas as such and so do Bhavya and Vinītadeva. It may be noted here that although the two theses are discussed in two different sections of the *Kathāvatthu*, the arguments and counter-arguments adduced in both are substantially the same. In fact, either hypothesis would follow from the other logically if one were to be accepted as such.

The Theravādins argue as to whether an Arahant has ignorance about everything for example such facts as ‘flood’, ‘bond’, *anusaya* (inclination), etc., just like an average person? If this ignorance be denied, then the possibility of none other can be maintained in the case of the Arahants. Further, an average person, owing to the lack of knowledge, kills living beings, commits theft, speaks lies and so on. The proponents, however, suggest that an Arahant would do the opposite of what an average person does from the lack of knowledge.

The proponents also deny that an Arahant lacks knowledge with regard to the Teacher, Doctrine, Order, etc. But an average man, who lacks knowledge, lacks in both respects, *i.e.*, about the Teacher, Doctrine, etc., as well as those common things of life about which an Arahant is said to be ignorant.

The Theravādins next recount various accomplishments of the Arahant such as his victory over the ‘passion, hate, ignorance, conceit, error, doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, indiscretion’, his cultivation of the ‘means of putting away passions and the development of the factors of enlightenment’ and so on and argue as to how such a being can lack in knowledge.
The Theravādins quote passages which preserve the description of the Arahant as one in whom the ‘intoxicants’ (āsayas) have been extinguished and who knows the nature of the rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra, their arising and perishing. He also knows ‘the nature of Ill, the cause of Ill, the cessation of Ill and the course leading to the cessation of Ill’. ‘He has renounced the faith in a living soul, rules and rites’. The Theravādins doubt thereby that an Arahant, who is characterized by all these accomplishments, may be said to lack knowledge.

The proponents, however, argue that an Arahant may be ignorant about the ‘name and lineage’ (nāmagotami) of a certain man or woman, about a ‘right or wrong road’ (maggāmaggā) and such other ordinary things.

At this, the Theravādins emphasize that an Arahant should be then said to lack knowledge about the fruition of earlier stages of the Path and if this has to be rejected then it cannot be said that he lacks knowledge. It may be suggested that this last argument of the Theravādins emerges from the idea that an Arahant, prior to his initiation, was an ordinary human being and hence in the know of the common things of life. And if it has to be taken for granted that he may have forgotten about those things after conversion and subsequent attainment of the Arahanthood, then it is equally likely that he may have forgotten about those path-stages which he trod early in his career and from where he proceeded further to be stalled at the pedestal of Arahanthood.

Almost the same arguments and counter-arguments as these are put forward by the two debating groups on the next issue, that is, the possibility of doubt existing in an Arahant. Some additional passages are, however, referred to by the Theravādins to dispute the thesis. In these passages it has been explained as to how ardent meditation leads to the removal of doubts.

It may be recalled that vicikicchā (doubt) is one of the seven anusayās. The Arahant is thus being attributed one of the anusayās. In this context the Andhaka view on the anusayās is worth noticing (XIV. 5). It makes a radical difference in kind between latent bias and its patent outbreak. It is apparent
from the preceding discussion that the Theravādins oppose the
two theses on the basis of their own notion about Arahant-
hood. According to them, no one can be said to be an
Arahant unless and until he gets rid of ignorance, i.e., avijjā
and vicikicchā, and develops perfect vision free from impurities
(virajjā, vitamalaṁ dhammadakkhuṁ) after having removed all
his doubts (kañkhā vapayanti sabhā).

The proponents, however, distinguish between a Sadhamma-
kusala Arahant and a Paradhamma-kusala Arahant. According
to them, although both types of Arahants do not have
avijjā in regard to the truths, the theory of causation, etc., or
vicikicchā about the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha or absence
of soul, yet the former may suffer from ignorance and doubt
about the name and family of an unknown man or woman or
of a tree, etc. It has been observed that the proponents do not
mean here sabbaññuvañña (omniscience) but just paradhamma-
añña, an intellectual power attained by Ubhatobhāgavimutta-
Arahants, owing to which they might know many things out-
side themselves. Thus, the proponents suggest that a
section of the Arahants, i.e., the Paññāvimuttas or Sadhamma-
kusala Arahant may have ignorance (añña) relating to things
or qualities other than those belonging to himself.

ARAHANTS EXCELLED BY OTHERS

The next thesis also belongs to the Pubbaseliyas who affirm
that an Arahant is excelled (parvitārāṇā) by others. However,
Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva as usual assign it to
the Mahāsaṃghikas in general. It may be recalled that this
also was one of the propositions of Mahādeva which had
stirred the Buddhist community then.

Once again, the same argumentation is put forth in this
discussion. The only new point that is raised by the Theravā-
dins is that if this proposition be accepted, one must also admit
that an Arahant is guided by others and acquires his attain-
ments through others. Its denial would be inconsistent with the
proposed thesis. They quote from the Canon to sub-
stantiate their argument.

As the argument goes in the text, the Theravādins take the
same stand on this thesis that an Arahant is viñāmoṇa and is possessed of dharmacakkhu and hence does not require any help or guidance (paraviṭṭhāna) from others. Contrary to this, the proponents hold that an Arahant develops faith in Triratna or acquires knowledge of the truths, etc., not by himself but through his preceptor. Thus, a Sādhamma-kusala Arahant does require paraviṭṭhāna while a paradhamma-kusala Arahant does not require it.

THE EMANCIPATION OF THE ARAHANTS

Another important issue of debate about the Arahant is concerned with the quality of his emancipation. The thesis in question is that ‘Arahantship is won without a certain “Fetter” —quantity being cast off.”¹¹⁴ In other words, it is affirmed that Arahants are not fully emancipated. It may be noted that this thesis is closely allied with the one which sought to establish the fallibility of the Arahants. With all the doubt and scepticism having emerged about the claims of the Arahant, it was only natural to lay down ultimately the thesis of their imperfect emancipation as compared to the Buddha. According to Buddhaghosa, some, e.g., the Mahāsarīghikas, hold that with reference to the Fetters of ignorance and doubt, even an Arahant does not know the whole range of Buddha-knowledge.¹¹⁵

The Theravādins argue that an Arahant is one who has acquired the clear vision about the origin and destruction of things, who has got rid of all doubts about the Buddha, Dhamma and Sarīgha, non-existence of soul, rule and ritual and has conquered lust, hate, etc. He has seen things for himself without the help of others and attained bodhi which, however, is catumaggānāna¹¹⁶ and not sabbaññuitaṇāna—the bodhi of the Buddhas.¹¹⁷

It is this last point which is actually the basis of the proponents’ thesis. They point out that since an Arahant does not know with the complete purview of a Buddha, their thesis stands.¹¹⁸

This thesis may also be compared with a more general one where the casting off of conceptions is described as a piecemeal
It is attributed to the Sammatiyas. The Theravādins criticize it on the score that it would make one a partial sotāpanna, etc. But it might well mean that sotāpati, etc., are stages in the gradual perfection on the Path. Similar is the import of another thesis attributed to the Andhakas, the Sabbatthivādins, the Sammatiyas, and the Bhadrayānikas. The thesis seeks to establish that in realizing the Four Paths, the corruptions were put away little by little as the Four Truths were realized. Apart from these significant controversies, there are some others of smaller range as follows:

A LAYMAN BECOMING AN ARAHANT

This is an Uttarāpathaka thesis that a layman may be an Arahant. The central argument of the Theravādins is that a layman, bound with layman’s fetters cannot be an Arahant. They refer to a dialogue between the Buddha and Vacchagotta where the Buddha is said to have laid down that a layman cannot be an Arahant, unless he has renounced the layman’s fetters. Moreover, how can an Arahant continue to be a house-dweller and enjoy the life therein?

The proponents, however, cite the examples of Yasa, Uttiya and Setu who became Arahant under all the circumstances of a laity. It may be observed that this controversy is merely a Buddhist echo of a larger issue which may be found in Brahmanical Thought. Kapila is stated to have insisted on sanyāsa before teaching Pāncaśikha. Bhagavadgītā seeks to elaborately establish the possibility of inner sanyāsa with the outward life of a layman. It may also be noted that Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna see no contradiction in the emancipation of the laity.

BIRTH AS AN ARAHANT

The Uttarāpathakas again upheld a thesis that one may become Arahant the moment he is reborn. They believed that, at the very outset of reborn consciousness, one might be an Arahant.
The Theravāda argument is that because reborn consciousness is wordly and one does not become with it even a stream-winner, etc., let alone an Arahant, it is not possible to sustain this view proposed by the Uttarāpathakas. Further, regarding the greatest of the Arahants, viz., Sāriputta, Moggalāna, Kassapa, Kaccāyana, etc., one may ask—were they born as Arahant?130

According to Buddhaghosa, the proponents uphold this thesis by carelessly interpreting passages in their own way.131 The Uttarāpathaka doctrine may be compared with the Yoga conception of Prakṛtilaya.132 So seems to be the import of the Vedāntic controversy between Sadyomukti and Kramamukti.133

ARAHANT AS ‘DEVOID OF CANKERS’ (ANĀSAVA)

The Uttarāpathakas also believed that all that belongs to the Arahant is devoid of toxicants.134

The Theravādins argue that all dharmas of the Arahants are not anāsava, i.e., free from ‘intoxicants’ or ‘cankers’, e.g., their physical body, robe, etc.135

The Uttarāpathakas, however, observe that since the Arahant himself is anāsava (free from āsavas, i.e., intoxicants), therefore, everything connected with him must be held anāsava.136

RETTAINING THE ‘ENDOWMENTS’

Another thesis of the Uttarāpathakas was that one who realizes a fruition retains the attributes thereof after realizing a higher fruition.137

According to the Theravādins, there is no such quality as the retention of ‘distinctive endowments’. Only personal ‘endowments’ are held, as distinct acquisitions, until they are cancelled by other acquisitions. Thus, in the Arahant stage, only Arahattaphala is acquired.138

Uttarāpathakas, however, argue that a past acquisition is a permanent acquisition139 in some Rūpa or Arūpa heaven and hence all the phalas are possessed by the Arahants.

Buddhaghosa points out that there are two kinds of spiritual acquisitions, viz., acquisition at the present moment and acquisition accruing at rebirth hereafter. But the Uttarāpa-
thakas believe in a third also, viz., holding of past acquisition as permanent acquisition.¹⁴₀

ARAHANT’S ‘INDIFFERENCE IN SENSE-COGNITION’

The Uttarāpathakas affirmed that an Arahant is endowed with a six-fold indifference with reference to each of the six gates of sense-knowledge.¹⁴¹

According to the Theravādins, an Arahant is chalupekkhā but he is not in a state of calling up indifference with respect to all six at the same time.¹⁴² Theravādins believed that sensations, however, shift in succession and are never simultaneous.¹⁴³

ATTAINING TO ARAHANTSHIP

The Andhakas proposed the thesis that the putting away of all the Fetters is Arahantship. They implied thereby that Arahantship means the simultaneous putting away of all the Fetters (saññojanas).¹⁴⁴

On the contrary, the Theravādins held that all saññojanas are gradually destroyed and not within the Arahattamagga alone.¹⁴⁵

‘ARAHANT HAVING ACCUMULATING MERIT’

According to the Andhakas there is accumulation of merit in the case of an Arahant.¹⁴⁶ They argue that an Arahant performs many good deeds, for instance, he is found making gifts, saluting shrines and so on and remains always self-possessed (sati saṃpajāno) even at the time of his parinibbāna and so he does collect merits and passes away with kusalacitta. The Theravādins, however, observe that the citta of the Arahant goes beyond pāpa and puñña, kusala and akusala, kriyā and vipāka. Hence to speak of them as acquiring merits or demerits is incorrect.¹⁴⁷

It seems that the Mahāsamghikas also agree with the Theravādins on this point and hold a position contrary to the Andhakas. It is interesting to note a tenet of the Mahāsamghika group of schools relating to the Arahant, recorded by Vasumitra,
viz., 'One who is kṣjakṛtyaḥ (katakaraṇiyo), i.e., accomplished in all that is to be done', does not take any dharma to himself, i.e., has no attachment for worldly things. According to N. Dutt, this statement of Vasumitra is echoed in two of the Kathāvatthu theses: (1) 'There is accumulation of merit in the case of an Arahant' and (2) 'The Arahant is ethically conscious when completing existence at final death.' It may be observed, however, that the statement of Vasumitra is the opposite of the first thesis cited by Dutt. It is relevant only with the second one.

The thesis of the Andhakas contradicts the general and logical belief about the transcendence of good and evil by the emancipated whether jīvanmukta in Brāhmanical thought or the Arahant in Jainism. If there is a kusalacitta even at the time of Parinibbāna, how would Parinibbāna be possible since a kusalacitta must produce a finite vipāka. Perhaps the Andhaka predilection for shrine worship may have conditioned this strange thesis.

'Arahant and Untimely Death'

The Rājagirikas and Sidharthikas upheld the thesis that there cannot be any untimely death for an Arahant. They quote the words of the Buddha who had laid down that 'there is no annulment of intentional deeds without their result having been experienced.' On the basis of this, they contend that, since an Arahant has to experience the result of his karma before he completes existence, he cannot have an untimely death. This thesis seems to emanate from their general doctrine that all is derived from action.

As against this, the Theravādins hold that an Arahant may have an untimely death as there are references to arahatghātakas, i.e., the murderers of Arahant. Further, the body of an Arahant is as much subject to poison, weapons or fire as any one else's.

The real issue is the effect of Arahatta on past karma, which is to be assessed in the light of the belief that the Arahant will not be reborn. Logically, therefore, he should not die with any kamma left unexhausted.
THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ARAHANT AT DEATH

The *Kathāvatthu* records two debates about the consciousness of an Arahant at the time of death.

The first thesis was upheld by some like the Andhakas, who believed that the Arahant is ethically conscious when completing existence at final death. It is their central argument that the Arahant is ever lucidly conscious, mindful and aware, even at the time of final death.\(^{158}\)

According to the Theravādins, the contention of the proponents 'merely points to the Arahant's lucidity and awareness while dying, to his ethically neutral and, therefore, inoperative presence of mind and reflection at the last moment of his cognitive process (*javana*). But it was not intended to show the arising of morally good thoughts.\(^{159}\)

Another thesis, viz., the Arahant 'completes existence (dies) in imperturbable absorption (*āneñja*)' was upheld by some of the Uttarāpathakas.\(^{160}\) They argued that since the Buddha is said to have passed away immediately after arising from the 'Fourth *Jhāna*', therefore, an Arahant, when passing away, is in a 'sustained 'Fourth *Jhāna'' (of the immaterial plane)'.

The Theravādins reject this as Arahants, according to them, do not die when in an imperturbable condition and devoid of *kriyācitta*. They pass out of meditation before death. In Buddhism, consciousness, under the specific aspect of causality, is regarded as either (1) karmic, *i.e.*, able to function causally as *karma*; (2) resultant (*vipāka*), or due to *karma*; (3) non-causal (*kiriyā*) called 'in-opertive'.\(^{161}\)

'BOGUS ARAHANTS'

Some of the Uttarāpathakas also affirmed that 'infra-human beings, taking the shape of Arahants, follow sexual desires'. They drew attention to the 'dress and deportment of evil-minded' monks to support their thesis.\(^{162}\)

The Theravādins, however, observe that since they are not known to indulge in other crimes, they cannot be said to do what the proponents contend.\(^{163}\)
MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

The ideal of early Buddhism may be justifiably dichotomized into Arahattva (Arahatta) and Nirvāṇa (Nibbāna). With the attainment of Arahantship, one reaches the climax of his career. The Buddha himself was described as an Arahant and so were his disciples known as Arahants. The first disciples of the Buddha converted at Sārnāth, became Arahants within a very short time. One might say that early Buddhism was a process and system of training in perfectibility of which the culmination was a spiritual status technically termed Arahantship, exemplified by the personality of the Buddha himself. The earliest usage does not distinguish Arahant from the Buddha just as the Jainas did not distinguish Arahant from Jina. This earliest usage is not distinctively Buddhistic either. Within Buddhism, however, a distinction between mere Arahant and Buddha emerged quite early. The doctrine that leads to Arahantship is designed as 'the doctrine of Arahant'. The Pāli Canon is full of the description of Arahant. To sum up, it may be said that an Arahant is one who is freed from passions and desires, has no further task to perform and has become immune from the cycle of rebirth occurring from the grouping of khandhas. Accordingly, there is utter extinction of sorrow and suffering for him.

The concept of Arahantship was, however, gradually diluted and delimited. During the centuries immediately succeeding the Mahāparinirvāṇa of the Buddha, the Arahant ideal of the original teaching tended to give rise, within a monastic system, to a kind of soteriological individualism. At the hands of some orthodox sects, particularly the Theravādins, the Arahant ideal received an individualistic twist, rather, it became completely identified with an extreme sort of spiritual individualism. The Theravādins strenuously emphasized the Arahant ideal as the only goal of salvation and freedom from suffering. It seems that the Theraādins tried to faithfully adhere to the moral, monastic and disciplinary life of early Buddhism. We do not, however, mean to suggest that the Theravāda standpoint thoroughly represents the spirit of original Buddhism or that the
entire Buddhism is comprised in the Pāli Canon as was the accepted belief of the older generation of Buddhist scholars. The purely individualistic attempts of the Theravāda to pursue the three-fold development of Sila, Samādhi and Pañña with the consequent attainment of Arahantship could well be deemed inadequate from the point of view of the average mass of mankind. On the other hand, for the spiritually more ambitious, the ideal of Arahantship would appear pale beside the glory of Buddha and may well lead them, through this comparison, to look at Arahantship with critical eyes. This tendency of the Theravāda, therefore, provoked protests from others in the Buddhist community. The panorama of sectarian antagonism reached its final culmination with the emergence of Mahāyāna which styled itself as the very anti-thesis of Hinayāna, i.e., the old Buddhism, so to say. It may be observed that the Theravāda tendency contributed by way of a reaction in a significant measure towards the growth of heretical and unwholesome notions about Arahant and Arahantship. Should we believe the traditions of Vasumitra, Bhavya, Vinitadeva and Tārānātha, it has to be affirmed that the very same tendency of Theravāda of an individualistic and narrow Arahant idealism provoked a revolt from a fairly large section of the monks and laymen who finally departed from the former and emerged as a new sect in the name of the Mahāsaṃghikas.

That they were basically opposed to the Arahants and their authoritarian cult is obvious from the fact that their first thesis was formulated to inflict a direct blow to the Arahant ideal as cherished by the orthodox Theravādins. They seem to have carried on a ceaseless propaganda against the halo that had been attached to the figure of the Arahant. The process of anti-Arahant movement gave rise to several theses which sought to draw attention to their failings and imperfections.

It was hardly possible, however, for the Theravādins to overlook the attack that was being made upon their ideal of Arahantship. It is against this background that they categorically reject the thesis about the possibility of the falling away of an emancipated one, even such, who attained this only occasionally in meditation. Still less can he fall away from Arahantship because, as suggested by some, he might have calumniated a
saint in some previous birth. They also deny that the gods of
the Māra group can impose physical impurities upon the Ara-
hant. He has acquired complete knowledge and hence cannot
have any doubt or be surpassed by others in knowledge.
He has cast aside every fetter of ignorance and doubt in attain-
ing his end. Nevertheless, he is human and hence the thesis
that he is entirely free in every regard from any association
with the four "intoxicants" cannot be sustained for the simple
reason that his body and sense organs cannot be considered
absolutely uncontaminated by these intoxicants. The only
things which are really free from any connection with the
intoxicants are the Paths, their Fruits, Nirvāṇa and the factors
leading to Insight. Similarly, though an Arahant is indifferent
to sense impressions, his indifference is manifested under human
conditions; he cannot attend to more than one sense impres-
sion or idea at the same time, for his consciousness is essen-
tially momentary. Moreover, the progress to Arahanthood
must be carried out in strict accordance with the stages laid
down. It is, therefore, wrong to assume that the attainment
of Arahanthood means the simultaneous destruction of all fetters.
In the first three stages, five of the fetters are cast away; in
the last, the aspirant rids himself of the desire for rebirth either
in the Rūpa-loka or Arūpa-loka, conceit, distraction and igno-
rance. It is also wrong to associate an Arahant's insight to a
learner. Similarly, no one can attain to Arahanthood unless he
has laid aside the life of a layman. It is also impossible for
any embryo to become an Arahant at the moment of rebirth.
Nor by offering gifts, paying homage to the shrines and so
on does an Arahant become subject to a process of accumu-
lating merit. If he could win merit, he could also win demerit,
which is absurd. Nor is it true to say that he cannot have
an untimely death for he has to experience the results of all
his former actions as was opined by some, since the liability to
accidents cannot be wholly ruled out. It is also denied that he
possesses consciousness subject to moral distinctions at the
time of his death. Nor is it right to say that an Arahant attains
the completion of existence while in the imperturbable
absorption of meditation.\(^2\)

Some of these suggest observed failings, e.g., (1) the ideal of
The individualistic Arahant may not be so attractive as that of the compassionate Buddha. This comparison would highlight the limitations of the former. (2) There is some reason to postulate a psychological hostility arising from institutional and historical reasons. (3) Some of the theses suggest actually observed failings and limitations. (4) There is also room for divergent interpretation in theCanonical statements on the Arahants.

Apart from this, however, there was something inherent in the early literature itself which, widely open to interpretation as it was, seems to have given way to scepticism and doubt about the exuberant claims of an Arahant. There was already some lacuna in the oldest tradition itself which underlies the growth of alien views and subsequent controversies on Arahantship. This necessitates an enquiry into the relationship between the conceptions of Buddhahood and Arahanthood.

There are some enigmatic passages in the Canonical literature, the testimony of which makes it difficult to draw any distinction between the conceptions of Buddha and Arahant.173 “Every “Buddha” (awakened one) was an Arahant. Every Arahant was “Buddha” (awakened).174 The Buddha himself is habitually called an Arahant.” At one place it is said: “Let us ask Gotama, the awakened one who has passed beyond anger and fear...”,175 but the very same adjectives as we find here are used elsewhere for an Arahant.176 Similarly, in a long description of Gotama,177 all the epithets used are generally found applied to one or other of his disciples. The teacher never called himself a Buddha as distinct from Arahant. When addressed as Buddha or spoken of as such by his disciples, it is always doubtful whether anything more is meant than an enlightened Arahant. In the oldest documents, thus, the two conceptions seem to be still in a state of fusion.

However, in the light of the Canonical literature itself, it is extremely doubtful to maintain that the ideal of Arahant was synonymous with Buddhahood and that no distinction was made between the two. This view inevitably implies the equality between the teacher and his disciples which we think would have been difficult to sustain for a community like the Buddhists with such an exalted figure as Buddha before them.
We come across such references in the *Nikāyas* where the difference between the conception of Arahant and Buddha may be brought out clearly. Attention may be drawn to a dialogue between Sāriputta and Buddha. Sāriputta here confesses that he has no knowledge about the able and 'awakened ones' that have been and are to come, as also, of the present times. Sāriputta was perhaps one of the greatest elders of the Buddhist community and yet his figure, as compared to the Buddha, is completely dwarfed by his statement and confession. It was logical to assume that a Buddha would possess a number of additional perfections as compared with an Arahant. There is an illuminating incident referred to in the *Sphutārthā* on the *Abhidharmakośa* where it is shown that the Buddha surpasses all his disciples by his omniscience which enables him to become the universal teacher or saviour. Further, the theory of a number of successive Buddhas presupposes the conception of a Buddha as a different and more exalted personage than Arahant. In a famous dialogue, Lord Buddha is reported to have said that he is neither a man nor a *yakkha* but a Buddha. It is interesting to observe that the Theravādins, though they desperately try to defend the cherished image of the Arahant, have to grant at last that the *bodhi* attained by an Arahant is *catumāggaññāṇa* and not *sabbaññutaññāṇa*, the *bodhi* of the Buddhas. It is plausible, therefore, that this basic disparity in the two conceptions inherent in the *Nikāyas* was brought to the fore in the course of time, and led to two parallel developments in a new direction in the history of Buddhism. One led to the gradual decline in the Arahant ideal and the other towards the eventual deification of the Buddha.
REFERENCES

11. Ibid., p. 84.
13. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 76.
14. Masuda, op. cit., pp. 24, 36, 38, 52
22. *Aṭṭhi arahato kānkāhā ti?* Ibid., II. 3.
24. See *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 54-5.
28. Ibid., XXI. 3.
33. Ibid., p. 42.
34. See Ibid., p. 27; *Abhidharmakośa*, VI, p. 255n.
40. Ibid., p. 36.
41. Ibid., p. 36.
42. Ibid., p. 36.
43. Cf. Ibid., pp. 36-7.
44. *Kathāvatthu*, pp. 72ff.
49. Ibid., pp. 78-86.
50. Ibid., pp. 86-8.
51. Ibid., pp. 88-90; see also *Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā*, p. 38.
55. *Kathāvatthu*, p. 92.
59. *Pattoparihāni*.
60. *Lokiyā-samāpatti*.
61. *Arahātādiśāmaññaphala*.
63. *Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā*, p. 35.
66. Abhidhamakośa, VI. 58.
67. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 35.
69. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 349-50.
70. Atthi Arahato asucisukkhavisaṭṭhīti? Kathāvatthu, II. 1.
71. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 54.
75. Ibid., pp. 154-5; Cf. Ibid., XIV. 6.
76. Kathāvatthu, p. 155.
77. See Points of Controversy, p. 112; see also Kathāvatthu, p. 155.
79. Puthujjana, see Kathāvatthu, p. 156.
82. Ibid., pp. 159-61.
83. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 54-5.
84. Cf. Milindepañha, pp. 260-1, 331f.
85. Samathā means calmness or quietude of heart, i.e., cessation of the Samkhāras. Cf. rāgāvirāga ceto vimutti, see Anguttara Nikāya, I. 58.
86. Vimokkha means the eight stages of emancipation.
87. Vipassanā means inward vision, insight, intuition or introspection, avijjāvirāgāpāññāvīmuttī, see Anguttara Nikāya, I. 58.
88. N. Dutt, EMB. II, p. 86.
89. Cullavagga, pp. 310-11.
91. Ibid., p. 161.
98. Ibid., pp. 163-4.
100. See Sānīyutta, Nikāya, II, p. 27.
102. See Points of Controversy, p. 117n.
104. Ibid., p. 168.
106. See Cullavagga, p. 21; Udāna, p. 133; Dīgha Nikāya, II, p. 205; see also Points of Controversy, pp. 118-9n.
107. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 165-6, 170-1; Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 54-5.
108. N. Dutt, EMB, II, p. 87.
109. Mrs. Rhys Davids and S.Z. Aung render the term paravitūraññā as excelled by others, see Points of Controversy, p. 119. Masuda, op. cit., p. 24ff, however, explains it as gaining spiritual perception by the help of others, i.e., enlightenment through others.
116. Sotippati, sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi, and Arahatta.
117. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 520-1; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 76-7.
120. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 42.
122. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 58.
123. Gihissa Arahā ti? Kathāvatthu, IV. 1; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 73.
125. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 240-1.
126. Ibid., p. 241.
129. Saha uppattiya Arahā ti? Kathāvatthu, IV. 2; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 73.
130. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 241-2.
131. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 73.
134. Arahāto sabbe dharmān anāsavā ti? Kathāvatthu, IV. 3; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 74.
118 Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

136. Ibid., p. 246.
137. Arahā caituhi phalehi samamāgato ti? Kathāvatthu, IV. 4; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 74-75.
140. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 75.
141. Kathāvatthu, IV. 5. See also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 75-6.
143. See Points of Controversy, p. 163n.
144. Sabbasānāṇānaṁ pahānaṁ arahattaṁ ti? Kathāvatthu, IV. 10; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 79.
146. Atthi Arahato Punī́napacayo ti? Kathāvatthu, XVII. 1; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 163.
147. Kathāvatthu, pp. 469-70.
149. See N. Dutt, EMB, II. pp. 87-8.
150. Kathāvatthu, XVII. 1.
151. See Ibid., XXII. 2.
152. See Ibid., p. 470; Masuda, op. cit., p. 38.
153. Natthi Arahato akālamaccāti? Kathāvatthu, XVII. 2; See also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 163f.
156. See A.B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, p. 213.
158. Arahā kusalacitto parinibbāyatīti? Kathāvatthu. XXII. 2; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 193.
159. See Points of Controversy, p. 358.
160. Arahā āneñje thito parinibbāyatīti? Kathāvatthu, XXII. 3; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 193.
162. Arahantānānaṁ vacṣena amanussā methunāṁ dhammaṁ paṭisevānti? Kathāvatthu, XXIII.2; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 197; Points of Controversy, p. 366.
163. See Kathāvatthu, p. 535.
164. See Cullavagga, p. 18.
166. Sutta Nipāta, p. 296.
167. Cf. Dīgha Nikāya, I, pp. 149, 168; III, pp. 65-76; Majjhima Nikāya, I, pp. 7, 94, 184, III, pp. 20, 41, 52; Sānъutta Nikāya, I, p. 70, 141; II,
pp. 44, 70, 81-2, 103, 204; III, pp. 20, 41, 52; IV, pp. 142-3, 258; Aṅguttara, Nikāya, I, pp. 133, 152; II, p. 225; Dhammapada, pp. 25-6; Itivuttaka, p. 208; Suta Nipāta, pp. 283, 351, 367.

168. Cf. "Khīnasavo katakaraniyo nāparaṁ itthatāyā; Khīnajāti vusitaṁ brahmacarīyaṁ karaṁ karaniyaṁ nāparaṁ ihatāyātī, see supra.


171. See supra, chapter II.

172. For the discussions and debates involved on these points see supra.


175. Sutta Nipāta, p. 309.


178. See Dīgha Nikāya, II, pp. 65ff.

179. See Dīgha Nikāya, II, pp. 8ff.

180. Sphutīrīhiḥ, p. 5.


183. See Kathāvatthu-Attha Kathā, p. 76.
The Apotheosis of the Buddha

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

An important and connected set of controversies in the Kathāvatthu centres round the figure of Buddha himself and the concept of Buddhahood. In the wake of sectarian developments, great importance came to be attached to the issue about the real nature of the Buddha. Some of the keenly contested problems that emerged may be summarised as follows:

(1) Whether the Buddha is transcendental?¹
(2) Whether the Buddha personally visited this earth and preached the Dhamma?²
(3) Whether every word of the Buddha could free the hearer from Sāṁsāra?³

It seems that with the gradual eclipse of the ideal of Arahanthood there emerged pari passu a strong tendency to elevate the concepts of the Buddha and Bodhisattva.⁴ There appears to have been, as suggested earlier, a definite inter-relationship between the two tendencies. Generally, the same group of sects, which carried on the anti-Arahant campaign, led a parallel movement seeking to establish the transcendentality and virtual divinity of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva.⁵

Quite ostensibly, for those, who were not enamoured of the personality of the Arahant but upheld theses postulating his
imperfections instead, it would be only natural to seek to concentrate their faith and reverence somewhere else. It hardly needs to be explained in too many words that for such persons there could not be a more befitting figure than the Buddha himself.

The earliest conception of the Buddha seems to have been different from that which emerged later owing to sectarian and scholastic encrustations. The original Buddha-nature, as it appeared to his immediate disciples, may aptly be described as essentially human. It is fairly sound to assume that, in the beginning, his disciples paid less attention to his life than to his teaching. This emerges most clearly from the fact that they preserved his teachings more carefully than his biography. Buddha himself disparaged attention to his "corruptible body" (pūtkāya), holding his true body to be the Dhamma. This may be because they were inclined to regard him essentially as a human being who, having undergone the normal experiences of life through his own efforts and exertions, became enlightened and finally at his death entered a mysterious state beyond common comprehension. They revered him as a Great Ascetic, a Great Sage; nevertheless, he was supposed to have been born and to have died just as everyone else does on this earth. The physical body is born of karman (karmajanya) and it is impregnated with karman (karmamaya). This is the belief about human body upheld in the Upaniṣads, among the Buddhists as well as among many of the Buddha's contemporary parivrājakas. Thus, granting the theory of rebirth or reincarnation, it was assumed that Gautama did not come into the world for the first time in the sixth century B.C. He, like others, had undergone many births, had experienced the world as an animal and as a man. The spiritual perfection attained in Buddhahood could not have been the result of just one life. It matured slowly during all these previous births before it was perfected as Sākya Gautama.

The Buddha is described as 'the Lord, the Arahant, the fully enlightened, endowed with knowledge and conduct, the Sugata (he who has well gone), knower of the world, the supreme charioteer of men to be tamed, the Buddha, the Lord'.
expression of the belief in an historical person. The Majjhima preserves the details about the knowledge and powers attained by Buddha at the time of his enlightenment. They are briefly the four trances (jhanas) and three knowledges (vijjas). Buddha held that a correct description of him would ascribe to him the three knowledges. He explicitly disclaimed omniscience in the sense in which it was claimed by the Jainas for their Master that he was omniscient, all-seeing and possessed of complete knowledge and insight, and that whether he was walking, standing, asleep or awake, knowledge and insight were continually present. Later, it came to be assumed, however, that the Buddha can so extend the ‘net of his knowledge’ that anything may come within the range of his knowledge. In short, whatever the merits and powers of the Buddha, his earthly life was believed to have been as real as that of any other human being. This was the strictly orthodox point of view upheld by the Theravadins.

However, in the Three Jewels that constitute the focus of Buddhism, Buddha undoubtedly was the most luminous and central for his followers. And not long after the physical disappearance of the Buddha from the scene, this became the foremost consideration for a large section of the Buddhist community, particularly those who had been led to nurture a resentment against the aloof and authoritarian Arahants. The ‘easterners’ (pacimaka) thus claimed in their opposition to the theras that the Buddha was born in their territory in the east. As against the early tendency of little attention to Buddha’s biography, it was taken up with great interest. There emerged in the religion a strong tendency of docetism towards the personality of the Buddha. A process was set moving under which the ‘life of the Master formed the edifice and the rival sects provided the material for superstructure’. Consequently, while the orthodox Theravadins adhered strictly to the realistic view of the person of their Teacher, the heterodox radicals proceeded boldly to idealize him. They were motivated by a natural instinct to glorify the personality of the Buddha and superimpose on it a variety of mythical fancies. Superhuman qualities and attributes were discovered in his person.
Thus, in the course of these developments, it came to be assumed that a single utterance of the Tathāgata implied the revelation of all truths at once.  

The physical body (rūpakāya) of a Tathāgata has no limit in space, his virtues and powers are infinite, and his life has immeasurable duration.  

As envisaged fundamentally in Buddhism, all life in this world is characterized by evil and suffering. Obviously, therefore, the Buddha never lived as a human being. He appeared to do so out of compassion for the ignorant. He, being perfect in every respect, could not have been subject to the limitations of ordinary life on earth. He neither has sleep nor dream. He is at all times in a complete union with all truths, in a deep contemplation, i.e., Yoga. He is omniscient, comprehending all things at once, in the thought of one single moment, because in his mind is always present the mystic store of prajñā i.e., wisdom. In his thought are constantly, at the same time, the wisdom of extinction (Ksayaprajñā) and the wisdom of non-origination (anutpāda-prajñā). The above reflects a process seeking to idealize and identify the Buddha’s person with a universal Buddhahood. With the growth of such notions, it was natural to derive the illusoriness of the physical life of a Buddha.

Both the Pāli and Sanskrit traditions agree substantially as regards the identification of the section that pleaded new theses about the supramundane (lokottara) nature of the Buddha. In the Kathāvatthu-Atīthakathā these theses are attributed to the Mahāsāṃghika group of schools, viz., the Mahāsāṃghikas, Andhakas, Vetulyakas and Uttarāpathakas. The treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva go to substantiate this tradition. According to Vasumitra, the results of the idealization of Buddha manifested themselves clearly in the schism of the schools, orthodox and heterodox.

The strictly orthodox Theravādins, on the other hand, continued to adhere to the practical moral teachings of the Master and to limit themselves to a pious obedience to the rules and traditions of the community. They believed the earthly life of the Buddha to have been real beyond any doubt or suspicion. Thus the two opposite camps were drawn into a series of interesting controversies preserved in minute details in the Kathāvatthu.
THESES AND ARGUMENTS

‘ORDINARY SPEECH’ (VOHĀRA) OF THE BUDDHA

In the Kathāvatthu, the first issue of debate about the Buddha rests over the thesis that the Exalted Buddha’s ordinary speech (vohāra) was supra-mundane. According to Buddhaghosa, Andhakas held the present thesis. Mrs. Rhys Davids and S. Z. Aung have preferred to render the term ‘vohāro’ into speech obviously for the reason that its reference is confined throughout the debate to speech, otherwise, the term stands for common worldly matters in general. It may be observed that the term Vohāro also means behaviour or action and it is perhaps in this sense that it has been used here to signify the pattern of behaviour of the Buddha, which a certain section takes to be supramundane. For illustration, however, the debaters take only one aspect of Buddha’s behaviour, i.e., speech, which is representative in the entire discussion that follows. The debaters use Vohāra as if it stood for Sanskrit Vyāhāra.

The Theravādins argue that the Andhaka assertion should also imply that Buddha’s speech was meant only for the spiritual and not for the mundane ear, and that the spiritual not the mundane intelligence, i.e., the average person (putthujjana) responded to it. The proponents would not admit this for they know that his speech worked on the mundane hearing and was responded to by the common man also. According to Buddhaghosa, the sense of the Theravāda query is that when Buddha’s speech worked on mundane objects, it cannot be supramundane.

Similarly, the Theravādins enquire whether the terms, e.g., Path (magga), Fruit (Phala), Nibbāna, etc., have been used by the Buddha in the supramundane sense? Further, were there people who were ravished (rajjeyyuā) by his speech? It is pointed out that there were such people. In that case, a supramundane object would be an occasion for sensuous desire (rāga), etc., whereas the case ought to be opposite. Similarly, there were some who were offended (dusseyyuā) by his habitual speech and some who were baffled (muyheyyuā) by it,
should not be expected from a speech that was supramundane. Next, they ask a crucial question: Did all the listeners of the Buddha ‘develop the Paths’? The Theravādins point out that his speeches were heard by the foolish, average people (bāla-puthujjana), matricides (mātughātaka), parricides (piitughātaka), slayers of Arahants (Arahanighātaka), etc., and the proponents’ assertion would mean thereby that all these people developed the Paths.50

Now, the proponents take up the issue and make a significant point. They observe that just as one can ‘with one golden wand point out both a heap of paddy and a heap of gold’, similarly the Buddha ‘with his supramundane habitual speech spoke about both mundane and supramundane doctrine’.51 According to the Theravādins, however, such a view implies that the speech of the Buddha worked upon mundane ears when he spoke of worldly things and on supramundane ears when he spoke of supramundane things; also that his hearers understood with their mundane intelligence in the former case and with their supramundane intelligence in the latter case.52 The Theravādins, thus, refuse to accept the thesis that ‘if you speak of Path, your word becomes Path and so on’. It is interesting to note that in the Mahāvastu also it is affirmed that Buddha’s acquisitions are all supramundane (lokottara) and cannot be compared to anything worldly.53 His spiritual practices are supramundane. His bodily movements, e.g., walking, standing, sitting and lying are supramundane. His eating, his putting on robes and other acts are also supramundane.54

Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinitadeva also make a mention of similar tenets in their respective works. According to Vasumitra, the Mahāsāṃghikas upheld the view that the sūtras or discourses preached by the Buddha are perfect in themselves (nītārtha). Buddhās speak only of dharma (doctrines), as such their teaching is concerned only with paramārthasatyam and not with samvrtisatyam.55 Also they affirmed that ‘the Buddha can expound all the doctrines with a single utterance. There is nothing which is not in conformity with the truth in what has been preached by the world-honoured one’.56 It may be pointed out, however, that so far as the first proposition of the
Mahāsaṃghikas is concerned, *viz.*, ‘all the speeches of the Tathāgata are concerned with the preaching of the righteous law’ it was a well-known phrase generally applied for the first sermon of the Buddha delivered at Banaras. But the Mahāsaṃghikas adopted this for all the utterances of the Buddha.\(^{57}\) Bhavya and Vinītadeva also notice the *lokottara* theses about the Buddha affirmed by the Mahāsaṃghikas.\(^ {58}\)

Vasumitra’s treatise also preserves the information that the Sarvāstivādins repudiated the Mahāsaṃghika contention. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the sūtras (or discourses) delivered by the Buddha are not all perfect in themselves. (*nītārtha*). The Buddha himself said that there were certain imperfect sūtras (*anītārtha-sūtra*).\(^ {59}\) Also the Bauhūsativādins, another offshoot of the Mahāsaṃghika group, upheld a modified thesis in this respect. They believed that teachings of the Buddha on five themes *viz.*, (1) transitoriness (*aniyata*) (2) suffering (*dukkha*), (3) void (*śūnya*), (4) non-ego (*anātman*) and (5) Nirvāṇa are supramundane teachings (*lokottara-śāsana*), because, they lead a man to the attainment of the path of emancipation. The teachings of the Tathāgata on the themes other than the above (literally the remaining sounds of the Tathāgata) are mundane (*laukika-śāsana*).\(^ {60}\)

It is thus affirmed by the Andhakas in the present thesis that the Buddhas are superhuman (*lokottara*) in all their actions, even during the earthly lives. Undoubted as it is that the Buddha had attained perfection in every respect, it would follow, as a natural corollary, that he could not have been subject to the limitation of ordinary life on earth. All life on earth is characterized by evil and suffering. Obviously, therefore, Buddha never lived as a human being. Curiously enough, even the early traditions sometime contain such ideas as this—‘from the moment of his enlightenment to the day of his passing away the Buddha said nothing false’\(^ {61}\) Similarly, the phrase, ‘all the speeches of the Tathāgata are concerned with the preaching of the righteous law’, was commonly applied for the first sermon of Buddha delivered at Banaras,\(^ {62}\) but it could be understood more generally. It is not unlikely that the Andhakas had these suggestions in their mind when they formulated their views.
We know that the Pubbaseliyas held the thesis that speech and action do not necessarily conform to thought, which would be a triviality normally but becomes significant if it were used to cast doubt of the common-sense inference of human thoughts, motives and desires in the Buddha from his overt speech and action.

The Andhakas were led to assert that there are states of the mind which may appear like the passions without really being so. Thus mettā, karuṇā and muditā are not rāga, though they are rāgapāṭirūpaka. Similarly, the Buddha’s use of apparently opprobrious terms must be held to indicate not kilesa but kilesapāṭirūpaka.64

We have an interesting Mahāsamghika thesis which holds the decay and death of supramundane things to be supramundane.65 The Mahāsamghikas argued that, since the decay and death of supramundane things cannot be called mundane it must be called supramundane. The thesis would have significance in relation to the attainments and characteristics of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva as conceived by some of the Mahāsamghikas.

POWERS OF THE BUDDHA

The next two controversies on Buddha relate to his Powers. The first deals with yet another Andhaka proposition, viz., the powers of Buddha are common to disciples.66 According to Buddhaghosa,67 this is an opinion among the Andhakas derived from a thoughtless consideration of the ten suttas in the Anuruddha-Saṁyutta, wherein the Buddha claims to know the causal occasion as such and distinguish it from that which is not the causal occasion.68 Buddhaghosa offers the explanation that as regards the ‘ten powers’ of a Tathāgata, some are sharable by his disciples, some not, and some are partly sharable by both. All can share insight into the extinction of ‘āsava’; Buddha alone discerns the degrees of development in the controlling powers (indriyāṇī). But the Andhakas, however, hold that the whole range of his powers was sharable by his leading disciples.69

The Theravadins point out that the thesis in question should
imply either that the power of the Tathāgatha is the same as the power of the disciple or else there is difference in the types of power. Similarly, the disciples’ previous application (pubbayoga), previous line of conduct (pubbacariyā), instruction in the Doctrine (dhammakāhāranā), teaching of the Doctrine (Dhamma-desanā),70 ought to be of the same type as those of the Tathāgata. All these implications are rejected by the proponents. Similarly, they would not grant that all the adjectives applicable to Buddha are equally applicable to the disciples or that the disciples, like the Buddha, can produce and propound a Path.71

The proponents recount those spheres where the powers of the two seem to be equal. In all, ten such examples are illustrated by them.72 The Theravādins, on the other hand, bring about such facets of the Buddha’s power which cannot be shared by the disciples.73

In the next debate, it is disputed that ‘the power of a Tathāgata, e.g., in discerning as it really is the causal occasion of anything, and its contradictory, is Ariyan’.74 It is gathered from the Commentary that the Andhakas held that ‘of the ten points of discernment or insight, not only the last (insight into extinction of intoxicants), but also the preceding nine were Ariyan’.75 The Theravādins observe that the Andhakas must also affirm the same about Path (magga), Fruit (phala), Nibbāna, etc., if they have to maintain their hypothesis. The proponents deny these implications.76

In disputing the first issue, the Theravādins take a stand which is more in consonance with the Mahāsamghikas and the Lokottaravāda point of view than their own orthodox tradition.77 They would insist and impress upon the Andhakas that there is need to draw a distinction between the powers of a Buddha and his disciples. It is somewhat difficult to explain as to how the Andhakas came to uphold this thesis in the light of the fact that they believed in the supramundane nature of the Buddha. Curiously enough, they affirm in the immediately following thesis that all the ten powers of the Buddha are Ariyan. The Mahāvastu also mentions the five eyes (cakkus) of the Tathāgata as uncommon and excelling those of the Pratyekabuddhas, Arahants and others.78 Similarly, Vasumitra attributes to the Mahāsamghikas the view that the divine powers of the
Tathāgata are limitless.⁷⁹

THE BUDDHA AND HIS ENLIGHTENMENT (BODHI)

The next controversy rests over the assertion that ‘through enlightenment one becomes “the Enlightened”’.⁸⁰ According to Buddhaghosa, the thesis is held by some, like the Uttarāpathakas, at present.⁸¹

The Theravādins observe that if it is by virtue of enlightenment that one becomes ‘The Enlightened’, then it follows that, by virtue of the cessation (niruddhi), suspension (vigati), subsidence of enlightenment (paṭisaddhā), he ceases to be Buddha. The proponents deny this but their thesis implies it. The Theravādins enquire further—‘or is one the Enlightened only by virtue of past enlightenment?’ The proponents again deny this, but then the previous objection of the Theravādins holds good. And if they assent, it would mean that one who is Enlightened exercises bodhi only by the past enlightenment (bodhi). The proponents’ admittance of this would imply that he understands ill, puts away its cause and so on, by that past enlightenment. In the opinion of the Theravādins, such a proposition would be absurd.⁸² Substituting future for the past and then present for future enlightenment, the debating groups enter into a similar argumentation.⁸³

Thus, according to the Theravādins, the present thesis ought to imply that one is said to be Enlightened through past, present and future enlightenment.⁸⁴ It would mean that there are three enlightenments. If the proponents deny this, their thesis cannot stand and if they assent, they imply that if such a person is being continually gifted with three enlightenments, they are all simultaneously present in him.⁸⁵

The Uttarāpathakas finally lay down that one who is said to be Enlightened (Buddha) is so called as he has acquired enlightenment (bodhi) and hence their thesis as presented.⁸⁶

According to Buddhaghosa, Bodhi stands for two things:
(1) ‘insight into the Four Paths’, i.e., catumagañāna, (2) ‘insight into all things’, i.e., sabbaññuvañāna or the omniscience of a Buddha. But some like the Uttarāpathakas fail to differentiate between the two and hold that ‘just as a thing is called
white by white-coloured surface so a person is called "Buddha" because of this or that aspect of bodhi. The Theravādins, however, distinguish between the two. There is still a sect in Burma who identify the Buddha with bodhi itself, ignoring his distinctive personality. This, in effect, appears to be the intention of the thesis under question. The orthodox point of view, on the other hand, takes the common-sense view of Buddha as a person who experiences Enlightenment.

GIFTS TO THE BUDDHA AND THEIR REWARD

The next point under dispute is that 'it should not be said that anything given to Buddha brings great reward'. According to Buddhaghosa, the Vettiyakas or the Mahāsuññatavādins disputed the idea that 'anything given to Buddha brought great reward'. They maintained this view because the Buddha, according to them, did not really enjoy anything, but only seemed to be doing so out of conformity to life in this world, therefore, nothing given to him was really helpful to him.

According to the Theravādins, the Buddha was a matchless and unique person, unequalled and unrivalled on the earth. How can anyone then maintain that a gift given to him did not bring great reward? There were perhaps none equal to him in virtue (sīla), will (samādhi) or intellect (pañña). The Theravādins quote a certain passage attributed to the Buddha in which it is said that no one in this world or, for that matter in any other world, is better suited for gifts than the Buddha himself. The passage has not, however, been traced so far. Thus, the Theravādins seek to emphasize that the gifts given to Buddha do bring reward. It may be noted here that the Vettiyakas made a similar assertion with regard to the 'Order'. In this thesis, they affirmed that it should not be said that anything given to the Order brings great reward.

BUDDHA'S APPEARANCE IN THE HUMAN WORLD

The next point disputed by the Theravādins in the Kathāvatthu is one of the most significant issues of debate over the Buddha. It was affirmed by a certain section of the Buddhists that it is
not right to say that the Buddha lived in this world.\textsuperscript{96} Buddhaghosa informs us that some, like the Vettleiyakas, owing to a careless interpretation of the Sutta passage, ‘born in the world, grew up in the world, dwelt having overcome the world, undefiled by the world’,\textsuperscript{97} hold that the Buddha took birth and lived in the Tusita heaven; and visited this world only in a specifically created shape. He observes, however, that their citation of the Sutta proves nothing, since, the Master was undefiled, not by being born out of the world, but for being untouched by the things of the world.\textsuperscript{98}

As goes the discussion, the Theravādins argue, as to whether there are not such shrines, parks, villages, towns, etc., which the Buddha has mentioned? Was he not born at Lumbini and enlightened under the Bodhi tree? Was not the wheel of Norm set rolling by him at Banaras?, and so on.\textsuperscript{99} The Theravādins cite such references where the Buddha had mentioned places he was living at the time of particular happenings.\textsuperscript{100} On the basis of this, the Theravādins maintain that the Buddha surely lived among men. At this, the proponents refer to the same phrase as noted by Buddhaghosa and observe that it is incorrect to say that the Buddha lived in the human world.\textsuperscript{101}

**BUDDHA AS ALL-PERVADING**

The next thesis, appears to be closely allied to the preceding one. It was affirmed by a certain section that the Buddhas persist in all directions.\textsuperscript{102} Buddhaghosa has vaguely attributed the thesis to some, like the Mahāsaṃghikas, who believed that a Buddha exists in the four quarters of the firmament, below, above and around, causing his change of habit to come to pass in any sphere of being.\textsuperscript{103}

The Theravādins argue whether the Buddha persists (tiṭṭhatīti) in the eastern quarter? If the proponents deny this, it would be a contradiction of the proposed thesis. In case they assent, the question would be as to how this eastern Buddha is named? What is his family, clan and so on?\textsuperscript{104}

This thesis also finds a mention in the Abhidharmakośa and its Vyākhyā. It has been said there that the Mahāsaṃghikas believed that Buddhas appear at the same time in more than
one world, and that they are omniscient in the sense that they know all dharmas at the same time.\textsuperscript{105} Vasumitra, though he does not record the central point of this thesis, nevertheless, attributes to the Mahāsāṃghikas, etc., the latter half of the same, i.e., the Buddhas know all the dharmas at the same time.\textsuperscript{106} Curiously enough, the Sarvāstivādins also allowed that several Buddhas may co-exist, though in different universes or fields of Buddha.\textsuperscript{107}

BUDDHA'S TEACHING OF THE NORM

In continuation of their distinct views on Buddhology, the Vetylyakas upheld another interesting thesis that it is not right to say that the Buddha himself taught the Norm.\textsuperscript{108} According to Buddhaghosa, the Vetylyakas were of the view that the created shape of the Buddha taught the Norm on earth to the venerable Ananda, while the Exalted one himself lived in the Tuṣita city. He created and sent forth that shape.\textsuperscript{109}

As the argument goes in the Kathāvatiṭṭhu, the Theravādins question the proponents as to who taught the Norm in case their proposition were to be accepted. According to the Vetylyaka, it was taught by the special creation. Then, according to the Theravādins, this created thing must have been the same as the Master, the Buddha Supreme, etc.\textsuperscript{110}

When the Theravādins repeat their question a second time as to who taught the Norm, the Vetylyakas affirm that Ananda taught the Norm. The Theravādins again repeat that in that case he too must have been the conqueror, the Master, etc.\textsuperscript{111} Lastly, the Theravādins quote certain utterance of the Buddha. He had once said that 'he may teach the Norm concisely; he may teach it in detail; he may teach it both ways. It is only they, who understand, that are hard to find.'\textsuperscript{112} Similarly, the Buddha had said that it is by the higher knowledge that he teaches the Norm and so on.\textsuperscript{113} Thus, the Theravādins lay down that the Buddha himself taught the Norm.\textsuperscript{114}

Apparently, the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Vetylyakas consider the Buddhas as omnipresent and as such beyond the possibility of location in any particular direction or sphere and they pervade throughout the different directions. The Vetylyakas
specifically seek to lay down two significant tenets in this respect: (1) that the Buddha does not live in the human world, and (2) that it was his created form (abhinimittojino) that delivered the doctrine. Vasumitra also attributes to the Mahāsāṁghikas the view that material bodies (rūpakāyas), powers (balas) length of life (āyu), etc., of the Buddha are unlimited.115 Buddhaghosa points out, that according to the Vetulyakas, the Buddha remained always in the Tuṣita heaven, where he was before his coming to this world. Obviously, the Mahāsāṁghikas and, more so, their offshoot the Vetulyakas upheld a transcendent al (lokottarvādā) conception of the Buddha.116 One may easily suggest that the saṅcībhogakāya conception of the Buddha is preserved in the preceding two theses of the Vetulyakas.117

BUDDHA'S 'SUPERNORMAL POWER' (IDDHI)

The next debate deals with the thesis that either a Buddha or his disciples have the power to perform anything supernormally.118 The theory of the Andhakas,119 as mentioned previously, was unacceptable to the Theravādins and they claim to refute it in the Kathāvatthu.

The Theravādins argue as to whether or not one could effect such wishes as 'Let trees be ever green (niccapaññā)! ever blossoming (niccapupphā)! ever in fruit (niccaphalikā)! Let there be perpetual moonlight (niccamjanham) and so on.120 According to the Theravādins, since all this is denied by the proponents, they cannot maintain the proposed thesis. At this, the proponents draw attention to a passage wherein Pilindavaccha is said to have resolved to effect the conversion of the palace of Bimbisāra into an all-gold palace and it did become so converted.121 Thus, they contend that their thesis holds good.

Buddhaghosa remarks on the proposed thesis that iddhi is only possible in certain directions. One cannot contravene by iddhi such laws as that of Impermanence, Ill, No-soul and other natural laws. But it is possible to effect the transformation of one character into another or to prolong it in its own character. This is, according to Buddhaghosa, the orthodox doct-
rune to which he adheres. But some, like the Andhakas, hold that *iddhi* may always be wrought by will.\textsuperscript{122}

It may be noted here that the Mahāsāṃghikas also claimed that by *iddhi* one may live for a *kappa* on the earth.\textsuperscript{123} They claim this on the basis of a *sutta* passage attributed to the Buddha in which it is said that any one, who has cultivated *iddhi*, can live the same life for a *kappa*.\textsuperscript{124} The Theravādins, however, reject this on the ground that since one cannot acquire his life-span, destiny or individuality with the help of *iddhi* so one cannot be said to live for a *kappa* by resorting to *iddhi*.\textsuperscript{125}

**BUDDHA AND PITY**

The following controversy rests over the thesis that the Exalted Buddha felt no pity (*karuṇā*).\textsuperscript{126} According to Buddhaghosa, some like the Uttarāpathakas, maintain that the ‘passionless’ Buddha felt no *karuṇā*.\textsuperscript{127}

The Theravādins argue that the thesis ought to imply that the Buddha did not feel either love (*mettā*), or sympathetic joy (*karuṇā*), or equanimity (*muditā*). This is, however, denied by the proponents. In the opinion of the Theravādins, then, how was the Buddha to be considered lacking in pity although he possessed these mentioned virtues? Further, the proponents’ proposition would imply that the Buddha was ruthless (*akaruṇikko*), though they concede that he was pitiful, kindly towards the world, compassionate towards the world (*lokāmukamipako*) and went about to do it good.\textsuperscript{128} The Theravādins lay down finally that the Exalted Buddha is said to have won the attainment of universal pity. The proponents, however, observe that if it is to be maintained that the Buddha had no passion (*rāga*), then it is similarly true to say that he had no compassion.\textsuperscript{129}

It seems that the Uttrāpathaka thesis, *viz.*, Buddhas can have no compassion (*karuṇā*) conforms with the basic assumption of the Mahāsāṃghikas that their body is made of *ānāsrava dharmas*.\textsuperscript{130} How can such a being be supposed to have been accessible to a mere mundane emotion like pity. It is stated in the *Abhidharmakosa* that Buddha’s compassion is transcen-
dent, being an aspect of his insight into Dharmas. As against the karunā of a śrāvaka which is mere karunā, the Buddha is said to possess mahākarunā which is dharmā-lambana.

DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE BUDDHA

The Theravādins next dispute the thesis that everything of the Buddha was fragrant. Through this thesis, it was sought to be affirmed that even the excreta (uccārapassāvo) of the Exalted Buddha excelled all other odorous things. According to Buddhaghosa, certain of the Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas held this view.

The Theravādins argue in this connection that, should this statement be accepted as true, it would mean that the Buddha was fed on perfumes (gandhabhaja). But the proponents concede on the contrary that the Buddha was fed on rice gruel (odanak-ummāsan). Further, if this fantastic situation were real, some would have used the excreta of the Buddha for the purposes of toilet, gathering and saving them in baskets and exposing them in the market and making cosmetics with them. But there is nothing to suggest that anything of this sort was really done.

