SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion

XIII
The will of the Rev. Louis H. Jordan provided that the greater part of his estate should be paid over to the School of Oriental and African Studies to be employed for the furtherance of studies in Comparative Religion, to which his life had been devoted. Part of the funds which thus became available was to be used for the endowment of a Louis H. Jordan Lectureship in Comparative Religion. The lecturer is required to deliver a course of six or eight lectures for subsequent publication. The first series of lectures was delivered in 1951.
Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective

On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet

by

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SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
1989
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Foreword

Comparative studies in religion and philosophy have over the years given rise to a number of questions and problems, and the very status and validity of the comparative method in these two fields have indeed often been the object of critical reflection and interrogation. This has been the case in particular where either totally different religious or historically independent philosophical traditions were the matter of comparison, even though the phenomenological method has of course proved to be productive in religious studies.¹

Somewhat less problematical no doubt is religious and philosophical comparison within a single culture and closely related traditions. The specialist in Indian religion and philosophy for example has been accustomed to compare the Brāhmanical/Hindu, Jaina and Indian Buddhist traditions which – whatever their ultimate genetic relationships may be – have clearly followed distinct lines of development. Furthermore, within each of these three traditions, the Indianist has found it meaningful to undertake comparisons between separate currents: e.g., to name only some of the broadest, between Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, Śvetāmbara and Digambara, or Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna. Reference can be made in this connexion to two previous series of the Jordan Lectures, one by Louis Renou (Religions of Ancient India, 1953) and the other by Jan Gonda (Viṣṇuisrn and Śivaism, 1970). One form of comparison at least – a basically historical and textually oriented one – has thus been well-established among

scholars of Indian religions and philosophies for more than a century and a half.

Extensive typological and structural studies in Indian religions and philosophies, or in the traditions of Buddhism, have on the other hand been relatively rare. Scholarly effort has hitherto been concentrated mainly on the necessary philological analysis of the texts, their pericopes and units of tradition, and on tracing historical developments and influences within India; in so doing, however, some practitioners of this historical-philological method have shown strangely little awareness of the presuppositions and pre-judgements with which they were operating, as if in the human sciences historical causality, development and influence were totally transparent and unproblematic things. Equally, the problems in intercultural transmission raised by the spread of Indian thought and civilization northwards and eastwards have attracted only modest attention. And even less work has been done on discovering comparable elements in the different Indian religious and philosophical traditions both within and outside India, i.e. on the task of identifying in terms of what has been termed family resemblances, in polythetic classification, the criss-crossing and sometimes overlapping strands that make up the traditions. Yet, when we consider Buddhism in its various traditions in India, in China and in Tibet (where, in addition to strictly speaking Tibetan constituents, typologically Indic and Sinitic strands are to be identified beside Indian,

2 The notion of family resemblance was made use of in philosophy by L. Wittgenstein in his Philosophical investigations (§ 67), and it has been the subject of further philosophical discussion since R. Bambrough, 'Universals and family resemblances', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 (1960–61), pp. 207–22 (reprinted in: G. Pitcher [ed.], Wittgenstein, the Philosophical Investigations: A collection of critical essays [New York, 1966], pp. 186–204). For comparative purposes in the anthropological study of descent and affinity, this notion has been employed, along with that of 'polythetic' as opposed to 'monothetic' classification, by R. Needham, e.g. in his 'Polythetic classification', Man 10 (1975), pp. 349–69. See also the same author's Belief, language and experience (Oxford, 1972) and Against the tranquility of axioms (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 36–65, with pp. 5–11 of the 'Advertisement’ where Needham writes that 'the denotations of a verbal concept need express no essential idea that is common to all its applications' (p. 9). Traditional 'monothetic' classifications operate with the common-feature definition of a class, i.e. a class defined by the invariable presence of certain common characteristic attributes in each and every individual. By contrast, in a polythetic arrangement or chain no single feature is essential, or sufficient, for membership in the classification in which all the individuals do not share one single characteristic feature. I am indebted to Srinivasa Ayya Srinivasan for calling my attention to this work in social anthropology and for illuminating discussions of it.
Chinese and Central Asian components actually known historically to have been introduced from outside), the question may even arise as to whether the name 'Buddhism' denotes one single entity rather than a classification embracing (more or less polythetically) a very large number of strands held together by family resemblances. In their work Sinologues have been wont to focus above all on what is Chinese, and hence on discontinuities between Chinese and Indian Buddhism; and whereas some Tibetologists have emphasized continuities as well as differences between Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, others have preferred to underscore the discontinuities above all else.

In the following essays an attempt is made to investigate a pair of themes in Buddhist thought by considering, in historical and comparative outline, their treatment in some traditions of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, while referring on occasion also to parallels in non-Buddhist Indian thought (Brahmanism and Jainism) and in Chinese Buddhism. The two themes are, schematically stated, 'nature' and 'nurture' in the twin realms of soteriology and gnoseology, a pair of topics that call for examination in terms of the notions of 'innatism', 'spontaneism' and 'simultaneism' as contrasted with graded acquisition and reinforcement through progressive cultivation. Connected themes are enstatic concentration (gnoseological rather than cataleptic) as against intellectual analysis, ethical and spiritual quietism in contrast to effort, and cataphaticism as opposed to apophaticism. Put in these terms, these notions are of course largely 'etic' ones of Western origin, and they require to be investigated and specified in the light of the rich 'emic' categories belonging to the traditions being considered. Since a full treatment of each of them in Indian and Tibetan thought could easily fill volumes, they can of course only be outlined in these essays. It perhaps needs to be explicitly noted also that, whereas the co-ordinate pair of theory (darśana = lta ba, theòria) and practice (caryā = spyod pa, praxis) underlies much of what is said in our Buddhist sources, praxis has perforce to be considered here more in terms of taxonomies or theories of practice than as spiritual experience and practice per se.³ As for paramārtha and saṃvṛti — ultimate reality and the

³ This specification is made explicit in response to a valuable methodological observation made by Alexander Piatigorsky.
surface level – which are also at the foundation of so much of what is at issue in our sources, they cannot be gone into separately for want of space.

The themes mentioned above will be considered in relation to the hermeneutics of the doctrine of the Buddha-nature – the tathāgatagarbha or germinal ‘Essence’ of the Tathāgata; to Emptiness of the heterogeneous (gžan ston : *parabhāvaśūnyatā) as opposed to Emptiness of own-nature (raṇi ston : svabhāvaśūnyatā); to the contrast between ‘simultaneist’ (cig c[har : yugapad) spontaneity and naturalness on the one side and on the other ‘gradualist’ (rim gyis : krama) reinforcement and cultivation – the tension in both theory and practice round which revolved, according to Tibetan sources, the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas that is reputed to have opposed the Indian ācārya Kamalasāla and the Chinese ho-shang Mo-ho-yen (hva śāri Mahāyāna) at the court of the Tibetan ruler Khri Sroṅ lde btsan towards the end of the eighth century CE; to the notion of the dkar po chig thub as the unique and self-sufficient sovereign remedy which is effective against all the Ills of Saṃsāra, which gives rise immediately and all at once to Awakening – i.e. the direct ‘face-to-face’ encounter with, and recognitive identification (no 'phrod pa) of, Mind (sems = citta) as it really is – and which is thus the specific ‘remedy’ that by itself ‘cures’ all conceptual constructions and discursivity of thinking that are at the root of Saṃsāra; and finally to the concepts subsumed under or associated with Quiet (śamatha = zhi gnas) and Insight (vipaśyanā = lhag mthon), which are thought of as making up a co-ordinated pair or an integrated syzygy.

According to the sources to be considered, the issues in the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas did not, it is true, necessarily hinge directly on the interpretation of the tathāgatagarbha-doctrine, which is in fact mentioned only occasionally in some of the relevant documents. And, conversely, the contrasts innate/acquired and cataphatic/apophatic in the hermeneutics of the tathāgatagarbha did not inevitably engage the oppositions simultaneous/gradualness and ethical or intellectual quietism/effort. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Indo-Tibetan problematics of tathāgatagarbha-hermeneutics and the issues addressed in the ‘Great Debate’ are evidently linked by a number of thematic strands that cross and intertwine, making up so to say lattices of
ideas. And sometimes in the Tibetan exegetical traditions they have been collocated or treated in parallel.  

Now, in the entire spectrum of their applications, the terms tathāgatagarbha, cig c(h)ar ba and rim gyis pa do not appear to define a single, constant and unitary core-notion or essence. Rather, they correspond to contextually varying values grouped round these terms or topoi. In the case of tathāgatagarbha, this may well have to do with the fact that it is not a referring term for any entity (bhāva), but a metatheoretical expression or counter. As for the terms cig char ba and rim gyis pa – and also dkar po chig thub – they too do not designate invariant referents but seem rather to describe sets of features that vary from case to case; and they can be variously applied depending on their particular place in a given system of thought. Thus, while most schools recognize the cig char ba in some context, they may do so in differing ways and connexions, so that the specific application of this term and category can vary from school to school; nevertheless, the notions in question are bound together by a range of family resemblances.

An attempt is furthermore made here to show how, once the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas had become a partly dehistoricized topos in the Tibetans’ later reconstruction of their (partly lost) early history, and in particular in their ‘constitution of tradition’, the expression ‘teaching of the Hva šān’ has served, in the Tibetan historical and doctrinal texts, as a model or exemplar for a theory considered to have unduly stressed that form of quietism which

4 The Buddha-nature (sans rgyas kyi ran bzhin) and simultaneous Yoga-Bhāvanā (theg pa chen po la cig char rnal ’byor du bogom pa’i thabs) are treated together for example in MS BN Pelliot tibétain 835. Cf. MS BL (IOL) Stein 693, ff. 15b, 27b–29b; Stein 710, f. 36b (sans rgyas ran grub) and f. 38a. See also Wang Hsi’s Cheng-li chüeh in P. Demiéville, Le concile de Lhasa (Paris, 1952), pp. 107, 116, 118 and 151; and below, Chapter ii, pp. 73 and 86.

G. Tucci had at one time expressed the opinion that a substantial part of the Hva šān Mahāyāna’s ideas along with those of the Indian Siddhas were preserved not only in the Tibetan rDsogs chen school but also in the Jo naṅ pa school, whose doctrine was in large part based on the tathāgatagarbha theory; see G. Tucci and W. Heissig, Die Religionen Tibets und der Mongolei (Stuttgart, 1970), p. 27. Compare however our remarks in Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub (Paris, 1973), p. 7 n. 1. This opinion was not repeated in the English version of Tucci’s work, The religions of Tibet (London, 1980).

A kind of prefiguration of the dkar po chig thub as a medical metaphor is perhaps to be found in a number of Sūtras, for example in the Mahāyānist Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra – a major source of the tathāgatagarbha-theory – which is itself described as a medicine or remedy.
foreword

excludes ethical and intellectual effort or that form of understanding that focuses non-analytically on the Empty alone, in contravention of the Buddhist principle that Quiet (śamatha) and Insight (vipaśyanā) — like means (upāya) and discriminative understanding (prajñā) — are co-ordinate and have to be cultivated together either in alternation or in unison as a fully integrated syzygy (yuganaddha). In this way, in Tibetan philosophical discourse, the figure of the Hvaṃ Mahāyāna and his teaching have come to fulfil a practically emblematic function, one that may in fact be somewhat different from the position actually occupied by the historical ho-shang Mo-ho-yen. The following study will then be concerned as much with the impact and significance of the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas for the Tibetan tradition — in other words its Wirkungsgeschichte — as with the question of what actually happened at the discussions in which the ho-shang Mo-ho-yen was involved toward the end of the eighth century in Tibet.

A fundamental problem at issue is, very briefly stated, the relation between the Fruit (phala = 'bras bu) — i.e. ultimate and perfect Awakening (anuttarasamyaksambodhi) in buddhahood —, the spiritual Ground (gzi) — known as the tathāgatagarbha or Buddha-nature — and the Path (mārga = lam) in all its stages. (To a certain degree, this is also the problem of the relation between paramārtha and samvṛti, or between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra which is usually described in the Mahāyāna as one of non-duality.) Now, to the extent that non-duality and non-difference are being focused on, the Fruit of buddhahood is stated to be Awakened to immediately, that is, without any mediating process consisting in the practiser’s utilization of means (upāya); and such direct comprehension could thus be described as a face-to-face encounter with and recognitive identification of Mind (sens no 'phrod pa). Yet over-emphasis on such immediacy — implying as it would a telescoping together of Ground and Fruit — runs the risk of making redundant the Path with its virtues and perfections (pāramitā = phar phyin) — and especially the first four of them that lead to the prajñāpāramitā — and it would then represent less a theory of non-duality than one of monistic identity between Ground and Fruit (i.e. a theory not accepted in any simple form
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in Mahāyāna Buddhism). In some Buddhist traditions, the complex problem of the relation (or the description of the relation) between ultimate Awakening and means — viz. the virtues of generosity, etc. — has been treated in terms of the dedicatory transmutation (parināmanā = yonis su bsno ba) of these virtues into Awakening (bodhi); interestingly, however, this question of parināmanā was scarcely thematized in the documents relating to the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas.5

In discussing the simultaneous/gradual polarity in Buddhist thought, especially on the Sūtra-level of the Pāramitāyāna, it is essential to be quite clear as to whether it is the Fruit or the Path that is in question. Now, that the realization of the Fruit at the very end of the practice of the Path is instantaneous (and in some sense ‘simultaneous’) is generally recognized, and this was therefore hardly the issue. It is accordingly the status of the Path — alongside the difficult problem of the ‘homology’ of Ground and Fruit and the ‘proleptic anticipation’ of the latter in the former — that is the problem being addressed.

The question further arises as to whether, given its positive and cataphatic character, the tathāgatagarbha theory was a syncretism, or a symbiotic accommodation, with the atman-doctrine of Brāhmanical thought — that is, in effect, a crypto-Brāhmanical ‘soul’-theory in Buddhism. Or was it perhaps conceived as inclusivistic of this atman-doctrine in the sense of Paul Hacker’s ‘inclusivism’, i.e. as incorporating this ‘soul’-theory in a subordinate position? Or, again, is it an authentic Buddhist treatment of a theme — and a religious and philosophic problem — which recurs in various forms throughout the history of Indian thought? A related question arises

5 It is true that Sa skya Paṇḍi ta has referred to parināmanā in proximity to some references he made to the (dkar po) chig thub, i.e. to a spiritual factor, said to have been assumed by the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna during the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas, that is supposed to operate as the unique and self-sufficient factor making possible the immediate and ‘simultaneous’ achievement of Awakening. See for example his sDom gsun rab dbye, ff. 34a and 38b, and his sKyes bu dam pa rnams la spriṅ ba’i yi ge, f. 5b. However, in these places parināmanā is not treated as either a bridge between, or as a factor permitting a leap from, the conditioned level of activity and impurity to the unconditioned level. And Sa skya Paṇḍi ta is evidently criticizing the treatment of parināmanā as a supplement to the chig thub, that is, as supporting a factor that was supposed by its proponents to be already totally effective and altogether self-sufficient in achieving Awakening. On parināmanā in connexion with the elimination of nimitta and upalambha and with reference to the cig charjirim gyis opposition, see also MS BN Pelliot tibétain 116 (125–6) and Pelliot tibétain 823, verso.
with respect to the theory of the Emptiness of the heterogeneous (gzhon ston) in contradistinction to that of the Emptiness of own-nature (ragn ston) associated with Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka thought. Are these two opposed theories of śūnyatā to be placed on exactly the same level and accordingly to be treated as incompatible and mutually exclusive? Or are they complementary in the sense that they somehow supplement each other? Or, again, are they perhaps simply incommensurable (somewhat in the sense that this term currently has in the history of science)?

Opposed— and hence apparently irreconcilable—strands of thought are indeed to be found in our sources. But it would seem that more consideration, and probably more weight, have to be given to the possibility that the strands in question are forms of thought (and techniques) existing as polarities in tension between which the Buddhist traditions have from early times felt the need to strike a balance, rather than necessarily contradictory doctrines (and incompatible techniques) which could be harmonized only artificially and superficially, by some stratagem such as ‘inclusivism’.

Some aspects of the proto-history of the opposition between ‘simultaneist innatism’—expressed in mystical or cataphatic terms—on the one side and analytical, and gradualist, cultivation—expressed in terms of intellection or apophaticism—on the other side have been recently addressed by Lambert Schmithausen, who has distinguished between ‘positive-mystical’ and ‘negative-intellectualist’ conceptions of liberation and Awakening in earlier Buddhist canonical sources. Similarly, in a recent publication by Paul Griffiths, the analysis of Buddhist meditation is based on an antithesis between the mystical-enstatic and the intellectual-analytical, with the Attainment of Cessation (nīrodhasamāpatti) even being compared with cataleptic trance.

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6 See L. Schmithausen, ‘On some aspects of descriptions or theories of ‘liberating insight’ and ‘enlightenment’ in Early Buddhism’, in: K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (eds.), Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus: Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf (Wiesbaden, 1981), pp. 199–250, especially p. 214ff. To these two trends Schmithausen (p. 218f.) has added the ‘Samjñāvedayatanirodha-Liberation theory’ in which the progressive anupĪravavīhāra pattern covers nine successive stages beginning with the first Dhyāna and continuing through a stage where notions and feelings come to a stop.

7 P. J. Griffiths, On being mindless: Buddhist meditation and the mind-body problem (La Salle, 1986).

8 Griffiths, op. cit., p. 11, describes the nīrodhasamāpatti-theory as ‘even more radical in its rejection of mental activity than are the dominant Western models for the understanding
The question thus again arises as to how these currents found in Sūtra-Buddhism, in fundamental classical Śāstras and in later Indian and Tibetan sources in fact relate to each other. Are they to be regarded as altogether heterogeneous and antithetical in the sense of being incompatible and mutually exclusive? And was the attempt to reconcile and harmonize the ‘positive-mystical’ with the ‘negative-intellectualist’, as found already in some earlier texts, ‘inclusivistic’ in Hacker’s sense, as has been suggested by Schmithausen? Or are they rather strands making up the whole fabric of Buddhist theory and practice, and standing in a structural relation of complementarity, with emphasis being placed sometimes on the one and sometimes on the other, whereas the two are in actuality considered to be required to supplement, and to reinforce, each other?

When analysing the textual pericopes and units of tradition identifiable in the literature of Buddhism, it will be useful to examine them not only in terms of historical stratification and chronological accretion of earlier and later textual matter, and of possible attempts made subsequently to reconcile and harmonize incompatible elements, but also in terms of a synchronic and structural co-ordination, motivated by considerations of a philosophical or meditative kind, of distinct but still complementary of catalepsy'. See also Schmithausen, op. cit., p. 223. However, Buddhist tradition seems usually to have regarded that form of exclusively concentrative enstasis that amounts to catalepsy as characteristic not of the supramundane (lokottara) bhāvanā of the Samāpattis but of the mundane (laukika) bhāvanāmarga alone. On this often neglected distinction see Chapter iv below.

9 Schmithausen, op. cit., pp. 223 and 230. Schmithausen has defined Hacker’s ‘inclusiv­­­­­ism’ as ‘a method of intellectual debate in which the competing doctrine, or essential elements of it, are admitted but relegated to a subordinate position, or given a suitable reinterpretation, and which aims not so much at reconciliation but at prevailing over the other doctrine or its propounders’ (p. 223). And he adds that this ‘inclusivistic’ tendency ‘is especially conspicuous in a few texts belonging to the “negative-intellectual” current’ (p. 223).

The question arises in this context as to whether, as asserted by J. Bronkhorst, these twin trends continue two genetically different traditions – one a rigoristic, ascetic and suppressive tradition attested e.g. in connexion with the Buddhist Samāpattis and Vimokṣas, but nevertheless of non-Buddhist origin, and the other the authentic Buddhist meditation in which insight plays a major part, and which is characteristic of Buddhist mindfulness, the Dhyānas and the realization of the four satyas. See J. Bronkhorst, The two traditions of meditation in Ancient India (Stuttgart, 1986). Bronkhorst’s treatment of the relevant material is not infrequently based on unexplicated or unexamined (and anything but self-evident) presuppositions about ‘contradictions’ in the traditions. (See e.g. the review by S. Collins, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1987, pp. 373–5.)
(or, perhaps, incommensurable) currents. In other words, we may be faced here not just with historically heterogeneous and logically incompatible elements artificially, or even forcibly, brought together in the course of diachronic stratification reflected in text-historical layers, but also by currents in syn­chronic tension and structural contrast.

Not only for Kamalaśīla but also for his Sūtra and Śāstra sources the synergistic co-ordination of śamatha and vipaśyanā in a syzygy is no more a mere artifice, or a case of inclusivistic subordination, than is the co-ordination of salvific means (upāya) and discriminative knowledge (prajñā), of Compassion (karuṇā) and Emptiness (śūnyatā), etc. In many classical periods of the Buddhist tradition it is indeed precisely this co-ordination of polarities that constitutes the specific character of theory and practice.

The relation between a positive or mystical current and a negative or analytical one – for example a cataphatic approach and positive theory and an apophatic approach and negative theory concerning insight and Awakening – or between the Emptiness of the heterogeneous (gžan ston) and the Emptiness of own-nature (raṅ ston) theories of śūnyatā and the tathāgatagarbha can provide the comparativist with interesting and methodologi­cally instructive cases of opposed theories and approaches existing in tension. Certain Buddhist traditions have regarded the first pair – attested respectively in the ‘scholastic corpus’ (rigs tshogs) and the ‘hymnic corpus’ (bstod tshogs) both ascribed to the same Nāgārjuna – as complementary (or, perhaps, as incommensurable in the sense mentioned above). But other traditions have subordi­nated one theory to the other, regarding the subordinate one as intentional (ābhiprāyika) and as representing only a provisional sense in need of further interpretation (neyārtha) and the superordi­nate theory as corresponding accordingly to the definitive and ultimately intended sense (nītārtha) in the Buddha’s teaching. And although the latter pair – viz. Emptiness of own-nature as expressed in the ‘Second Cycle’ of the Buddha’s teaching and Emptiness of the heterogeneous as ostensibly taught in parts of the ‘Third Cycle’ – has frequently been regarded as antithetical
and contradictory – with the one being interpreted as nītārtha and the other as neyārtha – it may be possible within the frame of systematic Buddhist hermeneutics to think in terms of a complementarity (or incommensurability) between two theories belonging to distinct universes of religious-philosophical discourse rather than in terms of a contradiction between theories competing on the same level. At all events, a theory such as that of the tathāgatagarbha in the ‘Third Cycle’ clearly cannot be simply, reductionistically or ‘inclusivistically’ identified with the classical Prajñāpāramitā or Madhyamaka notion of śūnyatā as expressed in the ‘Second Cycle’. Nonetheless, at least some hermeneuticians – for example those of the Tibetan dGe lugs pa school – have been prepared to let them stand side by side as valid teachings that are both definitive in sense (nītārtha), rather than treat the one as definitive and the other as intentional and in need of being further interpreted in a sense other than the obvious and provisional surface meaning, as has been done in other hermeneutical traditions.

To return now to the pair of śamatha and vipaśyanā, and to the concentrative and enstatic current on the one side and the analytical and observational current on the other side, as soteriological methods on the Path of Awakening they can be regarded not as mutually exclusive and contradictory, but as complementary and as equally necessary for the achievement of Awakening. If one current is emphasized at the expense of the other, there can indeed emerge an unbridgeable gap between them in philosophical theory and also in the theory of spiritual practice. But cultivated as co-ordinate components of the Path, they not only reinforce each other but they are both seen in theory and practice to be necessary in order to achieve their full effect.

With regard to the gradual/sudden (or subitist) polarity as it is known in sinological studies, it may well be that the circumstance that it ‘assumed its particular importance in the Chinese Buddhist tradition suggests that it resonated with, or gave form to, a similar pre-existent polarity within Chinese thought’,10 and even that it is

a 'peculiarly sinitic mode of approaching the enlightening experience'. The materials gathered in these essays nevertheless document the fact that the gradual/simultaneous polarity — krama/yugapad in Sanskrit and rim gyis/cig char in Tibetan — is neither uniquely and exclusively nor pre-eminently Chinese, and that it is in fact very well attested as a polar contrast or tension, and sometimes also as a conflict, in the Indian Buddhist traditions too. That the cultural and intellectual matrices and networks of concepts in which this polarity has found expression differ appreciably between India and China is of course no less clear, so that it is no doubt legitimate to speak of distinct Indian and Chinese developments (and also of Indic and Sinitic models in the Buddhism of Tibet). Meaningful comparison can perhaps be most fruitfully pursued in terms of typologies, structures and lattices of family resemblances.

As for the historical relation between Ch'an/Zen and the teachings of the Indian Siddhas, R. A. Stein and L. Gómez have noted that it is very unlikely that Ch'an could have derived from or been directly influenced by Indian Vajrayāna or Siddha schools; and to assume that the former originates from the latter would no doubt involve an historically unwarranted 'soft methodology' (to borrow an expression used in another connexion by Gómez). Nevertheless, mutatis mutandis, the typological parallels and family resemblances do seem clear enough for the comparativist to have to address them very seriously.

The extent to which mahāmudrā is to be seen as 'gradualist' or 'simultaneist' was moreover an important subject of reflection and discussion in Tibet. And Sa skyā Paṇḍita for one considered what...

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14 And the possibility of the existence of links between the Vajrayāna and some trends in at least later Ch'an (if only in Tibet) cannot be totally excluded a priori either. See below, Chapter iii, pp. 122, 131–2, 137.
15 Globally described as 'gradualist' by L. Gómez, op. cit., p. 143, n. 41. But this description would not fit well the current of the Tibetan Mahāmudrā tradition represented by Žan Tshal pa for example (see Chapter iii).
he termed 'Neo-Mahāmudrā' (da lta'i phyag rgya chen po) to have continued ideas of the Hvaśaṃ Mahāyāna. Whether Sa skya Panḍita conceived of this continuation only in terms of direct genetic and historical dependence or also in terms of typological similarity is perhaps not quite certain, as is the question whether he would have himself made such a conceptual distinction. At all events he writes that the 'Neo-Mahāmudrā' he was criticizing was based on texts left behind in Tibet by the Hvaśaṃ. Nevertheless, that the Hvaśaṃ's 'simultaneist' teaching was not unprecedented in the history of Buddhist thought is amply demonstrated by a study of the Indian documents including Kamalaśīla's Bhāvanākeramas where much earlier canonical discussions of the point are cited. And the link between 'Neo-Mahāmudrā' and the teachings of the Hvaśaṃ Mahāyāna posited by Sa skya Panḍita could then be due to a typological relationship, without a direct historical dependence having necessarily to be assumed by the historian and comparatist to exist between them.

The essays in this book are based on the Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion delivered at the School of Oriental and

16 See Sa skya Panḍita ta, sDom gsum rab dbye (sDe dge ed.), f. 26a. On texts concealed by the Hvaśaṃ before his banishment from Tibet, and on the motif of the boot he left behind, see the 'Alternative Tradition' of the sBa bṣed (ed. mGon po rgyal mtsshan, Beijing, 1982, p. 75), apparently used by Sa skya Panḍita ta also in his Thub pa'i dgon gi sgag (sDe dge ed.), f. 50a. The boot the Hvaśaṃ is said to have left behind in Tibet has sometimes been interpreted as a token of the future revival there of his teaching. Cf. below, Chapters ii and iii.

In the case of the 'Neo-Mahāmudrā' as well as of what he terms 'Chinese-style rDoṅga chen' (rgya nag lugs kyi rdzogs chen), Sa skya Panḍita ta writes in his sDom gsum rab dbye (f. 25b) that the notions yas 'bab and cig char ba, and the notions mas 'dzegs and rim gyis pa are equivalent, there being no distinction in point of fact.

17 In an article entitled 'Sa skya pandita’s account of the bSam yas Debate: History as polemic', Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 5 (1982), pp. 89–99, Roger Jackson has tried to show that Sa skya Panḍita ta’s treatment of the Debate and the ḏkar po chig thub problem was ‘simply a case of polemical anachronism’ motivated by ‘virulent opposition to the White Panacea and other mahāmudrā teachings’ which he wished to ‘discredit’ (p. 96). Recently, in an article in the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 10/2 (1987), pp. 27–68, M. Broido has taken up this line of argument and sought to explain Sa skya Panḍita ta’s critique as inspired by ‘personal animosity’ (p. 30) against Phag mo gru pa, and as ‘invective’ (p. 45). Treating Sa skya Panḍita ta’s critique in such a way as to reduce it to mere distortion, polemic and invective however results in trivializing the very real, and meaningful, problems being seriously addressed by him – problems that had a long history in Buddhism even before he took
African Studies, University of London in March 1987. In view of both the lecture-form at their origin and the limitations of space available, they do not lay claim to being comprehensive treatments of the themes with which they deal. As already noted, a full-scale history of these themes could easily fill several volumes. The reader will not therefore find here an exhaustive discussion of either the primary or secondary sources. It is hoped, nevertheless, that this study will make it possible for the reader to form an idea both of the historical, philosophical and religious significance of the subjects treated and of the major hermeneutical and comparative problems that surround their interpretation. In the notes appended to the essays the reader will find references to many of the main primary sources and to further discussions and bibliographical material in the secondary sources (to the extent that these unfortunately so often inaccessible materials have been available). These essays will have fulfilled their purpose if they succeed in focusing attention on a number of salient points in Buddhism and in indicating approaches that may be of value in the analysis and interpretation of the complex themes and vexed questions that have been broached.

For rendering classical Chinese terms and the names of Chinese Buddhist masters the Wade-Giles system has been employed. The names of places still existing have however been rendered according to the pinyin system currently in use in China (for example Dunhuang instead of Tun-huang).

them up. It has also to be borne in mind that Sa skya Paṇḍita ta’s account of the issues raised in the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas is paralleled not only by the accounts found in the sBa bzhed, which he cites, but also by material included in the History attributed to the rDzogs chen master Nāri ral (see Chapter ii below). As for Broido’s assertion (p. 42.) that Sa skya Paṇḍita ta charged the proponents of the dkar po chig thub and related doctrines with being no Buddhists at all, the passage he quotes (in his note 67) as evidence from the Thub pa’i dgos gsal (f. 50b2) does not demonstrate this point. In the text cited, phyi rabs pa is simply the opposite of stia rabs pa ‘earlier’. And although it is true that Sa skya Paṇḍita ta has described the opposed doctrines he rejects in the Thub pa’i dgos gsal, f. 50b2 ff., as neither Śrāvakayāna nor Mahāyāna and hence as not being the teaching of the Buddha (see f. 48b4), there is surely an important difference between characterizing and then rejecting a doctrine as non-Buddhist in the course of a reasoned argument about matters of fundamental importance and denouncing the holder of this doctrine as being no Buddhist at all. In its tum the description phyi rabs pa has to be understood in the context of what Sa skya Paṇḍita ta terms ‘Neo-Mahāmudrā’, in contradistinction to what he considers to be the old, and authentic, Mahāmudrā that belongs to the Tantric division of Buddhism, and which he has by no means rejected (see Chapter iii below).
The author wishes to thank the Centre of Religion and Philosophy and the authorities of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, for the opportunity to present these papers, and the participants in the seminars for their observations and criticisms which helped to clarify many a point.
The Buddhist Notion of an Immanent Absolute as a Problem in Comparative Religious and Philosophical Hermeneutics

Because of its philosophical and religious significance in the fields of soteriology and gnoseology the Mahāyānist theory of the tathāgatagarbha occupies a crucial position in Buddhist thought, and indeed in Indian thought as a whole. No doubt the number of Indian Buddhist sources devoted to this theory is relatively limited: they are chiefly the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra together with very considerable portions of other Sūtras such as the Śrīmālā, the Mahāyānist Mahāparinirvāṇa, and some sections of the Lāṅkāvatāra and the Ghanavyūha; several Tantric texts; and the long first chapter of the Rātnagotravibhāga with its very extensive commentary which quotes a number of Sūtras dealing with the subject that are now otherwise unavailable in their original Indian versions. The majority of the other Sūtras and Indian Śāstras of the Mahāyāna either allude only incidentally to the tathāgatagarbha, sometimes even with a critical intent, or they do not explicitly refer to it at all, as is the case also with the Śrāvakayānist literature. And, so far as we know, it is chiefly in the Buddhism of Central Asia (Khotan, Tibet and Mongolia) and East Asia that the problem of the tathāgatagarbha assumed the proportions of a controversial topic, and that it has as such remained until the present day the object of numerous discussions and sometimes even of polemics. However, the foundations of these Central and East Asian developments were clearly present in India, as a careful study of the extensive materials available readily demonstrates. In particular, the hermeneutical problems posed by the theory of the
tathāgatagarbha are by no means unknown to the Sūtras and earliest Śastras on the subject.1

In virtue of both their extent and their contents, the Sūtras treating the tathāgatagarbha—or other systematically related doctrines such as the natural luminosity (prakṛtiprabhāśvaratā) of Mind (citta) and the spiritual Germ existent by nature (prakṛtisthagotra)2—are amongst the most important of the Mahāyāna. And the Ratnakotravibhāga, a work traditionally included among the treatises ascribed to Maitreya, is unquestionably one of the basic Śastras of the Mahāyāna; its subtitle Mahāyānottaratantrāsāstra indeed underscores the fact that it is a text summarizing what was considered the final and ultimate teaching of the Mahāyāna. The idea that the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature is one of the supreme teachings of the Mahāyāna is explicitly stated besides in the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra.3

Mahāyānist doctrine is mainly concerned with the Path (mārga) of the Bodhisattva and supreme and perfect Awakening (bodhi), that is, the state of a buddha. Now the term tathāgatagarbha is used to denote the ‘buddhmorphic’ Base or Support for practice of

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Concerning in particular the hermeneutical questions arising in connexion with the tathāgatagarbha teaching, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra (Paris, 1969), and Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub (Paris, 1973), pp. 27f., 49f., 73f., 114n., 122–3, 134. On Tantric hermeneutics, with which this paper will not be directly concerned, much interesting work has recently been done by M. Broido; see e.g. Journal of the Tibet Society 2 (1982), p. 5ff., and Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984), p. 1ff.


3 Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (Tibetan translation of the Mahāyānist version from Sanskrit), f. 19546, and Colophon, f. 222b. Here and below, references are to the lHa sa edition of the Tibetan bKa’ gyur. (For an English translation of a (Sino-)Japanese version of this Sūtra, see Kosho Yamamoto, The Mahayana Mahāparinirvāna-Sūtra [Karin Buddhist Series 5], Tokyo, 1973–1975.)
the Path, and hence the motivating 'cause' (*hetu*: *dhātu*) for attainment of the Fruit (*phala*) of buddhahood. Even when the texts do not use the term *tathāgatagarbha* to designate this factor making it possible for all living beings ultimately to attain liberation and buddhahood, the importance of the theme of the *tathāgatagarbha* is therefore basic to the soteriology and gnoseology of the Mahāyāna.

To designate this same factor, certain texts use in addition the terms (*tathāgata*)*dhātu*, *prakṛtistha-gotra* and *prakṛtiprabhāsvāra-citta*, words that have a longer history in the development of Buddhist thought. The at least partial systematic equivalence of these terms from the points of view of soteriology and gnoseology is set out in several of the scriptural sources for the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine.

**The Soteriological and Metaphysical Status of the *Tathāgatagarbha* as a Problem in Exegesis and Hermeneutics**

If the fundamental rôle played by the notion of the 'Embryo-Essence' (*garbha*), or Germ, and by the spiritual 'Element' (*dhātu*) of the *tathāgata* is accordingly clear, the metaphysical and soteriological status of the *tathāgatagarbha*, *tathāgatadhatu* and *gotra* is somewhat less so. While the *prakṛtistha-gotra* as the Support (*adhara*) for practice of the Path is evidently situated on the 'causal' level — i.e. that of the sentient being in *saṃsāra* — and while the *tathāgatagarbha* is said to exist in all sentient beings without exception, the *tathāgatadhatu* on the other hand is present not only on this level of ordinary sentient beings but also, evidently, on the level of buddhahood itself. This difference makes it impossible to regard the *tathāgatagarbha* and *tathāgata-dhātu* as simply identical in all doctrinal contexts.

The *tathāgatagarbha* is characterized as permanent (*nitya*), immutable (*dhruva*), blissful (*sukha*), and eternal (*sāvātā*), and sometimes we are even told that it is ātman. These are epithets that one would expect to relate to the Absolute — indeed, *prima facie*, to a substantial Absolute.

The parallelism between the *tathāgatagarbha* (or its equivalents) and the Vedāntic ātman is quite striking and it might even be thought at first sight that a crypto-Vedāntic tendency has here
come to the surface in Buddhism. The *Lankāvatārasūtra* accordingly calls attention to the danger of simply equating the Buddhist teaching on the *tathāgatagarbha* with the *ātmavāda* of the Tīrthikas; and it clearly distinguishes between the Buddha’s doctrine of the Embryo-Essence of the *tathāgata* and the heterodox doctrine of a permanent and substantial universal Self.4

In evaluating the interrelation of the theory of the *tathāgatagarbha* with the *ātmavāda*, everything depends on just what the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical philosophers mean by the word *ātmā*. For the Buddhists and Brāhmaṇists evidently do not always intend exactly the same thing when they use this word. Moreover, even within Buddhist usage, there is a difference between the use of the word *ātmā* in a positive (or *svamata*) context, as an epithet of a factor such as the *tathāgatagarbha*, and its employment in a negative or polemical (i.e. *paramata*) context to designate an eternal entity rejected in Buddhist thought. It must be observed furthermore that the Buddhist critique of the *ātmā* is generally directed against the notion of an unchangeable substantial entity; and it has been remarked by scholars that the earlier Buddhists seem not to refer to the Upaniṣadic *ātmā*/brahman,5 and that the majority of the later Buddhists also practically ignore

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4 *Lankāvatārasūtra* (ed. B. Nanjio), ii, pp. 77–79. In the introductory paragraph of Ch. vi of the *Lankāvatārasūtra* (p. 220.3), *ātmā* nevertheless appears in exactly the same context in which the expression *tathāgatagarbha-ālayavijñāna* appears in the sequel in the same Sūtra.

5 On this point H. Nakamura, *The Vedānta philosophy as was revealed in Buddhist scriptures*, in *Pañcāntam* (Śāradīya Jñāna Mahotsava 3, Śrī Lāl Bahādur Śāstrī Rāṣṭrīya Sanskrīta Vidyā Pītha, Delhi, 2024 [= 1968], pp. 6, 8–12), was somewhat less categorical than P. Horsch, ‘Buddhismus und Upaniṣaden’, in *Pratīcānām* (Festschrift F. B. J. Kuiper, The Hague, 1967), pp. 462–77, who considered that there are no references to the Upaniṣadic *ātmā*/brahman in the earlier Buddhist literature. And in his *History of early Vedānta philosophy*, 1 (Delhi, 1983), Nakamura has expressed the opinion that the concept of Brahmā and other Upaniṣadic ideas are to be found scattered throughout the early Buddhist scriptures (pp. 135–9). K. R. Norman, ‘A note on *ātā* in the *Aḷagaddāpama-sutta*’ in *Studies in Indian philosophy* (Memorial volume in honour of Pandit Sukhlajī Sanghīvi, L.D. Series 84, Ahmedabad, 1981), pp. 19–21, finds an echo of the Upaniṣadic *ātmā* in the world-*ātmā* concept of the Majjhimanikāyā (I, pp. 30–42) (on which see, however, P. Horsch, loc. cit., p. 467). But it is very difficult indeed to say how specific to the Upaniṣads the *ātmā*-concept mentioned in this Sutta in fact was. A recent study on the *ātmā*-problem especially in the Theravāda tradition is S. Collins, *Selfless persons* (Cambridge, 1982).
the Advaita-Vedanta of Śaṃkāraṇa. The question therefore arises as to the extent to which the Buddhist critique of the ātmanavāda is applicable to the Vedantic ātman/brahman, at least in its philosophically elaborated versions.7

The Buddhist texts themselves have much of interest to say on the subject of parallels between Buddhist and Brahmanical thought. One important Sūtra, the Mahāyānist Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, alludes to the problem of the interrelation of the Buddhist and Brahmanical notions of the ātman and absolute reality in the following passage:

The six [Tīrthika]-masters asked: ‘Gautama, if the self (ātman) does not exist, who will do good and evil?’ – Bhagavat replied: ‘If what is called “self” does [it], can one say [of this “self”, as the Tīrthikas do] that it is “permanent” (nitya)? And if it is permanent, does it sometimes do good and sometimes evil? If there is a moment when it does both good and evil, will it be said that the self is “infinite”? If it is the self that acts, why does it do something evil? If it is the self that acts, and if [this self] is knowledge, how is it that doubt arises in a being about the non-existence of the self? Hence, as concerns the Tīrthika doctrine, the self certainly does not exist.’8

6 The Advaita-Vedanta seems to be mentioned for the first time in Buddhist literature by Kamalaśīla in his Pañjikā on Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha (328 f. dealing with the Aupaniṣadikas). Bhāskara is mentioned, together with a certain ‘Bhagavant’ (= Śaṃkara-Bhagavatpāda?), by Advayavajra, Tattvaratnavali (p. 19).

On the earlier Vedānta see Bhāvaviveka, Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā ch. viii (cf. iii.288f.). To what extent the Buddhists before Bhāvaviveka were really familiar with the Vedānta in its Upaniṣadic sources is problematical. On a passage of the Ta-chih-tu-lun ascribed to Nāgarjuna – and supposed by É. Lamotte to refer to Upaniṣadic ideas (see Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, II [Louvain, 1949], pp. 738 and 747) – see K. Bhattacharya, L’ātman-brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien (Paris, 1973), pp. 133–5. On the Daśabhaṁśivibhāgaśāstra. also ascribed to Nāgarjuna, and on works attributed to Āryadeva, see H. Nakamura, History of early Vedānta philosophy, I, pp. 158, 165. And on Aśvaghoṣa, the Mahāvibhāgaśāstra and Harivarman’s Tattva/Satyasiddhi, see Nakamura, op. cit., p. 141ff.

7 A recent study on this difficult question is K. Bhattacharya, L’ātman-brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien. See also the same scholar’s article on brahman in Buddhist literature in Sri Venkateswara Univ. Oriental Journal (Tirupati), 18 (1973), pp. 1–8.

The Sūtra then explains:

‘What is called “self” is the tathāgata. Why is this so? The [Buddha–]Body (sku) being infinite is free from the blemish of doubt, and it neither acts nor grasps, so that it is said to be “permanent”. In virtue of non-production and non-cessation (anutpāda, anirodha) it is said to be “blissful” (sukha). In virtue of the absence of the impurities of kleśa it is said to be “very pure” (pariśuddha, viśuddha). In virtue of the absence of ten marks, it is said to be “Empty” (śūnya). Consequently, the tathāgata is permanent, blissful, self, very pure, Empty and without marks. – The Tīrthikas [then] said: “If the tathāgata is Empty because he/it is permanent, blissful, self, very pure, and without marks, this is indeed so! And knowing that the dharma taught by Gautama is also not Empty (stoi pa ma yin pa), we accept and retain it.” Many Tīrthikas then took to religion in the Teaching of the Buddha with their minds full of faith.’

In another passage the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra represents the Tīrthikas who behold the radiance of the Buddha as thinking the following:

‘If only Gautama did not teach a nihilistic view (uccheda-drṣṭi), we would accept instruction and the discipline (śīla) from him.’ – [The Buddha thereupon observes:] ‘I then knew the thoughts of these wandering ascetics (parivṛjaksas) … I said to them: “Why do you think that I teach a nihilistic view?”’ – The wandering ascetics answered: ‘Gautama, in all the Sūtras you have said that there is no self in all living beings. If you thus say that no self exists, how can that not be a nihilistic view? If no self exists, who will bind himself by discipline and who will infringe it? – Bhagavat replied: ‘I have not said that no self exists in all living beings. If I have

9 Ibid. Bu ston, mDzes rgyan, f. 27a, considered that this statement is, however, intentional (dgos pa can = abhirāyika), the motive (dgos pa = prayojana) being to introduce Tīrthikas to the Buddha’s teaching (by avatāranābhisamādhi) and the intentional foundation (dgos gzi) being the Emptiness of dharmas having discursive development (prapañca) in tathatā, which is free from prapañca relating to the dichotomously conceptualized binary pair Empty/not Empty (stoi mi stoi gi spros pa) (the negative here being a case of paryudāsa-type negation). On the terms dgos pa can, dgos gzi and dgos pa, see below.
always said that the Buddha-nature (sang rgyas kyi rai bzin) exists in all living beings, is this very Buddha-nature then not self? Thus I do not teach a nihilistic theory. If, because one does not see the Buddha-nature of all sentient beings, one asserts the not permanent, the not self, the not blissful, and the not very pure, it is said that one teaches nihilism. Then, after the ascetics had heard the explanation that this Buddha-nature is self, they all produced the thought (citta) directed toward supreme and perfect Awakening (anuttara-samyaksambodhi). And having at that moment entered religious life (pravraj-), they exerted themselves on the path of Awakening (bodhimarga). But the Sutra nevertheless continues:

This Buddha-nature is not in reality ātman, and it is for the sake of sentient beings that a self is spoken of. Whereas in virtue of the existence of causes and conditions the Tathāgata has spoken of not-self (bdag med pa) as self, in reality there is no self. Though he has spoken thus, this was no untruth either. It is because of the existence of causes and conditions that it is said that the self is not-self. Whereas self exists in reality, it is with a view to the world of living beings (loka) that it has been said that there is no self. But that was no untruth. The Buddha-nature is not-self (bdag med de); and if the Tathāgata has spoken of ‘self’, this is because a designation has been employed (bdags pa yin pa’i phyir).

Elsewhere the same Sutra explains:

If what is called ‘self’ were an eternally permanent (kūṭa-sthanitya) dharma, there would be no freedom from suffering (duḥkha). And if what is called ‘self’ did not exist, pure


11 Ibid. In this case Bu ston, mDzes rgyan, f. 23a, has explained that designating the tathāgatagarbha, which is not self, as self is a case of pratipakṣābhisamādhi, i.e. that this teaching was intended as a counteragent against the contempt the Tirthikas may feel for the Dharma (because they take it to be nihilistic).
24 THE BUDDHIST NOTION OF AN IMMANENT ABSOLUTE

religious conduct (brahmacaryā) would be of no avail ... It is to be known that the Buddha-nature is the Middle Way (madhyamā pratipat) altogether free from the two extremes (antadvaya) ... Non-duality is reality:12 by nature self and not-self are without duality (gños su med pa). The Lord Buddha has thus affirmed that the meaning of the tathāgata-garbha is unfathomable ... In the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra also I have already taught that self and not-self are without duality by characteristic.13

Furthermore it is explained:

When one sees that all is Empty, failure to see the non-Empty will not be called the Middle Way. When one sees all up to [the limit of] non-self, failure to see the self will not be called the Middle Way. What is called ‘Middle Way’ is Buddha-nature.14

In these passages the Mahāparinirvānasūtra is evidently making use of paradoxical and antiphrastic expressions to emphasize the difficulty of understanding – the unfathomability – of absolute reality, and also, perhaps, to show that the sense of a given statement depends on the pragmatic situations in which it is uttered and on exactly what is meant by the terms used in it. It is, moreover, to be remembered that any statement carries along with it and evokes, in the discursus of linguistic usage, a counter-statement. Thus, while the Sūtra certainly does not seek to defend any heterodox theory of the ātman, it still does not reject out of hand an absolute which may, at least provisionally and conventionally, be designated by the name ‘ātman’, etc.

The commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga sums up the problem by saying:

It is to be understood that attainment of the perfection of supreme-self (paramātma-pāramitā) is the fruit of cultivating

12 yani dag pa ŋid (samvaktva ?).
the perfection of discriminative understanding (prajñāpāramitā), as the reverse (viparyaya) of attachment to the postulation of the non-existent self of the heterodox, who see a self in the five Groups as objects of appropriation.\textsuperscript{15} For all the heterodox have imagined as self a thing consisting of matter (rūpa) and the other [skandhas], [but] which does not have this [self] as its nature; and this thing as grasped by them is always non-self (anātman) by reason of the [very] fact that it does not conform to the characteristic of self (atmalakṣaṇa).\textsuperscript{16} But the Tathāgata has attained the supreme limit of the non-substantiality of all things (sarvadharmanairātmya) by means of exact gnosis; and this non-substantiality as seen by him is always considered as self because it conforms to the proper characteristic of not being self (anātmalakṣaṇa). For [here] non-substantiality (nairātmya) is held to be self in the manner of 'that which is fixed in the mode of non-fixation'.\textsuperscript{17}

From the viewpoint of the Buddhist, then, the situation is that the Tirthikas' conception of ātman does not, and cannot, really correspond to their own definition of the ātman; and for this reason it is unacceptable.\textsuperscript{18} Hence it is first said in the passage quoted above that the self — i.e. the self of the speculative ātmavāda (to which the ātman of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra and the other comparable Buddhist scriptures only appears to correspond) — does not exist.\textsuperscript{19} But this does not imply that the reality

\textsuperscript{15} Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary i.36, p. 31.10–12: pañcasūpañkānakandheśv ātmarāśi-nām anyatthamānām asadātmagāhābhāvihartīvaparyayena prajñāpāramitābhāvanāyāḥ paramātmapkāmādivāmaḥ phalam draṣṭavyam. On the 'showing' (paridipana) of lokottaradharmas by the counteragent (pratipakṣa) of laukikadharmas, see also Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary i. 154–5 (p. 76.19).

\textsuperscript{16} i.e. to the postulated definition of an ātman.

\textsuperscript{17} The Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary i. 36 reads here (p. 31.13–16): tathāgataḥ punar yathābhūtajñānena sarvadharmanirātmyaperapāramipraptaḥ ṭac cāsya nairātmyam anātmalakṣaṇena yathādāranam avisaṃvāditvā sarvakālam ātmabhīpreto nairātmyam evātmēti keśvā / yathōktaṁ sthito 'sthānayogenēti / — Cf. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya ix. 23 on paramātman. Cf. Aśṭasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā i, p. 8, for the application of the antithrastic statement sasthito 'sthānayogena.

\textsuperscript{18} See also Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya vi. 2. Cf. Āryadeva, Catuḥśatakā x. 1ab (quoted in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā ix. 12, avatāraśīkā): yas tavātāmā mamāntām āt rounded

\textsuperscript{19} See above, p. 21.
sometimes referred to in the Sūtra by the name ātman does not exist; for in this case the term is used to designate absolute reality in such a manner that theory and definition coincide. Hence it is next said that the self does indeed exist in reality, even though one is no doubt obliged to reject the concept of a self so long as one has in mind the speculative ātmavāda of the Tīrthikas. But, again, a one-sided affirmation of a supposedly ‘true’ absolute as the referent of the term ātman would be no more finally correct than the negation of an ātman. In short, for the Buddhist, the principle of the Middle Way always remains fully operative, and he therefore eschews both the eternalist and the nihilist views.

**Exegetical and Hermeneutical Approaches: Some Methodological Considerations**

Obliged as they thus were by these apparent parallels clearly to differentiate between the tathāgatagarbha — and the Buddhist notions of absolute reality informed by certain inseparable and constitutive factors — on the one side and on the other side an eternal and unchanging entity like the ātman or brahman, the Buddhist philosophers had available two hermeneutical possibilities, either of which would permit them to remain faithful to their fundamental principle of the non-substantiality (nairatmya) of the individual (pudgala) — as accepted by practically the whole of the Buddhist tradition\(^{20}\) — and the non-substantiality of the factors of existence (dharma) — as elaborated in the Mahāyāna.