Buddhaghosa offers the explanation that such a view was entertained owing to an indiscriminate affection for the Buddha. It may be observed that the Lokottaravādins also affirmed that the Buddha washes his body, though there is no dirt to wash; he cleans his teeth though his mouth smells like a lotus.

DISTINCTION AMONG THE BUDDHAS

Lastly, we have a debate on the problem whether or not the Buddhas differ mutually. According to Buddhaghosa, his school holds that except for the differences in body, age and radiance, at any given time, Buddhas differ mutually in no other respect. But there are some like the Andhakas who maintain that they differ in other qualities also. The Theravādins point out that if we accept the proposed thesis, it should be taken to mean that the Buddhas also differ in matters of Enlightenment (sammapp-adahnato), self-mastery (indriyato), omniscient insight and vision.
(sabbaññutañña-dassanato).¹³⁹

Buddhaghosa makes the comment that the Andhakas seek to lay down that the Buddhas differ from one another in some qualities other than attainments like satipatṭhāna, sammappa-dhāna, etc., as against which the orthodox school believes that the Buddhas may differ in respect of body (sarīra), length of life (āyu) and radiance (pabhāva), but not in regard to the attainments mentioned here.¹⁴⁰

However, the present thesis of the Vetulyakas is in consonance with their basic assumption that the Buddha ought to be regarded as a transcendent being whose nirmānakāya alone visited the earth and preached the doctrine. Obviously, they could not assume that there was any conceivable utility in offering gifts to the Buddha. It may be noted that they made a similar point with regard to the Order. They affirmed that it should not be said that anything given to the Order brings great reward.¹⁴¹ On the contrary, the Theravādins with their simple belief in a human Buddha were naturally opposed to any such notion as entertained by the Vetulyakas. It is interesting to mention that the problem of the efficacy of gifts to the Buddha is also taken up in the Milindapañha. The difficult problem that poses itself is that ‘the Buddha is absolutely departed; neither in life, nor yet more in death can he accept gifts; if there be no recipient, how can homage to him avail?’ Nāgasena, however, insists on the merit of acts of homage. He lays down that ‘men by erecting a shrine do homage to the supreme god under the form of the jewel treasure of his wisdom and win rebirth as a man or god. Diseases come to men without their consent from former evil deeds; it would follow, therefore, that good deed must bear fruit apart from consent.’¹⁴²

MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

Notwithstanding the Theravāda-Vibhajjavāda polemic, as detailed here, it is apparent that different philosophical schools of the Mahāsamghika group came out with distinctive theses regarding Buddhahood. Through these theses, they seek to instal the conception of the Buddhahood on a higher pedestal than was-
The Apotheosis of the Buddha

granted in the orthodox Theravāda tradition. To state the new tenets briefly, it was affirmed by the Andhakas that the vohāra (i.e., the 'ordinary speech') of the Buddha on this earth was supramundane. In other words, even during the earthly career, the actions of the Buddha were lokattaro. All the ten powers (balas) of the Tathāgata were Ariyan. Buddha, as also his disciples have the power to perform supernormal feats. The Buddha pervade the firmament. In other words, they are omnipresent and hence beyond the possibility of location in any particular direction or sphere. The Buddha did not really live in the world of mankind and it was only his nirmāṇakāya that visited the earth. It was this nirmāṇakāya (abhinimitto jino) who delivered the doctrine on this earth. To provide gifts to such a Buddha may not be of any use and thus the possibility of the efficacy of gifts to the Buddha has to be ruled out. The Buddha whose body is made of anāśrava-dharmas cannot obviously be moved by mere mundane emotions such as pity. In a bid to elevate the personality of the Buddha, a fantastic proposition was made that even his excreta excelled all odorous things. It was also laid down that one who is said to be enlightened is so called solely because he has acquired enlightenment. And lastly there is the Andhaka thesis that Buddhas differ mutually.143

It is evidently clear that almost all these theses are in the nature of elevating the concept of Buddha and making it far more sublime than the early belief in a human Buddha. The consensus of these views consists in making the person of the Buddha superhuman (lokottara). Philosophically, this involves the two crucial conceptions of Anāśrava rūpa144 and Nirmāṇa-kāya.145 The former is anaolgous to the suddhasattva referred to in the Yogabhūṣya to explain the yogic concept of Īsvara.146 The later concepts of Muhāmāyā, Bindu or Aprākṛta sattva are similar.147 Basically, any concept of a supernatural person presupposes the concept of a supernatural matter, stuff or matrix through which the Person acts in the natural world without being subject to its corruptibility. It was this logic of the situation which later led the Christians to postulate an immaculate birth for Jesus and a transfigured or glorious body for Him when risen from the grave, and which led to Gnostic
and Docetic ideas among some of them. The doctrine of *Nimmita* Buddha is analogous to the Yogic doctrine of *Nirmana-kaya* or *Nirmāṇacittā*. What appears as a body from outside is really mind within, being nothing but a thought projection of the Buddha or Yogi. The advantage of acting through such a body is that it does not lead to the accumulation of *Karman*. These two doctrines thus make it possible for the Buddha to remain wholly pure and yet more in the world.

It is generally agreed that a truly transcendental conception of the Buddha emerged fully with the development of Mahā-yāna. Therein the Buddha came to be regarded as a quasi-eternal god sending illusory images down to this earth to preach the norm. The Mahāyānists see in him one of the Buddhas residing in various Buddha-lands and influencing believers. Thus developed the *Trikāya* doctrine under the formulation of which the transcendental conception of Buddha was carried to its farthest limits. The Buddha was ascribed complete omniscience. The most outstanding feature of a Buddha, according to them, is his *mahākarunā*, that is, the spontaneous activity which is dovetailed with *Prajñā*. Thus the Mahāyānists were almost complete docetists. Obviously, this remarkable idea was developed very gradually by the Buddhist philosophers for the reason that the earliest notions of the Buddha were of a simple mortal, Gautama being the sole Tathāgata. In the old Pāli tradition, Gautama Sākyamuni, after his demise, was regarded as departed though under the shadow of an insoluble mystery. He could not be seen by gods and men, and honour paid to him after his death had only symbolic spiritual significance. In short, the historicity of the Buddha was indispensable for his earliest disciples, whereas ‘Mahāyāna escapes the predicament of having to depend on any particular historical person as the founder of that religion’. It is hardly deniable, however, that the primary source of inspiration which sustained the development of Mahāyāna was drawn from the life of the Buddha, its superhuman impression, loving adoration and speculations over it. The growth of his ‘biography’ and its miraculous exaggerations illustrate the point.

But the conception of Buddha that emerged in the Mahāyāna poses an enigmatic problem if it is to be taken to have developed
suddenly and without antecedents. It is so widely removed in its nature as also from the chronological point of view from the early conception of the Buddha that one cannot perhaps explain it merely as a sudden and new development. Apparently, such an apotheosis of the Buddha could not have flashed upon the minds of monks of the first century B.C. overnight. In all probability it was an outcome of a slow and gradual process that seems to have commenced quite early culminating finally into the almost virtual deification of the Buddha. It seems that the clue to this problem lies in the development of some of the early Buddhist sects mainly belonging to the Mahāsamghika group. One might venture to say that most of the theses enumerated here come out with a distinctive conception of the Buddha that may aptly be described as a half-way-house representing a transition between two well-defined phases of Buddhism, viz., Hinayāna and Mahāyāna.

Some of the suggestions of the Mahāsamghikas appear to be especially important from the point of view of the development of Mahāyāna. Such are the following—that the Buddha does not live in the human world, remaining always in the Tūṣita heaven where he was before his coming to this world, and that it was his nīrmaṇakāya only that visited the earth. This nīrmaṇakāya (abhinnimitto jino) delivered the doctrine on this earth. Thus, the entire preaching was done by the apparitional image of the Buddha. Masuda is tempted to perceive a Sāṃbhogakāya conception of the Buddha in these theses. According to N. Dutt, however, though this suggestion may be supported by the fact that in the Mahāvastu (I. p. 169) Buddha’s kāya is equated to nīṣyaṇḍakāya rendered into Chinese by pao sheng which is also the rendering of sāṃbhoga-kāyā, yet the time of the emergence of the sāṃbhogakāya conception is still a matter of controversy. He has, however, to concede that another thesis viz., ‘Buddhas mutually differ’, concerns its advocates with nothing but the sāṃbhogakāya conception. It may be pointed out that in the early orthodox tradition, including the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, the Buddha was conceived in two forms: (1) Rūpakāya i.e., the perfected human form in which he lived on this earth after his enlightenment and (2) Dharmakāya, i.e., the
doctrinal aspect of the Buddha and his pure qualities. The Mahāsaṃghikas made a distinct departure from this point of view. According to them, the form that appeared on this earth was illusory or nīrmanakāya. But the real form of the Buddha, i.e., his rūpakāya should be taken to be infinite and eternal like the Mahāyānīka sambhogakāya. This rūpakāya is the result of past good deeds. It is utterly pure and extremely radiant and is capable of assuming a proper shape at a suitable place owing to ādhiṣṭhānikā rddhi. This conception is in fact a prototype of the Sambhogakāya of the Mahāyāna.

Some of the Sanskrit texts, belonging to the northern tradition, preserve corroborative evidence regarding the elevation of Buddhahood. The treatise of Vasumitra preserves in considerable detail the views upheld by the Mahāsaṃghika group of schools. According to him, the Mahāsaṃghika, the Ekavyāvahārikas, the Lokottaravadins and the Kaukkuṭikas originally shared the following views with regard to the Buddha. The Buddhas are all supramundane (lokkottara). There are no sāsrava dharmas or defiled elements in all the Tathāgatas. 'All the speeches of the Tathāgata are concerned with the preaching of the righteous law'. 'The Buddha can expound all the doctrines with a single utterance'. 'There is nothing which is not in conformity with the truth in what has been preached by the World-honoured-one.' 'The rūpakāya of the Tathāgata is indeed limitless.' 'The divine power of the Tathāgata is also limitless.' The length of life of the Buddha is also limitless.' 'The Buddha is never tired of enlightening the sentient beings and awakening pure faith (śraddhā) in them.' 'The Buddha has neither sleep nor dream.' 'The Tathāgata does not pause in answering a question.' 'At no time does the Buddha preach after the arrangement of nouns (nāma) and so on, because he is always in Samādhi, but the sentient brings rejoice, considering that the Buddha preaches after the arrangement of nouns and so on.' 'The Blessed one understands all things (dharma) with a moment's mind (ekakṣanacitta). 'He knows all things (dharma) with the wisdom befitting a “moment’s mind” (ekakṣanikacitta-sampratīyukta prajñā).’ "The Kṣīnajñāna or “knowledge of "exitinc-
tion” and the anutpādaajñāna or “knowledge of the non-rebirth” are always present in Buddhhas, and they continue to be so till their parinirvāna." Bhavya has attributed some of these Lokottaravāda views to Ekavyāvahārikas exclusively. Vīnita-deva, on the other hand, associates the Lokottaravādins with these views. The Abhidharmaśāstra and its Vākyāyā also preserve the information that the Mahāsamghikas upheld the simultaneous existence of several Buddhhas in different directions.

The Mahāvastu, or the Vinaya of the Lokottaravādins, also contains relevant tenets. There is some disagreement among the scholars regarding the date and value of its contents. The work, however, seems to be sufficiently old though its compilation may have been completed in the Gupta Age as the references to the Hūnas, etc., would suggest. Apart from the close proximity of this work with the Pāli Tradition, there is still much in it of a Mahāyānic character. The intimations of Mahāyānic ideas such as dharmaśūnyatā, trikāya, the two āvaraṇas (klesa and jñeya) are available in the text. There is also reference to four caryās ten bhūmis, countless Buddhhas and their kṣetras (spheres). The lokottara conception of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas is clearly developed in the text. It is, therefore, aptly described as forming the bridge between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna.

The Buddha of the Mahāvastu is a superman. All his acquisition are supramundane and cannot be compared to anything in the mundane world. His spiritual practices and merits are supramundane. Even his physical actions, e.g., walking, standing, sitting, eating, etc., are supramundane. He does not feel hunger or thirst; he lives in ignorance of carnal desires; his wife remained a virgin. It is from owing to the considerations for humanity, in order to conform to the ways of the world (lokānuvartana), that he shows his iriyāpathas or behaves as a man or merely gives to men the false impression that he is behaving as a man. His feet are clean, still he washes them; his mouth smells like the lotus, still he cleans the teeth. His body is not touched by the sun or wind or rain, still he puts on garments and lives under a roof. He cannot have any disease and still he takes medicine to cure himself. All this is due to his being an embodiment of the effects of good actions.
is nothing in common between him and the beings of the world. Everything of the great rśi is transcendental, including his advent into the world.\textsuperscript{192}

THE PLACE OF THE MIRACULOUS IN THE EARLY BUDDHIST TRADITIONS

The Buddha himself appears to have condemned the display of miraculous powers and disclaimed the teaching of the way of their acquisition. In the Mahālisuṭṭhanta of the Dīgha Nikāya, Sunakhatta Licchaviputta complains that although he spent three years with the Lord he did not hear any celestial sound.\textsuperscript{193} Buddha told him that samādhi was intended for Nirvāṇa, not for supernormal psychic experiences. In the Kevatta sutta he explicitly condemns the display of miracles saying that even hypnosis (gāndhārī vidyā) and crystal-gazing can produce such powers.\textsuperscript{194} Nevertheless, the practice of the holy path was itself supposed to lead to the six supernormal powers or abhiññās. More particularly, Buddha claimed the three vijjās. In the Kathāvatthu we find an attempt to discuss some of the problems involved in the beliefs in supernormal powers of the mind. Thus, it is suggested by some that the psychic control of another’s mind may be possible.\textsuperscript{195} The next thesis suggests the possibility of psychically helping another.\textsuperscript{196} Also there is a discussion about the relationship of dibbacakkhu and dibbasota to their corporeal counterparts.\textsuperscript{197} ‘The “Celestial eye” amounts to insight into destiny according to deeds’.\textsuperscript{198} There is another debate about the exact object in cetopariyāyeñā.\textsuperscript{199} Some held that it was the bare citta or viññāna, others that it included the samprayukta dharmas also.\textsuperscript{200} Another controversy records two views about the knowledge of the future; one asserting its possibility unconditionally and appealing to the Buddha’s own predictions about the fate of Pātaliputra.\textsuperscript{201}

A critical analysis of the views preserved in the Kathāvatthu, the treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva and Mahāvastu would show that they sustain the twin tendencies ascribed to the development of Buddhist docetism. One is the way of mythical fancies about the superhuman nature of the Buddha and the other that of metaphysical speculation on his person-
ality as a Tathāgata and on its relation with the truth (dharma) which he revealed. Mahāyāna marks the meeting point of the two streams and the culmination of Buddhist docetism. The theses we have discussed are characterized by both types of speculations. It may be remarked, however, that, whereas ideas preserved in the Kathāvāittha and Mahāvastu are mostly of the first type i.e., mythical fancies about the supramundane nature of the Buddha, those enumerated by Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva contain many such theses as seek to explain the Buddha in the latter aspect, i.e., as a metaphysical principle and in relation to the doctrine preached by him. The philosophical principles have been indicated here. The other side grew as part of a developing religious sentiment which is comparable to Bhakti. In fact, the Bhagavadgītā with its emphasis on the concepts of supernatural God (Bhagavān), Avatāra, the supernatural birth and deeds of Kṛṣṇa and the doctrine of Grace presents a parallel development out of Upaniṣadic ideas. We do not know what direct contact there was between the Buddhist monks and the Bhāgavatas but they do appear as parallel, though, different lines of thought between which interaction was certainly possible. One may, however, point out that the similarity here is more in the sentiment than in the conceptions because the Buddha is never conceived as a God for he is never the creator or ordainer of the universe. Nor, on the other hand, is the Avatārā merely an appearance.

It may, thus, be suggested that these views, that came to be held about the Buddha and his nature by the Mahāsāṃghika group of school, show a distinct departure from the notions of a human Buddha and affirm such propositions which are in very close proximity with the Mahāyāna docetism. Quite a few of these new reflections are reminiscent of the conception of the Buddha that emerged in the Mahāyāna. It seems that the process of mythologizing began soon after the passing away of the Master and found many adherants outside the pale of strictly orthodox teachers. Basically, they seem to have been
motivated by a devotional attitude towards the Master and developed philosophical speculations in the same direction. The Mahāsaṃghikas were evidently the earliest school of the Hinayānists to show a tendency for conceiving the Buddha docetically which was brought to completion by some of their sub-sects, viz., Vetulyakas, Andhakas, Uttrāpathakas and above all the Lokottaravādins. One might aptly describe the Mahāsaṃghikas and their sub-sects as the precursors of Mahāyāna.204
REFERENCES

1. See Kathāvatthu, II, 10; see also Wassiljew, Der Buddhismus, Vol. I, p. 105.
2. See Kathāvatthu, XVIII, 1, 2; Cf. Wassiljew, op. cit.
5. Bodhisattva controversies have been treated separately in the following chapter.
6. Cf. those sections of the Mahāparinibbānasutta in which the Buddha appears as a human being, e.g., the illness of the Buddha at Beluvāgrāma; the grief of Ānanda in the fifth section.
8. Cf. श्रल वमल क ने पूलकवेिन दिई न । यो श्रल वमल धम्म म
   पस्तव्य सो म पस्तव्य Sāṃyutta Nikāya, II, p. 341.
10. Cf. ग्रगुडात्र: पुवसोस्तरात्मा सदा जनानां हृदये सनिवित Katha
   Upaniṣad, 2. 6. 17; इहऽवानः शरिरे सीम्य स पुहाय Praśna Upaniṣād
   6. 2. य एवोक्षिणी पुवो दृश्यतप्य आलेखि Chāndogya Upaniṣad,
   4. 15. 1. see also Brahmajāla and Pāvāsi suttas of the Dīgha
   Nikāya.
   56, 65.
15. Ibid., II, p. 174.
19. Triratna.
20. See supra chapter III.
25. Cf. e.g., Dīgha Nikāya, suttas 14-16. See also Kern, op. cit.
27. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
33. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 21.
34. Ibid., pp. 20-1.
37. See *Kathāvaththu-Āṭṭhakathā*, pp. 59, 62, 63, 76, 169, etc.
40. Ibid., II, p. 193.
46. See *Kathāvaththu-Āṭṭhakathā*, pp. 59-60.
47. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 135; *Psalms of the Brethren*, verse, 1270; *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II, 16.
51. *Kathāvaththu*, p. 204.
57. Ibid., p. 19n.
60. Ibid., pp. 35-6.
61. See Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 204.
62. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 19n.
63. *Kathāvatthu*, IX, 10-11; see also *Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā*, pp. 120-121.
64. See *Kathāvatthu*, XXIII, 4; see also *Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā*, p. 198.
69. See *Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā*, p. 62.
71. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 207-8.
72. Ibid., pp. 208-9.
73. Ibid., pp. 207ff.
74. Thanāthāne yathābhutām kānakam Tathāgatabalām ariyam ti? Kathāvatthu, III, 2, see also Points of Controversy, p. 142.
75. See Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, p. 63.
78. See Mahāvastu, I, pp. 159-50.
81. Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, p. 76.
82. Kathāvatthu, pp. 251-2.
83. Ibid., pp. 252-3.
84. Ibid., p. 252.
85. Ibid., p. 253; see also Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, pp. 76-7.
87. See Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, p. 76.
88. See Points of Controversy, p. 164n.
89. Na vattabbaṁ Buddhassa dinnam mahapphalāṁ ti? Kathāvatthu, XVII, 10.
91. Kathāvatthu, XVIII, 1.
92. Ibid., p. 479.
93. Cf. Ibid., p. 479.
94. See Points of Controversy, p. 321n.
95. See Kathāvatthu, XVII, 9.
97. See Saṁyutta Nikāya, II, p. 357; see also Debates Commentary, p. 211.
98. Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, p. 171.
99. See Kathāvatthu, p. 482.
100. Cf. Majjhima Nikāya, I, 326; Saṁyutta Nikāya, V, 185; see also Kathāvatthu, p. 482.
104. See Kathāvatthu, p. 523.
105. Abhidharmakośa, III, p. 200; IX, p. 254; see also Sphuṭārtha, p. 103.
107. See Poussin, ERE, VIII, p. 329, s.v. Buddhism.
110. Kathāvatthu, p. 483; see also Points of Controversy, p. 325n.
114. Kathāvatthu, p. 484.
117. Masuda, op. cit., p. 18n.
120. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 521-2.
123. Iḍḍhiabalena samannāgato kappām titṭheyyati, Kathāvatthu, XI. 7; see also Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā, p. 131.
131. See Abhidharmakośa, VII, pp. 77ff.
133. Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā; p. 172.
136. Mahāvastu.
137. Attīti Buddhānaṁ Buddhēhi hīṁśītrekātā ti, Kathāvatthu, XXI. 5.
143. For the details of the controversies on these issues see supra.
145. Cf. Ibid., p. 18n.
146. See Yogabhāṣya, ad Yogasutras, I. 24.
147. See G.N. Kaviraja, Tāntrik Vāṅgamaya me Śāktadriṣṭi, pp. 7, 245; Bhārtīya Sanskriti Aur Sādhanā, I, pp. 24, 200.
148. See ERE, IV, s.v. Docetism.


156. Masuda, op. cit., p. 18n.

157. N. Dutt, EMB, II, p. 76n.

158. N. Dutt, EMB, II, p. 76.

159. Cf. Samyutta Nikāya, II, p. 341; Visuddhamagga, Saddhammasaṅgaha; Divyavacana, p. 11; see also Anesaki, ERE, XII, pp. 202-4, s.v. Tathāgata; N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, pp. 101-2.


162. Masuda, op. cit., p. 19; Cf. N. Dutt, EMB, II, p. 74n; see Bareau, Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques, p. 238.


164. Ibid., p. 19; see Bareau, ibid., p. 139.


166. Ibid., p. 19.

167. Ibid., p. 19.

168. Ibid., p. 20.

169. Ibid., p. 20.

170. Ibid., p. 20.

171. Ibid., p. 20.

172. Ibid., p. 20.

173. Ibid., p. 20.

174. Ibid., p. 20.

175. Ibid., p. 20.


178. Abhidharmakośa, VII, p. 254; Sphutārthā, p. 103.

179. Cf. Windisch, Composition des Mahāvastu; Poussin, ERE, VIII, p. 329.

180. See Poussin, ERE, VIII, p. 329, s.v. Buddhology.


186. Jones, Mahāvastu, (Trans.,) I, pp. 112-51; Senart, Mahāvastu, I, pp. 142-93.
189. निधि जिवित सम्यक्करुत्ताने लोकेति सम्। ग्रथ खलु सब्जेवेव महा्यणा
लोकोत्तरम्।
तत्तां हि सम्यक्क संबुद्धानाः समुदायम्। सोजपि लोकोत्तरः।
Mahāvastu, I, p. 159.
190. लोकानुवत्ताना बुद्धा ग्रन्थवालस्ति लोकियो। प्रजापिस्मुनुवलस्ति सथा लोकोः
तारमिष्ठः। Mahāvastu, I, 168.
191. बुद्धानां शुभविष्यदाना एषा लोकानुवत्तान। Mahāvastu, I, p. 169.
194. Ibid., I, Kevattha sutta, pp. 183ff.
196. Cf. Ibid., XVI, 2.
197. Cf. Ibid., III, 7-8.
199. Cf. Ibid., V, 7.
200. See Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā, pp. 84-5.
203. जस्म कसः मे दिब्यमेव यी वैवित्ताव तत्वतः।
त्यक्त्वा वेद्व पुरुत्सनम् वैवित्त मामेति सोवज्ञन।
Bhagavadgītā, IV, 9.
204. Cf. N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, op. cit., p. 32.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Bodhisatta\textsuperscript{1} controversies recorded in the Kath\=avat\=thu are part of a larger complex of ideas and problems which include those relating to the Arahant and the Buddha. With an assertion of the failings and imperfections of the Arahant\textsuperscript{2} there was an extraordinary change in the conceptions about the Buddhahood.\textsuperscript{3} As such, it was laid down that the Buddha never visited this world personally, but instead his illusory form appeared on the earth and delivered the doctrine. He was thus placed on the way to be ultimately absolutized and deified in the Mah\=ay\=ana. It was, perhaps, quite natural to evolve a Bodhisatta stage for the Buddha in the process of such mythical fancies. If the Buddha is transcendental (lokott\=ara) and his body is made of an\=\textit{\=arava} dharumas, the Bodhisatta should also not be taken as an average human being. He must also be supramundane. In the treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinitadeva, several such views are expounded by the Mah\=asamghikas and their sub-sects.\textsuperscript{4} The \textit{Mah\=avastu} and \textit{Lalita\=avistara} also contain such reflections on the nature of Bodhisatta.\textsuperscript{5}
Curiously enough, we find in the Kathāvatthu that, whereas there are numerous points for the Theravādins to refute about the Buddha, the new theses about the Bodhisatta are comparatively few in number. The problems raised therein may be summarized as follows: (1) Is one gifted with the thirty-two characteristic marks, necessarily a Bodhisatta or not? (2) whether or not a Bodhisatta takes rebirth into a state of woe and undertakes a difficult course of life out of his own accord and-free will? (3) whether or not he is destined or assured prior to his last birth? The Bodhisatta controversies discussed in the Kathāvatthu seem to suggest two things: (1) that, the previous lives of Gautama Buddha began to excite interest, speculation and discussion and (2) that, although a systematic Bodhisatta doctrine as of Mahāyāna was yet to come, some of the points affirmed were already heading in that direction as the one about the Bodhisatta taking rebirth into the states of suffering and hardships. By implication it means that there was a gradual growth of the Bodhisatta doctrine before it finally assumed in the Mahāyāna the concept of a 'bodhi-being', 'spiritual-warrior', 'saviour' and so on.

The growth of new theses about the Bodhisatta, it seems, is closely linked with the growth of new conceptions about the Buddha. As with the Buddha, so in the case of the Bodhisatta, the Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins as also the old Āgamas entertained some notions of an extraordinary superior being (manusuttara) though they took both the Buddha and the Bodhisatta as strictly historical personages. However, some of the new sects deviated from the current notions and started elevating their concepts about the Buddha and the Bodhisatta by adorning them with superhuman qualities. The Mahāsaṃghikas, the Lokottaravādins, the Ekavyāvahārikas, the Vetulyakas, etc., were primarily instrumental in the growth of this process. The Mahāsaṃghikas and the Lokottaravādins came to believe that the Bodhisattas are self-born; they appear as human beings for the sake of conformity to the world (lokānuvartana), although their form is only mental (manomaya). The Ekavyāvahārikas added that the Bodhisattas, in fact, have no form. The Vetulyakas went to the extent of saying that from the Tuśitaloka there descended only a nirmānakāya of the Buddha on this earth.
The Mahāvastu dwells at some length on the Lokottaravāda notion of the Bodhisattahood. Mahāvastu, like the Nīdanakathā14 divides the account of Gautama Buddha’s life into three parts. The first part relates the story of his Bodhisattva career during the time of Dipākara Buddha. The second deals with the account of Tuṣita-loka, his conception and attainment of bodhi. The third part describes the details of Dharmacakravṛtvartana, i.e., the starting of the wheel of Dharma or preaching the Dharma (Dharmadeśā), and the commencement of the Order (Sāṃgha). This last phase is also comparable to the Pāli account preserved in the Mahāvagga.15

According to the Mahāvastu, the Bodhisattas are self-born (upapāduka) and not born of parents.16 A Bodhisatta sits cross-legged in the womb and preaches therefrom to the gods.17 During his stay in the womb, he remains untouched by the phlegm and the dirt of the womb. He issues from the right side of the womb without piercing it.18 He cannot have Kāma, his wife remained a virgin and thus Rāhula also was self-born.19

The Mahāsāṃghikas and their sub-sects were not alone engaged in elevating the concept of the Bodhisatta. The Sarvāstivādins also contributed in a certain measure towards the development of the Bodhisatta ideal. Lalitavistara,20 the text containing the Sarvāstivāda version of the life of Buddha, bears testimony to this. Although the text of Lalitavistara closely resembles the Pāli Tripitaka,21 yet its initial portions as also the end are clearly Mahāyānic. The Sarvāstivādins upheld the existence of numerous Buddhas and countless Bodhisattas, as also the contemporaneity of the former in different areas (kṣetra).22 According to the Lalitavistara, the Bodhisatta is not only placed in a crystal casket put within the womb but, while in that state, he is said to preach the dharma to the heavenly beings who flock around him.23

The treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinitadeva also depict an elevated picture of the life and career of the Bodhisattas as subscribed by the Mahāsāṃghika group of schools. To sum up some of the important theses in the accounts of Vasumitra, it is said that the Bodhisattas do not pass through the embryonic stages.24 They assume the form of a white elephant
as they enter their mother’s womb and come out of the same
by the right side. They are reminded here of the white elephant
seen by Māyādevī in a dream at the time of her conception
and the birth of the Bodhisatta by bursting through the right
side of the mother’s womb. Further, it is said that the
Bodhisattas do not entertain the thoughts of greed (kāmāsa-
niṣṇa), anger (vyāpādasamjña) or harming others (vihimsāsa-
niṣṇa). They even enter into the bad states of existence for
helping the beings of the world. Bhavya and Vinitadeva also
make a mention of some of these theses.

This is the outline of the Bodhisatta concept as it was emerg-
ing during the time of Kathāvatthu. Contemporary accounts
preserved in other works fill up the gaps left by the Kathāvai-thu
which discusses only a few tenets about the Bodhisattahood.
However, the Bodhisatta theses summarized here make it amply
clear that their growth is closely linked with the growth of
new conceptions about the nature of the Buddha. The move-
ment manifested itself in a process of idealization and spiritual-
ization of the figure of the Buddha and his nature (svabhāva)
and the growth of devotion or faith (bhakti) towards the
Master. Scholars like Winternitz, Kern, Senart, Saunders, Poussin, etc., have suggested that the element of
bhakti was adopted in Buddhism from Hinduism mainly from
Bhagavadgīța. Hardayal has argued that Buddhism had its
own genius of origination and innovation. We have noted
the parallelism as well as the conceptual difference between the
Buddhistic and the Bhāgavata developments. On account of
the uncertain chronology of the Gīța, it is difficult to assert
that it was definitely anterior to the Mahāsamghika ideas, which
emerged between Kālāśoka and Aśoka or even to the emergence
of Mahāyāna, which has to be placed in the first century B.C.
The basic ideas of the Gīța, however, were most probably
earlier than the second century B.C., but it is difficult to pin-
point the exact epoch of their emergence.

The Buddhist feeling of reverence and adoration for the
Buddha and the Bodhisatta is not bhakti in the sense of love
for an indwelling deity who assumes a human form so that he
may enter into a personal human relation with his disciples.
The attitude of the Buddhists is essentially that of ‘gurubhakti’,
seeking to transcend human life with the help of the Buddha. The goal for the Buddhists is utter transcendence while the Bhakti religion culminated in the doctrine of participation in divine immanence or Līlā.

It is, however, plausible that, at the popular level, the universal religious feeling of devotion should have found an outlet among the Buddhists through the adaptation of the new ideal of Bodhisatta in the light of current methods of worship and adoration of the gods and yakṣas. The process of mythical conceptions about the life of Bodhisatta and the nature of Bodhisattahood led ultimately to his conversion into the ideal spiritual pilgrim of Mahāyāna, on the one hand, and a popular figure receiving adoration and worship like a deity, on the other. The process seems to have started with the emergence of the Mahāsāṃghikas and its sub-sects in the history of Buddhist thought.

THESES AND ARGUMENTS

THE SELF-GOVERNED DESTINY
OF THE BODHISATTA

The first controversy about the Bodhisatta rests over his ‘self-governed destiny’. It is affirmed by the Andhakas that the Bodhisatta undertakes difficulties and hardships, such as, he goes to an ‘evil doom’, enters a womb, performs hard tasks and works penance under alien teachers of his own accord and free-will.

The Theravādins take up the issue with the Andhakas and enquire as to whether they imply thereby that the Bodhisatta so went and endured purgatory (nirayaṁ) the saṁjīva, kūlasutta, etc. In case the proponents deny this, they cannot maintain their thesis. Since, according to the proponents, the Bodhisatta does so owing to free-will, should the said free-will of the Bodhisatta be taken to imply that he could select to be reborn in purgatory or as an animal also, that is to say, does he possess magic potency (iddhi)? According to Buddhaghosa, ‘free-will, as liberty to do what one pleases through a specific power or gift, is practically a denial of karma’. The Theravādins further question as to whether the Bodhisatta practised
the different steps to that potency (cīhānādhipādo), viz., will, effort (viriyādhipādo), thought (cittādhipādo) and investigation (vimaṃsādhipādo). Again, as to the third point of the proponents that the Bodhisattva, of his own free-will, performed hard and painful tasks, the Theravādins ask: ‘Does it mean that he fell back on wrong views such as “the world is eternal” (sattatoloko), etc., or “the world is finite” (antavāloko) etc., “soul and body are the same or different”, etc.? ‘Lastly, did the Bodhisattva, while making a series of penances following alien teachers, also subscribe to the view held by these teachers?246

According to Buddhaghosa, the Andhakas were led to this belief on the basis of the six-toothed Jātaka (Chadantajātaka) and similar others.47 Vasumitra also preserves information about some theses relevant to the preceding one. According to him, the Mahā-samghikas and some of their sub-sects like the Ekavyāvahārika, the Lokottaravādins and the Kaukkutikas, upheld the view that ‘for the benefit of sentient beings (sattva), Bodhisattas are born into bad states (durgati) at will and can be born into any of them as they like’.48 The destinies mentioned are that of the condemned (nārakīya), famished ghosts (preta) and that of the animals.49 Bhavya has also recorded this view but he attributes it to the Ekavyāvahārikas exclusively.50

Thus, a section of the Buddhists believed that the Bodhisattvas are born into the bad states out of their own free-will. And this they do owing to the predominantly altruistic consideration for other beings, a feature that characterizes the very nature of a Bodhisattva’s personality as developed in the Mahāyāna.51 The thesis obviously implies a negation of the factor of karman, that is to say, that such births of the Bodhisattvas are not caused by their karman and that they are so born by the power of their will.52 Buddhaghosa also notes that the problem of iddhi is raised in the controversy only in order to assert the fact that free-will, as liberty to do what one pleases through a specific power or gift, is practically a denial of karman.53

We owe the information again to Vasumitra that the sects of Caityaśaila, the Aparaśaila and the Uttarśaila also contributed to the subject under dispute. They shared the belief that the
Bodhisattas do not escape from metempsychosis into the bad states of existence (*durgati*). Similarly, Vinitadeva has also noted that the Pūrvaśaṅkī and the Aparaśaṅkī schools upheld the view that the Bodhisattas are not free (*vimukta*) from being born into the bad states of existence (*durgāti*). This second set of opinion shared by the Śāila schools obviously harbours a certain amount of contradiction and discrepancy. The Kathāvatthu associates with the Andhakas the view that the Bodhisattas take birth into the bad states of existence (*durgāti*) out of their own free-will. Vasumitra and Bhavya attribute the same thesis to the Mahāsaṃghikas, the Ekavyāvahārīkas, the Lokottaravādins and the Kaukkūṭikas. But Vasumitra and Vinitadeva further attribute to the Caityāśaṅkī, the Aparaśaṅkī and the Uttarashaṅkī the view that the Bodhisattas are not free from metempsychosis into the bad states. The latter view sounds as an anti-thesis of the position held by the Andhakas in the Pāli tradition and the Mahāsaṃghikas, etc., in the tradition of Vasumitra and Bhavya. There is, however, some clue to solve this riddle which appears to have arisen due to some discrepancy. The discrepancy is evident, from different Chinese renderings of Vasumitra’s work. According to Yuan-chwang’s rendering, the Caityāśaṅkī, the Aparaśaṅkī and the Uttarashaṅkī sects believed that the Bodhisattas are free from rebirth into the bad states of existence. But Tsin’s Chinese translation of the same work completely reverses the theory in question. According to this work, the Bodhisattas escape from bad states of existence (*durgāti*). These two, entirely contradictory versions of the same thesis, suggest that there was some confusion about this view. One might suggest that the original thesis was perhaps the same as that recorded in the Kathāvatthu, i.e., the Bodhisattas take rebirth into the bad states of existence (*durgāti*) out of their own free-will for helping the beings of this universe. This thesis might have been advocated, in the beginning, by the Mahāsaṃghikas, the Ekavyāvahārīkas, the Lokottaravādins and the Kaukkūṭikas as the traditions of Vasumitra and Bhavya testify. These sects are likely to have done so in their enthusiasm for elevating the ideal of the Bodhisatta. Later on, it seems, however, that the Andhakas got struck to this thesis more than other offshoots of the Mahāsaṃghikas as
Buddhaghosa attributes it to the Andhakas exclusively. It is perhaps, due to this development that Vasumitra has been led to attribute the original thesis to the Mahāsāṃghikas, etc., and a part of it, rather a distorted one, to the Caityaśaila, the Aparaśaila and the Uttaraśaila. Vinitadeva also gives the name as the Pūrvaśaila and the Aparaśaila. We know that Andhaka was a general appellation given to these sects due to their geographical location. As regards the distortion of the original thesis, as given by Vasumitra and Vinītadeva, that the Bodhisattas are not free from the metempsychosis into the bad states, of which the opposite version is also preserved in Tsin’s translation of the former’s work, it appears that it is due to the brevity of expression that the view has been misstated. Otherwise, it hardly makes any sense to say that the Bodhisattas do not escape the bad states of existence a position quite unbecoming for the Bodhisatta.

BODHISATTA AND HIS CHARACTERISTIC MARKS

Another point discussed in the Kathāvatthu about the Bodhisattas arises from the thesis that one who is gifted with the marks (lakāññās) is a Bodhisatta. According to Buddhaghosa, this belief was upheld by the Uttarāpathakas.

The Theravādins observe that by proposing this thesis the proponents must also admit the following: (1) That any one who is gifted with the marks to a limited extent is, in the same manner, a limited Bodhisatta. (2) That a universal emperor (cakkavattisatto), gifted with the same marks, is a Bodhisatta, and that the ‘previous study’ (pubbayogo) and ‘conduct’ (pubbacariyā) ‘declaring and teaching the Norm’ (dhammākhānaṁ dhammadesanā) in the careers of the Bodhisatta and the universal emperor are identical. (3) That when a universal emperor is born, he is received by the devas first and the human beings later as in the case of a new-born Bodhisatta. (4) That the ‘four sons of the devas’ receive the new-born imperial babe, place it before the mother and speak to her thus: “Rejoice O, queen! to thee is born a mighty son”, just as they do for the new-born Bodhisatta. The Theravādins insist upon drawing similar other implications.
All these points are denied by the proponents. Buddhaghosa explains that the proponents assent with regard to a Bodhisatta but reject with regard to one who is not a Bodhisatta.\(^6^9\)

It is argued by the Uttarāpathakas that their proposition cannot be wrong in the light of the fact that the Buddha himself said that for one endowed with the thirty-two marks of a superman, only two careers lie open. If he lives the household life he becomes a chakravarti ruler, but if he chooses to renounce the household life he becomes an Arahat, Buddha Supreme.\(^7^0\)

It has been noted above\(^7^1\) that the name of the Uttarāpathaka sect is conspicuous by its absence in other works except the Kathāvatthu-Atthaṅkathā of Buddhaghosa. In conformity with this, the thesis of the Uttarāpathakas in question is not met with anywhere else except the Kathāvatthu. This is not, however, denying a basis for their thesis or suggesting that it was not grounded in some authoritative texts. Perhaps the Uttarāpathakas are the same as the Lokottaravādins of Bamiyan.\(^7^2\) In fact, the idea of thirty-two principal marks is as old as the concept of Bodhisatta itself. It is enumerated both in the Pāli as well as Sanskrit works.\(^7^3\) What is particular about the Uttarāpathakas in this regard is that, on the basis of such references as mentioned, they formulated the view that one who is gifted with the marks is a Bodhisatta.\(^7^4\)

It is interesting to note here the Sarvāstivāda observation on this point. According to this school, one acquires the name Bodhisatta from the moment one manifests the thirty-two marks of the great man. From then onwards, one is always born as a man and in a noble clan.\(^7^5\)

The Theravādins try to refute the Uttarāpathaka thesis on the basis of Canonical statements that the imperial babe is also endowed with the thirty-two marks but does not become a Bodhisatta. Buddhaghosa also observes that the Uttarāpathakas are led to assume such a view owing to their careless and incorrect interpretation of the sutta which they quote to support their argument. It may, however, be observed that the Uttarāpathakas do not suggest that everyone endowed with these marks becomes a Bodhisatta as they make very clear in the course of the discussion. But, for one to become a Bodhisatta, it is necessary to be endowed with these marks.
ASSURANCE (NIYĀMA) OF THE BODHISATTA

Another controversy in the Kathāvatthu over Bodhisatta is given as niyāmokkantikathā (i.e., the debate about stepping into the path destined to reach Nibbāna or Assurance)\textsuperscript{76} of the Bodhisatta prior to their last birth. The subject of the present dispute is whether or not the Bodhisattas are assured prior to their last birth? The controversy arises owing to the contention of a certain section of the Buddhists that the Bodhisatta had entered the Path of Assurance and conformed to the life therein during the dispensation (pavacana) of Kassapa Buddha.\textsuperscript{77} According to Buddhaghosa, the Uttarāpathakas and the Andhakas upheld this view.\textsuperscript{78}

In connection with the present thesis, the Theravādins argue that if the Bodhisatta had entered the Path of Assurance and conformed to the life therein during the teaching of Kassapa Buddha, it would mean that he must have been a disciple of Kassapa Buddha.\textsuperscript{79} The proponents deny this because such an admission would be tantamount to the fact that he became a Buddha after his career as a disciple. This would be against the general belief that a disciple is one who learns through information from others, while a Buddha is self-developed (sayam-bhū).\textsuperscript{80} Further, the Theravādins point out that, if the Bodhisatta became Kassapa's disciple, it follows that there were only three stages of fruition for him to know under the bodhi tree. But it is generally understood that all the four were realized there.\textsuperscript{81} Moreover, for one who had entered the Path of Assurance, was it necessary to undergo the austerities as done by the Bodhisatta in his last life as Gautama?\textsuperscript{82} And was it necessary for him to practise the austerities of other teachers? Further, did the Buddha live in the discipleship of Kassapa Buddha just as Ānanda, and the householders Citta Hatthaka the Ālavaka entered into Assurance and lived as disciples under the Buddha himself? The proponents deny this because they cannot affirm that the Bodhisatta entered the Path of Assurance and lived its higher life under Kassapa Buddha without being his disciple.\textsuperscript{83}

The Uttarāpathakas and the Andhakas come out with a counter-argument that their thesis is sustained by textual
evidence where the Buddha has said, ‘Under the Exalted one Kassapa, I lived the higher life for supreme enlightenment in future.’ The Theravādins also quote from the Canon to reiterate their position where the Buddha is reported to have affirmed the attainment of enlightenment as also the fact that there is no teacher for him and that he is unrivalled on earth and heaven. The Theravādins further quote a passage in which Buddha explains how the insight and wisdom of four truths were realized and developed by him. In the light of this, they finally lay down that the thesis in question cannot be sustained.

Buddhaghosa observes that the Andhakas, in view of the account of Ghaṭikāra Sutta, upheld the view that Bodhisatta, i.e., Buddha in his former birth as Jotipāla had entered the Path of Assurance under Kassapa Buddha. The idea is fully developed in the Mahāyāna that by the development of bodhicitta one becomes a niyata Bodhisatta. It is also accepted there that Jotipāla developed bodhicitta at the time of Kassapa Buddha and then, after several births, he ultimately attained perfection. However, as the argument goes in the mentioned controversy, the Theravādins are not prepared to concede that Gautama Buddha, in one of his former births, became a disciple of Kassapa Buddha.

‘ENTERING THE PATH OF ASSURANCE’

The next discussion on Assurance controversy seeks to dispute the point that ‘one who is morally certain of salvation has entered the Path of Assurance’. We gather from the commentary that the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas advocated this thesis.

In this connection, the Theravādins ask the proponents: whether they imply that the so-called ‘Assured’ enters the True Path of Assurance (sammattaniyāma) when assured of immediate retribution and upon the False Path of Assurance (micchatiani-
yāma), when assured of final salvation? According to Buddhaghosa, the question is asked to show that there can be no other assurance except the above two.

In the present controversy, the central argument of the
Theravāda school is that it is illogical to speak of a niyata śrāvaka or Bodhisatta as becoming a sammatā. According to Buddhaghosa, niyāma or Assurance is of two kinds according as it is in the right or wrong direction, i.e., sammattaniyāma and micchattaniyāma respectively. The former is the practice of brahmacariya (purity in conduct) and ariyamagga (path of sanctification) and the latter the commission of heinous crimes (anantariyakamma) leading to immediate retribution, i.e., hell without delay. All other mental phenomena happening in the three planes of being are not of the invariably fixed order. Buddhhas, by the force of their foresight, used to prophecy: ‘Such a one will in future attain to Bodhi (Buddhahood).’ ‘This person is a Bodhisatta, who may be called ‘Assured’ (niyata) by reason of the cumulative growth of merit.’ But the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas, taking the term ‘Assured’ without distinction as to direction, assumed that a Bodhisatta was becoming fitted to penetrate the Truths, in his last birth, and therefore held that he was already ‘Assured’. It has been suggested that the difference of opinion in this controversy really rests on the interpretation given to the word niyata in Mahāyāna texts as against that given by the Kathāvatthu and its commentator.

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

The Kathāvatthu maintains its orthodox attitude while disputing the Bodhisatta theses. The authors of the text are in no case prepared to entertain the propositions of other sects, who in their turn seek to focus new facts about the elevation of the concept and nature of a Bodhisatta. They reject, therefore, the Andhaka thesis that for the benefit of animate beings the Bodhisattas adopt a difficult career; they enter into evil doom such as existence in hell, rebirth as men, animals and birds; they perform hard tasks and undertake the practice of penance under alien teachers. For the strictly orthodox Theravādins, there are no Bodhisattas as a class of beings as envisaged in the developed Mahāyāna school. They believed in the humanity of the Buddha and hence the individual who happens to become
the Buddha is said to be a Bodhisatta in his former lives only in order to be distinguished from average persons of the world. The next thesis belonging to the Uttarāpathakas proposes that one endowed with thirty-two marks is a Bodhisatta. The Theravādins seek to refute this view by arguing that an imperial babe is also said to be endowed with the thirty-two marks. Their objections, however, appear to misrepresent the proponents’ point of view as they only wish to emphasize that it is necessary to be possessed of those marks for one to become a Bodhisatta. They never imply thereby that an imperial babe does not possess these marks.

Another Andhaka thesis about nīyāma of the Bodhisatta, founded on a certain sutta that the Sākyamuni entered the Path of Assurance (nīyāma) under the dispensation of the Buddha Kassapa, is also rejected by the Theravādins. It is argued that if this were true, then he must have been a disciple of Kassapa and this contradicts the essential nature of a Buddha which consists in his being self-developed. By calling one a Bodhisatta, the Theravādins do not attribute to him spiritual predestination for Buddhahood on any special virtues unattainable by the śrāvakas. In fact, by nīyāma, the Theravādins mean either sammattaniyāma or micchaitaniyāma. The Theravādins maintain that Gautama in his Bodhisatta existence did not become a disciple (śrāvaka) of Kassapa Buddha. They quote the words of the Buddha where he disowns any teacher for him. The Andhakas, however, affirm that he did become a śrāvaka of Kassapa Buddha and entered the Path of Assurance. They quote a passage from the Majjhima Nikāya to support their proposition. The Andhakas as a matter of fact appear to stress two important points in their propositions, viz., that (1) Prediction implies predestination and non-discipleship implies non-predestination. The Bodhisattas, prior to their last birth, enter into the Path of Assurance and thus become predestined to achieve Nibbāna and (2) that Bodhisattas are different from the śrāvakas. The Bodhisattas are superior because of their extra spiritual accomplishment. The Buddhas are also characterized by such qualities. Their omniscience and compassion, etc., are special spiritual achievements. Otherwise, the spiritual goal is attained with the realization of
Nirvāṇa. For the Theravādins, this last alone is relevant. They are so badly stuck with this belief that they hardly need emulate the extra spiritual accomplishments of the Buddha and the Bodhisattas. As against this, the Andhakas seem to suggest that:

an individual from the moment he develops bodhicitta becomes a Bodhisatta and is destined to become a Buddha. He follows a career which is quite different from that of a śrāvakka. The career of a Bodhisatta is marked by an enormous amount of love and compassion for the suffering beings while that of the latter has more of path-culture and sādhanā.¹⁰⁸

In fact, in all these niyāma controversies¹⁰⁹ debated in the Kathāvatthu, the Theravādins are inhibited by the belief as explained here that there are only two types of niyāmatās, viz., sammattaniyāmatā (i.e., the right type of assurance) and micchattaniyāmatā (i.e., the wrong type of assurance). They naively apply this argument in almost all the niyāma controversies. When the problem of niyāmatā of the Bodhisatta is raised, they do not agree to this because they do not consider a Bodhisatta in any way superior to a śrāvakka. Any śrāvakka, by the practice of brahmaçariya and ariyamagga, is set on the path of sammattaniyāmatā and so can a Bodhisatta also be.¹¹⁰

Therefore, it is unnecessary to make a special distinction about the Assurance of the Bodhisattas.

It seems thus that the Theravādins are stuck with their well-set notions and are not prepared to consider the theses of their opponents which for them appear to entertain new explanations for certain things. This new element manifests itself as inklings of Mahāyāna after which the unorthodox sects seem to be groping through their diverse pronouncements.

The two key-notes of the Mahāyāna philosophy consist in the doctrines of emptiness and Bodhisatta. As noted here, with the development of Mahāyāna, the Buddha becomes absolutely transcendental. In the last stage of his perfection, a Bodhisatta becomes verily the same as a Buddha.¹¹¹ And prior to this, the only difference between the two is that one is on the move towards a fulfilment which has already been achieved by the other.¹¹² We have seen that the Mahāsāṃghika group of schools emphasized the extraordinary traits in the character of the Buddha and Bodhisatta. This tendency evolved
fully in the *lokottara* conception as found in the *Mahāyāna*. It may be noted that the thirty-two characteristic marks of a Bodhisatta about which a proposition is asserted by the Uttarāpathakas in the *Kathāvatthu* were eventually incorporated in Mahāyāna as essential features of the Buddhas and the Bodhisattas.\textsuperscript{113}

The most significant of the mentioned theses appears to be the one which seeks to affirm: ‘*Bodhisatto issariyaka*karmakārikā*- *hetu vinipātām gacchati ti*’. The idea of unbounded compassion (*mahākarunā*) forms one of the most significant as also the most attractive doctrines of *Mahāyāna*; and Bodhisatta is the very incarnation of this *karunā*. The most remarkable manifestation of the *karunā* of Bodhisatta consists in his voluntary resolve to suffer the torments and agonies of the dreadful purgatories during innumerable aeons, if need be, so that he may lead all beings to perfect Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{114} He is utterly grieved to see the sufferings of others.\textsuperscript{115} He desires the weal and welfare of the world.\textsuperscript{116} He loves all beings as a mother loves her lone child.\textsuperscript{117} He seeks for the Enlightenment of others before his own.\textsuperscript{118} Later Mahāyāna works, such as, those of Āryasūra and Śāntideva exalt *karunā* above all other factors. In fact, in that stage of Mahāyāna, the element of compassion came to characterize the principal feature of the Bodhisatta perhaps even at the expense of the *bodhi* idea.\textsuperscript{119} Maitreya emerges therein as the supreme Bodhisatta.

Undoubted as it is that Mahāyāna Buddhism happened to lay great emphasis on *karunā*, the idea perhaps was not altogether new or alien. In fact, the Buddha himself finally decided to preach his *Dhamma* only out of such a motivation.\textsuperscript{120} He exhorted his disciples to go round the world and preach the *Dhamma* in order to uplift the suffering mass of humanity.\textsuperscript{121} The Pāli tradition also compares the *karunā* of the Buddha with the unselfish compassion of a mother.\textsuperscript{122} The idea of the compassion of the Buddha and the Bodhisatta is very well developed in the *Jātaka* literature. The *Jātakas* abound in stories and legends of his charitable and self-sacrificing acts. The story goes that a Bodhisatta threw himself before a hungry tigress, as else, owing to excessive hunger, she was on the verge of devouring her own little cubs.\textsuperscript{123} Another story
relates that a Bodhisatta in his birth as King Śivi distributed all his wealth among the people and yet remained dissatisfied to see some small insects for whom he had not done any thing. He thereupon inflicted several wounds on his person and shed his blood to feed those insects. Such stories must have been powerful reminders of the importance of the idea of compassion in the Buddhist tradition. The idea of altruism in the personality of a Bodhisatta is elaborately discussed in the Abhidharmakośa also. The discussion starts with the dilemma as to why a Bodhisatta takes such a long course to obtain the supreme Enlightenment. It is because supreme Enlightenment is very difficult to obtain: one needs to accumulate an enormous amount of knowledge and merit, innumerable heroic deeds in the course of three immeasurable kalpas. He undertakes infinite labour for the good of others, because he wants to pull others out of the great flood of suffering. The Andhakas, however, when they make a pronouncement as this, are seeking to draw this idea to its farthest limit which was eventually arrived at in the development of Mahāyāna. The speciality of Mahāyāna in this connection is that the idea of paramount compassion of Bodhisatta was made an ideal valid for all.

Now coming to the niyāma, i.e., Assurance controversies on the Bodhisatta, we witness a similar line of development. The idea of niyāma of the Bodhisatta is fully developed in the Mahāyāna. It is said that the Bodhisatta can come to know even at the very first state of his mind that he will become the Buddha. In the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and Sūtrā-laṅkāra of Asaṅga and other works it is said again and again that by the development of bodhicitta a person becomes an assured (niyata) Bodhisatta, that is to say, through the fulfilment of pāramīs and practice of the various forms of asceticism, he is assured of becoming a Buddha ultimately. As a matter of fact, it is this accomplishment of the Bodhisattas in pāramitās which makes them superior to Arahants and Pratyeka-Buddhas. It is believed that Siddhārtha Gautama in one of his previous births as Jotipāla-mānava did in fact develop bodhicitta during the time of Kassapa Buddha and enter the Path of Assurance. Thereupon in the course of
several births, he fulfilled the paramis and undertook all possible spiritual work whether Buddhistic or non-Buddhistic, and finally attained perfection.\textsuperscript{131} As is well-known, he even underwent the discipleship of Āḷāra Kālāma and Rudraka Rāmaputra whose doctrines are treated as heretical in the Buddhist tradition.\textsuperscript{182} We have noted here that Mahāvastu contains fairly elaborate discussion about the faring of a Bodhisatta through the fulfilment of the pāramitās and bhūmis. It may be that the Andhakas' made a thesis about the Assurance of the Bodhisatta perhaps in the same sense of niyāma as it emerged in the Mahāyāna.

The Theravādins would not obviously accept the Andhaka theses because they cannot entertain all the new tinge that was being given to the person of a Bodhisatta. They are not prepared to accept in any way the superiority of a Bodhisatta as compared to a śrāvaka. This is in fact the crux of the entire problem. The Theravādins are stuck with their own cherished ideal of a śrāvaka or an Arahant. On the contrary, the newly-emerged unorthodox schools consider the śrāvaka or Arahant ideal as thoroughly insufficient and selfish in view of the average persons of the world. Apparently, they are, thus, trying to counteract the Arahant or śrāvaka ideal by a far more befitting ideal of the Bodhisatta. The superiority of Bodhisattas over the śrāvakas is affirmed in the Mahāyāna works in very interesting terms.\textsuperscript{134} It is given to understand that the śrāvakas loath and fear the course of birth and death. On hearing that the individual is śūnya, devoid of substance, and on hearing the teaching of the Four Noble Truths, viz., that all that is composite is impermanent, painful, etc., they abstain from giving rise to imaginative constructions in regard to things. Like the deer that is besieged and hit by poisonous arrow, they just grow anxious and seek quickly to get rid of all things; they do not entertain any other thought. But as to the Bodhisatta, even though he has distaste for old-age, disease and death, he still has the ability to comprehend the true nature of all things; enters straight into the comprehension of non-ultimate of the basic elements of existence, and enters the limitless dharmadhatu. He is like the elephant of the higher kind, the king of elephants, that has entered the hunters net. Although it is hit with the arrow it looks at the hunter with kindness
and affection, and remains absolutely free from fear. It has the ability even then to lead its herd to the camp, moving forth in peaceful gait.\textsuperscript{135}

The Buddhist system, however, really seems to suggest a duality in the ideal of way-faring right from its inception. On the one hand is inculcated the idea of destruction of the āśravas or fetters (malina-vāsanā-kṣaya) which ultimately leads to Nibbāna and on the other is the idea of purification of the āśravas (vāsanā-bodhana). It gives rise to the development of pure āśravas and the personality gets purified. The purified being can embark upon the well-being of the people of the world. The two notions are certainly wide apart from each other. These two seem to differentiate the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna systems respectively. Śrāvakas aspire for the destruction of their own fetters and hence seek their personal salvation only, whereas a truly perfect ideal is much higher than this. This is the ideal of Buddhahood which consists in the acquisition of perfection requiring the purification of āśravas. And this ideal can be attained by none else but a Bodhisatta. Pure āśravas (suddha-vāsanā) are in fact parārthavāsanā. Bodhisatta, motivated with the pure āśravas, fares gradually on the path of perfection. The idea was however not unavailing in the early Buddhist tradition. The ideal of Buddhahood was very much there and also the notion that for the attainment of Enlightenment a farer has to be a Bodhisatta and gradually accomplish the bhūmis through its various stages.\textsuperscript{136}

It is, thus, quite possible to trace some of the important Mahāyāna notions about its Bodhisatta ideal in the Kathāvatthu theses on that subject. The Mahāsāṃghika group of schools appear to make such hypothetical pronouncements which developed later as important tenets of the Mahāyāna. Here again, as mentioned, the Mahāsāṃghika theses appear to represent a transition from the strictly Hinayāna stage to that of the Mahāyāna.

The Mahāsāṃghikas were not however absolute innovators in every sense. As we have occasionally shown, some seeds of these developments were already there in the early Buddhist tradition itself. The Mahāsāṃghikas, or for that matter, the Mahāyānists made a mark by picking up those threads and elaborating them into full-fledged doctrines.
REFERENCES

1. Pāli Bodhisatta is equivalent to Sanskrit Bodhisattva. While ‘Bodhi’ certainly means ‘enlightenment’, different explanations have been offered for the term ‘Sātva’, e.g., ‘Character’, ‘Essence’, ‘Nature’, ‘True Essence’, ‘Any living’, or ‘Sentient Being’, ‘Spirit’, ‘Mind’, ‘Sense’, ‘Consciousness’, ‘Intelligence’, ‘Satta’, ‘Sakta’, ‘Strength’, ‘Energy—Vigour’, ‘Power’, ‘Courage’ and so on. Dr. Hardyal, op. cit., pp. 4-9, has critically examined all these interpretations. He, however, suggests that the safest way is to go back to the Pāli notion of the term. There, Bodhisatta is a term for ‘bodhi-being’. But Satta does not merely denote an ordinary creature. It is related with the Vedic Satva which means a strong or valiant man, hero or warrior. Thus, the Pāli Bodhisatta would be interpreted as ‘heroic being’—spiritual warrior.

It seems, however, that in the old Pāli literature the term ‘Bodhisatta’ has been used in the sense of ‘future Buddha’. The following clause recurs frequently in the Majjhima Nikāya—‘In the days before my enlightenment when as yet I was only a Bodhisatta, etc., cf., e.g., I, pp. 23, 153, 212. The word also seems to be used only in connection with a Buddha’s last life in the Mahāpadāna sutta, Dīgha Nikāya, II, pp. 13ff; Aceharīyabhūtadhamma sutta, Majjhima Nikāya, III, p. 184. Apparently, the earliest references of Bodhisatta occur to denote the lives of one who eventually attained Saṃmā Sambodhi as Gautama Sākyamuni. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the idea of heroism or courage and dedication or attachment to bodhi or in other words the emphasis on bodhi came to be attached to Bodhisatta with the development of his later conception intimations of which we get in the Kathāvatthu.

2. See supra Chapter III.
3. See supra Chapter IV.
5. See infra.
7. Ibid., XXIII. 3.
8. Ibid., IV. 8.
9. On the factors which helped the growth of the Bodhisatta ideal, see Hardyal, op. cit., pp. 10ff.
13. See Kathāvatthu, XVIII. 1-2.
17. Cf. ibid., p. 214.
18. Ibid., p. 148.
19. Cf. ibid., I, 147.
23. Lalitavistara, p. 51; Cf. also Mahāvastu, I, p. 214.
25. Ibid., p. 21.
28. Ibid., pp. 21, 38; see also Boreau, Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhiques, Pt. I, pp. 240-41, 248; see also infra.
30. Winternitz, Some Problems of Indian Literature, p. 63.
34. Poussin, Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l’histoire de la Dogmatique, pp. 21-22.
35. Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 31ff.
37. See supra, p. 7f.
40. Issāriyakāmārṇārikādikāthā: this compound is not found elsewhere; Cf. Debates Commentary, p. 243n.
41. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 197.
42. Bodhipatto issāriyakāmārṇārikāhe tī viṇipātām gacchaīti? Kathāvatthu, XXIII, 3.
43. See Kathāvatthu, p. 536.
44. Kathāvatthu, p. 536.
47. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 197.
52. Walleser, op. cit., p. 25.
53. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 197; see also supra, p. 155.
54. Masuda, op. cit., p. 38; Boreau, Trois Traités sur les Sectes Bouddhi-
The Ideal of the Bodhisatta

58. There are three Chinese recensions of Vasumitra’s treatise, viz., Samayabhедoparacanacakra.
   (a) ‘Shi-pa-pu-la’ or a treatise on the eighteen schools’. This translation is ascribed to Kumārajīva by some and to Paramārtha by others.
   (b) ‘Pu-chi-i-lun’ or ‘a treatise on the differences of the views of the schools’. This translation was done by Paramārtha.
   (c) ‘I-pu-tsung-lun’ or ‘a treatise (called) the wheel of doctrines of different schools’. This is the Yuan Chwang version and is supposed to be the best of all.
60. Ibid., Pt. I, p. 248n.
62. See supra chapter on the Buddhist Sects and Schools.
64. Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā, p. 77.
70. Dīgha Nikāya, III, p. 112.
71. See supra Chapter II.
72. See supra p. 75.
73. See Dīgha Nikāya, II, p. 14ff; III, pp. 110ff; Majjhima Nikāya, II, pp. 382ff; For a fully enumerated list see Lalita Vistara, pp. 74-5.
75. Abhidharmakośa; IV, pp. 220-21.
78. Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā, p. 78.
79. Kathāvatthu, p. 256.
80. Pāli equivalent of Sanskrit Svayambhū.
172 Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

83. See Kathavāththu, pp. 257-58.
84. See Points of Controversy, p. 169n.
85. Cf. Mahāvagga, p. 11; Majjhima Nikāya, I, p. 221.
86. Sāmyutta Nikāya, IV, pp. 361-62.
89. Kathavatthu-Asṭṭhakathā, p. 78.
90. Cf. N. Dutt, EMB, II, pp. 82-3.
91. Niyato Niyāmaṃ okkamati ti? Kathavatthu, XIII, 4,
98. See ibid., p. 143; see also Debates Commentary, pp. 175-76.
100. See Kathavatthu, XXIII, 3; Kathavatthu-Asṭṭhakathā, p. 197f. see also supra, p. 155ff.
101. See Hardayal op. cit., pp. 9ff; Cf. Laṅkāvatāraśūtra, 66, 6; Sukhāvatīvyūha, 15.10ff; Aśī-śaṅkarīkā Prajnā-pāramitā, 375.14ff; Śāntideva’s Śikṣā-saṁcaya, 14, 8.
102. N. Dutt, EMB, II, p. 84.
103. Kathavatthu, IV, 7; see also supra, pp. 158ff.
104. Kathavatthu, IV, 8; see also supra, pp. 160ff.
105. See Kathavatthu-Asṭṭhakathā, p. 143.
106. See Mahāvagga, p. 11, Majjhima Nikāya, I, p. 221.
109. Kathavatthu, IV 8; XIII, 4; also XII, 5. 6.
112. Ibid., 719b, quoted Venkata Ramanan, op. cit., p. 311.
115. Jātaka Māla, 41.1.
117. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, 244, 8; Avadāna Śataka, I. 184.12; 1.209.12; Lalitavistara, pp. 130ff.
118. Śikṣā-saṁcaya, 146.10.
120. Cf. Mahāvagga, pp. 6-10.
121. Ibid., p. 23; Lalitavistara, p. 301.
122. Sutta-Nipāta, p. 291.
123. Jātakamālā, 1ff., Avadānakalpalatā, II, 95ff; II, 907.
124. See Jātakamālā, 6ff; Avādānaśataka, I, 182ff; Avadānakalpalatā, II, 831ff.
126. Kathavātthu, XXIII, 3.
127. Conze, Buddhism, p. 126.
128a. Cf. Śūkṣa-samuccaya, 2. 4-5, 287.14, 228.1-5; Bodhicaryāvatāra, IV, 15, 16, 20; IX, 163 etc.
130. Hardayal, op. cit., p. 170; Cf. Aśṭa-sāhasrikā Prajñā-Parāmitā, 396, 15ff; Lankavatārasūtra, p. 29, verse 62; Sūtrālankāra, 109. 16; 166. 18.
133. See on this point G.N. Kaviraj, Introduction, Baudhā-dharma-darśana by Narendradeo.
Spiritual Stages and Hierarchy

The way that the Lord Buddha is said to have devised for the attainment of Nirvāṇa, consisted in the accomplishment of three cardinal virtues, viz., *sīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā*. Thus, *samādhi*, which was a full-length process of mindfulness, concentration, contemplation, etc., formed the stepping-stone of *paññā*, i.e., wisdom or *vimutti*, i.e., emancipation. While in search of the Truth, when the Buddha decided to abandon asceticism, he is said to have fallen back to his childhood practice of *jhāna*, and it was owing to this that he was led to success.¹

The *Kathāvatthu* contains a number of controversies relating to diverse problems of the Path and its factors. We have theses laying down unique notions of the Path, e.g., (1) The Path can be attained by exclamations, such as, *idam dukkham*;² (2) Four-fold fruition of religious life may be acquired by one single Path,³ or (3) The Path is five-fold.⁴ There are others concerning the assurance (*niyāma*)⁵ or the possibilities of penetrating the truth⁶ and attaining Arahanthhood.⁷ The two key aspects of spiritual way-faring, viz., contemplation and insight also command a keen attention of the early Buddhist sects with the result that a considerable number of controversies.
are related to these problems. The elements or aspects of jhāna were sought to be reclassified. The nature of samādhi was also explored. Similarly, the nature of nirodha was also sought to be determined whether it is worldly (lokiya) or extra-worldly (lokotīra). There are also controversies about vimutti or emancipation.

As we scrutinize the different theses about the Path, discussed in the Kathāvatthu, we generally notice a basic agreement among the sects about the major points on the subject. Some of these theses are, however, still significant in so far as they touch some important issues. The theses, such as, about entering the Path with exclamation or about the attainments in a dream or a womb acquire significance by the very nature of the point they want to make. In all these controversies what is almost uniformly true is that different theses are affirmed on the basis of Canonical passages attributed to the Buddha. The Theravādins emerge as the orthodox defendants and they seek to dispute these assertions on various grounds, mostly on the basis of their own interpretations of the Buddhavacana. In short, the present group of controversies again highlight the prevailing tendency to question existing beliefs and tenets.

THESES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

ENTRANCE INTO THE PATH AND ‘DUKKHA’

The following set of four controversies in the Kathāvatthu reminds us of the older controversy raised by Mahādeva.

ARTICULATE UTTERANCE DURING ECSTACY

The debated issue is as to whether or not there is ‘articulate utterance’ on the part of one who has entered into jhāna. Buddhaghosa offers the information that a thesis was current among the Pubbaseliyas and others that one who has entered into first jhāna, at the moment of attaining the (first or) stream-winner’s way, utters the truth: ‘Sorrow’. Thus, according to the Pubbaseliyas and some others an adept while in the first
jhāna (meditation) and on the point of attainment of the sotāpatimagga, in some cases, gives out an exclamation like ‘aho dukkhan ti’.  

The Theravādins argue in this connection that all physical activities of a meditator are set at rest and hence it is impossible that he should utter such an exclamation. The central argument, however, that the proponents adduce for their thesis is that in the first jhāna (dhyāna) there is viññāṇaviciya and because of this there is vacīsamkhāra. In other words, discursive and discriminating thoughts cause vocal activity, hence there is the possibility that in the first jhāna a meditator utters the word dukkha.

HEARING IN JHĀNA (DHYĀNA)

Another thesis of the Pubbaseliyas discussed in the Kathāvatthu, is closely linked with the preceding. Here they contend that one who has attained jhāna hears sound.

The Theravādins argue that if this be the case, then it should be equally correct to say that the meditator in the course of jhāna can also see, smell, taste and touch objects. The proponents, however, account for the thesis by quoting the same passage as the one mentioned. They observe that as it has been said by the Buddha that sound is a hindrance to the first jhāna and that one rises from the first jhāna by an external sound, therefore, it may be said, one hears sound in meditation. It seems that the second proposition of the Pubbaseliyas emerges as a natural corollary of the first proposition for if it is granted that when one makes an utterance while in a state of jhāna, it would follow that he also hears a sound.

Vasumitra mentions in his treatise two doctrines which correspond to the present thesis. According to Vasumitra, (1) the Mahāsāṃghika group of schools upheld that even in the state of being samāhita one can utter words; and (2) the Haimavata school holds that the Path is realized by utterance. The Mahāsāṃghikas uphold that one can utter words even when in the samāhita stage or dhyāna because the mind in the state of dhyāna is not altogether unconscious of the external world. The stimuli which came from the external world are still
perceptible even in the state of dhyāna and afford opportunity to the mind to ponder over them. On the contrary, the Sarvāstivāda group of schools took the state of samāhita to be of total unconsciousness of the external world, the senses being withdrawn altogether from the external world.²³

Attention may be drawn to an interesting controversy with reference to this point. Once Maudgalyāyana is said to have sat in akincanyayatana-samādhi. As he sat, he heard the bellow of an elephant and, owing to this, he emerged from the abstract meditation. According to the Mahāsamghika group of schools, he heard the bellow in the state of the samādhi, whereas the Sarvāstivādins interpreted that he heard the sound when he came out of the samādhi, because there is no ear-consciousness in that state.²⁴

INDUCING INSIGHT BY SAYING ‘SORROW’

The thesis belongs to the Pubbaseliyas²⁵ again that induction of insight by repeating ‘sorrow’, is a factor included in the Path of salvation.²⁶

The Theravādins put the simple argument that there are many people who utter that word but they cannot all be supposed to be practising the Path.²⁷ However, the proponents seek to apply this thesis to those only who are qualified to win insight (vipassana).²⁸

THE UTTERANCE ‘THIS IS PAIN AND SORROW’

The thesis was held by some like the Andhakas²⁹ that from the words, ‘this is Ill’; insight into the nature of Ill is set working,³⁰ that is to say, this befalls at the moment of his entering into the Path.

According to the Theravādins, if this be the case, then a similar result should ensue on the utterance of the other three Truths. They further question whether the insight issues from every syllable of the formula—"dukkha"? The proponents do not, however, concede that insight issues from each syllable.³¹

According to Vasumitra, the Mahāsamghikas³² believed that (1) the words of suffering can help the process of realization
of the Path; (2) suffering leads a man to Path; (3) suffering also is a kind of food (āhāra); and (4) through the instrumentality (prayoga) of wisdom (prajñā) suffering is destroyed and final beatitude (sukha) is obtained.

It may be observed that the Mahāsāṃghikas of Vasumitra are, perhaps, the same whom Buddhaghosa mentions more specifically as Pubbaseliyas and Andhakas. These sects seek to lay down that when a meditator is led to believe that the world is a heap of cinders full of suffering, he utters the exclamation ‘aho vata dukkham’ and at the very moment that his insight penetrates into the first truth ‘idaṁ dukkhati’ and, as a result, he attains the sotāpattimagga. So dukkhaṁ may be said to be an āhāra as regards the realization of the Path as also an ‘aṅga’ (limb) of sotāpattimagga.33 Masuda has observed on the fourth doctrine, attributed to the Mahāsāṃghikas by Vasumitra, that dukkha can be removed not by means of the observance of moral precepts (silas) and practise of meditation (samādhi) but by knowledge of the truth, causal law, and anatta of the things of the world.34

It may be recalled that the five famous propositions of Mahādeva35 contain an assertion which appears to remind one of this thesis. In this particular assertion, Mahādeva had laid down that Path is attained by an exclamation as ‘aho’. As discussed, we have four theses in the Kathāvatthu of a similar nature: (1) One who has entered into the first jhāna makes an articulate utterance. (2) One who has attained jhāna hears sound. (3) Induction of insight by repeating ‘sorrow’ is a factor included in the Path of salvation. (4) From the words, ‘this is Ill’ (‘idaṁ dukkhafti’), insight into the nature of Ill is set working. It seems that the original proposition of Mahādeva has been analytically split up to arrive at its logical conclusion. Thus, the initial assertion is made that in the state of jhāna one makes an articulate utterance. With a view, perhaps, to rationalizing this statement, it is laid down that one also hears a sound while in jhāna. The logic behind such an utterance and hearing in jhāna is that induction of insight through this utterance is a factor included in the Path of salvation. And finally, from this utterance, viz., ‘idaṁ dukkham’ insight into the nature of Ill is set working, which is verily the same as the original thesis of Mahādeva that the-
Path is attained by an exclamation such as ‘aho’.

We have noted that there seems to be reason behind the tradition that the Śaila schools originated within the Mahāsamghikas owing to a second Mahādeva. It is apparent from some of the theses of the Śaila schools that they became radical advocates of the very same theses which had been formulated originally by Mahādeva. It seems that the emphasis they happened to lay on these points was likely to lead others to describe them as the followers of a second Mahādeva.

THE PATH AND ITS ACQUISITIONS

THE IDEA OF THE UNIQUE PATH

The disputed thesis is that the four-fold fruition of the religious life is realized by one Path only. The commentary of Buddhaghosa informs us that the Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas, owing to an indiscriminate affection for the Buddha, subscribed to the belief that he realized all the four Fruits, i.e., stream-winner, once-returner, never-returner and Arahatship by one single Ariyan Path and not in the four distinct stages, each called a Path.

The Theravāda argument in this connection is that an adept can attain the phalas of the corresponding maggas only, that is to say, a sotāpanna gets rid of sakkāyadiṭṭhi, but he cannot attain the phalas of the sakadāgāmi or anāgāmi magga, i.e., elimination of rūga, dosa and moha. They refer to the statements of the Buddha where he spoke of the specific fetters being removed in specific stages of the Path and thereby challenge the proposition. The proponents do not, however, concede on this point as they think that if the Exalted One developed each Path in succession, he should be called a stream-winner and so on.

Two other controversies are linked with this by the very nature of their content. Also, the advocates of the theses in question are the same.
RETAINING OF DISTINCTIVE ENDOGMENTS

The present thesis lays down that one who realizes a fruition retains the attributes thereof after realizing a higher fruition.\textsuperscript{40} Buddhaghosa observes that there are in fact two kinds of spiritual acquisitions, viz., acquisition at the present moment and acquisition accruing at rebirth hereafter. As against this, the Uttarāpathakas subscribe to a third one also, viz., holding of past acquisitions as permanent acquisition (patti-dhammo) in some rūpa or arūpa heaven. According to them, this acquisition can be retained as long as the jhānic achievement does not spend its force. The Theravāda school disputes the possibility of any such quality over and above the two spiritual acquisitions. Contrary to the present thesis of the Uttarāpathakas, the Theravādins thus hold that all personal endowments are only held, as distinct acquisitions, until they are cancelled by other acquisitions.\textsuperscript{41}

The next controversy centres round a more specific assertion of the same view as stated before. Here it is said that a person, who is practising to realize Arahantship, possesses, as a persistent distinct endowment, the preceding three fruitions.\textsuperscript{42} Buddhaghosa says that the view was shared by the Andhakas that a person holds the three fruitions as an acquired quality (patta-dhamma-vasena).\textsuperscript{43} Thus, on the basis of these two theses, the Uttarāpathakas seek to lay down that even after the realization of a higher fruition, one continues to retain the acquisitions of the preceding fruition. They cite the stock example of the Arahant, who, they think, possesses all the phalas. As against this, the Theravādins hold that in the stage of the Arahant, only Arahantphala is acquired and held.

THE PATH AS FIVE-FOLD ONLY

The Kathāvatthu records a unique debate on the atthaigika-magga. The Mahiśasakas\textsuperscript{44} hold, contrary to the general opinion, that speech, action and livelihood ought to be purified before the Ariyan Path is held to commence and hence the Path is really five-fold.\textsuperscript{45} This is based partly on a Canonical statement,\textsuperscript{46} which is not traceable; and partly on the consideration
that speech, action and livelihood are not states of consciousness like the other five. It is possible that the Mahīśāsaka view harks back to a time when the authority of the Eight-fold Path was not yet fully established. It also incidentally confirms the antiquity of the Mahīśāsaka sect.

ASSURANCE AND INSIGHT

LEARNER’S INSIGHT

The present dispute arises from the assertion that a learner has the insight of an adept. The Uttarāpathakas were the exponents of this thesis. The Theravādins do not accept this opinion for the reason that a learner and an adept are not identical in their accomplishments. The knowledge of an adept cannot be imputed to a learner and hence this thesis is untenable. The proponents, however, seek to make their point by citing an example. According to them, if the present suggestion is incorrect, how could Ananda, only a learner, know about the sublimity of the Buddha and his illustrious disciples as Sāriputta and Mogallāna.

It may be noted here that another thesis, belonging to the Andhakas, which lays down that a disciple can have knowledge about fruition, also tends to bridge the distance between the śrāvakas and the Buddha.

The Sammatiyas are said to hold that the puthuṣjana (average being) renounces kāmacchanda and vyāpāda, which is against the orthodox view of their complete renunciation occurring gradually in the Path. The Sammatiyas relied on the fact that the Canon refers to virtuous men of the past who were born in the Brahmaloka after death. They are said to have been freed from the bonds of sense-desire, though they had not entered the Path.

PATH OF ASSURANCE AND THE AVERAGE BEINGS

The Uttarāpathakas proposed two interesting theses relating to the Path of Assurance and the average beings. (1) That one, who has not gained Assurance (i.e., aniyata), may have
the insight (ñāna) to enter the Path of Assurance.\(^56\) (2) That the average man may possess final Assurance.\(^57\) According to Buddhaghosa,\(^58\) this sect is led to uphold the first thesis on the basis of certain statements of the Buddha who predicted for certain puthujjanas (average beings) that they would realize the truth ultimately, e.g., in the case of Aṅgulimāla. The Buddha had said that the person who enters the right way of Assurance (samma-niyama) is capable of penetrating the Dhamma.\(^59\) As regards the second thesis, the Uttarāpathakas based it on the sutta-passage—'once immersed is so once for all'.\(^60\) The Theravādins do not agree to either of the propositions and engage their advocates in a lengthy argumentation. The proponents, however, stick to their views that the puthujjanas who are aniyata (not definitely destined to attain Nibbāna) or who are doers of evil acts may ultimately become niyata and realize the truth.\(^61\)

SEVEN REBIRTHS’ LIMIT

Closely related to this is another thesis of the Uttarāpathakas who lay down that the persons who have to take seven more births to attain Nibbāna (sattakkhattuparama) can reach the goal after seven births and not earlier or later.\(^62\)

The Uttarāpathakas\(^63\) base their thesis on a statement of the Buddha that a certain person is liable to seven rebirths only.\(^64\)

The Theravādins would not agree to this by reasoning that such persons may quicken the pace of their progress by greater exertion or retard the same by performing evil deeds.

Initiating the debate, the Theravādins argue as to whether such an assured person is capable of murdering his mother, father, or an Arahant, or capable, with a malign heart,\(^65\) of shedding the blood of the Tathāgata or of creating schism in the Order. Buddhaghosa explains this by saying that there are two fixed orders (niyāma), the right order (samma-niyāma) and the wrong order (micchattaniyāma). The right order is that of the Ariyan Way which assures a man that he is not liable to fall (avipāta-dhammo) and that he is destined to attain the fruits (phalappatti). The wrong order is that of acts that find retribution in the very next existence. Now the
seven-rebirths'-limit person is destined by the stream-winner's way not to undergo punishment in purgatory and to attain the fruits. But as he does not follow the second order, he is incapable of doing things which entail inevitable retribution in the very next existence. There is, therefore, no nīyāma by which his rebirths may be limited only to seven births.66

According to Buddhaghosa, the Uttarāpathaka argument is unconvincing because the Buddha when he said—"This person, after going through this number of becomings, will utterly pass away"—specified, 'this number' by his own power of insight, and he did not assign thereby any fixed number of becomings to a man of the seven-rebirths'-limit.67

The next controversy given as a sequel to the foregoing68 is more an offshoot of the above, the upholders being the same, i.e., the Uttarāpathakas.69 They observe that if the Theravādins maintain that it is wrong to say that the Kolaṅkola (farer from family)70 or one ranking in the First Path next above him of the seven-rebirths'-limit is assured of salvation by his rank, does not his rank itself guarantee that he shall attain? And does not the next higher rank in the First Path, that of the eka-bijin, or 'one-seeder', also guarantee final salvation? Buddhaghosa however remarks in the same strain that the Buddha did not assign any order of becoming to a man of the seven-rebirths'-limit, either in the next higher rank in the First way (Kolaṅkola), or in that of 'one-seeder' (eka-bijin).71

In this debate, the Uttarāpathakas simply propose that a person who has been able to restrict his further births to a limit of seven at the most is assured of final salvation at the end of exactly seven births. The Theravādins, however, argue that such an assured person may be capable of attaining the insight during the interval. At the same time, while the sammattaniyāma does not fix the exact number of rebirths for such a person, there is no other nīyāma left except the micchattaniyāma which is obviously irrelevant. There is a similar thesis which affirms that for a person in the seventh rebirth evil tendencies are eliminated.72
SENSUOUS AND SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE

PATH CULTURE AND THE SENSES

Here the disputed thesis is that one may develop the Path while enjoying the five-fold cognitions of sense.73 According to Buddhaghosa, this thesis is advocated by the Mahāsamghikas74 on the basis of a sutta-passage—'When he sees an object with the eye, he does not grasp at it in idea'.75 The Theravādins argue in this connection that if this be the case, then either the Path developed is of a worldly nature, or the practiser’s sense-experience must be of the nature of the Path. But neither is possible, because the sense-cognition is worldly, and has not Nibbāna as its object.76

The five cognitions do not include manoviññāṇa which alone is relevant for maggabhāvanā. But the mahāsamghika does not speak of the six viññāṇas.77 There is, besides, a great gulf which separates the nature of sensuous perception and its object, on the one hand, from the mental awareness of the Paths and their nature, on the other. How then can the two be joined together in any relevant unity? Against these arguments of the Theravādin, the Mahāsamghikas apparently rely on the injunction to perceive the unsubstantiality of perceptible things without clinging to them. According to the Theravādin, however, this does not refer to the comprehension of Nirvāṇa as śānta. It refers only to the Path of a worldly nature.78

HIGHER LIFE AMONG THE DEVAS

Here the disputed assertion is that there is no higher life among the Devas.79 Buddhaghosa offers the explanation in his commentary that the higher life is of two-fold improt: path-culture and renunciation of the world. No deva practises the latter. But the former is not forbidden to them, except to those of the unconscious plane. But some, for instance the Sammitīyas, do not believe in any path-culture among the higher devas of the kāmaloka, and beyond them of the rūpaloka.80 They support their assertion on the basis of a sutta-passage where the Buddha had said that in three respects the people of India excel those of North Kuru and the Three and Thirty gods—in courage, in...
mindfulness and in the religious life.\textsuperscript{81}

There is an unattributed thesis which affirms that there is self-control among the Devas. The simple logic of this thesis as presented in the Kathāvaśītha is that if the Devas were devoid of self-control they would be thieves and murderers.\textsuperscript{82} The Andhakas also proposed a thesis that rūparāga and arūparāga are elements in rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu.\textsuperscript{83}

THE EIGHTH MAN

The eighth man is the rendering of the Pāli term āṭṭhama-kha which is a term for a person who has entered the stream. This is the lowest stage of the Four Paths and Four Fruitions and hence the eighth from Arahatship. It is this state which is arrived first in the course of the Buddhist way-faring. There are two assertions made about the person of this stage, which the orthodox section seeks to dispute.

(1) The first thesis is laid down by the Andhakas and Sammatiyas\textsuperscript{84} that for the person in the eighth stage, outbursts of wrong views and of doubts are put away.\textsuperscript{85} What they mean thereby is that at the moment of entering on the Path, after qualification and adoption, two of the (ten) corruptions no longer break out in the eighth man. The simple argument that they apply is that since the outburst of the two things, i.e., wrong views and doubt, is not liable to arise in a person of that stage, so one can very well say that their outburst has been put away.\textsuperscript{86} The Theravādins, however, argue that one cannot put away specific fetters without practising the specific stages of the Path. If, as the proponents suggest, the eighth man has checked the possibility of wrong views and doubt, he should be then described as a stream-winner.\textsuperscript{87} The proponents do not concede the idea of identifying the eighth man with a stream-winner, though they stick to their proposition.

(2) The second debate about the eighth man arises over the assertion that the ‘five controlling powers\textsuperscript{88} are absent in a person of the eighth stage’.\textsuperscript{89} According to Buddhaghosa, a belief is current among the Andhakas that at the moment of entering the first stage of the Path, the ‘eighth man’ is in process of acquiring, but has not yet attained to these powers.\textsuperscript{90} The Theravādins point out the contradiction involved in
the proponents’ thesis that the eighth man has faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and reason and yet he is devoid of the controlling powers of each of these respectively. They also refer to a certain statement of the Buddha who observed that the completion and perfection of the five controlling powers make one an Arahant and this accomplishment in respect of the controlling powers is held in all the lower Path stages in a corresponding lower degree. The person who is completely bereft of this achievement is an average person. Now the Andhaka argument would be that the eighth man not being the same as an average man, it must not be said that the five controlling powers are absent in him.

CAPABILITIES OF AN EMBRYO AND A DREAMER IN THE PATH-CULTURE

The present controversy revolves round a series of interesting assertions made by some of the Uttarāpathakas. They laid down four theses of a similar nature: (1) That an ‘embryo is down capable of penetrating the truth’, (2) That an ‘embryo is capable of attaining Arahantship’, (3) That a ‘dreamer is capable of penetrating the truth’, (4) That a ‘dreamer is capable of attaining Arahantship’. As regards their first assertion, the Uttarāpathakas assumed that a way-farer who was a stream-winner in his previous birth and remained so, must be able to grasp the Truth while an embryo. The Theravādins argue in this connection that there are only two avenues open towards the growth of right views for a person, viz., (a) listening to other’s voice and (b) intelligent attention. Obviously, an embryo is incapable of doing either. And, therefore, an embryo cannot penetrate the truth. It has been observed that the Uttarāpathakas were perhaps feeling out a theory of ‘heredity’. There is, however, nothing in their assertion to warrant the idea of heredity. In fact, their present proposition is in keeping with some of their earlier assertions regarding the holding of past acquisitions as permanent acquisitions. It is on the simple logic of the law of action that they seem to be claiming an embryo’s capability penetrating the truth.

The Uttarāpathakas are led to hold the second thesis on the basis of such legends where some very young stream-winners
were supposed to have attained Arahantship. There goes the story, for example, that a seven-year-old son of a certain lay disciple Suppavāsā was able to attain Arahantship.100 Thus, the Uttarāpathakas happened to believe in anti-natal attainment of Arahantship, that is to say, they thought that the embryonic consciousness carries the force of previous birth and the attainment of Arahantship is an effect culminating from his past actions. The central argument of the Theravādins against all these propositions is that the penetration of Truth is not possible for a person who is asleep, or languid (pamattā) or blurred in intelligence (matthasatissa) or one who is unreflective (asampajāna).101 The present set of theses seem to be in line with the tenet that the Buddha preaches while in the womb.102

TWO ASPECTS OF SPIRITUAL WAYFARING—CONTEMPLATION AND INSIGHT

JHĀNA AND SAMĀDHĪ

It has been suggested that jhāna was the characteristic mean which Buddha advocated for spiritual realization.103 It stood for the stilling of the mind which led to its purification and illumination. The mind was compared to a pool or mirror, which, when tranquilled or polished, became transparent and clear. When the mind is purified through the subsidence of the kilesas, the nīvaraṇas it becomes luminous as a result of jhānic practice. When the mind is perturbed, its cognitions are rendered defective by the working of passions and verbal habits and intellectual distractions. It is only after it has been stilled and purified by jhāna that it is capable of emerging into the still and silent synoptic vision of truth. It is this vision which is paññā properly so called. This entire process from the cultivation of jhāna to the attainment of the Buddhist beatific vision has been repeatedly and diversely described in early texts and in fact this description forms a stereotype.

In the Nikāyiic descriptions four jhānas have been mentioned.108 The first jhāna has five elements—vitakka, vicāra, sukhasomanassa, pīti-passaddhi, ekaggatā. In the second jhāna, the first two, in the third, the third element and in the fourth, the
fourth element subsides. The desire for logical arrangement soon led to a reclassification of this process into five stages,\textsuperscript{103} in each of which only one more element subsided. The Mahāsāṃghikas held that the passage from one jhāna to another did not require any intermediate stages.\textsuperscript{106} Buddhaghosa takes this to be a denial of the need of any preparatory stages (upacāra).\textsuperscript{107} Perhaps the thesis is really intended to uphold the scheme of four jhānas as against that of five jhānas. In contrast to this thesis of jhāna-saṅkhamati, there is the thesis advocated by the Sammatiyas which proposes intermediate stages (jhānantarika).\textsuperscript{108} Buddhaghosa, however, distinguishes this view from the Theravāda view of the five jhānas.\textsuperscript{109}

The standard formula for the four jhānas refers to vitakka and vicāra as elements of the first jhāna. They have been explained by Buddhaghosa as initial and sustained applications of the mind.\textsuperscript{110} It may be noted that the Yogasūtras apparently attach a different meaning to these words.\textsuperscript{111} In the Kathāvatthu, the Uttarāpathakas seem to assert that vitakka or attending to is a universal feature of psychic states.\textsuperscript{112} This is questioned on the obvious ground that there are jhānic states which are Canonically described avitakka. In view of this, it would seem that the Uttarāpathakas, perhaps, used the word vitakka in a more general sense too than the usual one, for example, they might have meant either the mere fact of the mind attending to its object, which is universally true, or they might have meant that there is a discursive element in all consciousness which would, by implication, be transcended only with the transcendence (nirodha) of the mind.\textsuperscript{113}

An interesting Andhaka thesis asserts that jhāna is enjoyed (assādeti) and that it is the object of a desire (nikkanti) for itself.\textsuperscript{114} The assertion of assāda and nikkanti for jhāna finds some Canonical support.\textsuperscript{115} What is more, in the first three jhānas, the elements of piti and sukha being there, how can enjoyment and proclivity be denied. The Theravāda refutation, therefore, is only concerned with determining the ultimately instrumental status of jhāna. There is, however, no doubt that contemplation and the world corresponding to it were given in early Buddhism a status of value and considerable enthusiasm was expressed for them. According to Schayer, in pre-Canonical Buddhism, the elements of rūpa alone were
considered impermanent. This almost Platonic exaltation of a contemplative consciousness appears to have come in for some relative depreciation in the Abhidharma which has place only for analysis, supernormal powers and the transcendent.

The profoundest problem concerning jhāna has been touched in a thesis which discusses the nature of samādhi. The orthodox opinion discovers the meaning of samādhi in ekaggatā, that is to say, if a moment of thought is both moral as well as concentrated on a single object, then we have samādhi. The Sabbatthivādins and the Uttarāpathakas criticize this on the score that one-pointedness is a universal feature of the mind on account of its momentariness. Samādhi, therefore, must mean a continuous flow of the mind (cittasantatissamanādhī ti). This apparently rational way of seeking the essence of samādhi as a feature characterizing a sequence rather than a moment of the mind is dismissed by the Theravādins on the score that the past and the future cannot be collected together into a set.

Several theses (XV.7-XV.9) relate to the elucidation of the highly obscure topic of nirodha. Two theses raise the issue whether saññāvedayitanirodha is worldly (lokiya) or supramundane (lokoittara). The Hetuvāda thesis that nirodha conduces to rebirth among the asaññāsattā, however, really implies that the nirodha is worldly or lokiya in its nature. The orthodox view refuses to categorize nirodha as either lokiya or lokoittara and regards it as a mere negative state, the suppression of four mental khandhas. However, the Rājagirikas have been attributed the thesis that, since there is no law about dying, a person may die even in a state of saññāvedayitanirodha. The Theravādins observe that death implies the operation of relevant causal factors and events in the mind which in such a case is complete abeyance. The Rājagirikas insist on repeating their inconvenient query—is there a rule governing the occurrence of death? The Theravādins can only say—"niyāme āsante pi marañnasamayena eva marati na asamayenāti."

Since the jhāna (concentration) over a physical object is gradually transformed into the contemplation of an idea, the Andhakas asserted that such jhāna produces hallucination. This opinion really is an important philosophical question. If the Andhaka view were logically pressed it would reduce
all conceptual and judgemental knowledge to error—a position which finds much support in Mahāyāna. This may be compared with the more outspoken and radical thesis attributed to the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas who assert the impossibility of grouping together different things under generic concepts. They argue that things are not like cattle to be tied together by a yoke. They are essentially different and there are no real universals. This is an example of extreme nominalism.

SPIRITUAL INSIGHT (YĀNA AND PATĪSAMBIDĀ)

In early Buddhist texts, cognitive phenomena have been classified in several ways. We have thus the distinction between sensation (pañca viññāna) and ideation (mano viññāna), perception (viññāna) and conception (saññā), popular belief (sammuti) and ultimate or transcendental knowledge. Supernormal knowledge or insight such as clairvoyance or telepathy was designated abhiññā while spiritual insight arising from meditation (in the original sense) and contemplation was called abhisamaya and patīsambhidā or vipassanā. It appears to have been believed that worldly knowledge, whether common-sense or science, arose from a mixture of sensation and conception and while it had a practical value, it rested on presupposition of avidyā and functioned within its realm. The comprehension of the three marks paved the way for the advance of knowledge to the plane of spiritual vision. In this advance were left behind not only sensations but also ultimately conceptions arising from and leading to the use of words, logical dichotomies and antinomies, in short, the discursive mode of knowledge. Thus, knowledge progressed from the pragmatic beliefs of common people embodying relative truth to the intuitive comprehension of the ultimate spiritual truth (paramattha).

The Andhakas appear to question this general dichotomy. They assert that all knowledge is patīsambhidā and that popular knowledge too should be deemed to have truth for its object. These propositions serve to highlight the prevailing Andhaka tendency to question existing beliefs and distinctions. The first of these two assertions implies the
wider question of the relationship of spiritual insight to the ordinary knowledge within the psyche of the Arahant. The Mahāsanghikas held that one who has removed spiritual ignorance by insight into the Path cannot simultaneously be experiencing ordinary sensuous cognition. The Pubbaseliyas proposed further that spiritual insight and ordinary consciousness, pertaining to the Arahant, must be quite independent mutually. To the same problem the Andhakas propose another solution—when the Arahant has sensuous cognition, at that time his spiritual insight may be deemed to be objectless. The Pubbaseliyas also suggest that the knowledge of the twelve aspects of the four truths constitutes a twelve-fold supramundane insight (lokottara yāna). This seems to stress minor distinctions more than the basic unity of such knowledge. The Hetuvādins question the division of insight (yāna) into worldly (lokiya) and extra-worldly (lokottara). They suggest that only the insight into the spiritual truth ought to be regarded as insight. This is tantamount to questioning the possibility of intuitive knowledge concerning significant truths at the level of ordinary worldly experience. The Theravādins seek to refute it by drawing the gratuitous conclusion that the thesis in question is intended to deny the powers of reasoning and reflection to the ordinary man. What is really denied is intuition.

Several theses (viz. V.7-10; III.9) relate to supernormal knowledge. Several of these raise the problem—what is the exact object of an intuitive knowledge concerning another's mind? Is such knowledge simply the knowledge of another's mental state or also of the objects of the latter. That this is a relevant doubt is shown by the fact that the Yogasūtras expressly deny this latter possibility. Buddhaghosa’s interpretation, however, explains that the Andhakas in V.7, mean to assert only the knowledge of bare citta or vinñhāna denying the sampayutta dhammas of the citta as falling within the ken of telepathy. This reduces the Andhaka thesis to complete insignificance if not to a palpable error. In V.8, the question of the possibility of knowing the future is raised. In view of the Buddha’s well-known prediction, the Andhakas seem to be obviously in the right, but the Theravādins raise the difficulty of knowing the proximate future for some reason
which is wholly obscure. They seem to think that the immediate future cannot be predicated, *(anantare ekanten' eva ṇāṇāṁ natiḥ)*, because the knowledge of the relevant causes and conditions for doing so would not be available.\(^{142}\) The Theravādins seem to be appealing to a kind of rational probabilistic knowledge which is uncertain for immediate instances and acquires certainty only over a long range. Their opponents, however, seem to have an intuitive knowledge in mind. The debate in V.9 seems to turn over the possibility of direct introspection.\(^{143}\) The Andhakas assert that insight being itself an impermanent phenomenon ought to be an object of insight.

**EMANCIPATION**

The Andhakas hold that it is only the mind with *rāga* that gets emancipated *(sarāgam cittāṁ sarāgato vimutti)*.\(^{144}\) In orthodox theory, a distinction is made between the subsidence or *rāga* which occurs at an earlier stage and emancipation which is the last stage and means freedom from rebirth. The Andhaka thesis does not seem to have the technical distinction between the *anāgāmī* and an Arahant. Their thesis is simply and picturesquely stated—emancipation is the removal of passion from the mind like dirt from a cloth. There is similar import of two other theses according to which obstructions *(nivaraṇas)* and fetters *(saṁyojanas)* are cast off only by those who are bound by them.\(^{145}\)

It is also proposed that there is a continuous process between the *vikkhaṁbhan-vimutti* accomplished by jhāna and the *saṁuccheda-vimutti* accomplished by the *maggakhāṇa*.\(^{146}\) On the orthodox view, the former is simply a preparation of the mind while the latter is entering the Path and undergoing a critical and reversible change approaching emancipation. Here again it is clear that the thesis considers the whole matter in a simple and non-technical way.\(^{147}\)

We have another thesis of the Andhakas which asserts that the 'knowledge of emancipation has itself the quality of emancipation'.\(^{148}\) Buddhaghosa points out that the *vimuttināṇa* refers to four ṇāṇas—vipassanā, *magga*, *phala* and *paccavekkhāna*. Of these *vipassanā* is *vimuttināṇa* or free because it is free from
the sense of a permanent object. Mārga is a severance from evils and hence has samuccaheda vimutti. Phala is peaceful repose and it has paṭipassaddhi-vimutti. Paccavekkhāna is the reflective knowledge of vimutti and hence deemed free of these four types of vimutti-ñāṇas. Only the phalañāṇa is to be really called vimutta in the real sense of the word (nippari-yāyena). The Andhakas do not make these distinctions but refer to all the vimuktiñāṇa as vimutta or emancipated. As in the case of the previous thesis on vimutti, so here the view controverted by the Theravādins gives the impression of being simpler and more archaic.
REFERENCES

1. See *Lalitavistara*, 1, 263; see also C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Sākyas*, p. 162.
3. Ibid., XVIII. 5.
4. Ibid., XX. 5.
5. See ibid., I. 5; V. 2, 4, 10; IX. 7; XII. 5.
6. Ibid., XXII. 4.
7. Ibid., XXII. 5.
8. Ibid., XVIII. 6-7.
9. Ibid., XI. 6.
10. Ibid., XV. 7-8.
11. Ibid., XII. 3-4; V. 1; XIII. 5-6.
12. *Samāpattārathī vacīlābhedo ti*, *Kathāvatthu*, II. 5; cf. also IX. 9,
    Masuda, op. cit., p. 33.
17. *Kathāvatthu-*Āṭṭhakathā, p. 175.
18. *Kathāvatthu*, XVIII. 8; cf. also IX. 8.
22. Ibid., p. 52.
23. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 23n.
24. Ibid., loc. cit.
27. Ibid., p. 187.
29. Ibid., p. 130.
30. ‘Idam dukkhan ti’ vācaṁ bhāsato, ‘idam dukkhan ti ṭhānaṁ pavattatī’,
    *Kathāvatthu*, XI. 6.
31. See ibid., pp. 394-6.
33. See *Kathāvatthu-*Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 56-7.
34. Masuda, op. cit., p. 24n.
35. See supra, pp. 50 ff.
36. See supra, pp. 65 ff.
37. *Ekena ariyamassena cattāri sāmaññaphalāni sacchikaro tī*,
    *Kathāvatthu*, XVIII. 5.
41. Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 74-5.
42. Arahattasacchikiriyāyā paṭippamo puggalo tihi phalehi samamāgato ti,
   Kathāvattu, IV. 9.
43. See Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 77, 79.
44. Ibid., p. 186.
45. Pañcaṅgiko maggoti, Kathāvattu, XX. 5.
46. See ibid., p. 516; see also Points of Controversy, p. 348.
   C.A.F. Rhys Davids, What Was the Original Gospel? p. 60;
   Sāky, p. 89; see also JRAI, 1935, p. 723.
49. Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 80-81.
51. See Kathāvattu, pp. 271-2.
52. Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 87.
53. Sāvakassassa phale aññān aññati, Kathāvattu, V. 10.
54. See Kathāvattu, I. 5; Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 42-3.
57. Atthi puthujjanassa accantaniyāmati ti, Kathāvattu, XIX. 7.
58. Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 82-3.
61. See Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 180-1.
62. Sattakkhattuparamo puggalo sattakkhattuparamatā niyato ti?
   Kathāvattu, XII. 5.
63. See Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 137.
65. Duṭṭhena-cittena.
67. See Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 137-8; see also Debates Commentary,
   p. 170.
68. Kathāvattu, XIII. 6, Kolankalakathā.
70. Cf. Points of Controversy, pp. 77a, 269n.
71. See Debates Commentary, pp. 168-70; cf. Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā,
72. Na vattabbam 'sattamabhavekassa puggalassa paññā duggattti,
   Kathāvattu, XII. 10.
74. Kathāvattu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 123.
75. Aṅguttara Nikāya, I, pp. 103-4.
76. See Kathāvattu, pp. 371-3.
78. See ibid., pp. 123-5.
81. Āṅguttara Nikāya, IV, p. 38.
82. See Kathāvatthu, III, 10; see also Kathāvatthu-Asṭhakathā, p. 71.
83. Kathāvatthu, XVI, 10.
86. Kathāvatthu, pp. 222-3.
87. Ibid., pp. 220ff.
88. The five controlling powers or spiritual sense-faculties are faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, reason or understanding. Cf. Sānyutta Nikāya, IV, pp. 174-5.
89. Āṭṭhamakassā puggalassā nathi saddhīndriyān ti, Kathāvatthu, III, 6.
94. Āṭṭhi gabbhaseyyāya dhammābhīsamayo ti? Kathāvatthu, XXI, 4; also XIV, 2, where the Pūbbasēliyas assert that the sense-mechanism of the embryo starts at the moment of conception.
95. Āṭṭhi gabbhaseyyāya arahattappattitī? Ibid., XXII, 5.
96. Āṭṭhi supinagatassā dhammābhīsamayo ti? Ibid., p. 530.
98. Points of Controversy, p. 360n.
99. See above.
100. See Pss. of the Brethren, lxx. 'Sivali', the child saint in question; Udāna, pp. 79ff.
102. See supra, p. 153.
Cf. Visuddhimagga, pp. 57, 95ff; see also Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva; 195.15; Yogasūtras, I, 17.
105. See Dhammasaṅgāni, pp. 48-51.
108. Āṭṭhi jhānantarikā ti, Kathāvatthu, XVIII, 7.
110. Visuddhimagga, p. 95.
111. Yogasūtras, I, 42-4.
112. Sabbam cittaṁ vitakkānupatītān ti, Kathāvatthu, IX, 7; see also Kathāvatthu-Asṭhakathā, pp. 118-19.
114. Samāpanno, assādeti jhānānikanti jhānārammaṇā ti, Kathāvatthu, XII, 7; see also Kathāvatthu-Asṭhakathā, pp. 144-5.
117. See Yogasūtras, IV, 51, where sāṅga is mentioned as a danger for the yogis.
120. In the Yogasūtras, samādhi is essentially a flow of mind; see Yogasūtras, II, 3; III, 11.
121. Saṅhāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti lokuttarā ti, Kathāvatthu, XV, 7; Saṅhāvedayitanirodha samāpatti lokīya ti, ibid., XV, 8.
122. Saṅhāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti asahānasattupikā ti, Kathāvatthu, XV, 10; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 155-6.
123. See Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 155.
125. See Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 81.
127. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 94.
133. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 84.
135. ṇāṇam cittaṭvippayuttaṁ ti, Kathāvatthu, XI, 3.
136. ṇāṇam atthaṁmaṇaṁ ti, Kathāvatthu, IX, 5.
137. Dvādasavattthukaṁ ṇāṇam lokuttarān ti, Kathāvatthu, XX, 6.
139. See Yogasūtras, IV, 20.
140. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 84-5.
141. Anāgata ṇāṇain atthiti, Kathāvatthu, V, 8.
142. See Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 85.
143. Paccuppamme ṇāṇain atthiti, Kathāvatthu, V, 9.
144. See Kathāvatthu, III, 3; Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 65.
145. *Nivuto nivaranam jahattii*, *Kathavatthu*, XIII. 5; *Sammukhibhuto sahinojanam jahattii*, ibid., XIII. 6.


149. See *Kathavatthu-Atthakathā*, p. 80.
The Buddhist Samgha—Its Spiritual Interpretation

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The fact that the Samgha occupies a very important position in Buddhism is amply evident as it constitutes the Three Jewels (triratna) of the Buddhists, viz., Buddha, Dhamma and Samgha. The great practical achievement of the Buddha was to found a religious Order which has lasted to the present day. It is chiefly to this institution that the performance of his religion is due.¹ It seems that the very nature of his Dhamma required for its successful propagation the help of some organized and well trained Samgha. It is observed that the inclusion of Samgha in the Tisaraṇa formula was done under the express order of the Buddha himself.² A person seeking to opt for the Buddhist way of life has to seek refuge in all the three with, perhaps, an equal amount of urgency and dedication to each one of them. From the beginning the monks were the Buddhists par excellence who could go up to emancipation and on whom was laid the duty of preaching the doctrine and guiding the laity. A special organization was created by the Buddha for the monks and the patronage of laity led to its material
prosperity. It was again the Sāṅgha which naturally claimed
to be the rightful body for interpreting the Dhamma. For
these reasons, the continued growth of the Sāṅgha was natural
in the centuries following the Buddha.

In the wake of the growing tendency of difference and debate
over various tenets of Buddhism, the Sāṅgha was inevitably
involved. With doubts and scepticism regarding the nature
of the Buddha and the elements of his doctrine, the concept
of the Sāṅgha also fell a prey to the upsurge. Consequently,
some assertions were made by certain sects with regard to the
Sāṅgha seeking to emphasize an ideal and abstract nature
for it as against the hard fact of its visible and factual reality.
This was something alien to the orthodox Theravādins who
perhaps formed the major bulk of its numerical strength.
Granting the new propositions was against their notion of
the Sāṅgha as a living body of monks. The Kathāvatthu
has taken up some of the interesting assertions for debate
and shown their untenability from the Theravāda point of
view.

THESES AND ARGUMENTS

AS AN ABSTRACT NOTION THE ORDER (SĀṅGHĀ).
CANNOT ACCEPT GIFTS

The present issue of debate seeks to discuss as to whether the
Order can accept gifts or not? According to the commentary
of Buddhaghosa, that section of the Vatulyakas, which is
known as Mahāsūññatāvādins, believes that in the metaphys-
cical sense (paramattha) of the word, the Order means the
Paths and the Fruits which being abstract notions cannot be
said to accept gifts.

The Theravādins, however, maintain that the Order, as the
supreme field of merit in the world, is worthy of offerings (āhu-
neyya), hospitality (pāhuneyya), gifts (dakkhiṇeyya), salutations
(aṅjaliṅkarāṇīya). Besides this, the Buddha laid down that four
pairs of men and eight classes of individuals are worthy of
gifts, as also that there are people who offer gifts to them.
Finally, the Theravādins quote a certain utterance of the Bud-
thā that the Order accepts gifts. Thus, the Theravādins would
maintain that the Order accepts gifts, a position diametrically opposed to the one suggested by the above thesis.

The advocates of the proposed thesis, however, argue that the Path and the Fruition cannot accept gifts and since, the Order stands for nothing but the preceding two, it cannot be said to accept gifts. It may be mentioned that the nature of what constitutes a gift or its results or its purification were matters themselves subjected to abstract debate in which the Rājagirikas, the Siddharthikas and the Uttarāpathakas played an important part.

OR PURIFY THE SAME

Again, the same section of the Vetulyakas, i.e., the Mahāsuṇṇatāvādins uphold, as a corollary to the previously mentioned that the Order as an abstract notion constituted of the Path and its Fruition, cannot be supposed to purify the gifts.

The Theravādins put forth similar arguments as in the preceding debate. They however make an additional point that there are people who offer gifts to the Order as well as make their offerings effective.

OR SHARE IN DAILY LIFE

Another thesis, belonging to the Mahāsuṇṇatāvādins with regard to the Order, seeks to lay down that it is incorrect to say that the Order enjoys (bhuṇjati), eats (khādati) and drinks (pivati).

But the Theravādins observe that it has to be admitted that there are people who partake of the meals of the Order, both daily as well as on special occasions. The Theravādins also bring in the reference of such utterances of Buddha where he spoke of (ganabhōjana) ‘meals taken in company’, (parampara-bhōjana) ‘in turn’, (atirittabhōjana) ‘of food left over’, and (anatirittabhōjana) ‘not left over’, as also of eight kinds of drinks.

OR CONFER GREAT MERIT

The last of the present set of theses again belongs to the
Mahāsuññatāvādins, who seek to lay down that it should not be said that ‘a thing given to the Order brings great reward’. The basic objection of the Therāvādins against this thesis is the same as in the previous controversies. They strengthen their argument by citing such suttas passages wherein the importance of giving to the Order is laid down. They quote the word of the Buddha who asked the lady of the Gotamas to give to the Order and thereby render honour to him as well as to the Saṅgha. Elsewhere, it is simply said that one who makes a gift to the Order reaps a great reward.

The Kathāvatthu contains a corresponding set of controversies wherein problems like the nature, content and efficacy of gifts are under dispute.

### NATURE OF GIFT

The first controversy of this set rests over the assertion that giving or dāna is a mental state. According to Buddhaghosa, the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas (Siddharthikas) recognized only the mental attitude in giving.

The Theravādins argue in this connection that dāna cannot be a mental state, otherwise it should be possible for one to give away his mental state to others.

The proponents, i.e., the Rājagirikas and the Siddharthikas, however, observe that the act of giving does not result into undesirable or disagreeable consequences, rather, its opposite is true. Thus, dāna is a mental state merely.

The Theravādins further argue that, granting the fact that dāna was pronounced by the Buddha, it cannot be yet maintained that giving a robe or alms food, etc. directly brings about desirable results.

In turn, the proponents quote from the utterances of Buddha where he speaks of meritorious giving and five great dānas as supreme. They maintain thereby that giving is a mental state.

The Theravādins also quote the words of Buddha to reiterate their view that dāna is a thing to be given and not a mental state as the proponents affirm.

The Buddha had clearly laid down that karmā or moral action consisted in will (cetanā) and volitional acts (cetayitvā). As Nāgārjuna also states, ‘cetanā cetayitvā ca karmoktiṁ
The Theravādins seem to consider dāna exclusively under the second heading, i.e., they regard giving and what is given as constituting dāna in virtue of their being in consequence to volitional acts. The Rājakīrikas and the Siddharthikas, on the other hand, seem to have in mind only that psychic factor which invests dāna with a moral value. It may be recalled that already in the Brahmāranyaka Upaniṣad, dāna is one of the three cardinal virtues. But here we have a subtle attempt at analyzing its notion which seeks to spiritualise it, emphasizing its psychic rather than its material components. The effect of such a notion of dāna tends to be parallel to the Vetulyaka denial of the spiritual relevance of material gifts to the Saṅgha.

**UTILITY AS THE MEASURE OF MERIT**

The next discussion rests on the assertion that merit increases with utility. Buddhaghosa attributes the view to sects like the Rājakīrikas, the Siddharthikas and the Sammatīyas.

The Theravādins argue that this assertion would imply that other mental experiences are increasing quantities, that is to say contact, feeling, perception, volition, etc., can each keep growing, since merit is held to be nothing except certain moral psychic factors. The proponents would deny this. They would also deny that merit keeps growing just as a creeper, or a tree, etc., keeps growing.

The Theravādins argue further that the proponents must also admit that a giver acquires merit when, having given his gift, he does not consider it further? The proponents would admit this. But then it would imply that merit accrues to one who does not consciously reflect upon an aim. But is not the case the opposite of this? The proponents concede this. Then it would be wrong to say that merit goes on growing with utility.

Again the proponents ought to admit that such a giver may also acquire merit who, on giving a gift, entertains, sensual, malevolent, or cruel thoughts, but then, we have a combination of two opposite contacts, feelings, perceptions, etc. The Theravādins now quote the words of Buddha that the norm of the good and the wicked are far apart from each
other, and, hence, it is wrong to say that good and bad mental states co-exist side by side in anyone. Now it is the proponents’ turn to quote the words of Buddha to reiterate their thesis that merit grows with utility. The Theravādins wind up the discussion with the observation that supposing the acceptor of the gift throws it away or someone takes it away, how can merit then increase there being no utility of the gift? Thus, merit is not dependent on utility.

The Kathāvatthu and its commentary both leave the debate in considerable obscurity, the principal cause of which is their obstinacy to crucify the proponents on conceptual process of entirely their own making. On the Theravādin concept of merit (puñña), the proponents’ thesis is simply absurd. They are unable to give any coherent account of any actual arguments which the proponents used. This shows that unlike some of the other debates, e.g., the one relating to Puggala, in this case the Theravādins did not possess any accurate knowledge of the point of view which they were criticizing.

It seems to us that the present thesis should be connected with the former where it has been maintained that a gift is a psychic factor. Here, the other side of the gift appears to be considered. The utility of the gift made appears also to be considered as a factor in the accruing of merit while the gift as a psychic resolve conforms a fixed merit. The same gift, considered as a utilization in time, may be held to confer increasing merit. In these two theses, thus, we have complete psychological analysis of dāna. It consists, on the one hand, of a meritorious resolve on the part of a donor and, on the other, it consists of a series of utilizations by the donee. From the second of the two there accrues an increasing merit to the donor. Socially, this would suggest that a proper gift ought to be highly and continuously useful for as long a period as possible.

With this may be connected the Mahāsamghika thesis which asserts that virtue grows through observance (samādāna hetukāṁ silam vaddhati). The thesis refers to the Canonical statement to the increase of merit ‘by planting pleasant parks and groves, etc.’. Buddhaghosa explains that the increase of virtue here does not refer to a psychic factor (cittavippayutta silopacayāṁ).
EFFECT OF GIVING

The present discussion rests over the assertion that what is given here sustains elsewhere.\textsuperscript{43} Buddhaghosa attributes this thesis to the Rājagirikas and the Siddharthikas.\textsuperscript{44}

The Theravādins challenge the view on the ground that the proposition commits one to the further statement that robes, alms-food, etc., are enjoyed in the after-life. It implies further that one person is the agent for another, that is to say, one acts and someone else experiences the consequences.