I

One solution to this hermeneutical problem was based on the idea of a teaching given by the Buddha that is not final and definitive, but which is ‘intentional’ (ābhiprayika) and non-definitive since its meaning requires to be elicited by explication and further

\(^{20}\) The Vātsiputriyas are an (at least apparent) exception.
interpretation (neyārtha).21 It consists in supposing that a teaching concerning the presence of the tathāgatagarbha in all living beings is really an expedient device motivated by the Buddha’s wish to attract persons clinging to the idea of a Self and thus to introduce them to his teaching, which will then free them from this clinging; or again by the Buddha’s wish to eliminate in his disciples such ethical and cognitive obstacles to the cultivation of the path of spiritual liberation as a feeling of depression on the part of those who have little confidence in their ability to attain buddhahood,22 or a feeling of superiority on the part of those who might look down on others less capable than themselves, or an inability to distinguish between the real and unreal according to the Middle Way. These motives have been expressly mentioned in the Sūtra literature as well as in the Ratnagotravibhāga.23 

And on the basis of the passage of the Lankāvatārasūtra (ii, p. 78) relating to the intentional and non-definitive nature of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine, Candrākīrti24 and some of his Tibetan followers — e.g. Sa skya Paṇḍi ta25 and Bu ston26 — have emphasized the intentional (dgongs pa can = abhiprayika) and non-definitive character of a teaching requiring further interpretation in another sense (dran don = neyārtha). For such a teaching refers on the literal surface-level to an ātman-like spiritual principle such as the tathāgatagarbha; but it is considered to have ultimately in

21 On these two terms and concepts in Sūtra hermeneutics, see the literature quoted above in n. 1. It should be emphasized that here the term ‘intentional’ is being used as a technical equivalent in English for Sanskrit abhiprayika, an adjectival derivative from abhipraya ‘intention; purport’ by means of the suffix -ika- denoting ‘belonging to’. See the present writer’s article on the terms abhipriyā = dgongs pa and dgon gzi in the Journal of Indian Philosophy, 13 (1985), pp. 309–25.

22 According to Harivarman’s Tatva/Satyasiddhiśāstra (ch. xxx), the Buddha has taught original purity of Mind as an expedient because indolent persons, on hearing that Mind is originally impure, would think that they will be unable to remove its impure nature, and they would therefore not strive to produce the pure Mind. See S. Katsumata, ‘Concerning various views of human nature’, Tōyō University Asian Studies 1 (Tōkyō, 1961), pp. 38–39.


24 See Madhyamakāvatāra vi. 95 (edited by L. de La Vallée Poussin, p. 198.14–15) with reference to the teaching mentioned in the Lankāvatārasūtra, ch. ii, that the tathāgatagarbha possessing all thirty-two laksyās of a buddha exists in satvatas ‘sentient beings’.

25 See Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan, sDom gsum rab dbye, f. 9a.

26 See Bu ston’s mDzes rgyan, passim.
view as its ‘intentional ground’ (doṅs gzi) the theory of nairātmya, śūnyatā and bhūtakoṭi as generally understood in the Mahāyāna. As will be seen below, the author of the Tarkajvalā evidently also had a similar view of the purport of the tathāgata-garbha doctrine.

This concept of intentionality is far from being a merely ad hoc hermeneutical device of some commentators, and it has behind it a long history in Indian semantics and semiotics. Already in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, vivakṣā ‘intention to express’ appears as a factor that can determine the use of a word-form. This vivakṣā may be either ordinary and ‘mundane’ (laukikī vivakṣā), which means that it corresponds with ordinary linguistic usage as covered by the usual rules of grammar; or it can on the other hand depend on the intention that a speaker has in a given set of circumstances and context (prāyoktri vivakṣā).28 When used independently, an expression is determined by the speaker’s intention to express; but if an expression is conditioned by external circumstances also it is said to be dependent.29 The later Sanskrit grammarians then extended the scope of this principle of intention. Jinendrabuddhi, the commentator on the Kāśikā, states that the determining factor in word-formation may be not only the existence of a corresponding object referred to but also the speaker’s intention to express.30 Saranādeva (twelfth century) also considers word-formation to be dependent on vivakṣā.31 We furthermore read in a paribhaṣāsūtra of the Cāndravyākaraṇa (no. 68): ‘The determination of the desired [word form] results from pervasion by an intention to express (vivakṣāvyāpter ištāvasa-yaḥ).’ Hence, according to this developed doctrine, it is the

28 Patañjali, Mahābhāṣya V. i. 16, which explains: laukikī vivakṣā yatra prāyasya sampratyayah / prāya iti loka vyapadiṣyate. Here loka = prāya is the general, as opposed to the individual in prāyoktri vivakṣā.
30 Nyāsa on Kāśikā I. i. 16: na hiha sādhaśāstre vastunaḥ sattaiva sādhaśāṃskārasya pradhānam kāraṇam / kim tathā vivakṣā ca ā.
31 Durghatavṛtti on II. ii. 8: vivakṣādhiṇā śabdavyutpattih. Cf. on I. iii. 36.
speaker’s intention to express that is decisive in the domain of word-formation; and the criterion of *vivakṣā* can also serve the purpose of justifying an unusual individual word-form (in the case of *prayoktṛi vivakṣā*) or frequently met word forms that are, nevertheless, not covered by the usual rules of grammar (in the case of *laukikī vivakṣā*).\(^{32}\)

As for the Buddhist logicians’ theory, it has been summed up by Dharmakīrti who states that *vivakṣā* is the cause linking word and meaning, and that linguistic convention (*saṃketa*) has the function of revealing this intention.\(^{33}\)

The concept of significative intention later came to occupy a perhaps even more important place from our present point of view in the Indian theories of aesthetics and poetics (*ālāṃkāra-śāstra*). There the secondary semantic function (*gaṇavṛtti*) based on transfer of meaning (*upacāra*) or metonymy — i.e. *lakṣaṇā* ‘indication’ — is at least partly governed by the concept of a speaker’s motive (*prayojana*) when uttering a sentence. For example, if in a sentence the primary denotation (*abhidhā*) of a word gives no intelligible and satisfactory meaning, it may be supposed that its use in that sentence is figurative or ‘indicational’ (*lakṣaṇika*). Nevertheless, in terms of this doctrine, the assumption of *lakṣaṇā* is no mere arbitrary procedure because the following conditions must operate: (i) the primary meaning of a word — the *mukhyārtha* conveyed by denotation (*abhidhā*) — must show incompatibility (*anupapatti*) with the intended purport of the sentence in which it is found, so that the former is as it was

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\(^{32}\) Cf. L. Renou, *Terminologie grammaticale du sanskrit*, s.v. *vivakṣā*. See also Helārāja on *Vākyapadīya* III. iii (*sambandha*). I concerning the *prayoktār abhiprayaḥ* ‘intention of the user [of speech]’, which is one of the three things conveyed by the use of words, together with the *ātiṃśam rūpm* of the word (Bhartṛhari’s *svarūpa*) and the *arthaḥ phalasādhanāḥ* (Bhartṛhari’s *bāhyo ’rthah*). Bhartṛhari himself (III. iii. 1a) speaks of the *jñānam prayoktuh*. Helārāja observes that the relation between word and the speaker’s intention is one of effect and cause (*kāryakārantaḥbhāva*, rather than the *vācyavācakabhāva* which obtains between *artha* and *sābda*).

\(^{33}\) *Pramāṇavārttika* i. 327ab: *vivakṣā niyame hetuḥ saṃketas tatprakāṣanāḥ.* The auto-commentary explains: *vivakṣayā hi sābdo ‘the niyame, na svaḥāvataḥ, tasya kvaścid apratibandhena sarvata tulyatoḥ / yatropi pratibandhas tadābhidhānaniyamābhāvāt / sarvaśābdaiḥ karaṇāṇāṃ abhidhānpraprasāṅgāt/tasmād vivakṣāpракāṣanāyābhipraṣyayavādanalakṣaṇāḥ saṃketaḥ kriyate /* (cf. ii. 16). In i. 65 Dharmakīrti contrasts the idea that words (vācaḥ) are dependent on *vivakṣā* with the idea that they are dependent on a thing (*vastuvāsa*).
cancelled by the latter (mukhyārthaḥ);34 (ii) then either the secondary meaning (gaunārtha) expressed by a word retains only a remote semantic connexion with the primary meaning and significative power of the word and is sanctioned rather by established and recognized linguistic convention (rūḍhi); 35 or the secondary meaning of the word is practically dissociated from the primary meaning, in which case it will be conditioned by the specific motive (prayojana) the speaker has when uttering the sentence in which the word occurs.36 In his Locana on the Dhvanyālokā (i.1 and i.4) of Ānandavardhana (ninth century), Abhinavagupta (tenth–eleventh century) has enumerated cancel­lation of the primary meaning (mukhyārthaḥ), cause (nimitta) and motive (prayojana) as the three ‘seeds’ of meaning-transfer (upacāra).

To quote an often–mentioned example of such a motivated utterance: according to many classical Indian poeticians and semiologists, the words gangayām ghoṣaḥ – meaning literally ‘the herdsman’s station in the Ganges [river]’ – is a case of prayojana vattā lakṣaṇā or motivated indication because the use of the unexpected and semantically anomalous expression gangayām ‘in the Ganges’ – instead of, e.g., gangātire ‘on the banks of the Ganges’ or some other similar expression – has the purpose of conveying the presence in this herdsman’s station of a high degree of coolness, purity and holiness (śītalatapavitavasevyatva), i.e. the very qualities which characterize the Ganges and which are thus transferred to this herdsman’s station by means of this particular ‘indica­tional’ turn of phrase.37

The concept of prayojana came, finally, to playa fundamental rôle in Indian semiology in the doctrine of poetic suggestion (vyājanā) or resonance (dhvani), i.e. that factor considered by

34 According to some sources, the incompatibility consists in tātparyānupapatti, i.e. in incompatibility with the true purport of the sentence with regard to the speaker’s intention. See e.g. Viśnātha Nyāyapaścādana, Siddhāntamuktavali 82; Dharmarājaḥavarindra, Vedāntaparibhāṣā, § iv. 30.
35 tadyogāḥ; mukhyārthasambandha or śākyasambandha; also nimitta. See Abhinavagupta, Locana (Kashi Sanskrit Series ed., 1940) i. 1 (p. 30) and i. 4 (p. 59).
36 Cf. Mammaṭa (second half of the eleventh century), Kāvyaprakāśa ii. 9; Viśvanātha (fourteenth century?), Śāhityadarpana ii. 3–7. On these and related points see e.g. K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian theories of meaning (Adyar, 1969).
37 See Abhinavagupta, Locana i. 4 (p. 60).
many authorities to constitute a third semantic function additional to, and distinct from, both primary denotation (abhidhā) and secondary indication (lakṣaṇā). Indeed, in his famous commentary on the Dhvanyāloka, Abhinavagupta has stated that this suggestive function of words belongs to the domain of prayojana.\(^{38}\)

It is of the greatest interest to observe that practically the same semiological concept and criteria have been applied in Buddhist hermeneutics to identify and define a scriptural statement that is intentional (ābhiprāyika) and in need of interpretative elicitation in a sense other than the obvious surface one (neyārtha) since it is non-definitive within the frame of a given philosophical system. Thus, before a scriptural passage can be characterized as being ābhiprāyika and neyārtha, its meaning must be shown to be cancelled by another teaching the meaning of which is, in a particular doctrinal system, recognized as final and definitive (nītārtha) and non-ābhiprāyika. In addition, it must refer indirectly, by a kind of philosophical-systematic ‘implicature’,\(^{39}\) to a certain ‘deep meaning’ which has not been directly conveyed to the addressed disciple by the statement in question but which is final and definitive. And, thirdly, the use of a non-definitive statement requiring further interpretative elicitation in another sense (neyārtha) must be conditioned by a definable and legitimate motive (prayojana) of the speaker — in the case of a Sūtra the Buddha himself who, in virtue of his expertise in means (upāyakauśalya), employs an ābhiprāyika and neyārtha statement as a device (upāya) in order to benefit his listener.\(^{40}\)

\(^{38}\) Abhinavagupta, Locana i. 17: dhvananām prayojānaviśayam (p. 148 f.). Cf. i. 4 (p. 60–61) and iii. 33 (p. 441–2).

\(^{39}\) For this use of the term ‘implicature’, see the present writer’s article in Journal of Indian Philosophy, 13 (1985), pp. 313 and 316 f.

\(^{40}\) The hermeneutical status of the Buddha’s teaching would thus differ significantly from that of the Vedic śrutī, inasmuch as the latter is considered by the Mīmāṃsākās to be authorless (apauruṣeya). In his Svārūti on the Pramāṇavārttika i (Śvārthānunānapariccheda) 325, Dharmakīrti — followed by Kāśyapagomin and Manorathānandin — observes that, according to this assumption of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā school, there could be no vivakṣā (linking śabda with artha), no samketa and no abhiprāya — in other words no authorial intention — for the Veda.

In Buddhist hermeneutics as traditionally practised, there can be no question of radically relativizing the intended purport of a canonical utterance or text (so-called semantic autonomy) and banishing the idea of authorial intention (so-called authorial irrelevance)
The Tibetan hermeneuticists have accordingly identified three characteristic factors that define a scriptural statement as intentional (*dgön pa can = abhiprayika) in the sense that it is of non-definitive meaning and, hence, in need of further interpretative elicitation in another sense (*drañ ba’i don or *bker ba’i don = neyārtha): (i) the motive (*dgos pa = prayojana) impelling the speaker (i.e. the Buddha) to give the teaching in question; (ii) the ‘intentional ground’ or intended ‘deep meaning’ (*dgön gzi) not conveyed (to the addressee) on the surface-level of the teaching in question, but only as it were by philosophical-systematic implicature and presupposition; and (iii) an incompatibility between the abhiprayika ‘surface’ teaching that is neyārtha and the actually intended non-abhiprayika ‘deep meaning’ that is nītārtha. This last factor, known as dnöṣ la gnod byed or incompatibility with the primary meaning, is clearly very close to the poeticians’ and semiologists’ mukhyārtha-bāḍha ‘cancellation of primary meaning’. And the first of the above-mentioned three factors, the motive, is equally close to the poeticians’ and semiologists’ prayojana. As for the second factor, the *dgön gzi (*abhipreta-vastu), it is parallel to (though probably not derived from or immediately reducible to) the concept of vyāṅgya, i.e. the meaning that is conveyed by the suggestive function of a word according to the dhvani theory of Indian poetics (which was itself apparently modelled on that of sphota).41

Let us now return to our scriptural statements that accept ātman, or that present the tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature as permanent, immutable, blissful, ātman, etc. In order to show that in favour of an interpretation, or ‘reading’, gained against the background of the reader’s (or listener’s) prejudgement or preknowledge. Buddhist hermeneutical theory, although it most certainly takes into account the pragmatic situation and the performative and perlocutionary aspects of linguistic communication, differs accordingly from much contemporary writing on the subject of literary interpretation and the hermeneutic circle. For criticisms of these recent trends in hermeneutics, see E. Betti, Teoria generale della interpretazione (Milan, 1955), and Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften (Tübingen, 1972); E. D. Hirsch, Validity in interpretation (New Haven, 1967) and Aims of interpretation (Chicago, 1976).

41 For the *dgön gzi see above, n. 27. And for some applications of this theory in Tibetan Sūtra hermeneutics, see Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu’ston Rin’chen grub, pp. 83–119, and La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra, pp. 158, 166, 199 n., 208, 212, 221 f., 399.
they are intentional (ābhiprāyika) and non-definitive because their meaning requires explication and further interpretation (neyārtha), it will be necessary to establish three things: (i) that they are cancelled by the teaching of the non-substantiality of the pudgala and the dharma, which is recognized in the Mahāyāna to be final and definitive; (ii) that the non-definitive ‘surface meaning’ relates intentionally – i.e. by systematic ‘implicature’ – to a ‘deep meaning’, viz. the bhūtakoti and śūnyatā or dharmanairatmya;\(^{42}\) and (iii) that the use of the intentionally motivated statement proceeds from certain identifiable and legitimate motives such as the above-mentioned wish on the Buddha’s part to attract and instruct those clinging to a Self (ātma-grāha), to encourage those who have little confidence in their own spiritual capabilities, and to eliminate pride based on the idea that one is superior to the irreligious and ‘damned’ icchantikas constitutionally unable (at least temporarily) to attain liberation.

The parallelism between the semantic theory of suggestion (vyājanā) and poetical resonance (dhvani) on the one hand and the Buddhist hermeneutician’s theory of ābhiprāyika and neyārtha teaching on the other is, therefore, striking. They seem to have been fully elaborated about the same time, for the aesthetic theory of vyājanā and dhvani was developed chiefly by Ānandavardhana and his commentator Abhinavagupta from the ninth to the eleventh century, whilst the Buddhist theory appears in well worked out form by the time of Ratnakarasiṃhi in the beginning of the eleventh century. The basic principles of this Buddhist hermeneutical theory however appear much earlier in the works of Candrakīrti (seventh century);\(^{43}\) and its germs are indeed traceable in such works as the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga (fourth century).

In Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasamgraha in particular, mention is made of the Buddha’s avatāra-ābhisamādhi (Tib. gzhug pa la ldem por dgon pa), that is, of that kind of allusive intention by means of which the Buddha is held by the Buddhist hermeneuticians to introduce certain non-Buddhists to the Śrāvakayāna through surface-level

\(^{42}\) See Lankāvatārasūtra ii, p. 78; and vi, p. 223.

\(^{43}\) In addition to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra vi. 95 (already cited above), see ibid., vi. 97; and his Prasannapadā i, pp. 41-43, and xv. 1, p. 276.
(samvärti) reference to a personal entity (pudgala), such a provisional teaching being in accord with the inclinations of these still immature addressees. And in his Madhyamakakārikās Nāgārjuna has observed that the Buddha sometimes made use of the designation (prajñāpita) ‘ātman’ and sometimes taught (deśita) anātman — in the manner so to say of the first two positions of a tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) — whilst on other occasions he taught that there is neither ātman nor anātman (xviii.6). According to Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā these three forms of teaching are meant to accord with the mental inclinations (āśaya) of distinct and progressively more advanced types of disciples (hinamadhyatma-vineyajana). The form of teaching based on a tetralemma is regarded by Nāgārjuna as an anuśāsana (xviii.8), that is, according to Candrakīrti, as a progressive and graded teaching (anupūravyā śāsanam) adapted in each stage to different degrees of addressees to be trained (vineyajana) by the Buddha.

Although only further detailed investigation can perhaps determine whether the literary or the philosophical application of these semiological and hermeneutical principles is older, the fact remains that virtually the same notions have found employment in both areas. This parallelism underscores once again the fundamental importance for the history of Indian thought of its exegetical and hermeneutical methodology based on analysis of language and meaning, as distinct from particular doctrines which of course vary considerably from school to school. These methods employed by the Indian thinkers appear, then, as a unifying thread behind the very great diversity of philosophical schools and even religions.

44 Asanga, Mahāyānasamgraha § 2.31 with Vasubandhu’s Bhāṣya (D, f. 154b), and *Asvabhāva’s Upanibandhana (D, f. 233b) which interprets the allusion to a pudgala in terms of an upapādika sattva.

The references to avatāraṇābhisamādhi as a means of reducing the addressed disciple’s terror (uttṛāsa) in the Mahāyānasūtraśālāṃkāra (xii. 16) and Bhāṣya — as well as in Sthiramati’s Veṭṭhibhāṣya (D, f. 240b) and *Asvabhāva’s Ṭīkā (D, f. 107a) — concern exclusively the Śrāvaka’s introduction to the Mahāyāna by the provisional teaching bearing on the existence of rūpa, etc., and not the introduction of the ‘outsider’ by provisional allusions to a pudgala (or ātman). On abhisamādhi and related terms, see D. Seyfort Ruegg in: C. Caillat et al. (ed.), Formes dialectales dans les littératures indo-āryennes (Paris, 1989), p. 299 ff.

45 Cf. Kāśyapaparivarta § 57; Nāgārjuna, Ratnavali ii. 3–4; and Āryadeva, Catuṣkātaka xiv. 21 with Candrakīrti’s comment which mentions a tetralemma based on the ātman notion. See the analysis in D. Seyfort Ruegg, Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (1977), pp. 7–9.
It is clear, however, that so powerful a hermeneutical instru-
ment as the idea of an intentionally motivated ‘surface’ teaching 
of provisional or non-definitive meaning requiring interpretation 
in a sense other than the obvious surface one, and opposed to a 
‘deep’ teaching of final and definitive meaning, had to be handled 
with care and restraint – and no doubt also as sparingly as possible 
in order not to be tainted with arbitrariness and disregard for a 
canonical corpus. Moreover, it is plain that the mere existence of 
a motive behind a teaching cannot alone suffice to justify the 
conclusion that it is ‘intentional’ (ābhiprāyika) in the technical 
sense in question, in other words that it is of provisional or non-
definitive value; for any teaching at all is motivated to the extent 
that its author has in view an intended meaning when he 
communicates it. This is indeed the reason the hermeneuticians 
have insisted that the other two above-mentioned conditions 
should also be satisfied.

II

An alternative solution to the problem raised by the status of the 
tathāgatagarbha and the theory of the absolute in the canonical 
texts dealing with it is suggested, however, by a careful analysis 
of the doctrine of the Sūtras and Śāstras expounding this doctrine 
with a view to determining its precise position in relation to the 
doctrine of non-substantiality (nairatmya) and Emptiness (śūnya-
tā), which is generally accepted in the Mahāyāna.

If we examine the form of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine that the 
Lāṅkāvatārāsūtra has described as comparable (at least prima facie) 
with the ātmavāda of the Tīrthikas, we in fact notice that it does 
not correspond exactly with the tathāgatagarbha teaching that has 
usually been set out in the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra and elsewhere, but 
rather with the idea that in all sentient beings there exists a 
spiritual principle already having the specific characteristics (la-
kṣaṇa) of perfect buddhahood, i.e. with an idea that is very similar 
indeed to the ātmavāda.46 Thus, according to the Lāṅkāvatārāsūtra, 
it is this idea that all sattvas are already in the full sense buddhas that 
is to be questioned. But the theory of an Embryo-Essence of the

46 See Lāṅkāvatārāsūtra ii, p. 77.15–78.1.
tathāgata usually taught in the majority of the Sūtras as well as in the Ratnagotravibhāga is hardly reducible to this latter idea, which the Buddhist would have to treat as either metaphorical or intentional when it appears in a scriptural text.\textsuperscript{47}

Moreover, the doctrine of śūnyatā is not repudiated either by the Ratnagotravibhāga (see i.156) and its Commentary or by the principal scriptural sources dealing with the tathāgatagarbha and the doctrines related to it. On the contrary, certain passages of the Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga and of the Śrīmālāsūtra it quotes\textsuperscript{48} even support a certain kind of assimilation of the tathāgatagarbha with śūnyatā (though in these passages the question of the precise meaning of śūnyatā remains open).\textsuperscript{49} Furthermore, the Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga effectively disposes of the notion that śūnyatā could be either an entity to which to cling or the destruction of a previously existing entity. Now the tathāgatagarbha has been presented in these sources in a way corresponding to this definition of Emptiness (Ratnagotravibhāga i.154–5 and i.12), so that some commentators consider the tathāgatagarbha doctrine to be in fact a restatement of the śūnyatā doctrine.\textsuperscript{50}

An analysis of the tathāgatagarbha theory in addition reveals that, if absolute reality on the so-called causal (gzi) level — viz. the tathāgatagarbha — or on the resultant (phala = 'bras bu) level —

\textsuperscript{47} It is to be noted that this latter form of the tathāgatagarbha teaching, which is on the face of it comparable with the ātmavāda, seems to be less frequently met with. See for example Mahābhārataśāstra, f. 181b, quoted in Bu ston's mDzes rgyan, fol. 6a (translated in Traité, p. 79). But contrast e.g. Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, kha, f. 134b, quoted in mDzes rgyan, f. 18a (translated in Traité, p. 103). In this connexion, the doctrines of the Tibetan Jo nān pa school, and the related doctrines of other schools, pose a problem that will have to be treated separately.

\textsuperscript{48} Ratnagotravibhāga–Commentary i. 154–5, quoting the Śrīmālādevīśimhanādasūtra, fol. 445a.

\textsuperscript{49} See also Laukikavatārasūtra ii, p. 79.8–9, and vi, p. 223.3–4, already cited. The gātan ston of the Jo nān pa and similar schools, as opposed to the rān ston, needs to be considered in this connexion.

\textsuperscript{50} See Ratnagotravibhāga i. 160 along with several of the Tibetan commentaries. On the hermeneutical tradition that assimilates the tathāgatagarbha and śūnyatā theories, and which is represented for example by the Tibetan dGe lugs pas, see Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra, p. 402 f.
viz. the dharmadhātu, buddhahood, etc. – has been described cataphatically by the positive terms ‘permanent’, ‘immutable’, ‘blissful’, etc., it is not because this reality is regarded as some kind of permanent substantial entity endowed with these attributes as inhering properties, but rather because the paramārtha is so characterized in order to distinguish it from the saṃvṛti level that is properly characterized by the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas of impermanent, painful, etc. It is therefore thought by some interpreters that, when applied to the unconditioned, this positive definition through inversion of what is specific to the conditioned does not imply the existence of the paramārtha as a permanent substantial entity established ‘in truth’, i.e. hypostatically (bden par grub pa). Inasmuch as such a definition uses terms in a descriptive and systematic context without, however, applying them to a thing regarded as an entity having self-existence (svabhāva), it is perhaps what might be called metatheoretical; that is, it does not refer to some objective, first-order entity. And, as noticed above, in the context of the description of Buddha-nature as ātman, our texts have themselves spoken of a designation (prajñāpti).

The positive description of absolute reality found in certain Buddhist texts proceeds, in addition, from what might be termed its gnoseological constitution. For these ‘qualities’ (dharma, guṇa) are thought of not as separable properties inhering in an entity as their substratum, but rather as inseparable (aviniṃbhaga) and as therefore constituting, or informing, absolute reality on the level of gnoseology.51

In terms of this interpretation – and irrespective of whether its wording is held to be explicit and literal (sgra ji bzin pa = yathārutarā-) or not – the tathāgatagarbha teaching is considered by many authorities to be of certain and definitive meaning (nītārtha). That is, according to the alternative interpretation being discussed here which has been favoured for example by the Tibetan Prāsaṅgikas of the dGe lugs pa school, because the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha relates in the last analysis to śūnyatā and nairatmya it must be of definitive meaning (nītārtha); for following the definition provided by the Akṣayamatirinirdeśasūtra, a Sūtra in which śūnyatā,

51 This gnoseological aspect has been of fundamental importance for the Jo nañ pa and related schools in Tibet.
38 THE BUDDHIST NOTION OF AN IMMANENT ABSOLUTE

ānimitta, apranīhiita, anabhisaṃskāra, etc., are taught is nītārtha.⁵² And here, in the frame of this Sūtra’s definition, the question whether the teaching is expressed literally and explicitly need not arise. Therefore, in this hermeneutical system at least, the term nītārtha will mean ‘of definitive meaning’ or ‘of certain meaning’ (Tibetan ries pa’i don), rather than ‘of explicit meaning’ (a usage that is appropriate in the hermeneutical system of the Vijñānavādins – who follow the Samdhinirmocanasūtra – and also of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas).

The version of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine found in the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra and other Sūtras of the same category can, moreover, probably even be regarded as being in addition of explicit meaning. For what these texts have spoken of is the presence of an Embryo-Essence (garbha) or Germ of the tathāgata in the conscious stream of all sentient beings. On the other hand, in its presently available form at least, the version of the teaching mentioned in the Lankāvatārasūtra according to which the tathāgatagarbha incarnate in sentient beings is endowed with the thirty-two perfectly developed characteristics of the buddha (p. 77) raises very considerable problems for Buddhist thought. And even though this version of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine is stated to refer to śūnyata, ānimitta, apranīhiita, etc., such a purport has presumably to be here as the intentional ground (dgonis gzi) or ‘deep meaning’ of an intentional (dgonis pa can = abhiprāyika) statement having as its motive (dgos pa = prayojana) the Buddha’s wish to eliminate the terror that immature people (bāla) feel for selflessness and non-substantiality (nairatmyasālsa), in other words their fear of Emptiness.⁵³

Now, as is well known, Śaṅkārācārya has sometimes been accused by his Brāhmanical opponents of being a Buddhist in disguise. In the present context what is of special interest is the at

⁵² See Candrakīrti’s quotation of the Sanskrit text of the Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra in his Prasannapadā i, p. 43. Compare also the Samādhirājasūtra vii. 5, also quoted in Prasannapadā i, p. 44.
least partial parallelism between the Buddhist’s positive description of absolute reality both by means of attributes that are the reverse of those properly applicable to the relative level and by means of characterization through inseparable constitutive qualities on the one side, and on the other Śaṅkara’s treatment of *satya* ‘truth’, *jñāna* ‘knowledge’ and *ananta* ‘infinite’ as constitutive qualities of *brahman*. According to his Bhāṣya on the *Taittirīyopanīṣad*, *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* are in fact distinctive characteristics proper only to *brahman*, which they thus differentiate from all else. Hence these essential characteristics are not mere attributes inhering in *brahman* as one member of a class; for *brahman* — the real — is unique. These epithets therefore define its uniqueness by delimiting (*niyantuṣṭva*) it from all that it is not, i.e. the unreal.\(^{54}\)

Despite very important differences in the philosophical background and problematics between Śaṅkara and the Buddhist philosophers in question, the similarity in the procedures and methods used to define ultimate reality is thus remarkable.

The suggestion that certain Buddhist and Brahmical notions of the absolute have some points of contact is therefore not unworthy of consideration. Indeed, we have already encountered some passages where the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* represents the Tīrthikas as readily assenting to that particular formulation of the Buddha’s teaching in which the existence of the Buddha-nature or *tathāgatagarbha* is emphasized. And elsewhere the same Sūtra goes so far as to say that Brāhmaṇa Tīrthikas have borrowed some of the Buddha’s teachings and incorporated them in their own scriptures.\(^{55}\) If he may be supposed to have been influenced, however indirectly, by earlier Buddhist thinking on the problem of the *paramārtha*, Śaṅkara could be a case in point.

In a remarkable passage the *Lankāvatārasūtra* moreover points to a certain equivalence between various names and notions of the

\(^{54}\) It has been suggested by M. Biardeau that this theory of the *Taittirīyopanīṣadbhāṣya* represents a final stage in the development of Śaṅkara’s thought, following on his apophaticism; see *Indo-Iranian Journal* 3 (1959), p. 100 (cf. *Journal asiatique* 1957, p. 371 f.). But P. Hacker has placed this Bhāṣya in the middle period of Śaṅkara’s philosophical development; see *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens* 12–13 (1968), pp. 129–30, 135, 147. Cf. also G. Maximilien, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 19 (1975), p. 117 f.

\(^{55}\) See Bu ston, *mDzes rgyan*, f. 22a–b (translated in *Traité* p. 113–14) and f. 27a (translated in *Traité*, p. 123–4).
supreme, which is called by some svayambhū, buddha, brahman (or: brahmā?), viṣṇu, iśvara, etc., and by others śūnyatā, tathatā, bhūtakoṭi, dharmaḍhātu, nirvāṇa, advaya; etc. And the great Svātantrika-Mādhyamika authority Bhāvaviveka (sixth century) remarks in the chapter of his Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās devoted to an exposition of reality (de kho na ādī = tattva) that the great Bodhisattvas Ārya-Avalokiteśvara, Ārya-Maitreya and others revere the supreme brahman (neuter) under the apparently paradoxical mode of non-reverence (anupāsanayoga). The commentary on the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās, the Tarkajvalā, in its section dealing with the Vedānta, adds that the absolute is brahman (or brahmā?) because it is essentially nirvāṇa (mya ṇan las 'das pa'i bdag ādī).

In the section of the Tarkajvalā devoted to Śrāvakayāna teachings it is nevertheless pointed out that the all-pervasiveness of the tathāgatagarbha and also the Vijñānavādin’s ādānavijñāna (= ālayavijñāna) has been taught for the sake of certain persons who have not freed themselves from the dogmatic postulation of a self (ātmagṛha). It may be that the author of this commentary (just like his later Prāsaṅgika counterpart Candrakīrti) himself regarded the tathāgatagarbha doctrine as intentional and non-definitive. It is furthermore remarked in the Tarkajvalā that the proposition that the tathāgata has not entered into Nirvāṇa and that he is not ‘extinguished’ (çī ba = śānta) – an idea found in the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra – would be incompatible with the fundamental principles of Buddhist thought (the dharmaḍdānas).

In reply to the suggestion that, in view of parallels between them, the nairātmya of the Buddhist is really similar to the Vedantic ātman, it is moreover explained in the sections of the

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56 Latikāvatārasūtra iii, p. 192–3.
57 Bhāvaviveka, Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā iii. 290: āryāvalokiteśāryamaitreyādīyāś ca sūrayāh / anupāsanayogena munayo yad upāsate //. See also Tarkajvalā iii, 289 f. (P. f. 140a) (cf. Indo-Iranian Journal 5 [1961–2], p. 273).
58 Tarkajvalā viii, f. 286b5 (Peking ed.). Cf. Indo-Iranian Journal 2 (1958), pp. 177 and 188. The ‘small fault’ (alpiaparaṇā) of the Aupaniṣadikas has been referred to by Śāntarakṣita in his Tattvasaṅgraha (330).
59 Tarkajvalā iv, f. 169a8.
61 Tarkajvalā iv, f. 169b1.
Madhyamakahavyakārikās and Tarkajvalā dealing with the Vedānta that this is not so. For nairatmya is precisely the absence of the self-nature characteristic of the Vedantic atman. Nor could that which is anatman be at the same time atman because of the incompatibility (virodha) of the two. And no comparison may be drawn with, for example, horse-nature that is at the same time not cow-nature (ba lañ gi no bo ma yin pa), that is, with a case of implicative and presuppositional (paryudāsa) negation rather than of the non-implicative and presuppositionless prasājya-negation involved in nairatmya. Accordingly, this bhāva-nīḥsvabhāvatā could never be an atman that is either a creator-agent (byed pa po = kartṛ, as in the theistic systems) or an enjoyer-agent (za ba po = bhokṣṭ, as in the Sāṃkhya), these entities being as unreal as the proverbial son of a barren woman. In so far as a cognitive object without self-nature is made the object of thought, it might perhaps be conceived of e.g. as single and unique; but this will be a mere mental construction, which is the source of imputation (samaropa).62

It is clear, then, that the authors of the basic Mahāyāna-Śāstras were no more ready to admit any form of substantialism on the level of the unconditioned than they were on that of the conditioned: the Mahāyānist pudgalanairatmya and dharmanairatmya make this quite impossible.

Moreover, for the canonical texts teaching the tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature, the Middle Way eschewing both eternalism and nihilism remained valid. And the affirmation of an absolute or atman opposed to anatman or nairatmya in a dichotomously conceptualized binary pair (vikalpa) based on discursive proliferation (prapanca) would, therefore, be no more acceptable than the purely nihilistic position of a dogmatic denial of the absolute.

Therefore, contrary to what has sometimes been suggested – and despite the undeniable parallels noted above between the problems treated and the methods used on the Buddhist and Brahmanical sides – the tathāgatagarbha theory, as well as the theory of the paramārtha with which it is connected, can not

62 Tarkajvalā viii, f. 305a-b.
constitute an 'absolute monism that is more Brahmanical than Buddhist'. Not only is this Buddhist theory not reducible to an \( \text{ätmavāda} \) — i.e. a theory positing a permanent and substantial \( \text{ätman} \) — but the non-duality (\( \text{advaya} \)) to which the Buddhist texts refer is not simply identical with the Vedāntic \( \text{advaita} \). In fact, in the perspective of the theory of the non-differentiation of \( \text{tathatā} \) and \( \text{dharmadhātu} \), there is non-duality (\( \text{advaya} \)) of the \( \text{dhātu} \) of the \( \text{sattva} \) and the \( \text{dhātu} \) of the \( \text{tathāgata} \), just as, according to the Madhyamaka, there is non-duality of \( \text{samsāra} \) and \( \text{nirvāṇa} \), or of the impure (\( \text{samalā} \)) and the pure (\( \text{nirmalā} \)) \( \text{tathatā} \). But the sources do not thereby posit the substantial existence of some kind of spiritual entity apart from which nothing would be real, in the sense of the monistic Advaita-Vedānta. (It is true that in the history of Buddhist thought we occasionally meet an ontological and more or less substantialist interpretation of absolute reality, and also of the \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \), for example in the tradition of the 'Void of the heterogeneous' (\( \text{gzan ston} \)) taught in the Tibetan Jo naṅ pa school and some of its Indian sources. But it should be noted that the Jo naṅ pa theory was inspired to a great extent by the Tantric notion of the immanence of buddhahood, and in particular by the Kālacakra system; and the Jo naṅ pas would appear to have extrapolated when they applied to the original \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) doctrine certain concepts of this Tantric system. This point is in need of further investigation.)

To sum up, in Buddhist Mahāyānist thought we find both a via negationis, in which reality is represented negatively and ap-

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63 See É. Lamotte \( \text{L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti} \) (Louvain, 1962), p. 36. Comparable views have been expressed by E. Frauwallner, in \( \text{Beiträge zur indischen Philologie und Altentumskunde} \) (Festschrift W. Schubring, Hamburg, 1951), p. 155 (= \text{Kleine Schriften}, p. 644) and \( \text{Anthropologie religieuse, Supplements to Numen}, \) Vol. II (Leiden, 1955), p. 129 (= \text{Kleine Schriften}, p. 699); and by H. Nakamura, \( \text{History of early Vedānta philosophy} \), i (Delhi, 1983), pp. 153–7, and 182 (cf. p. 136).

Such interpretations of the \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) and related doctrines would appear not only to have largely overlooked the fundamental questions of systematic exegesis and hermeneutics referred to above, but also to depend on a theory of language and communication in which non-referring or metalinguistic (and sometimes metatheoretical) expressions — i.e. 'counters' or 'chiffres' such as \( \text{tathāgatagarbha} \) and \( \text{ätman} \) as encountered in the texts quoted above — are treated as if they must necessarily designate substantial referents of an object-language. Such interpretations thus seem to derive not merely from historical-philological method, but also from a pronouncedly positivistic view of the world (and of language).
proached *apodictically*, and a *via* *eminence*, in which it is represented positively and approached *cataphatically*. The former approach is no doubt characteristic of the vast majority of Buddhist texts of both the earlier and later periods. But the latter approach is to be found both in the earliest texts (where we find allusions for example to an *amataṃ padam* and to *nibbāna* as *nīca, dhūva*, etc.64) and in the Mahāyāna. In neither of these cases would it however seem justified to assume the survival of some ‘pre-canonical Buddhism’ radically different from the canonical forms.65 The problem is surely more one of philosophy, hermeneutics, and linguistic description than of historical survivals.

Equally important, it would be quite incorrect to represent Buddhism as invariably asserting the non-existence of self and making a dogma of *nairatmya* and *śūnyatā*. While it is of course true that the known schools of Buddhism (with the apparent exception of the Vātsiputriya Pudgalavādins) rejected the current speculative theories concerning a substantial self, an authoritative Sūtra has nevertheless warned that the dogmatic view of Emptiness (*śūnyatādṛśti*) is even more dangerous than the individualist dogma (*pudgaladrśti*). And it is explained that *śūnyatā* is in fact release from all speculative views founded on discursive development of the dichotomously constructed conceptual opposition self/non-self, etc.66 For the Middle Way lies precisely ‘between’

64 See for example *Itivuttaka* II. ii. 6 (§ 43, p. 37): *attī ... ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asankhatam, no ce tam ... abhāvissa ajātaṃ ... asankhatam, nayidha jātassa ... sankhata sa nissaraṇaṁ paññāyeṣa.*

65 See for example the present writer’s remarks in *The study of Indian and Tibetan thought* (Leiden, 1967), pp. 9–13, 37–38.

66 Ṛkṣipaparivarta §§ 55–57, 64–65. See also Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* xiii. 8; and *Ratnagotravibhāga*-Commentary i. 32–33 (p. 28.5–13).
the extremes included in any such binary pair. As between the respective faults of the eternalist dogma and the nihilist dogma, then, all the schools of Buddhism would wish to say is probably that the nihilistic one may, in practice, be even more dangerous than its opposite because it makes spiritual effort impossible. But this clearly does not amount to a dogmatic positing of eternalism or the ātmanvāda.

What is of paramount importance in the last analysis is perhaps not so much whether absolute reality is to be described positively or negatively, as whether the theory adopted actually avoids representing this reality either as the nihilistic destruction of some (pre-existing) entity or as a real void to which one might cling dogmatically. This is because the Middle Way consists, as has been seen, precisely in the cessation of all dichotomous conceptual constructions (vikalpa) concerning a self as opposed to a non-self, etc. Hence it has been possible for the Mahāyāna Buddhist on occasion to make use even of the terms nītya, ātman, etc., in order to indicate, through characterization by inversion, or to point to absolute reality, while at the same time rejecting any view which posits an ātman as an eternal entity.

The Cognitive Status of the Tathāgatagarbha and the Absolute

If from the soteriological point of view the tathāgatagarbha theory somehow implies the immanence of the absolute – or, inasmuch as the tathāgatagarbha is 'still' obscured by adventitious impurities (āgantukamala), at least its proleptical presence – in all beings in Sāṃsāra, the question arises as to how a practiser is to realize it cognitively. For our sources not only state that absolute reality is beyond the range of ratiocinative thinking (atarkya) and free from the four extreme positions of discursive thinking (catuskoti) and that it cannot therefore be expressed verbally (avācya, anabhilāpya), but they also affirm that it is discursively inconceivable (acintya) and even unknowable (ajñeya). In other words, if

67 In Samādhirajāsūtra ix. 27 it is even stated that the wise person does not take a stand in a middle position either. On the rejection of the last two positions of the 'tetralemma' (catuskoti), see D. Seyfort Ruegg, Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (1977), pp. 1–71.
paramārtha is unthinkable, is not absolute reality in its function of Base or Support of spiritual practice (pratipatter ādāraḥ) – that is, the prakṛtistha-gotra or tathāgatagarbha – cognitively inaccessible also? And in this case are we not confronted with a curious, and indeed somewhat paradoxical, situation in which an absolute that is (at least proleptically) immanent in all sentient beings from the soteriological point of view would, nevertheless, be cognitively transcendent?

Concerning the gnoseological status of the tathāgatagarbha, one point seems to be clear. If the texts affirm that the paramārtha is ineffable, this means that discursive language cannot grasp its very nature; for such language is inextricably bound up with pragmatic and discursive usage (vyavahāra) and the dichotomizing conceptual construction (vikalpa) inherent in discursive proliferation (prapañca). And if these texts add that the paramārtha is unthinkable, this no doubt signifies that it cannot be the object of such conceptual thinking. But does it then follow that the paramārtha cannot be comprehended (adhitam-, etc.) by any form of knowledge, and that conceptual thinking and language can never point to it, by anticipation as it were (as in udbhāvanā-samvṛti)? Though the sources indeed speak frequently enough of comprehension (adhigama) of the absolute and state that it is to be known directly and introspectively (pratyatmavedaniya, etc.), the replies which the fundamental works on the tathāgatagarbha theory have given to these questions are unfortunately perhaps not quite as explicit as one might wish. And as a result later commentators are sometimes in disagreement about the exact gnoseological status of the paramārtha as well as of the tathāgatagarbha.

One group of thinkers has held that the tathāgatagarbha is in fact cognitively inaccessible and quite transcendent: not only is it beyond language (sgra = śabda) and discursive construction (rtog pa = kalpanā), but it cannot even be the object of a cognitive judgement (žen pa'i yul).68 This school can of course found its thesis on the Ratnagotravibhāga,69 and on its commentary which

68 See 'Gos lo tsā ba gZon nu dpal, Deb ther sion po, cha, f. 10b (Roerich, p. 349).
69 Ratnagotravibhāga i. 9 and 153.
quotes a number of scriptures to this effect. The Śrīmālāsūtra in particular states that the Mind which is very pure by nature is hard to comprehend; it is only accessible to Bodhisattvas endowed with the great dharma, and not to Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas who only approach it through confidence or ‘faith’ (śraddhā) in the tathāgata.

Another group of thinkers has on the contrary come to the conclusion that the paramārtha is accessible to the practiser, at least to a certain degree, even on the earlier stages of the path. This school also considers that it is even possible to indicate – to point to – it by words. This is indeed what the Sūtras and Śāstras are concerned with doing. For their interpretation these commentators can also find authority in the systematic exegesis of the scriptures which make the paramārtha immanent not only soteriologically but also gnoseologically.

This problem of the transcendence as against the immanence of the absolute is closely connected with the idea of confidence or ‘faith’ (śraddhā).

The Ratnagotrabihāga, following Sūtras quoted in its commentary, has indeed stated that the paramārtha can only be cognitively approached (anu-gam-) through faith. And the commentary sums the matter up by saying that dharmatā is the object of neither deliberative thinking (na cintayitavyā) nor dichotomizing conceptual construction (na vikalpayitavyā), and that it can therefore be the object only of convinced adhesion (adhimoktavyā).

Convinced adhesion (adhimukti, adhimokṣa) figures in fact as one cause of the purification of the tathāgatadhātu from the

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70 Ratnagotrabihāga-Commentary i. 12, 25 and 153.
71 Śrīmālāsūtra, f. 450a, quoted in the Ratnagotrabihāga-Commentary i. 25 (p. 22.1–4).
72 E. H. Johnston in his edition of the Ratnagotrabihāga-Commentary i. 12 (p. 12–14) – a quotation from the Śrīmālāsūtra – reads sūcyate ‘is indicated, pointed to’. L. Schmithausen has proposed altering this reading to ity ucyate (Weiner Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 15 [1971], p. 137). The term sūcyate is found again in Ratnagotrabihāga-Commentary i. 93, where it is applied to the caturākāragaṇaṃśpattypasambhinālaṅkaṇo nirvāṇadhātuḥ; and in i. 1, in connexion with the seven-fold adhigamārtha.
73 Ratnagotrabihāga-Commentary i. 153 and i. 1; compare also v. 9.
74 Ratnagotrabihāga-Commentary i. 153 (avataraṇīkā).
adventitious impurities that obscure it; it leads to the attainment of reality, and it is the antidote against the īcchantika's hostile resistance (pratīgha) to the dharma of the Mahāyāna. And if a person is so to speak committed (adhimucya) to the immutability of the dharma, he does not experience fatigue with regard to the dharma.

The circumstance that absolute reality can be cognitively approached (anu-gaṁ-, ā-gaṁ-) through faith holds true, according to the sources, not only for the worldling (pythagjana), but also for the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, who can comprehend the inconceivable (acintya) fact of both the naturally pure Mind (prakṛtipariśuddhacitta) — i.e. the tathāgatagarbha — and its state of defilement (upakṛṣṭa) only through faith (śraddhā). And it also holds true for the ‘young’ Bodhisattva newly started on his course (navayānasamprasthita); for such a young Bodhisattva is not yet able to know the tathāgatagarbha as absolute sūnyatā because his mind is distracted from Emptiness (sūnyatāvīkṣipta) by reason of the fact that he mistakenly takes it either to be the destruction of a previously existing entity or to be some negative entity to which to cling.

It is for these reasons that the transcendence of absolute reality and of the tathāgatagarbha which can only be comprehended through faith has been maintained by the Tibetan commentators rNog blo ldan šes rab (1059–1109), the pupil of the Kashmiri scholar Sajjana, and by gTsan nag pa (twelfth century), and then later by Bu ston (1290–1364) (who in any event assimilated the tathāgatagarbha directly with the dharmakāya on the resultant level of the Fruit, i.e. with the buddha-level).

But other interpreters, especially those of the dGe lugs pa school, have laid the emphasis elsewhere. They have preferred to

75 Op. cit., i. 36. 76 Cf. op. cit., i. 12.
81 Ratnagotrabhāga-Commentary, avatāranīkā to i. 154–5; and the Śrīmālāsūtra quoted thereafter.

It may be recalled here that these texts too support the assimilation of the tathāgatagarbha to sūnyatā: tathāgatagarbhaṁ eva tathāgatāṁ sūnyatāṁ (Śrīmālāsūtra, f. 445a) and tathāgatagarbhasūnyatārthaṁ (Ratnagotrabhāga-Commentary i. 154–5 avatāranīkā, p. 75.17). Compare pp. 33 and 36 above.
regard faith above all as a necessary preliminary that is required to calm and clarify the mind (cf. cittaprasāda) so that one may be able to understand the paramārtha. This shift in emphasis regarding the gnoseological status of the paramārtha and the rôle of faith is due to several reasons, some of which evidently proceed from systematic exegesis. In the first place, these interpreters observe that śraddhā – to the extent that it is based on a communication received from outside in the form of an instruction from a teacher or a text – is necessarily bound up with language, and hence with vikalpa and prapañca. (This is a principle emphasised also by the Buddhist epistemologists.) Now it is, as we have seen, axiomatic with all the schools that the ultimate comprehension of absolute reality must be direct and immediate, and that it is attained finally through non-conceptual gnosis (jñāna = ye šes); and it is therefore plain that faith could never be considered the direct and immediate instrument of the ultimate comprehension of the paramārtha. Hence, without in any way minimizing the transcendental absoluteness of ultimate reality, the advocates of this interpretation stress a certain immanence of the paramārtha. And, needless to say, faith understood as receptive calmness and clarity of spirit (prasāda) remains highly prized by these thinkers also. It is, moreover, to be noted that the passage of the Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary (i. 153) quoted above does not really stand against this interpretation; for in it the opposition is not between faith and direct non-conceptual gnosis, but between faith and ratiocinative or discursive knowledge. The implication, then, is that the paramārtha may indeed have to be approached in the first instance through faith – that is, with receptive clarity of mind – but this certainly does not deny that its actual comprehension ultimately takes place through non-conceptual gnosis.

In the second place, these interpreters differ from certain other Buddhist schools in maintaining that not only the Nobles (ārya) belonging to the Vehicles of the Bodhisattva but also Nobles of the other two yānas – the Ārya-Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas – have also to be able to comprehend the non-substantiality of the dharmas as well as of the individual (pudgala). Thus, according to them, the difference between the advanced adepts of the three

82 Cf. Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary i. 12.
yānas in this matter rests in the precise mode of their comprehension of sūnyatā, which is fuller in the case of the Ārya-Bodhisattva than in the case of the Ārya-Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha. Following this interpretation, the references in Śūtra (the Śrīmālāsūtra, etc.) and Śāstra (the Ratnagotrabhāga and its Commentary) to the essential rôle of faith in understanding the paramārtha have therefore to do with the fact that only the Bodhisattva endowed with the sharpest faculties (tiksṇendriya) is able to understand it in all its aspects exclusively through his transcending discriminative knowledge (prajñā) without first having to have recourse to faith. Consequently, faith may properly be said to be a characteristic feature of the other two ways, that of the Śrāvaka and that of the Pratyekabuddha. In sum, although the object of the Śrāvaka’s and the Pratyekabuddha’s understanding — nairatmya and sūnyatā — is the same as the Bodhisattva’s, the mode of their comprehension is not as full and all-embracing, and their understanding in this sense is only partial.

It thus appears that these thinkers have drawn what we might call the systematic consequences of the gnoseological implications of the tathāgatagarbha theory by combining it with the theory of the One Vehicle (ekayāna). In fact, apart from its classificatory or taxonomic function (and an occasional polemical rôle), the doctrine of the yānas has a very clearly marked gnoseological content in Mahāyānist thought. It is very difficult if not impossible to reconcile the theory of the three ultimately distinct Vehicles of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva, only the last of which would lead to buddhahood, with the theory of the tathāgatagarbha, which affirms that the germinal capacity for buddhahood is present in all sentient beings without exception.


84 A rather different view of the rôle of faith in the tathāgatagarbha literature has been put forward by S.-B. Park, Buddhist faith and sudden enlightenment (Albany, 1983). There, in his interpretation of the Ta ch’eng ch’i hsin lun ascribed to Aśvaghosa, he opposes what he terms ‘patriarchal faith’ (Chinese tsu hsin, implying ‘I am buddha’) to ‘doctrinal faith’ (Chinese chiao hsin, implying ‘I can become buddha’).
and which can therefore be thought to imply that they are all destined sooner or later to become buddhas. But the ekayāna theory, which holds that all vehicles ultimately converge in a single course leading to buddhahood, is quite in harmony with, and complementary to, the theory of the tathāgatagarbha. 85

**BUDDHA-NATURE AND PARAMĀTMAN IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE**

If we now consider the Buddha-nature or *tathāgatagarbha* and the Buddhist *paramātman* in a comparative perspective, in the light of the complex relationship seen in the transmitted texts of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* 86 between the ātman idea of the Brahman Tirthikas and these Buddhist theories — and, indeed, between the Brāhman Parivrajakas and the Buddha — several explanatory models suggest themselves.

Are we perhaps confronted here with a quite straightforward example of historical influence exercised by Brahmanism on Buddhism? And, if this be the case, do we find here a case of ‘just use’ — i.e. something comparable to the *usus iustus* or *chrēsis* of non-Christian ideas in early Christianity discussed by Paul Hacker 87 — whereby Buddhists might have sought thoroughly to transform and reorient for their own needs an idea originally, and fundamentally, foreign to them? Or was this an attempt on the part of the Buddhists to take over and incorporate, in the specific sense of Hacker’s inclusivism, 88 a Brahmanical idea with only superficial modification, subordinating it merely in a formal way to Buddhism and, perhaps, seeking at the same time to conceal their debt to a Brahmanical concept? Or, again, do we have here

85 On the gnoseological implications of the ekayāna doctrine, see *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, especially pp. 177–243.
86 See above, pp. 21–24.
88 See P. Hacker, *op. cit.*, Index *s.v.* Inklusivismus; and his article ‘Inklusivismus’ in G. Oberhammer (ed.), *Inklusivismus* (Vienna, 1983), pp. 11–28. As examples of inclusivism in Buddhism — which Hacker further characterizes as ‘inclusivism of strength’ — Hacker cites the Buddhist notion of *tapas* and Brahmā (p. 23 ff.). It should be made clear that Hacker has not himself mentioned the Buddhist *tathāgatagarbha* or *paramātman* theories as examples of either inclusivism or *chrēsis*. 
THE TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION OF BUDDHISM

a Buddhist effort to find a perhaps syncretistic accommodation with Brahmanism? Or, on the contrary, might a fundamental religious and philosophical problem – one that is common, mutatis mutandis, to so many schools of Indian thought – be coming here to the surface from a common Indian religious and philosophical ground while taking on a specifically Buddhist stamp? (These alternative hypotheses are not all mutually exclusive, and more than one process could conceivably have been involved in the development of the Buddhist theories in question.) A full and detailed study of the Mahāyānist Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra and all the related texts will be required to enable us to decide which of these alternatives is (or are) applicable in each individual case.

One thing seems at all events clear: the antithesis anātman/ātman cannot, in the present context, be used as a criterion for distinguishing between the Buddhist and the Brahmanical Tīrthika.

Against the first alternative – the hypothesis in its general form of a Buddhist borrowing from Brahmanical thought as entertained for example by E. Frauwallner, É. Lamotte and H. Nakamura89 – arguments have been advanced above based not only on the fundamentally important place occupied in Mahāyānist thought by these theories and their relation to certain concepts found in the old Buddhist canon – e.g. the natural luminosity of Mind, the notion of a spiritual Germ and that of a stable, permanent and immortal state (pāda)90 – but also on the distinctive and specific way that these theories have been taught and explicated in the relevant Buddhist Śūtras and Śāstras which makes any simple identification between them most difficult and problematic. In these circumstances, then, it will not do to treat them as foreign imports at some point in the history of Buddhism under the overwhelming influence of Hinduism and/or Brahmanical philosophy. The problem of the natural luminosity of Mind, the ‘buddhomorphic’ Ground of Awakening and the relation between it and buddhahood as the Fruit of Awakening is in fact too deeply embedded in Buddhist thought, and it is too significant religiously and philosophically,

89 See above, n. 63.  90 See above, p. 43.
for such an explanation to be wholly satisfactory. And the same considerations militate equally against the 'just use' version of the hypothesis of historical borrowing by Buddhists from Brahmanism. As for the version of this hypothesis based on religio-philosophical inclusivism, although (in agreement with Hacker's model) a resemblance—or, rather, parallelism—exists between the ātman of Brahmanical thought and the tathāgatagarbha and paramātman theory of the Buddhists, and although the superiority of the latter to the former is asserted or assumed by the Buddhists, the fact remains that (contrary to Hacker's model) they are not normally identified by the Sūtras and Śāstras that teach them; whereas the difference between the two is not only noted but is considered fundamental by these same sources.

Concerning the second main hypothesis of a Buddhist accommodation with Brahmanical thought, it is important to observe that such a view of the matter is not unknown to the Buddhist tradition. But its applicability will depend on precisely what is to be understood by accommodation, and also on what status is assigned to the relevant theories in Buddhist systematic hermeneutics. The accommodation model is compatible with the view mentioned above found in important sections of the Buddhist tradition according to which, in the Buddha's allusions to an ātman or pudgala, there is involved a certain avatārañābhisamādhi, that is, an 'allusive intention of introduction' effecting the attraction (ākāraṇa), by means of a provisional and 'intentional' (abhiprayika) teaching, of persons attached to the idea of a permanent ātman, who are thus not yet ready to receive the Buddha's ultimate and definitive teaching of non-substantiality (nairatmya) since it inspires terror (samtrāsa) in them.91 According to this view, the intentional teaching in question will be considered as neyārtha and, consequently, as not giving expression to the Buddha's definitive (nītārtha) doctrine.

In such a form of accommodation with the Brahmanical ātman, there is no question of a syncretism between Buddhism and

91 See above, p. 38.
The problem posed by the theories of the Buddha-nature, the 'buddhomorphic' Ground of Awakening and the paramātman cannot, however, be evacuated by simply treating the Śūtras teaching them as 'intentional' and neyārtha. For, as seen above, such teachings are too well-documented and philosophically rooted in several strata of Buddhist thought. They are indeed treated by a considerable part of the Buddhist hermeneutical tradition as non-intentional and nītārtha, for they are explicated in such a manner as to be consonant with the definitive teachings of nairātmya and śūnyatā according to the criterion established by the Aṣṭāyamatinirdeśasūtra and the Samādhirājasūtra. And, above all, they have been set out in a specifically Buddhist manner. Hence, following this view too, there is neither inclusivism nor syncretism, and also no conclusive evidence of usus iustus.

In sum, in its older texts as well as in more recent ones, the Buddhist canon contains references to what can be regarded as an absolute on the level of Ground or Fruit. These references can be neither interpreted away nor overlooked; and it would be as misleading to assign them an exclusively precanonical or protocanonical status as it would be to regard them as exclusively late and non-canonical. In the Mahāyāna these ideas have found clear expression in the theories of the Buddha-nature and tathāgatagarbha as the buddhomorphic Ground of buddhahood expounded in the tathāgatagarbha-Sūtras and the related Śāstras such as the Ratnagotravibhāga (ch. i), the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (ch. ix) and the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (ch. i), and also in the Tantras.

Moreover, a positive theory and a cataphatic approach both to this Ground and to buddhahood are well documented in the history of Buddhist thought beside the predominant apophatic theory. Sometimes these two doctrines appear as complementary, or indeed as incommensurable, theories. (This is the case in particular when they are developed into the theory of Emptiness


93 See above, pp. 37–38.
of own-nature [rañi ston] and Emptiness of the heterogeneous [gžan ston].) More often, the one is considered to be of provisional meaning requiring elicitation in another sense (neyārtha) and to be hierarchically subordinate to the other, which is definitive and of certain value (nītārtha). (This interpretation is also available when the rañi ston and gžan ston theories are regarded as antithetical.)

Finally, and most importantly, the tathāgatagarbha and paramātman theories in Buddhism, together with the procedure of characterization of the absolute by inversion in relation to the relative,⁹⁴ may be seen as intended to neutralize and cancel both ātmavāda and anātmavāda in so far as they represent a binary pair of conceptually antithetical positions that the Buddhist Middle Way is to transcend. Thus, at a certain stage in Buddhist thought, these theories serve as a sort of metatheory that founds a metalinguistic description of the absolute — which is itself inexpressible within the binary structure of discursive thinking (vikalpa) and the four positions of the tetralemma (catuṣkoti), and hence in a language presupposing positive and negative entities.⁹⁵

In the light of the available evidence, then, it appears difficult to maintain that, far from denying the Upaniṣadic ātman, the Buddha only denied what was mistakenly believed to be the ātman, and that the Mahāyānasūtraśāṅkara and the Ratnagotraṭṭābhāga-Commentary have continued in the line of the Upaniṣadic ātman doctrine, as has been argued by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya in his nevertheless challenging and well-documented book on ātman-brahman in Buddhism.⁹⁶ It may be the case that the Buddha and the older Buddhist texts did not negate the ātman in due propositional form, and that such a negation belongs to later sources only. But to conclude that the old Buddhist tradition was in basic agreement with the Upaniṣadic ātman doctrine is quite another matter, especially when it is anything but certain that this older tradition was even familiar with the Upaniṣads.⁹⁷ The overwhelming weight of the Buddhist tradition clearly does not support this conclusion. And its acceptance would not only imply

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⁹⁷ See above, p. 20.
that the majority of Buddhists have misunderstood the Buddha's teaching but overlooks the highly important distinctions between the ātman and the Buddhist tathāgatagarbha and paramātman made in the Buddhist Sūtras and Śāstras treating the latter.

The theories in question accordingly seem to be no less deeply rooted and motivated in Buddhist thought than is the ātman theory in other forms of Indian thought. But rather than either an identity or a convergence of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine with the Brāhmaṇical ātmavāda we have here a distinct theory that stands in a highly interesting tension with the ātmavāda. We have also found the Buddhists sometimes sharing a common stock of philosophical and exegetical methods with the Brahmanical schools. But these methods are variously applied on each side. Historically they are sometimes even attested for the first time in Buddhist texts, without it however being possible to prove that they actually originated there.98 Be this as it may, the Buddhists have concluded that the Brahmanist Tīrthikas' doctrine of the ātman (as they understood it) was both radically incoherent in itself99 and incompatible with the Buddha's intention.

Thus we seem to have distinct, and unconfatatable, theories and treatments of problems which are deeply embedded in Indian thought. They emerge from a common ground or substratum of religious and philosophical thinking but remain in a relation of tension.

When referring to a common ground or substratum, it should then be clear that it is not being suggested here that Buddhist thought may be assimilated or reduced to another system called Brahmmanism or (in the narrower sense) Hinduism. What we call Indian Buddhism is the creation of Indians, and very often of Brahmans, in the context of Indian civilization; but it is a distinct creation beside Upaniṣadic and later Vedāntic thought. When considering the Brahmanical ātman and the Buddhist theories in question, the common ground and the differences have equally to be kept clearly in mind.

98 See above, pp. 31, 33–34. 99 See above, p. 25.
The Great Debate between ‘Gradualists’ and ‘Simultaneists’ in eighth-century Tibet

INTRODUCTION

For the Tibetologist and historian of Buddhism, and equally for the specialist in comparative religion and intercultural studies, the remarkable encounter that took place in Tibet in the second part of the eighth century between the traditions of a non-scholastic, ‘spontaneist’ and more or less quietist Dhyāna (Ch’an) Buddhism – represented by several Chinese and Korean Ho-shangs and in particular by their best-known protagonist in Tibet, the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen¹⁰⁰ – and the scholastically highly developed and monastically organized Yogācāra-Mādhyamika tradition of India – represented by Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla – is a subject of very considerable interest.

This encounter of two traditions and the ensuing confrontation between its representatives have often been described as a Sino-Indian or Indo-Chinese controversy, debate or council. And the debate has been referred to by scholars as the Council of IHa sa (Demiéville), the Council of bSam yas (Tucci) and, more

¹⁰⁰ On the name Mo-ho-yen, as well as on the epithet ho-shang (Tib. hva šaṅ) derived from Skt. upādhyāya ‘master’, see P. Demiéville, Le concile de Lhasa (Paris, 1952), pp. 9 ff.

It should be recalled that other Ho-shangs such as Me ‘go/mgo and Kim (Ch. Chin, below, n. 116) had preceded Mo-ho-yen in Tibet. See e.g. sBa bṣad, ed. mGon po rgyal mtsihan (Beijing, 1982) (= G), pp. 6–10, 65, 67–68; ed. R. A. Stein (Paris, 1961) (Zabs btags ma version = S), pp. 4–6, 8–10, 55, 57; dPa’ bo gTsug lag phren ba, mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, ff. 115a5, 116a4. The Chos ‘byunī by Ne’u Pāṇḍi ta, the sNon gyi ston Me’ bo tshoṅ ba, ed. T. Tsepal Taikhang, Rare Tibetan historical and literary texts from the library of Tsepon W. D. Shokabpa, I (New Delhi, 1974), f. 15a (p. 87), indeed mentions their presence already at the time of King Sron btsan sgam po in the seventh century; and Bu ston (Chos ‘byunī, f. 124b6) gives the name Ma ḫa da va tsho, while the Deb ther dmar po (f. 16b = p. 35) gives the name Ma ḫa da ba. Cf. P. Demiéville, Concile, p. 11, n. 4, on the hva śaṅ Mahādeva at the time of Sroṅ btsan sgam po.
recently, the Council of Tibet (Demiéville and Ueyama). It should be noted at the outset that in the strict ecclesiastical sense this confrontation was not, however, a council, nor was it even a synod. The Tibetan historical sources have most often represented it as a debate (rtsod pa) in the form of an investigative discussion (gšags) between two parties that took place, in quite classical Indian and Buddhist style, with the Tibetan ruler acting as witness and arbiter (dpañ po = sākṣin). In the Chinese texts from Dunhuang, the discussion between the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen (Tib. Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna or Mahā yan) and his interlocutors is presented mainly in the form of a series of polemical questions put to Mo-ho-yen with his replies.101 In the Tibetan Dunhuang documents (and in the bSam gtan mig sgron),102 Mahāyāna’s teachings take the form of aphorisms or logia.

At the beginning of the discussion between Kamalaśīla and Mo-ho-yen as described in Tibetan sources, the Chinese Master asks whether, being senior in residence, he will be required either to put questions or to answer them. Kamalaśīla replies that he should discuss in accordance with his true thinking (dgongs pa ltar šags thob cig, sBa bzad, S, p. 57; see also Naṅ ral, Chos ′byun Me tog sning po, ed. R. O. Meisezahl, f. 430a2), or that he should formulate his thesis (pratijñā) in accordance with his true thinking (dgongs pa ltar dam bca’ ŋog cig, sBa bzed, G, p. 68), or that he should discuss his intended theory (dgongs pa’i lta ba la šags thob cig, dPa’ bo gTsus lag phreṅ bca, mkhas pa’i dga’ ston, f. 116b7). According to a passage of Wang Hsi’s Cheng-li chūeh, Mo-ho-yen requested a discussion with the ‘Brahman monk’ (f. 128a), but Mo-ho-yen is later shown describing himself as unfit for debate because of his advanced years and asking the King to put an end to the controversy (f. 143a). Indeed, what he was obliged in the

101 See Demiéville, Concile. The source of the questions put to Mo-ho-yen according to Wang Hsi’s Cheng-li chūeh is the so-called ‘Brahman monk’ (Concile, pp. 39–40), presumably Kamalaśīla.

The question and answer form of discussion was evidently used also in cases where there appears to have been no debate, for example in T’an-k’uáng’s ‘Dialogues’ translated by W. Pachow, A study of the twenty-two dialogues of Mahāyāna Buddhism (Taipei, 1979), and in Hung-jen’s ‘Discourse’ translated by W. Pachow, Chinese Buddhism (Washington, 1980), pp. 35–53. For T’an-k’uáng and his rôle in connexion with the problems posed by the ‘Great Debate’, see below, p. 128.

102 See below, p. 66.
discussions to state, following the Sūtras, was, he says, conceived only as an answer to the questions put to him; it was not the true system of his Dhyāna, which is ineffable (ff. 153a-155a).

In connexion with this encounter Demiéville once wrote: 'En matière d'histoire tibétaine ... il faut se méfier des méfiances hâtives'.\(^{103}\) In the case of what will be referred to here as the Great Debate, and of the complex issues occupying the ‘Gradualists’ and ‘Simultaneists’ in their encounter, the sources need to be studied with great attentiveness and care using every instrument that philological, historical, religious, philosophical and hermeneutical analysis can place in our hands. Our sources often differ as to details, and sometimes they diverge on more important matters too. Some of them are contemporary with the events related, or they at least reproduce accounts ultimately going back to these events. Other sources are on the contrary later, they certainly contain interpretations and some distortions, and they may partake of what has been called the ‘invention of tradition’.\(^{104}\) They are all of course the product of intellectual and historical processes that need to be identified and reconstructed. It would probably be illusory, however, to think that from any of these sources we can now retrieve a definitive factual version of events exactly as they happened. But to say this is not to espouse historical scepticism or agnosticism. For it is of the greatest interest to investigate the accounts of these formative events in the history of Tibetan civilization and thought provided by Tibetan sources, and especially by the histories written before the middle of the fourteenth century, and to discover how their views of the Great Debate relate to Buddhist religious and

\(^{103}\) Concile, p. 18.

\(^{104}\) The invention of tradition is the title of a book of essays, edited by E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (Cambridge, 1983), dealing with rather different situations in modern England, Scotland, Wales, continental Europe, India and Africa; and the use of the expression here should not be understood as implying an identification with such situations. For the bSam yas monastic cantre, one might compare also the concept of ‘Lieux de mémoire’, the title of a collection of essays edited by P. Nora (Paris, 1986).

On the constitution of tradition in the case of Ch’an Buddhism in the Sung period — after a break in the clan and school traditions of the T’ang — see H. Schmidt-Glintzer, Die Identität der buddhistischen Schulen und die Kompilation buddhistischer Universalgeschichten in China (Munich, 1982), p. 27 ff.
philosophical history. This is what will be essayed in the following, and an attempt will be made to see what light these views throw on religious and philosophical currents in Tibet and in Buddhism. In this way we shall be able to see how Tibetan Buddhists received and reacted to two important and distinct traditions within Buddhism and to the Chinese and Indian masters who were the transmitters of these traditions.

Although the accounts we find in the extant versions of the sBa bzed, in the Chos 'byun Me tog sūn po of Naṅ Ňi ma 'od zer, in Bu ston's Chos 'byun, and in the mKhas pa'i dga' ston of dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba differ in several respects, what happened seems in broad outline to have been the following according to the Tibetan sources.

In the third quarter of the eighth century, during the reign of Khri Sron Iide btsan, (rg. c. 755–794?), one of the foremost Buddhist masters of the time, Śaṅkara, was invited to Tibet with a view to establishing Buddhism on a firm and lasting institutional and philosophical basis. Śaṅkara was responsible for the ordination of the first Tibetan monks according to the rite of the Mulasarvāstivāda Vinaya (perhaps in 779) and for the foundation (in perhaps 787 or in 775–779) of bSam yas, the first monastic centre to be established in central Tibet. In the course of his work in spreading the Buddhist Dharma and establishing the Tibetan Saṃgha, Śaṅkara encountered influential Buddhist masters of Chinese origin who were known in Tibet by the generic name hva śāri derived from the Chinese word ho-shang (Skt. upādhyāya). Around the teachers of both Chinese and Indian origin who were active in propagating Buddhism there then gathered a number of Tibetan monk-disciples and lay followers. And as a consequence of this teaching activity flowing from both

105 Extracts relevant to the Great Debate from the sBa bzed (Zabs btags ma version) and dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba's mKhas pa'i dga' ston, as well as from Bu ston's Chos 'byun and some later sources, have been assembled by G. W. Houston, Sources for a history of the bSam yas debate (St. Augustin, 1980).

106 Many contemporary Tibetan historians however place the birth of Khri Sron Iide btsan, or his accession to the throne, in the year 790, and his death in 858 (or 848). See for example Tshe tan žabs druṅ, bsTan rtsis kun las btsus pa (mTsho sīon Printing House, 1982).
the Chinese and Indian Buddhist traditions (not to speak of important Central Asian influences) there came to the fore certain differences between the doctrinal and monastic traditions of Śāntarakṣita’s school and the apparently less organized meditative and teaching traditions of the. Ho-shangs that were linked in particular with Ch’ an (Dhyāna) Buddhism. Then, owing apparently to an accident, Śāntarakṣita died in Tibet. And his disciple Kamalāśīla, evidently already renowned in India, was invited, probably in accordance with his master’s recommendation to the King, to continue Śāntarakṣita’s work in Tibet.

It was probably in the 780s or early 790s that the tension between the two Buddhist currents of thought mentioned above reached a critical point. According to a number of Tibetan historical sources, a full-scale debate was then arranged between the party led by Kamalāśīla, the successor of the Ācārya-Bodhisattva Śāntarakṣita, and the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna. It is said to have taken place under the supervision of the ruler Khri Sroṅ lde btsan himself at the Byaṅ chub gliṅ temple of the bSam yas monastic centre. In this debate as reported by our sources, Kamalāśīla appears as the leading figure of the Indo-Tibetan school, which was placed to the monarch’s left in the debate. And the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna figures as both the protagonist and main spokesman of a Sino-Tibetan school, which was placed to the monarch’s right.

As Tibetan supporters of Kamalāśīla’s school special mention is made of Ye šes dbaṅ po – a leading monk from the influential sBa family identified with sBa gSal snaṅ or sBa Ratna, who was appointed chief monk (rin lugs = chos dpon) by Khri Sroṅ lde btsan – and ’Ba’/sBa dPal dbyanś – another monk evidently connected with the same family, who was named chief monk when Ye šes dbaṅ po retired after meeting with certain difficulties.¹⁰⁷ Mention is also made of sBa Saṅ ṣi (ta). A certain Vairocana – who despite his name may have been a Tibetan – is also named as a follower of this school.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Religious from the dBa’/s)Sa and Myaṅ families were already associated with, or were disciples of, Śāntarakṣita according to the Turkestan (Sa cu) document published by F. W. Thomas, Tibetan texts and documents, II (London, 1951), p. 85.
¹⁰⁸ These names are found in the lists of the sad mi mi bdun, who were to form the first Tibetan Saṅgha at bSam yas. See the discussion in G. Tucci, Minor Tibetan texts, II (Rome, 1958), p. 12 ff. (On a Vairocana who wrote in Sanskrit, and who was presumably an Indian, see V. V. Gokhale, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Diamond Jubilee Volume [1977], pp. 635–43.)
On the other side, as supporters of the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna and/or opponents of Ye śes dbaṅ po, special reference is made to a triad of disciples — a certain mNa’ Bi ma or sNa Bye ma (perhaps a Vimala[mitra]?),¹⁰⁹ Myaṅ Śa mi (who is known to our sources also as the associate of another, earlier Ho-shang)¹¹⁰ and an unnamed master from the rNog family¹¹¹ — as well as to Co rMa rma¹¹² and the Bhadanta Lāṅ ka.¹¹³ Khri Sroṅ Ide btsan’s ’Bro consort (’Bro bza) and his maternal aunt (sru) are also mentioned as supporters of the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna.¹¹⁴ And as an opponent of Ye śes dbaṅ po mention is made in particular of M yari/N ari Tiri rie ’dzin bzari po, who was apparently the associate of an earlier Ho-shang too.¹¹⁵

It is noteworthy that Kamalasila figures here as only one of the principal debaters on the side opposed to the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna,²⁰²

¹⁰⁹ See sBa bzed, G, pp. 65 and 68 (sNa Bye ma), and S, p. 55 (mNa Bi ma); Ňaṅ ral Ňi ma ’od zer, Chos ’byun Me tog śiṅi po, ed. R. O. Meisezahl (St. Augustin, 1985), ff. 426b3 and 429b3 (Na Bi ma); dPa’ bo gTsug lag phren ba, mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, ff. 115a5 and 116b4 (sNags Bye ma la). Cf. Demiéville, Concile, p. 41.

The rus-name here may be equivalent to gNags (as in the case of gNags Jāñāa-Kumāra, the disciple of Vimala), in which case the Bi ma/Bye ma in question would of course be a Tibetan, rather than the Indian Vimala(mitra).

¹¹⁰ See sBa bzed, G. pp. 65 and 67; S, pp. 55.1 and 57.11; mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 115a4 and 116b4; Ňaṅ Ňi ma ’od zer, Chos ’byun Me tog śiṅi po, f. 429b3 together with f. 426b3.

On Śa mi see also G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, II, pp. 9–10. A certain Myaṅ gSa (?) mi go cha has been mentioned in connexion with the Bodhisattva (i.e. Santarakṣita) in the document published by F. W. Thomas, op. cit., p. 85. This document also mentions another member of the Myaṅ family in the same context.

¹¹¹ For rNog Rin po che, compare Demiéville, Concile, p. 33.

¹¹² In the mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 118b7, Co rMa rma is described as the gzims mal pa or chamberlain (cf. f. 120b6) (cf. Tucci, Minor Buddhists texts, II, p. 38, and Preliminary report on two scientific expeditions in Nepal [Rome, 1956], p. 89). Compare Chos ’byun Me tog śiṅi po, f. 429a1.

¹¹³ The Bhadanta Lāṅka is not mentioned in the Chos ’byun Me tog śiṅi po (f. 429a), which mentions Co ma (?) only.

¹¹⁴ In these two see Demiéville, Concile, pp. 25, 33.

¹¹⁵ See sBa bzed, G, p. 63–64; S, p. 54; and mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 114b4; Chos ’byun Me tog śiṅi po, f. 425a1 (= Ms B, f. 237a27).

The Chos ’byun Me tog śiṅi po also refers to his being a disciple of Vimalamitra (f. 472a4) and to his exile and murder (?) (f. 473a; Ms B, f. 258a) at the time of King Glaṅ dar ma. This source in addition mentions his connexion with dBu ru (f. 472a4). On Tiṅ ne ’dzin and the Myaṅ see also the inscription of the dBu ru Žva’i lha khan in H. E. Richardson, A corpus of early Tibetan inscriptions (London, 1985), pp. 43 ff. Cf. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, II, p. 52 f.; below, p. 75.
and that in this capacity mention is made also of Ye šes dbang po (in the unsupplemented version of the sBa bzhed and in the ‘Alternative Tradition’ quoted in the same text) and of ‘Ba’ dPal dbyas (in the unsupplemented version of the sBa bzhed) and/or (sBa) Saṅ ši (ta) (in the supplemented version of the sBa bzhed).\textsuperscript{116}

Indeed, Kamalaslla – who had reportedly only recently arrived in Tibet – was presumably still unable to speak Tibetan fluently. But this circumstance would of course neither prove that he was not directly involved in the Great Debate nor that he was not present at it.\textsuperscript{117} According to the Tibetan historical texts under consideration, the Great Debate ended with the Hva šan’s conceding defeat and the Tibetan monarch’s decree that his teachings should no longer be propagated in Tibet. Several sources also record that it was further decreed that Nāgārjuna’s theory (ita ba) should be accepted,\textsuperscript{118} while in the domain of practice (spyod pa) the Six Perfections should be kept to.\textsuperscript{119}

In view of the weighty Tibetan participation in the Great Debate on Kamalaśīla’s side and also of the close association of Tibetans with the Hva šan Mahāyāna – whose teachings cannot,

\textsuperscript{116} This Saṅ ši (ta) has sometimes been identified with (sBa) dPal dbyas, but the question of his identity is far from clear. See Tucci, \textit{Minor Buddhist texts}, II, pp. 11–12, 22, 24; P. Demiéville, in M. Soymié (ed.), \textit{Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang} (Geneva-Paris, 1979), pp. 4–7 (referring also to H. Obata).

The \textit{sBa bzhed} (S, p. 5) mentions a rGya phrug gar mkhan Saṅ ši. And a Saṅ ši is mentioned also in connexion with sBa gSal snan (G, p. 10–11; S, p. 9); he seems to have been linked with Kim Hva šan (S, p. 10; cf. G, p. 7). Kim – Chinese Chin Ho-shang – was the name of a Korean Ch’an master, Musang (Ch. Wu-hsiang, 694–762) who taught in Sichuan (Chengdu). Cf. S. Yanagida, in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), \textit{Early Ch’an in China and Tibet} (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 18, 193; P. Demiéville, in Jao Tsong-yi and P. Demiéville, \textit{Peintures monochromes de Dunhuang} (Paris, 1978), p. 47, and in M. Soymié (ed.), \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 7, 11–12 (referring also to Z. Yamaguchi). – Wu-chu (Tib. Bu chu, 717–774), who is known to the rDzogs chen tradition (bsam gtan mig sgron), was in contact with Wu-hsiang/Musang in Chengdu (Demiéville, \textit{Contributions}, p. 5); but there were significant differences in their views (p. 7).

\textsuperscript{117} On the question of the language(s) in which the discussions and debates were held, their number, and of the participants in them, see P. Demiéville, \textit{T’oung-Pao} 56 (1970), p. 42; Y. Imaeda, \textit{Journal asiatique} 1975, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{118} See \textit{sBa bzhed}, S, p. 62.6 (the specific reference to Nāgārjuna is not in the other version); Bu ston, \textit{Chos ‘byun}, f. 129b5; mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 119a2; Nän Ni ma ’od zer, \textit{Chos ’byun} Me tog sniṅ po, f. 435b5.

\textsuperscript{119} The accounts of the Great Debate differ to a greater or lesser extent in the various sources, and there seems to have taken place a conflation with earlier discussion(s) in which a certain Me mgo (?) (rather than Mo-ho-yen) was the leading Ho-shang.
moreover, be exclusively identified with any specific known Chinese school of Ch'an and may reflect a version peculiar to Central Asia notwithstanding elements in common with the Northern, Southern and Pao-t'ang Schools — it may then be more accurate to speak not (as has often been done) of a clash in Tibet between Indian and Chinese Buddhism and of an ensuing Sino-Indian debate or council, but rather of the encounter, tension and confrontation between certain Indo-Tibetan and Sino-Tibetan traditions. (This question of the description of the traditions facing each other will be discussed in Chap. iii.)

At issue in this encounter, and in the ensuing Great Debate, were the doctrine of the ‘Gradualists’ (rim gyis pa) known as gradual engagement (rim gyis 'jug pa) — and also as the (br)tsse(n) mun/min (pa) (Chinese chien men [p'ai]) — of Kamalaśīla and his Tibetan followers and the teaching of the ‘Instantaneists’ or ‘Simultaneists’ (cig c[hr]ar ba) otherwise known as simultaneous engagement ([g]cig c[hr]ar gyis 'jug pa) — and also as the (s)ton mun/min (pa) (Chinese tun men [p'ai]) — of the Ho-shang Mo-ho- yen and his Tibetan followers.120

I. On Some Earlier Tibetan Historical Sources on the Great Debate

For long the best known Tibetan historical source on the Great Debate was no doubt Bu ston’s Chos 'byun (f. 128a—129b). In 1935 E. Obermiller — who had already published in 1932 an English translation of the relevant section of Bu ston’s history — called attention also to what he supposed to be one of Bu ston’s main sources on the subject, the third Bhāvanākrama by Kamalaśīla.121 This work indeed contains many passages that are perti-

120 See sBa bzed, S, p. 54; Ne'u Paṇḍita ta, Chos 'byun, f. 222a; Bu ston, Chos 'byun, f. 129b; Dalai Lama V, Bod kyi deb ther dpyid kyi rgyal mo'i glu dbyar, f. 39b (= p. 89); Thu'u bkvan Blo bzan chos kyi ni ma, Grub mtha' sel gyi me lon, rGya nag chapter, f. 10 ff. (with the transcriptions tun men/min and tsi'an men/bsi yan min).

For some pseudo-etymological explanations, based on Tibetan, of the originally Chinese expressions, see sBa bzed, G, p. 64 and S, p. 54.12—13; dPa' bo gTsug lag phren ba, mKhas pa'i dga' ston, ja, f. 115a; and Nan Ni ma 'od zer, Chos 'byun Me tog sni po, f. 426b.

nent to the Great Debate with Mo-ho-yen; but none of Kamala-
śīla’s three Bhāvanākramas actually mentions Mo-ho-yen. And
based as it is largely on quotations from Sūtras, Kamalaśīla’s
treatment of the progressive stages of meditative realization
(bhāvanā = bsgom pa) involving, beside Quieting of mind (śama-
tha = ži gnas), the fundamental factors of exact analytic investiga-
tion (bhūtapratyaveksā = yan dag pa’i so sor rtog pa) and its
culmination in analysis of the factors of existence (dharma-pravi-
caya = chos śin tu rnam par ’byed pa) or discriminative knowledge
produced from meditative realization (bhāvanāmai prajñā =
bsgom pa las byun ba’i šes rab), and then finally in Insight
(vipaśyanā = lhag mthon), refers specifically neither to any particu-
lar debate or to any individual opponent. Kamalaśīla’s three
treatises are accordingly relevant to Buddhist philosophical the-
ory and practice in general.

As for the historical existence of Kamalaśīla and his master
Śāntarakṣita, it is of course very well established by their extant
works available in Sanskrit or in Tibetan translations in the bsTan
’gyur as well as by many references in original Tibetan historical
and philosophical works. The historical existence of the Ho-
shang Mo-ho-yen/Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna (or Mahā yan) and of the
debate(s) in which he took part in Tibet – the two matters left
somewhat unclear in Tibetan bsTan ’gyur as well as in the
Sanskrit sources – has, despite some hesitations and obscurities in
the Tibetan traditions, been demonstrated by Wang Hsi’s Tun-wu
ta-cheng cheng-li chūeh or ‘Ratification of the true principles of the
Great Vehicle of Sudden Awakening’ preserved in two Chinese
manuscripts from Dunhuang (Pelliot 4646 and Stein 2672) which
has been translated into French and commented on by Demiéville
in his Le concile de Lhasa and ‘Deux documents de Touen-houang
sur le Dhyāna chinois’.122 In addition to Wang Hsi’s Preface, the
Cheng-li chūeh comprises three ‘Memorials’ two of which consist

122 In: Essays on the history of Buddhism presented to Professor Zenryu Tsukamoto (Kyōto,
Pelliot tibétain 823 contains a Tibetan version of a part of Wang Hsi’s Cheng-li chūeh; cf.
Y. Imaeda, Journal asiatique 1975, p. 127 ff. For further parallels between the Chinese
sources and Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang, see L. Gómez, ‘The direct and gradual
approaches of the Zen master Mahāyāna: Fragments of the teachings of Mo-ho-yen’ in:
mainly of a number of questions put to Mo-ho-yen together with his replies. On the Tibetan side corroboration is forthcoming from the Tibetan Dunhuang documents, a number of which have been recently analysed by L. Gómez in his 'The direct and gradual approaches of Zen Master Mahāyāna: Fragments of the teachings of Mo-ho-yen'.

Modern scholarly study of the Tibetan Dunhuang sources on Dhyāna and Ch'an was inaugurated in 1939 when Marcelle Lalou published MS BN Pelliot tibétain 996. This document contains the lineage of a certain Tibetan Dhyāna master named Tshig tsa Nam (m)k(h)a’i sīni po which includes a Dhyāna teacher named A rtan hyver, who travelled from India to Kučā, and two Chinese masters. The same Dunhuang text also contains a summary of the teachings of another important early Dhyāna master, sPug Ye šes dbyan. Subsequently, and especially over the past decade and a half, there has been a veritable flood of articles on the Dunhuang documents pertaining to the history of Ch'an, and on the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen. The extensive recent Japanese literature on the subject was inaugurated in 1968 by Ueyama Daishun, who has since been joined by many other scholars; this literature has been surveyed in a recent publication by D. Ueyama. Some of the relevant Western and Japanese secondary literature has also been considered by L. Gómez.

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123 See n. 122.
Another major source for the Dhyāna tradition in Tibet, as well as for the Mahāyoga and Atiyoga or rDzogs chen, is the bSam gtan mig sgron or rNal 'byor mig gi bsam gtan. This text is ascribed to the rDzogs chen master gNubs chen Saṅs rgyas ye śes, who is reputed to have lived in the eighth or ninth century. What is of importance in the present context is the fact that this text contains a chapter on the Gradualist’s Tsen min/men – i.e. the rim gyis pa or rim [gyis] 'jug pa – which is in turn connected with those Sūtras communicated to persons of inferior faculties (dbna po thā 'ṣa, f. 31b) whose meaning moreover requires to be elicited in another sense (drai ba don : neyārtha, f. 12a), and which is further described as a method that is as it were misleading (rim gyis sbyon ba bslu 'drid 'dra, f. 25b). The next chapter concerns the more advanced ‘Simultaneist’ sTon mun – i.e. the cig car ba or cig car 'jug pa – which is connected with the final and definitive sense (nes don = niṭārtha, f. 25b), that is, the real intended sense (yaṅ dag dgoṅs pa'i don, f. 25b). This work contains a veritable mine of

129 bSam gtan mig sgron, or rNal 'byor mig gi bsam gtan, published in 1974 in Leh by S. W. Tashigangpa in his Smanrtsis Shesrig Spendzod, vol. 74. The date of this text as we have it is not altogether free from doubt.

Its reputed author, gNubs (chen) Saṅs rgyas ye śes, is usually stated to have lived at the time of Padmasambhava, and to have been a pupil of Vimalamitra and even Śrīśimha towards the end of the eighth century. In his gSaṅ sniags sna 'gyur la bod du rtṣod pa sna phyir byun ba brtams kyi lan du brjod pa, nes don 'brug sgra (ed. Sanje Dorji, Collected writings of Sog-bzlog-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan, Volume I, New Delhi, 1975), f. 9a–b, Sog bzlog pa (b. 1552/3) has rejected the opinion (apparently maintained by 'Bri khun dPal 'dzin) that sNub (sic) ban Saṅs rgyas ye śes was a contemporary of King dPal 'khor btsan – the son of gNam Ie 'od sruṅs, son of Gñaṅ dar ma, and supposedly the last of the old Central Tibetan line of kings – which would have put him no earlier than the end of the ninth century. The bSam gtan mig sgron cites (f. 91b) a bDen gnis 'jug pa, but this is not the work by Atiśa included in the dBu ma section of the bsTan 'gyur. This text knows the Ch’an succession of seven masters (bdun brgyud) beginning with ‘Darmacāra’ (Bodhi-Dharma) and culminating in Mahāyāna (Mo-ho-yen) (f. 8a), as well as the story of the sandal/boot of ‘Darmotāra’ (f. 12b) (see below, pp. 73, 87–88) but it is uncertain how firm a basis these references can provide for the dating of the text. Very significant, however, is the reference to absolute, non-presuppositional and non-implicative, negation (med par dgag pa = prasajyapratīṣedha, f. 37a) and, in a note is small letters, to sādhyasama (ṣ grub bya mthan pa, f. 73b); these concepts became common in Tibetan philosophical literature starting in the eleventh century. ’Gos gZon nu dpal refers to the bSam gtan mig gi sgron ma being studied in the eleventh century (Deb ther sriṣṭi po, ga. f. 1745; Roerich, p. 137).

130 For the need of superior faculties (dbna po rdon po) to understand the Hva śaṅ’s teaching, and for the function of the ultimate and definitive sense (nes don as opposed to drai don) in this teaching, see Naṅ Nī ma ‘od zer, Chos ‘byun Me tog sniś po, ff. 425'b, 430a–b and 435b. Cf. below, pp. 84, 93, 98, 117, 141–2.
information on the lineages and teachings of the Ho-shangs, including Mahā yan who is counted as the seventh master in line from Bo de dar mo tā ra (sic) in a succession beginning with Kāśyapa (‘od sruṇs, f. 8a, 12a, 29a). In this text Kamalaśīla and the Hva śan Mahā yan have been mentioned side by side (f. 8a, 17a); but it is noteworthy that no mention has been made of the Great Debate in which they are said by the other sources under consideration here to have been involved. Material very similar to that of the bsam gtan mig sgron is moreover contained in the gter ma text known as the bKa’ thān sde līa, in the chapter entitled Blon po bka’i thān yig.131 These texts clearly testify to the links between the Dhyāna traditions of the Ho-shangs and the rDzogs chen pas/rNīñ ma ma pas. But it is at the same time notable that the bsam gtan mig sgron has explicitly distinguished between the sTon mun or Cig car bas and both the rNal ’byor chen po (Mahāyoga) and the rDzogs chen and Atiyoga, placing the sTon mun or cig car gyis ’jug pa as a second stage between the first stage consisting of the Tsen men or rim gyis ’jug pa and the third and fourth stages of Mahāyoga and the rDzogs chen.

In the wake of the current interest in the history and teachings of the various forms of Ch’an under the T’ang, what may be called the Tibetan and Tibetological dimension of the Great Debate and its background in the Dhyāna traditions of India and Central Asia have since Tucci’s masterly discussion of 1958 sometimes been relegated to the background.

Moreover, Y. Imaeda has gone so far as to express doubt as to whether an actual confrontation and debate ever really took place between Mo-ho-yen and Kamalaśīla;132 and the same scholar has described what is probably in its core our earliest Tibetan historical record on the subject, the sBa bzhed, as a relatively late work dating from the early fourteenth century.133 These ques-

131 The Lo paṅ bka’i thān yig is cited as a source concerning the Hva śan Mahāyāna and the Great Debate by Tshe dbaṅ nor bu (1698/9–1755) in his rGya nag hva śan gi byun tshul grub mtha’i phyogs sna bcas sa bon tsam smos pa yid kyi dri ma dag byed dge ba’i chu rgyun (reprinted in Vol. v of his works, Dalhousie, 1977), f. 7b4. But the text quoted actually corresponds to that of the Blon po bka’i thān yig, f. 19a (ed. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, II, p. 68).


tions will therefore be investigated in the following on the basis of some of the older Tibetan sources.

That a true debate took place towards the end of the eighth century at the Byan chub glin of bSam yas between Kamalaśīla and the Tibetan Gradualists on the one side and the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāṇa, i.e. Mo-ho-yen, supported by his Tibetan 'Simultaneist' followers on the other under the aegis of the Tibetan ruler Khri Sroṅ lde btsan is stated in both available texts of the sBa bżed (G, pp. 67–75 and S, pp. 57–62). This chronicle connected with the first Tibetan monastic centre of bSam yas (see G, p. 82.II) contains records of the sBa family, members of which are reputed to have participated in the Great Debate. And the sBa records may well be our oldest chos 'byurī source on the subject; at all events the sBa bżed has been described as the 'matrix' (phyi ma) – i.e. the textual source – of all Tibetan chronicles (rgyal rabs) and religious histories (chos 'byurī) as well as the record (bka' gtsigs, etc.) of bSam yas. The Supplemented Version (Zabs btags ma) of the sBa bżed became widely available to modern scholarship only in 1961, when R. A. Stein published a facsimile edition of it. And another, unsupplemented version of the sBa bżed was published as recently as 1980 in Beijing by mGon po rgyal mtshan. The title sBa bżed appears in Tibetan sources also in the forms rBa bżed, dBa’ bżed, dPa’ bżed and sPa bżed. The reference in each case appears to be

134 The colophon of the sBa bżed G p. 82 mentions the view that, in the title sBa bżed, sBa refers to sBa gSal snāṅ, as well as to another view that this rus-name refers to sBa Saṅ śī. This colophon then adds that the sBa bżed is in fact widely regarded as the record of bSam yas (bsam yas bka’ thams [= than?] ). A version known as the Mi sPa bżed (sic) is connected with gSal snāṅ and Saṅ śī in Sum pa mkhan po Ye sè dpal ‘byor’s dPags bsam ljon bzani, f. 10145 (p. 155).

135 See the title-page of the 1978 Dharamsala edition of the Zabs btags ma version.

136 The form dPa’ bżed is found in Sa skya Paṇḍī ta Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan, sKyed bu dam pa rnam la sprin ba’ yi ge (sDe dge ed.), f. 72b4, while the Thub pā’i dgonīs pa rab tu gsal ba, f. 50b2, has both dBa’ bżed (but dPa’ bżed in the N-GMPP Ms from Nepal, f. 72a4) and ‘Ba’ bżed; and the same text mentions in addition a rGyal bżed (cf. above, n. 134). ‘Gos gZon nu dpal’s Debs ther sbeon po, ka, f. 20a4, and Sum pa mkhan po’s dPags bsam ljon bzani, f. 10145 (p. 155), have sPa bżed (gtsang ma). The spelling rBa bżed is found in Bu ston’s Chos ‘byuri (f. 93b2), and in dPa’ bo gTsug lag phren ba’ sMkhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 120a4.

As for the family name, the forms sBa, rBa, dBa’, dBa’s ‘Ba’ and Bha are all found (as
to the sBa family – seemingly known earlier as dBa'(s) and also as 'Ba' – which played so prominent a part in the development of the bSam yas monastic centre, and indeed in the whole history of Tibet in the second half of the eight century, starting apparently at the end of the reign of Mes Ag tshom(s) and continuing throughout the reign of Khri Sroṅ lde btsan. The sBa b'zed is in fact considered the work of a member of this family, sBa gSal snañ.137 This man, who had once been governor of Maṅ yul province in southern Tibet and was in contact with a certain Ho­shang (Me mgo/’go), became closely associated with Śāntaraksīta by whom he is said to have been ordained under the name of Ye sès dbañ po.138 Another name closely associated with Śāntara­

well even as dPa’ and sPa).

Three versions of the btsan po mña bdag gi bka' gtsigs are mentioned in the sources. One is said to have been deposited in the Tibetan King’s own hand (jie'i phyag [shali]); another is said to have been in LHā sa; and the third is said to have been taken to Kham (see sBa b'zed, G, p. 82 ~ S, p. 65). Several sources furthermore mention the sBa b'zed properly speaking, presumably the one deposited according to some authorities with the ministers and officials; the rGyal b'zed, presumably the one deposited with the King; and the Bla b'zed, in other words the version deposited with the Tibetan clergy. See Sa skya Paṇḍi ta, Thub pa’i dgonis pa rab tu gsal ba (sDe dge ed.), f. 50b; Sog bzlog pa Blo gros ryal mtshan, gSan stangs stia ’gyur la bod du rtsad po stia phyir byun ba mams kyi lan du brijod pa, nès don ’brug sgra (in Collected works of Sog-bzlog-pa, ed. Sanje Dorje, Vol. i, New Delhi, 1975), f. 6a, f; Sum pa mkhan po Ye sès dpał ’byor, dPag bsam ljon bzan, f. 101 (= p. 155); Brag dgon žabs drun dKon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas, Deb ther rgya mtshe, f. 4a; A khu Šes rab rgya mtshe, dPe rgyun dkon po ’ga' žig gi tho yig, ed. Lokesh Chandra, Materials for a history of Tibetan literature, Part iii (New Delhi, 1963), nos. 11015–17. See also A. Vostrikov, Tibetan historical literature (Calcutta, 1970), pp. 24–26. According to Sog bzlog pa, op. cit., f. 64a, the Bla b'zed was composed, following the sBa b'zed, by Bla chen po (dGoñs pa rab gsal, or Ye sès ’od ?). The identity of the Mi sPa b'zed mentioned by Sum pa mkhan po, op. cit., f. 104a (p. 155) is not certain.

In connexion with the record of three versions of the King’s commands, of which one was apparently the sBa b'zed, compare the report that the King’s decision after the Great Debate was preserved in three versions, one of which was deposited in the King’s hand or archive (phyag dbal/shal) and another of which was distributed among the ministers (zaṅ blon) (sBa b'zed, G, p. 76; S, p. 62).

137 This attribution cannot of course hold for the entire Supplemented Version – the Zabs tagṣ ma – which recounts events from the time of the accession of Khri Sroṅ lde btsan’s successor Mu ne btsan po down to the time of Atiṣa in the middle of the eleventh century. Even the unsupplemented version recounts the death of sBa Ye sès dbañ po (G, p. 78 ff., identified with sBa gSal snañ in a note on p. 76) and sBa Saṅ ši (identified with dPa’ dbyans, G. pp. 76, 78).

138 See Bu ston, Chos ’byun, f. 125b7. (But compare f. 127a3 of the same work which connects this name with another monk.) See also sBa b'zed, S, p. 51; Bu ston, Chos ’byun, f. 127a5; dPa’ bo gTsug lag phren ba, mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 103b–104a. Cf. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, II, pp. 17–18.
ksita is that of sBa Ratna, who is also stated to have become a monk under the name of Ye šes dbañ po (sBa bžed, G, p. 64 note) and who is mentioned as an associate of Kamalāśīla during the Great Debate. According to an alternative view mentioned in the colophon of the sBa bžed, the name sBa refers to the records of ('Ba') Sañ śi (ta). The name Sañ śi alternates in some places with the name ('Ba'/sBa) dpal dbyaṅs, and the two seem in fact to refer to one and the same person. dpal dbyaṅs – the successor of Ye šes dbañ po as chief monk (riṇi lugs) – is well known as another of the Hva śaṇ Mahāyāna’s main opponents and interlocutors in the Great Debate.

Now it is true that Imaeda, followed tentatively by Demiéville, has dated the sBa bžed to the early fourteenth century. This dating would seem at first sight to find support in the fact that the Supplemented Version of the sBa bžed (S, p. 54.11) refers to the gSun rab rin po che'i mzdod, i.e. to Bu ston’s Chos ’byuṅ completed c. 1323. But this reference is missing in the other version (G, p. 64); and Bu ston has himself referred to a rBa bžed in his own Chos ’byun in another context (f. 93b2). Moreover, Bu ston’s source for the section in his Chos ’byun on the Great Debate may well have been a sBa bžed; at any rate, the accounts of it we find in both texts are clearly closely related. And the later accounts in many Chos ’byun texts rely on either Bu ston or the sBa bžed, or on both. In his mKhas pa’i dga’ ston completed in 1564, dPa’ bo gTsug lag phren ba (1504–1566) has quoted an ‘Alternative Tradition’ in a form that is practically identical with the one found in the unsupplemented version of the sBa bžed (G, pp. 72–73). Most important in this context, however, is the fact that Sa skya Paṇḍī ta Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan (1182–1251) much earlier referred to a dPa’ bžed (or dBa’ bžed) in his discussions of the Hva śaṇ Mahāyāna’s teachings.

139 In the sBa bžed, S, p. 50, sBa Ratna is mentioned as the first Tibetan monk; but compare Bu ston, Chos ’byun, f. 127a, and Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, II, p. 19. Z. Yamaguchi (Hirakawa felicitation volume, Tōkyō, 1975, p. 641 ff.) has identified dpal dbyaṅs = sBa Sañ śi with sBa Ratna. Bu ston, Chos ’byun, f. 128a, distinguishes between dpal dbyaṅs and Bha (sic) Ratna. The sBa bžed (S, p. 50) may identify ’Ba’ Khri gzigs with sBa Ratna, and (S, p. 51) ’Ba’ Khri (b)zer (Sañ śi ta) with dpal dbyaṅs (?). Compare sBa bžed, G, pp. 58–59, 76, where the equivalences sBa Khri gzigs = sBa dpal dbyaṅs = sBa Sañ śi (ta) have been indicated in small type; cf. p. 64.

In sum, despite the fact that the Supplemented Version of the $sBa\ b\z ed$ published by Stein must for the reasons mentioned above be considered as a whole to be much later than the eighth century, and although the recensions of the $sBa\ b\z ed$ now available to us differ in wording and in many details, there would nevertheless seem to exist no compelling reason to reject as completely spurious and unreliable the matter on which the recensions agree in substance. And there is reason to think that both these recensions contain ancient records or traditions ($b\z ed\ lugs$) that could go back to members of the $sBa$ family which played so important a rôle at the time of the foundation of $bSam\ yas$ and the controversy between the ‘Gradualists’ and ‘Simultaneists’ in late eighth-century Tibet, and that we thus have reflected (however indirectly) in our texts of the $sBa\ b\z ed$ the views of major participants in these events.