The proponents bring the example of the \textit{petas},\textsuperscript{45} for they are supposed to be thankful to those who give gifts which appease the hearts of those \textit{petas}.\textsuperscript{46} Similarly, they quote another reference from the utterances of the Buddha that parents contemplate about their incoming children that they would serve them in many ways.\textsuperscript{47}

That gifts made here in some sense avail in the after-life has been a perennial notion in India. That some Buddhist sects thought it fit to defend this popular notion shows perhaps the change coming over Buddhism. We know in fact that gifts were made by Buddhists for the welfare and merit of their relations.\textsuperscript{48} It is in this context that we should interpret this effort at accommodating the popular view.

SANCTIFICATION OF THE GIFT

Next discussion centres round the view that a gift is sanctified by the giver only, and not by the recipient.\textsuperscript{49} Buddhaghosa has associated the Uttarāpathakas with this view.\textsuperscript{50}

The Theravādins in their bid to refute the view draw the attention of the proponents to those personages for whom the Buddha had himself made pronouncements that they are worthy of gifts. As against this the Uttarāpathakas point out that if the suggestion of the Theravādins were to be accepted, it would mean that the recipient can be the agent for quite a different person.\textsuperscript{51} In that case, a certain person can work out the misery or happiness of the other, that is to say, one would sow and another reap.\textsuperscript{52}

The Theravādins quote the utterance of the Buddha on the Four-fold Way for the sanctification of the gift according to
which the recipient is also said to be capable of sanctifying the gift.\textsuperscript{53} Thus, the Theravādins conclude that it is wrong to say that a gift is sanctified only by the giver, not by the recipient.\textsuperscript{54} It may be noted that this debate is especially relevant with the Vetulyaka view that the Saṁgha cannot sanctify any gifts.\textsuperscript{55}

**CREATION OF THE DOCTRINE (SĀSANA)\textsuperscript{56} ANEW, i.e., ITS REFORMATION**

The present debate analyzes an interesting proposition of the Uttarāpathakas\textsuperscript{57} that the religion (sāsana) is, has been and may again be reformed (navakatāṁ), i.e., made new.\textsuperscript{58}

The Theravādins argue in this connection as to which aspect of the religion has been reformed or made new? Is it the applications in mindfulness (satipaññhāna) or supreme efforts (sammapadhāna), or steps to iñdhī (iddhipāda), or moral controls (indriyā) or moral forces (balā) or seven branches of enlightenment (bojjhaṅga)? Similarly, does the proposition imply that some thing that had been bad in the past has been made good? Or does it mean that something which was allied with vicious things—intoxicants (sāsavaṁ), fetters (saññojaniyaṁ), ties (gandāhāniyaṁ), floods (oghaniyaṁ), yokes (yoganiyaṁ), hindrances (nīvarṇiyaṁ), infections (parāmaṇā,hāṁ), grasplings (upādāniyaṁ), corruptions (saṁkilesikaṁ)—has been freed from them? The proponents are not prepared to grant the points raised by the Theravādins, but the latter emphasize that these propositions must imply either of these points. The Theravādins further argue that if these stated facts of the religion were not reformed what after all is there in the doctrine that admits of reformation?\textsuperscript{59}

**SCHISMATICS AND THEIR PUNISHMENT**

The Rājagirikas hold that a schismatic is to be tormented for the entire kappa (kalpa).\textsuperscript{60} The Uttarāpathakas suggest that such a person has absolutely no chance of acquiring any virtue even though he might give all kinds of gifts to the Saṁgha.\textsuperscript{61} The Kathāvatthu gives an account of the kinds of gifts contemplated.\textsuperscript{62} The Theravādins interestingly adopt a milder view
which held out some hope for the schismatic in case he gave gifts, etc., to the Order. Similar is the thesis of the Uttarāpatha
thakas that the ‘abettor of a cardinal crime’ (antarāyutta) is incapable of entering the ‘True Path of Assurance’ even if he had only occasionally abbetted. The Theravādins, however, hold hope for this class.

Schism arose from speculative opinion (diṭṭhi) and in the early texts diṭṭhi receives emphatic condemnation. It is, therefore, highly significant to find that the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas maintained that such opinions are ethically neutral (diṭṭhīgataṁ abyākatam). From the Theravāda point of view, this was a highly erroneous opinion which was at the same time immoral. Buddhaghosa points out that only four categories of objects are ethically neutral—vipāl a, kitiyā, rūpa and Nibbāna. Similar is the thesis which asserts that ‘diṭṭhīgataṁ aparīyāpannaṁ’. The argument is that since, a puthujjana though passionless is not free from diṭṭhi, diṭṭhi may be considered aparīyāpanna—a status reserved for those qualifying in the Path.

Another problem discussed in the Kathāvatthu is as to whether or not unintentionally committed (asaṁcicca) cardinal sins (anantarīyas) involve immediate retribution after death? The Uttarāpathakas take the sterner view. Its implications are especially interesting on the question of saṁghabheda. If, for example, a schismatic thinks that his opinion is right, will his schismatic activity, unintentionally committed, lead him to a dire doom after death? The Theravādins think not and quote a passage from the Vinaya which distinguishes between the curable and the incurable schismatics.

A couple of controversies are concerned with the extent to which the possible degradation of a person with right views (diṭṭhisampannopuggalo) may extend. We have an opinion later held by the Pubbaseliyas that such a person may intentionally commit murder since he has not entirely put away the seed of enmity from his heart. To the Uttarāpathakas is attributed the thesis that for such a person duggati is excluded since, by the virtue of his sound views, he cannot be reborn in the purgatory. The Uttarāpathakas have been attributed another thesis asserting that ‘the average man may possess final Assurance’.
SIGNS OF LAXITY

The Kathavatthu contains a significant controversy related to the assertion that sexual relations may be entered upon with a unified resolve.\(^7\) It has been attributed to the Andhakas and the Vetulyakas.\(^7\) The text of the controversy is, however, extremely obscure, except that the Theravādins raise two problems in the course of the debate, viz., (1) for whom is it meant? and (2) what is the nature of the resolve?\(^7\) Buddhaghosa explains (2) as kāruṇā or the resolve to be together in saṃsāra, but he is not clear on the first point.\(^7\)

The thesis would be quite innocuous if it refers to husband and wife, though its implicit promise would be attraction to the laity. On the other hand, if it has any application to other categories of persons especially to the members of the Order, it would be an extraordinary thesis comparable only to some of the more shocking dicta of the Tantra. It might thus indicate Tantric beginnings as well as moral laxity in the Order. Buddhaghosa’s use of the word kāruṇā makes one recall the story of the Bodhisattva who broke his vow of continence out of compassion for a woman.\(^7\) We seem to have here more a Mahāyānic than a Vajrayānic anticipation.

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

The small set of controversies that occurs in the Kathavatthu is remarkably significant in the sense that it involves discussion on the most significant issue as to the nature of the Saṅgha. The formulations that are laid down by certain sects are incompatible with the notion of the Saṅgha as cherished by the orthodox sections and hence unacceptable to the latter. To be specific, the Vetulyakas or Mahāsuṅgaṇṇatāvādins seek to idealize the notion of the Saṅgha and put it on a spiritual plane. For them the Saṅgha, in the metaphysical sense, means Paths and the Fruits, identical respectively with magga and maggaphala, and hence it is an abstract notion.\(^7\) This being so, the Saṅgha cannot be supposed to do all those things which one ordinarily associates with it such as accepting gifts, or purifying the same and so on. They apparently distinguish the Saṅgha from individuals without conceding to it any corporate personality. The Order for
them is simply the order of spiritual progress. This is a remarkably abstract conception. It is like identifying the University with the processes and stages of higher education.

The Theravādins, however, hold fast to the belief that the Saṅgha is an organization of the monks who have attained magga and phala. For them it is not an abstract notion but a factual assembly of individuals. The two opinions reflect amply upon the two divergent tendencies to which different sects were pulling powerfully, viz., the real and the ideal, the rational and the metaphysical, the human and the superhuman which ultimately resulted in the crystallization of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. It would be in the fitness of things, therefore, to trace the historical growth of the Saṅgha as a result of which new conceptions gained ground against current beliefs and predilections.

THE HISTORICAL GROWTH OF THE BUDDHIST SAṄGHA

Although the Buddhist monastic system is characterized by special features in so far as it developed on distinct lines and specific principles, yet it is true to say that religious mendicancy and loose assemblages of such mendicants was very well-known in India when the Buddha set the wheel of Law rolling. There were wandering ascetics, viz., Munis, Śramaṇas, Yatis, Pariṇājakas, etc., whom Jacobi traced to the Brahmanical institution of the Fourth Āśrama, but who seem to represent a pre-Vedic and non-Aryan tradition in their beliefs such as asceticism, atheism, pluralism and realism. There were also Brāhmanic mendicants dwelling in hermitages (āśramas) with a vow to observe brahmaścarya. Early Buddhist texts testify to the existence of a number of sects of the Pariṇājakas referred to as gaṇa or saṅgha. The general appellation for them is given as Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇas. There were some common features at the basis of all such Pariṇājaka gaṇas. Their members renounced the worldly life in the quest of enlightenment, lived an austere and saintly life and observed such ceremonies as Uposatha and Varsāvāsa. It was in such details as food and dress that these sects differed widely from each other. We know something about the monastic system and code of the Jains and the
It seems that the Buddha was conversant with the rules and regulations followed among the contemporary sects as he sought to frame the code of rules for his own disciples on the principle of his salient doctrine *majjhima-patipadā* which appeared as a golden mean between the two extreme forms of life, viz., (1) the rigorous asceticism of the Nigaṇṭhas and (2) the easy-going life of the materialists and rich Brāhmaṇas. It is also likely that, to begin with, the Buddha adopted suitable rules and regulations of code and conduct prevalent among the Vedic and non-Vedic recluses of the time.

It has been suggested that the Buddha hardly intended to form a Saṅgha and that the idea of the Saṅgha was thrust upon him. This hypothesis apparently depends on the legend that the Buddha was at first hesitant to preach the Dhamma. Once, however, he decided to preach it was quite natural that a number of disciples should flock around him and form a *gana* or Saṅgha. There is hardly anything to suggest that the Buddha was opposed to the idea of Saṅgha.

In fact, the possibility of the growth of a Saṅgha was something inherent in the way of his teaching and was bound to come in course of time. The idea of any hesitation regarding the formation of a Saṅgha on the part of the Buddha is cut at the very root by the fact that the Saṅgha constitutes the triple jewel of Buddhism, without which one could not be initiated as a Buddhist monk. The beginning of the Buddhist Saṅgha should be thus assigned to the time of the delivery of the very first sermon by the Lord at Sārnāth.

The Vinaya has recorded the tradition of the growth of the early Saṅgha. The first to be converted by the Buddha were the same five brāhmī who had deserted his company earlier on his giving up severe penance and asceticism, viz., Aṇṭākondāṇa, Vappa, Bhaddiya, Mahānāma and Assaji.

Their initiation into the Order was a simple affair. They sought admission by saying: ‘labheyyāma mayam, bhante, bhagavato santike pabbajjam, labheyyāma upasampadan ti’. The Buddha admitted them thus: ‘ehi bhikkhu’. Very soon, the number of disciples increased to sixty who were all Arahants. The Buddha asked them to go to different places for preaching the Dhamma. The process went on, and the number of
disciples kept on multiplying at a fast pace as may be gleaned from the *Vinaya*.

Obviously, the Buddhist Samgha was growing in shape and size in a remarkable way. On the one hand, people, irrespective of any *varna* and caste, were joining it in large numbers and, on the other, powerful states were providing royal patronage; and a wealthy commercial section of the society was forthcoming with charitable gestures.  

With the growth of the numerical strength of the Samgha and its spread to distant places may be observed a process of transformation and change in its complexion which was there at work from the very beginning. These changes were many-sided and quite a few of them had a very significant bearing on the course of Buddhist history.

The initial change was effected by the Buddha himself as he delegated the authority of ordination to his disciples. Prior to this, he himself used to initiate new entrants into the Order which entailed a sufficient amount of difficulty as experienced in the *Vinaya*. It facilitated greatly the process of ordination of new members in the Samgha. While empowering his disciples to confer ordination, the Buddha laid down detailed rules of ordination as against the simple and informal way in which he himself used to initiate by saying—*‘ehi bhikkhu’*. Some bars were also enjoined for certain categories of persons to become a member of the Samgha, and certain people were totally debarred from it. The ordination process was very much formalized in so far as two ceremonies began to be performed in this connection, viz., *pabajjā* and *upasampadā*. Elaborate rules were laid down regarding the mutual duties and obligations of the teacher and his disciple.

Significant changes took place in the way of living and residence of the monks. In the beginning, the ideal living that was prescribed for a Bhikkhu seems to have been of an extremely unsocial and secluded type. The Buddha insisted that his first missionaries move alone. Elsewhere, he said that as long as the Bhikkhus delight in forest-living, so long they may be expected not to decline, but to prosper. The *Khaggavisānasutta* of the *Sutta-Nipāta* is devoted to extolling the solitary life of a Bhikkhu. There the Bhikkhu is likened to a rhinoceros and it is said that he should wander like it,
all alone. Similarly, there are passages in the *Dhammapada* and *Theragāthā* which sing the glory of aloofness. Curiously enough, this eremitical ideal of early days gave way to the cenobitical ideal. It was still a riddle for the Greek king Milinda in the second century B.C., as to which of the two ideals the Lord Buddha really subscribed to. It seems that under the changing circumstances, the Buddha permitted to the Samgha a considerably comfortable type of living. Residence under the trees was the initial rule for the residence of the monks, but such dwelling places as *addhayoga, pāsāda, hammiya* and *guhā* were later allowed as *atirekalābha*. The Buddha was also persuaded to accept the gift of *Veluvanavihāra* which resulted in the sanction of *ārāmas* for the dwelling of monks. This was an incident of singular importance as it marked the starting point of almost a settled life for the monks. The rich *setthīs* of Rājagaha readily came forward to build several *vihāras*, *addhayogas*, *pāsādas*, *hammiyas* and *guhās* for the monks. Anāthapiṇḍaka, one of the richest persons of the time, built an illustrious monastery, Jetavana at Sāvatthi. Such monasteries consisted of dwelling rooms (*vihāra*), cells (*pariveṇa*), gate-chambers (*Koṭṭhaka*), service-halls (*upaṭṭhānasālā*), halls with fire-places (*aggisālā*), store-homes (*kappiyakuṭi*), closets (*vaccakuṭi*), cloisters (*caṅkamma*), rooms for walking exercises (*caṅkamasālā*), wells (*udapāṇa*), sheds for the wells (*udapānasālā*), bathing places (*jantāghara*), bath-rooms (*jantāgharasālā*), tanks (*pokkharaṇī*), pavilions (*manḍapa*).

With the growth of comfortable dwelling-places, the Buddha seems to have granted a great deal of latitude as regards the articles of daily usage of the monks such as furniture and dresses. They were allowed to have as their seats or beds benches built against the walls, bedsteads with short removable legs, arm-chairs, sofas, cushioned chairs, carpets, pillows, bolsters stuffed with wool, cotton grass, etc. Monks of certain areas, such as, Avantidakkhiṇāpatha were also allowed to use animal skin for seats or beds. In view of the numerical growth of the monks and shortage of accommodation, rules were framed for ascertaining the claim of priority and office-bearers such as *senāsanapaṭṭhapaka* were appointed to regulate the accommodation of the *Bhikkhus*.

As regards the dress of the monks, they were supposed to
wear paṁsukulacīvara, but linen (khōmaṁ), cotton (kappāsikāṁ), silk (koseyyam), woollen rug (kaṁbalam), coarse cloth (sānaṁ), hempen (bhangaṁ), were permitted as extra concessions. The story goes that at the instance of Jivaka Komārabhaṭaca, the Buddha allowed the monks to accept gifts of robes (cīvara) made of the mentioned materials. Besides cīvaras, they were also allowed to accept mantles (pāvara), blankets (kaṁbala), towels (mukhapuṇḍraka colaka), bags (parikhārakolaka), bathing clothes (udakasāṭika) and bandages for itches, wounds, etc., (kaṇḍupaticchādi). Shoes were also allowed.

With regard to food and drinks also, the rules were much relaxed. Initially, the monks were asked to live on alms, but they were subsequently allowed to accept invitations in groups or individually. Further came the sanction of kappiya-bhūmi for the storage of food. It is said that the Bhikkhus undertaking a journey were permitted even to receive gold through the kappiyarakara and purchase the necessities of life. For medical usage, the monks were originally enjoined to use urine, etc., (putimuttabhēṣaṁ) but later on butter (sappī), cream (navanīta), oil (tela), honey (madhu), molasses (phāṇīta) were allowed. Not only sick but healthy monks were allowed to take sugar-water, or other sweet-drinks, fruits, meat and fish under certain conditions.

With the increasing relaxations in the day-to-day life of the Saṁgha, a number of rules were laid down for regulating the organization which, however, tended to formalize it more and more. Some of the informal get-togethers of the early days crystallized into fundamental ceremonies of the Saṁgha.

The Buddha had introduced the system of a fortnightly sitting of monks to hold discussions about the Dhamma and Vinaya and to recite the rules of Pātimokkha. This fortnightly assembly was known as the Uposatha ceremony. Weekly or fortnightly meetings were already known in some form to the Brāhmins and Parivrājakas. Bimbisāra is said to have requested the Buddha to make some such arrangement in the Buddhist Saṁgha also and thus came the Uposatha. Gradually, however, the ceremony assumed a technical shape since it implied a number of formalities to be completed such as quorum, selection of place of the assembly and selection of monks who would put and answer questions and so on.
The necessity of quorum implied a jurisdiction of the Samgha, and hence rules were framed to define its limits. Various rules and regulations, major and minor, were laid down with regard to the Upesathā ceremony and the recitation of Pātimokkha.127 It was laid down that the recitation of Pātimokkha could be made only in an assembly in which the members had declared their parisuddhi and in which there were no nuns (Bhikkhuṇīs), sāmaṇerās, sāmaṇerīs, or a Bhikkhu undergoing punishment, or persons not admissible to the Samgha.128

The practice of Vassavāsa was another system which the Buddhist monks started observing at an early date. Even now, the geographical conditions of eastern U.P. and northern Bihar are such that travelling sometimes becomes difficult during the rainy season because of the floods in that area. To avoid the inconvenience of travelling in the rains and the chance of injuring sprouts and insects, it was laid down as a rule that the Bhikkhus should stay at one place (āvāsa) during three months of the rains.129

It was only in cases of urgent calls, such as, for the benefit of the Samgha or of the lay-devotees or sick persons, or for some particular business of the Samgha, or else if there was danger to life of the monks through beasts, snakes, robbers, fire, schism, etc., that the Bhikkhus were allowed to leave the āvāsa and that too only for seven days,130 in all other cases excepting the last. The ceremony of Pavaraṇā marked the end of the Vassavāsa every year. The object of this ceremony was to confess all sins of omission and commission131 that might have been committed during the Vassavāsa. Elaborate rules were framed towards the procedure of the Pavaraṇā ceremony.

Another ceremony on the termination of rain-resort was Kathina132 at which robes were made for the monks out of the gifts of cloth received from the laity. Certain Bhikkhus were selected and entrusted with this job and they were allowed certain privileges regarding food, dress, etc. Rules were laid down with regard to the distribution of the robes once they were ready after the Kathina ceremony.133

Another significant development in the history of the Buddhist Samgha was the formation of Bhikkhuṇī Samgha. The Buddha was definitely opposed to this idea and he had rejected such a request of Mahāprajāpati Gautamī at Kapilavatthu.134
Ānanda was, however, able to persuade him to grant its formation. A number of rules and restrictions were imposed upon the Bhikkhunis.

Apart from the various rules and regulations regarding the habitation, food, dress, practices and ceremonies, elaborate regulations were enjoined for ecclesiastical rules and for the punishment of offending monks. These rules were framed for maintaining the internal polity of the Saṅgha. It has been observed that the laws of polity by which the early Buddhist Saṅghhas were governed betray a remarkable maturity of development.

As we go into the details of the growth of the Buddhist Saṅgha, we observe a two-way traffic in its process. On the one hand, it was growing in strength and prosperity and, on the other, it was inheriting a number of rules, regulations, formalities and ceremonies.

These had significant implications in the near future. The numerical growth in membership of the Saṅgha was in itself sufficiently responsible for dispute and debate over the various aspects of the doctrine and discipline.

Similarly, it has been shown that there was difference of opinion among the Bhikkhus from very early times as to the various rules, regulations and formalities. A certain section pleaded for more stringent rules than were in vogue and there was also a group which wanted more and more laxity in the life of the Saṅgha. What is important, however, to note is the economic growth of the Saṅgha.

The sixth century B.C. marks a very important period in Indian history from the economic point of view just as it marked an epoch from the political, religious and philosophical point of view. The age is characterized by the growth of town and commerce and the organization of trade and crafts into guilds. And above all came the all-important evolution of Indian coinage which is now generally believed to belong to this period. This must have revolutionized the entire complex of contemporary economy.

We hear traditions of the fabulous wealth of merchants like Anāthapiṇḍaka of Śrāvasti and Ghoṣaka of Kauśāmbi. This was the economic background of North India when the magnetic personality of the Buddha emerged on the scene. The Buddhist
Canon bears ample testimony to the effect that many powerful princes and big merchants of the time became greatly devoted to the Buddha. The princes craved for his visits to their kingdom and readily offered their patronage to the new faith. The business magnates, on the other hand, vied with each other to render maximum service to the Buddha and his Samgha in the form of boarding and lodging arrangements at different places. The story goes that Anāthapiṇḍaka, the business magnate and High Treasurer of the kingdom of Kośala wanted to dedicate a monastery at Jetavana garden to the Samgha. The garden belonged to a certain prince, Jeta, on whose demand Anāthapiṇḍaka paid him as many gold pieces (hiraṇṇa) as would be sufficient to cover the entire field of the garden.142 This dedication is recorded in an inscription appended to the depiction of the scene at Bharhut thus: ‘Anāthapiṇḍaka dedicates Jetavana purchased with a layer of crores’.143 Ghoṣaka of Kauśāmbi had built a similar monastery known as Ghoṣitārāma at Kauśāmbi of which the remains have been discovered during recent excavations.144 There are many others referred to in the literature who built vihāras and invited the Bhikkhus for meals and offered them the gifts of alms and robes. At an early stage, specific rules were laid down with regard to the priority of accommodation in a vihāra, accepting an invitation from the lay-devotees and distribution of the robes, etc., gifted to the Samgha. In laying down such rules the Buddha seems to have anticipated difficulties in these matters. The dispute at the Second Council arose with the acceptance of ‘gold and silver’ by the Vajjian Bhikkhus.145 This is a token of the range of economic change which had occurred in the course of a century and threatened to render the old rules about the acceptance of gifts obsolete. Before the Third Council, again, we are told that some had entered the Samgha merely to share in its material gains.146 Thus, the issue of the appropriate mode of gifts to the Order assumed importance and with it the more radical sects appear to have raised the more fundamental question of the metaphysical nature of the Samgha and of the spiritual significance of gifts to it. Thus, a certain section of the monks came to entertain such fundamental doubts as (1) whether or not the Samgha could accept gifts at all? (2) whether or not the Samgha could purify the gifts? (3) whether-
or not the Samgha could enjoy the gifts given to it? and (4) whether or not the gifts given to the Samgha brought any rewards? The Vetulyakas or Mahāsuṇṇatāvādins came out with the suggestion that the Samgha should not be supposed to do any of these things. 147

We have noted that some of the Mahāsāṁghika group of schools were tending more and more towards an idealist and absolutist conception which ultimately received its final manifestation in the emergence of Mahāyāna. The nature of the Buddha was raised above humanity and absolutized and idealized by them. 148 So was the ideal of the Bodhisattva against the ideal of the Arahant. 149 These developments later form the cardinal points of the Mahāyāna system in which the Vetulyakas or Mahāsuṇṇatāvādins seem to have contributed significantly. They might aptly be regarded as the precursors of Mahāyāna. It was in conformity with their other doctrines that the Vetulyakas sought to idealize the notion of the Samgha. They did not subscribe to the notion that the Samgha was a body of individuals. For them, behind the apparent assembly of the Bhikkhus and Bhikkhuṇīs, there is an abstract and ideal notion of Samgha which makes it a conceptual and not an actual entity as the Theravādins believe. The acceptance of such a radical notion would doubtless have had a disastrous effect, materially speaking, on the Samgha and the monks. If the Order cannot accept gifts, or if even when a gift is made to the Samgha it cannot purify it or pay back any spiritual reward to the person who makes the gift, and if it is a mistake to think that the Samgha enjoys the gift in any sense, who would make an utterly empty sacrifice by way of any gifts to the Order? That such a thesis should then have been put forward leads seriously to the suspicion that its propounders were more than indifferent to the problems of the authorities of the Samgha who ran it, materially speaking.

As regards the thesis, viz., the sāsana has been and can be renovated, it may be observed that this is an unusual opinion of the Uttarāpathakas based on the simple logic that the religion had been actually reformed from time to time in the course of various Councils and hence it can very well be said that the Order can be reformed and renewed. Taking note of history, this thesis implies a conception of progress in religion.
which can, perhaps, be reconciled with the Master’s own suggestion that adjustments could be made in the Doctrine, but which was anathema to established authority. Such a principle would obviously justify innovation and would support the radical sects.

It is difficult to maintain that the Vetaluyaka theses regarding the Saṅgha emerged simply because of their imaginative capacity. In fact, the points which they try to make through these propositions do not lack a basis. There would hardly be a difference of opinion even among the Buddhists themselves that the Saṅgha at least stood for the practice of the Buddhist Path and obtaining the fruits thereof. This was the basic ideal, the essential nature of the Order and of course the higher and abstract notion underlying its obvious reality. It was very much open for any one to presume that this side alone should be taken into account as against its real form as a body of individuals. It may be observed here that an intimation of the ideality of the Saṅgha peeps through a certain statement of the Buddha. It is recorded that once Assaji was asked as to who was his religious guru and he replied, ‘I accepted religious mendicancy under the guidance of Lord Buddha’. This statement clearly indicates that in the beginning the Buddha was regarded as the head of his Saṅgha. A position totally inconsistent with this is met with in an episode described in the Mahāparinibbānasutta. Therein, Ananda expresses the hope that the Lord will not pass into Parinirvāṇa till he has said something concerning the Bhikkhu Saṅgha. The Buddha, however, refused to say anything and observed that he never thinks that he should lead the Saṅgha or that it is under his guidance. This statement of the Buddha seems to imply an ideal form of the Saṅgha for which he thinks there can be no sāstā or head.

It is interesting to note that ‘cātuḍḍisa Bhikkhu Saṅgha’, i.e., ‘the Saṅgha of the four quarters’ has been said to represent the ideal concept of the Buddhist Saṅgha. The Pāli Canon frequently refers to the Buddhist Saṅgha as ‘āgatānāgata cātuḍḍisa Bhikkhu Saṅgha’. The phrase also occurs in many donatory inscriptions, the earliest occurring in an inscription from Ceylon datable to third century B.C. There has been a difference of opinion among the scholars as to the real
significance of this phrase. M. Senart suggested that:

"the Monastic community may be classified in two respects, viz., according to their residence and according to the sect to which they belong. This double restriction is excluded in principle by the mention of the cātuddisa Saṅgha, though in some cases and, according to the disposition of the donor, it may mean specially one or the other."\textsuperscript{156}

S. Dutt, however, rejects this interpretation and observes that:

"in the Buddha’s life time had grown up a community of his followers, a Saṅgha founded by him and described by him as the Saṅgha of the Four Quarters. Admission to it was open without limitation of caste (such as was recognized by Tridanḍins or Brahmanical Sanyāsins) or of locality. As time went on, the original Saṅgha underwent divisions and sub-divisions, but it began at the same time to be idealized. The Saṅgha of the Four Quarters meant latterly an ideal confederation, which at one time had an historical reality. A Saṅgha in later times simply meant a body of resident monks at a particular monastery, but cātuddisa Saṅgha meant an ideal confederation, and it was to this ideal entity that donations were formally made."\textsuperscript{157}

S. Dutt seems to imagine far more than there is really in the phrase in question. The sole argument that he puts forward in support of his hypothesis is a reference in the Nasika cave inscription where a certain donor gives a cave to the cātuddisa Saṅgha and an endowment of 100 Kahāpanas in the hand of the Saṅgha.\textsuperscript{158} Thus he points out the difference between the two. It seems to us that the difference between sammukha Saṅgha and cātuddisa Saṅgha is not that of real and ideal but that of the local and the universal Saṅgha, i.e., the Buddhist Order in its entirety which had spread far and wide by the third century B.C. The Nasika cave inscription clearly says that the vihāra is donated to the cātuddisa Saṅgha, i.e., monks from all quarters could come and stay there, whereas the hard cash of 100 Kahāpanas is meant for the sustenance of the monks living there at that time. The complete phrase,
‘āgatānāgata cātuddisa Bhikkhu-Saṅgha’ simply means ‘Saṅgha of four quarters including all who had become or were to become Bhikkhus in future’. The strongest objection that comes in the way of Dutt’s hypothesis is that this phrase occurs most frequently in the Pāli Canon which would imply thereby that the Pāli or Theravāda school upheld the ideality of the Saṅgha. We have seen, however, on the testimony of the Kathāvatthu that the Theravāda was diametrically opposed to such notions and it upheld the idea of Saṅgha merely as a body of individuals. They severely criticized and condemned those who wanted to idealize the concept of Saṅgha.

It may be further pointed out that this phrase appears to start occurring with the growth of a process of erecting and dedicating the vihāras. The phrase does not occur in connection with Bimbisāra’s dedication of the Veluvana-ārāma. It occurs first when the Jetavana-vihāra is gifted. In fact, the coining and laying down of such a phrase became a historical necessity in view of the spread of Buddhist monks and their establishments at far-off places as also its growing prosperity owing to rich gifts coming from the lay devotees. Thus, at the time of dedicating and gifting something to the Saṅgha, it might be necessary to emphasize the point that it was shareable and thus a common property of the entire Buddhist community and was not meant only for the Bhikkhus present at the moment. Thus, although cātuddisa Saṅgha contrasted with the sammukha Saṅgha, is not limited in space or time like a local community or parish which has a definite simā, nevertheless, it stands for a community of persons, not for the abstract idea of Buddhist spiritual practices (magga) and experiences (phala). Hence, on the whole, the thesis here attributed to the Vetulyakas must be held to be a genuine conceptual innovation of which the practical need can only be conjectured in the background of a prospering Saṅgha with a rebellious sect of idealists.
REFERENCES


2. G.D. De, Democracy in Early Buddhist Saingha, Preface, p. xi.


5. See Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā, p. 167.


8. See Points of Controversy, p. 318n.


14. ‘Nanu atthi keci Sarīghassa dānañ datvā dakkhinañ ārādhenti ti; Kathāvatthu, p. 476


17. See Vinaya Texts, I, 38f.


26. It may be remarked that the Theravādins, elsewhere, maintain the opposite point of view, i.e., a dāna brings about mahāppala, see Kathāvatthu p. 478.


28. Ibid., III, pp. 244-5.

29. See ibid., III, p. 239; Dīgha Nikāya, III, pp. 199-200.


35. Cf. ‘Phassaṇḍayo kusala dhammā na tato aññāni…’, ibid., loc. cit.
36. According to Buddhaghosa the proponents admit this because ‘paṭiggāḥakāṇain paribhogena purimaccetanā pavaṇḍhāti, evan tiṁ hoti puññān’, Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 97.
38. Aṅguttara Nikāya, II, pp. 52-3.
40. See Kathāvatthu, p. 307.
42. See Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 127.
43. Ito dimena tattha yāpentaṁ, Kathāvatthu, VII. 6.
44. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 99.
45. On petas (pretas) see Childers, s.v. Petas; cf. Spence Hardy, Buddhism, p. 59.
46. Khuddakapāṭha, (PFS ed.) 6 (vi).
47. Aṅguttara Nikāya, III, p. 43.
48. See e.g., EI, XX, pp. 16, 18-21.
49. Dāyakato va dānāṁ visujjhati, no paṭiggaḥakato ti, Kathāvatthu, XVII. 11.
55. See supra, p. 201.
56. Modern terminology aptly renders the term Sāsana into Buddhism.
See S. Dutt, The Buddha and Five After Centuries, p. 123.
57. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 188
58. Sāsanaṁ navam kataṁ ti, Kathāvatthu, XXI. 1.
59. Ibid., pp. 519-20.
60. Kappāṭṭho Kappāṁ titṭheyyati, Kathāvatthu, XIII.1; cf. Itivuttaka, p. 190; Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 140.
62. Viz., cīvara (robe), punḍapāta (alms) senāsana (food), gilānapaccayabhesajjarikāra (medicines), khōdamīyāṁ, bhujanīyāṁ, pāṇīyāṁ (various kinds of food and drink, etc.)
63. Anantarāpayutto puggalo sammattaniyāmaṁ okkameyyati, Kathāvatthu XIII. 3.
64. Kathāvatthu, XIV. 8.
65. See Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 151.
69. This is a technical term for religious life, wherein the word *diṭṭhi* does not mean erroneous opinion. *Diṭṭhisampanno puggalo* is no doubt a learner but he is supposed to have put away all but the last fetters, see Points of Controversy, p. 269a.


74. Kathāvatthu-Attakathā, p. 197.

75. See Kathāvatthu, p. 535.


77. Śīkṣāsamuccaya, p. 93.

78. Kathāvatthu-Attakathā, p. 167f.


81. See SBE, XXII, pp. xxviii-xxx.


84. See supra, Chapter I.

85. See e.g., *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 400-1.


87. See *Sānīyutta Nikāya*, II, pp. 17. 21; see also M.M. Vidhushekhara Shastri in *M.M. Ganganatha Jha Commemoration Volume*, pp. 85ff.


90. See supra, p. 199.


98. Ibid., pp. 23-4.
99. Ibid. pp. 24, 52-5, 57ff., etc.
100. Mahāvagga, pp. 73ff.
101. Ibid., pp. 89ff.
102. Ibid., pp. 42ff; Cullavagga, pp. 328-36.
103. Mā ekena dve agamiththa, Cullavagga, p. 23.
107. Mīlinda paṇha, p. 93.
110. Ibid., p. 38.
111. See Cullavagga, pp. 239-40.
112. Cullavagga, pp. 208ff.
113. See ibid., pp. 241ff.
116. Mahāvagga, pp. 55, 100.
117. Ibid., p. 298ff.
118. Ibid., pp. 312ff.
119. Ibid., pp. 204ff.
120. Ibid., pp. 258-59.
121. Ibid., pp. 55, 100, 218.
122. Ibid., pp. 242ff.
129. Ibid., pp. 144ff.
130. Ibid., p. 155ff.
131. Diṭṭhena vā sutenā vā parisaṅkāya vā, see Mahāvagga, p. 167.
132. Mahāvagga, pp. 266ff.
133. Ibid., pp. 299ff.
134. Cullavagga, pp. 373ff.
135. Ibid., p. 374.
136. Ibid., pp. 374ff.
138. See supra, pp. 43-4, 48ff.
139. See T.W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist India, pp. 1ff; G.C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, pp. 310ff; cf. also V.S. Agrawal
India As Known to Pāṇini; B.C. Law, India As Described in Early Texts of Buddhism and Jainism; J.C. Jain, Life in Ancient India as Depicted in the Jain Canon; A.S. Altekar, State and Government in Ancient India; R.C. Majumdar, Corporate Life in Ancient India; R.S. Shārma, Light on Early Indian Society and Economy; Bridget and Raymond Allchin, The Birth of Indian Civilization; Romila Thapar, A History of India, Vol. I, etc.

140. See N.C. Bandopadhyaya, Economic Life and Progress in Ancient India, pp. 240ff; Cambridge History of India, I, pp. 205ff.
143. 'Jetavana Anāthađiko deti Kotisamhatena ketā—B.M. Berua and G. Sinha, Bharhut Inscriptions, p. 59; Cunningham, Stupa of Bharhut, pp. 85ff; C. Jātakaṭṭhakathā, I, pp. 66-7; see also CII, II, Pt. II: Bharhut Inscription (Luders), Waldschmidt, Mendendale, pp. 105-7; It is curious to observe that the 'hirāṇa' of texts seems to correspond to the representation of Kārṣṇapānas at Bharhut.
145. Cullavagga, pp. 416ff; see also supra, pp. 80ff.
146. See Dipavamsa, Chapter VII, Mahāvamsa, Ch. V; Kathāvattu-Aṭṭhakathā, p. 5f.
147. See supra, pp. 200ff.
148. See supra, Chapter IV.
149. See supra, Chapter V.
150. See Cullavagga, pp. 409-10.
152. C. Tathāgatassa kho Ānandan a evaṁ hoti, aham bhikkhu saṅghaṁ pariharissāmi vā maṁ udesiko bhikkhu saṅgho ti vā, Dīgha Nikāya; II, p. 80.
153. S. Dutt, EBM, pp. 67ff.
154. Mahāvagga, p. 319; Cullavagga, p. 259.
155. See, IA, I, 1872, pp. 139-141; see also A.M. Snasti, op. cit., p. 145; S. Dutt, EBM, p. 67.
156. EII, VIII, No. 8, pp. 59-60.
157. J.S. Dutt, EBM, p. 69.
158. Ibid., p. 69.
159. Mahāvagga, p. 38.
161. The observation that it is apparent from the Kathāvatthu that the Theravāda Buddhists conceived the Saṅgha merely as a body of individuals and were diametrically opposed to the attempts being made by a section of the Buddhists to idealize the notion of the Saṅgha and our suggestion that the phrase 'āgataṇāgata cūuddīsa Bhikkhu Saṅgha' stands for the entire community of Buddhist monks...
precluding all restrictions of space and time (see my article 'The Notion of Early Buddhist Saṅgha', *Jīṉāsā*, Vol. I, Nos. 1-2, 1974) have evoked instant, though misplaced, remarks from G.S.P. Misra. Writing in the subsequent issue of *Jīṉāsā* (Vol. I, Nos. 3-4, pp. 7-8) he has offered a four-point comment as below (in italics):

1. "The issue in question is not the difference between the Saṅgha and the Cātuddisa Saṅgha as the author has said but one between the Sammukho Saṅgha and Cātuddisa Saṅgha".

It seems Dr. Misra has not bothered to read my article carefully wherein (p. 34) I have said, "although the cātuddisa Saṅgha, contrasted with sammukha Saṅgha, is not limited in space or time like a local community or parish which has a definite simā, nevertheless, it stands for a community of persons not for the abstract idea of Buddhist spiritual practices (maggā) and experiences (phala)."

2. "That which is universal is not opposed to being abstract and ideal".

Nowhere in my article it has been suggested that anything universal is opposed to being abstract and ideal. One cannot, however, agree with the sweeping generalisation that something universal must necessarily be abstract and ideal.

3. "The author seems to imply that the notion and use of the term cātuddisa Saṅgha dates later than the economic changes belonging to the Second Council and 3rd century B.C."

My article, curiously enough, reads (p. 32), "The Pali Canon frequently refers to the Buddhist Saṅgha as 'āgatānāgata cātuddisa Saṅgha'. The term also occurs in many donatory inscriptions, the earliest occurring in an inscription from Ceylon datable to 3rd century B.C."

4. "The very term anāgata in the compound points to the Saṅgha as an idealized entity and not as a body of individuals, at least in its early phase."

It is precisely this fallacy which we have sought to remove through the article, in question, on the basis of detailed references and not mere reflections.

It may be noted from the article that the earliest references to the phrase āgatānāgata, etc., occur in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* and the donations, mentioned therein, are made to Buddha himself. I am afraid if there can be a phase earlier than this. It may further be noted that there are instances of donations to the Buddhist Saṅgha where the phrase, in question, is conspicuous by its absence but in such cases donations have been made to some specific sect or monks of a locality. Obviously, the mention of this phrase in the case of various other donations is intended to explicitly exclude all such limitations.

The *Vinaya Piṭaka* contains detailed lists of functionaries of the Saṅgha, e.g., regulator of the lodgings (*Senāsanapaṭṭāpaka*),
apportioner of food (*Bhikkudhesaka*), keeper of stores (*Bhandagarika*), recipient of robes (*Civara*pajigghaha), distributor of robes (*Civara*bhaja), of rice gruel (*Yagubhaja*), of fruits (*Phala*bhaja), of voting tickets (*Salakagahopaka*), and so on (*Cullavagga*, IV. 4; VI, 21). Similarly there were detailed rules for receiving stranger monks (*Agantu*as) and providing them hospitality and accommodation (*Cullavagga*, VIII, 2). In fact the *Vinaya Piṭaka* is full with rules and regulations enjoined upon the monks and nuns as members of a living organization and not an abstract or idealized body. These detailed rules and regulations might have been considered necessary for a democratic functioning of the Saṅgha governed by a constitution adopted, perhaps, from the contemporary republican states.

Even the phrase, in question, *āgataṅgata*, etc., was pronounced by Buddha as the formula of donation to be uttered by a donor. In laying down this formula, Buddha was, probably, trying to ward off possibilities of dissensions in the Saṅgha which may arise in future due to the occupation of particular monastery by a group of monks for a long time. Donating something, thus, to the Saṅgha, ‘present and future’ (*āgataṅgata*), the Saṅgha ‘of the four quarters’ (*cānuddisa*), is fully in accordance with the democratic spirit and structure of the Saṅgha. To suggest that the idea of an idealized entity underlies or overlies the obvious reality of the Saṅgha, *at least in its early phase*, is to shroud it with too far-fetched an interpretation.

Surprisingly, G.S.P. Misra’s own work, *The Age of Vinaya*, which “aims both at explaining the salient features of the *Vinaya and the Saṅgha*” does not throw any light on the phrase, in question, or on the so-called ideality of the Saṅgha.
Section C

Controversies Reflecting Philosophical Development
and the Beginnings of New Schools
Controversy over the Soul Theory (‘Pudgalavāda’)

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Of all the issues of debate, the one on the existence of Pudgala or Person (soul) seems to have occasioned probably the biggest controversy among the early Buddhists. The issue forms the subject-matter of the first controversy in the Kathāvatthu. It is borne out by the testimony of subsequent texts that later some eminent Buddhist masters made it a point to refute the assertion about the existence of Person. The Buddhists who advocated this thesis are known as the Pudgalavādins or ‘Personalists’. It is tempting to think that the controversy on Person in the Kathāvatthu may be taken as the oldest, though Tārānātha refers to an earlier controversy arising from the theory of soul propagated by Vatsa Brāhmaṇa in Kashmir which, according to him, resulted in a schism in the Order. This reference to some earlier Personalists cannot, however, be sustained in the light of evidence available so far. In fact, the very introduction of Buddhism in Kashmir is not datable to a period earlier than that of Aśoka.

The advocates of the existence of Person, referred to in the Kathāvatthu, thus, appear to be the first champions of this theory. Almost unanimously the Buddhist Personalists have been identified with a group of schools known as Vāṭsīputriya-
Sammatīyas. It is not unlikely that Tārāṇātha may have been led to associate the name Vatsa Brāhmaṇa with Pudgalavāda deriving the same from the Vātsiputriyas (Vātsiputriya-Vātsiputra).

On the testimony of Kathāvatthu, its commentary and some other works the origin of Vātsiputriyas has to be ascribed to the second century after the Nirvāṇa, that is to say, prior to the Third Buddhist Council. After some time, there developed four sects out of the Vātsiputriyas, viz., the Dharmottariya, the Bhadrayāniya, the Sammatīya and the Sannagarika. Out of these the Sammatīyas became the most important and formed the famous group, viz., the Vātsiputriya-Sammatīyas. The Vātsiputriya-Sammatīyas appear to have been the most widespread Buddhists as late as the time of Harṣavardhana (A.D. 606-647) when Yuan Chwang visited India. He came across sixty-six thousand Personalist monks out of a total number of 2,54,000 in the whole of the country. Yuan Chwang carried away fifteen treatises of this sect to China.

The Kathāvatthu presents the detailed dialogue that transpired between the Therāvādins and Pudgalavādins and finally lays down the unsoundness and refutability of the Pudgala thesis. The details of the Sarvāstivāda and Madhyamika criticism of this thesis are also extant in the treatises of the two respective schools.

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS

Despite all the difference of opinion among the Buddhist sects as evinced by the controversies preserved in the Kathāvatthu, it is interesting to note that there are some common assumptions shared by all of them. The Pudgalavādins, the most controversial sect, also appear to be anxious to register their conformity with the essential principles of Buddhism.

It is a basic tenet of Buddhism that all conditioned things, that is to say, all the factors of our normal experience are marked by impermanence. In its simple, untechnical meaning the doctrine of impermanence always stood for the fact that everything changed all the time. And this formulation of 'Ye dharmā hetuṇṇapabhaṇṇā, etc.', was shared commonly by all the Buddhist schools. The tenure of existence, of course, was supposed by the Therāvādins and the Sarvāstivādins to consist of a few
moments whereas the Sautrāntikas believed in just one instant (ksaṇa). Nevertheless, the basic assumption implied in the doctrine of impermanence was a common legacy of all the sects, the Pudgalavādins included. For Stcherbatsky, ‘instantaneous being is the fundamental doctrine by which all the Buddhist system is established at one stroke’, (eka prahārena eva).

Closely associated with the doctrine of impermanence (anit-yati) is the Buddhist rejection of two extreme views, viz., Eternalism and Annihilationism. Buddha outrightly rejected the two theories, so very widespread among the thinkers of his age. The Theravādins and the Pudgalavādins alike subscribe to this disposition of the Buddhist thought. In the course of the debate between the two, as we have it in the Kathāvatthu, the Pudgalavādins make their stand clear in unambiguous terms. They would not put the Pudgala either in the category of the conditioned or the unconditioned but would call it as undefinable in every respect.

Curiously enough, the Pudgalavādins also preserve the essence of the anattā doctrine, apart from their assertion that the Pudgala exists. The Pudgalavādins were careful enough to define the relation of the Pudgala to the skandhas in such a way that an erroneous belief in a self was put aside. They made it categorically clear that the Person is neither identical with the skandhas nor different from them, nor is he in the skandhas nor outside them. The Pudgalavādins thus, preserve the essence of the Buddha’s teachings on anattā, satkāyadrsti, viprayāsas, etc.

In the line of common assumptions, yet another link is provided by the Pudgalavādins holding fast to common scriptures. Most of the passages cited by the Pudgalavādins, in support of their view, may be found in the Pāli Canon. It is quite likely that the Sutta Piṭaka of the Pudgalavādins was substantially the same as that of Pāli. I-tsing, however, informs us that they had a separate Viṇaya.

The only work exclusively referred to as belonging to this school is the Sammītiya Śāstra or Sammītiyanikāyaśāstra which is extant in Chinese translation and contains the tenets of this school. The Pudgalavādins, however, acknowledged the authority of the Buddhist scriptures, although they had their own ideas about what constituted the ‘Buddha-word’.
THE PUDGALAVĀDA THEORY—ITS CLASSICAL FORM

The Pudgala theory was certainly the most fundamental doctrine propounded by them is clear from the fact that they received the name Pudgalavādins on that count. Through this doctrine they laid down that, in addition to the impersonal dharmas, there is still a Person to be reckoned with. This Person can be got at (upalabbhati) as a reality in the ultimate sense (paramatthena) and it can become the object of true experience (sacchikattha).\textsuperscript{22} Further, the Person was neither identical with nor different from the khandhas.\textsuperscript{23} The relationship between the two was held indescribable (avaktavya). The Person is a kind of substance which provides a common ground for the successive processes occurring in a self-identical individual. According to the Pudgalavādins, the idea of this Person is evidently clear in the events of one life from birth to death.

It also extends over many lives, and not only is it the same Person, who reappears again in every new birth, but it is also the same Person who is first an ordinary man and then, at the end, totally transformed by Nirvāṇa.\textsuperscript{24} They emphasized, therefore, the identity of the man who had won salvation with the man who had sought it. To support their theory, the Pudgalavādins quoted the Buddha, who is reported to have, at times, expressed himself in such terms which would lend support to a Personalist construction. For example, the Buddha had said: ‘This sage Sunetra, who existed in the past, that Sunetra was I’.\textsuperscript{25} Similarly, the Buddha said: ‘In the past I have had such a body’.\textsuperscript{26} Here the word ‘I’ can refer only to the ‘Person’. Further in the opinion of the Pudgalavādins, transmigration is inconceivable without a Person. It is the Person who wanders from one existence to another in the sense that he gives up the old skandhas, and takes up or acquires new ones. The Buddha had himself said: ‘He rejects one body and takes up another.’\textsuperscript{27} The existence of Person as upheld by the Pudgalavādins is formulated as an identity-in-difference that is to say a unity in combination with the diversity of states. It is the Person which exists and survives the change in psycho-physical elements. The Person is thought out as a mechanical and organic whole.

The Pudgalavādins pointed out that in each individual there:
are a number of factors which appear to survive the fleeting moments, e.g., memory. How is it possible for a thought-moment which has instantly perished to be remembered later; how can it remember and how can it recognize? ‘If the self is not real who then remembers, who recognizes things, who recites and memorises the books, who repeats the texts?’ ‘There must be an “I” which first experiences and then remembers what it has done. If there were none, how could one possibly remember what one has done?’ A similar reasoning is also applied to karman and its retribution. Moreover, a Person or Pudgala is needed to provide an agent or instrument for the activities of an individual. It is the Person who sees, the eye being merely the instrument.

Then again, if there were no Persons, the practice of friendliness would be unthinkable. Is it possible to be friendly to a conglomeration of impersonal and unsubstantial elements? The Pudgalavādins seem to reiterate the commonsense standpoint which in this context is so very evident as the hard fact of life. It was their emphatic argument that the denial of appearance requires reason. And for them, Pudgala is such an appearance whose denial is difficult to be substantiated by cogent reasons. It is in this strain that they argue that if Pudgala were not there, who indeed would fare through the ‘beginningless Sāṁsāra’?

Lastly, the Pudgalavādins draw attention to such Canonical references which seem to support their theory of Person or self. They frequently quote: ‘One Person (eka-pudgala) when he is born in the world is born for the weal of the many.’ Who is that one Person? It is the Tāthāgata. Similarly, we have: ‘After he has been reborn seven times at the most, a Person puts an end to suffering, and becomes one who has severed all bonds.’ Then there were some suttas classifying the Pudgalas. Even in the Abhidharma the eight types of saints were generally known as the ‘eight personages’ (Pudgala). Special attention is also drawn to the Bhārahārasūtra which provided the Pudgalavādins their strongest argument. It is interesting to note that this passage finds mention in the Brahmanical texts also, for instance, the Nyāya Vāritika refers to it. The passage in question of the Bhārahārasūtra lends sufficient support to the Pudgalavāda thesis for the reason that the Person here is clearly distinguished from the five skandhas. The Pudgalavādins observed:
that if Person and *skandhas* were identical then the burden would carry itself, which is absurd to assume.\(^{39}\)

The Pudgalavādins also adduced some positive arguments of a philosophical character. If there were no Pudgala how can the omniscience of Buddha be explained?\(^{40}\) If all acts of knowledge were instantaneous, none could know all things. A lasting personality, on the other hand, would provide a possible basis for omniscience.\(^{41}\)

It is pointed out that if the Pudgala is only a word to designate the five *skandhas*, then why did Buddha not identify *jīva* with *sarīra*?\(^{42}\) Similarly, why did Buddha declare Pudgala as indeterminate (*avyākṛta*)? If it did not exist, then why did the Lord not say in clear terms that Pudgala does not exist at all?\(^{43}\) Curiously enough, the orthodox sections admitted these passages but maintained that they do not mean what they say. On the contrary, the orthodox sects cited such passages which went against the Pudgala theory. According to the Pudgalavādins, however, these were unauthentic texts, since, they were not found in their *Piṭaka*.\(^{44}\)

The Pudgalavādins’ assertion about the existence of Pudgala, in addition to the impersonal dharmas, caused a great stir in the Buddhist community. It was only natural for the various sects to get entangled into a prolonged controversy with the advocates of the thesis which, according to them, was out and out an alien and heterodox view. We, however, preserve only the dialogue that occurred between the Theravādins and the Pudgalavādins\(^{45}\) and that between the Sarvāstivādins and the Pudgalavādins,\(^{46}\) as also the Mādhyamika criticism of the Pudgalavāda doctrine.\(^{47}\) The debate on this issue assumed such proportions that the Pudgalavādins have been described by other Buddhists as heretics or ‘outsiders in their midst’\(^{48}\) and pseudo-Buddhists.\(^{49}\) The Pudgalavādins have been subjected to a ‘ceaseless polemics’ in the history of Buddhism.\(^{50}\)

**THESIS AND ARGUMENTS**

**THERAVĀDA REFUTATION**

The debate commences with the attempt of the two opposite
camps, viz., the Pudgalavādins and the Theravādins seeking to refute each other’s basic stand on Pudgala by different methods. The former hold that the Pudgala exists.

The Theravādins put the most crucial question as to whether or not the Pudgala is known in the same way as any other real and ultimate thing such as Nibbāna or rūpa? The Theravādins also want to ascertain whether the Pudgalavādins admit of the existence of Pudgala either as the unchangeable, ever-existing reality like Nibbāna, or as constituted object like rūpa, or regard it as false as a mirage or look upon it simply as hearsay? The Pudgalavādins deny all the four possible categories but they maintain that the Pudgala is known as real and ultimate fact. Now these two positions taken by the Pudgalavādins appear contradictory to the Theravādins and they claim the refutability of the former.

At this, the Pudgalavādins come forward with a four-fold rejoinder. They counter-question the Theravādins as to whether they admit that the Pudgala is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? For the Theravādins it is not known in the above sense. They are now put to another question, viz., is the Pudgala not known in the same way as any real and ultimate is known? The Theravādins reply in the negative. Just as the Theravādins had charged the Pudgalavādins with contradiction in their statements the latter also charge them for contradictory statements.

The Theravādins put forward some straight questions instead of seeking for logical contradictions in the statements of the proponents. They ask accordingly— is Pudgala a paramatthasacca or not, i.e., whether or not the Pudgala is known in the same way as the real and ultimate everywhere (sabbththa), always (sabbadā) and in everything (sabbesu)? According to the Pudgalavādins, the Pudgala is not to be regarded as real in the highest sense, i.e., as existing everywhere, always and in everything as observed by the Theravādins. This is a discrepancy in the Pudgalavāda thesis according to the Theravādins and it is sufficient for their refutations. The proponents, however, come out with a similar rejoinder and make a counter-claim that their thesis has not been refuted convincingly.

In the section that follows, the hypothetical reality of
Pudgala is sought to be controverted on the basis of its comparison with other reals, viz., **khandhas**, **āyatana**, **dhātu** and **indriyas**.\(^{65}\)

The Theravādins question the Pudgalavādins as to whether the Pudgala is to be regarded as existing like any of the fifty-seven elements, i.e., the five **skandhas**, viz., **rūpa**, **vedanā**, **saññā**, **sankhāra**, **viññāna**, twelve sense factors, (**āyatana**), eighteen **dhātu** and twenty-two controlling powers? The Pudgalavādins admit the existence of Pudgala just as the existence of other reals is accepted. They refuse to admit, however, another point raised by the Theravādins, viz., whether the Pudgala is different from these elements?\(^{66}\) The Pudgalavādins deny this meaning thereby that they do not admit of Pudgala as an element apart from fifty-seven elements.\(^{67}\) They also quote a **Nikāya** passage: ‘**atthi puggalo attahitāya patipanno**’,\(^{68}\) i.e., ‘there is the Person who works for his own good’, which seems to imply that the Pudgala exists but not apart from the elements. This is a position which appears illogical to the Theravādins. To say that the Pudgala and **rūpa** (material quality), **vedanā** (feeling), etc. are known in the sense of real and ultimate fact and that they are not mutually distinct from each other (i.e., Pudgala and **rūpa** or Pudgala and **vedanā** and so on) is contradictory and hence the Theravādins claim to refute the Pudgalavādins.\(^{69}\)

Now the Pudgalavādins put a counter question to the Theravādins. The Theravādins also do not grant that the Pudgala, whose conventional (**sammuti**) reality they accept, is different from the elements.\(^{70}\) According to Buddhaghosa, the questions of the Pudgalavādins have a mixture of **sammuti** and **paramattha** truths and as such the Theravādins have no alternative but to leave them unanswered.\(^{71}\)

The controversy about Person on the basis of its comparison with the elements is continued further by way of analogy. The following section dilates on the above question, comparing it with the fifty-seven elements.\(^{72}\)

Next, the comparative analysis of the Person is initiated by the Theravādins by a four-fold method.\(^{73}\) They want the Pudgalavādins to agree to either of the two views, i.e., **Ucchedavāda** (Annihilationism) or **Sassatavāda** (Eternalism).\(^{74}\) They question the Pudgalavādins as to whether the Person is identical with
\textit{rūpa}, or different from \textit{rūpa}, or is in \textit{rūpa}, or \textit{rūpa} is in the Person? The Pudgalavādins reject all the four propositions, since, they know that these views imply either \textit{Ucchedavāda} or \textit{Sassatavāda}.\textsuperscript{75} Although the Pudgalavādins suppose that the Person is of the same nature\textsuperscript{76} as \textit{rūpa} and other elements, they would not grant that Person is an element separate from and independent of the fifty-seven elements.