Among other important earlier Tibetan historical sources, the $Bod\ kyi\ rgyal\ rabs$, an old chronicle in some three folios only by the Sa skya hierarch Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147–1216), has not entered into doctrinal matters, and this very short work contains no reference to the Hva śaṇ and the controversy between Gradualists and Simultaneists. And in the $Chos\ la\ 'jug\ pa'i\ sgo$ by the Sa skya hierarch bSod nams rtse mo (1142–1182), a work that does include briefly at the end some Chos ’byuṅ type material relating to Tibet, we also find no mention of these matters. It seems, then, that in the Sa skya historical tradition Sa skya Pañḍī ta (1182–1251) was the first of the great hierarchs to direct his attention to the controversy between Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalāśīla’s school and the Ho-shangs, which he has done in several of his writings.

In the history by Ne’u/Nel pa Pañḍī ta Grags pa smon lam blo gros, the $sNon\ gyi\ gtam\ Me\ tog\ phreṅ\ ba$ (dated to 1283 or 1343) which on many points follows traditions different from those found in the Chos ’byuṅ of the author’s contemporary Bu ston,\(^\text{141}\)

we find an allusion to the debate (rtsod pa) between the sTon min and the rTse min (f. 22ar), the Tibetan transcriptions of the Chinese names of the two opposed tendencies of ‘Simultaneism’ and ‘Gradualism’. Ne'u Paṇḍi ta has however provided no details about the doctrinal points at issue except to say, very interestingly, that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna taught a doctrine that was in agreement with the Mahāmudrā (phyag rgya chen po 'thun pa'i grub mtha' bzun, f. 21b5). This point had already been made earlier by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta. Ne'u Paṇḍi ta concludes his account of the matter by stating (f. 22ar) that the monk Mahāyāna was defeated and reporting that it was thereupon decreed that only Dharma (chos 'ba' žig) – that is, evidently, the Dharma taught by Śāntarakṣita and Kamālaśīla following Nāgārjuna – should henceforth be practised in Tibet, and that non-Dharma (chos ma yin pa) should not be practised (f. 22a2).

The account of the controversy and ensuing debate between the ‘Gradualists’ and ‘Simultaneists’ provided by Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290–1364) in his gSūn rab rin po che'i mdzod (ff. 127a–129b) has hitherto been no doubt the best known one since it has been drawn upon by a number of later Tibetan historians. Bu ston recounts how, in view of disagreements between Śāntarakṣita’s followers such as Ye śes dbaṅ po and the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna, Kamalaśīla was invited to Tibet to replace his master Śāntarakṣita, who had recently died as the result of an accident. A debate was then organized with the King sitting in the centre as witness and arbiter, and with the Hva šaṅ placed to his right and Kamalaśīla accompanied by the Tsen min to his left. Bu ston explains that the Chinese term tsen min (pa) corresponds to rim gyis pa ‘Gradualist’, and that the Chinese term ton mun (pa) corresponds to gcig car ba ‘Simultaneist’. According to Bu ston’s account, the points at issue were the Hva šaṅ’s teaching of the need for simultaneous engagement (gcig car [du] 'jug pa) while giving up all activity and thinking and the teaching of Kamalaśīla’s school concerning the need for gradual engagement (rim gyis

142 See below, p. 101ff. 'Brug pa Kun legs has also spoken of a phyag rgya hva šaṅ gi lta ba in his gSūn 'bum, kha, f. 14a (quoted by R. A. Stein, Revue de l’histoire des religions 179 [1971], p. 10 note). Compare also the colophon of the bSam gtan mig sgron ascribed to gNubs Šaṅs rgyas ye śes (Leh, 1974), f. 254a, for references to the relation between the (da lta'i) phyag chen and the teaching of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna.
'jug pa) which is compared with the step-by-step ascent of a mountain. As part of the ‘Simultaneist’ teaching, mention is made of primal buddhahood (dan po nas sans rgyas, f. 129a–b). As opponents of the Hva šaṅ’s Simultaneist teaching Bu ston mentions dPal dbyaṅs and Ye ṣes dbaṅ po beside Kamalaśīla. And Co rMa rma is mentioned as an associate of the Hva šaṅ. Already at the beginning of the debate the King is stated by Bu ston to have ordered that the loser should not remain. And after he had conceded defeat the Hva šaṅ is accordingly said to have been sent home (rgya’i yul du brdzans), at which point he concealed books of his as ‘treasures’ (gter du sbas so). The King decreed that henceforth the system (lugs) of Nāgārjuna should be observed in the domain of theory, that in the domain of praxis the ten Dharma-practices (chos spyod) should be followed, and that the Ton mun system was not to be permitted. Finally, according to Bu ston, four Chinese executioners of the Hva šaṅ (hva šaṅ gi rgya’i bšan pa mi bži) killed Kamalaśīla by squeezing his kidneys; and Ye ṣes dbaṅ po then died after having given up food. As already noted, Bu ston’s account is quite closely related to the version we find in the sBa’ bžed, and it is probably based on it. Another Tibetan history, the Deb ther dmar po (Hu lan deb ther) composed in 1346 by Tshal pa Kun dga’ rdo rje (dGe ba’i blo gros), merely mentions Kamalaśīla and the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna (f. 17b1 = p. 37) without, however, saying anything about a controversy or debate between ‘Gradualists’ and ‘Simultaneists’. The story of the Hva šaṅ, Kamalaśīla and the Great Debate was thereafter taken up by other historians of the bKa’ brgyud pa school. It is true that in his Deb ther shon po completed in 1478 the Karma pa historian ’Gos gZon nu dpal (1393–1481) does not mention the Great Debate; nor does he refer to Kamalaśīla in connexion with events at that time although he speaks of Śāntarakṣita. But he alludes to Hva ṣaṅs and to the story that one of them left behind in Tibet one of his boots as a presage of the spread of the Teaching in Tibet (ka, f. 21a); and he specifies that a Hva šaṅ prophesied that the conversion of Tibet was to be the special responsibility (’dul skal) of Śāntarakṣita, and that nobody

143 On this point see below, note 164.
else would be of help in this task (f. 21a5). Another historian from the Karma pa school, dPa’ bo gTṣug lag phren ba (1504–66), has on the contrary dealt in detail with the Great Debate and with the rôle of Kamalaśīla in his mKhas pa’i dga’ ston (ja, ff. 114a–122b). The treatment of the Great Debate and of Kamalaśīla’s rôle in the Chos ’byun bstan pa’i padma rgyas pa’i ṅin byed by the ‘Brug pa bKa’ brgyud pa Padma dkar po (1527–1592) is very closely related to Bu ston’s account and thus to that of the sBa bżed.144

Thus, in the earlier Tibetan historical literature up to the middle of the fourteenth century as available to us until recently, apart from the sBa bżed the exact school-links of which are not altogether clear, the encounter and controversy in Tibet between the ‘Gradualists’ and ‘Simultaneists’ and the Great Debate are found mentioned above all in sources connected with the Sa skya pa and, probably, the bKa’ gdams pa schools. Later the subject was treated by bKa’ brgyud pa authors too such as dPa’ bo gTṣug lag phren ba, who has based his account on the sBa bżed (including the ‘Alternative Tradition’ reproduced in the unsupplemented recension of the sBa bżed) and has also quoted (f. 119b) Bu ston’s Chos ’byun.

II. THE CHOS ’BYUN ME TOG SNIŃ PO OF ŪNA N ŪI MA ’OD ZER

The relative paucity and possible onesidedness of these older Tibetan historical materials have now been compensated in a most valuable and important way by the recent publication of the Chos ’byun Me tog sniṅ po sBran rtsi’i bceud, a history of Buddhism ascribed to the twelfth-century rNīṅ ma author Ūna Ūi ma ’od zer.145 For the most part, this work corroborates and supple­ments the accounts of the encounter between ‘Gradualists’ and ‘Simultaneists’ and of the Great Debate available from the sources mentioned above. But in certain respects it gives us a different view of some important details.

144 Ed. Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi, 1968), f. 164b ff. For other later Tibetan sources on the Great Debate, see G. W. Houston, Sources for a history of the bSam yas debate.

145 See: Chos ’byun Me tog sniṅ po sBran rtsi’i bceud, MS A and B, in Rin chen gter mdzod chen po’i rgyab chos, Volumes 5 and 6 (Paro, 1979); and R. O. Meisezahl, Die grosse Geschichte des tibetischen Buddhismus nach alter Tradition, Monumenta tibetica historica 1/3 (St. Augustin, 1985).
The date of birth of Nān ral has been variously given as 1124 and 1136, and his death has been placed in either 1192 or 1204. He is renowned as a master of the rDzogs chen, and as a Discoverer (gter ston) of both rNīn ma and Bon po texts (gter ma). He thus belongs to a tradition quite different from the author(s) of the sBa bžed, from Bu ston and the other gSar ma pa authors of later Chos 'byuṅs who follow the sBa bžed and/or Bu ston in their accounts of the Great Debate, and from Sa skya Paṇḍī ta.

Nī ma 'od zer's family name Nān/Myan (both spellings have the same pronunciation) might possibly suggest a link, however distant, with the tradition of Myan/Nān Tiṅ ne 'dzin (bzaṅ po), the preceptor of the young Khri IDe sroṅ btsan (Sad na legs, reigned c. 800–815?), a disciple of Vimalamitra from whom he received the sNīn thig teaching, and hence a very important early teacher of the rDzogs chen. As already noted above, Myan Tiṅ ne 'dzin bzaṅ po figures as an opponent of sBa Ye śes dbaṅ po. Another master evidently connected with the Myan/Nān tradition, Myan/Nān Sa mi, is also known as the associate of a Hva šaṅ sometimes known as Me 'go/mgo and of sNa Bye ma (sBa bžed, G, p. 67–68, and S, p. 57).

The Chos 'byuṅ Me tog siniṅ po accordingly is one of our earliest datable Tibetan sources concerning the encounter between 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' and the Great Debate. Its author is senior by at least half a century to Sa skya Paṇḍī ta, who has hitherto been our oldest securely datable authority on the subject. The Chos 'byuṅ Me tog siniṅ po may then be surpassed in antiquity only by sBa records incorporated in the sBa bžed, and perhaps by

146 On Nān ral and the question of 'ambivalent' – i.e. Buddhist (rDzogs chen) and Bon po – gter stons, see A. M. Blondeau in L. Ligeti (ed.), Tibetan and Buddhist studies commemorating the 200th anniversary of the birth of Alexander Csoma de Körös (Budapest, 1984), p. 77 ff., and MeisezahI's introduction to his facsimile edition of the Chos 'byun.

147 Richardson, A corpus of early Tibetan inscriptions, p. 44, regards such a connexion as perhaps speculative. The Myan ban Tiṅ ne 'dzin (bzaṅ po) founded the dBu ru Žva'i lha khaṅ 50 miles north-east of lHa sa on the Maṅ ra chu. As for the Naṅ bdag and Nān ral Nī ma 'od zer, though born in lHo brag, his gdan sa is to be found in Myan stod according to the 'Dzam glin rgyas bsd (f. 65a; Wylie, p. 71). And the Myan clan to which Tiṅ ne 'dzin belonged may have originated in the upper valley of the Myan chu around rGya mda' according to Richardson (Corpus, p. 44; see also Bulletin of Tibetology 4 (1967), p. 19 n. 10 on the location of Myan). Eva Dargyay has listed Myan Tiṅ ne 'dzin as an ancestor of Naṅ ral Nī ma 'od zer in her Rise of esoteric Buddhism in Tibet (Delhi, 1977), p. 57, but without clearly giving her source.
another source stemming from the same school as NaNral, the bSam gtan mig sgron ascribed to gNubs Sanṣ rgyas ye śes the date of which is, however, not established with certainty and which does not in any case explicitly mention the Great Debate even though it has much to say on the two schools of thought that then confronted each other.

It is at all events very important for the question of the reliability of the Tibetan accounts of the Great Debate that the version given in the Chos 'byun Me tog sniṅ po is in many parts close to, and sometimes indeed practically identical in wording with, the sBa bżed. In particular, this text relates the defeat of the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna by the ‘Gradualists’ headed by Kamalaśīla and his subsequent departure from Tibet. The only possible conclusion seems then to be that if NaNral did not actually follow the sBa bżed in one of its recensions, he was making use of either a source of the extant recensions of the sBa bżed or of some other text closely related to it.

The Chos 'byun Me tog sniṅ po thus seems effectively to dispose of the suspicion that the account of the Great Debate and of the Hva śaṅ’s defeat by Kamalaśīla’s school to be found in the sBa bżed, in Bu ston’s Chos 'byun and in the many later sources that give this version of events was nothing but a tendentious sectarian fabrication of Atiśa’s bKa’ gdams pas, and of other gSar ma pas such as the Sa skya pas and dGe lugs pas, which was concocted in order to discredit the traditions including the Dhyāna ones associated with the rNiṇ ma pas/ţDzogs chen pas. It has to be recalled also that in his Deb ther dmär po, composed in 1346 after the Chos 'byun of both Ne’u Panḍi ta and Bu ston, Kun dga’ rdo rje has made no point of mentioning the Great Debate or the Hva śaṅ’s defeat, something he might be expected to have done had this version of events been a fabrication of the gSar mas pas. It is equally noteworthy that whereas Sa skya Panḍi ta attached importance to criticizing the Hva śaṅ’s teachings, the Great Debate and the Hva śaṅ’s defeat have been mentioned by neither of his two great predecessors as hierarchs of Sa skya – Grags pa

148 On the relationship between the sBa bżed and the rNiṇ ma tradition, see also Sog bzolog pa, Nes don 'brug sgra, f. 6a f.
rgyal mtshan in his *Bod kyi rgyal rabs* and bSod nams rtse mo in his *Chos la 'jug pa'i sgo* — although these two authors were contemporaries of the rNin ma pa ṇaṅ ral who has recounted these things.

The account given by the rDzogs chen pa ṇaṅ ral of the Great Debate and especially of the Hva šaṅ's defeat is all the more significant for the evaluation of the authenticity and reliability of the sources containing them because at least as early as the time of Kloṅ chen rab 'byams pa (1308–1363) rDzogs chen pa authorities have inclined to look on the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's teachings with favour (see below, p. 102).

On the following points the account found in the *Chos 'byun Me tog sīni po* concerning the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna and the Great Debate deserves special mention. Some of them are quite close to what has been recorded in the sBa ḅezed and in the later Tibetan historical sources, but a few reflect noteworthy divergences from the hitherto available accounts.

(1) The discussions between the 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' in Tibet at the end of the eighth century are presented as taking the form of a formal debate (*rtsod pa*) between two tendencies, each engaged in trying to reach a decisive conclusion in investigative argument (*gsags*), with the Tibetan ruler himself acting as the witness-arbiter (*dpañ po = sākṣiṇ*) between Kamalāśīla and his Tibetan followers on the one side and the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna and his supporters on the other.¹⁴⁹

That this kind of discussion taking the form of a regular debate, familiar as it is to us from treatises on the Indian *vāda-

¹⁴⁹ For the rôle of the sākṣiṇ in a debate, see for example Dharmakīrti, *Vādanyāya* with Ṣantaraksīta's comment (ed. Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi, 1972), pp. 69, 107. A king's court is recognized as a vādādhikaraṇa or suitable place for debate by Asaṅga, *Abhidharma- samuccaya*, p. 104. The arbiter-witness is also known as sabhāpati (e.g. in Vācaspatimīśra's *Nyāyavārttikatanāparyāśikā* V. ii. 21). For later debates between Buddhists and Taoists under the Yüan, including one in which the young Phags pa took part in 1258 and which was presided over as crown prince by the future emperor Qubilai, see T. Thiel, *Monumenta Serica* 20 (1961), pp. 39–46.

That such a debate should have been organized and presided over (at least occasionally) by a king or prince is accordingly in no way unusual and need not be considered as later legend, or 'invention of tradition', by the Tibetan writers.
tradition, could have been already known in Tibet at the end of the eighth century is in accord with the likelihood that a high degree of scholastic knowledge and skill had been introduced in Tibet at that time by Śāntarakṣita (who indeed commented on Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya) and Kamalaśīla, and with the fact that extensive scholastic knowledge is demonstrated a little later by such an early Tibetan scholar as sNa nam Ye šes sde.¹⁵⁰

That just this scenario of a formal debate between Kamalaśīla and the Hva šān Mahāyāna should have been accepted for the controversy between the ‘Gradualists’ and ‘Simultaneists’ by the author of the Chos 'byün Me tog sūni po, who belonged to a school for which the use of philosophical debate was however anything but characteristic, is of considerable significance for assessing the Tibetan account of these events. This fact could be explained in various ways. The author may simply have been relying on the sBa bžed, or on some closely related source belonging to a tradition that did make extensive use of debate in its philosophical exercises. Or these traditions may have been current in at least a section of the rNin ma school too. Or, again, it may be that events actually took the form described in the above-mentioned Tibetan sources. All that can be said at present is that this account of the controversy may reflect one of the earliest Tibetan views of these events handed down by the sBa family and accepted also by the author of the Chos 'byün Me tog sūni po, even though this precise scenario is not known to us from the Dunhuang documents; or, on the contrary, it may be a more or less dramatized reconstruction by Tibetan writers of a slightly later period (possibly at the start of the phyi dar or Second Propagation of Buddhism in Tibet) in accordance with a standard schema of Indo–Tibetan philosophical and religious discussion.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. for example D. Seyfort Ruegg, Journal asiatique 1979, p. 207 ff., on sNa nam Ye šes sde. And for a discussion of other scholastic treatises ascribed to early Tibetan authors, see Tucci, Minor Tibetan texts, II, p. 122 ff.

Subsequently, philosophical discussion in the form of debate appears to have been cultivated at the very latest by the time of Phya pa Chos kyi sēn ge (1109–1169) at gSaṅ plu Ne'u thog. This seminary was founded in 1073 by rNog Legs pa'i šes rab, the uncle of rNog Blo ldan šes rab whose writings also attest a high degree of scholastic knowledge and who acted as abbot of this seminary. The forms of religio-philosophical discussion and debate have been set out in some detail by Sa skya Panḍi ta in his mKhas 'jug (Ch. iii), the oldest Tibetan text on the subject that appears to be available at present. Cf. now D. Jackson, The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III) (Vienna, 1987).
At all events, the fact that the Chos 'byun Me tog sűn po does mention a formal debate in which Kamalaśīla and his followers prevailed over the Hva śaṇ Mahāyāṇa lends no support to the opinion that the account found in the sBa bṣed and in Bu ston's Chos 'byun represents nothing but a deliberate and tendentious distortion of events by opponents of the 'Simultaneists' and of the rNiṅ ma/rDzogs chen traditions motivated by sectarian bias. An argument ex silentio based on the absence of an explicit reference in the Chinese documents to a formal debate between the Ho-shang and Kamalaśīla or his Tibetan followers cannot be regarded as conclusive, especially in view of the clearly polemical character of Wang Hsi's Cheng-li chüeh studied by Demiéville.

(2) In agreement with other sources, the Chos 'byun Me tog sűn po (f. 433a-b) has placed the master dPal dbyan among the opponents of the Hva śaṇ and the cig char 'jug pa or 'Chinese theory' (rgya'i lla ba) of the sTon min pas. This connexion is in accord with the attachment of dPal dbyan to the 'Ba'/sBa family (for example in the sBa bṣed). Tucci151 has entertained the hypothesis that since a (certain) dPal dbyan is stated to have belonged to the gNan family, and indeed to have been a disciple of Vimalamitra and gNags Jñānakumāra,152 the attachment of the participant in the debate named dPal dbyan to the party of Kamalaśīla and sBa Ye śes dbaṅ po may simply reflect a desire on the part of the author(s) of the sBa bṣed to glorify their own family. But the fact that the Chos 'byun Me tog sűn po also regards this dPal dbyan as an associate of Kamalaśīla and Ye śes dbaṅ po goes against this hypothesis; and the alternative view considered by Tucci, namely that we have here two different masters having the same name, is the likely one. It should be noted, moreover, that the words ascribed to dPal dbyan in this Chos 'byun, in one version of the sBa bṣed (G, p. 70) and in the mKhas pa'i dga' ston (ja, f. 117b) are ascribed in the Žabs btags ma version of the sBa bṣed (S, p. 59) to a certain Saṅ ši, a name (or title) borne by another member of the 'Ba' family (S, p. 17.15). (Strangely, the

152 See mKhas pa'i dga' ston, tha, f. 25a (p. 215.7); Deb ther shon po, ga, f. 2a (p. 104). On gNan dPal dbyan see R. Kimura, Journal asiatique, 1981, pp. 191–2.
Supplemented Version of the *sBa b'zed* then (S, p. 60) ascribes to dPal dbyaṅs the intervention in the Great Debate which the unsupplemented version (G, p. 70–71) attributes to Ye šes dbyaṅ po.

(3) In its account of the Great Debate the *Chos 'byun Me tog snyin po* (f. 433b2) mentions, in the intervention ascribed to the master dPal dbyaṅs, a trifurcation of the ‘middle Nikāyas’ (? *dbus sde rnam gsum*). What is meant by this enigmatic expression is unfortunately not clear.\(^{152a}\)

However, in this connexion both recensions of the *sBa b'zed*—G (p. 70.16) where dPal dbyaṅs is also mentioned as the speaker, and S (p. 60.5) where Saṅ śī is named as the speaker—as well as Bu ston’s *Chos 'byun* (f. 129a6) and the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* (ja, f. 175a1) all read *dbus ma rnam gsum*. Now, if the reference were to the three well-known schools of the Madhyamaka (*dbus ma*) recognized by the later Tibetan doxographers, this passage could hardly be dated before the eleventh or twelfth century when, as a consequence of the activity of Pa tshab Ŧi ma grags (said to have been born in 1055) and his associates, the *Prāsaṅgika* (Thal ’gyur ba) branch of the Madhyamaka first became established in Tibet in addition to the (Sautrāntika-)Svātantrika and the (Svātantrika-)Yogācāra-Madhyamaka branches already recognized by the ninth century. At all events, it seems highly unlikely that dPal dbyaṅs (or Saṅ śī) should have spoken of three branches of the Madhyamaka in Tibet at the end of the eighth century, when none of the known sources of that period seems ever to mention this third branch.

The reading *dbus sde* in the *Chos 'byun Me tog snyin po* seems to place the problem in a different light, and it might even be supposed to reflect an earlier version of the passage in question (although it is not clear to what the expression *dbus sde* might refer). On the other hand, the reading *dbus sde* might represent a

\(^{152a}\) The problem is compounded by the fact that in another historical work giving an account of the Great Debate and also ascribed to Ŧaṅ ral—the Mi rje lhas mdzad *Byān chub sens dpa’ sens dpa’ chen po chos rgyal mes dbon rnam gsum gyi rnam par thar pa, Rin po che’i phren ba* published in 1980 at Paro—we read *dbus ma rnam pa’ bha ma mthun te ston min 1 char du ‘jug mchis te* (f. 123b4–5). (The authorship of this work is not clear, and one folio is missing just before the last page of the reprint.)
correction, by Ňaṅ ral or by a source or a redactor of his, of the reading dbu ma rnam gsum. For the earlier rNiṅ ma/rDzogs chen authors did not ordinarily recognize three branches of the Madhyamaka; in addition, the author (or a redactor) of the Chos 'byun Me tog sniṅ po could well have been aware of the fact that this triple division of the Madhyamaka was not recognized in Tibet at the time of the Great Debate. Nevertheless, it must be noted that our Chos 'byun itself explicitly mentions (f. 512a) both Candrakīrti – the main source of the *Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka – and Pa tshab Ňi ma grags – reputedly its first major Tibetan proponent; but it has done so without mentioning the Thaḷ 'gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) as a distinct, third branch of the Madhyamaka.

(4) Concerning the circumstances of Kamalaśīla’s death after the Great Debate, the author of the Chos 'byun Me tog sniṅ po differs from the account we find in the sBa bzed, and he diverges completely from the version found in Bu ston’s Chos 'byun and the related sources.

According to the sBa bzed (G, p. 77–78; S, p. 64) and the mKhas pa'i dga' ston (ja, f. 122b6), Kamalaśīla was murdered by executioners (gshed ma) despatched by the mu stegs pa. This name, corresponding to Skt. tīrthika/tīrthakāra, designates a non-Buddhist, and in particular a Hindu sectarian. What mu stegs pa was intended to denote in this context is, however, uncertain. And the difficulty is compounded from the point of view of the Tibetan tradition by the fact that, in the prophetic testament he is supposed to have given Khri Sroṅ lde btsan, Śaṅtaraksīta is recorded to have foretold that after his death there would no

153 The *Prāsaṅgika school of Madhyamaka is not known to the bSam gtan mig sgron. Roṅ zom Chos kyi bzaṅ po (eleventh century) mentions only the mDo sde dbu ma and the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma in his Man nag lta phreng 'grel pa (f. 28b), lTa ba'i brjed byan (f. 11b–12a) and Grub mtha' brjed byan (f. 5a–6a). However, Klon chen rab 'byams pa (1308–1363) has recognized the *Prāsaṅgika branch, for example in the Grub mtha' mdzod (f. 54b f. 40a f).

154 Tucci has supposed that Kamalaśīla may have been killed by Bon pos (Minor Buddhist texts, II, p. 45). But since the reference is to executioners from China, could the mu stegs pa in this case have been Taoists (or even Buddho-Taoists)? On Taoism in Tibet at this time, see Demiéville in M. Soymié (ed.), Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang, p. 6. Compare for example the Li'i yul lhi bstan pa, translated by F. W. Thomas, Tibetan literary texts and documents concerning Chinese Turkestan, I (London, 1935), p. 84.
longer be any mu steGS paS in Tibet, but that instead a split would develop in the Buddhist Dharma itself. Bu ston (or possibly a source of his) may have noticed this discrepancy between the account that Kamalaśīla was murdered by an agent of the mu steGS pa and what Śaṅtarakṣita had foretold in his testament, which he has recorded in his Chos 'byun. For according to Bu ston Kamalaśīla was murdered by four executioners from China belonging to the Hva šān (hva śān gi rgya’i bśan pa mi bži, f. 129b6), a version of events that was later followed by Padma dkar po (Chos 'byun, f. 165a6) among others. In other words, Bu ston (or a source) may have engaged in a kind of rational reconstruction of events and concluded – given what Śaṅtarakṣita was held to have foretold – that it must have been the Ho-shang’s party that was responsible for Kamalaśīla’s alleged murder. In these circumstances, fully satisfactory grounds hardly exist for explaining Bu ston’s version (along with that of Padma dkar po and others) by simply ascribing to him a desire to denigrate the Ho-shang.

It is of special interest to observe in this connexion that the Chos ’byun Me tog sniṅ po (f. 138a) not only knows nothing of Bu ston’s version mentioning executioners sent by the Hva śān as Kamalaśīla’s murderers but distances itself from the sBa bzhed’s account of a murder by agents of the mu steGS pa by qualifying it as a report by means of the verb zer ba ‘it is said’. And it states instead that Kamalaśīla was killed by an Indian servant Dhanaśrī who was looking for gold.

(5) In the Chos ’byun Me tog sniṅ po (f. 429b–430a) it is related that at the start of the Great Debate at the Byaṅ chub glin of bSam yas the King decreed that the loser should, as the price of defeat, receive a punishment (chad pa gcod do), which is however not specified. But no mention is made in this text of the banishment from Tibet by royal command of the Hva śāṅ Mahāyāna after he lost the debate. According to this account the

155 sBa bzhed, G, pp. 66, 72; and S, p. 56; Bu ston, Chos ’byun, f. 127b; dPa’ bo gTsug lag phreng ba, mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 115b. Cf. Chos ’byun Me tog sniṅ po, f. 427b–428a.

156 Bu ston, Chos ’byun, f. 127b. It should however be noted that the teaching of non-activity which was Mo-ho-yen’s, and to which Kamalaśīla refers in his Bhāvanākrama (iii, p. 20), has been connected by Kamalaśīla with teachings of the mu steGS can (tīrthikas) called kun tu tshol ba, evidently the Ājīvikas. See below, p. 142.
Hva šaṅ left, apparently voluntarily, not for China but for Bodh Gayā (rDo rje gdan) in India (f. 436a–b).

In the sBa bžed (G, p. 75 and S, p. 62) it is related that the Hva šaṅ returned to China (slar rgya nag tu gšegs) (cf. mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 119a). The rGyal rabs gsal ba’i me loṅ (p. 182) too states that he departed (bžon pa) for China. For their part, Bu ston (Chos 'byun, f. 128b2) and Padma dkar po (Chos 'byun, f. 165a3–4) report that already at the very start of the Great Debate the Tibetan monarch decreed that the loser was not to remain in his realm; and these two sources relate that after losing the debate the Hva šaṅ was sent off (rdzon ba) — i.e. probably, was banished — to China (Bu ston, f. 129b6; Padma dkar po, f. 165a5). Wang Hsi’s Cheng-li chiūeh on the other hand refers neither to a defeat nor to the banishment of Mo-ho-yen; and it mentions (f. 129a) an official edict authorizing the practice of his Dhyāna teaching. The Chinese material indicates furthermore that Mo-ho-yen returned to Dunhuang.¹⁵⁷

The discrepancies in the accounts of the fate of Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen after the Great Debate have given rise to the hypothesis that he was involved in more than one debate, and that whereas he won the earlier debate he was finally defeated in a later one.¹⁵⁸ This is of course not impossible, but it would be as difficult to prove as it would be to disprove on the basis of the available evidence; it is at least equally possible that the divergence between the accounts reflects not the different outcome of two or more debates, but differing views of a single set of events.

(6) Of special interest is the account given in the Chos 'byun Me tog sīnī po of the fate of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna’s teaching in Tibet.

Both recensions of the sBa bžed (G, p. 75; 2, p. 62) and the mKhas pa’i dga’ ston (ja, f. 119a) relate that the Tibetan ruler condemned the practice of the Hva šaṅ’s Dharma (known as the

ston min pa cig char 'jug). And the Žabs btags ma version (S, p. 62), followed by the mKhas pa'i dga' ston (f. 119a), further specifies that the King decreed that henceforth the theory of Nāgārjuna should be accepted and that in the sphere of practice the Six Perfections should be adhered to. This version is followed in substance by Bu ston (Chos 'byun, f. 129b) and Padma dkar po (Chos 'byun, f. 165a). In the words of Ne'u Paṇḍita'sa Chos 'byun (f. 22a), after the defeat of the Hva šani, non-Dharma (chos ma yin pa) was not to be practised, and Dharma alone (chos 'ba' žig) — that is, evidently, the Dharma taught by Kamalaśīla following Śāntarakṣita and, ultimately, Nāgārjuna — was to be practised. Interestingly, the Blon po bkai than yig (f. 28a), a section of the bKa’ than sde lla which reproduces rDzogs chen traditions (cf. Pelliot tibétain 116), specifies that it was the Yoga-Madhyamaka (rnal 'byor dbu ma'i gžun) that was to be followed, but without mentioning Kamalaśīla in this connexion; this source in fact states that the ston mun cig car 'jug pa is the Madhyamaka.

Now the Chos 'byun, Me tog sfin po (f. 435b) relates that, after the Hva šani Mahāyāna had conceded defeat in the Great Debate, the debate was reconciled on the side of Dharma (rtsod pa chos phyogs su 'dum par byas so). And the King declared that in substance there was no disagreement (don la mi mthun pa tsam mi 'dug ste) between the two parties to the debate, and that with respect to the method of practising the Path the Hva šani's Dharma, known as the cig char du 'jug, is a teaching concerning persons whose faculties are highly developed (dbari po yari rab sbyaris pa cangyis chos [variant from Ms B: lam] yin la).159 But, the King added, the ten Dharma-practices had been condemned [by the Hva šani] starting with the case of those whose faculties are middling (dbaṅ po yan ri byan sbyan pa can gyis chos [variant from Ms B: lam] yin la). Mind thus becomes drowsy (sems ni bya ri), good equipment (tshogs = sambhāra) is not accumulated, and because others’ mental training is interrupted the Dharma also declines and is interrupted. And, the King concludes, you [i.e. the Hva šani] must practise meditative realisation (bsgom UNIQUE sig). Henceforth, in the sphere of theory (lta ba), the theory of Nāgārjuna should be

159 On the highly developed faculties (dbaṅ po rmoon po = tīkṣṇendriya) required to penetrate the Hva šani’s teaching, see also above p. 66.
accepted, and in the sphere of praxis (spyod pa) the Six Perfections should be practised; in the ten Dharma-practices (chos spyod bcu) should be exercised; in the sphere of meditative realization (bsgom pa) mental training is through the three kinds of discriminative understanding (ses rab = prajñā); Means (thabs = upāya) and Prajñā should be yoked together (zun du 'brel bar gyis), and one should engage thus in meditative realization.

This version of the King's decree does not, it is true, actually disagree with the words found in the sBa bžed, most of which it contains while omitting only a few. But by including several additional phrases the Chos 'byün Me tog sini po has nevertheless put another complexion on the Great Debate and the King's decree following it. Thus, the King's remark that the Hva šan Mahāyāna's teaching does not disagree in substance with that of Kamalaśīla's school and that it is the teaching (chos) — or, according to a variant reading, the Path (lam) — followed by advanced disciples effaces the radical opposition between the 'Gradualist' and the 'Simultaneist'.

Nevertheless, in the Chos 'byün Me tog sini po there is recorded the King's decree to the effect that Nāgārjuna's theory was thenceforth to be accepted, and that the practice of the Paramitās and the yoking together in yuganaddha of Upāya and Prajñā should be observed.

Interestingly, the bSam gtan mig sgron has quoted (f. 23b–24a) a verse from the rTen 'brel sini po, stating that it provides the source for the meditative realization of the sTon mun, in other words of the Hva šan Mahāyāna's school. Now this rTen 'brel sini po must be the Pratītyasamutpādakārikās ascribed to Nāgārjuna; for the verse quoted corresponds to verse 7 of this text (which is paralleled by Ratnagotravibhāga i. 154 and Abhisamayālamkāra v. 21, and partially by Āśvaghoṣa's Saundaranandakāvyā xiii. 44). It thus appears that an important rDzogs chen text that

160 This view of the matter is similar to the one attested in the bSam gtan mig sgron. And it is even attested in an intervention in the Great Debate ascribed either to sBa dPal dbyaṅs or Saṅ śi (see below, p. 86).

161 This verse is quoted also in the dMyigs su med pa tshul gcig pa'i gzhun (Pelliot tib. 116), f. 164 (cf. F. Faber, Acta Orientalia 46 [1985], pp. 71–72), and in Vimalamitra's Cig car 'jug pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don (D, f. 10b). For a recent discussion of the Pratītyasamutpādaḥ dayakārikās, see C. Dragonetti, WZKS 30 (1986), pp. 109–22 (where
treats the ‘Simultaneist’ doctrine favourably has gone so far as to cite a text elsewhere usually ascribed to Nāgārjuna as a major source for the Hva šān’s school.\footnote{162} This significant linkage is not weakened, from the point of view of the Tibetan tradition, by the fact that the results of modern scholarship make it unlikely that Nāgārjuna was actually the author of this verse, which fits rather into a distinct doctrinal complex (with which the Hymnic Corpus ascribed to Nāgārjuna may, however, be connected).

Finally, the relationship between twenty-one Indian Ācāryas and five (Chinese) Hva šāns has been described in the Chos ’byun Me tog sniin po (f. 437b) as a peaceful one at the Byams pa glin, after the defeat of the Hva šān Mahāyāna in the Great Debate at the Byan chub glin of bSam yas and his departure for Bodh Gayā in India.

Even according to the sBa traditions, a leading member of this family – dPal dbyan or Saṅ śī – remarked during the course of the Great Debate that although there indeed existed a difference as to ‘means of access’ (jug sgo) between the ‘Simultaneists’ and ‘Gradualists’ the two were nonetheless broadly in agreement as to their doctrines concerning the attainment of buddhahood. In other words, their doctrines of the Fruit (bras bu) were generally in harmony; and the disagreement between the two parties in the Great Debate concerned their respective theories of practice of the Path.\footnote{163} Kamalāśīla’s followers also rejected the idea of original Awakening (daṅ po nas sans rgyas).\footnote{164}

\footnote{(7) The Chos ’byun Me tog sniin po (f. 436b) rejects as false they are tentatively ascribed to a certain Šuddhamati, a Mādhyamika author of perhaps before the sixth century).}

\footnote{162 Nāgārjuna is quoted elsewhere in texts belonging to the Dhyāna-tradition, for example in Pelliot tibétain 116 (f. 164), where he is placed before a seven-membered line (bdun rgyud) beginning with Bo de dar ma ta la, and culminating in Ma ha yan.

Compare also ‘Thu’u bkvàn Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi śī ma, Grub mtha’ śel gyi me lon, rGya nag Chapter, f. 11b–13b, on the sniin po don gyi bygyud pa and the tsuṅ men (pa), a line that includes the Hva šān Mahāyāna at its end, and Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Rāhula towards its beginning. See below, p. 117f.}

\footnote{163 See sBa bzed, G, p. 70.18–19, mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, f. 118a2, and Chos ’byun Me tog sniin po, f. 433b3–4 (quoting dPal dbyan); sBa bzed, S, p. 60.6–7 (quoting Saṅ śī): ’jug sgo the dād kyari sans rgyas (thob par ’dod par) (g)cig (ızez) ’bras bu (’dod pa) (cig la) (don gyi) (spyi) mthun pa ... (The reading of the Chos ’byun Me tog sniin po is problematical here.)}

\footnote{164 See sBa bzed, S, p. 60.10 (quoting dPal dbyan); G, p. 70.23; mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, f. 118a3; Chos ’byun Me tog sniin po, f. 433b6 (quoting Ye śes dbaṅ po): cig char (du) ’jug na (khyed) da dang (rui) ci byed daṅ po nas sans rgyas na ci śes...}
rumour the reports that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāṇa immolated himself in fire after his defeat in debate or, alternatively, that in despair (yid mug pa) he left for home after leaving behind one of his boots as a token of the future spread of his teaching in Tibet.

Such a case of self-immolation, followed by death facing in the direction of the Sukhāvatī-heaven, of a Chinese master (rgya nag mkhan po) — according to the context apparently the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāṇa himself — is in fact reported in part of the ‘Alternative Tradition’ of the sBa b′zad (G, p. 75; but not reproduced in dPa’bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba’s mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, f. 120). Both recensions of the sBa b’zad have nevertheless elsewhere recounted that the Hva šaṅ left for China after having first constructed a temple in Tibet (G, p. 76; S, p. 62–63). The false rumour to which the Chos ’byun Me tog sniṅ po refers is then perhaps the account found in the ‘Alternative Tradition’ of the sBa b’zad.

Such an auto-da-fé by setting fire to the head carried out by a Hva šaṅ after having lost an argument is however reported in both recensions of the sBa b’zad (G, p. 68.1; S, p. 57.12), but only one version specifies that he thereupon died (G, p. 68.1; cf. also mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 115a5 and 116b4). The Hva šaṅ who thus immolated himself is, however, given the suggestive name, or probably rather epithet, of Me mgo/Me ’go, literally ‘Fire-head’ (see also sBa b’zad, S, p. 10.1 and p. 52). This appellation could well be based on the Chinese practice of lighting a lamp on the top of a monk’s head at the time of ordination,165 and it may then have been reinterpreted as signifying that the Ho-shang immolated himself.166 The reports of this Hva šaṅ’s auto-da-fé are doubtless influenced in addition by the practice of ritual self-cremation occasionally adopted by monks in East (and South East) Asia.167

It is interesting to observe that in this context the Chos ’byun

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166 For such suicides by Tibetans (!) in the Cheng-li chüeh, see Demiéville, Concile, pp. 41–42.
Me tog sūn po (f. 429b4) relates that the Hva šaṅ Mi/Me go died (? bro dor),\(^{168}\) while his associates – Ņaṅ Ša mi, rNog and sNa\(^{169}\) – ‘contracted illness’ (na tsha skyed). The Zabs btags ma version of the sBa bʿzed (S, p. 57) also states that the three ‘contracted illness’. Another version of the sBa bʿzed however specifies that they died as the result of self-mutilation (G, p. 67–68; cf. mKhas paʾi dgaʾ ston, ja, f. 116b).

As for the report that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna departed for China after leaving his boot behind in Tibet, it is found also in the ‘Alternative Tradition’ of the sBa bʿzed (G, p. 75.8, not reproduced in the mKhas paʾi dgaʾ ston, f. 120). The motif of the boot left behind is known also in connexion with another Hva šaṅ (perhaps one connected with sBa gSal snaṅ in the sBa bʿzed, G, p. 9 ~ S, p. 8).\(^{170}\) The association of this motif with Bodhidharma is of course known from the Chinese Chʾan tradition; and in Tibetan sources it is found in connexion with the Dhyāna-master Bodhi-Dharmottara in the bSam gtan mig sgron (f. 12b).\(^{171}\)

(8) It is significant that in the Chos ′byun Me tog sūn po (f. 425′a6) the expression dkar po chig thub – a term presumably borrowed from the vocabulary of Tibetan pharmacology and denoting in the present context a spiritual sovereign remedy – is recorded as a description, based on a medical metaphor, of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna’s ‘spontaneist’ and cognitively nativist teaching of face-to-face intuitive confrontation with and comprehension of Mind (sems no ’phrod pa, etc.).

The same expression is found in addition in the ‘Alternative

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168 See Chos ′byun Me tog sūn po, f. 426b4, where the expression bro bor is found. In standard classical Tibetan, bro bor ba and bro dor ba mean ‘to swear an oath’ (mnaʾ bskyal balskyel ba). In the present context, however, not only does this meaning not fit well but the corresponding passages in the parallel sources indicate that the appropriate meaning is ‘to die’ (li in sBa bʿzed, G, p. 68.1, and in dPaʾ bo gTsug lag phren baʾs mKhas paʾi dgaʾ ston, ja, f. 116b4; ′das in mKhas paʾi dgaʾ ston, ja, f. 115a3).

169 See above, p. 61.

170 See also ′Gos gZon nu dpal, Deb ther ston po, ka, f. 2123 (Roerich, p. 41); bSod nams rgyal mthsan, rGyal rabs gsal baʾi me loī (ed. Kuznetsov), p. 182. Cf. bSam gtan mig sgron, f. 12 (in connexion with ′Bodhidharmottara′); mGon po skyabs, rGya nag chos ′byun (Sichuan ed., 1983), p. 122. See also G. Tucci, Tibetan painted scrolls (Rome, 1949), p. 615 n. 252, and Minor Buddhist texts, II (Rome, 1958), p. 44.

171 Compare Thuʾu bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ni ma, Grub mthaʾ lel gyi me loī, rGya nag Chap., f. 13a.
Tradition' of the sBa bla' (G, pp. 72—75), from where dPa’ bo gTsug lag phreng ba has taken it (mKhas pa'i dga’ ston, ja, f. 120a6—7). And it is known too from Sa skya Pañḍi ta’s treatment of the Hva śaṅ’s teaching in connexion with his criticism of the Neo-Mahāmudrā (da lia’i phyag rgya chen po) and Chinese-style rDzogs chen (rgya nag lugs kyi rdzogs chen). A corresponding medical concept is, moreover, found in Wang Hsi’s Ch’eng-li chüeh (f. 146b); there, in the context of Mo-ho-yen’s own presentation of his teaching on non-reflection and non-examination, the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra is quoted on the subject of the medicine called agada, which is said to heal all illnesses.

This attestation in the Chos ’byun Me tog smin po – which as seen above is not unfavourable to the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna – of the expression dkar po chig thub as a description of the ‘Simultaneist’ teaching, supported as it is by the presence of a parallel medical description ascribed to Mo-ho-yen himself in the Ch’eng-li chüeh, disposes of the suspicion that the comparison with the Hva śaṅ’s teaching of certain other doctrines current in Tibet that also made use of the image of the dkar po chig thub as a spiritual panacea was arbitrary and nothing but a transparent polemical device used by Tibetan opponents of these later teachings such as Sa skya Pañḍi ta (see below, Chap. iii).

In sum, largely concordant accounts of the Great Debate between the ‘Gradualists’ headed by Kamalaśīla and represented in addition by Ye s’es dbaṅ po and dPal dbyangs – both members of the sBa family – on the one side and the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen associated with Myan/Nān Sa mi and other Tibetan followers on the other side have been handed down in the traditions of the sBa family (sBa bla‘) followed by Sa skya Pañḍi ta and Bu ston, and perhaps also by Ne’u Pañḍi ta, and in the Chos ’byun Me tog smin po.

172 See Sa skya Pañḍi ta, sDom gsum rab dbyar, f. 25b—26b. Cf. Thub pa’i dgois pa rab tu gsal ba, f. 48b—50b, 59b; and sK’yes bu dam pa’i ge f. 3a ff.
173 See Fa-hsien’s Chinese translation of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (T 376, p. 893b), a passage that is however not found in the other Chinese translations according to Demiéville, Concile, p. 122 n. 7. In the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra it is, moreover, the Sūtra itself that is compared with the agada. Cf. Hōbōgirin, p. 180, s.v. Akada.
by the rDzogs chen master of the ṇaṅ family, ṇi ma ’od zer. Assuming that the ascriptions of these texts are not wholly without foundation — and no reason to think otherwise has so far emerged — the account of the Great Debate and the issues addressed in it can be securely traced back at least as far as the early thirteenth century, in other words to no less than a century before Bu ston and to a time just before Sa skya Panḍi ta. No cogent reason has appeared either for supposing that sBa traditions, at least in their core, are not even older. Indeed — except of course for the supplemented version of the sBa bţed, which continues down to the time of Atiśa, and the very end of the unsupplemented version, which records events after the death of Ye šes dbaṅ po — the sBa traditions may go back essentially to the time of sBa gSal snaṅ (identified with Ye šes dbaṅ po) and dPal dbyaṅs, two of Mo-ho-yen’s main opponents in the Great Debate.

As for the Chos ’byun Me tog sṅiṅ po, the question arises as to whether its author, ṇaṅ raṅ ṇi ma ’od zer, could have made use of records going back as far as ṇaṅ/Myaṅ ṇa mi — an early advocate of ‘Simultaneist’ teachings and apparently an associate of the Hva šaṅ known as Me mgö/Me ’go, of sNa Bye ma la/mNa’ Bi ma,174 and perhaps of Mo-ho-yen himself175 — and Myaṅ ban Tiṅ ne ’dzin bzaṅ po — a supporter of the Ho-shangs and an opponent of Ye šes dbaṅ po.

Now, if the sBa bţed and sources such as the writings of Sa skya Panḍi ta, Bu ston’s Chos ’byun and the mKhas pa’i dga’ ston which agree with it have transmitted records of the sBa family going back to the time of the Great Debate whilst the Chos ’byun Me tog sṅiṅ po might perhaps be conjectured to reflect, at least to some degree, ancient traditions of the Myaṅ/Naṅ family, it will be all the more significant that the account of the events surrounding the Great Debate found in the latter Chos ’byun agrees fairly closely with the account in the sBa traditions. At all events, on several points of importance in the present context, the Chos ’byun Me tog sṅiṅ po hardly differs more from one or the other of the sBa bţed versions than these differ from each other. Hence, if Naṅ raṅ was not actually following a version of the sBa records, it

must be concluded that he was drawing either on a closely related text or on some older common source. 176

Therefore, and despite some important differences such as the ones noted above, the very considerable degree of agreement between the sBa records and the Chos 'byün Me tog snin po lends support if not to the assumption that the controversy and debate between Kamalasila's school and the Hva šan(s) actually took place in exactly the way related in these sources, then at least to the likelihood that these accounts are not mere fabrications by post-twelfth-century gSar ma pa writers motivated by hostility to the teachings of the eighth-century 'Simultaneists' and the rDzogs chen pas.

It has to be borne in mind too that if Kamalasila and the Hva šan Mahāyāna figure in a kind of complementary theoretical opposition to each other, Šāntarakṣita and Padmasambhava – a major source of the rNin ma tradition – stood in a relation of complementary suppletion according to the sources. Thus, in our sources there can be no question of an undifferentiated blanket rejection of all that is rNin ma or rDzogs chen; and it will not be possible either to hold that the rejection of the Hva šan and his teachings was simply inspired by hostility to rDzogs chen with which his teachings bear a certain typological affinity that did not go unrecognized by rNin ma pa authorities (see below, p. 102).

In the historiography of Tibetan religion and philosophy matters are seldom so simple as to be explainable merely by a conspiracy theory. If alterations and distortions of historical events have actually taken place, then both the causes and the

176 In his rGya nag hva šan gi byün tshul grub mtha'i phyogs sīa bcas sa bon tsam smos pa, f. 14a, Tshe dban nor bu has referred also to the sBa bzed in connexion with the differences between the Chinese Ho-shangs and the Indian Siddhāntas, as well as to the bSam gtan mig gi 'grel pa (i.e. the bSam gtan mig sgron) of gNubs Rin po che.

Furthermore, as already noted, monks of the dBa'/sBa and Myan families were already linked as disciples of Šāntarakṣita according to the Turkestan (Sa cu) document published by F. W. Thomas (see above, n. 107 and n. 110). Later, a certain sBa sgom was the disciple of Myan Šes rab 'byün gnas of the dBu ru Žva'i lha khan founded by Myan Tiṅ ne 'dzin, and a contemporary of Myan Byan chub grags (Myan Ša ba can); see gZon nu dpal, Deb ther sron po, 4a, f. 33b (= p. 173-4).

For a later rNin ma view of the Great Debate as reported in the sBa bzed and as discussed by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta, in addition to Tshe dban nor bu's work already cited above see Sog bzlog pa Blo gros rgyal mshan, gSan stags sīa 'gyur la bod du rtos pa sīa phyir byün ba nams kyi lan du brjod pa, nes don 'brug sgra, ff. 6a ff. and 117a-120b.
processes of these changes are probably fairly complex. Much historical, religious and philosophical analysis remains to be done on the eighth-century encounter in Tibet between 'Gradualism' and 'Simultaneism' for which the documentation is multifarious and sometimes opaque. An attempt in this direction will be made in the two following essays.
WHAT then were the fundamental questions at issue in the encounter between Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s Yogācāra-Madhyamaka school on the one side and on the other the doctrines of the Ho-shangs teaching in Tibet and the Dunhuang area with Mo-ho-yen (Mahāyāna/Mahā yan) amongst the best known of them?

In his Bhāvanākrama (III, ed. Tucci, pp. 13–14) Kamalaśīla has given the following summary of some teachings that represent the views of an unnamed opponent:

A certain [teacher] has the following opinion: ‘It is because of the force of good and bad deeds (śubhāśubhakarman), produced through mental construction (cittavikalpa), that sentient beings (sattva) revolve in the round of existences (samsāra), experiencing the fruits of deeds (karmaphala) such as heaven (svargādi). Those who on the contrary neither think on anything (na kimcic cintayanti) nor perform any deed whatever are completely freed (parimuc–) from the round of existences. Therefore nothing is to be thought on (na kimcic cintayitavyam), nor is salutary conduct (kuśalacaryā) consisting in generosity and the like (dānādi) to be practised. It is only in respect to foolish people (mūrkhajana) that salutary conduct consisting in generosity and the like has been indicated (nirdīṣṭā).’

Several lines further on in the same text Kamalaśīla again cites (p. 14) the assertion that the practice of generosity and the other virtues is not to be carried out, and he later quotes the thesis (p. 20): ‘No deed whatever, salutary or otherwise, is to be performed’.

Kamalaśīla also cites (p. 15) the teaching according to which one ‘enters’ all factors through non-mind and non-mentation (sarvadharmasya asmṛtyamanikāreṇa pravīṣati). And in another Bhāvanākrama (I, ed. Tucci, p. 212) Kamalaśīla quotes the Avikalpapravesadhāraṇī’s observation that ‘by non-mentation one sets aside the phenomenal marks of visible matter and so forth’ (amanasikāraṃ rūpādinimittam varjayati). According to Kamalaśīla’s explanation, what is here intended by the term amanasikāra is not simple absence of mentation (manasikāraḥ) but, rather, that non-objectifying or non-apprehension which belongs to him who analyses through discriminative knowledge (prajñayā nirūpayato yo ’nupalambhaḥ = ṣes rab kyis brtags na mi dmigs pa gani yin pa).179

178 Cf. Cheng-li chūeh f. 135a f. (Demiéville, p. 76 f.); Stein 468 (Gómez, p. 108) and 709 (Gómez, p. 114); Pelliot tibétain 823 (Gomèz, p. 126). Cf. bsam gtan mig sgron, f. 73a f. 179 Kamalaśīla has taken up this point in his Avikalpapravesadhārāṇī-Ṭikā (P, f. 156b-157b). There he observes first that when something is perceived by being presented in cognition (snan bar ’gyur bas mnon du ’gyur pa), it is something that may then be removed through non-mentation (amanasikāra). Next he argues that such amanasikāra is not mere absence of mentation [in the sense of absolute, non-presuppositional and non-implicative, negation, or prasajyapratīṣedha]. For, non-existence being no thing (drios po med pa), it cannot serve as the cause for anything at all; and without correct analytical examination (bhūtapratyavekṣā) it is impossible not to attend (manas-kye) to the phenomenal signs (nimitta) or the other [skandhas] presented in cognition. Nor, however, does something other than this mentation constitute amanasikāra [in the sense of relative, presuppositional and implicative negation, or paryudāsa]; for it would then follow that some other thing such as rūpa and the other [skandhas] too could be amanasikāra, [amanasikāra] being then not the counter-agent (pratipakṣa) against them [as is required by the theory]. Accordingly, what was intended [when amanasikāra was spoken of in the Avikalpapravesadhārāṇī] is that an amanasikāra that is the characteristic (laksanā) of bhūtapratyavekṣā – the contrary of that manasikāra [which is to be counteracted] – constitutes amanasikāra.

Alternatively, because amanasikāra is a product (phala) [of analytical examination], it has been stated that bhūtapratyavekṣā is to be designated metonymically by the term ‘amanasikāra’. That is, by merely indicating its product, it becomes evident by implication (arthasamarthya) that [analytical examination as the cause of amanasikāra] is to be effected. So it is possible fully to remove the phenomenal signs (nimitta). For, granted that the Yogin thus analytically examines phenomenal signs such as rūpa presented in his cognition [even though] in a form that is erroneous (viparyasta) owing to the force of misknowledge
In his Bhāvanākrama (III, p. 25–26) Kamalāśīla also cites the thesis that the Six Perfections (pāramitā) are contained in Dhyāna, so that through the cultivation (sevanā = bsten pa) of the latter all the Perfections are cultivated, whereas generosity (dāna) and the others should not be cultivated separately.\(^{180}\) This thesis contrasts with the view (based on the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras) according to which, in order to be true Perfections, the other pāramitās must be under the direction of the Perfection of discriminative understanding (prajñāpāramitā).

Now, he who suitably joins together dhyāna and prajñā is called prajñottaradhyāyin (šes rab mchog gi bsam gtan pa), i.e. a meditator for whom discriminative understanding is paramount.\(^{181}\) At this high stage of attainment, mind (manas) — or manasikāra according to Bhāvanākrama II (ed. Goshima, p. 47) — characterized as it henceforth is by the cessation of analytical reflection (uparatavicāra) is wholly without linguistic conceptual construction (nirjalpa­karasa = brjod pa med pa nān gcig tu gyur pa);\(^{182}\) and it operates of itself (svarasavāhin = ran gi nān gis 'jug pa), so that the Yogin will then abide in determining reality without conceptual effort (anabhisālīskaratas).\(^{183}\) When Mind (citta) is thus svarasavāhin and proceeds in balance (samapravṛttā = mīn par 'jug pa) there will be equanimity because of the relaxation of mental inflexion (ābhoga­sithilikaranād upeksaṇīyam).\(^{184}\) This is what is known as the Path

\(^{(avidyā)}, once they are not cognitively objectified (ālamb-) [any longer], conceptual attraction (abhinivesā) [to them] is removed. When they have been removed, absence of phenomenal sign (animitta) is comprehended ... \(^{[157b5].}\) In this way, the characteristic of bhūtapatravyeṣā is considered in this connexion to be manasikāra. Although it is [indeed] of the nature of dichotomizing construction (vikalpa), it will [nevertheless] be consumed by the fire of correct Gnosis (yai dag pa'i ye šes = samyajñāna) produced by it, just as e.g. two fire-sticks are consumed by the fire produced by rubbing them together. Thus, he who wishes to produce Gnosis free from vikalpa must first cultivate Insight (vipaśyanā), the characteristic of bhūtapatravyeṣā. Thereby phenomenal signs will be fully removed.

This image of the fire-sticks burnt up by the fire that issues from them is taken from the Kāśyappaparivarta § 69; see Bhāvanākrama III, p. 20, and below, pp. 114, 206. And on the nirvikalpa/avikalpa (praveśadhāraṇī), in addition to Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas (I, p. 212 and III, p. 11), compare Śhīramati’s Trimśikābhāṣya 22d, 28–30. See also K. Matsuoda, Bukkyō seminā 34 (1981), pp. 40–49.

\(^{180}\) Cf. Pelliot tibétain 116 (171 f.) and 117; Stein 709 (Gómez, pp. 80, 87).

\(^{181}\) Bhāvanākrama III (ed. Tucci), p. 8; II (ed. Goshima), p. 47. (This concept has to be distinguished from dhyānottaradhyāyitā in Asanga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya, p. 68, which constitutes a ground for Affects [samkleśa].)

\(^{182}\) Bhāvanākrama III, p. 5.6–7. \(^{183}\) Bhāvanākrama III, p. 8.

where Quieting and Insight operate in conjunction (śamathavipa-
śyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgo nispānah = ḍi gnas daṅ lhag mthon zung du 'brel ba'i lam grub pa).\(^{185}\)

The concept of the balanced process of Mind in śamatha and
vipaśyāna, as a consequence of which there is neither drowsiness (laya = byiṅ ba) nor excitation (auddhatya = rgod pa) of Mind, is
further illustrated by the image of a pair of oxen going along
yoked together (yuganaddhavāhibalivardadvaya = glan gnis zung du 'brel ba).\(^{186}\) Crucial in this context is exact analysis (bhūtapratya-
vekṣā = yan dag par so sor rtog pa) leading to analysis of the factors
of existence (dharmapravicaya = chos šin tu nmam par 'byed pa) and
discriminative understanding (prajñā = šes rab), and to Insight
(vipaśyanā = lhag mthon).

According to Kamalasila, then, there should indeed be a
simultaneous operation (cig car 'jug pa) of Means (thabs = upāya)
consisting in generosity, etc., and of Prajñā, this being the Path
of their joint processing (yuganaddhavāhī mārgaḥ).\(^{187}\)

Such practice leads to the Bodhisattva’s achievement of objec-
tifying the entirety of things (vastuparyantatālambana = dṇos po'i
mtha' la dmigs pa),\(^{188}\) to his birth in the Tathāgata-Family
(tathāgata-kula), to his entry into faultless determination (skyon med
pa = niyāma),\(^{189}\) and thus ultimately to buddhahood.

The opposed doctrines, which are found most clearly reported
in the third Bhāvanākrama and which Kamalasila has rebutted in
detail by means of a very extensive array of quotations from the
Sūtras and some Śāstras, are not, as already mentioned, explicitly
ascribed by him to the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen or to any other
contemporary. Indeed, as is frequently the case in Indian philo-
sophical treatises, no explicit information is provided as to
whether they were the actual views held by some particular
contemporary of the author. The fact that they are envisaged in
the Mahāyānist canonical texts cited by Kamalasila leads one to
suppose that they are quite old opinions. However, there are

\(^{185}\) Bhāvanākrama III, p. 9.

\(^{186}\) Bhāvanākrama III, p. 10; cf. I, p. 207, and II, p. 35.

\(^{187}\) Bhāvanākrama II, p. 71.


\(^{189}\) Bhāvanākrama II, p. 77, quoting the Daśabhūmikasūtra i, p. 12.
clear links between Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas and Avikapla-
praveśādhāraṇī-Tīkā and Mo-ho-yen’s views as found in the
Tibetan fragments from Dunhuang and in Wang Hsi’s Cheng-li
chüeh.

The two tendencies confronting each other have regularly
been described, and clearly contrasted, in the older Tibetan
historical texts by means of the designations rim gyis pa or rim gyis
‘jug pa for Kamalaśīla’s school and (g)cig c(h)ar ba or cig c(h)ar [du]
‘jug pa for Mo-ho-yen’s school. The term rim gyis pa, a noun
derived from the locution rim gyis ‘gradually’, corresponding to
Skt. krameśṇa, may accordingly be rendered by ‘gradualist’, the
emphasis in this tendency being on the step-by-step serial
cultivation (bhāvanā) through reinforcement (abhyaśa) of the Path
of Awakening with its successive gradations (rim pa = krama).
And rim gyis ‘jug pa can be rendered as ‘gradual engagement’ or
‘gradual process’ (‘jug pa = pravr̥. To render accurately the
second term (g)cig c(h)ar ba is somewhat more difficult. Since in
this tendency emphasis is put on the immediate, instantaneous,
simultaneous and holistic – i.e. the single-moment – nature of
Awakening, and because the term employed is derived from the
expression cig c(h)ar du ‘in one instant, simultaneously’ which is
used to render the Sanskrit words yugapat and sakṛt and which
may be glossed by dus gcig tu ‘at one time, at once’ (Skt.
ekavāram), the term can be rendered either as ‘instantaneous/
instantaneist’ or as ‘simultaneous/simultaneist’. The frequently
employed renderings ‘sudden’ for cig c(h)ar and ‘Subitist’ for cig
c(h)ar ba are of course appropriate also to the extent that these
words – together with Skt. sakṛt and ekavāram – are additionally
associated with the idea of suddenness; but only occasionally (see
below) is the word cig c(h)ar actually used to describe actions that
are sudden and abrupt (glo bur) as distinct from those that are
either simultaneous with each other or instantaneous.

In our Tibetan sources ‘Gradualism’ is in addition often
referred to by the expression (br)tse(n) min/mun, and the ‘Gradu-
alist’ by the word (br)tse(n) min/mun pa. And ‘Simultaneism’
is known as the (s)ton min/mun, and the ‘Simultaneist’ as a (s)ton
min/mun pa. These words, which are clearly not Tibetan in origin,
correspond respectively to the Chinese expressions chien men
(ʻai) ‘(school of) gradual entrance’ and tun men (ʻai) ‘(school
Another contrasting pair of expressions in Chinese are *chien wu* 'gradual Awakening' and *tun wu* 'sudden Awakening'. It is however not certain that simultaneity and suddenness are in fact totally identical notions in the history of the Dhyāṇa schools; but the clarification of this point is crucial for the history of Ch’ān rather than for that of the Tibetan doctrines being considered here.

The ‘Gradualist’ procedure is compared in Tibetan sources with a progressive, step-by-step ascent toward a mountain peak, or with a monkey’s gradual climbing to the top of a tree from below (*mas ’dzeg*). On the contrary, the ‘Simultaneist’ procedure is compared with an eagle’s sudden or abrupt (*glo bur*) descent on to the top of a tree from above (*yas babs, yas ’bab*). This pair of metaphorical descriptions is thus intended graphically to illustrate a distinguishing feature of two contrasting procedures.

The Hva śān Mahāyāna is stated to have said that not thinking on anything whatever, not conceptualizing anything whatever and not practising anything whatever constitute an objectifying that involves simultaneous engagement (*dmigs pa gcig char ’jug pa*), so that this is as (one) on the tenth Bodhisattva-stage (*sa = bhūmi*).

He is also shown as sometimes asserting that his method is taught for persons whose faculties are superior (*dban po rnon po = tīkṣṇendriya*), whereas the Dharma-practice based on generosity and so forth (*dānādi*) has been taught rather for those whose faculties are blunt.
A feature characteristic of the teachings ascribed in our Tibetan sources to the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna is the eradication of all discursive thinking in any and every form and an emphasis on non-mentation (yid la mi byed pa = amanus(i)kāra) and non-minding (dran pa med pa = asmṛti) as the necessary — and indeed sufficient — condition for achieving the meditator’s goal of understanding (rtogs pa) or face-to-face recognition (rió’phrod/ sprod pa) of Mind (sems).

This denial of the fitness of mental activity and analysis for the understanding of reality is the more remarkable as the Buddha himself is regularly presented as having enjoined his disciples to attend (Pali: sunotha) and apply their minds (Pali: manasi karotha) to his teaching; indeed, thorough application of mind (yoniso manasikāro) has been one of the salient and most highly prized features in Buddhism. In the Abhidharma manaskāra has been defined as inflexion of thinking (cetasā ābhogāḥ), and it is listed among the cittamahābhāmika-dharmas alongside mati (defined as prajñā dharmapravicayāh, ‘discriminative understanding and analysis of the dharmas’), smṛti (defined as ālambanāsamspramōsa, ‘non-forgetting of the object of thought’), and samādhi (defined as cittasyātikāgratā, ‘one-pointedness of mind’).195 A negative valuation of manas(i)kāra was, however, a characteristic of the Siddha movement, especially for example with Maitripāda (c. 1000 CE), as well as of Dhyāna/Ch’an. It can be accounted for by its association with discursive thinking and mental construction (vikalpa), which have to be brought to a stop before direct and immediate understanding of reality can be achieved, and perhaps also by the fact that mentation is absent in certain superior forms of Samāpatti and Viṃokṣa meditation. Clearly, what the Hva śaṅ was seeking was a ‘return’ to inborn and spontaneous Mind, in the form of its immediate face-to-face recognition, rather than an application of mind to what is communicated from outside, even if this communication be from the Buddha himself; for such mediated, ‘other-conditioned’ (parapratyaya) verbal-conceptual communication is inextricably tied up with mental construction

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(rtog pa = kalpanā) and binary conceptualization (rnam par rtog pa = vikalpa).

A noteworthy metaphorical description of the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen’s teaching was, as already mentioned above, by means of the expression dkar po chig thub found in both the ‘Alternative Tradition’ of the sBa bzhed and Naṅ ral’s Chos ’byun Me tog sīn po, as well as in later Tibetan sources. In the vocabulary of Tibetan pharmacology, this term evidently designates a certain substance (either mineral or vegetable) considered as a sovereign remedy, or at least as a pre-eminent antidote effective all by itself.196 Just so, according to the ‘Alternative Tradition’ of the sBa bzhed, understanding of Mind in face-to-face recognition was regarded by the Hva saṅ as a spiritual dkar po chig thub that acts alone, like a panacea (sems rtogs na dkar po chig thub yin pas des chog zer nas, G, p. 72). In dPa’ bo gtsug lag phren ba’s mKhas pa’i dga’ ston it is further specified that the doctrine of pure understanding of Mind (sems rtogs pa) known as dkar po chig thub, which suffices for the achievement of Awakening, involves the denial (skur pa ’debs pa = apavāda) of both salvific means (thabs = upāya) and discriminative knowledge (šes rab = prajñā; ja, f. 120a7); and it is added that the teaching according to which Awakening results from ‘recognition in confrontation’ of Mind is stated to have been described as this same dkar po chig thub (deṅ saṅchos rnal ma rnambs nor nas sems rino ’phrod pas ’tshaṅ rgya bar ’dod pa dkar po chig thub tu ’gro ba’i rgyu mtshan de yin gsun, ja, f. 120b6).197 This description is confirmed by Naṅ ral’s Chos ’byun Me tog sīn po, which cites the teaching that when there is understanding issuing from face-to-face recognition there is Awakening, and that it is therefore necessary to recognize Mind face-to-face, this mode of knowing being the dkar po chig thub (raṅ no šes nas rtogs na sāṅs rgya/ de’i phyir sems no ’phrod dgos/ de šes na dkar po chig thub yin, f. 425’a5–6). As already noted above, Wang Hsi’s Cheng-li chúeh (f. 146b) includes a passage where Mo-ho-yen compares his

197 Elsewhere in the mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, the expression sems no rtogs pa has been used. The Tibetan expressions sems rtogs pa, etc. – as well as sems la bta ba, etc., in the Dunhuang documents – correspond to Chinese k’an hsin, on which see Demiéville, Concile, pp. 43 n. 1, 51–52, 78, 125–6, 158. Cf. below, n. 461.
teaching of non-reflection and non-examination with the agada-
medicine mentioned in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, which describes
itself as this antidote that heals all illness.

The idea of the understanding and face-to-face recognition of
Mind being a sort of spiritual medicine that is self-potentiating
and effective entirely by itself – the *dkar po chig thub* – has been
discussed and severely criticized by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta Kun dga’
rgyal mtshan (1182–1251) in his *Thub pa’i dgonis pa rab tu gsal ba*
(ff. 48b, 50a, 56b) and *sDom gsum rab dbye* (ff. 25b–26a), as well
as in his *Phyogs bcu’i sans rgyas dain byañ chub sms dpa’ rnam s la žu
ba’i phrin yig* (f. 6b), *sKyes bu dam pa rnam s la sprin ba’i yi ge*
(ff. 3a–4a) and Epistle to Glo bo Lo tsā ba Šes rab rin chen
(f. 28a–b). With the exception of Nañ Ni ma ’od zer’s *Chos ‘byün
Me tog šini po* (and Byañ chub sms dpa’ sms dpa’ chen po chos rgyal
mes dbon rnam gsum gyi rnam par thar pa rin po che’i phrein ba?)
these works of Sa skya Paṇḍi ta appear to be the oldest securely datable
Tibetan sources discussing the Hva šañ Mahāyāna’s teachings
now available.

In the account of the Hva šañ’s teachings in the *sDom gsum rab
dbye* (ff. 25b–26a), this unique ‘medicine’ is even mentioned in the
prophetic testament that Šantaraksita is deemed to have delivered
to Khri Sroñ Ide btsan and in which he recommended that after
his death his disciple Kamalaśīla should be called to Tibet when a
split would occur in the Dharma, so that he might then combat
the teaching of the Hva šañ described as the *dkar po chig thub*. For
his version Sa skya Paṇḍi ta seems to have relied on the
‘Alternative Tradition’ of the *sBa’ bzed*, where Šantaraksīta’s
prophecy is quoted by Ye šes dbañ po and in which the *dkar po
chig thub* is also expressly named (G, p. 73.3).

In his account of what he termed the method (g’uñ lugs) of the
Chinese Bhikṣu and Master (mkhan po), Sa skya Paṇḍi ta has

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pp. 91–93.

199 The expression *dkar po chig thub* does not, however, appear in the version of
Šantaraksīta’s testament given in Bu ston’s *Chos ‘byün* (f. 127b), in dPa’ bo gTsug lag
phrein ba’s *mKhas pa’i dga’ ston* (ja, f. 115b), and in Padma dkar po’s *Chos ‘byün* (ed. Lokesh
Chandra, f. 164b). (See however *mKhas pa’i dga’ ston*, ja, f. 120a).
joined what he called ‘today’s Mahāmudrā’ (da lta'i phyag rgya chen po) – described as almost (phal cher) a Chinese Dharma system (rgya nag chos lugs) – and the Chinese-style rDzogs chen (rgya nag lugs keyi rdzogs chen). And using the metaphor of (the eagle’s sudden) descent from above (yas 'bab) along with the designation cig char ba, he has pointed out defects in all three doctrines together.

Exactly what Sa skya Paṇḍi ta had in mind when speaking of a ‘Neo-Mahāmudrā’ is perhaps not altogether clear from this passage of the sDom gsum rab dbye. His purpose was evidently to contrast it with an older Mahāmudrā teaching, that is, probably, with the classical one he accepted (ff. 26a–b); and his criticism does not therefore appear to be indiscriminately directed against all forms of Mahāmudrā. Indeed, in this connexion, he has explicitly recognized the version connected with Nāgārjuna; and he has also separately mentioned both Nāropa’s and Maitrīpāda’s Mahāmudrā teachings (f. 26a5).

Now we know that sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079–1153) – an early Tibetan master who combined the bKa’ brgyud pa traditions, one of whose fundamental teachings is

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200 It is to be noted that the rDzogs chen master Śrī Siṃha is sometimes described as rgya nag po'i slob dpon ‘the master offrom China’.

201 A connexion between the Hvaṣan Mahāyāna’s teaching and the phyag chen (mahāmudrā) has been mentioned in Ne’u Paṇḍi ta’s Chos’byun (f. 21b: hva san ma hā ya na byon pas/ phyag rgya chen po ‘thun pa’i grub mtha’ bzud). ‘Brug pa Kun legs (1455–1529) has also spoken of a phyag rgya ha šan gi lla ba in his gSun ‘bum (kha, f. 14a), quoted by Stein, Revue de l’histoire des religions 179 (1971), p. 10. (And a connexion with the [da lta’i] phyag chen is at least suggested in the colophon of the bSam gtan mig sgron [f. 254a].)

On the rDzogs chen side, Klon chen rab ‘byams pa (1308–1363) has mentioned the closeness of the Hva šan’s teachings to aspects of rdzogs chen (see the gNas lugs mdzod ‘grel, f. 33b–23b). See also the Bion po’i bka’i thab yig of the bKa’ thar sde lla. And Tshe dba’i nor bu (1698/9–1755), rGya nag ha šan gi byun tshul grub mtha’i phyogs sna bcas sa bon tsam smos pa (Volume V of his collected writings, Dalhousie, 1977), ff. 8b, 10b and 12b, has distinguished in the Hva šan’s teachings between what is correct and what is not. In particular, Tshe dba’i nor bu alludes to a partial similarity (cha ‘dra ba, f. 8b4–5), as does the bSam gtan mig sgron (f. 93b3). According to an opinion rejected by Sog bzhog pa (b. 1552/3), gNubs Siṃs rgyas ye sles conflated (sres po) the doctrine of the Hva šan with that of the Man nang lta ba’i phreng ba ascribed to Padmasambhava (see the gSan stags sna’ gyur la bdod du rtsod pa’i sna phyir byun ba nams kyi las du brjod pa, Nes don ‘brug sgra [New Delhi, 1975], f. 9a–10a). Further, A ro Ye sles ’byun gnas held both the seven-fold lineage-tradition of India and the seven-fold lineage-tradition of the Chinese Hva šan(s), which he taught to two disciples who then passed them on to Roṅ zom Choś kyi bzah po (eleventh century) (see ‘Gos gZon nu dpal, Deb ther sジョン po, ga, f. 30b).
THE TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION OF BUDDHISM

precisely the Mahāmudrā, with the tradition of Atiśa – in fact made use of the expression dkar po chig thub for his teaching. Thus, in his Dus gsum mkhyen pa'i žus lan, dkar po chig thub is a name for a form of spiritual realization (ñams) that is undetermined as to the length of its preparation and cognitive origin, and which remains constant and is linked with the yogic signs of hyperthermia.202 And in his Phag mo gru pa'i žus lan sGam po pa has referred to the dkar po chig thub as that by the knowledge of which alone total freedom ensues (gcig šes kun grol); through it the fetters of grasping at the cycle of existences ('khor bar 'dzin pa'i sgrog) burst of themselves, and the level of Great Bliss in Own-Mind is attained (rañ sens bde ba chen po'i sa non bya ba yin).203 This passage on the dkar po chig thub follows one in which the 'Gradualist' (rim gyis pa) and the 'Simultaneist' (cig car ba) are distinguished as to the degree of their spiritual practice, the cig car ba being described as more advanced on a continuous scale of development than the rim gyis pa. Here the concept of the dkar po chig thub does not appear linked specifically and exclusively with the Mantra domain of Tibetan Buddhist thought.

Žan Tshal pa brTson 'grus grags pa (1123–1193) was another early bKa’ brgyud pa master who made use of the expression dkar po chig thub in his teachings.204 He is in fact considered as the main propagator of the dkar po chig thub in the bKa’ brgyud pa

202 Collected works (gSut'i 'bum), Delhi, 1975, tha, f. 187b f.; rTibs ri'i spar ma (La dvags khris dpon 'KhruZ žig Padma chos rgyal, dKar rün gi skyes chen du ma'i phyogs rdzogs kyi gdams nag gnad bsdus ñer mkho rin po che'i gter mdzod), ca/3, f. 1b–2b.

203 Collected works, da, f. 236b; rTibs ri'i spar ma, ca/2, f. 4b.


204 See the Phyag rgya chen po lam zab mtgar thug (in the rTibs ri'i spar ma, ña/2), f. 26b1 = Phyag rgya chen po'i lam mchog mtgar thug (in Kon sprul's gDams nag mdzod, ña/21), f. 13b7. This text deals also with the bKa’ brgyud pa theory of the three kinds of person (gani zag), the rim gyis pa, the thod rgal ba and the gcig char ba. Cf. Padma dkar po (1527–1592), Phyag rgya gan mdzod.

On Žan Tshal pa/’Tshal pa/mTshal pa brTson 'grus grags pa (Žan rin po che), see Tshal pa Kun dga’ rdo rje, Deb ther dmør po, p. 126 f.; ‘Gos gZon nu dpal, Deb that smon po, ña, f. 136 f.; Thu'u bkvan Blo bzhan Chos kyi ni ma, Grub mtha’ sel gyi me loh, bKa’ brgyud chapter, f. 19b and f. 25b. Cf. Stein, Revue de l’histoire des religions 179 (1971), p. 10 n. and M. Broido, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 8 (1985), p. 49 n. 3. For his works, see Writings (bKa’ thor bu) of Žan gYu brag pa brTson 'grus grags pa (Palampur, 1972) (e.g. p. 712 for the dkar po chig thub).
MODELS OF BUDDHISM IN TIBET

'Gos gZon nu dpal mentions in particular his teacher sGom pa’s instruction on setting aside all conceptual and analytical investigation when engaging in true meditative realization (brtag dpyad ma byed par bsgoms šig).

Now Sa skya Panḍī ta has expressed the view that the Mahāmudrā is to be realized only on the basis of Mantra sources (sDom gsum rab dbye, f. 25b5), and he thus appears to exclude the validity of anything like a Sūtra-based version of Mahāmudrā. When speaking of a Neo-Mahāmudrā, then, Sa skya Panḍī ta may have been advertising to sGam po pa’s Sūtra-based form of the Mahāmudrā. And if it was indeed to these teachings of the bKa’ brgyud pa tradition of sGam po pa that he was referring under the name of da lta’i phyag rgya chen po, Sa skya Panḍī ta was then presumably not directly criticizing the highly problematic would-be Mahāmudrā that was propagated in the Kingdom of Western Tibet in particular in the tenth and eleventh centuries, and which Atiśa was invited there to help combat. According to the *Bodhipathadīpa-Paṇjiṅkā ascribed (perhaps incorrectly) to Atiśa himself, this deviant and pernicious doctrine, which was sometimes known under the name of Mahāmudrā, would seem to have had a strong—and in this case totally unauthentic—‘spontaneist’ and ‘innatist’ tendency. (Nevertheless, Sa skya Panḍī ta might have wished in particular to attack this infamous doctrine—one with which sGam po pa’s Sūtra-based form of Mahāmudrā could have had nothing in common, especially in view of the fact that sGam po pa belonged also to Atiśa’s bKa’ gdams pa lineage. See below, p. 121.)

In his extensive commentary on the sDom gsum rab dbye—the sDom pa gsum gyi rab tu dbye ba’i rnam bṣad (f. 104a ff.)—Go rams pa bSod nams sen ge (1429–1489) has contrasted the authentic Buddhist Mahāmudrā and the Neo-Mahāmudrā criticized by Sa skya Panḍī ta, describing the first—his school’s own (rañ lug)—as

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205 See for example lCaṅ skya Rol pa’i rdo rje, Grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bṣag pa gsal bar bṣad pa thub bstan lhun po’i māzes rgyan, kha, f. 21a (= p. 300).
206 Deb ther sion po, ῃ, f. 137b (G. N. Roerich’s translation, Blue annals, p. 714, is misleading here). This sGom pa Tshul khrims šiṅ po (1116–1169) was the nephew and disciple of sGam po pa (:pointer, f. 27a–b).
an Indian system (rgya gar gyi lugs) and the second – a doctrine held by others (gžan lugs) – as a Chinese system (rgya nag lugs). The last doctrine he has in fact defined as a specious Insight (lhag mthong ltar snañ) because it is a view that posits the Empty alone (ston rkyan du lka ba). This consists in the suppression of thought-construction in a sort of cataleptic fixation on the Empty (ston pa had de ’jog pa’i rtog pa kha tshom pa nidi) (ff. 104b1). In this context Go rams pa, quoting the sBa bžed (f. 106a1), devotes a long discussion to the teachings of the Hva śaṅs and the Great Debate of bSam yas between Kamalaśīla and Mahāyāna (ff. 105b–110a).

His evaluation of the Hva śaṅ’s doctrine is basically in agreement with that of the sBa bžed (G, p. 73), which alludes in this connexion to the impurity of view (lta ba’i snigs ma = dṛṣṭikāśāya) consisting in taking pleasure in Emptiness. Go rams pa however goes further, connecting (f. 110a) the doctrine of the Hva śaṅ criticized by Sa skya Pañjī ta with the deviant doctrines, also known under the name of Mahāmudrā, which spread at the time of Kings Yum brtan and ’od sruṇs after the breakdown of the old Tibetan kingdom consequent on the death of Glaṅ da ma.

In view of this connexion it may then be that Go rams pa even linked in his mind the debased pseudo-Mahāmudrā combatted in Western Tibet by Atiśa and Rin chen bzan po with the Hva śaṅ’s teachings which, he says, were recovered at that time from their places of concealment (gter sa), although he has not explicitly made this connexion in his comment.

Śākyamchog Idan (1428–1507), another master of the Sa skya pa school, has proceeded in a more complex (and also somewhat more conciliatory) fashion when discussing the Hva śaṅ’s teaching and the Neo-Mahāmudrā. This creative and rather innovative thinker was also an advocate of the theory of the Emptiness of the heterogeneous (gžan ston), which he describes as being in harmony with the Mahāmudrā in contradistinction to the doctrine of the Emptiness of own-nature (rani ston). He was thus linked

207a Sa skya Pañjī ta, Thub pa’i dgos gsal, following the sBa bžed, mentions both the dṛṣṭikāśāya of taking pleasure in Emptiness (f. 49a3) and the rejection of all activity (bya byed) on the path to Awakening (f. 49b2). Bu ston’s reference to the Hva śaṅ’s nihilism (chad lta) in his Chos ’byün (f. 128a1) relates rather to quietism and ataraxia.

207b Śākyamchog Idan, Lumi ’rgis kyi phyag rgya chen po bžed thshul la ’khrul pa sel ba’i bstan bcos, zui ’jug gi gru chen (gSun ’bum, vol. tsa/14), f. 14b2–3.
with the Tibetan tradition of tathāgatagarbha-exegesis that interpreted the Buddha-nature in a ‘spontaneist’ and ‘innatist’ fashion.

Now, in several works Śākya mchog ldan distinguishes between Fixation-Bhāvanā (jog sgom) and Inspection-Bhāvanā (dpyad sgom), pointing out that it is necessary to determine whether Fixation is to be preceded by Inspection or not. The dpyad sgom used in dispelling imputation (sgro 'dogs = samāropa) is connected roughly with Prajñāpāramitā-philosophy and the Madhyamaka, the bKa’ gdams pa Po to ba being cited as a master of this method (tsa/14, f. 24b). As for jog sgom, it would correspond mainly to intuitive awareness (nams myon), the coincidence of Bliss and the Empty (bde ston) in Mantrayāna and the Mahāmudrā. And while noting that still other systems of meditation have been developed based on traditions that are neither Mahāmudrā nor Madhyamaka, Śākya mchog ldan points to the fact that they have been rejected by Sa skyā Paṇḍi ta in his Thub pa'i dgoṅs gsal (tsa/18, f. 4a). Śākya mchog ldan furthermore connects analytic Inspection (dpyad pa) with the scholar-paṇḍit, i.e. the specialist in scholastic philosophy (mtshan ŉid pa) who engages in pratyavekṣā; Fixation-Bhāvanā is on the contrary linked by him with that kind of Yogin who takes everything just as it is, without engaging in mental construction and analysis, i.e. with the type of practiser known as the ku să li pa (tsa/18, f. 4b; tsa/14, ff. 15b–16a; tsa/21, f. 7a–b).

With regard to the problem of the kinds of Mahāmudrā, Śākya mchog ldan concludes that the theory of the non-duality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as explicated by Sa skyā Paṇḍi ta and the Mahāmudrā-teaching of ‘Candraprabhā-Kumāra’ (i.e. sGam po pa) are, notwithstanding the difference in their names, one in sense and import (don gcig). This is so in spite of the fact that the former doctrine as described by Śākya mchog ldan is concerned with the eradication and stoppage of imputation (samāropa: sgro

207c Śākya mchog ldan, Phyag rgya chen po'i šan 'byed ces bya bar b'i bstan bcos (Phyag rgya chen po gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos, Tsharis pa'i 'khor lo), gSuṅ 'bum, vol. tsa/14), ff. 8b–13a (addressed to a certain Sa skyon mchog, i.e. the Rin spuṅs pa ruler); Lun rigs gnis kyi phyag rgya chen po b'zhed tshul la 'khrul pa sel b'i bstan bcos, zun 'jug gi gru chen, gSuṅ 'bum, vol. tsa/14), ff. 13a–25a (addressed to Karma dbaṅ phyug dpal); and mKha' spyod dbaN po'i spyan drun du 'bal b'i mol mchid, gSuṅ 'bum, vol. tsa/18, ff. 1b–5a (addressed to Zva dmar IV, Chos grags ye šes, 1453–1524?); and Replies to the Rin spuṅs sde pa Śākya rgyal mtshan and sDe pa gar pa, gSuṅ 'bum, tsa/21, f. 5b ff.
'dogs chad pa, 'gog pa) by means of analytic inspection and reasoning (rigs pa) based on learning and reflection, and that it follows in particular the second of the Buddha’s three turnings of the Wheel of Dharma (i.e. the Prajñāpāramitā) and its teaching of the Emptiness of own-nature (ran ston) as explicated by Candrakīrti; whereas sGam po pa’s Mahāmudrā is concerned rather with intuitive awareness in Gnosis (ye šes kyis ņams su myon ba) born of the Consecrations and is in accord with the last of the Buddha’s three turnings of the Dharma-Wheel which is of definitive sense (nes don) and where Emptiness of the heterogeneous (gzan ston) has been taught (tsa/18, f. 2b). Indeed, Candrakīrti is considered the author not only of the analytical-philosophical Madhyamakāvatāra but also of the mystical-philosophical Pradīpoddyotana (tsa/18, f. 4a2).

It thus appears that Śākya mchog Idan sought to harmonize the whole of the authentic Mahāmudrā with the doctrinal position adopted by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta in his Thub pa’i dgoṅs gsal and sDom gsum rab dbye, and also to re-establish the gzaṅ ston tradition known from the hermeneutics of the tathāgatagarbha-doctrine and the Kālacakra beside the rai ston of the main line of the Madhyamaka school (after an early version of the gzaṅ ston, anterior to that taught by the Jo nang pa Dol bu pa [1292–1361], had been rejected by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta).

It has at the same time to be borne in mind that the Neo-Mahāmudrā has been criticized by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta and his followers in the main line of the Sa skya school on the ground that it was based in large part on the non-Tantric Prajñāpāramitā tradition rather than on the authentic pure Tantric tradition of the ‘standard’ Mahāmudrā. Now, given that Śākya mchog Idan fully accepted sGam po pa’s Mahāmudrā, it is perhaps not clear how, as a follower of Sa skya Paṇḍi ta, he considered that the two prongs of the latter’s criticism of the Neo-Mahāmudrā – viz. as not based on the authentic pure Tantric tradition and as close to the Hva šaṅ’s teaching – combine to constitute a compelling refutation of this Neo-Mahāmudrā. Śākya mchog Idan’s reorganization of the doctrinal categories and his shifting of the hermeneutical frame accepted by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta and the main line of the Sa skya school indeed makes it difficult fully to reconcile the views of this fifteenth-century Sa skya pa with the
position of the thirteenth-century Sa skya hierarch on the Neo-Mahāmudrā and its connexions with the Hva šan’s teachings. Go rams pa’s critique of the Hva šan’s teaching together with the Neo-Mahāmudrā may accordingly be considered typical of the main-line Sa skya school.

Śākya mchog Idan’s above-mentioned attempt to harmonize Sa skya Paṇḍī ta’s teaching with that of sGam po pa in the matter of the Mahāmudrā would seem to suggest at all events that he considered that it was indeed the latter’s Mahāmudrā doctrine that was the object of the Sa skya hierarch’s criticism.

As for the Hva šan, according to Śākya mchog Idan his mistake lay in having failed duly to differentiate between surface-level samvyūti and ultimate paramārtha, theory and practice, jñāna and vijñāna, the level of learning and reflection (thos bsam) and that of meditative realization (bsgom pa), and the indirect provisional neyārtha and the definitive nītārtha, as a consequence of which he came to believe that mere non-mention (ci yan yid la mi byed pa tsam: amanasikāra-mātra) constitutes the essential (tṣa/14, f. 10b5–6; tṣa/21, f. 5b). Śākya mchog Idan concludes that in the true Mahāmudrā freedom from conceptual construction and non-mention are altogether unlike the Hva šan’s meditation (tṣa/14, f. 11a1–2) and are not dull quietude (lten s po’i gzi gnas, tṣa/18, f. 3b; tṣa/21, ff. 5b, 6b).

Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554) — the eighth hierarch of the Karma branch of sGam po pa’s bKa’ brgyud pa school — however evidently understood Sa skya Paṇḍī ta’s criticism of Neo-Mahāmudrā as being directed against the non-mention (yid la mi byed pa) teaching of Maitripāda and also Saraha, sGam po pa’s great predecessors in this Indo-Tibetan lineage. Like sGam po pa’s, their teachings were considered to be linked also with the Sūtra and not solely with the Mantra department of Indo-Tibetan thought.208 Nevertheless, as already noted above, it would seem that Sa skya Paṇḍī ta wished rather to distinguish the Neo-Mahāmudrā he was criticizing from Nāgārjuna’s and evidently also from Nāropa’s and Maitripāda’s (sDom gsum rab dbye. f. 26a).

With regard to Žaṅ tshal pa as the propagator of the dkar po

chig thub in the bKa’ brgyud pa school,\textsuperscript{209} Thu’u bkvan Blo bzān Chos kyi ni ma writes in his Grub mtha’ šel gyi me lori that up to the time of Žaṅ Rin po che dkar po chig thub had not been well known as a term (tha śnād) in that school, but that from his time onwards it became very well known (bKa’ brgyud pa chapter, f. 19b). And he adds (f. 25b) that of the many refutations found in Sa skya Paṇḍī ta’s sDom gsum rab dbye the chief ones turn out to be directed against the dkar po chig thub teaching of Žaṅ Tshal pa and the dgoris gcig teaching of ’Bri guṇ pa; indeed, he notes, many writers have emulated Sa skya Paṇḍī ta and concluded that this teaching of Žaṅ Tshal pa had the meaning of non-mentation (yid la mi byed pa). Very interestingly, however, Blo bzān Chos kyi ni ma then observes that if an impartial person considers the sayings of Žaṅ Tshal pa, it becomes apparent to him that they do not in fact belong to the position (phyogs) of non-mentation; hence the refutation in the sDom gsum rab dbye was clearly an over-hasty statement (thub chod kyi gsum). As for the fundamental view of Mar pa, the source of the Dvags po bKa’ brgyud, Blo bzān Chos kyi ni ma describes it as Prāśaṅgika-Madhyamaka (f. 17b4).

The fact that the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna is represented as having upheld at the Great Debate the principles of non-mentation and of not thinking on anything (ci yaṅ mi sans pa) probably accounts for Sa skya Paṇḍī ta’s association of him with what he terms the ‘almost’ Chinese Dharma-system of Neo-Mahāmudrā, and also with Chinese-style rDzogs chen.\textsuperscript{210} As he has written in his sDom gsum rab dbye, despite the fact that the Neo-Mahāmudrā and the Chinese-style rDzogs chen have different names they are in substance without difference with respect to their simultaneism (cig char ba) and subitistic procedure (yas ’bab) (f. 25b); and the Neo-Mahāmudrā based on the literal wording of the tradition of the Chinese Master (rgya nag mkhan po’i gžuni lugs kyi yi ge tsam) was for the most part (phal cher) a Chinese Dharma-system (f. 26a). It is not impossible that in his account Sa skya Paṇḍī ta was thinking as much in terms of typological strands and family resemblances between teachings as in terms of direct and immediate historical influences. That he may not have meant to reject all

\textsuperscript{209} See above, pp. 103–04.
\textsuperscript{210} See also the discussion of Sa skya Paṇḍī ta’s view in Sog bzlog pa, Nes don ’brug sgra, ff. 117a–120b.
the teachings of Chinese Buddhism is perhaps suggested by the fact that with respect to the rejection of the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna’s teachings in Tibet he has written ‘that Chinese system’ (rgya nag lugs de, f. 26a3).

As for the doctrine of the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna as criticized and rejected by the main line of the Sa skya pa school, what was at issue was clearly not only quietism in the sense of the abandonment of praxis and the first four perfections (pāramitā) – though it was this too – but also a faulty form of vipaśyanā consisting in the dṛṣṭiṇāśya of taking pleasure in Emptiness – that is, in a frozen and more or less unconscious or cataleptic fixation in the Empty.

The current of thought in Tibet, and earlier in India, that thus emphasized, to the practical exclusion of all other exercises, the cultivation of non-construction (akalpanā, avikalpa, etc.) and the spontaneous and gnoseologically innate recognition of Mind together with its Quieting (samatthā) was opposed by a school of thought that laid much stress on correct analysis (bhūtapratyavekṣā = yaś dag par so sor rtog pa) leading to the full development of the investigation of the factors of existence (dharma-pravicayā = chos rnam šin tu rnam par ’byed pa) and of discriminative knowledge born from meditative realization (bhāvanāmayi prajñā) together with Insight (vipaśyanā = lhag mthon).

Among the early bKa’ gdams pa masters, Atiśa’s disciple Po to ba Rin chen gsal (103I?-1105) has stated in his Be’u bum that if, after having determined non-substantiality (bdag med = nairatmya) by reasoning on the stages of learning and reflection (thos bsam = śrūta and cintā), one then simply realizes non-construction (mi rtog) on the stage of meditative realization (sgom pa = bhāvanā), this would represent a faulty realization of Emptiness which is irrelevant (’bre lmed = asambuddha) and cannot function as the true counteragent (gñen po = pratipakṣa) against the positing of a hypostatized entity like a personal self (gaṇi zag = pudgala).211 Another early bKa’ gdams pa who considered that the extreme form of the non-mentation doctrine was incompatible with the Madhyamaka is Gro luṅ pa, the disciple of rNog Blo Idan šes rab

211 This passage is quoted from Tson kha pa, Lam rim chen mo (IHa sa ed.), f. 510b.
It should nevertheless be noted that Dipamkarasrijana’s Ekasrtyupadeśa (Dran pa gcig pa'i man nag) is described as an instruction on simultaneous engagement (cig car 'jug pa = yugapadvrtti); both discriminative understanding and means are involved in this instruction, as is the sequence (krama) of objectification followed by non-objectification (dmigs pa med pa) described as effortless and spontaneous (anābhoga).

In his classical treatise on the Path of Awakening, Tsoṅ kha pa has devoted much discussion to the relationship in meditative realization (sgom pa = bhāvanā) between the settling function of Fixation-Bhāvanā ('jog sgom) and the analytical function of Inspection-Bhāvanā (dpyad sgom) derived from analysis (dpyod pa = vicāra). Typologically speaking, it is no doubt true that non-mentation and non-analysis as advocated (according to Tibetan accounts) by ‘Simultaneists’ such as the Hvaṣan Mahāyāna bear a resemblance to Fixation-Bhāvanā and to Quieting (ţi gnas = śamatha). The distinction lies in the fact that alongside Fixation-Bhāvanā and Quieting the procedure for philosophical thought and meditation adopted by Kamalaśīla and his Tibetan followers requires in addition the application of the discriminative understanding of investigative analysis (so sor rtog pa’i šes rab = pratyaveksā-prajñā) and Insight (lhag mthon = vipaśyanā).

For Tsoṅ kha pa the essential point is then that these two forms of bhāvanā should be treated as complementary. For otherwise there might be simple acquaintance (go ba tsam), but there could be no full realization of the theory (lta ba) of non-substanciality and Emptiness, i.e. the ‘analytically inspected sense’ (dpyad pa’i don) (Lam rim chen mo, f. 501b2). Neither acquaintance (go ba) not followed by analytical inspection nor the mere assertion (dam bca’ ba tsam) of impermanence and the like can be effective alone.

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212 For Gro luri. pa’s understanding of non-mentation (yid la mi byed pa), see his bDe bar glegs pa’i bstan pa rin po che la ’jug pa’i lam gyi rim pa rnam par blad pa (bs Tsi rim), f. 377a–b etc. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, in: Orientalia I. Tucci memoriae dicata, iii, p. 1257, for Karma Mi bskyod rdo rje’s view of the matter.


and ascertainment (ries pa) of non-substantiality must therefore be firmly and repeatedly established by means of both fixation and inspection in co-ordination (f. 502b–503a). Only from effecting the serial alternation (re mos su byed pa) of fixation and inspection can there arise the Gnosis that is free from conceptual construction (mi rtog pa'i ye šes = nirvikalpaka-jñāna) (f. 504b5).

Tson kha pa's gnoseological model for understanding reality is derived from his interpretation of a distinction made many centuries earlier by Dharmakīrti215 between a cancelling or sublating counteragent (bādhaka) whose function is ascertainment (niścaya) and a mental construction to be cancelled (bādhya, as being mere imputation, samāropa), and from Dharmakīrti's further distinction between negative determination (vyavaccheda = rnam par gcod pa 'exclusion') and positive determination (pariccheda = yonis su gcod pa 'delimitation').216 Now, in Tson kha pa's model, the settling Fixation-Bhāvanā corresponds to the phase of cancellation (gnod byed = bādhaka: vyavaccheda) whilst the analytical Inspection-Bhāvanā corresponds to the phase of positive determination (sgrub byed = sādhanā: pariccheda). The first, representing as it does only the non-construction of a hypostatized entity (bden par yod pa mi rtog pa), cannot effect the ascertainment of non-substantiality (nairātmya); and in addition there is required, as the ascertaining counteragent against conceptual construction, the understanding (rtogs pa: adhigama) of non-hypostatization (bden med) and of the non-substantiality (bdag med) of both a personal self (i.e. pudgalanairātmya) and the factors of existence (i.e. dharmanairātmya) (f. 504b–505a).

In support of this type of philosophical and meditative realization in two co-ordinate phases, Tson kha pa has quoted many passages from Kamalaśīla's Bhāvanākramas. In addition, he has cited Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā iii. 21 where Bhāvaviveka has spoken of praṇā following on concentration of mind; Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya vi. 120 where Candrakīrti has described how stoppage ('gog pa: nirodha) of hypostatization is followed by

215 Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika i. 49ab.

216 See Dharmakīrti's Hetubindu (ed. E. Steinkellner), p. 25* f. For a further application of this model by Tson kha pa to the case of understanding reality, see D. Seyfort Ruegg in E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (eds.), Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy, pp: 225–7.
analytical inspection (*rnam par dpyad pa: vicāra*); and *Bodhicaryāvatāra* viii.4 where, following the Prajñāpāramitā-Śūtras, Śāntideva has treated successively the Perfections of Dhyāna and Prajñā (f. 503a–b).

Now, on the ground that by following the Hvaśān's instructions (as widely understood by the Tibetans) one would be trying to reach the signless (*mtshan med: ānimitta*) and non-construction (*mi rtog pa: akalpa[nā]*) merely by suppressing all mentation involved in the proliferating activity of mind (*sems 'phro ba: cittam prasarati*) without ever engaging in deconstructive analysis (*rigs pa'i dpyod pa*), Tson kha pa has rejected the Hvaśān's view as being contrary to what has been recommended in the *Ratnamghasūtra*, as interpreted by Kamalaśīla in his *Bhāvanākrama* II (pp. 29 and 45–46) and III (pp. 3, 7, and 18) (f. 503b–504b).217

In sum, according to Tson kha pa, not only is there to be non-construction of any hypostatized entity and of substantiality in the form of a *pudgala* and *dharman* but there must be comprehension of non-hypostatization (*bden med*) and two-fold non-substantiality (*bdag med*). Accordingly, (negative) absence of construction of a hypostatized entity and twofold substantiality must be carefully distinguished from (positive) understanding of non-hypostatization and non-substantiality (f. 504b–505a).

Now, the *nirvikalpa-jñāna* of the Ārya is of course immediate understanding (*mṇion sum du rtogs pa*) of the sense of non-substantiality, empty of the cognitive object (*yul = viśaya*) that is falsely hypostatized in the one or other form of substantiality, i.e. of *pudgala* or *dharman*. Nevertheless, even though it is conceded that the required meditative realization by means of the post-analytical (*dpyad nas*) understanding that a hypostatically posited entity does not exist does in fact involve conceptual construction, the latter still proves to be an altogether homogeneous cause (*śin tu rjes su mthun pa'i rgyu*) for non-constructive Gnosis (*nirvikalpa-

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217 Interestingly, however, the *bSam gtan mig sgron* ascribes to the Hvaśān Mahāyāna the teaching that one should not suppress notions (*'du ūes dag par yai mi bya*, f. 834a). This version of his teaching appears at first sight different from what is usually found in other sources, both Tibetan and Chinese. It may refer to his rejection of the Śrāvaka's mere suppression of notions (*samjñā*) and feeling (*vedita*). See Pelliot tibétain 117 and Stein 709 (cf. L. Gómez in R. Gimello and P. Gregory (eds.), *Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen*, pp. 110–112); and Demiéville, *Concilium*, pp. 63 n. 67, 71 (cf. pp. 75–76, 130, 140); below, p. 202 f.
The procedure may therefore be illustrated by the idea suggested in the Kāśyapaparīvarta (§ 69) that exact analysis (bhūtapratyavekṣā) gives birth to prajñā and is then consumed by this prajñā, just as fire created by attrition of two pieces of wood is as it were consumed in the blaze thus produced (f. 505a).

If on the contrary, following the Hva śaṅ’s instruction, one were to suppose that any and every conceptual construction (rtog pa) – inclusive, therefore, of pratyavekṣā (so sor rtog pa) – binds one to Sāṁsāra, and then to request the Hva śaṅ’s instruction (gdams rtag) on non-conceptualization (mi rtog pa) with the sincere intention of realizing it meditatively, this procedure could, in terms of the Hva śaṅ’s own assumption, only result in binding one to Sāṁsāra (cf. Bhāvanākrama III, p. 15) (f. 506b). In other words, if taken seriously, the Hva śaṅ’s method will be self-defeating.

Even if we hold mental cognition (blo) to be in error, the point is to discover how we are to know this unless and until we realize that the cognitive object perceived by it is not substantially real. This unreality of the cognitive object, grasped hypostatically, cannot be established by mere assertion (dam bea’ ba tsam); and the realization of reality depends on bringing together unalloyed scriptural sources (lurī = āgama) and arguments (rigs pa = yukti) establishing it. What is required, therefore, is non-construction preceded by already accomplished inspection through prajñā pertaining to pratyavekṣā (so sor rtog pa’i šes rab kyi dpyad pa snon du soṅ ba’i mi rtog pa), mere non-construction alone being quite inadequate for this (f. 507a).