Next, the Theravādins seek to controvert their opponents' position by questioning on the \textit{lakkhanas} of the Person.\textsuperscript{77} They question whether the Person is \textit{sappaccaya} (caused) and \textit{saṅkhāta} (constituted) like \textit{rūpa} or is \textit{appaccaya} (uncaused) and \textit{asaṅkhāta} (unconstituted)\textsuperscript{78} like Nibbāna? Is it eternal or is it temporal? The Pudgalavādins refuse to put the Person in either of the two categories of reals. Instead, they repeat the words of the Buddha where he had said: ‘\textit{atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno tī},’ i.e., ‘there is the Person who works for his own good’, and question the Theravādins whether the Person referred to in this passage is \textit{sappaccaya} and \textit{saṅkhāta} or \textit{appaccaya} and \textit{asaṅkhāta}? The Theravādins also deny both the positions as, in their opinion, the term Pudgala is only a \textit{sammutisacca}, i.e., conventional truth.\textsuperscript{79}

Next, the problem of Person as percipient is raised. The Theravādins question the Pudgalavādins as to whether the Person is known and whether that which is known is the Person?\textsuperscript{80} According to Buddhaghosa, through this argument, the Theravādins mean to enquire whether the statement ‘Pudgala perceives’ is the same as the statement ‘that which perceives is Pudgala’? In other words, are these two statements identical as \textit{citta} is with \textit{mano} or they are different as \textit{rūpa} is from \textit{vedanā}?\textsuperscript{81} The Pudgalavādins’ reply to this query is that the Person is known and of that which is known some is Person and some is not and similarly the Person perceives but not everything that perceives is Person.\textsuperscript{82} According to Buddhaghosa, the Pudgalavādins hold that the Pudgala perceives but not everything that perceives is Pudgala, e.g., \textit{rūpa}, \textit{vedanā}, etc., are not Pudgala.\textsuperscript{83} As the argument goes, the Pudgalavādins, however, rely on the already quoted statement of Buddha: ‘\textit{atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno tī},’ and affirm their proposition. The Theravādins counteract this argument by referring to a statement of
the Buddha in which he is reported to have said: ‘suññato lokam avekkhassu’, etc., i.e., ‘the world is empty of soul’.

The Theravādins put three further questions to the Pudgalavādins to examine the description (paññatti) of the Person as assumed by the Pudgalavādins. They want to know as to whether or not the Pudgala of the rūpadhātu is rūpi, of the kāmadhātu is kāmi and likewise of the arūpadhātu is arūpi? The Pudgalavādins admit the first and the third propositions but not the second. According to Buddhaghosa, the Pudgalavādins admit the first point because the material body comes to be, and so there is a concept of actuality. They deny the second because a Person may come to be in a passionless sphere, and so there is not actuality of the concept of material quality. They admit the third point again because a Person may come to be in the sphere of the immaterial, and so there is again a concept of actuality. They argue that Pudgala = satta = jīva and kāya = sarīra. Though the Pudgalavādins do not admit either the identity of, or difference between, jīva and sarīra, they hold, however, that kāya must be different from Pudgala as there are such statements as ‘so kāye kāyānupassi viharati’ and so forth, i.e., ‘he contemplates body in the body’, in which ‘so’, i.e., ‘he’, cannot but refer to Pudgala.

The next discussion relates to the problem of rebirth and transmigration of the Person. The Pudgalavādins affirm that the Person transmigrates from this world to another but it is neither the selfsame Person nor a different Person. Such an assertion obviously saves the Pudgalavādins from the charge of upholding either the Sassaṭavāda or Ucchedavāda. The Theravādins would, however, make a similar assertion about the passing of the khandhas. The Pudgalavādins further claim that their assumption is based upon the Canonical testimony as it said: ‘a person transmigrates but seven times at the most’.

On this suggestion of the Pudgalavādins, the Theravādins observe that some form of Pudgala as referred to in the mentioned passages does pass from one existence to another. This Pudgala can then have no death, it once becomes a man and then a god and so forth, which is absurd. In their reply, the Pudgalavādins point out that sotāpanna-manussa is known to take rebirth as a sotāpanna-deva and question the Theravādins, how
this *sotāpanna* can pass from this existence to another unless there exists some form of Pudgala to carry the qualities?

The Theravādins cross-question whether the passing Pudgala *ren* ains identical in every respect⁹² and does not lose any of its qualities⁹³ The Pudgalavādins first deny this on the ground that a man does not continue to be a man in the deva-loka. But on second thought they affirm it in view of the fact that the carrier of certain qualities from one existence to another is a Pudgala, an *antarābhavapudgala*.⁹⁴

The Pudgalavādins are careful enough not to show the slightest inclination to either of the two extreme views: ‘*tāṁ jīvaṁ tāṁ sarīraṁ and aṁnāṁ jīvaṁ aṁnāṁ sarīraṁ*.⁹⁵ Buddhaghosa has offered the explanation that the Pudgalavādins seek to lay down that the transformed *khandhas* and Pudgala and not the identical *khandhas* and Pudgala pass from one existence to another, since, the *khandhas* are not to be taken as permanent, while the Pudgala is not so. However, the Pudgala also is not permanent and unconstituted in the absolute sense. Without *khandha*, āyatana, dhātu, indriya and citta Pudgala cannot be, but for that reason the colour and other qualities of the *khandha*, āyatana, etc., do not affect the Pudgala. The Pudgalavādins hold this because they would not admit the identity of Person with blue-green colour and its pluralistic state in the individual organism by way of variegated colours like blue-green, etc.⁹⁶ Yet, the Pudgala is not a mere shadow of the *khandhas*.⁹⁷ On the question whether Pudgala is perceivable in every momentary thought,⁹⁸ the Pudgalavādins answer in the affirmative but they would not accept the implication of the Theravādins that the Pudgala should thus have momentary existence (*khanika-bhāvanī*).⁹⁹

The Pudgalavādins ask the Theravādins whether they would admit that one who sees something by means of an organ of sense is the Pudgala or not?¹⁰⁰ The Theravādins affirm this as a conventional truth. They put the same question to the proponents, however, in a different form thus: One who does not see anything by means of an organ of sense, is he not a Pudgala? The proponents quote from the Canon where the Buddha is reported to have said, ‘I see, by means of my divine eyes,’¹⁰¹ beings appearing and disappearing’ and so forth, and, thus,
they infer that the seer in question is the Pudgala.\textsuperscript{102}

The following argument relates to purusākāra or human action.\textsuperscript{103} The Theravādins do not admit any doer, so they question the proponents as to whether they also subscribe to the same view or not? On the denial of the latter, the Theravādins ask whether the Pudgalavādins would admit the existence of the doer and a creator of the doer, which, however, the Pudgalavādins have to refuse on account of the heretical doctrine of issaranimmāna,\textsuperscript{104} but subsequently they accept it in view of the fact that the parents, teachers, etc., are also in a sense the makers of a Person.\textsuperscript{105} The Theravādins, however, point out that such a state of things, i.e., a doer and a deed implies not just a deed but also a doer. This leads to the conclusion that so long as there is action there is its doer also and hence there can be no end to Pudgalaparamparā and that would falsify the fact that, by the stoppage of the wheel of actions, dukkha can be brought to an end. In that case Nibbāna, mahāpathavī, etc., must also have a doer. The Pudgalavādins reject all the inferences drawn by the Theravādins. Thus, the Pudgalavādins deny that the deed and the doer can be distinct, just to avoid admitting the heresy that the Pudgala has mental properties or coefficients (savīkhāra).\textsuperscript{106}

Next follows a discussion over the identity of the doer of a deed with the enjoyer of its fruits.\textsuperscript{107} In the opinion of the Theravādins there does not exist a feeler or enjoyer of action apart from vipākapavatti (i.e., the sequence of fruition). As against this, the Pudgalavādins hold that paṭisamveditabba is vipāka (result) but the Pudgala is not vipāka. According to them Nibbāna, mahāpathavī, mahāsamudda, etc., are not vipāka like divine happiness (dībba-sukha) or human happiness (manussasukha), so none of them is an object of enjoyment of the Pudgala. Also, the Pudgalavādins do not admit that sukha is distinct from sukha-enjoyer. The Theravādins, in fact, logically wanted to make the Pudgalavādins admit that there must be not only an enjoyer of a fruit but also an enjoyer of the enjoyer of the fruit and so on an endless chain.\textsuperscript{108}

The Theravādins put the crucial question whether the doer of a deed is identical with, or different from, the enjoyer of its fruit? The proponents first deny both the possibilities in view of the Buddha’s words: ‘sayain katain paraṁ katain sukhadukkhani’,\textsuperscript{109}
etc., but on second thought, in view of their theory that there is a common element keeping the link between the present and the future life, they admit that there is a kāraka (doer) and vedaka (feeler or enjoyer) of a deed but the two are neither identical nor different, neither both identical and different, nor not both identical and different.110

The Pudgalavādins next reiterate the Pudgala thesis by referring to abhinā.111 (supernormal powers), ātī112 (relatives) and phala113 (attainments). According to the Pudgalavādins,

1. How can a person perform miracles keeping his organs of sense, etc., inert and inactive unless there is something else as Pudgala? By implication they mean that a soul or Pudgala can achieve magical efficacy (iddhi) only with respect to such matter as is bound up with human power of control.114

2. How can one accept the existence of parents, etc., without implying the existence of a Pudgala?115

3. How can a phalastha continue to be the same in his subsequent births, unless the existence of a Pudgala is admitted?116

The Theravādins merely evade these arguments by putting the counter-questions that one who cannot perform miracles is he not a Pudgala and so on.

The next problem posed by the Theravādins seeks to ascertain whether Pudgala is conditioned (saṁkhata), unconditioned or neither conditioned nor unconditioned (n'eva saṁkhato nāsaṁkhato).117 The Pudgalavādins assent to the last alternative. They state that the Pudgala has certain aspects of saṁkhata, in so far as it is subject to sukhā-dukhā and so forth. Also, it has certain aspects of asaṁkhata, for the reason that it is not subject to birth, old age and death (jāti, jārā and maraṇa).

On the next query of the Theravādins, as to whether a parinibbāto Pudgala exists in Nibbāna or not?118 the Pudgalavādins negative both as the affirmation of either would associate them with Sassatavāda or Ucchedavāda respectively.119

To support their thesis, the Pudgalavādins further point out that at times one says that he is feeling happy or unhappy and
so forth; how can a person say so unless he is a Pudgala and not a mere conglomeration of separate khandhas? The Theravādins put a counter-question: well, if a Person does not feel happiness or unhappiness should it be taken to mean that there is no Pudgala? The Theravādins further ask whether the proponents would treat sukha and Pudgala as something separate and distinct? The Pudgalavādins also avoid a direct answer and question the Theravādins instead: when a Pudgala is said to be ‘kāye kāyānupassi viharati’, does it not affirm the existence of a Pudgala?

Finally, the two debating sects take recourse to the citation of several passages from the Nikāyas. The Theravādins refer only to such passages in which the doctrine of anatta is expressed explicitly or implicitly. On the contrary, the Pudgalavādins quote such passages where terms such as ‘puggala’, ‘attahita’, ‘so’, etc., are mentioned.

As would appear from the discussion, the Theravādins’ point of view is the same as the Buddhist doctrine of anatta which consists in the denial that there is, in the physical or mental realms, anything which may properly be called one’s ‘self’. The Theravādins and for that matter, all other sects denied the existence of a ‘self’ which might run like a single thread through a string of pearls. For them, there are pearls only and no thread to hold them together. This, according to the orthodox sections, was laid down by the Buddha in the very first sermon delivered at Banaras. Matter cannot be the self, for if it were, then the body would not be subject to disease and one would be able to control one’s body at pleasure; feeling, perceptions, dispositions, and intellect, none can be equated with self either. There are several other passages in the Nikāyas which lead to the conclusion that one ought to lay aside the false views of the self. The doctrine forms the subject of an interesting deliberation in the Milindapañha, where the king is instructed by means of the parallel of the chariot and it is pointed out that the name Nāgasena denotes no soul, but is merely an appellation of the five aggregates which constitute the empirical individual. Buddhaghosa also affirms that he who believes in a living entity must assume that this living entity will either perish or not perish. If he assumes the former, he falls into the heresy of annihilation.
or extinction and if he assumes the latter he is struck
against the heresy of Persistence of Existence (Sassatavāda). 129
Similarly, it is pointed out by Anuruddhācariya 130 that because
of the continuity of temporary selves, men under that blinding
influence of ignorance (avijjā) mistake similarity for identity,
and are apt to think of all this river of life as one enduring,
abiding soul or ego, even as they take the river of yesterday
identical with that of to-day. 131 Accordingly, the human being
as also the whole of the Cosmos is explained in the Buddhist
theory of existence as constituted of Name and Form. The
belief in ātman, Jīva or soul is thus replaced by a doctrine of
the dhammas.

The various dhammas or elements into which the world-order
including the subject and the object is sought to be resolved
are divided into two categories, i.e., constituted (sāṁskṛta) and
unconstituted (asaṁskṛta). 132 Rūpa and Nirvāna, for example,
represent the two categories respectively. The Theravāda
standpoint consists in the fact that anything given would be
either identical with a certain element or class of elements or it
would be different from that, since, there are various but
classified elements only. In the course of the Pudgala contro-
versy, they make repeated efforts to make the Pudgalavādins
accept one of the two alternatives. That is to say, the latter
should either identify the Pudgala with the skandhas or else
they must distinguish it from the same. Similarly, when the
Pudgalavādins affirm that the Pudgala is known or got at as
real, the Theravādins want to know whether it is real in the
same way as Nirvāna is real, that is, whether or not it is sacchi-
kaṭṭhaparamaṇaithena? As against this the Pudgalavādins do
not admit either the difference of, or the identity between jīva
and sarīra. Again, in case of transmigration of Pudgala, the
Theravādins insist on knowing the position of their adver-
saries as to whether the same Pudgala passes on to the other
world or a different one. Similarly, they enquire about the
identity of the doer of a deed and its enjoyer, that is to say,
whether or not they are identifiable?

However, the Theravāda insistence on establishing either
identity or difference between the Pudgala and skandhas, on the
one hand, and Pudgala and Nirvāna, on the other, is not in
itself a valid argument as becomes clear when the Mādhyamika
system takes up this issue. In fact, it is difficult to formulate any conceivable relationship—identity or difference or both between the ātman (Pudgala) and the states (upādāna, i.e., skandhas). Does the ātman (Pudgala) exist before, after or simultaneously with the states? If before, how is it apprehended at all without the states, without the difference of mental content? If the ātman (Pudgala) could exist without the states, the states too could exist without the ātman? The ātman (Pudgala) cannot be posterior to the states, as this would mean that the states could exist without the direction of the agent (self or Pudgala). Nor are the two simultaneous; for, only those two are simultaneous which can exist apart from each other. Nāgārjuna thus concludes: “The self is not different from the states, nor identical with them; there is no self without the states; nor is it to be considered non-existent. This is not, however, the final Mādhyamika verdict on the Pudgala theory for the reason that in the ultimate analysis their dialectic leads to the ‘critical’ (middle) position, according to which, there are no states without the self, nor is there the self without the states, and therefore both are unreal, being relative, that is to say, reality belongs to neither.

The Pudgalavāda doctrine is also recorded in the treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva. They all attribute this doctrine unanimously to the Vātsīputriya-Sammatīyas.

According to Vasumitra, the Vātsīputriyas or Sāmmatīyas upheld the Pudgala thesis thus:

1. The Pudgalas are neither the same as skandhas nor different from the skandhas. The name Pudgala is provisionally given to an aggregate of skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus.

2. Things (dhammas or dharmas) cannot transmigrate from one world to the other apart from Pudgala. They can be said to transmigrate along with Pudgala.

According to Bhavya, the Vātsīputriyas believed that the dharmas do not transmigrate from this world to another. The Person or individual (Pudgala) having grasped (upādāya) the five aggregates, transmigrates. Similarly, he sums up the Sammatīya views thus: What must exist (bhavanīya) and
that which exists (bhava) and that which must be stopped (nirod-
dhavya) and that which has stopped (niruddha) and that which
must be born (janitavya) and that which is born (jāti), that
which must die (marāṇiya) and that which is dead (mṛta), that
which must be done (kṛtya) and that which is done (kṛta), that
which must be freed (muktya) and that which is freed (mukta),
that which must go (gantavya) and that which goes (gāmin), that which must be understood (vijñeya) and the con-
sciousness (vijñāna), (all) exist.\footnote{142}

Vinitadeva also records that the Ārya-Sammatīyas and their
sub-sect held the view that the Person is not really identical
with the aggregates (skandhas). It is not in the aggregates.
It does not exist out of the aggregates.\footnote{143}

SARVĀSTIVĀDA REFUTATION

According to the Sarvāstivāda standpoint the stock disproof
of the Pudgala consists in terms of anupalabdhi.\footnote{144} For them,
there is nothing existent which cannot be got at ('nāsti anupal-
abdhi'). The self is a mere fiction. For the non-Pudgalavādins,
the 'Person' belongs to conventional, and not to ultimate
reality (paramattha); it cannot be got at (upalabhyate) for the
simple reason that there is nothing there to be perceived as
real.\footnote{145} Prolonged meditation on dharma, it is pointed out,
would easily dispel the misconceived notion of the Person or
Self.\footnote{146}

An interesting detail of the debate between the Sarvāstivāda-
Vaibhāṣikas and the Vātsiputriya-Sammatīyas on the issue is
preserved in the ninth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa under
the caption 'Pudgala-viniścaya'. Ācārya Vasubandhu examines
the Pudgala thesis by putting to its advocates a number of
intricate questions. Vaibhāṣika criticism and point of view
emerge through the course of this polemic.

As noted previously, the Abhidharmakośa debate starts with
the dilemma as to whether the Vātsiputriyas are Buddhists
at all and entitled to attain emancipation or not?\footnote{147}

Vasubandhu puts the most crucial question thus: Is the
Pudgala of the Vātsiputriyas real (dravya) or only conventional
(prajñāpīti)?\footnote{148} The real (dravya) existence in the early
Buddhist (Abhidhārmika) context denotes the existence of
elements like rūpa and such other, whereas the conventional (prajñāpti) stands for an element like ‘milk’, which is a mere name having no separate existence of its own apart from the constituent. Now, if the Pudgala is of the former category (dravya), it would be different from the skandhas as vedanā is from rūpa. In that case, it should be saṁskṛta (constituted), or asaṁskṛta (unconstituted). But it cannot be the latter for it implies the heretical āśvata view. On the other hand, if the Pudgala is said to be of the second category (prajñāpti), its existence should depend on the skandhas. Since it has no independent existence of its own, it cannot be said to exist.

According to the Vātsīputrīyas, Pudgala is undoubtedly real (dravya) but it is neither identical with, nor different from the skandhas as fire is to fuel. Fire exists so long as there is fuel. Similarly, the Pudgala exists as long as there are skandhas.

Vasubandhu however argues that fuel and fire appear at different times (bhinnakāla) like seed and sprout. Hence, fire is impermanent, and the difference between fuel and fire is one of time and characteristics (lakṣaṇa), and again, one is the cause of the other. Further, according to the proponents, fuel is constituted of three mahābhūtas while fire is of the fourth (tejas) only. That means fire is different from fuel.

At this, the Vātsīputrīyas point out that fire and fuel are co-existent and the latter is in fact a complementary of the former (āśritva), and that one is not wholly different from the other (saḥabhāva) for fuel is not totally devoid of the element of fire. Similarly, the Pudgala should be distinguished from skandhas. Vasubandhu, however, cites the example of a burning log of wood and argues that it represents both fire and fuel and hence identical (ananyā).

Instead, the Vātsīputrīyas hold that the Pudgala is neither to be described as anītya, which is sub-divided into past (aśīta), present (pratyutpanna) and future (anāgata), nor nitya, eternal. It is avaktavya, indeterminable, inexplicable. It is not among the constituents of a being but is perceived only when all the constituents are present.

Vasubandhu puts the next question as to whether the Pudgala can be cognized by any sense-organ (indriya), if so, by which? According to the Vātsīputrīyas, it is cognized
by all the six sense-organs. They point out that eyes do not see rūpa (object) unless the mind (mana-indriya) co-operates. Similarly, none of the five sense-organs can function in its respective sphere independent of the mind. In fact, all the sense-organs suggest to the mind indirectly that there is a Pudgala. According to Vasubandhu, if rūpa also is the cause of Pudgala’s cognition, one should not say that rūpa and Pudgala are different; and if cognition of rūpa leads at once to the cognition of Pudgala, one should say that rūpa and Pudgala are identical. The Vātsiputriyas, however, neither regard the perception of rūpa as identical with the perception of Pudgala nor look upon them as different.

Next follows the argument of Vasubandhu that if Pudgala be an entity, it should be either material (rūpa) or non-material (nāma). But the Buddha is on record to have stated that rūpa, or vedanā or sanjīnā or saṁsāra or viññāna are not self—all dharmas are without self—there is no Pudgala. Also he clearly mentioned that sattva, jīva or Pudgala is a prajñāapti (designation) applied to the false notion of a self cherished by the average people.

But the Vātsiputriyas do not accept the authenticity of these so-called utterances of the Buddha for they are wanting in their own Canon. Instead, they would refer to such statements in which the Buddha speaks of a Person’s past existence, or recognizes pūbhenivāsañāna as one of the higher acquisitions of an adept, and asks, who is that which remembers? Is it Pudgala or the skandhas? Further, if the Buddha is to be regarded as omniscient, this must mean that there is a continuity of something, i.e., there is a Pudgala. Similarly, unless there were some form of Pudgala, why should the disciples be instructed to avoid assuming thus: ‘rūpavān aham babhūvātiśīlahvani’, i.e., in the past I possessed a body and so forth. Vasubandhu, however, contends that this is merely a conventional usage of the terms Pudgala which refers only to skandha-santāna.

The Vātsiputriyas now cite the reference from the all-important Bhūrahārasūtra, and suggest that by bhāra is meant here the skandhas and by bhārahāra the individual (Pudgala); the two are distinguished here and hence the Pudgala exists apart from the skandhas.
In reply to this, Vasubandhu observes that the *sūtra* in question undoubtedly says that the Five Groups (*pañcopādāna-skan-dhāḥ*) are the burden, attachment to them is carrying of the burden, detachment from them is laying down of the burden and the burden-bearer is the individual. But the individual spoken of in the passage is only the empirical individual. It was merely for conforming to the prevalent usage of the word that the Buddha used it and hence one should not speak of Pudgala as an entity.\textsuperscript{169}

The Vātsīputriyas admit the existence of *anupapādikā* beings and *anatarābhava*, and prove thereby the existence of Pudgala. They quote such passages as ‘ekapuggalo bhikkhave loke uppa-jjamāno uppaajiati bahujanahītāya’ and hence there is Pudgala besides the *skandhas*.\textsuperscript{170} According to Vasubandhu, the sense of the *sūtra*, as derived by the Pudgalavādins, is far-fetched. Instead, he draws the proponents’ attention to such texts as *Parmārtha-sūnyatāsūtra* where the Buddha is supposed to have said that there is action, there is retribution, but no agent. Similarly, he refers to *Phālgunasūtra* etc., and rejects the Pudgalavāda view-point.\textsuperscript{171}

The Vātsīputriyas further argue that if the Pudgala is only a word meant to designate the five *skandhas*, then why did Buddha not identify *jīva* with *sarīra*? If the individual is the same as the elements, he is composed of, and nothing else, why did the Lord decline to decide the question, whether the living being is identical with the body or not?\textsuperscript{172}

Vasubandhu recounts an earlier discussion on this question and points out that the Buddha declined because he took into consideration the intention of the questioner. The latter asked about the existence of the soul as a real living unit, controlling our actions from within. But as such, since a soul is absolutely non-existing, how could the Buddha have decided whether it did or did not differ from the body?\textsuperscript{173}

Vātsīputriyas put the further question: And why did not the Lord declare that it does not exist at all?\textsuperscript{174} Again, Vasubandhu would point out that the Lord did not do so because he took into consideration the questioner’s state of mind. The latter could have misunderstood it to mean that the present living being (*jīva*) is identical with the past in the sense that the *skandhas* are permanent as the continuing elements of a life-
(and that this continuity) is also derived. He would thus have fallen into a wrong doctrine, (the doctrine of Nihilism).\textsuperscript{175}

The Vātsiputriyas observe, however, that to state that ‘Ātmā’ does not exist in reality (\textit{satyatah sthititah}) is a wrong view, is indirectly to imply the admission of the existence of Pudgala.\textsuperscript{176}

The next argument of the Vātsiputriyas is that if Pudgala does not exist, who fares through Samsāra? If only the elements exist, how to explain the statement of the Buddha, ‘I was at that time the master Sunetra’, and in that statement why is the ‘I’ of the past identified with the ‘I’ of the present; does it indicate that the elements of the past are the elements of the present?\textsuperscript{177} Vasubandhu seeks to refute it by saying that just as fire passes from wood to wood, the fire never remaining the same, so the elements pass from one existence to another, nothing remaining identical.\textsuperscript{178}

The Vātsiputriyas next ask, how can memory be explained without the existence of Pudgala? Who is it that remembers?\textsuperscript{179} Vasubandhu answers that it is \textit{saṃjñā} that remembers.\textsuperscript{180} ‘Remembrance is a new state of consciousness directed to the same object, conditioned as it is by the previous states.’\textsuperscript{181}

The Vātsiputriyas further observe that there must be an agent, a doer, a proprietor of the memory. There must be a cognizing agent, an action must have a doer. ‘Devadatta walks’, implies the existence of a certain individual.\textsuperscript{182} According to Vasubandhu, it is not so. Just as when fire traverses from one forest to another, no question of individuality arises, even so Devadatta is a \textit{prajñāpti} (like fire) applied to a conglomerate of elements passing from one existence to another, and has no individuality.\textsuperscript{183}

Instead of scholastic argumentation, the Sarvāstivādins come down to more practical grounds while criticizing this theory in the \textit{Vijñānakāyā}. They observe that even if Pudgala exists, it does not help in the search for salvation, does not promote welfare, or dharma, or the religious life, produces no superknowledge, enlightenment or Nirvāṇa. Because there is no use for him, therefore, he does not exist.\textsuperscript{184}
NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSY

The Kathāvatthu controversy on soul, when contrasted with that of the Abhidhammakosā, seems to be characterized by a simplicity of its own. The Theravādins put to the proponents pairs of questions and seek to find contradiction in the standpoint of the latter as they are not prepared to admit the same thing about one which they affirm in the case of the other. On the contrary, the Abhidhammakosā debate is marked by a scholastic approach to the issue. The arguments and counter-arguments are given a deeper treatment in this text. The versatile genius of Vasubandhu is manifest throughout the criticism he lashes out at the Pudgalavādins. It seems that the nature and style of debating in the Kathāvatthu conforms to its early date in comparison with which the Abhidhammakosā belongs to a later and more scholastic phase of Buddhism.

As regards the respective standpoints of the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins that emerge through the two debates, we may briefly sum them up as follows. In the context of the Pudgala controversy, the Theravādins seek to lay down that the use of such terms as ‘Pudgala’, ‘being’, etc., in their conventional sense, as was done by the Buddha while preaching the laity, by no means confers upon the transient aggregates, designated by the same terms collectively, any ultimate or philosophical reality. Given bodily and mental aggregates, it is customary to speak of a being in terms of a name, family, etc. In popular convention, this means a ‘Person’. But the Buddha laid down clearly that there are ‘merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world’. The existence of the Person, as assumed by the Pudgalavādins, is simply untenable for the reason that it cannot be classed in any of the categories of reals.

The Sarvāstivādins did not deny the reality of the empirical individual. But whatsoever be designated by such terms as personality, ego, self, individual, etc., the underlying idea within all these is not that of a real and ultimate fact. They all denote a mere name for a multitude of inter-connected facts. With the development of Abhidharma resulting in a deep and complex psychological analysis, this idea was sought to be carried to its logical end. Man came to be conceived as
just an aggregate of causally connected elements and the analysis rendered him threadbare into khandhas, āyatanas and dhātus. The entire process of the events and experiences of the world has to be understood in terms of various elements or dharmas which constitute the world. There is no soul apart from feelings, ideas, volitions, etc. It is emphasized that for the self, only the unsubstantial elements have to be accounted. The Theravādins also upheld this point as may be seen from the comments of Buddhaghosa.189

These explanations appear unconvincing to the Vātsīputrīya-Sammadhiyas. They seek to lay down that the five khandhas which are distinct from one another cannot give rise to the consciousness of I-ness as a unity. They affirm therefore the existence of a sixth mental property and call it Pudgala which can remain along with the khandhas and disappears when the khandhas disappear in Nibbāna.190 This mental property or Pudgala, not being momentary (kṣanika) like the khandhas, it has not all the properties of saṁkhata (constituted object) and similarly as it is not also unchanging and ever existing like Nibbāna, so it is not asaṁkhata. And hence the Pudgala must be held as neither saṁkhata nor asaṁkhata. A similar view is referred to in the Tarkajñā. There it is said that the Vātsīputrīya-Sammadhiyas, etc., admitted the reality of an ‘individual’ which is something inexpressible being neither identical with the five groups of elements nor different from them.191

Despite all the debate with a view to refuting the Pudgala thesis, it is doubtful if Vātsīputrīya-Sammadhiyas were at all convinced and dissociated from their original stand. They firmly held to their essential thesis that the ego or empirical self-consciousness is an undeniable entity, though it is never found apart from the stream of mental life. That they survived these sectarian onslaughts is proved by the fact that the Mādhyamikas had to contend with the upholders of Pudgalavāda.192 Centuries later, Yuan Chhwang found them the most prosperous sect in the seventh century A.D. According to Tārānātha, Vātsīputrīyas existed as a sect even in the time of Pāla kings, i.e., in the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D.193 At the end of the controversy, however, one finds himself in an absorbing dilemma as to the origin and raison d’être of the Pudgala doctrine.
252 Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

ORIGINS OF PUDGALAVĀDA

The origin and rationale of the Pudgala doctrine seems to pose a complex problem involving exegetical, historical and philosophical issues. Exegetical issues relate to the interpretative side of the original gospel. And this seems to be of prime importance referring to the Buddhist controversy on Person or ātma. An analysis of the Nikāya data would clearly indicate that the Buddha did not perhaps deny the ‘self’ in every sense in absolutely clear terms. When asked directly, he is reported to have refused to answer the question about the existence of the ātman either positively or negatively.194 He carefully avoided a categorical answer to the question ‘Does the Ātā exist’? Or ‘Does it not exist’?195 Instead, the problem of ‘soul’ or jīva was left over as inexpressible or indeterminate (avyākta)196 by the Buddha.197 On the contrary, there are such texts which preserve unambiguous reference to a doctrine of anatta. The doctrine lays down that there is nothing in the physical or mental realms which may properly be called one’s self.198 This of itself does not, however, mean the denial of all self whatever, but only of the phenomenality of the self. What is meant here is that any of the khandhas may be mistaken for the attā and not perhaps the denial of the existence of attā as such. Added to this there occur in the Nikāyas such compound terms for attā as ajjhatta, paccatta, attabhāva, pahitatta and bhāvitatta which seem to be used in a sense different from that of a man as a complex of body and mind only.199 Similarly, Pudgala is of frequent occurrence in the Nikāyas.200 As a result of this, the possibilities were wide open for a diversity of interpretations. It is, therefore, not very surprising to note that some of the Buddha’s contemporary monks were sometimes confused on this issue.201 Later, we note that Gopā Arahant, a contemporary of Devaśarman is said to have insisted on the existence of ātman.202 Gopā Arahant, the author of the Abhidharma-vijñānakāya-pāda, is supposed to have existed a hundred years after the Sākyamuni.203 It is obvious, therefore, that the interpreters were confronted with a difficult situation when they analyzed the Canonical data on Pudgala, jīva or soul. Curiously enough, the difficulty in the Buddhist Canon has also kept the modern scholarship
Controversy Over the Soul Theory ('Pudgalavāda') 253

...divided on this issue. Although a number of modern scholars have upheld the view that a clear and unambiguous anatta doctrine was preached by the Buddha, there is a significant section of eminent Buddhist scholars who dispute this assumption and lay down that the Buddha did not deny the existence of attā, and that the anatta doctrine originated owing to the scholastic tendencies of the later monks. Mrs. Rhys Davids has enthusiastically championed this view.

It seems that the growth of the Abhidharma system meant a rigorous analysis of anicca and anatta doctrines. With the development of Abhidharma, the essentials of the Buddha's teaching appear to have been reduced to dharma theory as it emerged in its most uncompromising form. The Abhidharmaists, by insisting that only isolated momentary events are real, held on to processes to the exclusion of all substance, and gloried in denying the relative unity. It is not unlikely that the Pudgalavādins in their insistence on the existence of Pudgala appear to represent a reaction against the depersonalizing tendencies of the Abhidharmaists. The Abhidharmaists, as we know, advocated the Pudgala-nairātmya with greater vehemence and fervour.

Above all, the utter denial of all self was bound to give rise to grave philosophical difficulties, especially about the nature of the Buddha and memory. Similarly, if there is no soul, ego, or jīva at all, how is the theory of transmigration, which is one of the other important doctrines of Buddhism, to be accounted for? The Theravādins, Sarvāstivādins, etc., insisted that cittā and caitasika dhammas perish at every moment; in that case, what is that which retains mental experience? Further: the facts that a person acts or thinks as one and not as many separate things, that in many passages Buddha does actually use the word 'so', attā and puggala and that a person's attainment like sotāpannahood continues to be the same in different births, that one speaks of his past births and so forth, all these do lead to the conclusion that beside the five khandhas there exists some mental property which forms the basis of I-ness and maintains the continuity of karman from one existence to another. The Vātsiputriyas came to uphold the existence of Pudgala in order, perhaps, to meet the afore-
said difficulties. Their notion of the ego or self is, however, altogether different from the Sāṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika and other Bāhmanical systems as also from the worldly Pudgalas of the Sarvāstivāda. They seem to have divided the earlier and contemporary theories of ātman or Pudgala into two categories, viz., (1) Pudgala as identical with the skandhas and (2) Pudgala as different from the skandhas. They rejected these two and established their own category of Pudgalas according to which a Pudgala is neither identical with the skandhas nor different from the skandhas. In fact, these difficulties, which, we think, led to the development of Pudgalavāda, were realized by some other sects also and they had to offer one explanation or the other in order to remove the pitfall enjoined in the anatta doctrine.
REFERENCES

1. The term ātman (soul), jīva (individual or living being), sattva (substance), pudgala (person) are synonyms. Cf. Scherbatsky, Soul Theory of the Buddhists, p. 838; Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, p. 8. However, the Vātsiputriyas made some distinction between Pudgala and ātman. They were Pudgalavādins and not Ātmanvādins. See Scherbatsky, Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 21, n. 76. See also Abhidharmakośa, IX, pp. 228-9.

2. Cf. Abhidharmakośa, Chap. IX; Vājñānakāya (Nanjio 1281), II, Pudgalaskandhaka, trans. Études Asiatiques, 1925, pp. 358-76; Madhyamika Kārikas, Chaps. IX, X, Sūtrālaṅkāra, VIII, 92-103; Prasannapāda, Chapters IX, X, XVIII; Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX 57ff.

3. Tārānātha (Trans., Schiefner), pp. 53-5.

4. G.C. Pande, BDVI, p. 18a; cf. Watters, op. cit., I, p. 239.


6. Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, p. 8; see also Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 227, 232n.


9. See P.V. Bapat, 2500 years of Buddhism, p. 245.


11. Abhidharmakośa, Chapter IX.

12. Madhyamika Kārikās. Chapters IX-X.


17. Kathāvatthu, pp. 3ff.


22. Puggalo upalabhāti saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti, Kathāvatthu, p. 3; Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 230.

23. Kathāvatthu, pp. 12ff; Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 231.


27. Ibid., V, pp. 259-60; cf. Sarvyutta Nikāya, III, p. 56.


29. Kathāvatthu, pp. 33ff; Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 271.

32. Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 271.
33. Anguttara Nikāya, I, p. 22.
34. Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 259.
35. Here the reference is to the stream-winner who is supposed to have seven births limit, Cf. Kathāvatthu, XII, 5. 9.
36. These eight are: stream-winner, once-returner, never-returner, and Arahat, as well as the candidates to each of these.
37. Savinyutta Nikāya, III, pp. 261-2; The passage is quoted differently in the Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 256.
40. Ibid., IX, p. 254f.
41. Ibid., IX, p. 254f.
42. Ibid., IX, p. 262f.
43. Ibid., IX, pp. 264ff.
44. Cf. na kila tad buddhavacanam iti, Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 251.
45. Kathāvatthu, I. 1.
46. Abhidharmakośa, Chapter IX.
47. Mādhyamika Kārikas, Chapters IX-X.
48. Cf. Kathāvatthu-Atṭhakathā, p. 8; Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 232n; Śāntideva calls them ‘Antascaratirikha’ see Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, 60.
49. Śāntideva also calls them ‘Saṅgatammanya’, see Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, 60; cf. Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 228.
51. Cf. ‘Suddhasacchikāṭṭho’, Kathāvatthu, p. 3.
52. Puggalo upalabbhāti saccikāṭṭhaparamatthenā ti, Kathāvatthu, I. 1.
56. Kathāvatthu pp. 4-6.
63. Kathāvatthu, pp. 9-11.
64. Kathāvatthu, pp. 11-20; see also Debates Commentary, pp. 18-19.
Controversy Over the Soul Theory (‘Padgalavāda’) 257

68. Cf. Dīgha Nikāya, III, p. 181, Majjhima Nikāya, II, pp. 5, 89, etc.
69. Kathāvatthu, p. 17.
70. Ibid., pp. 15f; cf. also Kathāvatthu, XXI, 2.
73. ‘Catukkanaya-sahassandanaṁ’ Kathāvatthu, p. 25.
74. Ucchedavāda and Sassatavāda, see supra, pp. 14-15.
76. ‘Ekadhammo’ Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, p. 18.
77. ‘Lakkhanayutti’, Kathāvatthu, p. 29.
78. Ibid., pp. 29-30; cf. Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, pp. 8, 19.
79. See, Kathāvatthu, pp. 29-30.
83. See Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, p. 20.
85. Paññattānuyoga, Kathāvatthu, p. 31.
88. Satisaṭṭhāna formula.
92. Sābbākārena ekasaddo, i.e., anañño, Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, p. 23.
93. ‘Ekena pi ekāreṇa avigato, Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, p. 23.
94. Ibid., p. 23.
95. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 38f.
97. Ibid., 25-6.
98. Kathāvatthu, pp. 45ff.
100. Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 46-8.
101. i.e., clairvoyance or dibbena cakṣuṇā, see Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, p. 27.
104. According to this doctrine god is the creator of the world. See Aṅguutta Nikāya, I, 160-1; Vīhāra, p. 439.
111. Abhīñā, i.e., psychic power or gift; also iddhi, i.e., super-normal, or superintellectual power; cf. Compendium of Philosophy, p. 61; Pañisaṁbidāmaggā, pp. 472-3; Visuddhimagga, Chapter XII.
112. Sāti, i.e., relatives; also jāti, i.e., rank; see Debates Commentary, p. 38a.
113. Phala, i.e., fruitions of four paths, see Points of Controversy, p. 53n.
118. Ibid., pp. 63-4.
119. See Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā, p. 32.
120. Kathāvatthu, p. 64; cf. Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā, p. 32.
121. Kathāvatthu, p. 65.
122. For the quoted passages see the texts of Kathāvatthu, pp. 66-71.
125. Mahāvagga, pp. 16-18.
128. Milindapañha, pp. 27ff.
129. Visuddhimagga, Khāṇḍanidessā, pp. 304ff.
130. Cf. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, s.v. Anuruddha.
132. For detailed classification, see Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, op. cit., pp. 5ff.
133. ‘Dāsāsavāsavanādibhyo vedanādibhy eva ca; yah prāg yavasthitobhāvah kena prajñāpyate’ tha sah’, Mādhyāmika, Kārikās, IX, 3.
134. Mādhyāmika Kārikās, IX, 4.
135. Ibid., IX, 10.
136. Ibid., IX, 12; Mādhyāmika Kārikās Vṛtti, p. 199.
137. Mādhyāmika Kārikās, XXVII, 8.
139. Ibid., p. 55.
141. ‘La personne (Pudgala) ayant saisi (upādāya) les cing aggregates (skandha), transmigre (saṅkramati)’ ibid., Pt. II, p. 183.
143. Ibid., Pt. II, p. 200.
144. Abhidharmakosa, IX, pp. 231-2; cf. Pratyakṣam ity upalabhāy viśeṣānam, Abhidharmakosa, Vyākhyā, p. 697.
Controversy Over the Soul Theory (‘Pudgalavāda’) 259

147. ‘Na hi Vātsputi, āryaṁ muktir n ājate buddhatvā’ Abhidharmakośa, IX, pp. 228, 232; Abhidharmakośa, Vyākhyā, p. 699.


149. Ibid., IX, p. 232.


152. See Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 234; cf. Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā, p. 700.


154. Ibid., IX, p. 236.


156. Ibid., IX, p. 238.


158. Abhidharmakośa, IX, pp. 239-40.

159. Ibid., IX, pp. 240ff.

160. ‘Rūpam anātmaḥ...vijñānaḥ anātmaḥ’, Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 241.

161. ‘ Sarve dharmā anātmaḥ tathā’, see Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 252.

162. Abhidharmakośa, IX, pp. 241ff, 253ff.

163. ‘Na kilattad buddhavacanam iti’, ibid., IX, p. 251; cf. ‘kenāpyādhyāropitāny etāi sūtraṇity abhiprātyāḥ, Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā, p. 705.


165. Ibid., IX, pp. 254-5.

166. Ibid., IX, p. 153.


168. Ibid., p. 256.

169. Ibid., pp. 256-7; cf. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, p. 82.


171. Ibid., pp. 259-61.

172. Ibid., IX, pp. 262-3; cf. Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā, p. 708; see also Stcherbatsky, Soul Theory of the Buddhists, pp. 846ff.

173. Pūrvakair eveti—Sathavīra Nāgaseṇādibhiḥ, Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā, p. 708; see Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 263.


175. See Abhidharmakośa, IX, pp. 264-5.

176. Ibid., IX, p. 270.

177. See Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 272; see also Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā, p. 710.

178. Abhidharmakośa, IX, p. 272; see also Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā p. 710.


180. Ibid., see also Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā, pp. 710-11.


260 Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

183. Abhidharmakosa, IX, pp. 280-1.
187. See Masuda, p. 50.
188. See Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 21-2.
189. Aṭṭhasālīni, p. 33.
192. See supra, pp. 229ff.
196. Or avyākytavastu.
197. See Dīgha Nikāya, I, pp. 134-7, 156-7; Saṁyutta Nikāya, Abyākata Saṁyutta.
203. Ibid., p. 53n. 5.
205. See Schrader, op. cit., pp. 4-6; C.A.F. Rhys Davids, What was the Original Gospel; Sakya, pp. 183ff; The Birth of Indian Psychology; Commarsway, Living Thoughts of Buddha, Introduction, Hinduism and Buddhism, pp. 57-69; Yamakami Sogen, op. cit., pp. 16ff; Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 382ff.
206. E. Conze Buddhist Thought, p. 130.
Existence and other Modes of Conditioned Reality

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The last message of Buddha is said to have been that all conditioned things are impermanent (vaiddhamma saṅkhārā). 1 While the Upanisads had emphasized the reality in which the finite and impermanent things are grounded, 2 the Buddha viewed the world as a phenomenal procession exhibiting the law which governs them. Actual things are devoid of any lasting or substantial reality. 3 They are merely passing phenomena, empty but orderly. The Buddha thus put forward the following three characteristics or marks of conditioned reality (saṅkhata dhamma lakkhaṇas)—anicca, dukkha and anatta. 4 The governing law of these phenomena (dhamma) is stated to be in terms of their dependent origination (Paṭiccasamuppāda) 5 which formulates the fixed regularities that sequence the phenomena exhibit. In the course of time, all these concepts, the three lakkhaṇas as well as Paṭiccasamuppāda, underwent development through diverse interpretations.

The doctrine of impermanence has naturally to meet the strong challenge posed by the common-sense as well as the eternalist thoughts. For common-sense, change implies an unchanging reality. In other words, common-sense seeks to join
permanence with impermanence in things. Eternalist philosophies, whether Vedānta or Sāṁkhya or Jainism, tend to stress the permanent and changing aspects of the things. It is, therefore, interesting to observe the emergence of an opinion within Buddhism which sought to reintroduce from the back door, as it were, the concept of existence through time.

In the history of Buddhist Schools, the Sarvāstivāda occupies a prominent place just as some others like the Mahāsāṃghika, the Theravāda and the Vātsiputriya did. Some of the basic assertions of the Sarvāstivāda have contributed a great deal towards the unceasing doctrinal controversies in early Buddhism.

The principal point of difference between others and the Sarvāstivādins consists in the fact that the latter maintain the existence of five dharmas, in their subtlest form, at all times, whether past, present or future, while almost all other sects deny any such existence. Although the Sarvāstivādins accept all the basic tenets of Buddhist doctrine, viz., anatta (non-substantiality), and anicca (impermanence of all worldly things), they believe, however, that the things constituted out of the dharmas are subject to disintegration but not the dharmas themselves, which always exist in their essential state. For example, vedanā may be kusala, akusala or avyākyta at a given moment and place, but vedanā as such exists at all times.

According to the Sarvāstivādins, dharmas can be considered either in their actual being or phenomena or in their essential being or noumena. They manifest themselves only at the moment of their activity, but essentially they existed in the past and would exist in the future also.

This theory seems to have taken account of the ancient tradition that a dharma is something long-lasting and infinite. The Sarvāstivādins might be trying to hold fast to the tradition of the Brāhmaṇas ‘which considered all factors, which constitute the individual, as participating in something transcendental’. They adduced four reasons for their thesis in question: (1) The Buddha has clearly taught it. (2) Mind-knowledge arises from the contact between mind and its object, and if one were to believe that the past and future dharmas did not exist, there cannot be any mind consciousness about object. (3) Without an object no knowledge can arise, and all our knowledge would be restricted to the present only. (4) If the
past does not exist, how can a good or bad action produce a fruit in the future? For, at the moment when the fruit is produced, the cause of the retribution is said to have vanished. This pan-realism of the Sarvāstivādins seeks to establish that: becoming and arising of dharmas is not a real arising and disappearing, but a wandering of always existent entities from one period of time to another. Entities which seem to have newly arisen, in fact, wander from future into the present and, when they perish, they are transferred into the past. During the fourth Buddhist council held at the time of Kaniska, four interpretations were offered by different scholars of the Sarvāstivāda school regarding their fundamental tenet.

1. Bhāvānyathātva was the explanation of Bhadanta Dharmatāta. According to him past, present and future have to be differentiated on account of the non-identity of bhāva and not of dravya (object). For example, supposing a vase of gold is broken and transformed into a figure of gold, the colour of the gold remains the same. Even so, when a future dharma is changed to present, the anāgatabhāva only is abandoned and the vartamāna bhāva is acquired, dravya remaining the same.

2. Lakṣaṇāyathātva was upheld by Bhadanta Ghoṣaka. He maintains that the dharmas in their transition from past to present, and present to future, manifest changes in characteristics (lakṣaṇas) only. A dharma, when it is past, is associated (yukta) with the lakṣaṇas of the past, but it is not dissociated (aviyukta) with the lakṣaṇas of the present and future, so also a future dharma is associated (yukta) with the lakṣaṇas of the future but not dissociated from the lakṣaṇas of the present and past. The same can be said about the present. To cite an example, it is said that when a man is attached (rakta) to a woman, he is not detached to (avirakta) from other women.

3. Avasthānyathātva was the explanation offered by Bhadanta Vasumitra and others. According to him, the past, present and future of a dharma is shown by the difference
in condition. If in a certain state (avasthā), a dharma is not active, it is future (anāgata), if the dharma is active, it is present (varīmāna), and if the dharma has ceased after being active, it is past. It would thus mean that there is only a change of states (avasthāntara) and not a change of objects (dravyāntara).

4. Anyonyathāvā was the view of Bhadanta Buddhadeva. According to him, past, present and future are so described in view of relativity. Future is established relatively (apekṣayā) to past and present; the past relatively to present and future and the present relatively to past and future. For example, the same woman may be a daughter and mother in relation to her mother and daughter respectively. Thus, there is actually no change in a dhamma.

The Abhidharmakośa discusses the four explanations offered on the Sarvastivāda thesis by its scholars. Therein, the first explanation is rejected as being similar to Saṅkhya Parināmavāda, i.e., the theory of transformation. The second opinion is criticized as being characterized by confusion of time because the laksānas (characteristics) of past, present and future are made to be always present. According to the fourth explanation, all the three past, present and future exist at the same time and hence this too is unacceptable. Thus, the opinion of Vasumitra, i.e., avasthānyathāvā is approved by Vasubandhu.

The Sarvāstivādins eventually divided into two groups, i.e., the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, all things have two components, viz., ideal essence and actuality. All things (dharmas) permanently exist in their ideal essence (dravyasat) in past, present and future. However, owing to the association of samskṛta laksānas, this permanence is vitiated. Sautrāntikas were not prepared to accept this theory. According to them, it is foolish to believe that the svabhāva (nature) of the dharmas is permanent and their bhāva (actuality) is impermanent. They would, instead, affirm that the so-called ideal nature is simply a name, i.e., (prajñapti).

The Sarvāstivāda thesis of ‘pan-realism’ provided an occasion for bitter criticism and debate among the early Buddhist.
sects. It was as alien an assertion as the one made by the Vātsiputriyas postulating the existence of Pudgalas. The Theravadins and the Mahāsāṃghikas were both equally critical of this thesis. Reality is cognized either as actuality or as ideality, i.e., existence and essence respectively. The Theravadins could not reconcile to the Sarvāstivāda thesis due to their belief that all things with a conceptualizable essence have only an imperfect temporal reality. And the Mahāsāṃghikas in their turn laid emphasis on the ideal or perfect reality and, hence, were opposed to the Sarvāstivāda view. This emphasis on the ideal or perfect reality by the Mahāsāṃghikas paved the way for the relegation of actualities to the realm of illusion in the Mahāyāna.

THESSES AND ARGUMENTS

THE PERSISTENT EXISTENCE OF THE DHAMMAS (DHARMAHS)

The main controversy on existence obviously centres round the view that everything exists, which is the well-known theory of the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism. The Theravādins initiate a lengthy discussion with the remark that the proposition that ‘all’ exists involves further admissions that all exists everywhere (sabbattha), always (sabbadā), in every way (sabbena) in all things (sabbesu) not in a combined state (ayogantikatva). Also, the non-existent exists and both micchādiṭṭhi and summādiṭṭhi exist together.

Again, in terms of time, how can the proponents maintain their thesis since the past has already ceased (atītāṃ niruddham vigatām), and the future has yet to come to be (anūgatam ajāta-mabhūtām). Just as they affirm about the present as something which has not yet ceased, they must similarly affirm about the past that it has not ceased if at all they have to maintain their thesis. Similar arguments are advanced with regard to present and future. The Sarvāstivādins refuse to accept the implications as suggested by the Theravādins.

It would appear from this that the Sarvāstivādins maintain that all dharmas exist but not always and everywhere and in...
the same form as suggested by the Theravādins. They do not similarly concede the point raised by the Theravādins, viz., whether khandhas, which are all different by nature, exist uncombined (ayogani). The Theravādins, however, seek to pinpoint a fallacy that if this be the case, then both micchādiṭṭhi and sammādiṭṭhi should be taken to exist together. The Theravādins also point out that if past and future exist, then their existence should be predicated in the same way as it is predicated of the present. The Sarvāstivādins deny this owing to their belief that past and future exist but not exactly in the same way as one would speak of the present.32

Next, the Theravādins raise the question whether past material qualities (attitān rūpaṇi) exist? The proponents’ reply would be in the positive. But then if the past is something that has ceased, as aforesaid, how can the proponents maintain that past material qualities exist? Similarly, about future material qualities, if the future is not yet born, how can the same be said to exist?33

Similarly, the other more general admissions stated, apply also to material qualities in particular. For example, if by saying that the ‘present material qualities’ (paccuppannaṁ rūpaṇi) exist, it is meant that they have not ceased to be, then the same must be said about the past if its existence has to be affirmed. And if, by saying that the ‘present material qualities’ exist, it is meant that they are born and have come to be, then the same must be said about future material qualities (anāgatān rūpaṇi), if its existence is to be upheld. Similarly, if by saying that ‘past material qualities’ exist, one means that they have ceased or departed, then the same ought to be affirmed for ‘present material qualities’. And if, by saying ‘future material qualities’ exist, one means that they are not yet born, it must similarly be affirmed for ‘present material qualities’ in order to maintain the hypothesis of their existence.34

All these arguments are equally applicable to each of the other four aggregates, i.e., feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā) ‘mental coefficients’ (samkhāra) and consciousness (viññāna).35

According to the Theravādins, taking for example, the expression ‘present material-aggregate’, if one chooses to say that the present material-aggregate, on ceasing, gives up its present
state, he must also admit that material-aggregate gives up its materiality. Otherwise, if he says that present material-aggregate on ceasing does not give up its materiality, he must also admit that it does not give up its present state.36

According to the Sarvāstivādins, however, taking for example an expression, 'white cloth' (odātam), if it is said that the 'white cloth when it is being dyed loses its whiteness', one must also admit that it loses its clothness. In case one chooses to affirm that 'white cloth when it is being dyed does not give up its clothness', he must also admit that it does not give up its whiteness.37

The Theravādins further point out that should the material aggregate retain its materiality as suggested by the proponents, they must also assume that the same is permanent and eternal just as Nibbāna is permanent and eternal.38

In the second set of arguments, as presented here, the Theravādins taking an example of the 'present material aggregate'39 as one inseparable object, observe that, at a certain point of time, this material aggregate becomes past, i.e., gives up its presentness40 to which the Sarvāstivādins agree. Now, the Theravādins argue that in the same way it can be said that the material aggregate also gives up its materiality.41 The Sarvāstivādins reject this implication by putting a counter-argument thus—taking a piece of white cloth, for example, as one inseparable object, if this cloth were dyed it would give up its whiteness but does it give up its clothness also? The Theravādins, however, resort to suddhikanaya (pure logic) and observe that if the material (rūpa) does not give up its materiality (rūpabhāva), then rūpa becomes permanent, something as eternally existing like Nibbāna. The Sarvāstivādins refuse to accept this conclusion as, according to them, rūpabhāva is different from Nibbānabhāva.42

The Theravādins argue next that if the proponents in their statement 'the past exists' mean that it retains its pastness then, in order to affirm that 'the future exists', they ought to imply that it retains its futurity. Similarly, in their statement 'the present exists', they ought to mean that it retains its presentness. In other words, each of these assertions involves a similar implication regarding the other two divisions of time.43
If the past exists and retains its pastness (atītabhāva), then it must be permanent, persistent, eternal and so on; but this is denied by the proponents. All the foregoing arguments of the Theravādins are equally applicable to the particular past, future, and present things called 'the five aggregates'.

The Theravādins further ask—is the past a non-existent thing? If the proponents admit this, they must reject their view that the past exists. That is to say, if 'the non-past exists', then to say there exists a past is equally wrong. Similarly, about the future the same argument is put forth.

The Theravādins ask next: does that, which has been future, become present? If they assent, they must admit that something, which was future at a certain point of time, is the same as that which is now present. If they admit this, they must admit that anything, which having been future, is present will in turn, become once more present. The series of dilemmas is also applicable to present and past.

In this set of arguments, the basic question raised by the Theravādins is whether past (atīta) gives up its pastness (atītabhāva)? The Sarvāstivādins refuse to accept this, but they are careful enough to observe that when they say that atītabhāva exists they mean that anāgatabhāva (futurity) and paccuppanna-bhāva (presentness) do not exist like the atītabhāva, and similarly when they predicate existence of anāgatabhāva, they mean atītabhāva and paccuppanna-bhāva do not exist, like anāgatabhāva. The same is shown to be valid in the case of each of the khandhas. The Theravādins conclude the discussion by their usual siddhikanaya saying that atīta or atītabhāva then would be the same as Nibbāna or Nibbānabhāva, a conclusion rejected by the Sarvāstivādins. The Theravādins finally take recourse to vacanasa-dhāna and observe that (1) if the existence of past (atīta) and non-past (nvātīta), as also, future (anāgata) and non-future (nvānāgata) is denied then the Sarvāstivādins should not say that past and future exist; so also (2) if they do not accept the identity of atīta, paccuppanna and anāgata, they cannot maintain that atīta and anāgata exist.

The Theravādins further point out that if the proponents, i.e., the Sarvāstivādins, admit that paccuppanna-bhāna (present cognition) exists and its function is to know things then why
should the atītaññā and anāgataññā, (the existence of which is affirmed by the Sarvāstivādins) not have the function of knowing things like that of paccuppannaññāna?48

The Theravādins next illustrate the examples of the Arahattas, anāgāmis etc., and observe that as the Sarvāstivādins state that atīta rāga exists in the Arahatta, atīta byāpāda exists in an anāgāmi and so forth, an Arahatt should be then supposed to be sarāgo, an anāgāmi byāpannacitto and so on. This inference is, however, rejected by the Sarvāstivādins.49

Next, the Theravādins raise a crucial point that if the existence of atīta, paccuppanna and anāgata khandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, be admitted, then the Sarvāstivādins should affirm that there are in all 15 khandhas, 54 dhātus and 36 āyatanas. The Sarvāstivādins, however, reject this on the ground that atīta or anāgata exists from one standpoint and does not exist from another standpoint.50 This is reminiscent of Jain Syāda-vāda.51 The Theravādins once again bring in the suddhikanaya argument by citing the example of Nibbāna and thus seek to establish the untenability of the Sarvāstivāda thesis.52

Lastly, in order to substantiate their contention, the two debating groups cite Canonical passages having a favourable bearing on their respective standpoints.