Tson kha pa has referred as well to Sūtras such as the Samādhirāja and the Samādhinirmocana where the synergetic co-ordination of Quieting (samatha) and Insight (vipaśyanā) have been taught. Chapter viii in particular of the last Sūtra is regarded by the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika Kamalaśīla as a locus classicus on the subject of this co-ordination or syzygy. Tson kha pa has

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218 This highly important theme, mentioned by Kamalaśīla (Bhāvanākrama III, p. 20), is discussed also in the Madhyamakaratantraprātipa, a work ascribed to Bhavya, in Chapter VII entitled bhāvanākrama (P, f. 352b), which also alludes to the question of non-mentation. See above, pp. 94–95 note; below, p. 206.
elsewhere referred to the account of the Great Debate\textsuperscript{219} according to which this very Sūtra was contemptuously rejected by the Hva ṣaṅ (f. 306a).

It is therefore concluded by Tson kha pa that settling Fixation-Bhāvanā consisting in retention free from dispersal (mi ’phro bar ’dzin pa’i ’jog sgom) and Inspection by prajñā consisting in analysis (so sor rtog pa’i šes rab kyis dpyod pa) should first be made to alternate in meditative realization. In this way śamatha and vipaśyānā reach equilibrium (cha mñam), where there is an excess of neither the settling aspect (gnas cha: sthiti) nor of analytical investigation (f. 509b). Tson kha pa observes that śamatha and vipaśyānā are realized separately, and are made to alternate (spel mar byed pa) with each other, there being no rule at this stage that Inspection and Fixation should be realized [together] in a single mental continuum (rgyun gcig) (f. 510a5).

But in a later stage there follows the yoking together (zuṅ du ’brel ba: yuGANaddha), or syzygy, of śamatha and vipaśyānā, when they merge and operate together (samapraṇvṛttā: mñam du ’jug pa). The Path being then characterized by this yoked pair functions of itself (raṅ gi na’i gis ’jug pa = svarasavāhin), without effort (mnōn par byed pa = abhisāmakāra) and mental inflection (rtsol ba = ābhoga) (f. 514a–b). Here the force of analytical Inspection-Bhāvanā (dpyad sgom) consisting in pratyavekṣā makes it possible to achieve Quieting (śamatha) (f. 514b6). And whilst inspection (dpyod pa) is vipaśyānā, this inspection once brought to perfect completion (dpyad pa mthar thug pa) is apprehension of Emptiness (śūnyatā) qualified by śamatha (f. 515a1).

This Fixation-Bhāvanā that initially alternates and then finally coincides with analytical Inspection, in the form first of a regular sequence and then of a syzygy of śamatha and vipaśyānā, is not, therefore, to be confused with ‘Darkness-Bhāvanā’ (mun sgom) and with non-construction known as tsom ’jog gi mi rtog pa (f. 496a6). These last two expressions are used to describe that one-sided form of totally non-analytical, and practically cataleptic, non-mentation and non-construction so often attributed in the Tibetan treatises to the Hva ṣaṅ, when asmṛti and amanasikāra

\textsuperscript{219} See sBa bṣed, G, p. 66.16 ~ S, p. 56.8; dPa’ bo gTsug lag phren ba, mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 116a2.
are advocated to the exclusion of exact analytical inspection (bhūtapratyaveksa) and the resulting transcending discriminative understanding (prajñā).

In Tson kha pa’s opinion, Nāgārjuna, Bhāvaviveka, Candrakīrti, Śāntideva, Kamalaśīla and Atiśa Dipamkaraśrījñāna have all agreed on the matter of guidance in meditative realization (’khris tshul) concerning the linkage that should obtain between Fixation-Bhāvanā and Inspection-Bhāvanā. And according to him the same fundamental method was, in addition, taught by Maitreya(nātha) and Asaṅga, and finally by Ratnākaraśānti (eleventh century) who faultlessly upheld their method in his Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (f. 511a).

The doxographer Blo bzān Chos kyi ṇi ma (1737–1802) has stated in his Grub mtha’ šel gyi me loṅ that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna figures not as a ston mun pa (as he does in the sources considered above) but as a special kind of Tsuṅ men pa. Yet Blo bzān Chos kyi ṇi ma observes straightaway that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna’s doctrine does not prove to be identical with the general theory (spyi’i lta ba) of the Tsuṅ men pa. 220

The same author then remarks that, according to the Tsuṅ men pa, the results of wholesome and unwholesome karman sustained by neither release (nes ’byuri = nihsarana) nor the bodhicitta can respectively engender bliss and pain, but that they nevertheless do not differ in so far as neither turns into the cause of Liberation and Omniscience. In the same way, black and white clouds are different in colour; but still they do not differ in their effect of obscuring the sky. 221 Not observing the appropriate distinction, however, the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna has mistakenly asserted that good mental construction (bzāṅ rtog) and evil mental construction (niṅ rtog) are alike in being fetters. In the instruction on the meditative practice of real Tsuṅ men pa theory, there is mention

220 Thu’u bkvan Blo bzāṅ Chos kyi ṇi ma, Grub mtha’ šel gyi me loṅ, rGya nag Chapter, ff. 11b–13b. I am indebted to Professor R. A. Stein for pointing out to me that Tib. tsuṅ corresponds here to Ch. tsung ‘school’, i.e. to the Ch’an as the school par excellence.

221 Cf. sBa bzed, G, p. 68.18 and S, p. 58.5–6; Stein 709, f. 7a3 (cf. Gómez in Studies in Ch’an and Hua-yen, p. 114); Chos ’byun Me tog snin po, f. 430b4; Chos ’byun mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 117a2.
of inactivity (ci yan mi bya) and non-mentation (gañ yan mi bsam); but they concern the person who has attained direct understanding of reality (gnas lugs mni du gyur pa'i gañ zag gi dba'n du byas pa yin pa). However, the Hva šan Mahāyāna has asserted that starting already with the level of the beginner (las dañ po pa = ādikarmika), liberation results from total absence of thinking (ci yan yid la mi byed pa). The assertion made by this one Hva šan is therefore wrong. But it is nevertheless impossible to hold that all theories of a Ho-shang (hva šan gi lta ba thams cad) are consequently false.

According to Blo bza'n Chos kyi ni ma (f. 11b ff.), the tsun men belongs to the tradition (brgyud pa) of the sīnī po don. The term tsun men is explained (f. 14a) as designating a tradition of realization in practice (sgrub brgyud), as distinct from a Vinaya one or an exegetical one (bšad brgyud).

The sgrub brgyud sīnī po don gyi brgyud pa is said by Blo bza'n

222 See Demiéville, Concile, p. 77, and above, pp. 66, 84, 93, 98. But compare Concile, pp. 76, 86–88, 120–1, 157, 162, 164, as well as Stein 709, f. 40b.

223 Grub mtha' tel gyi me lo'i, Rgya nag chapter, f. 13b. Blo bza'n Chos kyi ni ma seems to have followed an account found in the Rgya nag chos 'byun of mGon po skyabs (eighteenth century), f. 72a ff. (of the sDe dge ed.; p. 118 ff. of the Sichuan People's Publishing House ed. of 1983).

224 While the expression sīnī po don or sīnī po'i don is often used in Tibet to refer to the Dohā traditions of the Siddhas and the bKa' brgyud, according to mGon po skyabs (p. 118) – who also mentions the Mahāmudrā (phyag rgya chen po) – the allusion is to a teaching given to Āryadeva by Nāgārjuna; see Tāranātha, Rgya gar chos 'byun (p. 67), who adds that the sīnī po'i don was passed on to Rāhulabhadra by Āryadeva (p. 68). Tshe dba'n nor bu (Rgya nag hva šan gi byun tshul, f. 9a) relates the reference to the nes don sīnī po'i mdo sde, i.e. to the Sātras of the Third Cycle teaching the tathāgatagarbha, such as the Mahāparinirvānasūtra, which deal with don bsgom (ff. 9a, 15a). This is also the tsun men tradition going back, through the Hva šan Mahāyāna, to Kāśyapa and Bodhidharma, even though it is sometimes referred to as the tuñ min (e.g. in the bSam gyan mig sgron, f. 8b). It resembles in part the rDzogs chen according to Tshe dba'n nor bu (f. 8b); however, it has to be distinguished from the latter in the same way as it relates to the mdo lam rather than the snags lam (f. 9b–10a). Tshe dba'n nor bu nevertheless concludes that the don bsgom pa, the amanasi(kara) method of India and the two bsam gyan gi 'jug sgo of the Rgya nag mkhan po are virtually without difference (phal cher mi mthun pa med do, f. 12a).

225 It should be noted that mGon po skyabs differentiates between the tsun men (pp. 118–123 of the Sichuan ed. of his Rgya nag chos 'byun) as a bka' yi brgyud pa comprising the twenty-eight Ch'an masters from Mahākāśyapa to Bodhidharmottara (see below) – and to which he has attached the sīnī po don also known as rig ston phyag rgya chen po – and the zab mo lta ba'i brgyud pa in connexion with which he has discussed the tuñ min (= gsig char 'jug pa'i sgo) as opposed to the ts'i yan men (= rim gys 'jug pa'i sgo) (pp. 123–4). mGon po skyabs (p. 119) furthermore associates the tsun men tradition with the Ratnaṇuṇasaṃcaya-gāthās, Kambala's Alokamālā, and Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya.
IIS MODELS OF BUDDHISM IN TIBET

Chos kyi nī ma (f. 12a) to descend through Bodhidharmottara (or Dharmo), the twenty-eighth in a line of spiritual transmission starting with Kāśyapa. However, since in China Bodhidharmottara did not expound his doctrine literally (sgra ji bzin pa), but only by means of indirect allusion (ldem dgon kyi gsun : samdhāvacana) and symbols (brda : saṃketa), it is related that those who heard him did not have confidence (mos pa) and that they took him to be a teacher of nihilism (chad lta mkhan); and so he did not remain in China but went away to the North. The story of Bodhidharma’s single shoe is also mentioned, as is the relevant iconography (f. 13a). And it is noted that by some he was identified with Pha dam pa rgya gar or Dam pa saṅs rgyas, an Indian master of the Ži byed doctrine who is reputed to have also gone to China. Our author nevertheless expresses uncertainty about the value of this identification because he knows of no reliable source for it (f. 13a).

In agreement with mGon po skyabs, Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi nī ma then adds that the sīṇī po don (or tsuṅ men) appears as a Tradition of Symbol-Mahāmudrā (phyag rgya chen po brda'i brgyud pa), one that is moreover in substantial agreement with the Tibetan bKa’ brgyud pa (f. 13b). He thus approaches what Sa skya Paṇḍita ta has said in his critique of ‘Chinese-style’ rDzogs chen and Neo-Mahāmudrā, but apparently without a critical (or polemical) intent.

It is to be noted furthermore that, like mGon po skyabs, Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi nī ma distinguishes this sīṇī po don – and with it the tsuṅ men – from the tun men/min (cig car ’jug pa’i sgo) – the correlate of the tsi’an men/tsi yan min (rim gyis ’jug pa’i sgo) – which he attaches to the distinct tradition of Profound Theory (zab mo lta ba’i brgyud pa) descending through Nāgārjuna and the

226 This information concerning the Hva šāṇ Mahāyāna’s connexion with Bodhidharmottara’s lineage and the tsuṅ men is found also in Tshe dbaṅ nor bu, rGya nag hva šāṇ gi byuri tshul, ff. 5b, 8a, 10b. On f. 9 Tse dbaṅ nor bu describes ‘Bodhidharmottara’ as the source of the tsuṅ men (see also f. 10b2: bsam gtan [?] mkhan hva šāṇ tsuṅ men rnam). But, at the same time, Tse dbaṅ nor bu maintains the connexion of Bodhidharma and his brgyud ’dzin Hva šāṇ Mahāyāna with the cig char ’jug pa following what he refers to as the Lo paṅ bka’ thain (in fact the Blon po bka’i thain yig, f. 19a); see also f. 7b–8a. On the question of the line of twenty-eight Dhyāna masters, see further below, pp. 132–3.

227 The spellings tse ya(n) men/mam are found in Tse dbaṅ nor bu, rGya nag hva šāṇ gi byuri tshul, ff. 3b and 10b.
THE TRANSMISSION AND RECESSION OF BUDDHISM

Younger Bhavya (f. 9b–11a). It is in addition of great interest to see that this author considers (f. 11b) it incorrect to regard the latter two traditions as opposed doctrinal systems (grub mtha' = siddhānta); according to him they are rather to be seen as methods of spiritual instruction ('khrid tshul) by which a disciple may be guided in accordance with his nature.229 The same was in addition said by a great teacher cited by Blo bzān Chos kyi ṅi ma to apply to the distinction between cig car ba and thod rgal, which have been counted as two types in the practice of the Path (lam gyi rim pa) (f. 11b).

This linking of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna with a form of the tsun men is clearly of considerable interest. Study of Mo-ho-yen’s school-affiliations has suggested that, at least to begin with, he may have been a follower of the somewhat more gradualist Northern School of Ch’an linked with Shen-hsiu (seventh century), and that he only later moved closer to the Southern School represented by Shen-hui (670–762 or 684–758). However, the fact that he is sometimes listed as the seventh master in a line beginning with Dharmottara/Bodhidharma can be interpreted as indicating rather that he in fact belonged strictly speaking neither to the Northern School, where it was P’u-chi (651–739) who was counted as the successor of the sixth Chinese Patriarch Shen-hsiu, nor to the Southern School, where Shen-hui is counted as the successor of the sixth Chinese Patriarch Huineng. Moreover, affinities between Mo-ho-yen and the Pao-t’ang School of Ch’an in Sichuan have also been noted by scholars. And it appears that his teaching was not wholly that of any of the well-known schools of Ch’an and that it was close to Ch’an movements in Sichuan and the Dunhuang area.230

In the records studied by Demiéville, furthermore, Mo-ho-yen is shown relativizing, and transcending, instantaneous (tun) and gradual (chien) tendencies within Ch’an.231 Indeed, in a source

228 See below, pp. 206–09.
229 See also mGon po skyabs, rGya nag chos byun, p. 173.
231 See Demiéville, Concile, p. 75; in Essays in the history of Buddhism presented to Professor Z. Tsukamoto (Kyoto, 1961), pp. 5, 26–27; Toung Pao 56 (1970) pp. 83–86; and
often used by him, the *Lankâvatârasūtra*, we already find a relativization of the pair *yugapad 'simultaneous' and kramavṛtti 'progressive engagement'* (ii, pp. 55–56, 82 and 84). Vimalamitra is credited furthermore in the bsTan 'gyur with one treatise on the *cig car ba* doctrine and another on the *rim gyis pa* doctrine; and to the extent that these two works are attributable to a single author (whether he is named Vimalamitra or not), this too could attest an attempt at relativizing and reconciling the opposition between 'Simultaneism' and 'Gradualism' (or, eventually, at more or less inclusivistically integrating and 'recovering' the one in the other). At all events the *Cig car 'jug pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don* ascribed to Vimalamitra contains materials corresponding to Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākramas*.232

In its furthest consequences the innatist and 'spontaneist' doctrine — especially if misunderstood — could, in certain circumstances, lead to ethical relativism or antinomianism.

It is interesting to observe that in connexion with the twin practices of ritualized sexual union and mactation (*sbyor sgrol*) — associated in the eleventh century in the Kingdom of Western Tibet with the so-called Ar tsho Ban de (or A ra mo Ban de) — antinomianism did in fact rage in tandem with immanentism


L. Gómez (in: R. Gimello and P. Gregory, *Studies in Ch’an and Hua-yen*, p. 95) has compared Mo-ho-yen’s teachings with Tsung-mi’s doctrine of sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation. Tsung-mi belonged to the lineage of Shen-hui and hailed from Sichuan (cf. Yanagida, *loc. cit.*, p. 31). Wu-chu (Tib. Bu cu) of the Pao-t’ang Ch’an school of Sichuan inclined towards ‘Subitism’, whereas Master Kim (Chin Ho-shang, i.e. Wu-hsiang/Musang), the Korean master who taught in Sichuan, inclined towards ‘Gradualism’ (see Demiéville, in M. Soymié [ed.], *Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang*, pp. 3–7). On the ‘sudden’ tendency in the Northern School, in particular with Chih-ta who was a disciple of Shen-hsiu (rather than a later, and perhaps fictitious, master to be placed after Shen-hui), see B. Faure, *Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie* 2 (1986), pp. 123–132.232 Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, pp. 117, 120–1, speaks of interpolation. And Gómez in *Studies in Ch’an and Hua-yen*, p. 147 n. 8, regards ‘all Bhāvanākrama passages in the *Cig car [jug pa rnam par mi rtog pa’i bsgom don]* as interpolations, and not as instances of plagiarism or concessions to the gradualists; see also Gómez, in *Early Ch’an in China and Tibet*, p. 397 and p. 430 n. 21. F. Faber has argued against attributing this treatise ascribed to Vimalamitra to (his) Vimalamitra (*Acta orientalia* 46 [1985], p. 49–50).
according to historical sources which tell us that Atiśa was invited to Western Tibet in the middle of the eleventh century in order to combat this pseudo-Tantric doctrine in collaboration with Rin chen bzaṅ po. In this case the aberrations in theory and practice were apparently connected not with Chinese Ho-shangs but with a debased form of Mahāmudrā-teaching that was current in the border land with Kāśmīr, where a syncretism had evidently developed between Śivaism and Buddhism in which the doctrine and practice of both are said to have become perverted.²³³

Still, it is perhaps significant that the Supplemented Version of the sBa bzhed, the Žabs btags ma, which has in its first part devoted so much space to the Great Debate and the circumstances surrounding it, deals at the end of its supplement (S, p. 90) with Atiśa’s confutation of those deviant Tantriks who – not having understood the intended purport (dgonis pa = abhiprāya) of texts the meaning of which requires to be elicited (drai don = neyārtha) but clinging rather to the bare words (sgra = vyañjana) – held that there was no need to have recourse to generosity (shyin pa = dāna) and the other salvific means (thabs = upāya); for it is, they maintained, by Emptiness alone that one is Awakened. And in view of the resemblance between some of the problems at issue in the Great Debate and in the false doctrines propagated in Western Tibet by the Ar tsho Ban de which Atiśa was called on to combat – and in particular the idea of dispensing with means as antidotes and the emphasis laid on the spontaneous innateness of buddha-hood – it might even seem that the supplement to the sBa bzhed was meant as it were to update this older text with a view to confronting a new, but in some respects comparable, situation.


Such antinomianism could, it is true, be derived from ‘over-interpretation’ of what has been said in even such classical texts of Buddhism as the Kāśyapaparivarta (§§ 48–49, on the wise and skilful Bodhisattva’s being untouched by the pain of the passions) and Asanga’s Mahāyānasāmāṇgraha (§ 10.28.11–12, on the theory of the destruction of the kleśas through the kleśas themselves), which have in fact been cited in just this connexion by the bSam gtan mig sgron (see below p. 122). See also Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra xiii. 11, and Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā ii. 14 (p. 76) on kleśa as a factor of Awakening (bodhyaṅga). See in addition dPal brtsegs, lTa ba’i rim pa (cf. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, II, p. 139); and passages from Vimalamitra discussed by L. Gómez in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), Early Ch’ an in China and Tibet, pp. 403–4.
However, it is important to note that no comparison has actually been drawn in the Žabs btags ma between the religious situation prevailing in Central and Eastern Tibet at the end of the eighth century, at the time of the Great Debate, and the dangerous debasement that menaced the Dharma in Western Tibet in the first part of the eleventh century. At most there may have been a kind of conflation of the problematics of each case.

It is nevertheless very curious to find cited in the bsam gtan mig sgron (f. 90a) a passage from a certain rGya luni (‘Chinese Treatise’) according to which even murder is a sin (sdig pa) only if the murderer conceives of the murdered person as a sentient being (sems can). On the contrary, if one does not do so — that is, in so far as one is able to recognize that all sentient beings are māyā-like and dream-like — there can, in the absence of any real sentient being, be no murder. This is compared with the case of killing in dream, where actually there is no killing at all of anybody; and dream and waking are then held to be alike in terms of the view in question. This doctrine seems, however, not to be often met with in our sources connected with the eighth-century Great Debate of bsam yas.234

In other words, despite a certain similarity in ideas, the actual practices and events in the two cases under consideration no doubt appeared altogether different to the authors of our sources. And they therefore did not equate the Hva šañ’s rather etherealized spontaneous and innatist spiritualism and quietism — which dispensed with the difficult and prolonged ‘allopathic’ technique of the ‘Gradualists’ in favour of a spontaneous ‘Nature-cure’ of Mind235 — with the deviant ideas and debased practices ascribed to the Ar tsho Ban de, who are reported to have engaged in ritual sexuality and mactation in the guise of a method that also repudiated the customary doctrines and praxis of ‘Gradualist’ Buddhism.

234 Compare the citation from the mkhan po Phag do šan ši published by K. Okimoto, Indogaku bukkyogaku kenkyū 24/2 (1976), p. 994, who also has some information on a rGya lun (chen po) (pp. 993–2). In the bsam gtan mig sgron, f. 10a2, Dar mo ta ra is credited with a rGya luni chen po.

235 Cf. the comparison of the rDzogs chen Man nag sde with moxabustion by Klon chen rab ‘byams pa, Grub mtha’ mdzod, f. 126a5 (~ p. 348.4–5): yin sñam yid dpyod du ma lus par gnad thag tu phebs pas me btsa lia bu’o.
In many Tibetan historical writings, and above all in philosophico-philosophical and doxographical works, the expressions theory (ita ba) of the Hvaśāñ, Dharma-system (chos lugs) of the Hvaśāñ and tradition (gzun lugs) of the Hvaśāñ have come to be used in a sense that is for all practical purposes dehistoricized and universalized. These expressions have thus come to be widely employed as generic designations for a type of theory or teaching that is characterized as quietist, spontaneist, innatist and simultaneist.236

Since disagreement may exist as to the extent to which Mo-ho-yen (and Ch'an) actually adhered exclusively, or mainly, to such views, this typological use of the expressions is perhaps not entirely justified historically. Yet it can be convincingly derived from the view, reliably ascribed to Mo-ho-yen, that all sentient beings are by their nature buddhas and that in coming to an awareness of their intrinsic and innate buddhahood — i.e. the Buddha-nature or tathāgatagarbha — any activity or 'reinforcement' of a religious and ethical as well as of an intellectual and discursively philosophical character is therefore altogether superfluous and irrelevant,237 and may even be a hindrance on the level at least of the advanced practiser.238 In this perspective, the Triple Vehicle (triyāna) is set aside in favour of the Unique Vehicle (ekayāna) — or even the Non-Vehicle (ayāna) — free from all verbalizations and conceptualization.239 This interpretation of the Ho-shang's teaching is underpinned by his statements that liberation is achieved in immediate and face-to-face recognition of Mind free from all discursive and ratiocinative mentation, that is, in pure tranquillity unaccompanied by analysis and discriminative understanding.

Under this analysis, the Hvaśāñ's doctrine of the Buddha-nature and tathāgatagarbha would not issue in the eternalist view —

236 L. Gómez in Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, p. 428 n. 14, describes the term quietism to refer to Ch'an as an unfortunate legacy of Demiéville's Concile. However, if not taken as referring specifically to seventeenth-century European thought, the word does not appear to be unsuitable. The hesychast too does not eschew all activity.

237 See Demiéville, Concile, pp. 95, 107–08, 116–19, 151.

238 See above, p. 117.

with which these concepts have elsewhere been associated—and it could easily be (mis)understood as practically nihilistic. In Bston's *chos 'byun*, the Hvā śaṅ's teaching is in fact assimilated to the nihilist view (*chad lta = ucchedadṛṣṭi*).²⁴⁰

In sum, virtually irrespective of its primary historical reference, the expression 'Hvā śaṅ's theory' (or the like) has been used at least from the time of Sa skya Panḍita in the thirteenth century up to the present by Tibetan writers as a standard *topos*, and as a convenient *typological* designation for what a historian of religion and philosophy might call gnoseological nativism, soteriological spontaneity, philosophical ataraxia (without of course presupposing any specific reference to Pyrrho or Stoical Pyrrhonism) and ethico-religious quietism (again without any specific reference to Molinos and Madame Guyon and to seventeenth-century European thought). In a large section of the Tibetan tradition it has in this way acquired currency as a term in the description of spiritual theory and practice.

Were it not for the fact that the historical existence of the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen is established by Chinese and Tibetan documents from Dunhuang and that Kamalaśīla and his teacher Śāntarakṣita are well-known figures in the history of Buddhism many of whose writings are extant in the original Sanskrit as well as in Tibetan translation, a historian might indeed have been excused for inferring from the available rather schematic accounts of the Great Debate, and from the almost paradigmatic rôles played in it by the Hvā śaṅ Mahāyāna and Kamalaśīla, that this event and these names correspond not to historical facts and persons, but to emblematic figures embodying so to say a pair of contrasting religio-philosophical positions in typological and structural opposition. Certainly, in not a few Tibetan historical and doxographical traditions, the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen has been partly dehistoricized and has developed into a practically emblematic figure occupying a paradigmatic, and structurally antithetical, position as the 'Simultaneist' *par excellence* in opposition to the

²⁴⁰ See Bston, *chos 'byun*, f. 128a1; compare the 'Alternative Tradition' of the *sBa brед* (G, p. 73) on *stori pa riid la dga' ba*. See however, *bsam gtan mig sgron*, f. 83a–b, on not falling into annihilation (*chad pa = uccheda*) and on not suppressing *samjñā* and not falling into absence of *samjñā.*
‘Gradualist’ Kamalaśīla. And even though the historical documentation available to us of course excludes such an inference, we still have to bear in mind that the figures in question have come to exemplify two important, and old, positions that have often been in tension, either virtual or actual, in the history of Buddhism. (Compare the cases of Musīla and Nārada, and of Mahākotṭhita/Mahākotṭhika and Sāriputta, in the old Buddhist canon mentioned below, Chap. iv)

The fact that, for the Tibetan historical and doxographical traditions, important facts concerning the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen were uncertain and wrapped in the mists of time and legend must have greatly contributed to his becoming a somewhat shadowy and emblematic figure. For example, it was evidently not clear to the rNin ma master Tshe dба́н nor bu (1698/9–1755) whether he should be placed in the time of Khri Sroṅ lde btsan or earlier, at the end of the reign of this king’s predecessor Mes Ag tshom(s) and whether it was he or a disciple of his who debated with Kamalaśīla.241 Furthermore, as already noted, although the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāṇa is usually regarded by the Tibetan traditions as a ‘Simultaneist’, there seems to have been some uncertainty as to whether he should be identified as a ston mun pa or as a tsunī men pa.

Originally, and historically, ‘Simultaneism’ was possibly just as much complementary with as antithetical to ‘Gradualism’. Ñaṅ ral’s Chos 'byun Me tog šiṅ po has presented the teachings of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāṇa and Kamalaśīla as being without difference in substance, notwithstanding the fact that they were pitched at different levels (f. 435b).242 And in the bSam gtan mig sgron ascribed to gNubs Sais rgyas ye śes, simultaneous engagement (cig car ’jug pa) is a stage that follows on gradual engagement (rim gyis ’jug pa) and leads on first to Mahāyoga (nal 'byor chen po) and

241 See Tshe dба́н nor bu, rGya nag hva šaṅ gi byun tshul, f. 8a–b, where Mahāyāṇa is placed in the latter part of the reign of Mes Ag tshom can (i.e. Khri lDe gsug btsan, the father of Khri Sroṅ lde btsan) together with his disciples sBa gSal snaṅ (!) and Myan Tiṅ nē 'dzin bzaṅ po and is therefore tentatively distinguished from the Hva šaṅ who debated with Kamalaśīla and who would then have been Mahāyāṇa’s disciple. For an account of ho-shangs in Tibet at the time of Mes Ag tshoms, see for example the sBa bzer. And on the Hva šaṅ Me ’go/mgo at that time see Chap. ii above.

242 See above, pp. 84–85. On the similar opinion of dPal dbyaṅs see above, p. 86.
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then to Atiyoga and rDzogs chen; and although this work mentions the Hva šaṅ Mahā yan and Kamalaśila in parallel, it does not refer to the Great Debate, nor does it present these two masters as opponents.243 Kamalaśila has, moreover, himself admitted the simultaneous operation (cig car 'jug pa) of prajñā and upāya in his Bhāvanākrama (II, p. 71).

CONCLUSION

The encounter in late eighth-century Tibet between two distinct, and contrasting, religio-philosophic currents has sometimes been presented in the Tibetan sources as well as by modern scholars as a confrontation between Indian and Chinese Buddhism. And by some modern scholars it has been described as a Sino-Indian or Indo-Chinese controversy, a conflict between Indian and Chinese culture, and sometimes even as a struggle at the Tibetan court between Indians and Chinese pursuing their respective political or religio-political interests.244 The question arises as to whether such descriptions define the nature of the issues involved as precisely as is possible given the documentation available to us.

To take the last description first, although it is not impossible that political factors did play a part in these developments, it seems likely that the opposition between the two parties at the time of the Great Debate stemmed as much, if not more, from rivalries and conflicts between Tibetan magnates and their families (such as the sBa and Myañ, members of which had become Buddhist monks) as from national or ethnic rivalry between Indians and Chinese as such. The sBa family with which we have so often been concerned in the course of this discussion for example included some members – sBa gSal snañ and perhaps the enigmatic Sañ ši (ta) – associated with Chinese and Korean Ho-

243 In Don dam smra ba’i sen ge (15th–16th century ?), bŚad mdzod yid bzin nor bu (ed. Lokesh Chandra, New Delhi, 1969), f. 163a, there is a reference to Kamalaśīla and the Tsen min pa, as well as to the need to yoke together samatha and vipāśyanā and to follow the theory of Nāgārjuna; but there is no mention of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna as Kamalaśīla’s opponent. The rdzogs chen and atiyoga are, however, mentioned.

244 Compare recently Demiéville in M. Soymié (ed.), Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang, p. 7, who refers back to his views expressed in his Concile.
shangs, and other members – Ye śes dpaṅ po (who is, however, identified as gSal snaṅ once he had become a monk) and dPal dbyaṅs (who may or may not be identical with Saṅ śi) – who were closely linked with Kamalāśīla. As for Mo-ho-yen, two of his main supporters are reported to have been Khri Sroṅ lde btsan’s 'Bro consort (the 'Bro bza’ Jo mo Byaṅ chub rje) and his maternal aunt (sru Yaṅ dag), while other supporters of the Hva śaṅ were the chamberlain (gzims mal pa) Co rMa rma and a member of the rNog family. Myaṅ Tiṅ śi 'dzin bzaṅ po is also sometimes numbered as one of Ye śes dpaṅ po’s chief opponents.

In the eighth century Tibet was in fact a major independent Central Asian power in its own right, especially after imperial power in China was shaken by the An Lu-shan rebellion. And there is no concrete evidence to show that the Tibetans, who figure so prominently in this encounter and the associated controversies, were pursuing anything but their own religious concerns, along perhaps with the political interests of their families and regions. At all events, and contrary to what has sometimes been suggested or implied, there is no reason to suppose that the Tibetans then represented nothing but the proverbial tabula rasa merely waiting to be converted or manipulated by Chinese or Indians. For their part, the Indians and Chinese in Tibet at the time would presumably have derived any political influence they may have possessed above all through the Tibetans with whom they were associated. And it is not evident that they would have been on their own in a position to further their national or ethnic interests in Tibet under the guise of a religio-philosophical controversy in which many of the points at issue had a long history in Buddhist thought. In sum, no conclusive evidence has been adduced to demonstrate that this controversy was essentially an eighth-century expression of Sino-Indian geo-political or politico-ideological rivalries and conflicts.

As to the view that the controversy was the consequence of cultural confrontation between Indian and Chinese Buddhism, and ultimately between Indian and Chinese civilization, it has to be borne in mind that there then existed no totally homogeneous

245 See sBa bĕced cited above, n. 100. 246 See above, p. 60 ff.
and monolithic Indian and Chinese Buddhism. On the one side the Chinese Ch'an traditions—which today are usually regarded as so typically Chinese—not only differed among themselves, but they had their origins, at least in part, in Dhyāna teachings from India and Central Asia and their counterparts in the teachings of certain Indian Siddhas and Yoga-masters. On the other side, the scholastic traditions of India had their Chinese extensions and equivalents, before and during the T'ang, in the San-lun (Mahāyānasamgraha) School, in Paramārtha's She-lun (Mahāyānasamgraha) School, in Paramārtha's and Hsüan-tsang's Chü-she (Abhidharma-kośa) traditions, and in Hsüan-tsang's Fa-hsiang (dharmanalaksana) School, as well as more generally in certain component strands of such major Chinese Buddhist schools as the T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen. Furthermore, T'an-k'uang—an (elder?) contemporary of Mo-ho-yen at Dunhuang who evidently was in communication by correspondence with Khri Sroṅ lde btsan himself—was linked for example with the Abhidharma and Dharmalaksana (i.e. Vijñānavāda) traditions in China.  

What the student of comparative religion and intercultural transmission finds here is, then, neither a straightforward case of political conflict in Tibet between India and China, nor even a clear-cut case of cultural confrontation and hostility between homogeneous and monolithic national forms of Buddhism contending for the minds and hearts of Tibetans more or less passively waiting to be converted to the one or the other. Rather, we discover a complex of currents and trends—many of them old and respectable in the history of Buddhism—represented, in varying proportions, in the Buddhist traditions of India and China, and of course subsequently in Tibet itself.

Now, as already noted above, it is quite true that Tibetan sources have themselves underscored the fact that the two tendencies facing each other in Tibet arrived there in the main the one directly from India and the other through China, and that they were propagated respectively by Indian and Chinese masters. And the question of historically Chinese and Indian

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components in Tibetan Buddhism does unquestionably arise. Moreover, according to Tibetan sources, a certain ho-shang endowed with clairvoyance (mṇon šes can) foretold early in the reign of Khri Sroṅ lde btsan that Tibet was to be the special domain of teaching ('dul skal) of Śāntarakṣita (rather than of the ho-shangs). 248

It would however appear that the Tibetan authors were thinking in terms neither of religio-political and politico-ideological interests and hegemony nor of national forms of Buddhism — a modern concept that would probably have been scarcely intelligible to these authors — but of lines of magisterial transmission and of doctrinal traditions differentiated according to their connexions with regions and lineages. Such classifications are of course well known within India and China; and in Tibet many schools (chos lugs) and teaching transmissions (brgyud pa) have been differentiated in just this way according to the names of places and regions (e.g. Sa skya pa, Jo nāñ pa, dGa’ ldan pa, etc.). In other words, geographical regions and family lineages are very likely to have been involved to a degree now difficult precisely to determine in the encounter between currents and tendencies of thought with which we are here concerned. But to see this involvement as basically and essentially reducible to putative ethnic or national forms of Buddhism, or to great-power rivalry in Tibet, is to go beyond the evidence and to impose on it categories of thinking and analysis that are largely anachronistic. On the evidence available, such factors (to the extent that they existed) appear as incidental to the central issues at stake.

In the course of the later development of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, nevertheless, the connexion of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna, and of the other hva šaṅs, with China may well have had an impact on the reception of their doctrines in Tibet. For the fact that the ston mun pa or ‘Simultaneist’ teachings are known to have been transmitted by Chinese and Korean Ho-shangs may have resulted in their being questioned or rejected by Tibetan writers on the ground of not being part of the main stock of Buddhism and its lines of transmission to Tibet. This would at the very

248 See sBa bzhed, G, pp. 7–8; S, pp. 6–7 (cf. G, pp. 11–12; S, p. 12.5); ’Gos gZon nu dpal, Deb ther sions po, ka, f. 21a5.
least have made it easier for any Tibetan masters disposed to do so for reasons of theory or practice to take their distance from them.

Already at the end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth centuries, the Tibetan rulers were evidently striving toward a normalization of the Buddhist teachings being propagated in their realm. This effort is reflected in the decrees attributed to them according to which the (Mûla)Sarvâstivâda should be the standard Nikâya-tradition in Tibet, the philosophical theory of Nâgârjuna’s Madhyamaka should be followed there, and the dissemination of the Vajrayâna should be restricted. These decisions – whether they were actually made by the monarch himself or by his advisers in the Dharma, or are part of some subsequent Tibetan ‘invention of tradition’ – do not, however, amount to the anathematization of all other Śrâvakayânist Nikâyas apart from the (Mûla)Sarvâstivâdins, of all schools of philosophy other than Nâgârjuna’s Madhyamaka, and of the Buddhist Tantras. And, similarly, the monarch’s decree forbidding the dissemination of the Hvaśan’s teachings, assuming again that such a decree was actually issued by him, can perhaps be best understood as part of a further attempt at standardization rather than as an anathematization inspired by Kamalâsîla and his Tibetan followers. It has also to be recalled that at this time Tibetan civilization was in many of its aspects combining Chinese with Indian and Central Asian elements. And in the ninth century translations of important Sûtras and major Sûstras (such


251 See sGrub sbyor dam giis, p. 260 (compare Padma dkar po, Chos ’byun, f. 168b), in the time of Khri lDe sroñ btsan; Bu ston, Chos ’byun, f. 130a–b, in the time of Ral pa can = Khri gTsug lde btsan (!).

as the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra-Ṭīkā* by the Korean Wŏn ch’uk [613–696], P 5517 = D 4016) were being made from Chinese, notably by ‘Go(s) Chos grub (Fa-cheng). But the norm accepted for Tibetan Buddhism from the eighth century onwards has tended to be the twin criteria of the existence of an original Indian canonical source and of a valid Indo-Tibetan tradition of transmission.

A further interesting point of difference between the Indian (and Indo-Tibetan) tradition and the Chinese tradition of Buddhism was that the former relied at least as much on Śastra as on Sūtra sources whereas the latter was perhaps based more on Sūtras. It is no doubt to this tendency that Mo-ho-yen was referring when he contrasted his own Sutra-based teachings and the predominantly Śastraic content of the Buddhism being propagated by the ‘Brahman monk’ (*p’o-lo-men seng*).

In sum, on the basis of the materials discussed above it appears appropriate to distinguish within Buddhism a ‘Gradualist’ current characteristic of the Sūtras and Śastras that set out what might be termed the ‘allopathic’ use of counteragents (*gānen po* = *pratipakṣa* ‘antidote’) and salvific means (*thabs* = *upāya*) in a progressive course of gnoseological and soteriological reinforcement (*bhāvanā, sevanā* and *abhyāsa*); a gnoseologically ‘innatist’ and a soteriologically ‘spontaneist’ tendency characteristic in particular of the Siddhas and some Dhyāna-masters who followed above all certain Sūtras which dispense with ‘allopathic’ means and tend to have recourse mainly, or exclusively, so to say to a ‘Nature-cure’ based on the holistically immediate and face-to-face ‘recognition’ of Mind; and, finally, a current best known from the Vajrayāna (but not altogether absent from certain Sūtras and Śastras) that makes use of what might be called ‘homoeopathic’ procedures by which obstacles such as the defilements/afflictions (*kleśa* = *ñon

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254 For the use of this criterion in editing the canon, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The life of Bu ston Rin po che* (Rome, 1966), pp. 27–28.
mons) are overcome or cured through themselves.\textsuperscript{256} And it is necessary to differentiate these currents – which have existed within Buddhism in a relationship of both suppletive and antithetical complementarity – from deviations and aberrations in theory and practice that arose from misunderstanding, debasement and misuse of either of the last two currents, and which are therefore distinct from them.

Although one or the other of these currents has no doubt predominated at a given place and time, it would be excessive to maintain that quintessentially and typically the first is Indian and the second is Chinese, and accordingly to represent the Great Debate and the encounter of theories and practices that accompanied it as a conflict between an Indian (or Indic) and a Chinese (or Sinitic) Buddhism. Similarly, however typical the ‘Left-hand path’ (vāmačāra) and the Cinakrama may have been of certain Himalayan areas, it would not seem possible to consider the grave difficulties that arose in the Kingdom of Western Tibet in the eleventh century, and which led to Atiśa’s being invited there to combat them, only as a clash between Indian and ‘Himalayish’ tendencies; for the problems involved extended far beyond these geographical and cultural areas.

In terms of any debate between ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ – and in gnoseology and soteriology between nativism and reinforcement – the ‘Simultaneist’ with his principle of immediacy, spontaneity and holism and his theory of the innateness of buddhahood would appear to stand on the side of ‘nature’ and gnoseological nativism, whereas the ‘Gradualist’ with his method of progressively eliminating all obscurations and defilements by means of counter-agents clearly emphasizes the need of ‘nurture’ and the reinforcement in meditative realization and cultivation of the factors conducive to buddhahood. These two approaches can also be applied to the understanding of the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha, that is, the buddhomorphic nature of all sentient beings. For according to the ‘Simultaneist’ this teaching signifies

\textsuperscript{256} Concerning the confluence of the last two currents in the teachings of Ta-mo-to-lo (*Dharmaratā) according to Pao-t’ang Ch’ān, see P. Demiéville, Peintures monochromes de Dunhuang (Paris, 1978), pp. 47–48.

For European thought, a connexion has been made between quietism and affectivity in A. Lalande, \textit{Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie} (Paris, 1962), p. 874.
that all sentient beings are already buddhas; whilst according to the ‘Gradualist’ who insists on the need for methodical cultivation the same teaching signifies that on the ‘causal’ level (gzi) beings are all potentially buddhas, that is, that their inborn capacity of achieving the ‘fruit’ (bras bu) of buddhahood is proleptic and still unfulfilled. Nevertheless, as said in the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra quoted by Kamalaśīla in his Bhāvanākrama (II, p. 19), the Matrix or Germ (gotra) of the tathāgata (de bžin gšegs pa’i rigs) is perceived only when Quieting (samatha) and Insight (vipaśyanā) are in balance, as is the case with tathāgatas or buddhas. For when the mental tranquillity of concentration (samādhi) predominates and the discriminative function of prajñā is weak, as in the case of an Auditor (srāvaka), one does not see the tathāgatagotra at all; conversely, if prajñā predominates and samādhi is weak, as is the case with Bodhisattvas still on the Path of Awakening, it is seen only indistinctly. That Kamalaśīla has thus called attention to the relevance of the tathāgatagarbha and gotra theories to his other concerns in his Bhāvanākrama is in keeping with the fact that in his Madhyamakāloka — which he is reputed to have composed in Tibet for the benefit of the monarch257 — he introduced this theory into the main Madhyamaka tradition.

As regards the Vajrayāna, it appears to combine elements of the rapid way of ‘nature’ and nativism with a recognition that means, both ritual and cognitive, have to be brought into play gradually.

It is of special importance to note that both ‘Gradualism’ and ‘Simultaneism’ can find support in the Sūtra literature of Buddhism, and that in the Śāstras also many traces can be found of the idea of gnoseological nativism and soteriological spontaneity as well as of holism and instantaneousness or ‘Subitism’.

In Tibetan literature noteworthy indications are found concerning the manner in which the Tibetans have themselves regarded the interrelation and classification of the component elements of their religion and culture in terms of architectural organization in space.

257 See sBa bzhed G, p. 77 and S, p. 63; Ňi ma ‘od zer, Chos ‘byun Me tog sūn po, f. 437a6.
In the plan of the great temple complex of bSam yas – where at least part of the Great Debate took place in the Byaṅ chub glin, which was constructed as a cosmogram on the model of the Indian temple of Otantapuri, and where for centuries members of the various Tibetan religious communities have found their monastic centre and have congregated – the exposition of Dharma (chos 'chad pa) was kept up in the western temple (glin) of Vairocana, the Dhyāna (bsam gtan) tradition of the ‘Chinese Hva šān’ was cultivated in the western temple Mi g-yo bSam gtan glin, Tantric rituals comprising Mandalas and Abhiṣekas were performed in the southern temple of bDud 'dul snags pa glin, Discipline (khrims) was placed in the eastern rNam dag khrims khan temple, and the grammatical and literary arts were studied in the eastern Tshaṅs pa temple. Here, then, we find a kind of diagram horizontally co-ordinating the various component traditions constituting Tibetan Buddhism.

In the vertical disposition of its successive storeys and their decoration, the central temple (dEu rtse) of bSam yas is said to have reflected a sort of symbiosis – or at all events a collocation – in ascending order of Tibetan, Chinese and Indian modes. Thus, whilst the Tibetan style was represented on ground level in this sanctuary built in Tibet for the benefit of the Tibetan people, and whilst the Indian style characterized the pinnacle, the Chinese style is said to have been used in the middle storey. In this way, the component elements of Tibetan religious culture appear

258 See G. Tucci, To Lhasa and beyond (Rome, 1956), p. 120.
259 Bu ston, Chos 'byun, f. 127b; cf. bSod nams rgyal mtshan, rGyal rabs gsal ba'i me loi, Chap. xviii, f. 83b–84a.

The classical Tibetan tradition has usually co-ordinated scholastic instruction (bhad pa) and spiritual realization (grub pa), meditation being associated with the former as well as with the latter. As for the grammatical and literary arts, they are regarded as general and 'exterior', i.e. as not specifically Buddhist, sciences (vidyāsthāna) and accomplishments of the Bodhisattva. Cf. Bodhisattvabhiṣakā. i. 8 (p. 105) and i. 14 (p. 212).

260 See sBa bzed, G, pp. 38–45, and S, pp. 31–16; Tshal pa Kun dga’ rdo rje, Deb ther dmar po (Hu lan deb ther), f. 17b (p. 37); Padma bka’i thar yig, Ch. lxvii (transl. Toussaint, p. 342–3); rGyal rabs gsal ba’i me loi, Ch. xviii, f. 82b–83a. Cf. A. Ferrari et al., mKhyen brtse’s guide to the holy places of Central Tibet (Rome, 1958), p. 113; Tucci, To Lhasa and beyond, p. 119 f.; R. A. Stein, La civilisation tibétaine (Paris, 1987), p. 201. Reference can also be made to the remarks on the plan and models of the Pu-ning-ssu of Jehol (Chengde) in A. Chayet, Les temples de Jehol et leurs modèles tibétains (Paris, 1985), pp. 29, 67; and to P. Mortari Vergara Caffarelli, Rivista degli studi orientali 53 (1979), pp. 163–96 (with a bibliography of the question).
vertically ordered in a synthesis. However, no connexion appears to have been specified between the middle storey in Chinese style of the dBu rtse and the teachings of Dhyāna and the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna.

The ground-plan of the bSam yas temple-complex thus suggests a horizontal co-ordination of philosophical exposition and Dhyāna, and even their structured complementarity and integration. And although the storey in Indian style was placed vertically above the one in Chinese style in the central temple, it is noteworthy that the elevation of this sanctuary has been interpreted by the sources cited as symbolizing neither a subordination nor an inclusivistic subjection of the Dhyāna propagated by Mo-ho-yen to the type of Buddhism taught by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, or to that represented by Padmasambhava. It is to be recalled that, similarly, the teachings of Śāntarakṣita and Padmasambhava are traditionally regarded in Tibet as being in complementary harmony in the sense that their different methods serve the same end. And the close association of both Śāntarakṣita and Padmasambhava with Khri sроṅ lde btsan has been symbolized for the Tibetan tradition by the sdom brtson dam pa device at least since the time of Sa skya Paṇḍi ta, who painted on a wall of bSam yas this emblem in which Śāntarakṣita is represented by a bird, Padmasambhava by a lotus and the Tibetan monarch by a flaming sword.

In summary, when we attempt to piece together from the Tibetan sources the circumstances in which the Great Debate of bSam yas took place, we find no clear and conclusive evidence to show that either Kamalaśīla or Mo-ho-yen was seeking a confrontation. Rather, having become aware of the presence in Tibet of tensions and polarized approaches within the Buddhist traditions connected on the one side with the teachings of certain Ho-shangs and on the other with the doctrines of Śāntarakṣita, the Tibetan monarch and his advisers are said to have taken the initiative in bringing representatives of the two currents together in a discussion because of their concern for the sound establishment and regularization in the kingdom of Buddhist theory and practice. And with this end in view Kamalaśīla was invited to
Tibet, supposedly in accordance with the advice that his master Śāntarakṣita had given just before his death.

It would moreover seem that, on the levels of both Ground (gzi) and Fruit ('bras bu), there was little in Mo-ho-yen's teaching (to the extent to which it is available to us to judge) that could have been totally unfamiliar to Kamalaśīla from recognized Indian sources, despite the Chinese garb in which it was being presented by its propagators. Equally, much of what Kamalaśīla's teaching stood for was well known to large sections of the Chinese Buddhist traditions, and thus it may not have been quite unfamiliar to Mo-ho-yen. It is however unlikely that Mo-ho-yen and Kamalaśīla could discuss or even converse directly with each other; and it is practically certain that interpreters, presumably Tibetans for the most part, would have had to act as translators in any meeting between them.

In this situation there lay the risk that what was a polarity — and a well-recognized and more or less creative tension — between two currents of thought and two approaches to the Buddhist Path could become magnified in a way not fully explained by any fundamental contradictions in either the commonly held canonical sources or in philosophical doctrine. And the ensuing rift would then have focused less on philosophy, or even on a theory of spiritual and philosophical praxis, than on methods and formulations bearing on the Path. In this way a polarity and tension present even in some of the oldest sources of Indian Buddhism could have assumed the proportions of the radical cleavage that we find in a large number of Tibetan accounts of the Great Debate starting with the sBa bżed and continuing in the discussions by Sa skya Paṇḍita and his successors.

It has at the same time to be borne in mind that part of the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism was markedly less critical of Mo-ho-yen's teachings. This attitude we find partially reflected in the Chos 'byurī Me tog sīni po by the rDzogs chen master Naṅ ral Ňima 'od zer. And another rDzogs chen pa, Kłoṅ chen rab 'byams pa, called attention to the similarity between certain of the

261 See the remark on the basic agreement between the two parties in the Great Debate in regard to the Fruit ('bras bu) and the attainment of buddhahood, and on the difference between them as to the method of procedure ('jug sgo), in sBa bżed, G, p. 70.18-19 (attributed to dPal dbyaṅs) and S, p. 60.6-7 (attributed to Saṅ śi).
teachings of the Hva śan Mahāyāṇa and the doctrine of rdzogs chen, as did in a slightly less pronounced way Tshe dbaṅ nor bu also. These masters have done so notwithstanding their recognition of the fact that whereas rdzogs chen is deeply Mantrayānist the teachings ascribed to the Hva śan Mahāyāṇa are basically Sūtrayānist.262

In addition, a closeness in certain respects between some of the Hva śan Mahāyāṇa’s teachings and Mahāmudrā (phyag rgya chen po) was admitted by some bKa’ brgyud pa masters, though certainly not by all. A link is indeed suggested by a convergent use of the metaphor of the Sovereign Remedy (dkar po chig thub) for the Hva śan’s teaching on non-mentational face-to-face recognition of Mind and the non-mentation (yid la mi byed pa) teaching of the bKa’ brgyud pa, which with sGam po pa and some of his followers had a Sūtra branch in addition to the generally recognized Mantra branch.

It however remains true that neither all the rNin ma rDzogs chen pas nor gSar ma bKa’ brgyud pas such as dPa’ bo gtGtsug lag phreṅ ba and Padma dkar po have identified themselves with the Hva śan’s tradition. The closest approach to such an identification is perhaps to be found in the bSam gtan mig sgron ascribed to gNubs chen Sāns rgyas ye šes and in the Blon po bka’i than i yig of the bKa’ than sde lta. That differences in fact existed between the Hva śan Mahāyāṇa and the forms of Buddhism adopted in Tibet appears to be recognized by most of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition; nevertheless some representatives of this tradition have placed greater emphasis on the differences, taking them as the grounds for a radical cleavage, whereas other Tibetan masters have adopted a noticeably more conciliatory stance toward the teachings they connected with the Hva śan.

262 Some ‘Tantric’ features however already appear in certain forms of Ch’an; cf. for example R. Kimura, Journal asiatique 1981, p. 192 (after gNan dPal dbyaṅs); D. Ueyama, in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), Early Ch’an in China and Tibet, p. 349 n. 30; B. Faure, in P. Gregory (ed.), Traditions of meditation in Chinese Buddhism (Honolulu, 1986), pp. 115–16, 121. Moreover, the tathāgatagarbha theory, which is of such great importance in these traditions, is in some respects ‘proto-Tantric’, while some of its later developments are very clearly Vajrayānist.
The Background to Some Issues in the Great Debate

KAMALAŚILA’s treatment of the progressive Path of meditative realization (bhāvanā) and Awakening combining Quieting and Insight strongly suggests that he considered what might be described as the problem of innateness, immediacy, holism and spontaneity in relation to his theory of gradual development and reinforcement – in a sense of ‘nature’ in relation to ‘nurture’ – to be both an old and a recurring one in Buddhist thought.

Concepts such as manifestation or revelation (abhivyakti, etc.) in contrast to production or creation (ārambha, utpatti, etc.), the pre-existence of an effect in its cause (satkāryavāda) as opposed to production for the first time of a not previously existing effect (asatkāryavāda, ārambhavāda), and of simultaneous, non-sequential immediacy as distinct from sequential progressiveness in verbal knowledge and in the meaning of a poem are familiar from Indian philosophical thought, the semantics of the sphota-theory and the aesthetics of the dhvani-theory.263 In the Vedānta as the jñānakāṇḍa, activity – the ritual works and duties (karman, dharma) of the karmakāṇḍa – has often been denied real soteriological value, gnosis (jñāṇa) alone being regarded as constitutive of deliverance; whereas by other authorities (e.g. Maṇḍanamiśra) the conjunction of gnosis and works (jñānakarmasamuccaya) has been recognized as conducive to deliverance. In the Vedānta too the direct instrumentality, for immediate intuitive gnosis (aparokṣajñāna) of brahman, of both mental reflection (manana) and meditative practice (nididhyāsana) in addition to śravaṇa – i.e. the

263 In the ‘resonance’ (dhvani) theory of the Indian poeticians, for example, there is an opposition between the asam lakṣyakramavānga and the sam lakṣyakramavānga, the two divisions of the vivakṣitānaparavācya which is abhidhāmāla. As for progressiveness as opposed to sudden immediacy in the sphota-theory of the philosopher-grammarians, see K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian theories of meaning (Adyar, 1969), p. 124 f.
'auditive assimilation' of the sense of the authorless and immemorial scriptural mahāvākyas inducing knowledge of brahman and immediate deliverance (sadyomukti, as opposed to kramamukti) – has been a subject of discussion. Repeated meditative practice (pramāṇakhyāṇa) subsequent to this śravaṇa has been held (by Sureśvara) to be superfluous in the face of śābdajñāna or Word-generated knowledge. Another notion germane to the present enquiry is immediate recognition (pratyabhijñā) – the 'recollection' as it were of reality264 – to which may be added the soteriological concept of the abrupt onset of spiritual realisation (sāhasa). Mention may also be made of the state of anupāya 'absence of means' which – in so far as it corresponds to the ultimate state of the turyātīta where all means are excluded – is free from all mediacy, as opposed to the three successive levels involving means and mediacy of the āṇava (kriyopāya), the śākta (jñānopāya) and the śāṁbhava (ichopāya). These terms and ideas – though not identical historically with the questions directly at issue in the Great Debate of bSams, and despite the basic difference between Buddhists and the Vedānta with regard to Word (śabda) and Word-induced knowledge (śābdajñāna) as constituting immediate intuitive gnosis (aparokṣajñāna) – nevertheless provide in their problematics a number of interesting parallels and points of comparison with the issues considered by Kamalaśīla and Mo-ho-yen and so merit the attention of the comparativist.

The fact that the authoritative sources cited by Kamalaśīla – mainly Mahāyāna Sūtras – have a direct or indirect bearing on this subject indicates at all events that the problems at issue go back a long way in the history of Buddhist thought. Kamalaśīla was clearly not dealing with issues that had arisen for the first time during the eighth century in the specific historical context of the encounter in Tibet between Indian and Chinese ways of thinking and of a confrontation between Indian and Chinese masters. That this was so seems moreover to have been recognized in the 'Alternative Tradition' of the sBa bţed,265 where

265 See sBa bţed, G, p. 73.5–8.
Kamalaśīla’s master Śāntarakṣita is shown referring to the understanding of Mind known as the Sovereign Remedy (dkar po chig thub) as a ‘stain in theory’ (dṛṣṭikaśāya) that consists in taking pleasure in Emptiness (stōṇa pa ēd la dga’ ba), and which was to be found not only in Tibet but also very widely among persons who are tainted by these ‘stains’ and take pleasure in the notion of Emptiness.\(^{266}\)

Since the evidence available to us indicates that this complex of problems has repeatedly arisen in one form or the other in the history of the Buddhist traditions in South, Central and East Asia – none of which has been entirely homogeneous and monolithic and each of which has included various currents of theory and practice – contrary to what has been suggested in Demiéville’s masterly study,\(^{267}\) it does not seem appropriate to see in Kamalaśīla’s treatment of the issues merely a dehistoricization of the Great Debate. For Kamalaśīla the Great Debate was probably rather one more occasion when this set of religious and philosophical problems embedded in the history of Buddhist thought came once again to be focused upon and to raise acute difficulties. And it was then in the later Tibetan traditions, as already observed, that the expression ‘teaching of the Hva śaṅ’ was taken from its specific historical context and came to be employed as a dehistoricized topos and as a generic designation for a type of quietistic and innatist teaching.

What the comparativist has to study here are not so much abstract entities like ‘Indian Buddhism’, ‘Chinese Buddhism’ or ‘Tibetan Buddhism’ – which are to a certain degree merely convenient constructs for the scholar – but rather the structural and typological features subsumed under these designations. This is of course not to deny that certain features are, at particular times and places, predominant in a given geographically delimited form of Buddhism, and that they may characterize and

\(^{266}\) On the lta ba’i sūgs ma = dṛṣṭikaśāya, see Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya iii. 94ab with Yaśomitra’s Vyākhyā. It is one of the five kaśāyas, on which see e.g. Lalitavistara p. 248.13; Saddharma-pundarika ii, p. 43.4, 56.8, 58.11; Bodhisattvabhumi i.17 (p. 252); Mahāvyutpatti 2336–40. These stains characterize especially the last 500-year period of the Dharma (cf. sBa bzhed, G, p. 66.8; S, p. 56.2–3). On the dkar po chig thub see above, pp. 88–89, 100 ff.

\(^{267}\) Demiéville, Concile, p. 18.
constitute it: if there were no overarching structures and continu­
ities, but only innumerable discrete features, the terms ‘Bud­
dhism’, ‘Indian Buddhism’ and the like would be mere empty
names of no use to an historian. But the richness and diversity
within the Buddhist traditions militate against taking even such
serviceable terms as names of single and homogeneous individual
entities. In sum, such constructs can fulfil a useful and legitimate
heuristic and descriptive purpose for an historian provided that he
does not reify them in historical and comparative work.

In the following, several themes typical of the ideas at issue in
the Great Debate, and ascribed either to the ‘Gradualists’ or the
‘Simultaneists’, will be considered with a view to identifying
earlier examples or prefigurations of these themes and to situating
them in the Buddhist (and non-Buddhist) traditions of India.

I. THE GIVING UP OF ACTIVITY AND KARMA

While it is recognized that Mo-ho-yen considered the activity of
cutural and discursive thinking (rnam par rtog pa'i sems, etc.) to
be the root of involvement in the round of existence, he is held
by Tibetan authorities to have in addition advocated the total
relinquishment – at least by all advanced practisers – of not only
all unsalutary activity but of all religious and philosophical
activity of a salutary kind also. For according to him this kind
of activity is inextricably bound up with dichotomizing construc­
tion (rnam par rtog pa) and unreal notions (m[y]i bden pa'i 'du shes)
and thinking (m[y]i bden pa'i sems).

268 See Stein 468 (cf. Gómez, Studies, p. 107); Stein 709, p. 28; Cheng-li chüeh, ff. 129b,
131b, 134a–b, 135b, 138a–b.
269 On the giving up of the ten forms of Dharma-practice which was reputedly taught
by the Hva šāñ Mahāyāna, see sBa bżed, G, p. 68 (cf. p. 73–74); S, p. 58; mKhas pa'i dga'
ston, ja, f. 117al; and ṇān ņi ma 'od zer, Chos 'byün Me tog shiin po, f. 430b2 (where the
practice of the ten is compared with gradual ascent, mas 'dzeg pa). And for the Tibetan
King's command that they should be practised, see sBa bżed, G, p. 75 and S, p. 62; mKhas
pa'i dga' ston, ff. 119a1; and Chos 'byün Me tog shiin po, f. 435b6. For a list of ten
dharma-pa's, see Mahāvyutpatti 903–912.
270 See sBa bżed, G, p. 64 (lus nag gi chos bya mi dgos) lus nag gi dge bas sans mi rgya); S,
p. 54 (lus nag gi chos sphyod dge ba byas pas sans mi rgya); mKhas pa'i dga' ston, ja, f. 115al (lus
nag gi chos sphyod mi dgos) lus nag gi dge bas 'tshan mi rgya); G, p. 68 (thsams cad sems kyi rnam
par rtog pa' bsbyed pas dge mi dge'i dbang gis las dge mi dge mtha' ris dan san sgo gi 'bras bu myön
zhi 'khor ba na 'khor ro) ~ S, pp. 57–58; mKhas pa'i dga' ston, ja, f. 116b7–117a1 (... gañ žig
ci la ya'i mi sems ži'i ci ya'i mi byed pa de 'khor ba las yonis su thar par 'gyur ro); etc. But
In his third Bhāvanākrama Kamalasiśa has ascribed to an unnamed opponent the teaching that no salutary activity consisting in the virtues of generosity and the like should be accomplished, such activity having been taught solely for the foolish (nāpi dānādikusālacaryā kartavayā: kevalān mūrkhañjanam adhikṛtya daṇḍi kuśalacaryā nirdīṣṭā, ed. Tucci, p. 14). No action, salutary or otherwise, should be carried out (na kīṃcit kuśalādikarma karta-vyam), for it would lead to the round of existences (saṃsāravāhaka, pp. 20–21). That Kamalasiśa considered as ancient this idea that karman, salutary as well as non-salutary, should be abandoned is shown by the fact that he has ascribed to the old Śramaṇa-school of the Ājīvikas the doctrine that deliverance results from the exhaustion of deeds (karmakṣayān muktiḥ, p. 20). And he has observed that no such doctrine is to be found in the teaching (pravacana) of the Buddha, who taught rather that liberation results from the exhaustion of the defilements/afflictions (kleśa-kṣaya, pp. 20–21).

Now, in some old Buddhist canonical texts also there are in fact found certain references to the idea that liberation from Ill (duḥkha) results from, and consists in, the non-production of any future karman at all and from the ending, often through austerities (tapas), of any existing bad karman. This idea is there usually ascribed to the Niganṭha Nātaputta (Nirgrantha Jñāṇaputra), in other words to Mahāvīra and the Jainas. We also read that immobility of body and renunciation of speech bring ease...
Moreover, in a couple of Buddhist canonical texts the idea that no new karman at all should be generated, and that any existing karman should be ended, has even been connected with the Buddha himself in a sermon he once addressed to a Nirgrantha and in another one he addressed to Vappa, a disciple of the Nirgranthas.

The connexion of such a teaching with the Buddha himself seems nevertheless to be rare. When it does occur, it is evidently to be explained by the fact that his auditor was a Nirgrantha and that the teaching was thus intended as an introductory salvific device, a circumstance that would lend support to Kamalâsîla's statement denying that such relinquishment of all activity was the Buddha's own teaching. In the majority of other places where it has been mentioned in the Pali canon, this doctrine has in fact been severely criticized. It is patently inconsistent with such basic principles of Buddhist doctrine as the four correct efforts (sammâppadhâna/ samyâkprahâna) whereby the exercitant seeks to generate an impulse (chanda) with a view both to the production of still non-present salutary dharmas and to the increase of already present ones, while also generating an impulse for the non-production only of non-present bad and non-salutary dharmas and for the elimination of already present ones.

Certain passages of the old canon have, however, referred to the idea that both good and bad karman binds one by leading respectively to good and evil states in the round of existence. And there are accordingly traces in it of the notion of a special kind of karmic intention (cetanā) that is neither good nor bad, and which would thus obviate any form of maturing karman binding one to Samsāra. It is thus said that cetanā having in view the elimination of black (kaṇṭha), white (sukka) and partially black and partially white (kaṇṭhasukka) acts constitutes a fourth kind of act that is neither wholly nor partially black or white (akaṇṭhāsukka) and which is indeed conducive to the exhaustion of acts (kammakkhāyā saṁvattati).

273 See Majjhima Nikāya I 94–95.
274 See Anguttara Nikāya I 221 and II 196–8.
275 See Anguttara Nikāya II 230–37; cf. Dighanikāya III 230, and Majjhimanikāya I 389–91. The four kinds of karman are the black which has a kaṇṭhavipāka, the white which has a sukkavipāka, the black-and-white which has kaṇṭhasukkavipāka, and that which is
This last notion of what may be termed deconstructive, or counteractive, karman as the fourth variety in a tetralemmatic structure does not, however, appear to be identical with Mo-ho-yen’s Mahāyānistically inspired idea of non-activity and quietism; nor indeed is it even totally incompatible with Kamalasila’s own theory of spiritual practice. But the teaching ascribed to Mo-ho-yen concerning the relinquishment of all action is clearly comparable with the above-mentioned idea of deliverance through the exhaustion of all karman, wholesome as well as unwholesome, which Kamalasila has ascribed to the Ājīvikas, and which is found connected chiefly with the Nirgranthas in the old canon.

In this connexion attention may be called also to the interesting reference to the question whether exhaustion of action (karmakṣaya) can, alone, lead to liberation in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter (ed. Miyasaka, 272c–280b) of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikā and in the commentaries on this passage. There—in the frame of a discussion of what has been taken by commentators to be the Nirgrantha doctrine of liberation, which may therefore be compared with the Devadahasutta of the Majjhimanikāya (II 214 ff.) cited above—Dharmakīrti has stated that, without a course of spiritual practices as a remedy (vipaṣṭa = gñen po) against desire (ṭṣṇā, and its associated ātmagraha or ātmadṛṣṭi), there can be no freedom from karman; and any effort (yatna) directed toward karmakṣaya is futile so long as ṭṣṇā remains. Indeed, faults (doṣa) do not result from karman, but it is the person who is ‘defective’ (duṣṭa) that acts; and without false conceptions (mithyāvikalpā) there is no craving (abhilāsa) even because of pleasure (sukha). Manorathanandin has accordingly remarked that the cause of the doṣas is not karman but inexact mental activity (ayoniśomanaskāra).

Mo-ho-yen’s teaching on the subject may be compared too with a doctrine such as that of the Vajracchedikā (§ 6, p. 32). There

neither black nor white and which has acaṇṭhasukkavipaśka and thus leads to the exhaustion of action (kammakheyyaya saṃvattati). Examples of this fourth kind are the eight factors of the Path, from sammādiṭṭhi to sammāsamādhi, and the seven factors of Awakening (sambojjhāna), from sati and dharmavicaya to samādhi and upekhā (Āṅguttaranikāya II 236–7). Concerning this kind of karman, see L. Schmithausen in R. W. Neufeldt (ed.), Karma and rebirth: post-classical developments (Albany, 1986), pp. 207, 222 n. 30.
we read that the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva should not ‘take up’ (udgrah-) either dharma or adharma; hence, with this in mind (samdhāya), the Tathāgata has declared that those who fully understand the raft-like Dharma-text (kolopama dharmaparyāya) should abandon (prahā-) dharmas and a fortiori adharmas. This text would, however, have been known to and recognized by Kamalaśīla, who composed a Tīkā on the Vajracchedikā. Besides, the comparison of the Dharma with a raft, which one abandons once one has used it to cross over to the further bank of a stream, is a classical one found in the old canon. But as understood by Kamalaśīla — and as attested by passages of the Cheng-li chūeh — Mo-ho-yen went appreciably further than this classical view of the matter.

Nāgārjuna has furthermore analysed and deconstructed the notions of action (karman), its agent and its fruit in Chapter xvii of his Madhyamakakārikās. And the question of giving up both demerit and merit — in the wide sense as well as in the traditional, Vedic sense — is a topic discussed in the first chapter of the *Śatasāstra* ascribed to Ārya-Deva; in the same place also the progressive arising of the Way is mentioned. This discussion has to do with the idea of merit and demerit as interconnected concepts in binary thinking (vikalpa), and as coimplicates (pratīdvandvin ‘contrapletes’), and with the fact that the postulation (grāha) of the happy and virtuous (sukha) and the pure (śubha, śuci) has to be eliminated together with that of the permanent (nitya) and self (ātman).

In a verse of his Catuḥsataka (viii. 11) Āryadeva has furthermore written:

\[
\text{akurvāṇasya nirvāṇam kurvāṇasya punarbhavah/}
\text{niścintena sukham prāptum nirvāṇam tena nētaraḥ}/\]

‘For one who is inactive [there is] Nirvāṇa [whilst] for one who is active [there is] renewed existence: for one free from concerns

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277 See the kullūpama parable applied to dhamma in the Majjhimanikāya I 134–5.
278 See G. Tucci, *Pre-Dīnāgā Buddhist texts on logic* (Baroda, 1929), pp. 15–19.
279 See e.g. Āryadeva, *Catuḥsataka*, Chap. i–iv.
Nirvāṇa is easy of achievement, [but] the other [viz. existences] not. A doctrine of non-activity and ataraxia pure and simple could however be founded on this statement only if the total context of Āryadeva’s treatise is left out of account. (In his comment Candrakīrti supposes that Āryadeva has formulated this (apparent) paradox in reply to those who point out how difficult — indeed how virtually impossible — it would be to achieve all the infinite wholesome factors which together constitute the means of achieving Nirvāṇa, the Best Ease (bde ba dam pa), whereas to achieve birth requires no effort at all.) It is true that ‘participation’ in the Tranquil can only exist when there has been produced a turning away in distaste from the here and now [i.e. Saṃsāra according to Candrakīrti] (viii. 12ab: udvego yasya nāstīha bhaktis tasya kutah śive). In a teaching concerning the worldly level (laukikī deśanā) it is engagement (pravṛtti) that is spoken of, whereas disengagement (nivṛtti) is taught when speaking of ultimate reality (paramārthakathā) (viii. 8). And it is necessarily dharma as something involving activity (pravartaka) that the foolish practice, while fearing through lack of familiarity (anabhyāsata) that very dharma which leads to the cessation of activity (nivartaka) (xii. 9). Āryadeva has also specified that for the least able generosity (dana) and for the middling discipline (śīla) have been taught; for the best it is the Tranquil (zi ba) that has been indicated (viii. 14). Indeed, by somebody desiring the wholesome (punyākāma) no mention should be made of Emptiness, for as a medicine unsuitably used śūnyatā could become a poison (viii. 18). Still, the non-wholesome (apunyā) has first to be eliminated, and the [dogma of a] self next; only then may all [postulation and positions relating to entities (cf. viii. 16, 20)] be eliminated (viii. 15).

It is only natural to consider Mo-ho-yen’s devaluation of activity, ethical as well as mental, in the frame of Ch’an contemplation of Mind (k’an-hsin ~ kuan-hsin) and what Demiéville has termed anoetism (wu-hsin, wu-nien; pu-kuan; wu-tso-i ‘not planning’), perhaps also of ‘One-practice Samādhi’ (i-hsing san-mei) understood as a quietistic development of śamatha, and of course of the Chinese idea of non-activity (wu-wei). And this has in fact been done by historians of Chinese...
Buddhism. It however needs to be recalled that, alongside the cases of rejection of karmic activity noted above from early Indian sources, the question of the combination of knowledge and activity (jñānakarmasamuccaya) was also a major problem and point of controversy in classical Vedānta. Thus, whereas Maṇḍanamiśra accepted in his Brahmaśiddhi a particular conjunction of karman and jñāna, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara denied all soteriological value to karman and recognized only jñāna (or vidyā) for the achievement of this goal. Moreover, in his comment on the Bhagavadgītā (iv. 21), Śaṅkara has gone so far as to write that, for one seeking liberation, even dharma constitutes a fault because it brings about bondage, so that freed from both dharma and its opposite (pāpa 'evil, sin') one is free from Śaṁsāra (dharmo 'pi mumukṣoḥ kilīṣam eva bandhāpādakatvā/ tasmāt tāḥhyām mukto bhavati, sāṁsārāṁ mukto bhavati). These words of Śaṅkara's were written at a time that was probably not very far removed from that of the Great Debate of bSam yas; and they demonstrate that one of the points that Kamalaśīla has severely criticized in his opponent's teaching has a very close parallel in the thought of a leading Hindu authority of nearly the same time.

Hence, while the teachings of Kamalaśīla's opponents in the Great Debate may indeed have been strongly influenced and reinforced by the milieu in which the Dhyāna schools evolved in China, it is not necessary to account for rejection of activity solely by reference to Chinese developments.

2. Voluntary Death, Self-immolation and the Samasīsi(n)

The Pali Paṭisambhidāmagga and Puggalapāṇīatti recognize a category of persons (puggala) called samasīsi(n) 'equal-headed' because, for them, exhaustion of the impurities (āsavaparīyādāna)

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and of life (jīvātāparijñādāna) are simultaneous. This type of person is listed also in the Nettippakarana, where he occupies a position after the types known as saddhāvimutta, pañña vimutta, suññatāvimutta and ubhatabhāgavimutta, and before the pacc shackuddha and the sammāsambuddha. Such a puggala represents then a special case of simultaneousness that consists in the co-occurrence of spiritual realization and the end of life.

In several cases of accelerated or precipitate achievement of the state of an Ārya and Arhat alluded to in the Pali tradition, spiritual realization supervenes immediately on a self-inflicted death decided on as a result of a feeling of shock (saṃvega) springing from a person’s sense of spiritual inadequacy or failure. Examples cited are Godhika Thera and Channa Thera – who cut their own throats because of dissatisfaction with their spiritual progress – and Mahānāma Thera, Sappadāsa Thera and Sīhā Therī – who in disgust prepared to kill themselves. However, in other cases the ‘shock’ in question is evidently one of pure rapture, resulting from a sense of the beauty of the environment, as in the case of Usabha Thera who was transported by the loveliness (rāmaṇeyyaka) of the season’s fullness in forest and mountain. In still other cases, spiritual realization is said to have been abruptly precipitated by a physical shock brought about by slipping and falling, as in the cases of Bhagu Thera or Dhamma Therī. The phenomenon in question is therefore not exclusively confined to cases of suicide, or near suicide, due to a feeling of inadequateness and depression. A common factor in many if not all cases of shock suddenly precipitating (without

282 Patisambhidamagga I 101; Puggalapaññatti, pp. 2, 13. This category of person – connected with the naivasāṃjñānāsamajjā level – is not accepted by the Sarvāstivādins; cf. A. Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule (Paris, 1955), pp. 175, 184, 198, 262.

283 Nettippakarana, p. 190.


exactly causing) spiritual realization seems to be a sense of impermanence (anicca), either as an immediately preceding condition in the case of Patācāra Therī (and perhaps Usabha Thera), or as a more remote condition.²⁸⁶

The case of Gautika (or: Bhautika) is known also to the Abhidharma. In his Abhidharmakosābhāṣya Vasubandhu has mentioned this Śaikṣa’s killing himself because of the disgust he felt (nirvīṇṇa) for having repeatedly fallen away (parihīyanāṇa) from conditional release (sāmayikī vimuktiḥ) owing to delection (āsvādana) and the weakness of his faculties (mṛḍvindriyatva).²⁸⁷ The reference to his attaining Arhatship in these circumstances occurs in connexion with Vasubandhu’s exegesis of the technical term cetanādharman (Tib. ’chi bar sms pa’i chos can), which designates in the soteriology of the Abhidharma a category of Arhat interpreted by Yasomitra as one having the quality of killing himself (ātmanāraṇadharman).²⁸⁸

Whether the self-immolation reported for a Ho-shang and his followers in Tibet after their defeat in debate could be even remotely linked with any of these cases of suicide coinciding with the achievement of spiritual realization is difficult to determine in the absence of clearer and more decisive evidence.²⁸⁹ The cases reported from Tibet of self-immolation may ultimately be connected rather with a distinct set of ideas that go back to Mahāyāna Śūtras such as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (Ch. xxii) and the Samādhīrājasūtra (Ch. xxxiii), where the Bodhisattvas Sarvasattvapriyadarśana and Kṣemadatta are related to have burnt an arm or the entire body as a mark of respect for a Tathāgata and his Caitya. These ideas seem then to have been reinterpreted, and to have been literally put into practice as an act of protest and moral pressure, mainly in the Buddhist traditions of East Asia including Vietnam. In its account of the events leading up to the

²⁸⁶ The case of Vakkali Thera does not, however, easily fit this description. On these persons see G. Malalasekera, op. cit., with references to the sources in which they are mentioned. See also É. Lamotte, Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, II (Louvain, 1949), p. 740 n. 1; Rahula, op. cit., p. 22–23; and Bhattacharya, op. cit., pp. 29, 157–9.

²⁸⁷ Abhidharmakosābhāṣya vi. 58b.

²⁸⁸ As though the word cetanā ‘intention’ were equivalent to chedana ‘destruction’ and derived, by a Prakritic development, from the root chid– rather than from cit– (?) See Yasomitra, Abhidharmakosāvyākhyā vi. 58b (p. 582).

²⁸⁹ See above, pp. 86–88 with the references cited in n. 167.
Great Debate between the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen and Kamalaśīla, the sBa bzod has actually cited the example of a certain sage (drai sroi = ṭṣi) bZod pa (Kṣānti?) who set fire to himself and thus made himself a living offering; however, it has done so not in connexion with the Ho-shang and the ‘Simultaneist’ ston min pas (or cig car bas) but with reference to a Tibetan folk-etymology, based on brtse ba ‘compassion’, of the term brtse(n) min pa, the word of Chinese origin denoting the ‘Gradualist’ (rim gyis pa) school of Kamalaśīla.  

3. The Gradual as Opposed to the Simultaneous/Instantaneous and the Procedure of Leaping

The Problem in Early ‘Dhyāna’ and ‘Maitreya-traditions’

Mo-ho-yen’s teaching concerning the ultimate irrelevance of good deeds and the virtues for the achievement of liberation and Awakening is evidently closely linked with the notion of an Immediate or Sudden Way either leaping over or simply suppressing stages of the Path that was developed by masters of India and Central Asian ‘Dhyāna’ and East Asian Ch’an. The contrast between the Gradual (Ch. chien) Way and the Immediate or Sudden (Ch. tun) Way in Indian, and in particular Kaśmīrian, Dhyāna traditions has been traced, on the basis of sources now available only in Chinese, at least as far back as the Mahāyānist supplement to Śaṅgharakṣa’s Yogācārabhūmi, and to Dharmatrāta and Buddhasena both of whom lived in Kaśmir c. 400 CE.  

This Mahāyānist supplement to the Yogācārabhūmi (Taishō 606) by Śaṅgharakṣa – a master of the Kaśmīrian Sarvāstivāda school who lived in the second century – which was translated into Chinese by Dharmarakṣa was touched on already in 1926 by J. Rahder; and it has since been studied in detail by Demiéville
in his substantial monograph of 1954. Demiéville has dated the addition of this Supplement to the period between Dharmarakṣa’s translation of the main text of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in 284 and Tao-an’s Catalogue of 384. And he has pointed out the relevance of the section of this Supplement on the Bodhisattva’s practice to the history of Dhyāna in India and Serindia and to the question of ‘Subitism’ in China. Moreover, in connexion with this same Supplement, Demiéville has studied the procedure of leaping (Ch. ch’ao-hsing: *vyutkrāntaka-cāryā) by which the Bodhisattva is enabled to skip over several stages of the Path, the concept according to which the Bodhisattva achieves the stage of non-regression in virtue of his first production of the *bodhicitta*, and the link between the technique of leaping and innate purity of mind (*pratītyāsāvatāra* of *citta*). Demiéville has in addition investigated Śāṃgharakṣa’s own connexion with the Maitreya traditions.

As for Buddhāsenā (early fifth century), he was in fact the author of the so-called *Dharmatāla-Dhyānasūtra* (*Ta-mo-to-lo ch’an-ch’ing*, Taishō 618) translated into Chinese by his disciple Buddhahadra, who also translated the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* with Fa-hsien (Taishō 376) and was himself connected with a Maitreya-tradition. And from what is recorded in the Chinese sources, it appears that the teachings associated with the name of Dharmatrāta — identified as a Yogācāra who lived in Kasmīr c. 410 CE — were also closely linked with the idea of the immediate Sudden Way.

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298 Demiéville, *loc. cit.*, p. 432. Compare the notions of the *tathāgatagarbha* and *pratītyāsāvatāra*.
In other words, questions concerning the immanent, immediate, spontaneous, and sudden were evidently already an issue in Kāśmīr and Serindia by the early fifth century. Indeed, differences between the *tun* and *chien* approaches have been noticed in the preface to *Taishō 618* ascribed to Hui-yüan (334–416).304 Dharmatrāta, to whom the above-mentioned *Taishō 618* was wrongly attributed, has often been conflated with a certain Dharmatāla (?), and also with the great Ch’an patriarch Bodhidharma/Bodhidharmatrāta.305 In a Chinese tradition there is a curious record of the latter’s leaving behind one of his shoes as a token of the future spread of his teaching,306 a motif found also in the Tibetan traditions which relate *inter alia* that a certain Chinese Master (*rgya nag mkhan po*) – i.e. one of the Ho-shangs active in Tibet in the eighth century – left one of his boots behind in Tibet after being defeated in a controversy as a sign that his teaching would survive and later spread in that country.307

In the Tibetan iconographic and ritual traditions, moreover, the Upāsaka (*dge bṣiṅ*) Dharmatāla/Dharmatrāta figures, together with a certain Hva śaṅ counted also as an Upāsaka, alongside the sixteen Arhats in a well-known group that thus consists of a total of eighteen figures.308 The Hva śaṅ in this group is often identified with the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna, even though the latter is usually regarded as a monk; and an identification is made in addition with Pu-tai/Mi-lo (Maitreya) of the Chinese tradition.309 Dharmatāra/Dharmatāla/Bodhidharma figures in Tibetan sources as an authority of the *sTong min pa/Cig car ba* tradition, or of the *Tsun min*, that originated with Kāśyapa,

307 See *sBa bṣed*, G, p. 75.8; G, p. 9 and S, p. 8; and the other sources cited above, n. 170.
passed through Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva and culminated, in the seventh generation of the Chinese lineage, with the Hva śāñ Mahāyāna, i.e. the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen.310

In the traditions outlined above we thus find mixed together reasonably tangible historical and doctrinal material and more or less vague associations or recollections. Tenuous though the latter may be, they still reflect connexions that have been made by the traditions in question; and they accordingly deserve mention beside the properly historical data.

Gradual Understanding and Single-moment Understanding according to the Abhisamayālaṃkāra

When considering the background to the controversy that opposed Kamalāśīla and the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen, it is of the greatest interest to turn to Haribhadra—a contemporary of Kamalāśīla, and also a follower of Śāntarakṣita, who flourished in the latter part of the eighth century—to see what light he can throw on the question.311

310 See bSam gtan mig sgon, f. 8a: rgya nag por bdun bgyud tha ma ha śāñ Ma hā ya na la thug. Cf. Blon po bka'i than yig (in the bKa' than sde lha, lHa sa ed.), f. 19a: rgya nag sprul bdun bgyud pa'i tha: hva śāñ mahā yā na nīd la thug (a passage quoted by Tshe dbāṅ nor bu, rGya nag hva śāñ gi byun tshul grub mtha'i phyogs sna bcas sa bon tsam smos pa yid kyi dri ma dag byed dge ba'i chu rgyun [collected works, Vol. V, Dalhousie, 1977], f. 7b4, as from the Lo paṅ bka' yi than yig). See also Pelliot tibétain 116 (104), 121 (40), 813; and compare Pelliot tibétain 996 and Stein 689, 710.


311 These masters have all been classified as Yogācāra-(Śvātantrika-)Mādhyamikas by the Tibetan doxographers. By some doxographers Haribhadra is further described as an Alikākāravādin; and his predecessor Ārya Vimuktiśena (sixth century), whose Vṛttī is the earliest available commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, is further described as a Satyākāravādin. See for example, lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, Grub mtha', kha, f.115b–116a, p. 401; D. Seyfort Ruegg, The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India (Wiesbaden, 1981), p. 101.
In his fundamental comments on the Prajñāpāramitā and on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra—Prajñāpāramitopadeśa contained both in his shorter Sphuṭārthā Vṛttiḥ and in his very extensive Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā, this master has discussed at length not only progressive activity (anupūrvakriyā = mthar gyis pa’i bya ba) — i.e. progressive intuition (anupūrvābhisamaya) — but also single-moment awareness (ekakṣanāvabodha = skad cig ma gcig pa’i rtogs pa) which is also known as ekakṣanābhisambodha and ekakṣanābhīṣasamaya. This pair of understandings constitute the sixth and seventh main topics (padārtha = dṇos po) in Prajñāpāramitā philosophy as expounded in Chapters vi and vii of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra ascribed by tradition to Maitreya(nātha).

In the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (vi. 1) it has been specified that progressive activity is comprised of a series of good qualities extending from generosity (dāna) up to discriminative understanding (prajñā), as well as of ‘commemoration’ (anuṣmṛti) of the Buddha, etc., and lastly of a nature consisting in non-existence of the factors of existence as hypostatized entities (dharmābhūvasvabhava).

This anupūrvābhisamaya has then been explicated as thirteen-fold312 inasmuch as it covers the six Perfections (pāramitā), set out in terms of non-attachment to all factors of existence (sarvadharmāsaṅga) mentioned in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (p. 893); six ‘commemorations’ pertaining to the Buddha, Dharma and Samgha as well as to discipline (śīla), renunciation (tyāga) and deities (devatā), set out in terms of the non-differentiation of all factors of existence (sarvadharmāsambheda) in the same Sūtra (p. 893); and the non-substantial nature of all factors of existence, set out in terms of the Sūtra’s teaching (p. 893) concerning the non-existence of all these factors (sarvadharmāsvabhava).313 At the outset Haribhadra has pointed out that, as Perfections (pāramitā), the qualities of generosity, discipline, energy, and receptive perseverance are comprised in the Perfe-

312 See Abhisamayālaṃkāra i. 17; Ārya Vimuktisena, Abhisamayālaṃkāra-Vṛtti, P, f. 221b6.
tion of discriminative understanding (prajña-pāramitā).\(^{314}\) In consequence of this the three components of any of the relevant acts – viz. the agent, the intended beneficiary and the activity of giving, etc. – are relativized and cancelled as hypostatic entities through what is known as triaspectual purification (trimanḍalavī-suddhi).

Haribhadra has next explained that comprehension (adhigama) results, \textit{inter alia},

(i) from ‘commemoration’ (anusmaraṇa) of the Buddha finding expression progressively in the factors of the three Paths of preparation (prayogamārga, i.e. the four nirvedhabhāgiyas), vision (darśanamārga) and meditative realization (bhāvanā-mārga);

(ii) from ‘commemoration’ bearing on Dharma, i.e. the factors that are categorized as wholesome (kuśala), unwholesome and undetermined (avyākṛta); and

(iii) from ‘commemoration’ bearing on the Saṃgha, which Haribhadra here understands as the community of non-retrogressing (avaivartika) Ārya-Bodhisattvas.

Now, very significantly for the purpose of this study, Haribhadra has specified that, in reality (paramārtha-tās), buddhānusmaraṇa is characterized precisely by non-recollection (asmaraṇalakṣaṇa). And comprehension (adhigama) has been stated by him to consist in understanding that the very nature of all dharmanas is precisely their ‘entitylessness’ (dharma-bhavasvabhāva), i.e. their non-substantiality as hypostatized entities.\(^{315}\)

Haribhadra has further explained that anupūrvābhīṣamaṇa consists in cultivation with a view to stabilization consequent on the progressive ordering of the matter, which is then understood both in disconnexion and in connexion (vyāstasamastatvenādhīga-tān arthān anupūrvākṛtya sthirikaraṇāyā vibhāvayati).

Such then, according to Haribhadra, is progressive compre-

\(^{314}\) It is to be noted that – unlike Ratnakarasanti (Śrātāmā, p. 163.19) – Haribhadra does not here refer to dhyāna as comprised in the prajña-pāramitā; and he speaks (vi. i, p. 908) of four Perfections (pāramitācatuṣṭaya) being comprised in prajña-pāramitā. The significance of this restriction, which distinguishes Haribhadra from Kamalāśīla for example, remains to be clarified in detail.

hension, the sixth main topic in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra's exposition of Prajñāpāramitā philosophy.

The next main topic in Prajñāpāramitā philosophy, which makes up Chapter vii of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, is known as single-moment awareness (ekakṣaṇāvabodha). As comprehension in a single moment (kṣaṇenāikenādhamagamah), this awareness is known to Haribhadra in addition as ekakṣaṇābhisambodha and ekakṣaṇābhisamaya. Then, for one who has fully realized this ekakṣaṇābhisambodha there ultimately arises, in a second moment (dvitīye kṣaṇe), the eighth awareness relating to the dharmakāya as the culmination of Prajñāpāramitā philosophy and practice, i.e. the final main topic treated in Chapter viii of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra.316

In the philosophy of Prajñāpāramitā as expounded in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra and in Haribhadra's Vṛttī and Ālokā — works which are rightly regarded as veritable monuments of the ‘Gradualist’ current in Buddhist thought — what exactly is meant by single-moment awareness or understanding?

Following Chapter vii of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Haribhadra has explicated the concept under the following four headings.317

(i) Ekakṣaṇābhisambodha is to be understood first in terms of the fact that each pure factor (anāsravadharma) is included in the multitude of dharman, and also of the fact that these anāsrava-dharman are themselves all comprised in each single dharma extending from generosity (dāna) up to the eighty marks (anuvyāñjana) of the Buddha. This is so in virtue of a particular Gnosis (jñāna) free from the error of grasping each object separately, and which is accordingly termed single-moment (ekakṣaṇa) Gnosis. The concept of a jñāna by which all is realized simultaneously and at once, in virtue of the Dharma-Sphere of totality (dharma-dhatu),318 has been illustrated in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (vii. 2) by the image of the noria or Persian wheel (araghatā = zo chun gyi rgyud ~ zo chun bgyud) the entire mechanism of which is set in motion

316 Compare also Abhisamayālaṃkāra i. 18.
317 Haribhadra, Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā vii; cf. i. 17.
318 The Sanskrit texts reads (p. 909): pūrvaprajñāhānāvedha-dharmadhātu-sāmarthyaḥ (Tib. sron gyi smon lam gyi ‘phen pa’i lugs dañ chos kyi dbyin kyi mthu).
simultaneously and at once (sakṛt = cīg car, glossed as ekāvār-
am = dus gcig tu) by a single impulse of energy. In this way, in the first form of ekākṣaṇābhīṣambodha, the single pure Gnosis (anāsravajñāna) ‘presents’ (abhīmukhīkārayati), in one single moment, all that is in its scope as homogeneous (sajātiya = ri[g]s mthun pa). It is defined by Haribhadra as characterized by the single-moment comprehension of all pure, non-fruitional factors (avipākānāsravadharma).

(ii) The next aspect of ekākṣaṇābhīṣambodha is described as consisting in the fact that, once all obstacles have been removed in the Bodhisattva’s meditative realization of the appropriate counteragents (pratipakṣa), there arises the state of ‘reality of fruition’ consisting in the aspect of total purification (sakalavyāvadānapakṣavipākadharmanvasthā). And through comprehension of all anāsravadharmanas that have therewith reached, in one single moment, this state of fruition, there arises the Gnosis that corresponds to prajñā- pāramitā. This second aspect of ekākṣaṇābhīṣambodha has accordingly been defined by Haribhadra as characterized by the single-moment comprehension of all pure factors in the state of reality of fruition. Haribhadra’s forerunner Ārya Vimuktiśena (sixth century) had earlier specified that fruition (vipāka) through understanding (abhisamaya) in a single moment arises and ceases all at once (cīg car du = sakṛt or yugapad?).

(iii) The following aspect of ekākṣaṇābhīṣambodha is defined as being characterized by the single-moment comprehension of all dharmanas as devoid of characteristic marks (alakṣaṇasar- vadharmākakṣaṇalakṣaṇa), this marklessness also being known in one single moment. Indeed, as had been explained by Ārya Vimuktiśena, were dharmanas on the contrary differentiated from each other by distinct characteristic marks, their required inclusion within one single dharma would be impossible; and it would then wrongly follow that there could be no realization (abhisamaya) in a single moment. According to the later commentator Ratnakarasanti (c. 1000), because of the absence of characteristic mark,

Gnosis at this level is of one value (ekarasa).\(^{321}\) In this regard the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (vii. 4) refers to the Bodhisattva’s taking his place in ‘dream-like’ dharmas through the practice of generosity and the associated series of other qualities.

(iv) Finally, the fourth aspect of *ekaksanābhisambodha* is defined as being characterized by the single-moment comprehension of all dharmas as marked by non-duality (advayalakṣaṇāsarvadharmakṣaṇalakṣaṇa). With regard to this the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (vii. 5) compares the non-duality of what is dreamt (svapna) and its cognition in dream.

In all its many ramifications and applications this seventh topic is as important, and as complex, as any in the philosophy of Prajñāpāramitā; and a full explication and analysis of the above-mentioned four aspects of the *ekaksanābhisambodha* on the basis of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras and the extensive exegetical literature that relates to them could well fill a monograph. For our present purpose it will be sufficient to observe that single-moment comprehension here occupies a critical, and pivotal, position in the transition from the step-by-step cultivation of the Path by the Śaikṣa-practiser to the climactic comprehension of dharmakāya as a culminating awareness on the Āsaikṣa-level of a buddha.

At an even earlier stage of practice of the Path, following on the transition from the final moment of the mundane (laukika) Path of preparation (prayogamārga) of the worldling (prthagjana) – that is, from the laukikāgradharmas – to the supramundane Path of vision (darśanamārga) of the Ārya, mention has also been made in Haribhadra’s *Ālokā* of this Darśanamārga as a single-moment understanding (ekaksanābhisamaya).\(^{322}\)

This concept is to be understood in the following way. The Darśanamārga is regularly represented as consisting of sixteen thought-moments (citta[-kṣaṇa]). In it the following four factors are then identified: (i) a preliminary externally objectified receptive perseverance in knowledge (dharmajñānakṣaṇī) and (ii) a full externally objectified knowledge (dharmajñāna) bearing on

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\(^{321}\) Ratnakaraśaṃti, *Sarvatamā* vii, 4, p. 171.1.

\(^{322}\) Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka* ii. 12 (ed. Wogihara, p. 171; =P, f. 120b).
the objective (grāhya) factors of existence, beside (iii) a preliminary consequent receptive perseverance in knowledge (anvayajñān nakṣānti) and (iv) a full consequent knowledge (anvayajñāna) bearing on the subjective (grāhaka). This set of four factors is brought into relation with each of the four Principles or Realities of the Nobles (āryasatya).

Quoting one view of this matter in his Ālokā, Haribhadra has explained that, in the exact moment when III (duḥkha, i.e. the first āryasatya) is eliminated following on its recognition, the other three satyas also are all simultaneously involved, viz. in the form of elimination of the origin of III (i.e. the second āryasatya), the realization of the cessation of III (i.e. the third āryasatya), and the practice of the Path (i.e. the fourth āryasatya). And the same applies mutatis mutandis in the case of each of the following three satyas. Hence, according to this view, the Mahāyānist intuition of the Darśanamārga is to be regarded in this respect as a single-moment intuition (ekakṣaṇābhisamaya) with respect to its intuition of a single effect (ekakāryābhisamaya). According to another view of the matter also mentioned by Haribhadra, intuition of the Darśanamārga is an ekakṣaṇābhisamaya because there here arises a pure knowledge (anāsravajñāna) making known the nature of all modes (sarvākāraśvarūpapratisvādakāriṇāna); and this knowledge has within its scope the totality of all factors (sarvādharmaviśaya), thus bearing a certain (at least formal) resemblance to the two aspects of the ekakṣaṇābhisambodha at the very end of the Path.

In sum, there are recognized in the tradition of Prajñāpāramitā philosophy to which Haribhadra belonged — a tradition very closely connected with the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and ultimately with a Maitreya-tradition — both a progressive, serial form of understanding involving inter alia forms of commemoration which are characterized as being in

323 Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka ii. 12, p. 171 (= P, f. 120b).
324 Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka ii. 12, p. 171: ity ekakāryābhisamayād ekakṣaṇābhisamayo mahāyāne darśanamārga draśṭavyah (Tib., P, f. 120b: de ltar ‘bras bu’i mnion par riogs pa la blo sas theg pa chen po’i mthong ba’i lam la mnion par riogs pa skad cig ma geig yin no). On the kāryābhīsamaya see Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 27 (below, pp. 177–8).
reality non-recollective (asmarañalakṣaṇa) and without mentation, and also a single-moment understanding aspects of which involve simultaneous (sakṛt) realization. This ekakṣañābhīsamodha leads, in the following and culminating moment, to ultimate comprehension of the dharma-kāya. In addition, at an even earlier stage of the Path, the pivotal transition from the mundane (laukika) Prayogamarga of the worldling (prthagjana) to the transmundane (lokottara) Darśanamarga of the Ārya, reference is made to a single-moment intuition (ekakṣañābhīsamaya) on the Darśana-marga.

The above-mentioned transitions appear to parallel what has in the Vijñānavāda school been termed mārgāśrayaparivṛtti (so long as one remains a Śaikṣa) and cittāśrayaparivṛtti (when one attains the āśaikṣamarga).325

The notion of the momentary or instantaneous (ekakṣaṇa) as attaching to a crucial and pivotal point where a leap—a veritable saut-de-plan—is made from the conditioned level to the unconditioned—from the saṃskṛta level of the Bodhisattva under training (śaikṣa) to the asaṃskṛta level of the Āśaikṣa in Buddhahood (or Arhathood)—is thus a critical one. It is essential to underscore the fact that both these aspects, the Gradual and the Instantaneous/Simultaneous, have been recognized by the school that taught the progressive Path.

From the foregoing it therefore emerges that a classical school of Indian Prajñāpāramitā thought embraced a complex of typologically ‘simultaneist’ ideas and terms that figured also among the points at issue in the controversy that took place in Tibet at the end of the eighth century between the ‘Gradualists’ with Kama-laśila at their head and the ‘Simultaneists’ with the Ho-shang Moho-yen as one of their leading proponents. That the issues are even older in Prajñāpāramitā thought than the second half of the eighth century is demonstrated by the fact that the Abhisamayā- laṃkāra (of uncertain date) and its early commentator Ārya Vimuktiṣena (sixth century) already clearly recognized both these forms of understanding or awareness as complementary, and also by the fact that several of the problems in question are implicitly or explicitly touched on in the canonical sources quoted by

325 See Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (ed. N. Tatia), p. 93.
Kamalaśīla in his Bhāvanākramas and in his commentary on the Avikalpa-praveśadhāraṇī.

The Hvašān Mahāyāna is recorded to have said that the simultaneous engagement (gcig char 'jug pa) he taught is like the tenth stage (sa = bhūmi). It may be that he was thus referring to a state comparable to what we have just seen recognized for the ekakṣaṇābhīṣambodha in relation to dharmakāyābhīṣambodha in Prajñāpāramitā thought.

It is moreover in connexion with the buddhabhūmi that the Mādhyamika master Candrakīrti has evoked the instantaneousness of the buddha’s Gnosis (jñāna). In his Madhyamakāvatāra we read (xii. 2, p. 356):

'Just as space is not differentiated according to differences in the containers [in which it may be enclosed], so there is in reality no differentiation whatever caused by things (bhāva) [i.e. by the skandhas such as matter and feeling]. Therefore, when correctly comprehending [this reality] as being of one single value (ekarasa) – oh Thou of highest understanding! – Thou didst understand the knowable (jñeya) in one instant (kṣaṇa).'

In his autocommentary Candrakīrti has explained that, once he achieved Awakening in the Akaniśṭha-sphere (see Madhyamakāvatāra xii. 1), Bhagavat attained the Gnosis of the Omniscient (thams cad mKhyen pa ye šes) in one instant. And it is by this understanding, in just a single knowledge-moment (mKhyen pa’i skad cig gcig kho na), that Bhagavat attained the Gnosis of the Omniscient in precisely that single knowledge-moment (mKhyen pa’i skad cig gcig kho nar).

Here then the single-moment character of Gnosis on the stage of the buddha is explained in terms of the one value (ekarasa) of reality, that is, the fact that on the supreme and final level of Buddhahood all is understood to be of one single value only. This single value is liberation along with Emptiness (śūnyatā).

326 See sBa bZed, G, p. 68.20 and S, p. 58.7; mKhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja, f. 117a2; Chos ’byun Me tog sNin po, f. 430b5.
This theme has been alluded to also in the *Triśaraṇasaptati* ascribed to (a) Candrakīrti (verse 14):

\[
\text{chos rnams ņid kyi no bo ni}/\text{thams cad yod pa ma yin te}/
\text{de phyir skad cig gcig gis ni}/\text{bde gśegs thams cad mkhyen par}
\text{’dod’}/
\]

'A nature does not exist at all for the dharmas. Therefore it is held that, in one single moment, the Sugata knows all.'

This treatise was known to Haribhadra, who has quoted its verse 33 in his *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka* (i. 3, pp. 8–9).

According to a much earlier source, the basic Commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* (i. 25, pp. 21–22), the fact that stained Thusness (*samalā tathātā*) is simultaneously and at once (*yugapad ekakālam = cig car dus gcig*) both [naturally] pure (*viśuddhā*) and [adventitiously] Affected (*saṃkliśtā*), is to be regarded as an inconceivable matter (*acintyasthana*), as is declared in the *Śrīmālādeviśīṃhanādaśāstra*. And the further fact that stainless Thusness (*nirmalā tathātā*) is un-Affected by previous stains (*pūrvalāsaṃkliśtā*), even though it is later purified (*paścād viśuddhā*), is also an inconceivable matter. Hence it is declared in the *Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra* that Mind (*citta*) is by nature luminous (*prakṛtiprabhāsva*), and is knowledge ‘just so’ (*tathaiva jñānam = de kho na bzin ṣes so*). As a consequence, it is also stated that Perfect Awakening (*samyaksambodhi*) is Awakened to (*abhisambuddhā*) in virtue of that understanding which is endowed with the characteristic of being a single-moment one (*ekakṣaṇalaksana-samāyuktā prajñā*) (i. 25, p. 22).

A related idea is also expressed in another passage of the basic Commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (i. 15), where it is explained that the pair (*dvaya*) represented by what is termed ‘natural luminosity of mind’ (*cittasya prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā*) and its sub-defilement/affliction (*upakleśa*) is very hard to comprehend. For no second *citta* in fact intervenes (*anabhisaṃdhāna = mtshams sbyor ba med pa*) because of the single flow (*ekaratva = gcig rgyu ba*) of both salutary and non-salutary *cittas* in the Pure Sphere (*anāsravadhātu*). Hence, as is declared in the *Śrīmālādeviśīṃhanādaśāstra*, salutary thought (*kuśalacittā*) is instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*): it
does not become Affected by defilements/afflictions (na kleśaḥ saṃkliśyate). And non-salutary thought (akuśala-citta) is instantaneous: it is not in a state of Affection by the defilements/afflictions, and no defilements/afflictions touch this citta.