The Sarvāstivādins refer to a discourse of the Buddha that material quality, whether past, future or present is called the material aggregate. Similarly about the feeling, whether past, future or present is termed as the aggregate of feeling. Even so are the other three aggregates.53

The Theravādins, however, quote another statement of the Buddha that three modes of speaking and naming have always been distinct. The three categories respectively are ‘has been’, ‘exists’ and ‘will be’.54 They also quote two dialogues in which the Buddha is said to have spoken to Phagguna and Nandaka that none of the senses is capable of revealing facts about the past Buddhas nor do hate and dullness of the past exist.55 Thus, the Theravādins lay down that the Sarvāstivāda thesis, in question, viz., ‘sabbām atthi’ is contradicted by the Canonical passages. The proponents, however, further quote from the Sānyutta Nikāya56 to affirm their thesis. Thus, the present controversy makes a thorough analysis of the basic tenet of
the Sarvāstivādins.

The popularity and importance gained by the Sarvāstivāda school is evident from the fact that in some of the early texts their essential doctrines are laid down in sufficient detail. The Abhidharmakośa, thus, contains a detailed exposition of the Sarvāstivāda view. Among other works, Milindapañha, and the treatises of Vasumitra, Bhavya, Vinītadeva, etc., may be mentioned. According to Vasumitra, the Sarvāstivādins believed that the so-called things (dharmas), which exist, are divided in two classes: the first nāma and the second rūpa. The substances of things are also things which really exist. All the dharmāyatanas can be known, can also be understood and can be attained.

One might observe that the Sarvāstivāda theory is an attempt to solve the problem of time. Professor Stcherbatsky, however, suggests that the principle ‘everything exists’ is set forth in order to affirm that nothing but the twelve bases of cognition (āyatana) are existent. An object, which cannot be viewed as a separate object of cognition or a separate faculty of cognition, is unreal as, e.g., the soul, or the personality. Being a conglomeration of separate elements, it is declared to be a name and not a dharma. This interpretation does not seem to conform with what we have in the Kathāvatthu about the Sarvāstivāda doctrine. It makes the problem not the problem of the nature of time, but of the reality of certain concepts as they come within the scheme of the ‘bases of cognition’, the āyatanas.

Like the scheme of the khandhas, the idea of twelve āyatanas is set forth in view of classifying everything. ‘Everything’ is classified under the six channels of knowledge and their objects. However, in whatever way everything is classed, the essential question is how it exists. The Theravādins mention it in their argument to mean that the Sarvāstivādins asserted that the past exists, the future exists, the present exists. Rosenberg’s remarks become relevant here when he says that the name of the school means the view which says that everything is, in which ‘everything’ does not refer to all dharmas in the sense of the dharmas of every kind, but to dharmas of all the three times.

According to E.J. Thomas, we have here two distinct interpretations of the scriptural utterance, sarvam asti.
As the āyatanas or bases of cognition form a classification of everything knowable grouped under the separate senses, the statement asserts that everything which really exists must come under one of the senses and it implies that anything which cannot be so included is unreal. This is the sense in which it is taken by Stcherbatsky, and hence does not refer to the problem of time. But there were Sarvāstivādins who asserted the existence of past, present and future as real things (dravyataḥ). This is the sense which is rejected by the Kathāvatthu. Both views are discussed in the Abhidharmakośa and there the former interpretation is called the good Sarvāstivāda doctrine. It is in fact a doctrine in which all Buddhists agreed, but it does not solve the problem of time raised by the second interpretation. 68

M.M. Pandit Gopinath Kaviraj also thinks that the Sarvāstivāda thesis is evidently associated with the implications of the doctrine of Trikālavāda on which there was a great controversy in ancient India not only in the Buddhist school but also among some of the Hindu systems of philosophy such as Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa, Sāmkhya-Yoga and others. 69

In fact, we have to remember that in the Kathāvatthu, the two theses XV.3 and XV.4 which are directly concerned with time—whether its epochs are real (parinipphama) or conventional (paññatti)—are dealt with very perfunctorily. 70

It may be observed, thus, that essentially the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of ‘suvam asti’ consists in the assertion that everything exists everywhere, at all times and in every way. What they mean thereby is that (1) all elements are real for they hold firmly their own essences which they never give up and (2) that all elements, all fundamental essences always exist. 71 In their opinion, for the essences there is no arising or perishing; the arising and perishing are of their functions. Whether the elements rise to function or not, they are there all the same and they are real. 72

One may compare here the thesis (XXI.7), according to which, all things are by nature immutable (niyata). 73 This has been attributed to the Andhakas and some of the Uttarā-pathakas. 74 The principal argument here is that one kind of
substance such as matter or mind remains ever fixed as such and cannot be changed to another. It would be noticed that this is the opposite of what Sāṅkhya believes where one indeterminate stuff forms the permanent substratum of manifest things. It is reminiscent of the doctrine of seven immutables held by Pakudha Kaccāyana in the Buddha's time.

The thesis in I.10 has been attributed to the Andhakas, the Pubbaseliyas, etc. It asserts that things exist so (evatthi) and not otherwise. It is taken to mean that the past, present and future exist only as past, present and future and not otherwise. This seems to predicate both existence and non-existence to the same thing which is the ground on which it has been criticized by the Theravādins. The contrasted views of hevatthi and hevanatthi of the Andhakas and evatthi and sevanatthi of the Theravādins rightly recalls the Saptbhāṅgaṇīya of the Jains as pointed out by Barua.

Apart from the main controversy on Existence arising from the Sarvāstivāda views, as detailed here, we may discuss some allied problems also.

**NATURE OF THE PAST**

Another controversy, recorded in the Kathāvatthu, seeks to analyze the nature of one's past. It is laid down that one's past consists in bodily and mental aggregates. Curiously enough, we notice a deviation in the present debate in so far as this thesis does not belong to any of the so-called unorthodox sects. The entire process is reversed in this case. The thesis is laid down by the Theravādins and is disputed by a sect, which has not been identified by Buddhaghosa.

It is argued in the case of this thesis that since the Theravādins affirm that one's past consisted in aggregates, they must also admit that the past exists, which the Theravādins deny. This is also the position in the case of the organs and objects of sense, the elements or all the three taken together. Similarly the argument goes in the case of future. Further, since the Theravādins admit that one's present consists in aggregates and that it exists, they must also admit that one's past, which consisted in aggregates, exists.

And if they admit, a past consisting of aggregates or other
factors, e.g., sense-organs, etc., does not exist now, they must admit that the present, consisting in aggregates, etc., no longer exists.\textsuperscript{38}

Again if they admit that material qualities in the past formed one's aggregates, sense-organs and objects, elements or all these taken together, then they must also admit that the past material qualities exist. Similarly about the future material qualities. This is also valid if they affirm that the present exists and that material qualities in the present form one's bodily aggregates and the other factors. The same argument may be applied for future instead of past 'material quality'.\textsuperscript{84} The Theravādins quote from the \textit{Niruttipatha sutta}\textsuperscript{85} to affirm that past and future do not exist. The proponents, however, also quote from the \textit{Nikāyas} to prove that one's past and future consist in aggregates and that they exist.\textsuperscript{86}

Apparently, both groups agree on the point that past and future consist in bodily and mental aggregates. The basic difference between the two lies in the fact that the Theravāda regards the past and future as non-existing, whereas the opposing sect takes both of them as existent. The latter affirm this because they believe that aggregates and other factors of one's experience retain their state as a sort of complex self.\textsuperscript{87}

\textbf{SOME OF THE PAST AND FUTURE AS STILL EXISTING}

The next controversy centres around the assertion that some of the past, as also, some of the future exists, but some of the two does not exist.\textsuperscript{88} Buddhaghosa has attributed the thesis to the Kassapikas,\textsuperscript{89} which is the only thesis of this school discussed in the text.

The Theravādins argue that if some of the past exists and some does not, one must admit that some of it has ceased and departed and some has not yet ceased or departed. All this is denied by the proponents.\textsuperscript{90}

Again, the Theravādins put a direct question as to which of the past exists, which does not? According to the Kassapikas, such past things of which the effect is yet to mature exist and those past things of which the effect has matured do not exist.\textsuperscript{91}

The Theravādins observe that if the proponents admit the
existence of the former part they must also admit the existence of the latter, and also the existence of those past things that are without effect. This argument is further elongated in various forms.92

It is now the Kassapikas' turn to put a crucial question—'is it not correct to say that past things, the effect of which is yet to mature, will mature sometime and will yield its effect'?93 The Theravādins have to concede this point. According to the advocates of the thesis, then it is surely in agreement with their basic assertion that past things, yet immature in their effect, exist. The Theravādins, however, refuse to admit the thesis.94 Similar argumentation may be noted in the case of future (anāgata).95

Vasumitra also records some of the doctrines of the Kassapikas. One of the doctrines is the same as the preceding one.96 It is believed that the Kassapikas seceded from their parent body, i.e., the Sarvāstivādins, on some significant difference of opinion.97 This difference is, perhaps, contained in the present thesis which seeks to modify the most important doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins.

PAST OR FUTURE EXPERIENCE

The controversy here relates to an assertion that a past or future experience is actually possessed.98 Buddhaghosa attributes the view to the Andhakas.99 According to the Theravādins, however, the past is extinct and the future still unborn. Further, one, who possesses a present material aggregate, cannot also possess the past and a future bodily aggregate. If he is said to possess all the three, one must admit three bodily aggregates. Thus, he should actually possess five past and five future as well as five present bodily and mental aggregates, which position would raise the number of the aggregates to fifteen. A similar argument applies to the organs and objects of sense to the eighteen elements, to the twenty-two controlling powers.100

According to the Andhakas, on the other hand, since there are such persons who, 'meditating on the eight stages of emancipation, can induce the four jhānas at their pleasure', it is right to say that one can have actual present possession of past and future things.101

Buddhaghosa, defending the orthodox position, says that in
this connection we must distinguish between actual and potential possession. The former is of the present moment. But for a man who has acquired the 'Eight Attainments' in jhāna, the possession of them is potentially present, though not of all at once. According to him, the Andhakas do not make this distinction.102

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

In the present set of controversies, the most significant problem is the one posed by the Sarvāstivādins in their assertion that everything exists (sarvam asti). The Sarvāstivādins derive their name from this very doctrine which lays down the ultimate nature of the fundamental elements, entities or essences (dharmāḥ).103 The doctrine of the timeless and underived character of the specific essences is unique to the Sarvāstivādins and here we find an extreme form of emphasis on the analysis and definition of elements. Abhidharma, according to the Sarvāstivādins, means a thorough analysis of the fundamental elements, in order to understand their nature clearly, so that there may not be any further illusion.104

Like other unorthodox sects such as the Vātsīputriyās, Sammatiyās, etc., the Sarvāstivādins were also quite keen to conform to the basic gospel of the Buddha. Except for the significant deviation in the formulation of the doctrine of 'sarvam asti', of which the import was undoubtedly bound to create a stir in the Buddhist organisation, the Sarvāstivādins subscribed to the main tenets of Buddhism, viz., anitya, anatma, dukkha and so on. They interpreted them in a way, however, so as to bring about an agreement with their new thesis.

They admitted śūnyatā, which meant for them that among the basic elements of existence there is no ātman, no substantial entity called 'I'. Also the middle way they interpreted in accordance with their doctrine, i.e., the avoidance of extremes is only in regard to the nature of constituted things and this means that in regard to the constituted things, there is no possibility of such views as absolutely existent and absolutely non-existent; this is to reveal the nature of existence as a series of arising and perishing events. But in this the
question of the basic elements does not arise. According to
them, the reality of basic elements does not violate the
principle of the middle way since the domain of the former is
different from that of the latter and the two doctrines, the
dependent origination of events, and the self-existence of the
basic elements, are bound together. The Sarvāstivādins thus
seek to distinguish themselves from the eternalists who hold
that the extinction of things means their latency and the
production of things means their manifestation.\textsuperscript{105}

However, what the Sarvāstivādins came to contribute as their
own in the history of Buddhist thought appeared as something
uncompromising with its essentials and as a departure from the
main line of thinking. It seems that the formulation of the
doctrine of momentariness or instantaneousness of dharmas in its
extreme and uncompromising form was beset with some insur-
mountable difficulties which the monks were bound to feel after
the demise of the Buddha. The foremost difficulty was realized
with regard to the doctrine of karman and its result. How can
a dharma cause an effect after it has itself vanished from the
scene?\textsuperscript{106} Secondly, the saints and wayfarers are said to acquire
and accomplish a number of possessions which seem to survive
even after the moment of their acquisition.

Also there are mental states which seem to last longer than
one moment, e.g., saṁskāras or anuśayas of a particular individ-
ual.\textsuperscript{107} It seems to have led to the apprehension that not only
actualities but also potentialities are real. In view of these
difficulties, enquiries were made to find out the exact duration
of an event, i.e., how long it lasts. A difference of opinion arose
among the Sarvāstivādins, the Therāvādins and the Sautrāntikas
as the first two sects upheld that an event lasts for three, four
or even more moments, whereas the last sect upheld the persis-
tence of an event for just one moment.\textsuperscript{108} According to the
Sarvāstivādins, each single conditioned event must go through
four moments, i.e., (1) birth or origination (utpatti), (2) sub-
sistence (sthitī), (3) decay (jarā), (4) destruction (marāṇa).\textsuperscript{109}
These inevitable four lakṣāṇas are, however, held to be compati-
ble both with momentariness as well as with sarvāstivāda.

Gradually, thus, when the difficulties of the doctrine of
momentaries were realized, it was necessary to introduce new
concepts to make amends in that. Curiously enough, just as the dogmatic assertion of the non-existence of a ‘self’ had to be supplemented by some ‘pseudo-selves’, so the dogmatic assertion of impermanence could be made credible only by introducing certain ‘pseudo-permanencies’. It is suggested that three doctrines originated through the desire to nullify those implications of the doctrine of instantaneity which threaten the fruitfulness of the spiritual life. They are as under: (1) the Sarvastivāda doctrine of ‘sarvaiḥ asti’, (2) the doctrine of possession (prāpti) and dispossession (a-prāpti), and (3) the Sautrāntika doctrine of germ (bijā) suffusions (vāsanā) and kindred concepts.

Thus, developed the ‘pan-realism’ of the Sarvastivādins in the course of reinterpreting and readjusting the original teachings of the Buddha. As a natural corollary to this development, there arose an uncompromising debate among the monks of different dispositions. The Sarvastivāda assertion became a target of bitter condemnation at the hands of the Theravādins and others. It was pointed out that the Sarvastivāda tended to a kind of eternalism, the absolute self-being of the multiple specific elements, and that with this they fail to conform to the doctrine of change or becoming which was said by the Buddha to be the original nature of things. The Sautrāntikas were equally critical of the Sarvastivāda thesis. According to them, the Sarvastivādins fail to distinguish between the essence which they take as non-temporal and the function which is temporal, and consequently fail to distinguish between composite and incomposite. They mistake the continuation of the past to mean its everlastingness and hence its self-being. Further, they mistake the fact-hood of the object of cognition to mean its substantiality and self-being (svabhāva) and fail to draw a clear line of distinction between existence and non-existence. They also fail to provide for negation and error or illusion and mistake relative existence to mean absolute self-being.

OTHER MODES OF CONDITIONED REALITY

DUKKHA (SUFFERING)

In the Nikāyas, all conditioned things have been repeatedly
declared to be dukkha.\textsuperscript{117} It was, therefore, not at all surprising that some monks, more lugubrious than others, should have concluded that everything is absolutely dukkha, the world a mere heap of ashes.\textsuperscript{118} This is the thesis which the commentary attributes to the Gokulikas.\textsuperscript{119} The Theravādins argue that there are many references which admit the facts of pleasure and happiness in the course of worldly as well as spiritual experience. How then can everything be called dukkha in an unqualified manner. The proponents easily cite passages from the scriptures which make such unconditional statements.\textsuperscript{120}

The Kathāvatthu in its debate on this thesis has not been able to advance beyond sheer contradictions. The Abhidharmakośa presents us with a more detailed and profound discussion on the nature of dukkha which distinguishes between dukkha and dukkhasatya as well as between three different senses of dukkha—dukkha-dukkhatā, parināma-dukkhatā and saṃskāra-dukkhatā.\textsuperscript{121} The feeling of pain (dukkha-dukkhatā) is not universal, but the feeling of pleasure is beset by its changing character and all experiences and things share the common characteristic of being in commotion. It is in this sense that dukkha is universal. One may suggest that it was the insistence of the Gokulikas on a strict interpretation of dukkha, which, by threatening a reductio ad absurdum, perhaps, led to a subtler analysis of the whole matter.\textsuperscript{122}

Another thesis relating to dukkha belongs to the Hetuvādins,\textsuperscript{123} who assert that the dukkha, for the destruction of which one undertakes spiritual life, is only the experienced unhappiness.\textsuperscript{124} They seem to ignore the larger sense of dukkha by which even insentient things are called dukkha, since they become causal factors in it in various ways. According to Buddhaghosa, dukkha is of two kinds, (1) dukkha as bound up with the indriyas and (2) dukkha as not bound up with the indriyas. The Hetuvādins, however, do not distinguish between the two.\textsuperscript{125}

If indriyabaddha dukkha means simply the sensation of pain, then obviously the thesis is faulty and does not comprehend the full or even the essential meaning of dukkha. On the other hand, if it means experienced unhappiness of whatever kind
as distinguished from those material things which may also indirectly be called dukkha, it would grasp the essential though not the full meaning of the word.\textsuperscript{126}

The Hetuvādins\textsuperscript{127} are also associated with the thesis that except the Ariya-magga all other saṅkhata dhāmas may be called dukkha.\textsuperscript{128} It may be recalled the four noble truths, saṁyāmāphala, Nirodhasamāpatti, etc., were declared to be asaṅkhata, i.e., unconditioned.\textsuperscript{129}

The Uttarāpathakas and the Hetuvādins\textsuperscript{130} hold, on the basis of the famous verses of the nun Vajjira\textsuperscript{131} that it is dukkha alone which arises and passes and hence, excepting dukkha, all the khandhas, dhātus and indriyas are aparinippanna.\textsuperscript{132} It has been interpreted in the text to mean that only dukkha is caused whereas all the other things are uncaused.\textsuperscript{133} It might, however, be interpreted to mean that dukkha alone is the constant, the absolute element in experience whereas all the other things are variable.

**Paticcasamuppāda**

The early Buddhist texts are distinguished by their attention to causal analysis.\textsuperscript{134} Hetu, paccaya and nidāna were the general terms used in this context. Pātīcchasamuppāda was the general law enunciated for the purpose, its general form being—inasmiṁ satī idam bhavati, imassa uppādā idam uppajjati, etc.\textsuperscript{135} Its application to particular psychic phenomena was expressed in chains of causes and effects of which the most famous is the chain of twelve nidānas. To the Abhidhammika analysts, however, it became clear that the interrelations of things are multi-form.\textsuperscript{136} Consequently, an attempt was made to discover the basic forms of the hetus and paccayas. The Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma works gave elaborate though not identical results. In view of this tendency, it is not surprising to find that some of the theses in the Kathāvatthu are connected with the notion of paccaya or causal relations.

Thus, we have the Mahāsamghika thesis—paccayatā vavatthitā\textsuperscript{137}—meaning thereby that causal relations are fixed or constant. The Kathāvatthu takes this to mean that a particular thing can be connected with another only through one kind of paccaya relation. If it is a samanantara paccaya, it cannot be
an ārammaṇa paccaya.\textsuperscript{139} The way in which the Kathāvatthu interprets the principle makes it palpably erroneous. If we take the thesis to refer to the constancy and distinctness of the relations rather than to the fact that a particular, in relation to another, may enter only one of these distinct patterns of relationship, the thesis would acquire sense and plausibility. We would then be saying that the relation of succession, for example, should not be confused with the relation of objectivity. We would be proposing a system of relationships comprising distinct elements. These elements (relations) would be constant and fixed but their elements or things would be merely variables, the actual value of which, in terms of the natural world, would be a matter of factual propriety. A constant relationship would be defined in terms of variables.

Another thesis, belonging to the Mahāsamghikas,\textsuperscript{140} denies the reversibility of relations.\textsuperscript{141} If avidyā is the cause of saṁskāra we cannot assert that saṁskāra is the cause of avidyā. This is the interpretation given in the Kathāvatthu and, according to Buddhaghosa, the thesis asserts that the paccayas cannot be symmetric (a aññamañña).\textsuperscript{142} However, if we take paccaya in a strictly causal sense, then the thesis would appear plausible, but if we dilute the meaning of paccaya to include co-operative factors or substitute individuals from the classes of causes and effects, this would not be true. For example, while a seed cannot be the effect of particular tree which it produces, it can very well be the effect of another tree. The same logic might well apply to such instances as a relationship between viññāna and nāmarūpa or ignorance and actions. Here the relationship is mutual between classes but hardly between strictly particular instances.

Another thesis, attributed to the Uttarāpathakas, lays down that, since, all things are momentary, nothing can be a cause by way of repeated action\textsuperscript{143} and hence there is no such thing as āsevana paccayatā.\textsuperscript{144} This appears a logical conclusion to have been drawn from the doctrine of momentariness. It also reduces to shreds the Abhidharmika doctrine of āsevana paccaya. Unfortunately, it would also appear to free men from the dangers, as well as, the advantages which accrue from habit and this is the score on which it has been criticized.\textsuperscript{145}
CLASSIFICATION OF THE 'DHAMMAS'—MATTER

Buddhism emerges as a doctrine based essentially on the fundamental principle that existence is an interplay of a plurality of subtle and ultimate elements.

The earliest classification of the elements of existence appears to have been into nāma and rūpa, kāya and viññāna, rūpa and citta or rūpa and dhamma. Later, the classification into five skandhas comes into being. This changed the division into rūpa citta, caitta (including the three arūpa skandhas) and citta-viprayuktā saṁskāras.

The Kathāvatthu presents us with several controversies relating to rūpa. There is a thesis of the Andhakas holding the four elements to be visible. According to the Andhakas, since things like earth, stone, mountain, etc., are actually seen, therefore, they may be said to be visible. They also hold that the rūpa-dhātu is constituted by material elements. They also postulated that in the rūpa-dhātu, beings have all the six senses. And finally they went on to assert the existence of matter in the arūpa-dhātu. Similar is the import of another Andhaka thesis, i.e., XVI.9 which lays down that, since matter which is the product of action done in the world of sense-desires, belongs to that world, therefore, if it be the product of actions done in the material or immaterial heavens, it belongs equally to these worlds.

Against these views, the Theravādins hold that there is only subtle matter in the rūpa-dhātu and none in the arūpa-dhātu. The Andhaka view appears to have arisen from the interpretation of some Canonical statements which seems to have suggested that a being in the rūpa-dhātu has all the senses and thus even the gross matter of smell, taste and touch. The word rūpi in this passage is, however, ambiguous. The famous phrase—viññāna paccayānāma rūpaṁ—suggested that some kind of matter ought to be accompanying viññāna even in the arūpa-dhātu.

The Uttarāpathakas held that matter might be subjective as well as objective. That matter (rūpa) is sārammaṇa in some sense is admitted on all hands. The Theravādins held that while matter may be an object it cannot have an object. The Uttarāpathakas do not make such a distinction.
The Uttarāpathakas assert that matter (rūpa) is a hetu.\footnote{157}
Now hetu, if interpreted in the sense of a cause in general, i.e., as paccayahetu, this thesis would be unexceptionable. But this is supposed to use hetu also in the sense of one of the three mūlas—lobha, dosa and moha. The possibility of matter being ahetu in this sense implies that matter may be held good or bad which is the thesis, VIII.9, and matter being able to act like a mental impulse which has an object, i.e., matters may have a purpose. Now this we have seen was an explicit thesis of the Uttarāpathakas—(cf. IX.3—rūpaṁ sārammanaṁ). Rūpa as kusala-kusala, hetu and sārammana form one complex assertion.

Another variant of XVI.5 is XVI.6. Instead of matter being called a hetu, it is here said to be accompanied by moral condition (sahetuka). The Andhakas asserted that rūpa is vipāka (XVI.8). The Uttarāpathakas asserted (XIV.4) that the speech and action of the Ariyans are (ariyarūpa) material.

All these theses, which seek to invest matter with moral status, origin and results, appear to have arisen from two considerations—(1) the feeling that the law of karman is ubiquitous and unexceptional; (2) that physical actions and speech, although in their nature only material movements, are still morally significant. If the law of karman is to prevail in the universe how can there be any part of it radically amoral and indifferent to it. The law of karman operating naturally must be a law of nature. This tendency thus has a powerful philosophical dialectic behind it which found its full expression in Vijñānavāda where the environments in which different beings find themselves are nothing but dream-like products of the mind, appropriate to its particular actions and tendencies.
REFERENCES


2. Cf. Taïttriya Upaniṣad, III, I; Chāndogya Upaniṣad, III, 14, 1; Kaṭha Upaniṣad, II, 2.15.


4. Cf. Majjhima Nikāya, I, p. 280; see also II, p. 196; III, pp. 81, 144.


6. Cf. Abhidhammakośa, III, pp. 56-7, 82; see also Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 157-159, 279-80, 364, 405-6; S.N. Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 188f, 238f, 477f; Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, I, pp. 308ff; II, pp. 283ff, 475ff.

7. Two exceptions are the Vibhajyavādi Sarvāstivādins and the Kāśyapīyas, both offshoots of the Sarvāstivāda school. According to them not all but some of the past and future dharmas exist, see Kathāvatthu, I, 8; Abhidharmakośa, V, p. 52; cf. Barea, Les Sectes Bouddhiques du petit Véhicule, p. 168.


10. Abhidharmakośa, V, p. 50.


13. See Śāṅkyākāra, III, 14; see also Abhidharmakośa, V, p. 51n.


15. E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, pp. 140-1; see Conze, Buddhist Thought, p. 139.

16. See Abhidharmakośa, V, p. 52.

17. Ibid., V, p. 53.


19. Abhidharmakośa, V, pp. 53-54.

20. See Abhidharmakośa Vākhyā, p. 470; see also Abhidharmakośa, V, p. 54.


26. See Abhidharmakośa, V, pp. 56-7; see also Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 10, 20.
28. See Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, p. 43.
29. On the rendering of sabbaṁ as 'all' see Points of Controversy, p. 85 onwards.
   Appendix 3, pp. 375-7; cf. Majjhima Nikāya, I, pp. 5-6.
30. See Kathāvatthu, p. 113; Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, p. 43.
34. Ibid., p. 115.
35. Ibid., pp. 115-16.
36. Ibid., p. 116; cf. Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, p. 44.
37. Ibid., pp. 116-17; cf. Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, p. 44.
38. Kathāvatthu, p. 117.
39. Paccuppammapā, see Ibid., p. 118.
40. Paccuppammapābhava, ibid., p. 117.
41. Rūpa-bhava, ibid., p. 117.
42. Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, pp. 44-5.
43. Kathāvatthu, p. 117.
44. See ibid., pp. 118-20.
45. Ibid., p. 121.
46. Ibid., pp. 121-2; Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, p. 45.
49. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 126-30; cf. Kathāvatthu-Atīṭhakathā, p. 49.
54. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 135-6; cf. Sānyutta Nikāya, II, pp. 299-300.
57. See Abhidharmakośa, Chapter V.
64. See E.J. Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought, p. 164.
65. Dhammasaṅgīti, pp. 18ff.
66. See supra, p. 265ff.
70. See *Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā*, p. 153.
71. See *Abhidhammapaśa*, V, pp. 50ff.
72. See *Abhidhammapaśa*, V, pp. 51ff; see also *Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā*, p. 43.
75. Cf.Śāṅkhya-kārikā, pp. 9-10.
79. See *Points of Controversy*, p. 110n; see also H. Jacobi, *Jain Śūtras*, XLV, pp. xxvin.
83. Ibid., p. 139.
84. Ibid., p. 140.
89. *Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā*, p. 50.
91. Ibid., pp. 143-4.
92. Ibid., pp. 144-5.
94. Ibid., p. 145; see also *Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā*, pp. 50-1.
96. Masuda, op. cit., p. 64.
97. See supra, p. 17.
98. Aṭṭhena samannāgato ti; anāgatena samannāgato ti; *Kathāvatthu*, IX, 12.
Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

102. See Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 120-1.
103. See also Stcherbatsky, Soul Theory of the Buddhists, p. 943.
104. See Abhidharmakosa, I, p. 1.
105. Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā-sāstra, quoted, Venkata Ramanan, op. cit., p. 60; cf. Abhidharmakosa, III, pp. 56-7; also Chapter IX.
107. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 126ff.
108. Cf. Abhidharmakosa, IV, pp. 7-8; see also Conze, Buddhist Thought, p. 134.
111. Abhidharmakosa, II, pp. 179ff.
112. See supra.
114. See Mahāvagga, p. 39.
115. See Abhidharmakosa, V, pp. 55ff; Abhidharmakosa Vyākhya, p. 476ff; see also Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, Appendix I, pp. 69-80.
116. See also Sammatiya Nikāya Śāstra, Viśvabhāratī Annals, Vol. V, p. 187; see also Masuda, op. cit., pp. 54-5.
118. Sabbe saṅkhārā anodhikātā kukkanāti, Kathāvatthu, II, 8.
120. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 191-4.
121. Abhidharmakosa, IV, p. 125.
122. See G.C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, pp. 400-7; cf. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, What was the Original Gospel, pp. 52-8; and Appendix, Sakya, pp. 16-17; JRAS, 1935, p. 723.
128. Thapetvā ariyamaggaṃ avasesā saṅkhārā dukkhaḥ ti, Kathāvatthu, XVII. 5.
129. See infra, Chapter X.
132. Rūpaṇi aparajippanṇi ti, Kathāvatthu, XXIII. 5.


137. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 152.


139. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 440-2; Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 152.

140. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 152.

141. Kathāvatthu, XV. 2.


143. See Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 195.

144. Kathāvatthu, XXII. 7.


146. Cf. Digha Nikāya, I, p. 190; II, pp. 26-7, 45, 50; III, p. 169, 211; Majjhima Nikāya, I, pp. 71-2; III, p. 127; Mahāvagga, p. 3, etc.

147. See Dhammasangīti, pp. 22ff; Abhidhammatthasamīga, p. 1ff; Abhidhammakośa, I, pp. 22.

148. Pathavīdhātu sanidassanā ti, Kathāvatthu, VI.8; see Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 93.

149. Rūpino dhammā rūpadhātu ti, Kathāvatthu VII.5; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 109.

150. Salāyataniko atthaḥāvo rūpadhāunnyāti, Kathāvatthu, VII. 7; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 110.

151. Atthi rūpaṁ orūpasīti, Kathāvatthu, VIII.8; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 111.


155. Rūpaṁ sārammanan ti, Kathāvatthu, IX. 3.

156. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 117.

The Problem of the Unconditioned

THE NATURE OF NIBBĀNA

There are two concise but highly significant controversies on Nibbāna (Nirvāṇa) in the Kathāvatthu. As a matter of fact, from the earliest times there has been a remarkable difference of opinion over the nature of Nibbāna as taught by the Buddha. It seems to us that such controversies have primarily arisen from two basic paradoxes—1(a) on the one hand, the denial of a permanent self seems to imply that Nibbāna should be the extinction of personal life; (b) on the other, if Nibbāna is simply an extinction, this would, like Ucchedavāda, tend to discourage spiritual life. Who would make such a Nibbāna the goal of spiritual effort? 2. Similarly, if impermanence is a necessary mark of the real, if the efficient or causally efficacious and hence the changing and transitory phenomena alone are real, what would be the status of Nibbāna which is held to be unchanging and eternal? Diverse pronouncements were made about Nibbāna in the early or Nikāya texts. And yet it was labelled as indescribable and ineffable, indeterminate and inexpressible, which makes the notion more mystical and more elusive, almost as if all conceptions of Nibbāna were misconceptions. However, it was never meant to debar the
elders and monks of the Buddhist community from reflecting and interpreting the notion of Nibbāna.  

THESSES AND ARGUMENTS

Nibbāna or Ambrosial (Amata) as Conducive to Fetter (Saññojana)

The first dispute over Nibbāna rests on the problem as to whether or not the Ambrosial, as an object of thought, is a fetter? According to Buddhaghosa, the thesis belongs to the Pubbase-liyas who make this assertion due to a careless inference from such passages as 'he fancies things about Nibbāna'. The Theravādins initiate a discussion that by assuming the preceding, the proponents must also admit that the Ambrosial is the object of consciousness accompanied by 'Fetters', 'Ties', 'Floods', etc. On the contrary, this is supposed to be an object accompanied by the very opposite. Further, if the thesis were to be maintained it would mean that the Ambrosial (amata) itself conduces to occasions for all these things? According to Buddhaghosa, the proponents deny all of them for fear of contradicting the suttas.

At this stage the proponents quote a sutta-passage wherein the Buddha is reported to have said—'he perceives Nibbāna as such, and having perceived it, he imagines things about Nibbāna.' Buddha, however, points out that the term Nibbāna in the present sutta-passage stands only for temporal well-being and hence the argument carries no weight.

Nibbāna as Morally Good

The next controversy discusses as to whether or not the 'element or sphere) of Nibbāna' (Nibbānadham) is good. According to Buddhaghosa, a mental state is said to be good either because, as something faultless, it ensures a desirable result (vipāka), or because it is free from corruptions in being faultless. This is universally true except in the case of immoral states. The Andhakas however do not discriminate between good, bad and indifferent states, and call Nibbāna 'good' just because it is a faultless state.
The Theravādins argue that by proposing this one ought to imply that Nibbāna is a mental process capable of adverting, reflecting, co-ordinating, attending, etc., which would be something against the very nature of Nibbāna. One could easily predicate these things about all morally good mental states, e.g., alobha, adosa, amoha, saddhā, viriya, samādhi, paññā. But one cannot equally predicate about Nibbāna, and hence Nibbānadhātu cannot be said to be morally good.14

Finally, the Andhakas lay down that the Nibbānadhātu is said to be faultless to which even the Theravādins assent. The Nibbāna not being immoral must be said to be moral.15

THE CONCEPT OF TWO NIRODHAS (CESSATIONS)

The present controversy centres round the assertion that there are two cessations (nirodhas) of sorrow.16 It is attributed by Buddhaghosa to the Mahāsakas and the Andhakas.17

The Theravāda argument is that if this duality is accepted with respect to the third noble truth, i.e., the ‘cessation of ill’ the same must be maintained about the other three, viz., ‘nature of ill’, ‘its cause’ and the ‘path leading to the cessation of ill’. Further, one must admit that there are two shelters, two refuges, two nībbānas, etc.18 According to the proponents, cessation is two-fold simply because it is possible (1) on the basis of deep reflection and (2) as also without. The Theravādins, however, point out that this does not involve two cessations.

It seems that the Kathāvatthu as well as its commentator have not been able to give any clear exposition of the concepts of Apatīsatāṁkhānirodha and Paṭīsatāṁkhānirodha. The Kathāvatthu merely argues that such a distinction would lead to two Nirvāṇas and that, in any case, whatever be the means to nirodha, nirodha itself must be one. Buddhaghosa points out in his commentary: Tattha yesaṁ appaṭīsaṁkhāḥ nirodhaṁ ca paṭīsaṁkhāḥ nirodhaṁ ca dve pi ekato katvā nirodhasarccan ‘ti laddhi. Seyyathāpi etarahi Mahīmsasakānāṁ c’ eva Andhakānān ca...Appaṭīsaṁkhāḥ niruddhe ‘ti ye paṭīsaṁkhāya lokuttaraṁ aññena aniruddha saddhāpakhathattā vā uddesaparipucchādānāṁ.
vā vasena samudācaranato niruddhā’ ti vuccanti. In this last statement the reference to ‘suddhapakatikattā’ and ‘uddesa-paripuccahādināṃ vā vasena’ shows clearly that Buddhaghosa has not fully understood the meaning of ‘Apaṭisaṃkhā-nirodha’. It is also a clear instance of an apparently faulty attribution. The doctrine of three nirodhas, viz., Pratīṣaṃkhya-nirodha, Apratīṣaṃkhya-nirodha and Anityatānirodha is a well-known Vaibhāṣīka doctrine. The first is attained by wisdom and comprehension of the four noble truths. It is defined as a dharma which brings about the possession of disjunction (visāmyoga) from all impure dharmas, this disjunction itself being eternal and not produced by causes. Apratīṣaṃkhya-nirodha renders absolutely impossible, in him who possesses it, the birth of this or that dharma and it prevents the rising of future dharmas, not through wisdom, but because the condition thereof have been rendered insufficient. While the first two are said to be anisktṛta, the third one is said to be samaskṛta. By this nirodha, one attains to a state wherein the activity of the saṅkhāras comes to an end. Thus, the present thesis, belonging to the Andhakas, appears as a reminiscent of the Vaibhāṣīka doctrine of Pratīṣaṃkhya-nirodha and Apratīṣaṃkhya-nirodha.

THE VOID (SUṆṆATA)

One of the controversies in the Kathāvatthu seeks to discuss the problem as to whether or not ‘the void is included in the aggregate of mental co-efficients (saṅkhārakhandha)’. According to Buddhaghosa, some, like the Andhakas, indiscriminately uphold this tenet. The Andhakas, however, point out that their thesis is based on the statement of the Buddha that saṅkhāra is devoid of ‘soul or what belongs to soul’. The Theravādins contradict the thesis in the usual manner that if this assertion be correct, then animitta and apanihita should also be said to be included in the saṅkhārakhandha. Buddhaghosa has offered the explanation on the issue that suṆṇata stands for two things—(1) absence of soul, which is the very nature of aggregates (nāmarūpa) and (2) Nibbāna itself. As regards (1) some marks of no-soul (anatta) may be included under the fourth aggregate (saṅkhārakhandha) but Nibbāna
is not included in it. The Andhakas, according to him, fail to make this distinction.29

Buddhaghosa seems to have misunderstood the point of the Andhakas. As the thesis is debated in the Kashāvatthu it seems to mean that there is no suññatā outside sankhārakhandha. The Theravādins distinguish two senses of suññatā—(1) anatta applying to the conditioned things and (2) an absolute sense of suññatā unique to Nibbāna. It is well-known that in the Mahāyāna, there is only one suññatā (śūnyatā) wherein both the senses are fused. The Prajñā sūtras, thus, say rūpaṃ śūnyatā, śūnyatā rūpaṃ, etc.30 Although it is tempting to connect the Andhaka attempt to replace the two-fold by a single suññatā with this later development, nevertheless, their placing suññatā within sankhārakhandha shows that this view is still very far from the Mahāyānic concept of śūnyatā.

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

Attention has been drawn to some Nāgārjunikā inscriptions where there are incidental references to Buddha and Nirvāṇa and the conceptions thereof have been attributed to the Pūrvaśailas or Caityakas.31 Buddha is described here32 as jita-rūga-dosa-moha, i.e., one who has conquered attachment, ill-will and delusion and dhātuvararaparigahita, i.e., possessed of excellent dhātu. In return, the donor expects transferable merits which may be passed off to the relatives and friends also. He expects (1) religious merits for himself, his relatives and friends bringing happiness in this as well as the other world,33 and (2) nivāṇa-sampati (attainment of Nibbāna) for himself. In the opinion of N. Dutt, the idea that the gifts may bring happiness to all, but Nirvāṇa only to oneself deserves careful consideration. The compassionate attitude in seeking the good of the relatives and friends comes as an article of faith generally unrecognized in the Pāli works where attadīpā and attasarāṇā is the maxim. And secondly the distinction drawn in the two fruits expected is rather uncommon and has not been made even in the inscription recording the gifts of the Queen of Vanavāsi to the Mahāśāsakas34 or in the long inscription of the Sinhalese donor.35 Further, the expressions dhātuvararaparigahita or nivāṇa-sampati
—sampādaka raise the presumption that the Andhaka conception of Nirvāṇa was different from that of the Theravādins or their sub-sect, the Mahīśāsakas.

It is evidently clear from the two controversies on Nibbāna, discussed in the Kāshāvatthu, that the Pubbaseliya and Andhaka conception was different from that of the Theravādins. But that the difference lies where it has been suggested by N. Dutt, lseems to be open to doubt. According to him, “the Pubbaseliyas or the Andhakas conceived of Nibbāna, as a ‘positive faultless state’—a conception which can hardly be accepted by the Theravādins, who speak of realizing Nibbāna within one’s self (paccatam veditabbo viññāhi) and not of grasping the same as some object producing pure happiness”.36 We agree with him in so far as the preceding points are contained in the views expressed by the rival sects in connection with the Nirvāṇa controversies but his surmise that the conception of Nirvāṇa as a positive faultless state was unacceptable to the Theravādins may not be sustained as such. In fact, we have reason to believe that the Theravādins neither discredited a positive notion of Nibbāna nor were they opposed to the idea of its being faultless. What they were trying to contest in the two controversies was something more implied by the Pubbaseliyas and the Andhakas through their respective propositions.

It seems to us that throughout its long history, the Theravādins cherished a positive notion of Nibbāna. The unconditioned Nibbāna may be explained as the opposite of the conditioned reality characterized by three marks.37 Thus it is (1) deathless, (2) at peace and (3) secure.38 Contrary to the worldly nature, Nibbāna is emancipation (mokṣa), liberation (vimukti), stopping of becoming (nirodha),39 supramundane, the only (kevalaṁ) the end of the world,40 unconditioned, not made (a-katāmi), invisible (anidassanāmi), hard to see, astonishing (āścaryamī), wonderful (adbhuṭamī), subtle, inefable,41 immeasurable or incomparable. It is Real Truth, true being, true reality in the ultimate sense.42 It is the supreme goal, supreme good, final release. For one who has attained it, steadfast is his thought, gained is deliverance.43 There are many more epithets, in the Nikāyas alone, to describe Nibbāna. Confronted with this wealth of epithets an absolute distinction between the positive and negative can hardly be drawn. Still in a statement like
this—‘there is an unborn, unbecome, unmade, uncompounded; for if there were not this unborn, unbecome, unmade, uncompounded, there would be apparently no escape from this here that is born, become, made and compounded’.44 One might say the features here are negative, the ‘is’ is positive. In fact, conceptual determination is negation. Thus, although Nibbāna is a conceptually negative state in the sense that no attribute can be predicated of it, nevertheless, inasmuch as it constitutes the very basis of the possibility of emancipation from phenomenal existence it may be described as spiritually positive in the sense of being the definite goal of religious life.

The Theravādins seem to be obsessed with this difficulty for quite some time as may be seen even in some of the subsequent works. The Dhammasaṅgani describes the asaṅkhata-dhātu, i.e., Nibbāna as ethically ‘abyākata’, ‘void of the working of conception of thought discursive’, infinite (appamāna), nor a cause nor associated with one, invisible and non-impinging, without material form, supramundane, not of intellect, not derived, not joyous, unaccompanied by joy, ease or disinterestness, and something having no beyond.45 It is contrasted with all form (sabbam rūpaṁ)46 and distinguished from Arahant by ‘neither pertaining nor not pertaining to studentship’.47 The description of Nibbāna in the Dhammasaṅgani seems to be still in line with the Nikāya texts though it certainly reflects the concern of the authors to arrive at precision and unambiguity. Gradually, these notions on different subjects got more and more crystallized. Thus, in the Kathāvatthu, the Theravādins rigorously insist on the oneness of Nibbāna which came to be conceived as ‘niccaṁ dhuvāṁ sassaṁ aviparināmadhammam’,48 anārammaṇa,49 cittavippayutta.50

The Milindapañho makes the matter clear.51 It is stated there that Nirvāṇa is not the result of a cause (a-hetu-jam). There is no cause for the production of Nirvāṇa, but there is a Path which leads to its realization. It is considered to be something positive,52 non-temporally eternal53 and supremely beatific.54 It can be experienced55 though not described.56 Buddhaghosa rejects the idea that Nibbāna is a mere absence or annihilation of the passion, etc.57 Similarly, Anuruddhacariya describes Nibbāna as eternal, transcendental, supreme, realizable and unique. It is the ārammaṇa of the
Accordingly, throughout its long history, the Theravāda school considered Nibbāna to be positive, experienceable, indescribable and supreme, i.e., the most worthwhile.

So far as the question of the faultlessness or Nibbāna is concerned it is absolutely clear from the discussion in the Kathāvatthu itself that the Theravādins could not but describe it as faultless in the most unequivocal terms. That it is faultless, according to the Theravādins, may be clearly seen in the standpoint put forth in the first controversy where they argue that ‘Ambrosial’ (amataapada) is an object accompanied by the very opposite of things of the sort of fetters. As a matter of fact, the attainment of Nibbāna is preceded by a destruction of the very fetters which is the essential idea underlying the notion of Nibbāna in its early references. How can Nibbāna, the supreme goal, be accompanied by fetters which is really the negation of the latter. On the contrary, it is the proponents who should, by there proposition - that amataapada is an object of thought of a person not yet free from bondage,— imply that amataapada conduces to occasion for fetters to arise. The Theravādins seek to refute the idea of fancying things about Nibbāna, which is the basis of the proponents’ belief as incorporated in their argument. This is, however, a non-Buddhist approach to Nibbāna, an approach of the unskilled in the Dhamma who takes delight in fancying things about Nibbāna. The Theravādins have a ready-at-hand argument to offer.

In course of the second controversy, the Theravādins do not subscribe to the idea of grasping Nibbāna as some object producing pure happiness. It may be noted, however, that even here the Theravādins affirm the faultlessness of Nibbāna. It is faultless for them in the sense that it is free from the corruptions. It is not faultless, however, in the sense in which the Andhakas take it as a mental process of adverting, willing, desiring, aiming, etc., that is to say, it ensures a desired vipāka.

It is tempting to deduce that a large number of the Kathāvatthu controversies are actually grounded in the suttas of the Pāli Canon. In the first controversy, for example, the Pubbaseliyas quote from the Majjhima Nikāya. However,
as the _sutta_-passage, quoted by them, refers to a non-Buddhist view of Nibbāna, their argument is rendered ineffective.\(^{64}\) In the second controversy, the Theravādins take the stand that the idea of grasping Nibbāna as some object involving a mental process of adverting, reflecting, etc., cannot be sustained. In fact Nibbāna is peace, the stilling of all mind-activity.\(^{65}\) One may observe, however, that even the Theravādins do not eschew the idea of blissfulness or pure happiness as characterizing the nature of Nibbāna. Curiously enough, instead of a denial, they have maintained this idea in unambiguous terms. Nibbāna is peace, cool and bliss; one who sees it in sorrow cannot attain liberation.\(^{66}\) Similarly, it is said: health is the highest gain, Nibbāna the highest bliss.\(^{67}\) Buddha is an experiencer of highest bliss.\(^{68}\) In the _Milindapañha_, it is described as _paramān sukham_, _ekanta sukham_.\(^{69}\) Nevertheless, as we have it in the _Kathāvatthu_, the Theravādins seek to controvert the Andhaka thesis that Nibbāna is morally good (_kusala_).\(^{70}\) The Theravāda stand-point is, perhaps, properly represented when they say that Nibbāna is ethnically (_avvākṛta_), i.e., indeterminate,\(^{71}\) or that Nibbāna is neither black nor white,\(^{72}\) i.e., it involves the transcendence of merit and demerit. One the other hand, the Andhakas too do not lack Canonical support, e.g., Nibbāna is the destruction of attachment, aversion and confusion, i.e., a state of mind devoid of _akusala_ roots.\(^{73}\) On may quite logically assume that whatever is devoid of _akusala_ must be said to be _kusala_. It is interesting to note that the Sarvāsti-vādins have to make a specific mention of this fact that Nirvāṇa is _kusala_.\(^{74}\)

It seems that difference of opinion on the conception of Nibbāna did not cease with the occasional debates among the Andhakas and the Theravādins. The issue was yet hotly discussed among the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. One of the issues debated centred over the fact whether the unconditioned Nibbāna has a course and an effect or none. However, the central controversy continued to be over the relation of Nirvāṇa to the categories of ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’. The difference of opinion between the Sarvāstivādins, the Theravādins and the Mahāyānasakas, on the one side, and the Sautrāntikas, on the other, led to prolonged controversy as to whether Nirvāṇa is existent (_dravya_) or non-existent (_abhava_).\(^{75}\)
The Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāsakas hold fast to the former idea while the Sautrāntikas subscribed to the latter. According to the Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika conception, Nirvāṇa is real and eternal. It is the dharmasyabhāva which remains on the cessation of dharmalakṣaṇa. It is impersonal and inexplicable.76 We have noted the similar idea of Nibbāṇa as contained in the Milindapañha, according to which, Nirvāṇa is, it is discerned by a pure and exalted mind; the holy disciple who has progressed rightly actually sees Nirvāṇa.77 The Sautrāntika view is diametrically opposed to this and asserts that Nirvāṇa is not a real and distinct entity but the mere absence of one.78 It is the mere non-existence of the five skandhas, and, thus, one cannot attribute a separate existence to this non-existence.79 May one not suggest at this juncture that the Sautrāntikas’ negative conception of Nirvāṇa was, perhaps, derived from such utterances in the suttas where its references would appear to reflect a character of just nothing—whatever (akīñcanān).80 Perhaps an additional incentive and the more recent one for the opposite pronouncements was provided by the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins themselves through their Abhidharmist endeavour to define the miraculous in strictly rational terms which was giving rise to a deadlock and landing thought into insuperable difficulties. The Sautrāntikas admittedly represent a reaction to the commentorial tradition which under the Vaibhāṣikas appeared to be acquiring a ‘Sāṅkhyan’, ‘eternalist’ flavour. The Sautrāntikas, on the contrary, adopted a very critical philosophical attitude and, applying Occam’s Razor ruthlessly, reduced many of the accepted dharmas to mere names and abstractions (prajñapti).

It appears, thus, that for a greater part the controversies on Nirvāṇa, such as about its nature, whether it is positive or negative, may be taken to emerge from the profound suggestiveness of the early texts. We have tried to show that some of these views, which came to be upheld by the different schools of early Buddhism, may be said to be clearly grounded in the Nikāya texts. Also, there cannot be a denying of the fact that these originals were subjected for long to a universal tendency of interpretation and reflection. It was only natural that in this process of interpretation, the interpreter, while
determining the unexpressed meanings and implications of the texts, should have added a bit of his own philosophy on the subject in question.

OTHER THINGS AS UNCONDITIONED (ASAḤMKHATA)

In the suttas of the Buddhist Canon, the Absolute, in its impersonal form, occurs as the ‘unconditioned’ or Nirvāṇa. There the transcendence of Nirvāṇa is spoken in deeply felt poetical terms and language. The bulk of the Abhidharma literature is, on the other hand, concerned mainly with an analysis of the conditioned. It is only with the Mahāyāna that interest definitely shifts to the unconditioned which becomes the almost exclusive topic of discussion. However, in the course of this development from the original Buddhism to Hinayāna and then to Mahāyāna, there was the growth of a distinct tendency of divergent interpretations and theoris on Nirvāṇa as on other important subjects of the Buddhist doctrine. Apart from the controversies on the one accepted unconditioned, there was a growth of the notion of several unconditioneds. These new unconditioned items were propounded by sects generally of the Mahāsaṃghika group. But the Theravādins, the orthodox defenders of Buddhism, are not able to reconcile themselves with the new hypotheses and hence we have a series of polemics on the so-called unconditioneds. Except for the last two sections, the entire sixth book of the Kathāvatthu is devoted to them. Besides, some others are treated in the nineteenth book. We have thus discussions on Assurance (niyāma), causal genesis (pāṭiccasamuppāda), Four Truths, Four Immaterial spheres (arūpas), Attaining to Cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), etc., which are all advocated by one or the other sect to be unconditioned and challenged by the Theravādins.

ASSURANCE OF SALVATION (NIYĀMA)

We have a controversy as to whether Assurance is unconditioned or not. According to Buddhaghosa, the Andhakas hold that Assurance is unconditioned in the sense of being eternal (nicca). The Theravādins argue that if the present thesis were true, then niyāma should be of the same nature as Nibbāna,
the shelter (tāṇāṁ), the cave (lenaṁ), the refuge (saraṇāṁ), the goal (parāyanaṁ), etc.\(^{85}\) Also, there must be two kinds of unconditioned. A denial of this would contradict the proposed thesis and, if the proponents choose to assent, then they would be admitting two Nibbānas. The proponents do not, however, concede the points raised by the Theravādins. Further, the Theravādins point out that there may be some people who may claim to enter into and attain Assurance (niyāma), cause it to arise and so on, but this is not applicable to that which is unconditioned. Further, if the Path is conditioned how can Assurance be unconditioned? If all the four stages of Assurance be unconditioned, as also Nibbāna be, there would be five kinds of unconditioned things. Lastly, the Theravādins enquire whether the false Assurance\(^{86}\) is also unconditioned? The Andhakas refuse to admit the objections raised by the Theravādins.\(^{87}\)

Now it is the turn of the Andhakas to put their argument. According to them, once the state of Assurance is attained by anyone, it does not cease and the person concerned is sure to achieve his salvation. The Assurance, therefore, must be unconditioned, i.e., it cannot begin and cease.\(^{88}\) The Theravādins, however, argue that the same logic of the proponents can be applied to false Assurance also.\(^{89}\)

Thus, the central argument put forward by the Theravādins consists in the question whether Assurance as an asahāskṛta is of the same nature as Nibbāna or not? The proponents do not accept this identity but they stick to their thesis that, Assurance being eternal, it is unconditioned.

**CAUSAL GENESIS (PATICCASAMUPPĀDA)**

The next controversy is as to whether or not the 'elements in the law of causal genesis' are unconditioned.\(^{90}\) According to Buddhaghosa, some of the Pubbaseliyas and the Mahīśāsakas upheld the view that the 'elements of the law of causal genesis' are unconditioned.\(^{91}\)

The Theravādins start the debate with a similar argument as in the preceding controversy. Further, they point out that if the proposed thesis is granted it should also imply that any single term in each clause of the formula of causal genesis refers to something unconditioned, for instance, 'ignorance', or
'karman', in the clause 'because of ignorance, karman', etc. The Pubbaseliyas and the Mahiśāsakas cite a *sutta*-passage wherein the Buddha is supposed to have said that the law of 'causal genesis' is immutable irrespective of everything else, e.g., whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise in this world. Thus they affirm that the causal element in that law is unconditioned.

The Theravādins argue further that if each factor in the law of causal genesis were to be taken as unconditioned, there would be in all twelve unconditioned things. Since the proponents cannot maintain this, their thesis is declared to be untenable.

It may be noted that Vasumitra and Viniṭadeva have also attributed to the Mahiśāsakas the thesis in question.

The problem that is posed in the debate lies in the riddle: Does the law refer to an ideality over and above the reals? The basic argument of the Theravādins is just the same. For them, *Pratītyasamutpada* is identical with *saṁskṛtdharma* since the elements therein are real rather than ideal. As against this, the Pubbaseliyas and Mahiśāsakas declared it to be *asaṁskṛta* by which they do not mean the links separately but the unchangeable law (1) of the origin of a thing through a cause, and (2) of the unchangeable nature of *dhammas*, undisturbed by appearance (*uppāda*) or non-appearance (*anuppāda*) or continuity (*thiti*). One might be tempted to observe that in case the advocates of this thesis imply the unchangeability in the order of a certain effect coming out of a certain cause such as *saṁskāra* emerging from ignorance and so on, then it is well to describe the law as permanent and unchangeable. But if they mean to suggest through their contention that there is a permanent, *asaṁskṛta dharma* in the form of *Pratītyasamutpāda*, then it would hardly carry any conviction. Production, i.e., *uppāda* is a perennial feature of the conditioned *dhammas*. How can a thing be both *pratītyasamutpāna* and *nitya*, i.e., permanent?

It may be noted, however, that an early tendency is reflected in Buddhist thought to the dialectical annulment of the distinction between the phenomenal and the transcendent. An interesting reference occurs in the *Sanātana Nikāya* as also in the *Saṁyukta Āgama* to show that *Pratītyasamutpāda* was
at times described as independent, self-subsistent and eternal reality \(\text{dharmadhātu, dharmyām-dharmatā}\). In some ancient texts, the principle is said to be ‘deep, difficult to see, difficult to awake, beyond the realm of thought'.\(^{101}\) Lalita-vistara seems to put it at par with Nirvāṇa.\(^{102}\) Mahāyāna would interpret it as though the two have not been differentiated here. We know it, for example, that the Mādhyamikas finally made Praśītyasamutpāda not only the ‘principle of phenomenal unreality but also of transcendent reality'.\(^{103}\)

Paticcasamuppāda has been described in the Canon as the ultimate law determining phenomena. It has been stated to be, in a famous passage, an impersonal norm independent of the rising and passing away of the Tathāgatas\(^{104}\) and it has been described as dhamaṁśhitatā and dhammaniyāmatā.\(^{105}\) These two expressions seem to be equivalent to the nature of the dhammas and the order or the law of the dhammas respectively. In another passage, Paticcasamuppāda is placed by the side of Nibbāna as dhamma.\(^{106}\) Thus, it seems to have been believed that Paticcasamuppāda itself was something constant and changeless.

We have a thesis in the Kathāvatthu, attributed to the Andhakas,\(^{107}\) which describes dhamaṁśhitatā as parinippanna which has been explained in the Pāli tradition as predetermined and, thus, an obvious charge of a vicious regressus ad infinitum has been levelled against the thesis.\(^{109}\) It seems to us, however, that the expression parinippanna may have been used in a different sense, i.e., in the sense of principle which is itself unproduced and independent. We may recall that in Mahāyāna, parinispātya laksana is contrasted with paratantra laksana. In this sense parinispātya would be contrasted with parinispātya, something existing by itself or pre-existing, contrasted with the things which are produced and ordered under its aegis. Such a view will naturally cohere with the thesis that Paticcasamuppāda is asaṁkhaṭ. This way of understanding this thesis and connecting them with some of the Nikāyic passages, alluded to previously, will also tend to connect them with the later Mahāyānic conception of dharmadhātu and dharmakāya. It is well-known how Nāgārjuna explicitly identifies Praśītyasamutpāda with śūnyatā which tends to become the absolute. Unfortunately, in Hinayāna, whether of the Theravāda variety,
which Buddhaghosa and the translators of the \textit{Kathāvatthu} have in mind, or Sarvāstivāda, which Stecherbatsky always has in mind,\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Paṭiccasamuppāda} is identified with the particular elements arising and perishing and is no more than an abstraction of their contingency. Those who asserted \textit{Paṭiccasamuppāda} to be \textit{asaṅkhata} or \textit{parinipphanna} could not possibly have had such a view in mind. They were not without justification in the Canon.

We have another Andhaka\textsuperscript{112} thesis that impermanence is \textit{parinipphanna}.\textsuperscript{113} It is obvious here that the meaning which the Theravādins attach to \textit{parinipphanna} would not enable us to understand this thesis. Nowhere does the Buddha ever speak of impermanence as due to any causes. The impermanence of things is natural. The later Brahmanical works consider this a cardinal principle of the Buddhists that they hold the destruction of things to be spontaneous and causeless. We might thus render the thesis, impermanence is absolute, that is to say, it is not itself a derivative from any other principle.

\section*{THE FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS}

We have another controversy in the \textit{Kathāvatthu} which discusses the problem as to whether or not the Four Noble Truths are unconditioned.\textsuperscript{114} According to Buddhaghosa, Pubbaseliyas upheld these truths as unconditioned.\textsuperscript{115}

The Theravāda argument is that by holding the Four Truths to be unconditioned the proponents ought to admit four Nibbānas. And if it is so, they must also point out the difference and dividing line that may be drawn between them.\textsuperscript{116}

However, as the proponents affirm that each Truth is unconditioned, the Theravādins take for illustration the First Truth, i.e., about the fact and nature (\textit{lakkhaṇa sacca}) of Ill (suffering), and enquire whether Ill itself is unconditioned. The proponents have to deny this because Ill of various kinds are apparently conditioned. Similarly, about the Second Truth, i.e., on the cause of Ill, the Theravādins enquire whether the cause is unconditioned and so on. All these the proponents have to deny. According to the Theravādins, the proponents, thus, admit that Ill, its cause, the Path are conditioned, and all the factors of those facts are conditioned but they deny that the
abstract statement of each fact as a ‘Truth’ is conditioned. This is untenable according to the Theravādins.\(^{117}\)

In their turn, the Pubbaselīyas argue that if their proposition is wrong why did the Buddha lay down that four things, viz., Ill, the cause of Ill, the cessation of Ill and the course leading to the cessation of Ill are constant, immutable.\(^{118}\) The Four Truths must therefore be held as unconditioned.\(^{119}\)

In this controversy, again the Theravādins put the argument that it is only Nibbāna which is unconditioned. For the proponents, however, all the Four Truths are unconditioned in the sense that they are stable and constant as described by Buddha.\(^{120}\) Lest they are landed in a logical difficulty, the Pubbaselīyas draw, however, a distinction between a ‘fact’ and a ‘truth’ considering that the former is conditioned, the latter unconditioned.\(^{121}\)

THE FOUR IMMATERIAL SPHERES (ĀRUPPADS)

Next follows the controversy whether the sphere of infinite-space is unconditioned or not.\(^{122}\) According to Buddhaghosa, the four āruppas were held to be unconditioned because of a certain passage which refers to the four āruppas.\(^{123}\) Vasumitra associates this thesis with the Mahāsaṃghikas in general.\(^{124}\) Vinītadeva associates the Lokottaravādins with this view.\(^{125}\)

The Theravādins seek to know whether it is thereby implied that the sphere of infinite space is identical with Nibbāna? If the proponents deny this identity they cannot classify the āruppas as unconditioned. In case they affirm it, then one would have two unconditioneds, and two Nibbānas, which is absurd. Further, the sphere of the āruppas is a kind of rebirth but something which is unconditioned cannot be so described. Moreover, it is owing to karmāṇ that rebirth takes place in that sphere; then it should be karmāṇ to bring about rebirth in the unconditioned. This is something which even the proponents would deny.

At last, the proponents finally lay down that the Buddha did declare ‘the four immaterial spheres to be imperturbable’.\(^{126}\) Surely then, one may call them unconditioned. Buddhaghosa, however, comments that since the sutta-passage in question has been put without discerning its real significance, it is not possible-
to concede the proponents’ point.\textsuperscript{127}

The Theravādins seek to refute the proponents’ assertion by pointing out the distinction between Nibbāna and the four immaterial spheres.\textsuperscript{128} Since they are unlike Nibbāna which is the only unconditioned, the four immaterials cannot be unconditioned. According to the proponents, however, the four immaterials, having been described as imperturbable by the Buddha, are also unconditioned.

**THE ATTAINING TO CESSATION (NIRODHASAMĀPATTI)**

Next follows the controversy as to whether or not the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti) is unconditioned?\textsuperscript{129} According to Buddhaghosa, the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti) is here meant for the non-functioning (appavatti) of the four (mental) aggregates, i.e., the suspension of conscious activity in jhāna. As something done and attained, it is called accomplished (nippannā), but it cannot be spoken of as conditioned, or unconditioned, since the features of neither of the two states are present. However, some of the sects as the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas, hold that, because it is not conditioned, it is therefore, unconditioned.\textsuperscript{130}

The Theravādins raise similar arguments as in some of the earlier debates. They ask whether the proposition implies that this state (i.e., attaining to cessation) is identical with Nibbāna. The proponents deny this. According to the Theravādins, then there must be two unconditioned—two Nibbānas. Further, are there any who attain to cessation, and thus by their acquiring it cause it to rise? If so, can the proponents speak similarly about the unconditioned?\textsuperscript{131} This is apparently not possible for anyone to affirm. Buddhaghosa points out that there are persons who produce the material and other qualities which are conditioned, but there are none who similarly attain to the unconditioned.\textsuperscript{132} Moreover, is there apparent such a thing as purification through and emerging from\textsuperscript{133} cessation? If so, is there the same from the unconditioned? The proponents cannot affirm this. The next argument is that in attaining cessation, first speech, then action, then consciousness ceases. And in emerging from cessation, first consciousness, then action, then speech occurs. Could one so speak of attaining the unconditioned or emerging
from the unconditioned.

The proponents, i.e., the Andhakas and Uttarāpatheras argue that if their proposition as such is wrong, they would like to know if cessation is conditioned? Since the Theravādins cannot accept this it must be unconditioned.

SPACE (ĀKĀSA)

Space is the next item on which a controversy takes place—as to whether it is unconditioned or not. According to the Commentary, ākāsa is of three modes: as spatial form which is confined or delimited, as ‘abstracted from object’ (or possibly as the meditative object so called) and as empty or inane. Of these, the first is conditioned; the other two are mere abstract ideas. But some, like the Uttarāpathakas and the Mahīśāsakas, hold that the two latter modes are also unconditioned.

As in the preceding controversies, the Theravādins again put a set of four arguments to refute the present thesis. They observe that, if space is unconditioned, as the proponents affirm, then they must class it with Nibbāna or otherwise they must affirm two sorts of unconditioned and so two Nibbānas also. Further, they ask if anyone could make space where there has been none. That would mean that one could convert conditioned into unconditioned. The proponents come forward with the same argument, viz., if it is wrong to say space is unconditioned, is it conditioned? Since the Theravādins deny this, they conclude that it must be taken as unconditioned. It is interesting to note that this doctrine is recorded in the treatise of Vasumitra and therein it is attributed to the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Mahīśāsakas.

It may be recalled that the significance of ākāsa as an ultimate principle has been asserted more than once in the Upaniṣads and there is also reference to an ancient Buddhist sūtra which speaks of it in the same manner. The Sarvāstivādins also maintained ākāsa, as an asamskṛta. The present thesis appears then to continue an ancient tradition.

THE FRUIT OF SPIRITUAL LIFE (SĀMAṆNÄPHALA)

The next controverted thesis is as to whether or not the fruit
of recluseship is unconditioned. Bodhaghosa remarks that our doctrine has judged that the term ‘fruits of spiritual life’ means the resultant mental state from the practice of the Path (ariyamaggassa vipākacittān), whether during the maggavīthi or during the phalasamāpatti. But there are some, like the Pubbaseliyas, who, taking it otherwise, mean by it just the putting away of corruptions (kilesappahānāṁ) or attaining the Fruits (Phalappatti).

The Theravādins argue in a stereotype manner that the proponents must then identify ‘fruit’ with Nibbāna. Otherwise, there should be two ‘unconditioned’s. The proponents deny both alternatives. It is unconditioned for them because it is uncaused and unproduced by the four conditions—karman, mind, food, or physical environment. Thus, in fact, they would have in these four and Nibbāna, five ‘unconditioned’s. Or if they identify the four with Nibbāna, they then get five sorts of Nibbānas.

Contrary to this, however, the Pubbaseliyas regard as asaññaskṛta the sāmaññaphalas identifying them with the removal of afflictions (kilesapahānāṁ) and the attainment (patti) of the phalas. This has been interpreted by N. Dutt to mean that the attainment, rather than the maggā or phalas, is asaññaskṛta, for it is manifested by the removal of some mental properties (kilesas). Vasumitra seems to corroborate this by using the term mārgāṅgikatva, i.e., prāpti of a mārga, and not simply mārga. This would be significant, however, only if a special theory of prāpti were implied. If we take the thesis to be the same as held by the Vaibhāṣikas, it would have to be explained as N. Dutt has done. The difficulty is one of attribution here. It may be noted that Poussin has taken the ‘asanāskṛta śrāmanyaphala’ as pratisamkhyaniruddha. It may be noted here that the Andhakas hold that there is no vipāka for the ariyadhamma. Bodhaghosa explains that the Andhakas consider the sāmaññaphala to be simply kilesapahāna and not mental states—(cittacetasikā dhamma). This thesis, like the earlier one making sāmaññaphala asamkhatā, would also become intelligible if sāmaññaphala and kilesapahāna are taken to be technically equivalent to patisamkhyaniruddha or Nibbāna which would be both asamkhata and have no vipāka.
ATTAINMENT (PATTI)

Next follows the controversy on Attainment i.e., Patti (Prāpti)—as to whether or not this is unconditioned. According to Buddhaghosa, some, like the Pubbaseliyas again upheld the view that the winning of any acquisition is itself unconditioned. The Theravādins, however, argue that the proponents ought to imply thereby that the winning of raiment, alms-food, etc., is also unconditioned? But if so, the same difficulty arises as in the case of attainment in general. In fact, they would have in these four and Nibbāna, five ‘unconditioned’. A similar argument is used for the winning of any of the Rūpa Jhānas, or of Arūpa Jhānas or of the Four Paths and Four Fruits. And, thus, in fact, they would have in these eight and Nibbāna, nine ‘unconditioned’.

The Pubbaseliyas, however, lay down that if the present proposition is wrong, could the Theravādins identify Patti with any one of the five aggregates, bodily or mental? If not, then, it is unconditioned.

It is doubtful if the Theravādins’ criticism of the thesis can be considered very reliable. By understanding Prāpti in a wholly non-technical sense, they have managed to reduce their opponents to a ridiculous position. Probably, Prāpti either stood for a spiritual attainment (samāpatti) or for some philosophical principle such as the Prāpti of the Sarvāstivādins. It could hardly be ‘any gain’ (paṭilābha) as Buddhaghosa interprets it. But even he feels the need of a denial—na hi patti nāma koci dhammo—which would be uncalled for and meaningless if no philosophical counter-assertion were in view.

THUSNESS (TATHATĀ)

Next follows a controversy on ‘Thusness’. Here again, it is disputed as to whether or not the fundamental characteristics of all things (sabba-dhammi) are unconditioned? According to Buddhaghosa, some like the Uttarāpathakas, held that there is an immutable something called thusness (suchness) in the very nature of all things, material or otherwise (taken as a whole). And because this thusness is not itself included in the (particular) conditioned matter, etc., therefore, it is
unconditioned.\textsuperscript{156} The Theravādins come forward with the same old arguments as in the previous controversies. They observe that assuming a materiality (rūpatā) of matter or body, is not materiality unconditioned? The proponents assent and hence the same old difficulties and arguments may be raised. This objection is equally applicable in the case of other aggregates, viz., feeling, perception, etc. At last, the Uttarāpathakas argue, is the ‘thusness’ of all things the five aggregates (taken together)? The Theravādins affirm this. Then that ‘thusness’ of all things is unconditioned. For the Theravādins, however, there is only one unconditioned and that is Nibbāna.\textsuperscript{157} It is remarkable, however, that Kathāvaithu records this interesting controversy on Tathātā. We are aware of the importance that came to be ascribed to ‘thusness’ or ‘suchness’ by certain of the Mahāyānists.\textsuperscript{158} It has been pointed out that Tathātā does not occur again throughout the Piṭakas and the Commentary of Buddhaghosa does not attach any special interest or importance to the term and the argument in the text is exactly like that in other controversies on the so-called unconditioned.\textsuperscript{159} This surmise however seems to be unsound. There is reference to dharmatā, dharmmatthitātā in the Saṁyutta Nikāya, where it has been said whether Tathāgatas arise or not, the law of dharmatā is constant.\textsuperscript{160} As a matter of fact, Buddhaghosa appears to identify Tathātā with the Sarvāstivāda conception of dharmasvabhāva which, perhaps, misses the mark altogether. Tathātā should mean not the ultimate character of each element (dharmaḥ) but the ultimate character of their ordering principle, Dhamma with a capital D. One could point out that even in the Upaniṣads, Dhamma occurs in the sense of a fixed order\textsuperscript{161} and in the Nikāyas there is a famous passage which speaks of the immutable Dhammatā and which is echoed in later Mahāyāna writings.\textsuperscript{162}

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSIES

Nirvāṇa is the one universally accepted unconditioned in Buddhism. It is established in opposition to all that is conditioned. The conditioned (sānkhaṭa) is, in the Buddhist tradition, what
has been prepared, brought about by something else, made, has come together by conditions. Anything that springs into being through a cause, is necessarily conditioned. One of the characteristic marks of the conditioned is impermanence. As against this, the unconditioned is (1) deathless, (2) at peace and (3) secure. The \textit{asankhatadhatu} is described in the \textit{Dhammasaṅgani} as ethically \textit{‘abhyākata’}, \textit{‘void of the working of conception of thought discursive’}, infinite (\textit{appamāṇa}) etc.\footnote{163} It is something as opposed to all form (\textit{sabhāna rūpa})\footnote{164} and distinguished from Arahant by ‘neither pertaining nor not pertaining to studentship’.\footnote{165} Commentarial tradition identifies the \textit{asankhatadhatu} of the \textit{Dhammasaṅgani} with Nibbāna. Mrs. Rhys Davids, however, observes that this represents a later development.\footnote{166} In fact, the word ‘Nibbāna’ occurs but once in the \textit{Dhammasaṅgani} and that too in its closing sentences where Nibbāna is called one of the two kinds of \textit{Vimutti}.\footnote{167} It has been suggested, however, that the \textit{asankhata} and Nibbāna of the \textit{Dhammasaṅgani} are the same thing viewed in two ways.\footnote{168} In fact, the \textit{Milindapoṭha} puts the essence of the matter quite clearly. It is stated there that Nibbāna is not the result of a cause (\textit{a-hetu-jām}). There is no cause for the production of Nibbāna, but there is a Path which leads to its realization. Nibbāna itself is unproducible (\textit{anuppādaniya}) because it is ‘made by nothing at all’. One cannot say of it that it has been produced or not produced, or that it can be produced, or that it is past, future or present.\footnote{170} Vasubandhu also says that the unconditioned has no cause or fruit (effect) but it is both cause and fruit.\footnote{171} It has no fruit because it is outside the three periods of time. No cause can produce it, and as inactive it can produce no effect. Thus, there is almost a complete unanimity in different traditions about the \textit{asankhata}-hood of Nibbāna. Vaibhāṣikas, however, distinguished three kinds of \textit{Nirodhas}, i.e., \textit{Pratisaṅkhyaṃnirodha}, \textit{Apratisaṅkhyaṃnirodha} and \textit{Anityatānirodha}.\footnote{172} The first two are \textit{aṃskṛta} while the third is \textit{aṃskṛta}.

The first \textit{Nirodha} is termed Nirvāṇa which is \textit{asādhāraṇa} in the sense that all do not acquire it simultaneously and \textit{asabhāga} in the sense that it has no \textit{sabhāga-hetu}.\footnote{174}
Apart from Nibbāna, akāsa also is often given a closely resembling treatment so much so that certain sects reckon it among the unconditioned dharmas, while some others do not. It is interesting to note that even some Pāli texts occasionally compare the attributes of Nibbāna and Space. Both are unobstructed, supportless and infinite, without origin, life or death, rise or fall. Curiously enough, the Theravādins, as is the position taken by them in the Kathāvatthu, did not take Space as an unconditioned and so did the Vātsiputriyas. As against this, the Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsaṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas and Uttarāpathakas regarded it as unconditioned.

In course of time, there developed a tendency to raise several items on the pedestal of the unconditioned. As recorded in the Kathāvatthu and occasionally attested by the traditions of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinitadeva, the number of these so-called unconditioneds is gradually multiplied from that state of the Buddhist Canon where Nibbāna is the only unconditioned recognised. The Andhakas increased the number to nine and included the four aruppas and āryamārgāngikatva. Similarly, the Mahīśāsakas upheld the theory of nine asaṁkhatas although their items slightly differ from that of the Andhakas. Some other sub-sects of the Mahāsaṃghika group such as the Pubbaseliyas and the Uttarāpathakas also recognised several unconditioneds. The Theravādins, on the other hand, who do not agree to the theories of these asaṁkhatas, seek to refute the alien views in the manner as detailed here. Their central argument is whether each of these asaṁkhatas is of the same nature as Nibbāna, if not, it must be a saṁkhata item. The point of view of the proponents is, however, different from that of the Theravādins. According to them, the asaṁkhata is that which is unchangeable (āṭenja). In regard to the causal law, they rely on Buddha's statement and point out that by the asaṁkhata they do not mean the links separately but the unchangeable law of the origin of a thing through a cause. The crux of the entire problem lies in the fact whether the law implies an ideality over and above the reals. Whereas the proponents would have us believe that the law refers to ideality by the very nature of its consistency and unchangeability in a world of constant flux, the Theravādins would emphasize only the reality of the law and the
reals lying therein. They identify the Law and the elements ordered by it. In the ordered relationship of cause and effect, the Mahāsaṃghikas, however, see an ideal order. Similarly with regard to the relationship of concept and terms of the Four Truths and the facts thereof. That is to say, apart from the particular relationship of cause and effect, there is an ideal order of this type which signifies the general pattern of such an order. One might observe, however, that in case the proponents imply the unchangeability in the order of a certain effect coming out of a certain cause such as saṃskāra issuing from ignorance and so on, then it may well be said that the law is unalterable, unchangeable or permanent. But if they mean to suggest through their contention that there is a permanent asaṁskṛta dharma in the form of Pratītyasamutpāda, then it would hardly carry conviction. Production, i.e., utpāda is a perennial feature of the conditioned dharmas. How can a thing be both pratītyasamutpāna and nitya. Similarly, in the case of Assurance of salvation, etc., the two warring camps are stuck on two different points. According to the Theravāda point of view, that, which can be brought into being, cannot be said to be unconditioned. In fact, that, which can be made to arise, must also cease to be at a certain point of time. But the question is whether this argument is valid in the case of negative entities also such as cessation which is abhāva rūpa? Moreover, it may also be observed that in the case of Assurance or Path or Four Truths, etc., they are not, as a matter of fact, brought into being but there is growth in them. Synoptically viewed and designated as a whole, they appear to be static structures or fixed orders, while in terms of contexts they refer to processes of spiritual growth. On the contrary, the Mahāsaṃghikas are stuck to the other end of the same fact. According to them, that which does not have the property to cease, cannot be anything but unconditioned.

As far as the āryamārgāṅgikatva is concerned, the Pubbaseliyas regard as asaṁkhata the fact of attainment (patti) of a magga or phala or the removal of certain mental impurities (kilesapahānāni) and not the maggas or phalas by themselves. It may be thus observed, on the basis of the discussion on the unconditioned, that it is mainly owing to interpretative difficulties that these controversies arise. A set of unconditioneds
came to be propounded because of a certain likeness among their attributes and that of Nibbāna the one undisputed unconditioned of Buddhism. The proponents, though they are not able to associate all the sublime attributes of Nibbāna to these so-called unconditioned items, still, however, they generally derived their hypotheses from some of the epithets and attributes of Nibbāna such as añena, i.e., unchangeability as also from occasional Canonical utterances about at least some of the entities like ākīsa, Dhammaṭṭhitatā, Dhammaniyāmatā, Samāpatti, Āruppas, etc. The central point of difference between the two sections, however, is that according to the Theravādins, that, which can be made to arise, must also cease to exist and, hence, anything, which is so made to arise, cannot be unconditioned. But this argument does not appear to be valid in the case of negative entities such as cessation. Besides, ideal principles or patterns are also immutable, though not identifiable with a principle like Nibbāna, which constitutes ultimate spiritual value. Further, in case of Assurance or Path or Four Truths, etc., we have in fact ordered processes of growth which are not reducible to the rising and perishing of particular reals.

It is thus clear that we have ‘immutabilities’ of various kinds—of negative entities (e.g., Nirodha or ākāsa), of ideal principles (e.g., Tathāta), of ordered spiritual processes (e.g., Niyāmatā or Sāmaññaphala) and finally of Nirvāṇa. The Theravādins define the last as asaṁskṛta, the rest as either saṁskṛta dharmas cum prajñapti or as neither saṁskṛta nor asaṁskṛta. The Mahāsamarighikas, on the other hand, dichotomize all entities into saṁskṛta and asaṁskṛta and hence place all these into the latter category.
REFERENCES


4. Amata and Nibbāna are more or less equivalent in the Buddhist tradition, see I.B. Horner, *Middle Length Sayings*, I, Introduction, p. xviii.


10. See Kathāvatthu, p. 354; cf. Majjhima Nikāya, I, p. 6; see also *Points of Controversy*, p. 233n.


17. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 60.


23. See Abhidharmakośa, I, p. 10; see also Sogen, op. cit., 164-5.

24. N. Dutt (EMB, II, p. 102) has pointed out that the three asaṁskṛtas are accepted in the Pāli works as well. It is difficult to agree with his observation. The Dhammasaṅgaṇi recognizes only one unconditioned and that is Nibbāna. Granted that ākāsa is described even in the Pāli works in almost as high terms as Nibbāna, yet Kathāvatthu, vigorously combats the view which seeks to hold ākāsa as an unconditioned; see Kathāvatthu, VI, 6.


29. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 177.
314 Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

32. See EI, Vol. XX, pp. 16, 18, 19, 20, 21.
33. i.e., ubhaya-loka hita-sukhāvahanāya.
35. Ibid., p. 22.
37. See supra, Chapter IX. Cf. Dīgha Nikāya, II, p. 120.
42. Aṅguttara Nikāya, IV, p. 367.
43. Aṅguttara Nikāya, III, pp. 89-90.
47. Ibid., pp. 264-5.
48. Kathāvatthu, p. 117.
49. Ibid., p. 358.
50. Ibid., p. 413.
51. Milindapañha, pp. 72, 263ff; cf. Conze, Buddhist Texts, pp. 97-100.
52. Milindapañha, p. 265.
53. Ibid., pp. 1264, 316.
54. Ibid., pp. 72, 306, 317.
55. Ibid., pp. 263, 265.
56. Ibid., pp. 309-10.
62. The Mulapariyāyasutta (Majjhima Nikāya, I, p. 6) from which the proponents have cited a passage in support of their thesis really deals with the views of the average persons unskilled in Dhamma. Buddhaghosa in his commentaries both on the Kathāvatthu as well as the Majjhima Nikāya, specifically makes a mention of this fact and suggests thereby in the former that the proponents’ views are untenable.
63. See Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā, p. 116.
64. See supra.
68. Ibid., II, p. 4f.
69. Milindapañha, pp. 72, 308, 317.
70. See supra.
71. Dhammasaṅgāni, pp. 294ff.
72. Cf. Aṅguttara Nikāya, I, pp. 146-7; IV, p. 16.
73. Samyutta Nikāya, III, p. 223.
76. Stcherbatsky aptly compares it to the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya, see Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, pp. 27-8.
82. See Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 2f.
83. Niyāna asamkhato ti, Kathāvatthu, VI. 1.
86. I.e., Micchatta-niyāna, which is assurance in the wrong direction applied to the five kinds of heinous crimes, see Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, p. 89.
87. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 283-4.
90. Paṭiccasamuppādo asamkhato ti, Kathāvatthu, VI. 2.
95. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 61.
97. On jhīti see, Points of Controversy, Appendix 7.
100. See Abhidharmakośa, II, p. 77.
102. Lalitavistara, p. 286.
109. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 399-400; Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, pp. 132-3.
110. Mādhyamika Kārikā, XXIV. 18.
112. Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā, p. 130.
113. Aniccata parinipphamṇati, Kathāvatthu, XI. 10
114. Cattāri saiccāni asainkhatāni ti, Kathāvatthu, VI. 3.
117. Ibid., pp. 287-9.
120. See Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā, pp. 90-1.
123. Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā, p. 91; cf. Tattha yesam cattāro āruppā-
anekañjā tivacanan nissāya sabbe pi te dhamma asainkhata ti. The
translator, Dr. B.C. Law, appears to have amended anekajā to anteñjā.
See *Debates Commentary*, p. 113.
128. The four immaterials are: (i) Ākāśānāṇcāyatanā, (ii) Viññānāntiyāya-
tana, (iii) Viññānāntiyāyatanā, (iv) Naivasaññā-nāsaññāyatanā.
133. According to Buddhaghosa these two terms viz. (e) Nirodhavad-
ānāṁ, (b) Vuttānānāṁ refer to the attainment of Fruition after emer-
gence. See Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā p. 92.
136. See Kāthāvatthu, pp. 292-3.
137. Ibid., p. 293.
139. See, e.g., Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, III, 6, 8; IV. 1.
140. Quoted in *Sphutārthā*, p. 17, see also G.C. Pande, *Studies in the
Origins of Buddhism*, p. 31n.
144. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 499-500.
146. See Masuda, op. cit., p. 29.
151. Patti asainkhatā ti, Kathāvatthu, XIX, 4.
152. Kathāvatthu-Atlṭhakathā, p. 179.
153. See Abhidharmakośa, II, p. 36.
155. Sabbadhammānaṁ taikata āsaṁkhata ti Kathāvatthu, XIX. 5.
156. Kathāvatthu-Atlṭhakathā, p. 179.
158. See Suzuki, Awakening of Faith, pp. 53ff.
161. See Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, I, 5.23.
165. Ibid., p. 166, n. 1.
166. Ibid., pp. 264-5.
168. Ibid., p. 166, n. 1, 367.
170. See Milindapaṇiha, pp. 268, 271.
171. Abhidharmakośa, II, 50.
172. Ibid., II, 57.
175. See, e.g., Milindapaṇiha, pp. 268, 271.
177. See. Conze, Buddhist Thought, pp. 163.
178. See Kathāvatthu, VI. 6; see also Masuda, op. cit., pp. 29, 61.
Psycho-Ethical Controversies in the Kathāvatthu

Buddhist philosophy is primarily ethical but at the same time its ethics is inextricably blended with psychology.¹ The true spiritual force of Buddhism lies in its emphasis on immediate experience and the rejection of everything that might make one lose what is essential and supreme in life. The Buddhist analysis of consciousness eliminated the soul-seeking to explain the mental phenomena in terms of the law of dependence which postulated physical objects including the physical body as constituted of dhammas.² With the development of Abhidhamma,³ the analytical process resulted in the long lists of elementary dhammas so as to enable one to see beyond the apparent unity of persons and things which would lead him to altogether dispense with the notion of self. The first book of Pāli Abhidhamma begins with a significant remark—‘when a healthy conscious attitude, belonging to the world of sensuous relatedness, accompanied by and permeated with serenity and linked with knowledge has arisen...’.⁴ On the results of psychological analysis, Buddhism sought to base the whole rationale of its practical doctrine and discipline.

From studying the processes of attention, and the nature of sensation, the range and depth of feeling and the plasticity of will in desire and in control, it organized its system of practical self-culture.⁵
The Abhidhamma stage may be aptly described as the rational phase of Buddhism grounded essentially in its psycho-ethical attitude.

The Kathāvatthu, another important work of the Pāli Abhidhamma, contains a long list of psycho-ethical controversies related to a variety of problems, e.g., consciousness—its duration, structure and functions, anusayas, virtues and kamma. The text, however, preserves these debates in the most haphazard manner insofar as they are scattered throughout the different sections of the work. The variety of the problems, as also their distribution, makes it increasingly difficult to group them together and to draw their combined significance. We have, however, tried to group them together on the basis of some connection in the import of the different theses and have drawn the significance of individual theses along with their discussion.

THESES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

The following two controversies arise from the attempt to interpret the extent and variation of impermanence in the fundamental Buddhist assertion that all things are impermanent. The first seeks to know—are they equally impermanent? and the second enquires as to what are their ultimate units of duration.

DHAMMAS AND UNITS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

According to the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas, ‘all things are momentary conscious units’. They subscribed to this tenet for the simple reason that the conditioned phenomena (dhammas) are said to be impermanent and hence they cannot endure for more than one conscious moment.

This, however, is an arbitrary assertion, according to the Theravādins. In their opinion, despite universal impermanence, there is a comparative variation in the duration of different things. They would cite such examples as a mountain or an ocean or trees which do not seem to vanish along the passing away of thought-moments. The Theravādins also provide Canonical testimony to affirm that the organ of sight and
visual cognition do not coincide at the same moment.\textsuperscript{15}

**DURATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS**

The issue of discussion here is whether a single unit of
consciousness lasts for a day.\textsuperscript{16} Buddhaghosa attributes this
belief to the Andhakas.\textsuperscript{17}

The Theravādins point out that the thesis in question implies
that one-half of the day belongs to the ‘nascent moment’
(uppāda) and one-half to ‘cessant moment’ (vaya or bhaṅga).
And a similar admission is involved in affirming that a state of
consciousness lasts two days or four days and so on. The
Buddha is said to have clearly stated that there is no pheno-
mena so fickle and fluctuating as mind.\textsuperscript{18} He compared it
with a monkey which catches one branch to jump on some
other.\textsuperscript{19}

According to Buddhaghosa, the Andhakas, judging by
the apparent continuity of consciousness attained through
jhāna (in the Arūpaloka) and of subconsciousness (during the
hours of the day), came to hold that a single consciousness
lasted for a length of time.\textsuperscript{20}

The real origin, however, of the Andhaka thesis might lie in
the observation that there is an apparent break of the conti-
uinity of consciousness during sleep. We are reminded of the
controversy between Descartes and Locke over the apparent
discontinuity of consciousness in sleep.\textsuperscript{21} In Brāhmaṇical
thought day and night corresponded to creation and dissolution,
or life and death.\textsuperscript{22} Perhaps, the Andhaka reference to the long-
lasting consciousness of some gods echoes the notion of Brahmic
day.\textsuperscript{23} This would represent the other and cosmic pole of the
microcosmic momentariness of consciousness towards which the
major tendency of Buddhist thought was moving. Even from
the point of view of momentariness, it is clear that the
‘moment’ of mind needs defining and cannot without further
ado be identified with the ‘moment’ of material process as the
Theravādins themselves realised later on.\textsuperscript{24} If the two
‘moments’ concur, then as the Sautrāntikas pointed out there
can be no direct perception.\textsuperscript{25} The Theravādins sought to
overcome this difficulty by shortening the mental moment
(cittakkhaṇa). The Andhakas appear to have lengthened it
which would have the identical effect of making experience possible. In choosing their unit, they seem to have been led by common sense as well as an ancient cosmological parallel.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF A PAST OBJECT

The discussion here rests on the view that consciousness of a past object is without object. According to the Commentary, the Uttarāpathakas are led to hold this view on the ground that past or future mental objects do not really exist at the time of mental recollection and hence the mind recalling these objects is supposed to be without those objects.

According to the Theravādins, in the light of their own admission that there is such a thing as a mental object that is past, how can they make such a self-contradictory statement that the consciousness of a past object is without object.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF A FUTURE IDEA

There is a similar assertion with reference to future that 'a consciousness, having an idea that is future, is without object'. Though the Commentary of Buddhaghosa does not make a separate comment on this discussion, it is obvious, however, that this too was an Uttarāpathaka belief.

The Theravādins repeat this argument verbatim, substituting future for past. Added to this they observe that the proponents admit with reference to present that there can be adventing of mind, ideation and so on, so that consciousness of a present idea has its mental object. They also admit that there can be adventing of mind and so on about the past and also about the future. Yet if in both these cases, mind is without mental object, then why not in the present? It is clear that both these theses intend to assert the unreality of past and future objects even when they are objects of cognition. The argument would really be aimed against the Sarvāstivādins. The Theravādins rightly point out the danger of an idealistic implication in the Uttarāpathaka view—the present may also be treated as unreal! But perhaps the Uttarāpathakas were themselves groping in an idealistic direction.
EMERGENCE OF A FRESH UNIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The present debate rests over the assertion that before five aggregates seeking rebirth have ceased, five operative aggregates arise.\textsuperscript{31} Buddhaghosa associates the Andhakas with this view.\textsuperscript{32} The Theravādins argue that if this were true, there should be a congeries of ten aggregates. There must be then two copies of each aggregate which is an unorthodox position.

The Andhakas were led to uphold this thesis on the score that:

‘If, before a unit of becoming lapses, another unit of consciousness (kiriya) entitling merit or demerit with its (operative) fourfold aggregate and the material aggregate sprung from it, has not arisen, then becoming being ended, the living continuum must be cut off.’\textsuperscript{33}

This problem of the continuity of the stream of consciousness (santati)\textsuperscript{34} especially from one life to another is the issue here. The more general problems of psychic continuity are debated in another controversy, viz., anantarapaccayakathā.\textsuperscript{35} The Uttarā-pathakas advocated a strictly unbroken flow\textsuperscript{36} which the Theravādins contested. The distinction between Bhavaṅga and Kiriya, latent and manifest psyche, serves to explain this continuity. The Andhakas only seek to extend the application of this device to the crucial transition at death. The Theravādins themselves had to take the question more seriously later and tended to solve it by identifying the last consciousness of one life with the first of the next.\textsuperscript{37} The parallel between Bhavaṅga and Kiriya on the one hand and Ālaya Vijñāna and Pravṛtti Vijñāna on the other may be noted.\textsuperscript{38}

ATTENDING TO ALL AT ONCE

The issue of this debate is that one can attend to everything simultaneously.\textsuperscript{39} We gather from Buddhaghosa that the Pubbasielias and Aparaseliyas upheld this thesis.\textsuperscript{40}

The Theravādins argue—does the thesis mean to suggest that we know the consciousness by which we so attend? The proponents deny it first because it cannot be subject and object at once.\textsuperscript{41} But when questioned a second time, they assent because:
one is already aware of the nature of the thesis advanced. Then the question would be whether the consciousness by which we so attend is known as consciousness? As above, the proponents deny first but assent later, then, is the subject of consciousness the same as its object and so on.

The proponents, however, refer to the words of Buddha that 'all things are impermanent' and hence assert that in generalising one can attend to all things at once.

Buddhaghosa, however, points out that attention (manasikāra) arises in two ways; by logical induction (nayaio) or direct perception (ārammanato). To infer from the observed transience of one or more phenomena that 'all things are impermanent' illustrates the former. But in attending to past things, we cannot attend to future things. We attend to a certain thing in one of the time relations. This is attention by way of directly perceiving the object of consciousness. Moreover, when we attend to present things, we are not able at the present moment to attend to the consciousness by which they arise. Nevertheless, the concerned thesis is advocated by the mentioned sects. And because they hold that in so doing we must also attend to the consciousness by which we attend, the argument runs as mentioned.

From the exposition of Buddhaghosa, it seems that the Śāila schools were principally concerned with seeking to explain the way in which the subject of a universal proposition comes to be known. The subject here is a universe class as in 'all things are impermanent'. Apparently, corresponding to this judgement, there must be a simultaneous awareness of many objects. To this, Buddhaghosa rightly answers by distinguishing between the simultaneity of perceptions at the psychological level from the logical timelessness of a universal judgement. Whether self-consciousness is simultaneous with object consciousness or merely reflective is another point which is discussed. It seems to us, however, that the real significance of the thesis from the Buddhist point of view has hardly been raised in the Theravāda account of the controversy. In the Mahāsamghika sect of which the Śāila schools were a part, Buddha is believed to know all things in one moment. The nature of his omniscience was an object of discussion from the days of the Nikāyas. Three views
appear to have developed; the earliest, which the Buddha himself blessed, defined his omniscience merely as the knowledge of spiritual truths; the second held that the Buddha knew one object at one time but could attend to any object he chose; the third explained omniscience as the simultaneous knowledge of all things. The Mahāsamghikas and the Mahāyānists tended to emphasize the last.48

The Buddhist analysis of consciousness eliminated the soul-seeking to explain the mental phenomena in terms of the law of dependence which postulated physical objects including the physical body. It was obvious, however, that the connection between the mind and the body has a unique aspect which is not covered by its relations with mere objects. This uniqueness is popularly expressed by thinking of body as the seat of life or vitality for the functioning of a mind. The Upaniṣads had speculated a lot over this vital force or prāṇa. The concept of jīvitendriye, i.e., vital power, persistently crops up in Abhidharmikā thought also.49 In the Kathāvatīthu, we have the radical thesis that vital power is not material nor mental.50 This might cut a philosophical gordian knot, but forgets the original purpose for which the knot was tied.

CONATIVE AND AFFECTIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In the earlier analysis of the Nikāyas, conative and affective functions are collected in the vedanā and saṃskāra skandhas while vijñāna and saṃjñā constitute the cognitive functions of the mind. The tendency was to gradually elaborate the saṃskāra skandha and to assimilate saṃjñā, vedanā and saṃskāra as various functions dependent on vijñāna as co-existing with it. Thus, instead of the four co-ordinate, skandhas came to be analyzed into citta or vijñāna attended by samprayukta dharmas or cetasikas.51 It is in this context that we can appreciate some of the debates of the Kathāvatīthu.

Buddhaghosa attributes to the Rājagirikas and the Siddhārthikas two theses52 which attack the concept of the cetasikas. In the first,53 they criticize it on the score that the idea of association (saṃprayuktād) has no meaning since there is no necessary connection between different mental phenomena.54
In the second thesis,\textsuperscript{55} they deny the existence of the \textit{caitasi\-kas}. They seem here to be asserting that the so-called \textit{cetasikas} have a misleading name. Their mere dependence on the \textit{citta} does not give them a nature contiguous with the \textit{citta}, e.g., something depending on \textit{phassa} may be called \textit{phassika}, but it does not acquire the nature of \textit{phassa}.\textsuperscript{56}

Relying on a scriptural statement,\textsuperscript{57} the Pubbaseliyas sought to reduce the whole ‘\textit{Kāmadhātu}’ to merely five types of sensuous pleasures.\textsuperscript{58} Against this, the Theravādins include in the ‘\textit{Kāma-

\textit{dhātu}’ objects of sense desire (\textit{vatthukāma}) the desires them-

selves (\textit{kilesckāma}) and the world of desires (\textit{kāmabhava}).\textsuperscript{59} The Pubbaseliya thesis has a clearly idealistic and subjective bias which would contract the world of desires to sensations merely. This comes out more clearly in another assertion of the Pubbaseliyas, where the subjective desires and their objects are sought to be identified, i.e., the \textit{āyatanas} are the \textit{kāmas}.\textsuperscript{60}

Among the objects of desire there was also held to be a sixth sphere, the \textit{dhammāyatana}. The Pubbaseliyas assert the ‘desire for ideas’ (\textit{dhammataanā})\textsuperscript{61} is immoral (\textit{abyākata})\textsuperscript{62} and not the cause of \textit{dukkhasamudaya}.\textsuperscript{63}

The Uttarakathakas are reported to assert that there is ‘a lusting for what is disagreeable’ (\textit{asātarāga}).\textsuperscript{64} According to the Theravādins, the Uttarakathakas derive this view from a misunderstood Canonical utterance.\textsuperscript{65} The Uttarakathakas, however, appear to have reflected over a profound fact of experience, which is that in the fascination that even those objects exert on the mind, on the whole the disagreeable element predominates. The person who is quickly enraged and enters into a brawl would bear testimony to this principle of \textit{asātarāga}.

The Andhakas and the Sammatiyas seek to enlarge the sphere of \textit{rāga} to the \textit{rūpa} and \textit{arūpa} worlds, by conceiving of \textit{rūparāga} and \textit{arūparāga} in parallelism to \textit{kāmarāga}.\textsuperscript{66}

The Hetuvādins and Mahīśāsakas distinguish between two sets of \textit{saddhā}, \textit{viriya}, \textit{sati}, \textit{samādhi}, and \textit{paññā}. For them, the ordinary mental factors, designated thus, are not the same as the five \textit{balas} of the same name.\textsuperscript{67} It may be noticed that \textit{indriya} originally meant just faculty and this sense is preserved in the Theravāda view.\textsuperscript{68} The proponents of the thesis, however, make the \textit{indriyas lokottara}.\textsuperscript{69}
PERCEPTION

On the question of perception, the earlier analysis found in the Nikāyas reduces it as the resultant function of the contact of particular senses with their specific objects. It had also emphasized the distinctive and co-ordinating role of the sixth viññāna, viz., mano and dhamma.69

In the Kathāvatthu, some of the controversies raise the difficult problems of the perception of ‘space’ and ‘substance’. The Andhakas postulated the perceptibility of ākāsa70 (ākāsa-sanidasseno). They argued for the visibility of empty intervals or interstices between objects. The Theravādins seek to contradict them by pointing to the necessity of a positive object which can only be rūpa, i.e., form and colour where visual perception is concerned.71 Buddhaghosa explains with his later-day psychology that the perception of emptiness results from a mental cognition following a visual cognition which has a different object.72 It may, however, be pointed out that, despite Mrs. Rhys Davids’ commendation of the psychological subtlety of Buddhaghosa,73 a profound philosophical problem must be held to have been dimly described in the Andhaka assertion, a problem which Buddhaghosa does not even perceive. One needs only to refer to the later controversies over the perception of abhāva among the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas, etc.74

While the later Buddhist schools of philosophy denying any reality to negative things or absences sought to explain their cognition as essentially an intellectual construct, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas took the opposite course of asserting their reality and validating their perception, or else exalting a certain non-perception into a separate means of knowledge. If the Andhaka view were developed consistently, it would depart far from the usual Buddhist attitude, at once nominalistic and idealistic.

Similarly, the Andhakas advocate the common-sense view that the elements earth, air, water, etc., are perceptible.75 The Theravādins contradict them by alluding to the subtle nature of these elements and pointing out that what is actually is only some coloured surface and form, from which the elements are inferred.76 Here again a philosophical issue lies hidden.
Later-day Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers argued for the position that ‘substances’ are perceived not inferred. Such a view implicitly combated the Buddhist attempt to reduce substances to mere constructs. The implications of the Andhaka view, thus, would tend to run counter to the Buddhist emphasis on insubstantiality. In both these theses, the Andhakas advocate a common-sense psychology on the philosophical implications of which would be very heterodox from the Buddhist standpoint.

Another debate arose from the attempt to define the subject of perception, that is, to say, is it the eye that perceives or the visual consciousness that perceives. It is interesting to note that neither side defends the common-sense notion of a self that perceives.

**RELEASE THROUGH SEEING THE GOOD**

The controversy here rests over a thesis that the fetters are put off for one who discerns a blessing in store. Buddhaghosa attributes the view to the Andhakas, who subscribe to an optimistic approach that it is through Nibbāna as a blessing that the fetters are put off.

The Theravādins point out that it is also possible to put off the fetters by realizing the impermanence of the world (sankhārā). And hence one should not conceive the former possibility alone as the proponents affirm in their proposition.

In fact the proponents also admit that the fetters are put off when the true nature of the world is understood, viz., the world as characterized by disease, canker, etc. But their assertion, as above, makes their position one-sided. The proponents, however, quote the words of Buddha revealing the bliss and ecstasy of Nibbāna and affirm that it is for one who discerns the happy prospect that the fetters are put off. Buddhaghosa offers the explanation that it is clearly laid down that when anyone discerns (1) the world as full of peril, and (2) Nibbāna as blessing, the ‘fetters’ are put off. But the Andhakas take one of these two alternative statements and say it is only by the latter discernment that the fetters are removed.

A profound psychological point is made—the attachment to the lower is given up when the ‘higher’ is glimpsed. It should
also be remembered that avijjā is not of the samyojanas. How can avidyā go without vidyā?

TWO CODES OF MORALS

Next follows the controversy that one who is engaged in the Path is practising a double morality. According to Buddhaghosa, Mahāsamghikas advocated this view.

According to the Theravāda argument, in order to assert this, the proponents must also admit that one is possessed of this dual morality with a dual mental contact, dual feeling, dual perception, etc.

The proponents' standpoint, as they put it, is that (1) one actually engaged on the Path practises a worldly morality in the three factors relating to conduct—right speech, right action, right livelihood—but not in the five factors relating to mental life, and that (2) in those three factors his morals are both worldly and supramundane, but they are only the latter in the other five factors. The Theravādins emphasize that they must admit the same higher morality for all the eight.

It is apparent from the present thesis that the Theravādins try to show that if such a proposition be accepted then each morality would involve two separate sets of mental processes. Buddhaghosa has remarked in his Commentary that the Mahāsamghikas came to hold the view that inasmuch as the virtuous person is developing the Path which is not of the world, with a morality that is of the world, he must at the moment of realization, be possessed simultaneously of both a worldly and an unworldly morality. He adds further that this opinion was formulated on the basis of such passages in the Nikāyas as 'when a man is established in virtue he is gifted with wisdom'. In fact, the Mahāsamghikas have raised a fundamental problem—the sage working in the world has a dual role and status. He shares in social or worldly morality (sīla) and at the same time participates in spiritual vision (pāññā). Its limiting instance is found in the Apratīṣṭhita Nirvāṇa of the Vijñānavād.

THE ETHICS OF SENSES

Here the controversial view is that 'the five kinds of sense—
consciousness are good, i.e., they have positive moral qualities. The Commentary does not contribute any explanation or note on this discussion. It seems however from the foregoing discussions that the Mahāsāṃghikas advocated the view.

The Theravādins put lengthy arguments, their central objection being that the senses are limited to sense-objects, whereas ethical and intellectual matters are the concerns of will, etc.

The proponents in turn quote the words of Buddha that when a Bhikkhu sees an object with the eye, he sometimes grasps, and sometimes does not grasp at the general characters, or the details of it and so on.

The thesis seems to advocate a sane, common-sense view compared to which the Theravāda view is psychologically subtle. The Mahāsāṃghika thesis could only have arisen before the Abhidharmic psychology of the mental process or cittavīthi had even rudimentarily been worked out.

VIRTUE

Next follow two discussions on the nature of virtue. It is affirmed by a section of Buddhists that moral conduct is not at all a function of consciousness. Buddhaghosha adds in his Commentary that it was held by some, like the Mahāsāṃghikas, that even when there has been moral conduct, even though it has ceased, there is an accretion of virtue, and hence the doer becomes virtuous.

The central objection against this thesis, as pointed out by the Theravādins, is as follows: (1) Conduct with its moral quality is utterly unlike anything non-mental; (2) Conduct produces a moral resultant—value or disvalue—which cannot be mechanically or naturally produced. As against this, the Mahāsāṃghikas seek to affirm that the moral quality of conduct is a deep and persistent quality.

Another discussion on this subject is preserved in the following section and rests over the assertion that conduct is not constantly parallel to or determined by thought. The Commentary adds that this is merely a pendant to the previous discourse. The arguments are also similar.

The Mahāsāṃghikas point out the fundamental role of character, habit and unconscious tendencies in the appraisal of
moral conduct. All these factors, called saṁskāra (= vāsanā) in Brahmanical thought, (e.g. Yogasutras or Vaiṣeṣika) are recognized there as unconscious. Unlike the quick freedom of conscious will, conduct has an inertial force or habit which is essential for the realization of virtue. To think of sila as acetasika is to stress the other side of the truth that kamma is cetanā (which is acetasika). The later concept of avijñapti may be compared with the Mahāsāṃghika concept, for avijñapti is at once moral and non-mental.

**ACTS OF INTIMATION AS MORAL**

Next we have a discussion on the tenet that acts of intimation are moral acts. Buddhaghosa observes in his Commentary that:

Some like the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sammatiyas, thinking that bodily intimation is karma of deed, vocal intimation is karma of speech, believe that such acts have a moral quality. But intimation as gesture or speech is a material matter, while morality or virtuous conduct is not so, but is a deliberate, i.e., mental act of abstinence.

The Theravādins seem to interpret this thesis to mean ‘All Sila is Viññatti’. The plain meaning, however, is ‘All Viññatti is Sila’, i.e., ‘all vocal and physical gestures intimating moral resolve is itself a form of moral conduct’. This latter assertion has a plain rationale. The Brahmanical tradition held that action is threefold—mental, vocal and physical. The Mahāsāṃghikas seek to restore to ‘speech’ and bodily action the status of moral action universally. The orthodox view treats them, when ‘gestures,’ as merely physical facts. A consequence of the present thesis is drawn in VIII. 9. Since viññatti is moral or immoral and it is material (rūpa), it follows that matter can be good (kusala) or bad (akusala). Elsewhere, even the speech of actions of the Ariya are said to be material. This is also a thesis of connected import.

**ACTS OF NON-INTIMATION AS IMMORAL**

In consonance with this, it was quite natural to hold that acts not intimating a moral purpose are immoral. However, this latter proposition was maintained only by the Mahāsāṃghikas
and not by the Sammatiyyas as Buddhaghosa informs us in his Commentary.\textsuperscript{105}

The Theravādins argue whether the proponents affirm that the conduct which is immoral such as taking life, theft, etc., are so many modes of non-intimation. Since the proponents deny, therefore, they are intimative, and some immoral acts are hence intimative of moral purpose. Further, if anyone giving in charity has resolved on some evil deed, do his merit and demerit grow thereby? If the proponents assent, they are involved thereby in an anomaly where, good and bad, low and high states of mind should be simultaneously present, whereas the fact is that they are as far apart as earth and sky.\textsuperscript{106}

However, the proponents point out that when an evil deed has been resolved, as the Theravādins themselves admit, it is right to say that acts non-intimative of a moral thought behind them are immoral. Buddhaghosa has remarked that this view of the Mahāsāṃghikas is based on the idea of a possible accumulation of demerit in the past, and on the fact that moral precepts may be broken at the dictates of another.\textsuperscript{107}

THE ‘LATENT BIAS’ (ANUSAYA)

The Kathāvatthu also preserves debates on a significant problem, viz., ‘latent bias’ or anusaya.\textsuperscript{108} According to Buddhaghosa, the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sammatiyyas\textsuperscript{109} affirmed that the anusayas are abyākata (indeterminate), acetasika (i.e., without mental object) and ahetuka (i.e., without moral or immoral motive).\textsuperscript{110}

The Theravāda objections against the anusaya being abyākata is that in that case anusaya should be identifiable with other morally indeterminate phenomena. As against this, the principal argument to establish the abyākata character of the anusayas is that they can co-exist with moral as well as immoral thoughts. The hetus which govern the conscious thoughts do not determine the anusayas, hence the second assertion of their being ahetuka. The third point of their being acetasika follows directly from the earlier thesis which makes them anārammaṇa. The third thesis is a logical implication of these. Since anusaya is sharply distinguished from conscious thoughts, it has to be distinguished from pariyutthāna. All these theses are contiguous
with the earlier thesis about śīla not being cetasika exclusively. The heterodox schools are really trying to point out the irrationality of the unconscious which tends to make it almost a blind natural tendency. The Theravādins, on the other hand, interpret these primeval impulses as merely the latent side of the psyche which could well become manifest. It is almost as if the Mahāsāṃghikas are speaking of the deep unconscious forever incapable of rising into self-consciousness, though capable of exerting a causal influence. As such, while it has to be reckoned as a relevant factor, it cannot be adjudged moral or immoral. The Theravādins, on the other hand, seem to speak of the sub-conscious.

An interesting debate which has an inner relevance to this one relates to the ethical status of dream-consciousness. The Theravādins consider dream-consciousness as ethically moral or immoral. Since it expresses the process of sub-conscious thought, they consider it practically negligible (abboḥārikā). Thus, for them there is a continuity between dreaming and waking consciousness though there is a sensible difference of degree.

SELF-RESTRAINT

The controversy here rests over the view that self-restraint is positive action, i.e., karma. According to the Commentary, the Mahāsāṃghikas upheld this view. They quote the utterance of the Buddha wherein he said that when one sees an object with the eye he grasps at the general characters thereof and does not grasp at the external appearance, etc. Self-restraint and want of it are, thus, affirmed to be morally effective action, i.e., they amount to overt action or karma. It is, however, volition, proceeding by way of deed, word and thought which gets the name of action of body, speech, and mind, so, if self-restraint be action, that self-restraint proceeding by way of sense-control, would get the name of visual karmas, auditory karmas, etc. This is not warranted by the Suttanta and hence it is inconclusive.

It may be pointed out that the Mahāsāṃghikas assert saṃvarā to be kamma, whereas for the Theravādins, cetanā also is active volition, saṃvarā is restraint of the senses. The
Theravādins seem to regard this restraint as a consequential disposal of the senses and hence not kamma. This thesis may be compared with an earlier one where the sensations are credited with ābhoga.

THE MUTUAL CONSECUITIVENESS OF GOOD AND EVIL

The next disputed thesis is whether right and wrong thoughts can immediately succeed each other. The thesis is attributed to the Mahāsamghikas. According to the orthodox position, in speaking of the right and wrong thoughts, we really mean moment of active aperception called javana in later literature. This active moment has to be preceded by the emergence of a moment of attention later called āvajjana while the earlier term was āvattanā, from the subconscious flow (bhavaṅga). Now, a kusala citta cannot have the same preceding āvajjana as an akusala citta. According to the orthodox position, they have each a different motivation and a different sequence of activation. The Mahāsamghikas, on the other hand, stress the patent fact of experience that one can both like and then dislike the same thing. Here again, it will be seen that as against the psychological subtlety of the Theravādin, there is an appeal to obvious common-sense. This point of view seems to belong to a more primitive age than that of a sophisticated Abhidhamma analysis.

MORAL REFORM AND TIME

Another important discussion in the present context is preserved on the issue that one may extirpate past, future and present corruptions. Buddhaghosa attributes the thesis to some of the Uttarāpathakas.

According to the Theravāda argument, the thesis, by implication, postulates that even that which has ceased may be stopped, and that one can produce the unborn, something that is non-existent. On the other hand, the proponents suggest that if it be wrong to say that one can put away past, future and present corruptions, it means that there is no extirpation of corruptions, and, hence, the thesis stands. According to Buddhaghosa, inasmuch as there is the
possibility of putting away corruptions, it must be admitted that: one can put away the corruptions of past, etc. 126

In the extirpation of the kilesas, the Uttarāpathakas require it to be done for all the three periods of time as if for them kilesas had a reality such as the Sarvāstivādins conceive. Or they simply have in mind that this passion should mean freedom from the influence of passions, past, present and future. The Theravāda conception is subtler philosophically.

KARMAP

It is in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad that we first hear of karman as the determinant of life—as what is left after death and as what serves as the root of fresh life. 127 In the Nikāyas, while at some places, such as, Suttā-Nipāta, karman is described as the principle governing the world, 128 at some other places, karman is merely one of the eight causes of things. 129 Between these two is the usual view that it is the principle which determines the future experiences of pain and pleasure. In iater Brahmanical tradition, karman is supposed to determine jāti, āyus and bhoga. 130 Thus, karman determines vipāka not everything. Karman itself is determined by will (cetanā). 131 Vipāka is ethically neutral (abyākata) while karman may be kusala or akusala or ahyākata. When the karman is ahyākata it is called kirtiyā. On this position, sufficient freedom is preserved alongside responsibility.

In the Kathāvatthu, we have a thesis that all this is determined by kamma. 132 It is attributed to the Rājagirikas and the Siddharthikas. 133 By holding that everything including kamma is due to kamma, this opinion implies absolute fatalism such as is comparable to the Ājivaka doctrine. Special instances of this thesis are XII.3 and 4, which would make sound and sense organs as vipāka. 134 Similar again is the thesis in VII.10, that vipāka itself entails other vipākas. 135 This seems to assert with respect to the future what is asserted in the earlier thesis XVII.3 with respect to the past. 136 In fact, the two are contiguous. If everything is due to karman, everything becomes a vipāka. The same thing is vipāka with respect to the past and a cause (hetu) with respect to the future. In fact taken together these two theses constitute complete determinism.
where there is only a distinction of relative position of the sequence but hardly of any qualitative difference between karman and vipāka. This is hard to distinguish from the Ājivaka position.

The assertion that everything is due to karman has an obvious implication. Is matter or the earth also due to karman? The Andhakas and the Sammatiyas are stated to hold that material qualities are vipāka. They are rebutted by the Theravādins on the ground that matter has no felt qualities such as are essential to vipāka. To the Andhakas is attributed the strange sounding thesis that land is a result of action. They argue that since land serves to fulfil the enjoyment of prosperity (issariya) and sovereignty (adhipacca) it must be a kamma vipāka. The Theravāda criticism appears obvious enough but perhaps the proponents meant something more special by pathavī than the common-sense to which the Theravādins allude.

The Andhakas assert that old age and death are a result of action. Here too they are criticized on the ground that old age and death do not have the subjective nature of vipāka. It is interesting that the Commentary brings up here the causal functioning of the purely physical order (utu).

The notion of antarābhava has been proposed on the ground that if one dies without completing the proper life-span he may have to wait to find the suitable time and occasion for his rebirth. From the Abhidharmakosā we know that in this state such a being was called a gandharva. The Theravādin rejects it on the score that there are only three well-known bhavas and no more.

If the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammatiyas propose a new intermediate bhava the Andhakas propose a sixth gati to account for the asuras. It is clearly in addition to the five gatis mentioned in the early texts—niraya, tirchāna, peta, manussa, deva. In the ancient Brahmanical tradition, Devas and Asuras are essentially of the same class though opposed in tendency. The orthodox Buddhist tradition also does not regard the Asuras as essentially distinct.

The Mahāsamghikas maintain that all karman leads to vipāka. This is a denial of any abyākata kamma a kiriyā. The implications of this unorthodox thesis are specially hard
in the context of the actions of those who are emancipated—will they be bound further by continuing to act? The Mahā-
samghikas, thus, if they maintain this thesis, must distinguish
the actions of common men from those of Buddhas and Bodhi-
sattvas.

Another variety of fatalism appears in another thesis where
it is held that all karmas are inflexible,\textsuperscript{149} that is to say, the
karmas which cause the experiences of the present life, those
which would underlie the next life, and those which would be
experienced in later life are all distinctly fixed. The Theravādin
is able to rightly point out that in such a case the first and the
second would have to belong to the sammatta or micchatta
niyāma.\textsuperscript{150} This shows that the thesis is an unorthodox fatalism,
which is not clear about the source from which it derives the
fixity of the karmas.

It is also asserted that while kamma is one thing, its upacaya
another.\textsuperscript{161} Upacaya normally means accumulation, but here
it seems to mean continuation. The Andhakas and the Samma-
tīyas to whom the thesis is attributed appear to hold that the
persistence of karmic energy for its due result has to be disting-
ished from the kamma itself. In contrast with kamma the upa-
caya is cittavippayukta, abhyākata and anārammana.\textsuperscript{151} This con-
cept may be compared with the concept of adṛśta which, accor-
ding to the Mīmāṃsā, mediates between action and its result.\textsuperscript{153}
In Jainism also, the future operation of actions is explained on
the basis of karma understood as an insentient and persistent
entity.\textsuperscript{154} The thesis in question thus arises from the attempt
to explain the modus operandi of action when it operates at a
distance in time. The action as a mental function is moment-
tary and ceases. Its effect is produced at a future date.
To connect the vanished cause with the unborn effect, the pre-
sent thesis appears to postulate a distinct fact of persistence,
some kind of a cause which survives the moment of act of
volition. From the orthodox point of view, however, this
would be a misunderstanding of the causal law which does
not really require persistent causes. Karman and its upacaya
thus need not be distinguished, nor the doctrine of momentari-
ness impugned.

In relation to karman, the prevailing assumption of the Thera-
vādins is that every individual is himself responsible for his
own happiness and unhappiness, even though this contains the principles of moral responsibility as well as the idea of a man being ultimately the captain of his destiny. It has apparently an isolating effect on individual destiny. It is not possible for any one to be really and directly the cause of happiness or unhappiness for another. It is interesting, therefore, to read that according to the Hetuvādins it is possible for one to bestow happiness on another.\textsuperscript{155}

Hell and heaven constitute inevitable appendages to the theory of karman and there are a couple of interesting debates on the subject in the Kathāvatthu.

There is a controversy whether niraya has real guards or only karmas in the shape of gods\textsuperscript{156} which latter is the Andhaka position. This seems to be in keeping with the later Vijñānavāda position.

Another debate discusses seriously whether the animals like erāvana mentioned among the devas may not be animals reborn there.\textsuperscript{157} The Theravādins ask with equal seriousness if along with the elephants and horses one may not also find in heaven\textsuperscript{158} stables, fodders, trainers, etc.
REFERENCES

2. Ibid., p. xviiif.
3. The study of Abhidhamma is said to bring about unending joy and serenity, cf. Aṭṭhasālinī, p. 11.
5. Buddhist Psychological Ethics, p. xvii.
6. See E. Conze, Buddhist Thought, p. 29.
7. Cf. Kathāvatthu, II. 7; III. 11-12; IX, 6-7; X. 1; XXII. 10, etc.
8. Cf. ibid., IX. 4; XI. 1; XIV. 5.
10. Cf. ibid., VII. 7-8; XII. 1-2; XVI. 8, etc.
13. See Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 196.
30. The text preserves this discussion under the caption 'Cessation' or Nirodha, but the heading we have given to it seems to be better warranted by the content as well as the remarks of the commentator.
33. See Debates Commentary, p. 150; Cf. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 122.
34. It is the sense of the continuity of subjective life which made W. James use the phrase 'streams of consciousness' see W. James, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 239.
35. Cakkhuviññānassa anantarā sataviññānaṁ uppajjatīti, Kathāvatthu, XIV. 3.
37. See Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, p. 86.
42. Ibid., loc. cit.
43. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 457-9.
44. ‘Sabbe saṁkahāra aniccā ti’, cf. Majjhima Nikāya, I, pp. 236, 280; see also Âṭṭhasaṅgī, p. 33.
45. Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā, p. 159.
47. Cf. supra, Chapter IV.
48. Cf. Abhidhammakośa, V, 254; Masuda, op. cit., pp. 19-20; among the Mahāsaṁghikas and connected sects like the Andhakas, an idealistic tendency is clear, e.g., Kathāvatthu, I. 9 and VII. 5-8.
49. Cf. e.g., Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, pp. 64ff.
52. Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā, pp. 94-95.
53. N’atthi cetasiko dhammo ti, Kathāvatthu, VII. 3.
55. Cetasiko dhammo dānan ti, Kathāvatthu, VII. 4.
57. ‘Pañcane, Bhikkhave, Kāmagnā...etc.’, cf. Majjhima Nikāya, I, p. 119.
58. Pañc’eva kāmagnā kāmādāhāti ti, Kathāvatthu, VIII. 3.
62. Dhammatānāhā abyākarāti ti, Kathāvatthu, XIII. 9; see also Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā, p. 146.
63. Dhammatānāhā na dukkhasamudayo ti, Kathāvatthu, XIII. 10; see also Kathāvatthu-Âṭṭhakathā, p. 146.
64. Atthi asātāro pa, Kathāvatthu, XIII. 8.
69. Cf. Majjhima Nikāya, Mahāvedīlasuttanta; Dham nasāṅgāyi, p. 22; see also C.A.F. Rhys Davids, The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism, pp. 317ff.

70. Ākāso sanidassano ti, Kathāvatthu, VI. 7.

71. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 292-3.


73. See Points of Controversy, p. 193n.


75. Pathaviḥātu sanidassanāti, Kathāvatthu, VI. 8.


80. Ānisamadasassayissa sannivajjanaṁ pahānaṁ ti, Kathāvatthu, IX. 1.


84. Cf. Bhādayate ṛddaya granthiḥ ... tasmādriṣṭe parāvare, Mundaka Upaniṣad, II. 28; cf. Kṣtha Upaniṣad, II. 6.15.


86. Kathāvatthu-Atṭhakathā, p. 126.

87. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 377-8.


92. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 373-4.

93. See ibid., p. 375; Vībhanga, (PTS), 307.


96. Silāṁ na cittiṃparivattiti, Kathāvatthu, X. 8.


106. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 384-5.


108. See Dīgha Nikāya, III, p. 195; Visuddhimagga, Pt. II. Visuddhimagga Dipikā, pp. 61. 136-7; P.V. Bapat, Vinuttimagga and Visuddhimagga,
110. See Anusayā abyākatā ti, Kathāvatthu, XI. 1; cf. Anusayā anāraṃmaṇāti, ibid., IX. 4; Añño kāmarāgānusayo aññaṃ kāmarāgapariyuṭṭhānanaṃ ti, ibid., XIV. 5.
111. See supra.
112. Cf. Kathāvatthu, XV. 5 which presents a parallel thesis of the Hetuvādins that the āsavas are anāsavas.
115. Sānvaro kammaṇaṃ ti, Kathāvatthu, XII. 1.
119. Pañca viññāṇā sābhogatt, Kathāvatthu, X. 5.
120. Akoṣaṃalāvānaṃ pāṭisandahati kusalamālon ti, Kathāvatthu, XIV. 1.
121. Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 147.
125. See Kathāvatthu, pp. 496-7.
129. Milindapañha, p. 137f.
130. Cf. 'Satimude tadvipāko jātyāurbhogā', Yogasūtras, II. 13.
132. Sābanī idāṃ kammoti, Kathāvatthu, XVII. 3.
134. Sadho vipāko ti, Kathāvatthu, XII. 3; Cakkhāyatanaṃ vipāko ti, ibid., XIV. 2.
135. Vipāko vipākadhammaṇadhanno ti, ibid., VII. 10.
136. Sābanī idāṃ kammato ti, ibid., XVII. 3.
137. Rupāṃ vipāko ti, ibid., XVI. 8.
140. Cf. 'Manusya vata prthivi... etc. Arthasastra, VII. 11. The Andhaka thesis in question may be an early idea of human control over the resources of nature.
141. Jarāmaraṇaṃ vipāko ti, Kathāvatthu, VII. 8; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 101-2.
143. Atthi antarābhavo ti, Kathāvatthu, VIII. 2; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 106-7.
144. Abhidharmakośa.
146. Cha gatto ti, Kathāvatthu, VIII. 1; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, p. 105.
147. See e.g., Dīgha Nikāya, III, p. 182; cf. J.R. Haldar, Early Buddhist Mythology, pp. 21ff, 139ff.

148. Sabaṁ kammaṁ savipākan ti, Kathāvatthu, XII.2; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 135-6.

149. Sabbe kammā niyatā ti, Kathāvatthu, XXI.8.


151. Aṭṭhaṁ kammaṁ añño kammuṇḍacayo ti, Kathāvatthu, XV.11.


156. N'atthi nirayasu nirayapāla ti, Kathāvatthu, XX.3; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 184-5.

157. Atthi devesu tiracchānagatā ti, Kathāvatthu, XX.4; see also Kathāvatthu-Āṭṭhakathā, pp. 185-6.

158. Cf. J.R. Haldar, op. cit., pp. 21ff; N.Dutt, Buddhist Sects in India.
Bibliography

*Note: (i) Only such works are listed in the Bibliography which have been referred to in the preceding pages.
(ii) For the Pāli Tripitaka Nālandā-Devanāgarī Pāli Series edited by J. Kashyap and published by the Nava- Nālandā-Mahāvihāra, Nālandā has been utilised, except where stated otherwise.
(iii) Wherever different editions of the same work are used the relevant edition is specified in the footnote.

ORIGINAL SOURCES—TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS


Bhagavadgītā, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.


Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.


Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Gita Press Gorakhpur.


Devī-Bhāgavata-Purāṇa, ed., Shri Ram Sharma.


Dhammapada-Atthakathā, PTS, ed.


Bibliography


_Iṣa Upaniṣad_, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.


_I-isin̄ga_, _A Record of the Buddhist Reiligion as practised in India and the Malaya Archipelago_, Eng. tr. by J. Takakusu, Reprint, Delhi, 1961.


_Kāṭha Upaniṣad_, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.


_Kauśitaki Upaniṣad_, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.

_Kena Upaniṣad_, Gita Press Gorakhpur.


_Laṅkāvatārasūtra_, ed., B. Nanjio, Kyoto, 1923. Also ed.,
Mahābhārata, A critical edition of the Mahābhārata.
Poona.
Mahābodhiśa, PTS, ed.
Petersburg, 1911.
Mahāyāna Sūtārahāmkāra, ed., S. Levi, Paris, 1907
Māṇḍakya-Upanisad, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.
Munḍaka Upaniṣad, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.
Bibliography


Praśna Upaniṣad, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.


Śāṅkara—Bhagavadgītā Bhāṣyaṁ, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.


Si-yu-ki or Buddhisi Record of the Western World by Hiuen Tsang, Eng. tr. by S. Beal, 4 Pts., Reprint, Calcutta, 1957.


Śvetāvatara Upaniṣad, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.
Taittirīya Upaniṣad, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.
Tarkjvāla of Bhāvanīvēka, Notices of Palm leaf MSS, discovered in Tibet by Rahul Sankrityayana in JBORS, Vol. XXIII, Pt. I.
Tūrānātha, Geschichte des Buddhismus, German tr. by Schiefsner, St. Petersburg, 1869.
Therīgāthā Commentary, PTS, ed.
The Travels of Fa-hien (399-414 A.D.) or Record of the Buddhist Kingdom, Eng. tr. by H.A. Giles, Cambridge, 1923.
Udāna Commentary, PTS, ed.
Vedāntasūtras, with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya, Eng. tr. by G. Thibaut, SBE, Vols. 34, 38, London, 1890, 1896.
Vijñānakāyā, Nanjio's Catalogue, No. 1281, tr. in Etudes Asiatiques, 1925.
Visuddhimagga, ed., Dharmanand Kosambi, Bharetiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1940.
Yogasūtras of Patañjali, Gita Press, Gorakhpur.

MODERN WORKS

Agarwal, V.S. India as Known to Pāṇini, Lucknow, 1953.
Bibliography


Anešaki, M. 'Buddhist Docetism', *ERE*, Vol. IV.


Bapat, P.V. (ed.) *2500 Years of Buddhism*, Publication Division, Delhi, 1956, Reprint, 1959.

---, *Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga, A Comparative Study*, Poona, 1937.


Barua, B.M. *A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1921.

---, *Asoka and His Inscriptions*, Calcutta, 1946.


---, *Lectures on Ancient Indian Numismatics*, Calcutta, 1921.


Bhattacarya, V. *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, University of Calcutta, 1934.


Cross Currents in Early Buddhism:

Coomaraswamy, A.K., Hinduism and Buddhism, the Philosophical Library, New York.
Cultural Heritage of India, Ramkrishan Mission Institute, Calcutta, 1937, 1957, etc.
Demièville, Paul L'origine des Sectes Bouddhiques d'après Paramârtha, Bruxelles, 1932.
Dube, S.N. 'Religious Conviction of Asoka', University of Rajasthan Studies (History), Jaipur, 1965-66.
———, Early Monastic Buddhism, 2 Vols., Calcutta, 1941-45.


———, *Introduction to the History of Early Buddhist Schools*, in *Sir Ashutosh Silver Jubilee Volume, III*.

Kosambi, Dharmanand *Visuddhimagga dipikā*, Sarnath, 1943.


Law, B.C. *India as Described in Early Texts of Buddhism and Jainism*, London, 1941.

———, *Historical Gleanings*, Calcutta, 1922.


Masuda, J. ‘Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools’, *Asia Major* II 1925 pp. 1-78.


Oldenberg, H. *Buddha*, Eng. tr. by Hoey, Calcutta, 1927.


———, 'Philosophy' (Buddhist) *ERE*, Vol. VIII.

———, 'Buddhology,' *ERE*, Vol. VIII.

———, 'Nirvāṇa,' *ERE*, Vol. IX.

———, 'Councils', *ERE*, Vol. IV.


———, 'The Five Points of Mahādeva,' *JBAS*, 1910, pp. 414ff.


———, 'Uposatha' *Journal of Buddhist India*, 1927.

Radhakrishnan, S. *Indian Philosophy*, 2 Vols., Reprint, 1951.


Rhys Davids, C.A.F. *What was the Original Gospel in Buddhism*, London.


———, *Buddhist India*, Calcutta, 1957.


———, 'Sects' (Buddhist) *ERE*, Vol. XI.


Rosenberg, O. *Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie*, 1924.
Sogen, Y. *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, Calcutta, 1912.

Walleser, Max *Die Secten des alten Buddhismus*, Heidelberg, 1921.

Warder, A.K. *Indian Buddhism*, Delhi, 1970.


Welbon Guy Richard *The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and its Western Interpretations*, University of Chicago, 1968.


———, *Some Problems of Indian Literature*, Calcutta, 1925.

**DICTIONARIES, ENCYCLOPAEDIAS, FELICITATION AND COMMEMORATION VOLUMES AND JOURNALS**


*Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume.*

*M.M. Ganganatha Jha Commemoration Volume.*


*Asia Major.*

*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, St. Petersburg.

*Bibliothèque du Musèon*, Louvain.


*Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R.*

*East and West*, Rome.

*Epigraphia Indica*, Delhi.

*Indian Antiquity*, Bombay.

*Indian Archaeology, A Review*, Delhi.
Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.

Jīñāsā, A Journal of the History of Ideas and Culture, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
Journal of Buddhist India.
Journal of the Astatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta.
Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Asiatic Society, Bombay.
Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta.

Sir Ashutosh Silver Jubilee Volume.
The Ceylon Historical Journal, Ceylon.
University of Rajasthan Studies (History), Jaipur.
Vishwabharati Annals, Santiniketana.
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
Index

a-hetu-jana, 294
a-katañ, 293
a-prêpi, 277
abbotrikā, 332
abhava, 296, 326
Abhayagiri, 73, 75
Abhayagirivasi, 73
Abhayagirivasiim, 6, 51, 59, 73
Abhiccasaam uppamika, 14
Abhidhamma, 19, 42, 50, 318, 319, 333; Abhidhamma Pitaka, 1; treatises, 3; works, 1
Abhidhammi, 279
Abhidhammikas, 22
Abhidharma, 22, 61, 69, 80, 189, 233, 252, 253, 275, 279, 298; Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāsālun, 51; Abhidharma Pitaka, 78; Abhidharmama-Vijnānakāyapāda, 252
Abhidharmakośa, 71, 72, 92, 97, 113, 131, 134, 141, 166, 245, 250, 264, 270, 271, 278, 335
Abhidharma pitaka, 68
Abhidhammic psychology, 329
Abhidharmika, 245, 280, 324
Abhidharmist (s), 253, 297
abhinnimitto, 137, 139
abhinnimittojina, 133
abhīti (s), 142, 190
abhisamaya, 190
abhoga, 333
abrahamacarya, 97
Absolute, 64, 298
abyākata, 294, 309, 325, 331, 334, 336
abyākata kamma, 335
acariya, 37, 38
acaryakula, 37
ācariyavāda, 37, 38
ācetasika, 330, 331
ādhutamah, 293
addhayoga (s), 212
ādhiṣṭhānīkā paddhi, 140
adhīpacca, 335
adosa, 290
ādṛśta, 336
Āgamas, 152
āgatāṅgata Cātud disa Bhikkhu
Samgha, 218, 220
agisalā, 212
āhāra, 178
Āharana, 29
āhāram, 244
ahetuka, 331
aho-dukkhan ti, 176
aho vata dukkhan, 178
Ahoganga, 49
āhuveyya, 200
Ajita, Elder, 49
Ājīvakas, 210, 334, 335
ajjhājīva and adhit-pātimokkha, 42
ajjhārata, 252
akāruñika, 134
Ākasa, 305, 312, 326
ākāsa anātanidassano, 326
akīncanath, 297
akānuyatana-Samādhī, 177
Akkīvadins, 15
akusala, 106, 262, 330, 334
Alara Kalama, 167
Index 359

Aalavaka, 160
Alaya Vijñāna, 322
.alloha, 290
Amarāvati, 56, 65, 74
amata, 289
.amatapada, 295
Ambrosial, 289, 295
Anāgāmi, 95, 192, 269
Anāgami byāpannacitto, 269
Anāgata, 246, 263, 268, 269, 274
Anāgata Khandhas, 269
Anāgatabhava, 263, 268
Anagatam ajatam abhutam, 265
Anāgatam rūpaṃ, 266
Anāgataññāña, 269
Ananda, 18, 22, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 132, 160, 181, 215, 218
anantarapaccayakathā, 322
anantariyakamma, 162
anantariyas, 207
Anathapindaka, 215
anārammana, 331, 336
anāśrava, 151: anāśrava dhammas, 134, 137; anāśrava rūpa, 137
anāsava, 105
anatarābha, 248
Anathapindaka, 212, 216
anatilītabhājana, 201
anātma, 275
anātman, 126
Anatta, 17, 178, 231, 252, 253, 254, 262, 291, 292
.anavapādika, 248
Andhra, 64, 65, 66, 74, 78
Andhrakas, 60, 65
Anena, 108
Anīga, 178
Anūgulimāla, 182
Anūguttara Nikāya, 38, 96
Anicca, 17, 253, 261
Anidassanaṃ, 293
animitta, 291
anīṭṭha-sūtra, 126
anitya, 275
anityatā, 126, 181, 182, 231
Anityatānīrodha, 309
anjalikaranīya, 200
aṇṇamañña, 280
aṇṇāna, 100, 102
Aṇṇākondaṇṇā, 210
Annihilationism, 231, 236
anadhikāvāsakulā, 63
Antanantika, 14
antarābhava, 335
antarābhavapudgala, 239
antarāvutta, 207
antaravāko, 156
Ānvikṣoki, 25
anuloma, 28
anupaladhi, 245
anuppāda, 300
anuppādaya, 309
Anuruddha, 42
Anuruddha-Samyutta, 127
Anuruddhacariya, 243, 294
anusaya (s), 100, 101, 276, 319, 331
anutpāda-prajñā, 123
anutpādajñāna, 91, 141
Anuyoga, 29
Anyonyathāvpa, 264
apanihita, 291
aparānta, 15, 68
Aparasaila (s), 57, 58, 59, 65-66, 74, 98, 156, 157, 158
Aparaselikas, 56
Aparaseliya (s), 56, 74, 78, 79, 92, 98, 161, 162, 319, 322
aparinipphanna, 279
Apatinsaññānīrodha, 290, 291
apekṣaya, 264
appaccaya, 237
appanāna, 294, 309
appavatti, 304
Aparākṛta sattva, 137
Apratisankhyānirodha, 291, 309
Apratīṣṭhita Nirvāna, 328
Arhat (ś) (hood) (ship) (Arhat), 50, 51, 52, 53, 64, 67, 68, 75, 80, 90-113, 120, 122, 125, 128, 151, 159, 166, 167, 174, 179, 180, 182, 185, 186, 187, 191, 192, 210, 217, 217, 252, 269, 309; and untimely death, 107; bogus Arhants, 108; Consciousness of, at death, 108; defilement of, 97-100; emancipation of, 103-4; excelled by others, 102-3; fallibility of, 93-97
Arhatghātaka (ś) 107, 125
Ārhatta, 107, 109
Arahatamagga, 106
Arahatapala, 105
ārāmaś, 212
ārammano, 294
ārammano paceaya, 280
ārammānato, 323
Arthakārśāpana, 48
Arhat, 90
Ariṣṭa, 44
Āriya, 330; Ariya puggalas, 95
ariyadhamma, 306
ariyamagga, 162, 164, 279
ariyamaggaśa vipākacittam, 306
Āriyan: Ariyan Path, 10, 179, 180; Ariyan way, 182; Ariyans, 95, 128, 137, 282
ariyarūpa, 282
Arthasāstra of Kautilya, 25
Ārupa (Āruppas), 95, 105, 180, 298, 303, 310, 312
Ariyā Jīhānaś, 307
Ariyā-loka, 111, 320
ariyaphūtto, 185, 281
ariyaphūtta, 185, 325
Ārya-Mahāsāṃghika, 59
Ārya-Mūla-Sarvastivāda, 59
Ārya-Sammatiya, 59, 245
Ārya-Thavira, 59
Āryadhama, 99
āryāṃsāngikatva, 310, 311
Āryasura, 165
asabhāga, 309
asādhāraṇa, 309
asamayavimutta, 95
asānakha (ś), 80, 237, 241, 251,
279, 306, 310, 311
asānakhaṇī, 187
asānikṣātra, 66, 243, 246, 291, 299,
300, 306, 309, 312
asānikṣātra dharma, 311
asānikṣātra śāraṇāgaphala, 306
asaṅcarita, 207
Asaṅga, 166
asānakhaṭa, 302, 309
asānakhaṭadhātu, 294, 309
asāṅkuṭāhā, 189
asāṭarāga, 325
āśava (ś), 99, 101, 105, 127
āśavakkaṇha, 99
āścaryā, 293
āśeṇaṃ paccayata, 280
Asoka, King, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 23, 24,
69, 50, 51, 54, 73, 78, 154, 229,
Asokan inscription, 6
Asokarama, 4
āśramas, 209
aśravas, 168
aśritya, 246
assāda, 188
assādeśī, 188
Assaji, 210, 218
Assurance, 160-161, 162, 164, 166,
167, 181-82, 207, 298, 299, 311,
312
'Assured', 162
Asuras, 335
Asvalāyana, Kausalya, 25
Asymmetry, 9
attirekalābha, 212
attīrītābīhohana, 201
attīta, 246, 268, 269
attīta byāpāda, 269
attītabhāva, 268
attītaṃ niruddhahāṃ vigattam, 265
attītaṃ riṣaṇī, 266
attītaṇīna, 269
Ātman, 11, 12, 243, 244, 252, 254, 275
Ātma-vāda, 25
Index

bālaputhujjana, 125
Bāmiyān, 75, 78
Banaras, 19, 126, 131
Bareau, A., 37, 38, 58, 60, 64, 68, 71, 74, 272
Bedali, 71
Belatthiputta Saṅjaya, 14, 15
Bhādāyānīkas, 56
Bhaddiya, 210
Bhadrayanika(s), 8, 57, 68, 104
Bhadrayārīya, 56, 57, 58, 60, 67, 230
Bhagavatārītā, 104, 143, 154
Bhāgavata, 154; Bhagavatas, 143
bhakti, 154, 155; bhakti cults, 80
Bhandarkar, Dr., 5
bhāṅga, 320
bhāṅgāna, 213
bhāra, 247
Bharadvaja, Sukesā, 25
bhūrāhāra, 247
Bhūrāharāsitra, 232, 247
Bharhut, 216
bhassarāmaṇa, 96
bhāva, 245, 263, 264, 335
Bhāvaṇīga, 322, 333
Bhāvānītāvī, 263
bhāvāntīya, 244
bhāvītattā, 252
Bhāvya, 7, 8, 40, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 65, 68, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 92, 93, 98, 100, 102, 110, 123, 125, 126, 141, 142, 143, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 244, 270, 310
Bhāvaviveka, 67
Bhikkhu(s), 96, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 230, 329; Bhikkhu Saṅgha, 218; Bhikkunī(s), 214, 215, 217
bhinnakāla, 246
bhogu, 334
bhūmis, 141, 167, 168
bhujjati, 201
Bihar, 124
bija, 277
Bimbisāra, 133, 213, 220
Bindu, 137
bodhi, 91, 103, 113, 129, 130, 131, 162, 165, bodhi tree, 131, 160

Bāhmānical systems, 254
Bāhuṣrutika, 57
Bāhuṣrutiya(s), 58, 59, 60, 64, 126; Bāhuṣrutiya-Vidhāyavādins, 64
Bāhusuttikas, 55
bala(s), 133, 205, 325

attā, 252
attabhāva, 252
attadīpa, 292
attairtha, 242
Attainment (paṭṭi), 306, 307, 311
attasaranī, 292
Āṭṭhaka vagga, 18
āṭṭhakakāthā (s), 4, 10
Āṭṭhama-ko, 185
āṭṭhaṅgikamagga, 180
Āṭṭhavargīva sūtra, 18
āṭṭhi puggalo āṭṭhātāya paṭṭipanno, 236, 237
Aung, S. Z., 124
Avajjāna, 333
avakata, 232, 246
Avantaka, 58, 59, 68
Avanti, 48, 49, 54, 68, 69, 78
Avantidakkhaṇīpatthā, 212
āvarana, 141
āvasthā, 264
Avasthāṅyathātva, 263, 264
Avataṁsaka, 61
Avatārā, 80, 143
Avatārvada, 25
āvātāna, 333
Avidita, 12
avidya, 190, 280, 328
avijjā, 102, 243, 328
avijñapti, 330
avindījaṭhadhammo, 182
avirakta, 263
avittaka, 188
avosa, 214
avayakta, 234, 262, 296
avāyikta, 252
āvataña(s), 236, 239, 244, 251, 269, 270, 325
ayogam, 266
ayogantikatva, 265
āyus(s), 133, 136, 334

Bāhmānical systems, 254
Bāhuṣrutika, 57
Bāhuṣrutiya(s), 58, 59, 60, 64, 126; Bāhuṣrutiya-Vidhāyavādins, 64
Bāhusuttikas, 55
bala(s), 133, 205, 325
Cross Currents in Early Buddhism

- bodhicitta, 161, 164, 166
- Bodhisattva(s), 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 208, 213, 236; and his characteristic marks, 158-59; assurance (niyama) of, 160-161; self-governed destiny of, 155-158; ideal of, 151-168
- Bodhisattvahood, 153, 154, 155
- Bodhisattva Pitaka, 72
- bojjhaha, 206
- Brahmacarya, 12, 209
- brahmacariya, 162, 164
- Brahmaloka, 181
- Brahman, 12, 25
- Brähmana(s), 11, 15, 16, 210, 262; of Kuru, 26; of Pancala, 26
- Brahmanical: Sanyāsins, 219; sects, 233; thought, 104, 107, 320, 330; tradition, 330, 334, 335; works, 302
- Brähmins, 213
- Brāhmya, 11
- Byhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, 11, 12, 13, 26, 203, 334
- Buxton, 48
- Buddha, 112
- Buddha, Dipankara, 153
- Buddha, Kassapa, 160, 161, 163, 166
- Buddha, I ord., 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 50, 52, 61, 64, 66, 67, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 90, 91, 93, 96, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 110, 112, 113, 151, 152, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 174, 175, 176, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 187, 191, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 232, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 242, 247, 248, 249, 252, 253, 256, 262, 269, 272, 275, 277, 288, 289, 291, 292, 300, 302, 303, 310, 320, 323, 324, 327, 329, 332; and his enlightenment (bodhi) 129-130; and pity, 134-135; apotheosis of the, 120-144; appearance in the human world, 130-131; disciples of, 21; distinctiveness of, 135; gifts to the, and their reward, 130; gospel of, 16, 80; nirvana of 70, 71; powers of, 127-129; super normal powers (Iddii) of, 133-134; teaching of the norm, 132-33
- Buddha monastic systems, 209
- Buddhadeva, Bhadanta, 264
- Buddhapalita, 112
- Buddhas, 49, 103, 113, 125, 126, 131, 132, 134, 136, 139, 141, 153, 162, 163, 330; distinction among the, 135-136
- Buddhavacana, 47, 175
- Buddhist canon(s), 1, 2, 13, 43, 215-16, 252, 298, 310
- Buddhist Church, 8
- Buddhist Councils: 1st, 21, 22, 43, 46-47, 69, 77; 2nd, 47, 48, 53, 54, 61, 69, 216; 3rd, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 54, 67, 70, 73, 77, 78, 216, 230; 4th, 263
- Buddhist doctetism, 142, 143
- Buddhist doctrines, 23, 37-38, 75, 298
- Buddhist literature, 22
- Buddhist logic, 2
- Buddhist monastic establishments, 6
Buddhist monks, 9-10, 143, 214, 220
See also Monks
Buddhist Order, 5, 6, 7, 22, 41, 42, 45, 47, 53, 68, 77, 80, 92, 219
Buddhist philosophy, 138, 318
Buddhist schools, 37-38, 262, 271
Buddhist sects, 2, 7, 20, 25, 37-80, 90, 139, 174, 205, 230, 264-65
Buddhist sūtra, 305
Buddhist suttaśa, 14
Buddhist texts, 190, 279
Buddhist thoughts, 2, 8, 19, 39, 61, 231, 276, 300, 320
Buddhist tradition, 3, 19, 142-144, 166, 167, 168, 308, 335
Buddhology, 132
Buddhu, 40
Budhaghosa See Buddhaghosa
Buddha, 62
Burma, 73, 130

Caitasikas, 325; Caitasika dharma, 253
Caitika(s), 58, 60, 64-65, 66
Caitita, 281
Caityaka(s), 64, 292
Caityas, 65
Caityasāila(s), 65, 156, 157, 158
Cakkavatti Satto, 158
Cakṣus, 128
Cambodia, 73
Canikama, 212
Canikamasaṭṭā, 212
Cankers, 105
Canon, 9, 38, 40, 41, 43, 47, 54, 61, 69, 72, 77, 79, 102, 161, 181, 239, 247, 301, 302; Canonical literature, 40, 112
Cayās, 141
Cātuddisa Bhikkhu Samgha, 218
Cātuddisa Satīgha, 219, 220
Catumaggañāna, 91, 103, 113, 129
Central Asia, 70, 73
Catanā, 202
Cetasika(s), 324, 332
Cetayinā, 202
Cetiya, 55
Ceylon, 60, 69, 73, 75, 78, 79, 218
Ceylonese chronicles, 4, 7, 38, 39, 49, 52
Ceylonese Theravada, 73
Chadantaṭāraka, 156
Chatīrika, 57
Chakravarti, 159
Chalukekhu, 106
Chāndogya Upanisads, 11, 12, 25, 26
Channagarika(s), 56, 60, 67
Chhandiddhipāda, 156
China, 70, Chinese language, 57, 58
Christianity, 17, 22; Christian era, 39; Christians, 137
Cīta, 239, 253, 281, 325; citta
Hattaka, 160; citta-viprayukta sanskaras, 281
Cittacetasīka dharma, 306
Cittakkhana, 320
Cittasamatisamādhi ti, 189
Cittavippayutta, 294, 336
Cittavihī, 329
Cittiddhipāda, 156
Civaras, 213
Cochin-China, 70
Consciousness, 319-322, 324-325
Cosmos, 243
Council of Kāśyapa, 51
Council of Pāṭtīputra, 54
Council of Trent, 7
Council of Vaiśāli, 24, 51, 52, 54
Cuḷavagga, 40, 46, 48
Dakkhinayya, 200
Daksināpatha, 68, 78
Dāna, 12, 202, 203
Dārśāntikas, 71, 72
Davids, C.A.F. Rhys, 40
Davids, Mrs. Rhys, 2, 3, 4, 8, 43, 45, 53, 124, 253, 309, 326
Davids, T.W. Rhys, 38, 39
Dayā, 12
Démieville, 23
Fourth Jhāna, 108
Franke, 46
Frauwaller, 23, 24
Fruit (Phala), 124, 128
Fruition, 201
Fruits (Phalapathī), 111, 200, 208, 306
Fruits of spiritual life (Sāmañña-phala), 305-6
Gāmin, 245
gāna, 210
ganabhōjanā, 201
gandhabhōja, 135
Gāndhakuri Mahāvihara, 49
Gandhāra, 64, 69
gandhāniyana, 206
gandhāri Vidyā, 142
gautavya, 245
Gārgī, 26
Gārgya, Sauryāyani, 25
gatis, 335
Gautami Sākyamuni, 138
Gautamī Mahāprajāpati, 214
Gavāmpati, 47
Gayāsīsa, 45
Ghaṭikāra Sutta, 161
Ghosa, 215
Ghosa, Bhadanta, 263
Ghospilārama, 216
Girnar dialect, 78
Gīta, 25, 154
‘Gnosis’, 91
Gnostic ideas, 138
God, (Bhagavān), 17, 143
Gokulika(s), (Kukkutikas) 8, 22, 55, 57, 59, 62, 63, 97, 278
Gopā (Arahat), 252
Gopinath Kaviraj, M. M. Pandit, 271
Gosala, Makkhali, 14, 15
Gotamaka, 45
Gotiput Kāsāpagota, 76
Grdhrkūta, 19
Greece, 11
Greek Sophists, 13, 26
Guha(s), 212
Gupta Age, 141; Gupta inscription, 68
Kamma, 319, 330, 332, 333
Kamma vipāka, 335
Kammāramātā, 96
Kānū, 238
Kanauj, 70
Kāṇḍāputhāchādī, 213
Kanherī, 67
Kaniṣṭha, 263
Kaśikā, 91, 100
Kaśikā vapayanti sabhā, 102
Kappa, 41, 134, 206
Kappāsikā, 213
Kapila, 104
Kapilavatthu, 214
Kappiya-bhūmi, 213
Kappiya-karaka, 213
Kappiya-kutī, 212
Kāraka, 241
Karle, 67; Cave temples of, 62
Karma, 107, 108, 155, 330, 332, 336, 337
Karmajānaya, 121
Karman, 11, 12, 13, 121, 138, 156
202, 213, 253, 276, 282, 300, 303, 306, 334-37
Karmannaya, 121
Karmic, 108
Kārśāppa, 48
Karunā, 127, 134, 135, 165, 208
Kasapa, Purana, 14, 15, 105
Kashgar, 70
Kashmir, 58, 60, 69, 74, 229
Kāsapa-gotta, 76
Kassapikas, 56, 273, 274
Kasyapa, 24, 51
Kātyāpya(s) 8, 23, 24, 39, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 70, 71, 72, 76, 78
Kāśyapagotra, 76
Katakaraṇīyo, 107
Kathā (s), 1, 2, 3, 4
Katha Upanisad 12, 28
Kathavattthu-Visārada, 10
Kathavatthu, 1-29, 39, 40, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73
74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 107, 108, 109, 123, 124, 130, 132, 133, 124, 143, 151, 152, 154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 168, 174, 175, 176,
178, 180, 185, 188, 200, 202, 204, 206, 207, 208, 220, 229, 230, 231, 250, 270, 271, 272, 278, 279, 280, 281, 288, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 298, 301, 302, 308, 310, 319, 324, 326, 331, 334, 337; compilation of, 2-10; methodology of debate in the, 25, 29
Kathavattthu-Atthakathā, 55, 56, 62, 63, 64, 92, 123, 159
Kathina, 214
Kathopanisad, 25
Kātyāyana, Kabandhi, 25
Kātyāyaniputra 24,
Kaukkalika, 64
Kaukkutika(s), 64, 93, 140, 156, 157
Kausāmbi, 5, 22, 48, 54, 66, 67, 68, 69, 78, 215, 216; dissension at, 42-45
Kāya, 139, 238
Kāye kāyanupassī viharati, 242
Kena Upanisad, 12, 13
Kern, 154
Kesakumbi, Ajita, 14, 15
Kevalam, 293
Kevāṭṭa sutta, 142
Khādati, 201
Khaggavisānasutta, 211
Khondhas, 91, 109, 189, 232, 236, 238,
239, 242, 251, 252, 253, 266, 268,
269, 279
Khalkate, 22
Khankabāvan, 239,
Kharachara, 71
Khomeini, 213
Khotān, 71
Kilesa(s) 127, 187, 306, 334
Kilesakāna, 325
Kilesapahāna, 306, 311
Kilesappatirāpaka, 127
Kilesapahānāni, 306
Kiriya, 108, 207, 324, 335
Klesa(s), 91, 141
Kolamkola, 183
Konkukutika, 60
Kañcana, 44, 216
Koseyyam, 213
Koṭṭhaka, 212
Koucha, 70
Kourukullaka, 60
Kramamukti, 105
Kriyā, 106
Kriyācittā, 108
Kriyāvāda, 15
Kṛṣṇa, 143
Kūta, 245
Kṛṣṭakṛtyah, 107
Kṛṣṇa, 245
Kṣapa, 231
Kṣapika, 251
Kṣayañña, 91
Kṣayarajñā, 123
Kṣetra(s), 141, 153
Kṣiprajñā, 140
Kukkulika, 63
Kukkutārāma, 51, 63,
Kukkukūṭika[s] [Gokulikaas], 58, 59, 62,
63
Kurukullaka, 58, 59, 68
Kusala, 106, 262, 296, 330, 334
Kusalacittā, 107, 333
Kusalākusalā, 282
lakkhāna sacca, 302
lakkhaṇas, 158, 237
laksana(s), 246, 263, 264, 276
Laksanāyathāra, 151, 153, 301
Lamotje, 52
Laṅkāvarā-Sūtra, 166
Laos, 73
Lāta, 62, 70
Laukkika sidhānta, 18
Law, B.C., 74
Liṇāmi, 299
Lilā, 155
lobha, 282
Locke, 320
Lokānukatipako, 134
Lokānuvartana, 141, 152
Lokayata, 25
Lokiya, 175, 189
Lokottara, 123, 125, 126, 137, 140,
141, 151, 165, 175, 189, 191
Lokottara-sasana, 126
Lokottara-yana, 191
Lokottaravāda, 7, 25, 57, 58, 59, 63-
64, 75, 133, 153
Lokottaravādin(s), 60, 63, 64, 93,
135, 140, 141, 144, 152, 156, 157,
303
Lumbini, 131
madhu, 213
Madhu-Piṇḍika-Sutta, 3
Mādhyamā pratipad, 17, 27
Mādhyamikas(s), 18, 19, 27, 61, 230,
234, 243, 244, 251, 301
Madhyāntika, 69
Magadha, 62, 74
magga(s), 42, 124, 128, 179, 192, 208,
209, 220, 306, 311
maggabhāvanā, 184
maggakkha, 192
maggānagga, 101
maggaphala(s), 208, 295
maggavitti, 306
mahābhūtas, 246
Mahācātuyā, 65
Mahādeva, 24, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 60,
76, 92, 93, 94, 97, 102, 175, 178,
179
Mahāgirika, 56
Mahākaccāna, 3
mahākaruṇa, 135, 138, 165
Mahākassapa, 77
Mahākāśyapa, 46, 47
Mahakatyayana, 68
Māhiśottanta, 142
Mahāmāya, 137
Mahānama, 210
Mahāpadmananda, 50, 54
Mahāparinibbānesutta, 218
Mahāparinirvāṇa, 46, 54, 108
mahāpathavi, 240
Maharashtra, 62
Mahāsāṃghika, 51, 52, 53, 54
Mahāsāṃghikas(s), 7, 8, 9, 10, 21, 24,
48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58,
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 70,
72, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 92, 93,
94, 98, 102, 106, 110, 123, 125,
malina-vāsanā-ksaya, 168
mana-indr.ya, 247
manasikāra, 323
manas, 12
maṇḍapa, 212
Maṇjuśrīmūlakalpa, 48
Maññanti, 8
mano, 326
mano-viññāṇa, 190
manomaya, 152
manoviññāṇa, 184
Mantra Schools, 161
manussa, 335
mansuttara, 152
Māra, 98, 111
marana, 241, 276
maranāya, 245
Mārga, 193
mārgāṅgikatva, 306
Masuda, 139, 178
Mathura, 51, 54, 62, 68, 69, 78
Mathurā Lion Capital, 62, 70
mātikā, 322
Māṭikātharas, 22
Matipur, 70
mātugātaka, 125
Māudgalyāyana, 177
Māyādevi, 154
meditation, 176
mettā, 127, 134
micchādiṭṭhi, 265, 266
micchattaniyāna, 161, 162, 163, 164, 182, 183, 336
‘Middle Way’, 17
Miōinda, 212
Mimāṃsā, 336
Mimāṃsakas, 326
Moggallāna, 22, 45, 105, 181
moha, 179, 282
mokṣa, 293
Monastery, 212, 216
monovīṣṇu, 326
nisyandā āya, 139
niñātha, 64, 125, 126
nīva, 246, 311
niñāṇa-sampati, 292
niñāṇa-sampatisampādaka, 292
nīvarṇas, 192
nīvarṇaṁ, 206
Nīyāma, 160-161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 174, 182, 183, 298-99
niyāmatā, s) 164. 312
niyānokkantikathā, 160
niyata 162, 166, 271
niyata, Bodhisattva, 161
niyataśrīvaka, 162
Nivatavāda, 14
niyato sambodhiparāśyano, 95
Norm, 131, 132-33, 158
North Kuru, 184
Nunas, 5
nvānagata, 268
nvāti, 268
Nyaya, 2, 271
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, 327
Nyāya Vārtika, 233

Obhiṇā, 241
Occam’s, Razor, 297
Oḍaiti, 267
Oghaniyain, 206
Oldenberg, 46
Omnicience, 91
Once-Returner, 95
Order, 98, 100, 153, 182, 199, 200, 201, 202, 207, 208, 210, 216, 217, 218

Originists, 14
Orthodox Church, 7

pābajjā, 211
pabhā, 136
Paccanika-nigghaha, 29
Paccatam vedābbbo viññāhi, 293
paceatta, 252
paccekkhāna, 192, 193
paccayahetu, 282
paccayas, 279
paccayata vavatthā, 279
paccuppanna, 268, 269
paccuppanna bhāva, 268
paccuppannam rūpaṁ, 28
paccuppannaṁ añña, 268, 269
paccinaka, 122
Pādakārṣāpaṇa, 48
pahittatta, 252
pahuneyya, 200
Pälātu-Dhērī-Jars, 71
Pālī, 92, 99, 123, 185, 231; Pālī Abbhidhamma, 318, 319; Pālī account, 153; Pālī canon, 22, 109, 110, 218, 220, 231, 295; Pālī commentaries, 38; Pālī school, 220; Pālī texts, 16; Pālī tradition, 5, 20, 48, 67, 73, 138, 141, 157, 165, 301; Pālī Tripitaka, 153; Pālī Vajjiputtaka, 67; Pālī vinaya, 48; Pālī works, 292
paimukulacīvara, 213
pāṅca-viññāna, 190
Pancasikha, 104
pāṅçopādāna-skandhāh, 248
Paññā, 99, 110, 130, 174, 187, 290, 325, 328
paññattis, 55, 238, 271
Paññatti vādins, 55
Paññāvīrutta, s, 99, 102
pāpa, 106
Papacy, system of, 22
Pāpanā, 28
Parahamha-kusala Arahant, 99, 102
parahammamañña, 102
parama sinking, 296
Paramārtha, 29, 62, 64, 65, 72, 190, 200, 236, 245
Paramārtha satya, 19
Paramārtha-sīnyātatsuta, 248
paramārthasatya, 125
parārthavāsanā, 168
Paramārthika siddhānta, 18
parāmaṭṭham, 206
paramaithasa, 235
paramaithena, 232
paramāsa, 166, 167
paramitaś, 166, 167
paramparabhajana, 201
paravīrti, 103
parāvanā, 299
parīpassu, 120
parīthāna, 97
parikkhāracoloka, 213
parināmavāda, 25
parināma-dukkhadā, 278
parinibbāna, 106, 107
parinibbātī, 241
parinnipphanna, 271, 301, 302
parānirvāṇa, 141, 218
parinispamanna, laykāna, 301
parinisphāya, 301
parisuddhi, 214
parisuṭṭhāna, 331
Parivāra, 50, 61
parivēca, 212
Parivrājakas, 13, 121, 209, 213
Parivrājaka gānas, 209
pariyuttāna, 98
parivirēṣānā, 102
pāsāda(s), 212
Pāṭaliputra, 3, 4, 50, 51, 53, 54, 61, 62, 63, 66, 70, 77, 78, 142
Pāth, 8, 16, 43, 51, 95, 101, 104, 111, 124, 125, 128, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180-81, 184, 185, 186, 191, 192, 200, 201, 208, 218, 294, 299, 302, 309, 311, 312, 328; Path of Assurance, 160, 161-62, 163, 166, 181-82; Path of salvation, 178
Pāṭīcchasamuppāda, 261, 279-89, 298, 299, 302
Pāṭikamma, 28
Pāṭilābha, 307
Pāṭimokkha, 213, 214
Pātiṇāda, 29
patipada, 42
patipassaddhi-vimuttis, 193
patissaddhi, 129
patiṣāṁbhidi, 190
Patiṣambhidā, 61
Patiṣambidhamagga, 50
Patiṣāṁkhānirodha, 290
patiṣāṁkhyanūdha, 306
pativaipatīdī, 240
pattā-dhamma-vasena, 180
Pattikāna, 1
Patti, 8
pattidhammo, 180
Pāvā, 48, 49
pavacana, 160
pāvora, 213
Pavāraṇā, 214
Peha, 74
Persistence of Existence, 243
Person, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 238, 240
Personalist monks, 230
Peshawar, 71
petar(s), 205, 335
Phagguna, 269
Phala(s), 124, 128, 179, 180, 192, 193, 209, 220, 241, 306, 311
phalaṇṇa, 193
phalapatti, 182
phalastha, 241
Phāgunasūtra, 248
phānta, 213
phassa, 325
phassika, 325
Pīlindavaccha, 133
Pippalāda, 25
Pitaka(s), 4, 22, 41, 72, 234; 308
Pitāvāna, 11
pitī-passaddhi, 187
pitughātaka, 125
pivati, 201
pokkharaṇi, 212
Poussin, 38, 154, 365
prajñā, 123, 138, 178
Prajñā sūtras, 292
Prajñāpāramitāśastra, 19
prajñāpatiṣut-pudgala, 67
prajñāpati, 245, 246, 247, 249, 264, 297
Prajñāaptivāda, 57, 58, 59
Prajñāapṭivādins, 64
Prakṛtiśaya, 105
Prāna, 12, 324
prāpti, 277, 306, 307
Prasenajit, King, 44
Prasnopanisad, 25
Prātimoksa, 41, 46, 72
Index 373

Pratipāksika siddhānta, 18
Pratīsāmkhyāvīrodha, 291, 306, 309
Pratītyasamutpada, 17, 27, 300, 301, 311
pratītyasamutpāna, 300, 311
pratyeka-Buddhas, 166
pratyutpāna, 246
Pravrtti-Vijñāna, 322
pratyājña, 178
preta, 156
preyas, 12
Proto-Mahāyānic tenets, 7
Prthūdika, 74
Przyluski, 23, 47, 69, 72, 76
Pubba, 56
Pubbacaryā, 128, 158
Pubbaseliya(s), 56, 74, 78, 79, 92, 98, 100, 102, 127, 161, 162, 175, 176, 177, 178, 191, 207, 272, 293, 295, 299, 300, 302, 303, 306, 307, 310, 311, 319, 322, 325, 335
pubbavagga, 128, 158
pubben/vāsañāṇa, 247
Pudgala-nairatmya, 253
Pudgala-viniścaya, 245
Pudgalaparamparā, 240
Pudgalavada, 229-254; classical form of, 232-234
Puggala, 28, 80, 204, 253
Puggalavada, 25
Puggalavadins, 20, 21, 28, 29
Punjab, 74
puṇha, 106, 204
Purāṇa, 47, 69, 77
Puruṣa, 11
purusakāra, 240
Pūrva, 65
Purvāṇa, 15
Purvaśila(s), 57, 58, 59, 60, 65-66, 74, 98, 157, 158, 292
Pushpapura, 49
Pūṣyamitra, 23
puthujjana(s), 124, 181, 182, 207
Pusyamitra, 23
pūtiśāya, 121
puthujjana (s), 124, 181, 182, 207
putimuttakesajjā, 213
rāga, 99, 124, 127, 134, 179, 192, 325
rāgapaṭipāpa, 127
Raiwaka, 25
Rājagaha, 212
Rājagiri, 74
Rājagirika(s), 56, 57, 66, 74, 78, 79, 107, 189, 190, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 324, 334
Rājagṛha, 46, 70
rajeyya, 124
rakta, 263
Real Truth, 293
reductio ad absurdum, 278
Remembrance, 240
Revata of Soreyya, 49
Ropanā, 28
Rosenberg, 270
rūpa-dhātu, 281
Rūpa Jhānas, 307
Rūpa-loka, 111, 284
rūpabha, 267
rūpadhātu, 185, 238
rūpakaṇḍa(s), 123, 133, 139, 140
rūparāga, 185, 325
rūparatā, 308
rūpayān abhāsa bhū-vattādhavanī, 247
sabba-dhammā, 307
sabbadā, 235, 265
subbaumāri, 269
sabbaṁ rūpaṁ, 294, 309
sabbaṇṇautāñña, 91, 102, 103, 113, 129
sabbaṇṇautāñña-dassanāto, 136
sabbattha, 265
Sabbatthivādins, 56, 93, 104, 189
sabbena, 265
sabbesu, 235, 265
sabbītha, 235
sahhāga-hetu, 309
sacchikāṭṭha, 232
sacchikāṭṭhapharamamaṭṭhana, 243
saddhā, 290, 325
Saddharthika, 57
Sadhamma-kusala Arahant, 99, 102
Sadyomukti, 105
sahabhāva, 246
Sahajāti, 49
Śāla Schools, 94, 157, 179, 323
Śaka Kshatrapa Sodasa, 62
Śakadagami, 95, 179
sakkāyādīṭṭhi, 179
Śākya Gautama, 121
Śākyamuni, 45, 163, 252
Śākyan clan, 45
Śājha, 49
Salvation, 298-99
Śamādhi, 110, 130, 142, 174, 175, 178, 187-190, 290, 325
Śamādhirāja, 48
śamāhita, 175, 177
Śamana-Brāhmaṇas, 209
śamananta r pa cayā, 279
śamarasas, 214
śamaṇṇaphala(s), 279, 306, 312
śāmāṇṇaphala assāṅkhāta, 306
Śampatti, 312
śāmāṭhābhīnīvesa, 99
śamayabhedoparamakrama, 55, 58, 63, 64, 68, 69
śamayavicchita, 95, 96, 97
śambhogakāya, 133, 139, 140
Śambhuta Sanavasi, 49
śambodi, 17
śaṅgaṅguārāmatā, 96
Śaṅgha(s), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 41, 42, 48, 51, 54, 72, 76, 98, 102, 103, 153, 199-220
Śaṅghabheda, 40, 207
Śaṅgharājī, 41
saṅjhā, 249, 324
saṅkhāra, 101, 236, 240, 266
saṅkīhata, 237, 241, 151
saṅkīhata dhammas, 279
Saṅkhyā, 25, 254, 262, 272
Saṅkhyā-yoga, 25, 271
saṅkilesikcīn, 206
Saṅkrāntivādins, 56, 67
saṅmāḍīṭṭhi, 265, 266
saṅmappadhāma, 136, 206
saṅmappadhāmaṇato, 135
Saṃmatīyas, 8, 12, 50, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 68, 70, 72, 76, 93, 97, 104, 181, 184, 185, 188, 203, 230, 244, 275, 325, 330, 331, 335, 336;
Saṃmatīya tradition, 55, 63, 70
Saṃmatattā, 162, 336
Saṃmattanīyāṇa, 161, 162, 163, 182, 183
saṃmattanīyāṇatā, 164
Sammitis, 56
Saṃmityā Svāstra, 231
Saṃmityānākhyāvāsāstra, 231
Saṃmityās, 184
sammukha Saṅgha, 220
saṃmuti, 190, 236
saṃmutisaceṅa, 237
saṃprayuktā dhammas, 142, 324
saṃprayuktā, 324
saṃsāra, 15, 120, 208, 233, 249
Saṃskāra(s), 276, 280, 300, 311, 324
saṃskāra-dukkhātā, 278
Saṃskāra skandhas, 324
samkrita, 66, 243, 246, 291, 312
saṃskṛta lakṣanas, 264
samkritadhammas, 300
samuccada-rūmūti, 192, 193
Saṃvara, 332
Saṃvṛti satya, 19, 125
sānyojanas, 192, 328
Sānyukta Āgama, 300
Sānyutta Nikāya, 16, 42, 269, 300;
308
Sānyutta Piṭaka, 51
sānāṭhī, 213
Sanatakumāra, 25
Sanchi, 5, 6, 39, 76
Saṅgha, 91
Saṅghabheda, 45
saṅjīva, 155
saṅkhāra(s), 291, 327
saṅkhāra-khandha, 291, 292
saṅkhata, 308
saṅkhata dhamma lakkhanaṁ, 26E
Index 375

Śāṇkhyān, 264
Śakaṟṇātī, 72
Śakaṟṇāṭikā(s), 57, 58, 71-72
Śaṅkaṟṇāṭivāda, 56, 59, 70
Śaṅkaṟṇāṭivādīn(s), 60, 72
śānā, 101, 190, 236, 266
Sannagarika, 56, 57, 58, 67, 230
saṅhavedayalanirūdra, 189
saṅhojanas, 106
saṅhojanīyaṁ, 206
Sanskrit tradition, 7
śaṅtai, 322
Śaṅtideva, 165
sanyāsa, 104
sappacca, 237
sappi, 213
Saptabhaṅgīnaya, 272
sārammanā, 281, 282
śāraṇa, 299
Śāriparikāpratipadā, 55, 57, 58,
63, 64, 68, 69, 75
Sariputta, 22, 43, 45, 105, 113, 181
śārīra, 136, 234, 238, 243, 248
Sarnath, 5, 68, 70, 109
sarnath-Sanchi-Kausambi edict, 5
Śarvānti, 71, 270, 271, 275, 277
Śarvāntivāda, 23, 24, 25, 56, 57, 58,
59, 60, 61, 68, 69-70, 71, 72, 75,
76, 153, 159, 177, 230, 245, 254,
262, 277, 264, 265, 269, 270, 271,
279, 297, 302, 308; Šarvativada
Canons, 80; Šarvativada school,
263; Šarvativada traditions, 55,
58-59; Šarvativada Vaiśasikas,
71; Šarvativada Vinaya, 48
Śarvativādins, 8, 20, 21, 22, 68, 69,
70, 71, 78, 80, 97, 126, 132, 139,
152, 153, 177, 230, 234, 249, 250,
253, 262, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268,
269, 270, 274, 275, 296, 297, 305,
307, 310, 321, 334
Śāsana, 1, 206, 217
Śāsavaṁ, 206
saṅrava, 140
Śaṣaṭaloka, 156
Saṣaṭavāda, 14, 236, 237, 238, 241,
243
Śaṣṭā, 21, 218
Śāṣvata, 246
Śāti, 44, 325
sattī sampaṭṭāno, 106
satīpanthāna, 136, 206
saṅkāyaśrāṇi, 231
satta, 238
saṭṭakkattūparama, 182
sattā, 98
sattra, 156, 247
Saṅya, 12
Saṇyaśakama, 25
sāyaṁ jñāṇam anentam atmaarupa,
12
sāyaṁ sthitatḥ, 249
Saunders, 154
Saṅtrāntika(s), 22, 57, 58, 60, 71-72,
231, 264, 276, 277, 296, 297, 300
Sāvatthi, 212,
say rūpaṁ sānyatā, 292
sayaṁ bhū, 160
sayaṁ kataṁ param kataṁ sukhadu
kkāṁ, 240
Schayer, 188
Schism, 40, 41, 52, 55, 61, 77; and
second Buddhist Council, 47-48;
Origins, growth of, and influence
of, 40-41
Schismatics, 41, 206-7
Self-restraint, 332-333
Senart, 154, 219
senāsanaṁpāṭhāpa, 212
Set-Mahet Image, 70
setthis, 212
Setu, 104
sevenatthi, 272
sevāṭṭhi, 272
Seven rebirths limit, 182-83
Sialkot, 70
Śāma, 73
Śādhdanta, 18
Śiddhārtha See Buddha
Śiddharthika(s), 66, 74, 78, 79, 107,
201, 202, 203, 205, 324, 334
Śiddhatthas, 56
Śiddhatthika(s), 56, 74, 290, 292
Śīla(s), 110, 130, 174, 178, 328, 330,
332
Simhalese traditional accounts, 2