Still another 'inconceivable matter', as pointed out in the Dhāraṇīsvararājasūtra, is represented by the fact that Buddha-activity (jina-kriyā) functions spontaneously (anābhoja) and without binary mental construction (avikalpa-panas) for sentient beings — in accordance with their predispositions and the way they are to be trained — simultaneously (yugapāta = cig car), everywhere (sara-vatra = thams cad la) and at all times (sarvakālam = dus thams cad du) (i. 25, p. 24; cf. Ratnagotravibhāga iv. 67).

Here in the Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary and in its Sūtra sources, then, the notion of instantaneousness and simultaneity marks not exactly a critical and climactic transition from one stage of the Path to another (such as from the Prayogamārga to the Darśanamārga) or from the Path to the Fruit of Buddhahood (as in the cases from Prajñāpāramitā philosophy studied above), but instead the so to speak non-rational ‘co-relationship’ of the buddha-level with the level of sentient beings. This co-relationship (if such it may be called) is in effect that of bondage and liberation in the classical Buddhist perspective of the ultimate non-duality of Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa/Bodhi, or of samalā tathātā and nirmalā tathātā. And in view of the fundamental principles of non-substantiality (non-hypostatization) and non-duality (but not monistic identity), this ‘relationship’ is non-rational because, in reality, there exist no separate and opposed hypostatic entities, in other words no ultimately real relata. In the conventional discourse of philosophical analysis and of the description of the Path, the positions and sequences sattva: buddha, bondage: liberation, samsāra: nirvāṇa, samalā tathātā: nirmalā tathātā and so on no doubt all have their pedagogical and heuristic usefulness and legitimacy; but they lack any ontologically or gnoseologically real foundation as hypostatizable entities that could be related and opposed. This is why the ostensible terms of this non-rational ‘relationship’, which goes beyond the frames of space and time, are described as instantaneous, and also why the understanding that pertains to them is itself characterized as being a single-moment prajñā. Position in space and succession in time of the
two levels are thus neutralized and cancelled in philosophical description by atemporal instantaneity and simultaneity.

That Kamalasila was not unfamiliar with these ideas expounded in the Ratnagotravibhaga and its Commentary and Sutrasources — and connected with the doctrines of the natural luminosity of Mind, the tathagatagarbha, and the prakrtisthagotra which is also a topic of Chapter i of the Abhisamayalamkara — is suggested by the fact that in his Madhyamakaloka he incorporated the tathagatagarbha doctrine in the Yogacara-Madhyamaka.

Leaping and the Samapatti or Samadhi called Avaskanda(ka), Viśkanda(ka) and Vyutkrānta

Associated with various forms of rapid way and immediate access to Awakening, we find the Tibetan concepts of thod rgal and khrregs chod.327 The latter is known from the rDzogs chen tradition, where it is described as ka dag; and no Sanskrit original for this term has so far been identified.328 On the other hand, the term thod rgal, well-known in rDzogs chen literature too, is amply attested elsewhere.329 In rDzogs chen literature it is glossed as lhun grub ‘spontaneous’ (Skt. anābhoga),330 but it actually means leaping or skipping. The Sanskrit words translated by thod rgal are avaskanda(ka) and viśkanda(ka), meaning jumping over, and vyutkrānta(ka), used in the sense of striding over.331

327 On these two terms, see H. V. Guenther, Tibetan Buddhism in western perspective (Emeryville, 1977), p. 151; G. Tucci, Religions of Tibet (London, 1980), pp. 85–87, 131; R. A. Stein, Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 179 (1971), pp. 23–28; and M. Broido, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 8 (1985), p. 35 (concerning the types of person known as cig car ba, thad rgal ba and rim gyes pa). Thod rgal has often been regarded as an essentially gradual, even though accelerated, process as opposed to khrregs gcod. But in some cases thod rgal too can be extremely rapid and for all intents and purposes sudden.328 In the Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo (Zang-Han daicidian, Peking, 1985), khrregs chod is defined as (1) sia 'gyur ba'i lhag mthoni gi brda chad (i.e. an expression used by the rNi'i ma pas for lhag mthoni = vipaśyana), and (2) ka dag khrregs chod kyi bsuds tshig.

329 In Sakaki's edition of the Mahāvyutpatti the spelling thod rgyal is found under no. 1496.

330 Cf. Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, s.v.

331 It should be noted that ava-skand- means not only 'to jump down' but also 'to assault, storm'. The latter meaning would be appropriate when the avaskanda(ka) technique designates an accelerated and very rapid process.

As for the term viśkanda(ka), the word viśkanda is attested in the meaning of 'dispersing, moving away'.

327 On these two terms, see H. V. Guenther, Tibetan Buddhism in western perspective (Emeryville, 1977), p. 151; G. Tucci, Religions of Tibet (London, 1980), pp. 85–87, 131; R. A. Stein, Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 179 (1971), pp. 23–28; and M. Broido, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 8 (1985), p. 35 (concerning the types of person known as cig car ba, thad rgal ba and rim gyes pa). Thod rgal has often been regarded as an essentially gradual, even though accelerated, process as opposed to khrregs gcod. But in some cases thod rgal too can be extremely rapid and for all intents and purposes sudden.328 In the Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo (Zang-Han daicidian, Peking, 1985), khrregs chod is defined as (1) sia 'gyur ba'i lhag mthoni gi brda chad (i.e. an expression used by the rNi'i ma pas for lhag mthoni = vipaśyana), and (2) ka dag khrregs chod kyi bsuds tshig.

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In the Mahāvyutpatti (no. 1496), the vyutikrāntakasamāpatti (or vyatikrāntakasamāpatti) = thod rgyal (sic) gyi sīoms par 'jug pa follows on brief descriptions of the four Ārūpyas – i.e. the Samāpattis relating to the Ākāśānāntyāyatanas, the Viśnūnāntyāyatanas, theĀkāśamanyāyatanas and the Naivasamājānāyatanas (nos. 1492–5) – and it precedes the vyāskandaka- or vyatyasta-samāpatti (= snrel zi'i sīoms par 'jug pa, no. 1497). It is usually contrasted with the nine Samāpattis of progressive and sequential residence (anupūrvavihārasamāpatti = mthar gyis gnas pa'i sīoms par 'jug pa, no. 1498) consisting of the four Dhyānas (nos. 1478–81) and four Samāpattis (nos. 1492–5 already mentioned together with, in addition, the samājñāvedayitanirodha, no. 1500).

The notion of leaping or skipping stages of the graded Path is known in the Dhyāna-tradition of Buddhism. And since it is relevant to the ston mun pa and cig c(h)ar ba techniques at issue in the Great Debate in Tibet, it will be of interest to see to what extent, and where, these ideas are attested in the main sources of the classical schools of Indian Buddhism and, especially, in those of Śantarākṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s school.

After briefly describing in both the forward (ascending, anuloma) and reverse (descending, pratiloma) directions the nine sequential Attainments in absorption (anupūrvvasamāpatti) – i.e. the four Dhyānas relating to the rūpadhātu and the five Samāpattis relating to the four Āyatanas of the ārūpyadhātu and the Samājñāvedayitanirodha – the Aṣṭādāśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (ed. Conze, Ch. lxii, pp. 108–10) describes the Sīmhavijñāmbhita Samādhi, which is shown to consist in ascending through the four Dhyānas and four Āyatanas to the Nirodhasamāpatti and then descending from this high Samāpatti to the first Dhyāna in a progressive and sequential fashion. Next, this Sūtra takes up the Viṣkandaka ('jumping', or 'dispersing?') Samādhi, which is practised once the Sīmhavijñāmbhita Samādhi has been worked

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through. This Concentration – otherwise referred to in the same Sūtra and elsewhere as the Āvaskandaka (‘jumping’, and perhaps also ‘storming’?) Samādhi – consists in the practiser’s first ascending progressively through the Dhyanas and Āyatanas to the Nirodhasamāpatti, gaining (samāpad-) each stage in sequence. Then, from the Nirodhasamāpatti he jumps back to the second Dhārāna, thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the third Dhārāna, thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the fourth Dhārāna, thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the Ākāśānāntyāyatana, thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the Vījñānānāntyāyatana, thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the Ākīṃcanyāyatana, and thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the Naivasamīnjānāsāṃjñāyatana. Then the practiser ascends once more to the Nirodhasamāpatti and descends back down to the Naivasamīnjānāsāṃjñāyatana, from which he this time arises to remain in a state of non-concentration (asamāhitacitta

In his edition of the Aṣṭādaśāhāsrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Rome, 1962), Conze prints asamāhitacittā throughout. But the Aṣṭasāhārikā and other texts have asamāhitā.
Ārūpyasamāpatti\textsuperscript{335} attaining the first Dhyāna and then, having arisen from it, the Nirodhasamāpatti. Thence the practiser attains the second Dhyāna, thence again the Nirodhasamāpatti, thence the third Dhyāna, thence again the Nirodhasamāpatti, thence the fourth Dhyāna, and thence again the Nirodhasamāpatti. Next, attaining once again the Nirodhasamāpatti, and following a similar procedure, the practiser ascends through the four Āyatanas. And arising from the fourth Āyatana – the Naivasamājñāna-samājñā – the practiser attains the Nirodhasamāpatti finally. The description of this procedure of jumping in the Śatasāhasrikā\textsuperscript{336} follows a statement (p. 272) as to how Bodhisattva-Mahasattvas awaken to supreme and perfect Awakening (anuttarasamyaksambodhi) in virtue of their very first cittotpāda.

A similar procedure is also described in the version of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā\textsuperscript{337} published by N. Dutt (pp. 70–71), where it is stated that Bodhisattva-Mahasattvas attain sāmañdhī by jumping (avaskandaka)\textsuperscript{338} and then awaken to supreme and perfect Awakening in the various Buddha-fields. One who proceeds thus is then referred to as a kāyasākṣin (p. 71).\textsuperscript{339}

Pertinent to this matter too is the statement in the version of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā\textsuperscript{335} published by Dutt that the Bodhisattva-Mahasattva, having attained the Diamond-like Concentration (vajropamasamādhi)\textsuperscript{336} immediately after the Bodhicitta, acquires the Omnimal Gnosis of a buddha by means of discriminative knowledge conjoined with a single thought moment (ekacittaka-nasamāyukta-prajñā sarvārahajñātām anuprāpnoti, p. 82).

Concerning the kāyasākṣin (Pali kāyasakkhi[n]), he is one of several kinds of psychological and spiritual types recognized in

\textsuperscript{335} See below, pp. 168–70.

\textsuperscript{336} On the vajropamasamādhi, see Abhidharmakośa vi. 44d (=ānantaryamārga, on the level of the bhavāra, for a candidate for Arhatship, followed by the vimuktimārga and āsavākṣayaśajñāna), and Yasomitra’s Vāyākyā ii. 16c (where the bhāvanāmārga is described as extending from the anvayaśajñāna relating to mārga to the vajropamasamādhi, where the Fruit of Arhatship is attained). See also Śrāvakabhūmi iv, p. 506 f. (cf. L. Schmithaussen’s ed. in: L. Hercus et al. (eds.), Indological and Buddhist studies [Festschrift J. W. de Jong], Canberra, 1982, p. 460 f.), where (p. 510 [=p. 472]) the vajropamasamādhi consists in the prayoganiṣṭha manaskāra, one of the seven forms of the ‘act of mentation’ listed in the Śrāvakabhūmi. Cf. also L. de La Vallée Poussin, L’Abhidharmakośa, vi, pp. 227–9, and Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Louvain, 1929), p. 667; below, p. 200.
BACKGROUND TO ISSUES IN THE GREAT DEBATE

the Buddhist traditions as being worthy of honour (*dakkhin­neyya*);\(^{337}\) he is characterized by the faculty of concentration (*samādhindriya*).\(^{338}\) By extension (*pariyāyena*) the name Kāyasā­kṣin is used for one who has ‘contacted’ the four Dhyānas and the four Ārūpyas; and strictly (*nippariyāyena*) this designation applies to one who has attained the Saṃjñāvedayitanirodha, in which case the impurities (*āsava*) are exhausted by discriminative knowledge (*paññā*, which is to say that the Kāyasā­kṣin is then an Arhat).\(^{339}\) When his mental attention (*manasikāra*) focuses on Ill (*dukkha*) the *samādhindriya* predominates in him; and his realiza­tion, or ‘attestation’ (*sacchikar­-*), is described as being by bodily contact, for he first ‘contacts’ Dhyāna and then Stoppage and Nirvāṇa (*jhānaphasam paṭhamam phusati, pacchā nirodham nib­bānam sacchikaroti*).\(^{340}\) Moreover, the designation Kāyasā­kṣin applies both to a person who attains the *sotāpattimagga* by the power of the *samādhindriya* and to the persons who by the power of this faculty of concentration attain the *sotāpattiphala*, the Paths and Fruits of the Sakadāgāmin and the Anāgāmin, the Path of Arhat­hood and the Fruit of Arhat­hood; while the *samādhindriya* predominates in this type, the other four faculties (*saddhā, paññā*, etc.) nevertheless play a subordinate part in his spiritual constitu­tion.\(^{341}\) The Kāyasā­kṣin is described as one who abides having contacted ‘in the body’ the tranquil Vimokṣas – the Ārūpyas beyond the Rūpas – and *some* of whose *āsavas* are exhausted by discriminative knowledge; the restriction ‘some’ (*ekacce*) is also applied to the *āsavas* in the cases of the spiritual types of the Dṛṣṭiprāpta, the Śraddhāvimukta and the Dharmānusārin, but significantly it is not so applied in the cases of the Ubhayatobha­gavimukta (who also abides in bodily contact with the tranquil Ārūpya Vimokṣas) and the Prajñāvimukta (who however does not abide in bodily contact with the Ārūpya Vimokṣas).\(^{342}\) In the

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337 Dīghanikāya III 105; 252–4; Majjhimanikāya I 439, 477–8; etc.
340 *Patisambhidamagga* II 51–52. 341 *Patisambhidamagga* II 54.
342 Majjhimanikāya I 478. (In the Nālandā edition, the negative na is missing before kāyena phussitvā/phassitvā in the case of the paññāvimutta.) On this and parallel passages, and on the relationship between *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* and praññā, see L. Schmithausen in K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (eds.), *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus* (Gedenkschrift L. Alsdorf, Wiesbaden, 1981), p. 216 f.
Puggalapaññatti, the Kāyasākṣin is clearly connected with the eight Vimokṣas.\textsuperscript{343}

The Kāyasākṣin thus figures alongside the person released through confidence (śraddhāvimukta, saddhāvimutta), the person released through discriminative knowledge (prajñāvimukta, paññāvimutta) and the Dṛṣṭiprāpta (dìṭṭhipatta). And in the Aṅguttaranikāya there is found an interesting discussion as to which of three psychological and spiritual types is superior; Saviṭṭha/Samiddha—who figures as the interlocutor of Musila and Nārada in a comparable context (see pp. 191–2)—holds that the saddhāvimutta is best because of the predominance in him of the faculty of confidence (saddhindriya), Mahākoṭṭhita/Mahākoṭṭhīka—a monk known elsewhere for his skill in paṭisambhidā—holds that the kāyasakkhi(n) is best because of the predominance of the faculty of concentration, and Sāriputta holds that the dìṭṭhipatta is best because of the predominance of the faculty of discriminative knowledge (paññindriya). When approached to resolve this difference of opinion the Buddha is said, however, to have remarked that it is not possible to decide unilaterally (ekalp/sena); for anyone of these three types may become not only a Sakadāgāmin and Anāgāmin but also an Arhat.\textsuperscript{344}

In the Abhidharmakośa (vi. 43cd), the Kāyasākṣin has been defined as an Anāgāmin who reaches nirodha; and Yaśomitra has specified that the Anāgāmin in question may be either śraddhādhi-mukta or dṛṣṭiprāpta. According to the Vaibhāṣika theory summarized here by Vasubandhu, the Kāyasākṣin attests ‘in the body’ a dharma that is a simulacrum of Nirvāṇa; and he does this because the body serves him as his āsraya in the absence of mind (citta) in the state of nirodha (Bhāṣya vi. 43cd). According to Vasubandhu’s own (Sautrāntika) view, however, on arising from concentration the Kāyasākṣin attains a previously unattained conscious bodily tranquillity (tasmād vyutthāyāpratilabdhapūrṇam savijñānakām kāyašāntiṃ pratilabhate), thinking: ‘Tranquil is the Nirodhasamapatti, Nirvāṇa-like is the Nirodhasamāpatti.’\textsuperscript{345} It is in this way, then,

\textsuperscript{343} Puggalapaññatti, pp. 14–15, 29, 72.

\textsuperscript{344} Aṅguttaranikāya I 118–20.

\textsuperscript{345} Cf. Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ii. 44d (p. 72) and 61d (pp. 98–100) on the samantarapratītyaya for the vyutthānacitta when a meditator arises from the nirodhasamāpatti.
that tranquillity (śāntatva) is ‘attested’. ‘Attestation’ has been defined (Bhāṣya vi. 43cd) as immediate perception by the attestation of ‘connexion’ or ‘knowledge’ (prāptijñānasāksātikriyābhhyām pratyakṣikāro hi sāksātikriyā). According to Yaśomitra, at the time of samādhi there is attestation through prāpti of a suitable āśraya, and on arising from samādhi there is attestation through jñāna that is awareness of the preceding. Alternatively, it is through having attained conscious ‘bodily tranquillity’ that prāpti ‘connexion’ with this state is understood in the state of unconscious bodily tranquillity (savijñānakāyaśāntipratilambhena vā avijñānakāya-śāntyavasthābhūyām tatprāptir gamyata iti).346

In Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya (p. 88), the Kāyāksin has been defined as a Learner (śaikṣa) who meditates in the eight Vimokṣas.

The process of jumping stages is further treated in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (v. 24–25) and its commentaries just after the Simhavijṛmbhita Samādhi. These texts have not hitherto been examined in connexion with the notion of skipping stages of the Path, presumably because these works are not included among the sources of the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition on which discussion has so far been mainly concentrated.

In Abhisamayālaṃkāra v. 23, the Simhavijṛmbhita Samādhi is mentioned in connexion with the Darśanāmārga that involves the vision of the twelve members of the chain of origination in dependence (pratītyasamutpāda) in both the forward direction (anulomam), beginning with nescience (avidyā) as the condition for the arising of the constructions (samśkāra), and in the reverse direction (pratilomam), beginning with the cessation of ageing and death as a consequence of the cessation of birth.347

Then, on the level of the highest supramundane Path of meditative realization (bhāvanāmārga), mention is made first of the nine successive Attainments in absorption (anupūrvasamā-

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346 As noted by Vasubandhu (Abhidharmakosabhāṣya viii. 34), sāksātkarāṇa ‘attestation, realization’ is connected specifically with the third Vimokṣa (of subha) and the eighth Vimokṣa (of saṃjñāvedayitanirodha).

347 In the samādhi-list of the Mahāvyutpatti (no. 533), the simhavijṛmbhita immediately precedes the vyatyasta (śreṣṭha).
patti = mthar gyis gnas pa’i sīoms par ’jug pa) and then of the Avaskanda-Samāpatti (v. 24–25):

kāmāptam avadhīkṛtya vijñānam asamāhitam/
sanirodhāḥ samāpattīr gatavāgamyā nava dvidhā] /
ekadvitritahpañcaśatāśaptaśtāvyatikramāt/
avaskandasamāpattīr ā nirodham atulyagā]/

‘Having taken as a terminal the unconcentrated consciousness belonging to [the level of] desire, and having gone [upwards] and returned [downwards], doubly, through the nine attainments including the Nirodha[saṃpatti], by passing over one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, and [finally] eight [stages in the series of the nine successive Samāpattis] the Attainment of Jumping, without even[ness], proceeds up to Cessation.’

According to Haribhadra, the Avaskanda-Samāpatti comprises the nine successive Samāpattis that make up the Bhāvanāmārga. The procedure of jumping consists to begin with in ascending in sequence from the first Dhyāna to the Nirodha and then descending in sequence back to the first Dhyāna, thus describing a forwards and backwards sequence (anulomapratiloma-krama) through the four Dhyānas, the four Ārūyas and the Nirodha(saṃpatti). Next, the practiser attains (saṃpadyate) the first Dhyāna and then, arising from it, he attains the Nirodha. And he follows this method through the Dhyānas and Āyatanas until from the Naivasamjñānaśamjñāyatana he at last attains the Nirodha once again. Next, after arising from the latter, he takes as his support (ālambya) the ‘adjacent attainment’348 and, fixing (avasthāpya) as his terminal (maryāda) the consciousness in the sphere of desire (kāmāvacāraṃ vijñānam) and then arising from Samāpatti through the strength of his expertness in means (upāyakauśalya), the practiser ‘faces’ (āmukhīkṛ-) the unconcentrated consciousness (vijñānam asamāhitam). Then, from this state of non-concentration he attains the Nirodha, thence again the non-concentrated state, and thence – leaving out (parityāyya) only the Nirodha – the Naivasamjñānaśamjñāyatana. Thence he again

348 anantasamāpatti = Tib. de ma thag pa’i sīoms par ’jug pa (P, f. 382b).
reaches non-concentration and—leaving out this time two stages—he attains the Ākiṃcanyāyatana, and thence non-concentration once again. Finally, leaving out eight stages, he attains the first Dhyāna, and thence non-concentration once more. Thus, by the leaving out (parityāga) of from one to eight stages, the practiser proceeds as far as the Nirodha. And it is in this way that one wishing to take up the Avaskanda-Samāpatti which is without even progression (utulyagā)—and which is characterized by the practiser’s mastery (vasitva) and has as its nature the Bhāvanāmarga and expertness in means—should course in prajñāpāramitā. Haribhadra cites the Pañcavimśatisahasrikā with regard to this procedure.349

Haribhadra then compares and contrasts the related theory of the Abhidharmakośa where, instead of avaskanda(ka)samāpatti, the term used is vyutkrāntakasamāpatti (viii. 18c–19b):

gatvāgamya dvidhā bhūmir aṣṭau śiṣṭaikalanāghitāḥ//
vyutkrāntakasamāpattir visabhāgatātyagā/
‘Having gone [upwards] and returned [downwards], doubly, through the eight stages, [either] consecutively [or] jumping one [at a time], the Vyutkrānta-Samāpatti proceeds to a third [stage from the starting one] of a heterogeneous kind.’

According to Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the word ‘doubly’ relates to the stages that are either impure (sāsra) or pure (anāsra). The word ‘consecutively’ (śiṣṭa) refers to a progressive sequence (anukrama), whilst the word ‘jumping one’ (ekalatighita) refers to the skipping of one stage in each movement. The meditator who proceeds thus has been called a vyutkrāntakasamāpatti.350

The procedure (prayoga) in question consists, according to the Bhāṣya, in the practiser’s first passing over in ascending and descending sequence eight sāsra stages, and then seven anāsra stages.351 Next, he attains the third sāsra Dhyāna from the first,

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350 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya viii. 15ac (p. 444.2).
351 According to La Vallée Poussin, L’Abhidharmakośa, viii, pp. 145 and 175, the naivasamjñānāsamjñā (bhavāgra) level is never anāsra, so that only the seven preceding
and thence the Ākāśāṃanta-yāyatana (i.e. the first Samāpatti), and thence the Ākīṃcanyāyatana (i.e. the third Samāpatti), thus skipping one stage in each movement. And having next passed over these stages in a backwards and downwards direction (pratilomam), the practiser goes on to attain the anāsrava stages first in a forwards and then in a backwards movement, skipping one stage in each movement. But when, starting from the first sārava Dhyāna, he gains the third anāsrava Dhyāna, thence the sārava Ākāśāṃanta-yāyatana, and thence the anāsrava Ākīṃcanyāyatana, and then descends once more, owing to the fact that one proceeds to a third stage from the starting point which is of a heterogeneous kind (visabhāgatīyadravya), the attainment is complete (abhinispannā). One does not, according to the Bhāṣya, attain a fourth stage from the starting point (thus skipping two stages instead of one), for it is too distant. It is, moreover, only the Asamayavimukta — i.e. the Arhat who is unconditionally released352 — who proceeds in this way; for he is without defilements/afflictions (kleśa), and he has mastery over concentration (samādhaṃ vaśītvam). Sequentiality as opposed to skipping is on the contrary the rule (niyama) that applies for the beginner (prāthamakalpika); and only those who have acquired mastery at will (prāptakāṃavaśītvā) can gain the stages by skipping one.353

In the Pali tradition, the technique of skipping one stage at a time in the sequence of Concentrations and Attainments is attested under the name of jhānukkantika in Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga (xii. 2 and 5) and in the Atthasālinī (§ 3.388, p. 187), which also mention the jhānānuloma and the jhānapati-loma. The technique of skipping one stage only is known in addition from a number of further Śrāvakayānist sources, and also from the Yogācārābhūmi.354

levels may be counted as anāsrava; see below, pp. 195, 200.

In the bhavāgra the bodhimārgāgas are lacking (Abhidharmakośa vi. 73a). In the Abhidharmasamuccaya (p. 69) and its Bhāṣya (p. 81), this level is stated to be exclusively mundane (laukika) and not to belong therefore to the āryāmārga; the reason given is that the Buddha has declared that there is ājñāprativedha only so long as there is saṃjñāsamāpatti (see below, pp. 199–200).

352 Abhidharmakośa vi. 57a.
353 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ii. 44d (p. 72), a passage which also mentions the vyutkrānta-samāpatti.
354 See Hōbōgirin s.v. chōjō and chūōtsushō.
The *Vyutkrāntaka-Samādhi has been discussed in the *Ta-chih tu-lun ascribed to Nāgārjuna in the context of the Perfection of dhyāna.⁵⁵⁵ Since in this treatise the practiser is not a Śrāvakāyānist but a Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva of the Mahāyāna, he is considered able to skip not only from the first to the third Dhyāna-level for example, but from the first to the fourth Dhyāna-level or to one of the last five Samāpattis including the SaIfljfiavedayitanirodha. In other words, unlike the Śrāvakāyānist, the Mahāyānist is not restricted to skipping only one stage at a time as is prescribed in the *Abhidharmakośa (ekalanighita, viii. 18d).⁵⁵⁶

In sum, in the Mahāyāna the notion of leaping over a large number of stages of the Path can be followed fairly far back in the Vijñānavāda school and even further in the Madhyamaka. As already noted, the concept is attested also in the Mahāyānist supplement to Saṃgharaska’s *Yogācārabhūmi (Taishō 606) dealing with the practice of the Bodhisattva. And very interestingly the *Vimuttimagga (Taishō 1648) also recognizes the possibility of skipping more than one stage at a time.⁵⁵⁷

It thus appears that a standard Śrāvakāyānist method of skipping differs in an important respect from the Mahāyānist ones in so far as the technique taught in the *Abhidharmakośa as well as in the Pali tradition allows a practiser each time to jump over only one stage in the sequence of stages, whereas the technique mentioned in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra for example allows for up to eight stages to be skipped at a time. This possibility that exists for the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva may be connected with his ability, mentioned in the *Satasāhasrikā *Prajñāpāramitā, to awaken to anuttarasamyaksambodhi in virtue of his very first production of the Thought of Awakening (prathamacittotpāda). However, the Mahāyānist methods noted above differ among themselves in certain significant respects. Not only are some clearly more rapid

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⁵⁵⁶ This important difference has been discussed in the *Höbōgirin*, in the articles chojō and chōtsushō, by J. May, who has also pointed out (pp. 358, 369) that the leap over several stages is attested in the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*. May considers that the notion of the attestation of the Fruits by leaping prefigures the idea of Sudden Awakening (*tongo* = *tun wu*) in Ch’ān (pp. 356 and 371).
than others, but one involves the Bodhisattva’s returning, in a
final series of movements, to a state of non-concentration
(asamāhitacitta) while the other does not. The former method of
leaping – known sometimes also as Viśkandaka Samādhi –
appears to emphasize the Bodhisattva’s resolve to remain in an
ordinary, un-concentrated state of consciousness in Sarīśāra (com-
pare the Bodhisattva who refrains from entering Nirvāṇa, apra-
tiṣṭhītaniṁśa);\textsuperscript{358} whereas the latter method is directed toward
the highest Samāpattis culminating in the cessations of notions and
feelings (saṃjñāved[ay]ñitanirodha). The Mahāyānist method of
leaping moreover differs from that of the Śrāvakayāna by
including this ninth stage of saṃjñāvedayitanirodha, which the
Śrāvakayānist technique has left aside.

It has furthermore to be noted that in Haribhadra’s comment
on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, as well as in Vasubandu’s Abhidharma-
kośa, the procedure of leaping seems to have less to do with a way
of instantaneous and immediate access to the highest than with a
particular technique in meditation. In the Śatasāhasrika Prajñāpār-
amiṭā on the contrary, the notion of rapidity and instantaneous
access seems to be implicit in what is said about the Bodhisattva’s
very first cittaotpāda bringing on anuttarasamyaksambodhi.

The comprehension (abhisamaya) of the four Principles or
Realities of the Nobles (āryasatya) and the acquisition of the four
Fruits (phalaprāpti) of the Noble’s religious life – viz. those of the
Stream-winner (srotāpañña), the Once-returner (sakṛdāgāmin),
the Non-returner (anāgāmin), and the Arhat – are said by some
Buddhist schools to be sequential and by others to be simultane-
ous.

In many passages of the old canon, the gradualness of training
(anupubbasikkhā), spiritual activity (anupubbakiriya) and of the
Path of insight (anupubbapāṭipāda) has been affirmed.\textsuperscript{359} And it is
stated that the wise person proceeds gradually and little by little

\textsuperscript{358} On the question of dispersal beside concentration, compare Demiéville, BEFEO 44
(1954), pp. 397 n. 3 and p. 429 n. 1; Hōbōrin, pp. 357 and 359.

\textsuperscript{359} See Cullavagga, Vinaya II 238; Udāna, p. 54; Majjhimanikāya I 479–80, III 1; and
Āṅguttaranikāya IV 198, 201, 207; cf. below, p. 180.
in each moment, in the same way that a metal-worker would remove impurities from silver-ore. The comprehension of the āryasatyas is furthermore compared with the gradual construction, storey by storey, of a lofty mansion (kūṭāgāra).

A theory of both the gradual development and then the final instantaneousness of the Path of preparation (prayogamārga) has been set out in Chapter vi of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa. There mention has specifically been made of the gradualness of the Salutary Root (kuśalamūla) of Heat (uṣmagata) – i.e. the first of the four factors of penetration (nirvedhabhāgīya) – which is said to be nurtured in progressive stages (kramābhivyddha) in its three degrees, viz. the slight (mṛdu), the middling (madhya), and the superior (adhimātra); and the uṣmagata is further described in terms of serial prolongation (prākarṣikatva = prābandhikatva) when having as its object the four satyas. A similar gradualness is stated to apply to all three degrees of the Head-stage (mūrdhan), the second of the four nirvedhabhāgīyas. As for the third nirvedhabhāgīya, receptive perseverance (kṣānti), in contradistinction to its middling degree where III (duḥkha) is the object of mental attention lasting through two moments (kṣaṇa), its superior degree is stated to comprise one single moment only (kṣanika) and not to be serially prolonged (prākarṣiki). Finally, the fourth factor of penetration, the laukikagradharmas, are all described as momentary (kṣaṇika).

In the section of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya treating of the sequential process of comprehension (abhisamayakrama) of the four āryasatyas – each of which has four aspects (ākara) making a total of sixteen mind-moments (śoḍaśacittaka) – this abhisamaya has been specifically described as taking place gradually (krama-

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360 See Dhammapada 239; cf. Suttanipāta 962cd.
361 See Saṃyuttanikāya V 452. For the Sanskrit version, see Yasomitra, Abhidharmakośavyakhya vi. 27, where two further relevant Sūtras from the Saṃyuktāgama are also cited.
362 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 15b–17.
363 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 17b.
364 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 18b.
365 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 19ab; duḥkkham dvābhyyāṁ kṣaṇābhyyāṁ manasi karote eṣā sarvātva madhyā, kṣāntir yadāikam eva kṣaṇam tad adhimātrī|| kṣanikā cāsau, na prākarṣikī.
366 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 19c. Compare Vasumitra’s view mentioned below, p. 179.
comprehension (ekābhisamaya)\(^{367}\) will need to be understood with regard to an (unexpressed) intention (abhiprāya) of the Buddha.\(^{368}\) Such a mention of ekābhisamaya may then have to be interpreted by taking this comprehension to concern the effect (kāryābhisamaya) of the four satyas – viz. parijñāna, prahāna, sāksātkarāṇa and bhāvana – in contrast to comprehension as vision (darśanābhisamaya) achieved through pure discriminative knowledge (anāsrava prajñā),\(^{369}\) for when it is stated in a Sūtra that abhisamaya is gradual this is what was really aimed at (lakṣyate) in respect to darśanābhisamaya. (Yet another Sūtra-reference to ekābhisamaya might according to some involve an allusive utterance (abhisamādhivacana)\(^{370}\) to singleness, as when absence of uncertainty concerning duḥkha is stated to include absence of uncertainty in respect to the Buddha.\(^{371}\)

The transition from the stage of a worldling (prthāgjana) on the mundane (laukika) level of the Prayogamārga to that of a Noble (ārya) on the transmundane Darśanamārga depends on receptive perseverance with a view to dharma-knowledge concerning Ill (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti) – that is, the stage of entry into determination (niyāmāvakrānti) in view of Exactness (samyaktva = nirvāṇa) – in association with the laukikāgradharmanas at the culminating point of the Prayogamārga. Here the laukikāgradharmanas may be seen as fulfilling the function of an ānantaryamārga, the anāsrava dharmajñānakṣānti having then the function of a vimuktimārga.\(^{372}\)

The Darśanamārga proper has been described by Vasubandhu as consisting in fifteen moments (kṣaṇa) beginning with this dharmajñānakṣānti concerning Ill and culminating in the anavajñānakṣānti concerning the Path (mārga). For the sixteenth and final moment – i.e. consequent knowledge concerning the Path

\(^{367}\) As with the Dharmaguptas, according to Yaśomitra.

\(^{368}\) Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 27a. On the notion of abhiprāya, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, Journal of Indian Philosophy 13 (1985), pp. 309–25, and 16 (1988), pp. 1–4, with the literature cited there.

\(^{369}\) Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 27bc.


\(^{371}\) Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, vi. 27bc.

\(^{372}\) Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 26a.
(mārga 'nvayajñānam) — represents the pivotal instant of transition from the Darśanamārga to the Bhāvanāmārga. And it is reckoned to belong to the Bhāvanāmārga because, inter alia, it cultivates (bhāvanāt) the eight jñānas of the Darśanamārga and the sixteen aspects (ākāra) of the satyas, and because it pertains to continuation (prābandhikatvat).

Vasubandhu has specified that the Bhāvanāmārga is like the Darśanamārga in respect to the gradualness of reflection on the sixteen aspects of the satyas. Nevertheless, a reference has been made by both Vasubandhu and Yasomitra to acquisition by single attainment (ekaprāptilābhā) of the total elimination of all that is to be eliminated by vision (darśana) when the Srotāpanna achieves the Fruit of entry into the stream; and to the acquisition simultaneously (yugapad) of the eight jñānas — viz. the four dharmajñānas pertaining to the Kāmadhātu and the four anyayajñānas pertaining to the Rūpa and Ārūpya levels — when the Fruit of the Once-returner (sakṛddāgāmāphala) is achieved by eliminating what is to be eliminated by darśana as well as all that is to be eliminated by the Bhāvanāmārga.

In his comment on the Abhisamayālāmākārā Haribhadra has also explained how, by force of proper method (nyāyabalāt) in virtue of a specific intention (abhiprāya), the Darśanamārga, even though it consists in single-moment abhisamaya, has nevertheless been stated to consist of sixteen discrete moments from the point of view of the Candidates for and the Achievers of the Fruits of the Ārya (pratipannakādi), in contrast to comprehension as effect (kāryābhīṣamaya).

As was observed by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (vi. 27), opinions have differed in the Śrāvaka schools (nikāya)

\[\text{Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 28–29. The eight ksāntis have the function of ānantaryāmārgas, and the eight jñānas that of vinuktimārgas, according to Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 28a.}\]

\[\text{Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 28cd. Compare prākarṣikī as the antonym of ksānikā in vi. 19b (above, p. 176).}\]

\[\text{Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 27bc.}\]

\[\text{Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Vyākhyā vi. 52–53c. Cf. vii. 22.}\]

\[\text{Haribhadra, Abhisamayālāmākārāloka ii. 12–16 (p. 171 = P, f. 121a4): prativedhābhīṣamayād ekaksāṇābhīṣamayo darśanamārga ity apare (see above, p. 159).}\]
concerning the gradualness as against the simultaneity of comprehension. These differences figure prominently among the doctrines of these schools, and their branches, the Lokottaravādins and the Ekavyāvahārikas. 378 And a connexion between the Mahāsāṃghikas (phal chen sde) and the Simultaneous Engagement (cig car 'jug pa) of Kaśyapa as transmitted by the school of (Bodhi-)Dharmottarala (sic) is seemingly suggested in a chapter of the bKa' than sde lria, the Blon po bka'i thal yig. 379

According to Vasumitra's Samayabhedoparacanaacakra, in the view of the Mahāsāṃghikas it is by a single thought that [a buddha] knows all (sams geig gis thams cad rnam par mkhyen to); and it is through discriminative knowledge (prajñā) conjoined with single thought-moment that [a buddha] fully knows all dharmas (sams kyi skad cig ma geig da'i mtshuvis par ldan pa'i šes rab kyis chos thams cad yons su mkhyen to). 380 A branch of the Mahāsāṃghikas, the Ekavyāvahārikas, are so named according to Bhavya's Nikāyahadvedibhangavyākhya because they have in this way accepted one single procedure (ekavyāvahāra). 381

According to Vinītadeva's Samayabhedoparacanaacakre Nikāyabhedopadarśanaṁa-samgraha, moreover, in the view of the Lokottaravādin-Mahāsāṃghikas, the four Principles of the Nobles (āryasatya) are realized all at once (bden pa ni cig car mthoṅ nio). 382

And in the view of the two subschools of the Mahāsāṃghikas in

379 lHa sa edition of the bKa' than sde lria, f. 19a: 'od sruns cig car 'jug pa phal chen sde: mkhan po dharmtā ra la'i bryud pa ni ... 'the Simultaneous Entry of Kaśyapa, Mahāsāṃghika: the line of the Master Dharmottarala ... '. The standard Tibetan equivalent of Mahāsāṃghika is dge 'dun phal chen po('i sde), and Tucci's translation in his Minor Buddhist texts (II, p. 81) differs from the one offered here. There is no correspondence in the parallel passage of the bSam gtan mig sgron, f. 8.
Bhavya’s account – the Ekavyāvahārikas and Gokulikas – the Bodhisattva fully knows the four āryasatyas by a single jñāna (ye ŝes gcig gis bden pa bži rnams yonis su ŝes so).\(^{383}\)

According to Vinitadeva’s account of the doctrine of the Mahīśāsakas (an offshoot of the Vibhajyavādaṃ Sthaviras and the Sarvāstivādins), too, the satyas are realized all at once (bden pa cig car mthor'i no).\(^{384}\) But according to Bhavya this view was rejected by the Sarvāstivādins, who taught that the four āryasatyas are known gradually (rim gyis rtogs par 'gyur ro); and the Sūtra-reference to simultaneous comprehension may then be non-definitive and require further elicitation (drai ba'i don = nayār-tha).\(^{385}\) For the Sarvāstivādins, the laukikāgradharmas belong, however, to a single thought-moment.\(^{386}\)

Controversy concerning simultaneousness as against gradualness is reported in the Kathāvatthu also. There (ii. 9) we find a lengthy discussion as to whether comprehension is gradual (anupubbābhīsamaya) or not. According to the Āṭṭhakathā, the Andhakas, Sabbaṭṭhikas, Sammitiyas and Bhadrayānikas maintained the thesis of the anupubbābhīsamaya by Candidates for the four Fruits in virtue of their seeing the four Principles of the Nobles, etc. These schools are said to have done so on the basis of canonical texts such as the Dhammapada (239), Udāna (p. 54), Cullavagga (II 238), Saṁyuttaniyāya (V 452), Majjhimanikāya (III 1), and An̄guttaranikāya (I 162).\(^{387}\) On the contrary, according to the Theravādins – and notwithstanding what is stated in the canonical passages cited above – this comprehension is not gradual. Indeed, as is said in Suttanipāta 231, because of the attainment of vision (dassanasampāda) the three fetters (samyojana, namely sakkāya diṭṭhi, vicikicchita and silabbata[parāmaśa]) are all simultaneously (saha) eliminated, a text corroborated by others that declare that the three fetters are all simultaneously (saha) eliminated by the Noble Śrāvaka with the arising in him of the

\(^{383}\) Bhavya, op. cit., p. 24.

\(^{384}\) Vinitadeva, op. cit., p. 43. See Bareau, op. cit., p. 183.

\(^{385}\) Bhavya, op. cit., p. 27. See above, p. 177, for Vasubandhu’s references to abhiprāya and abhisandhi in Sūtra-statements.

\(^{386}\) Vasumitra, op. cit., p. 10. See Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 19c (above, p. 176).

\(^{387}\) See also the Patisaṃbhidiṇaṃga II 105–07; and A. K. Warder’s introduction to Naṇamoli’s translation, The guide (London, 1977), p. xxv.
'Dharma-eye', i.e. the knowledge that whatever originates (sammadhayadhamma) ceases (nirodhadhamma). A closely related point is made in Kathavatthu i. 4, where there is a discussion as to whether Candidates for the four Fruits of the Nobles eliminate defilement (kilesa) piecemeal (odhisodhiso), through their vision of the āryasatyas. (According to the Āṭṭhakathā [p. 43] the doctrine discussed in i. 4 was that of the Sammātiyas and some others.) And according to another section of the Kathavatthu (xxii. 8) and its Āṭṭhakathā, two branches of the Mahāsāṃghikas – the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas – maintained that all dhammas belong to a single mental moment (ekacittakkhaṇika). The same two sources further mention (xi. 6) the opinion – ascribed to the Sabbatthivāda and Uttarāpathaka – that samādhi pertains to a single mind-moment (ekacittakkhaṇiko samādhi).

According to Asaṅga's Abhidharmasamuccaya, the Stream-winner (srotāpañña) – that is, the first of the four Nobles (ārya) at the pivotal point of the sixteenth moment of the Darśanamārga and the first of the Bhāvanāmārga – may be either one who obtains release gradually (rim gyis pa) or one who obtains release all at once (sakṛṇairyaṇīka = cig car nes par 'byin pa). The first type is said to be of the kind described earlier (p. 89). The sakṛṇairyaṇīka is on the contrary defined as one who, having achieved the comprehension of the four satyas, takes the threshold-meditation (anāgamyā = mi lcos pa med pa) as his base and eliminates all at once (sakṛt = cig car) all the defilements/afflictions of the three

388 Saṃyuttanikāya IV 47, 107; Aṅguttaranikāya IV 186.
389 Compare also the discussion in the Kathavatthu-Āṭṭhakathā v. 9 (p. 86).
391 Pradhan reads aprāptasamāpatti. The four Dhyānas and the four Ārūpyas each have a threshold called sāmantaka (ṇes bsdog), the one before the first Dhyāna being known specifically as the anāgamyā. The anāgamyā is deficient in śamatha, while the Ārūpyas are deficient in vipāyāna according to Abhidhammakośabhāṣya vi. 66b. On the anāgamyā see Abhidharmakośa iv. 18, v. 66, vi. 20, 47; viii. 22, as well as La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa vi. p. 235 n. 3, and viii, pp. 166–7, 179 n. 6; P. Jaini, Abhidharmadipika, p. 415 note; E. Lamotte, Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, II, p. 1036 ff.; E. Frauwallner, 'Abhidharma-Studien iii', WZKS 15 (1971), p. 100; L. Schmithausen in K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (eds.), Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus, pp. 240, 246. Cf. below, p. 190.
levels (traidhātukāvacarāḥ sarvakleśāḥ) by means of the transmundane Path (lokottaramārga). In his case only two (rather than the usual four sequential) Fruits are achieved, namely those of the Stream-winner and the Arhat. The person in question is then stated mainly to reach full liberating knowledge (ājnā, of the Arhat) in the present existence (dṛṣṭa-dharma) or at the time of his death.\footnote{392}

It thus emerges clearly that the sakṣmārājakājakā type of Srotāpanna can achieve his goal rapidly, without acquiring successively all four Fruits of the āryamārga.

4. THE CONJUNCTION OF QUIETING AND INSIGHT AND OF MEANS AND DISCRIMINATIVE KNOWLEDGE

One of the most important points repeatedly made by Kamalaśīla in his Bhāvanākramas is that Quieting (samatha) and Insight (vipaśyanā) should be conjoined (yuganaddāha), that they must operate so to speak in conjunction like a pair of oxen teamed together (yuganaddhāvahāvīdāvadacyavayavat). The perfect Path is accordingly described as operating as a syzygy of Quieting and Insight (samathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgo nispannah).\footnote{393}

Quieting, defined as one-pointedness of mind (cittātikāgrata),\footnote{394} involves observing the nine ‘positions’ or ‘stations’ of mind (cittasthiti) which are known from a number of sources such as the Śrāvakabhūmi and the Abhidharmasamuccaya.\footnote{395} As for vipaśyanā, it is defined as exact analytical investigation [of the real] (bhūtapratyavekṣā, Bhāvanākrama, III pp. 3, 5). This bhūtapratyavekṣā consists in the analysis of the factors of existence (dharma-pravīcaya), which is otherwise known as discriminative knowledge (prajñā) (III pp. 14–15). The bhūta is here explained as the non-

\footnote{392} When this is not so, the reason is one’s resolve (prajñādhānavajena); in that case, being born in the Kāmadhātu because of this resolve, one becomes a pratyekajīna at a time when there is no buddha.


\footnote{394} Bhāvanākrama III, p. 3.

\footnote{395} Śrāvakabhūmi (ed. Shukla), pp. 363–5; Asaṅga, Abhidharmasamuccya, p. 75; cf. Petakopadesa, p. 122, for an expanded list.
substantiality or essencelessness of both an individual self and the factors of existence (pudgaladharmanairātmya, III, p. 5).

The process of analytical investigation is no doubt associated with recollective attention (smṛti) and mentation (manasikāra) (cf. III, p. 16); but when brought to its highest point, bhūtapratyaveksā is the necessary condition for the absence of both recollection (āsmṛti) and mentation (amanasikāra) in the sense of non-constructive Gnosis (nirvikalpam jñānam) and the ceasing of all mental and verbal proliferation (prapañcāpāsama).396

If samatha is in excess, the mind of the meditator will be blunted and dull and prajñā will then have to be especially cultivated. But if prajñā is in excess, his mind will be agitated and samatha will then have to be cultivated in particular. When samatha and vipaśyanā are on the contrary in balance, the mind is in equilibrium (saparvatīta). And in view of the absence then of both dullness (laya) and agitation (auddhatya) citta proceeds naturally of itself (svara-sava-hin). It is then also stated to be in its natural state.397

It cannot therefore be maintained that the Perfections (pāramitā) are all comprised in dhyāna, and that by cultivating the latter all of them are cultivated (III, p. 25). All the Bodhisattva’s virtues inclusive of dhyāna are in fact to be controlled by prajñā, and it is because of this prajñā that these qualities become true pāramitās. To proceed in accordance with this principle is referred to by Kamalaśīla as being prajñottaradhyayin.398 Such dhyāna in which prajñā is supreme is opposed to the ‘Dhyāna’ which is said to subsume all pāramitās in itself (III, pp. 25–26) – in other words, apparently, the ‘Dhyāna’ of Kamalaśīla’s opponent Mo-ho-yen. And the exclusive observance of non-recollection (asmṛti) and non-mentation (amanasikāra) – i.e. the method advocated by Mo-ho-yen – would merely lead to a state like that of the cataleptic cessation of thinking (cittanirodha) by the worldling (ptthagjana) on the level of the fourth Dhyāna (III, pp. 16–17) – i.e. the attainment of unconsciousness (asamjñisamāpatti) which is, how-

ever, not to be practised by the Buddhist Ārya.\textsuperscript{399}

Kamalaśīla has supported his teaching concerning the co-ordination of \textit{samatha} and \textit{vipaśyanā} by quoting a large number of Mahāyānasūtras. Among them is the \textit{Sāṃdhinirmocana}, Chapter viii of which is devoted to a detailed discussion of the subject. It was this Sūtra that the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna cast aside according to a Tibetan tradition recorded in the \textit{sBa bzhed}.\textsuperscript{400}

Beside this syzygy of \textit{samatha} and \textit{vipaśyanā} (or \textit{dhyāna} and \textit{prajñā}), and in a position of no less importance, Kamalaśīla has placed the conjunction of Emptiness (\textit{sūnyatā}) and Means (\textit{upāya}) and of discriminative knowledge (\textit{prajñā}) and practice (\textit{cāryā}) through means. Practice (\textit{cāryā}) is stated to consist in consist in generosity (\textit{dāna}) and the other virtues, as does salvific means (\textit{upāya}).\textsuperscript{401}

Now, when \textit{sūnyatā} is thus correctly and indissolubly bonded with \textit{upāya}, it is known to Kamalaśīla as Emptiness endowed with all excellent modes (\textit{saṃvākāravaropeta-sūnyatā}). This notion is contrasted with an isolated emptiness, that is, an ‘emptiness-method’ (\textit{sūnyatānaya}) that makes of \textit{sūnyatā} something that is a self-sufficient and independent principle (\textit{ekanaya}).\textsuperscript{402} Because of such a method of isolation, however, practice (\textit{cāryā}) would no longer be purified; and those who thus cultivate \textit{sūnyatā} in isolation ‘fall’ in Nirvāṇa, like an Auditor (kevalaṃ \textit{sūnyatām eva sevamānāḥ śrāvakāvan nirvāṇe patanti}).\textsuperscript{403} When the need for conjoining \textit{prajñā} and \textit{dhyāna} is not appreciated and \textit{dhyāna} is overemphasized, the meditator’s practice would, moreover, be like that of a Śrāvaka who attains the concentration of cessation (\textit{nirodhasamādhi})\textsuperscript{404}

The correct method for a practiser involves then a gradual (\textit{krameṇa}) procedure of purification (\textit{viśuddhi}, III, p. 2), one in which the mind-continuum (\textit{cittasamtati}) is purified in a way compared with the purification of gold by a metal-worker (III,
The idea of the yoking together of Quiet (samatha) and Insight (vipassanā) is also well attested in texts of the old canon, and in Pali treatises such as Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga (xxiii. 43).

Thus, in its description of the practiser who perfects the eight-fold path, the constituents of Awakening, etc., the Majjhimanikāya (III 289) states that for him samatha and vipassanā are yoked (yuganaddha). And in his comment on this passage in the Pāpañcasūdāṇī Buddhaghosa has defined this pair as yoked in a single-moment syzygy (ekakkhaṇikayuganaddhā), for concentration (samāpatti) and insight belong on the ariyamagga to one single moment (ekakkhaṇikā). This case he contrasts with the one where the two belong to different moments (nāṇākkhaṇikā).

In the same commentary Buddhaghosa has also spoken of the serial (paṭīpatiyā) attainment of the three marks (viz. dukkha, anicca and anatta) and production of vipassanā whereby the practiser attains the path of Stream-winning; at this moment, he then adds, the practiser penetrates the four saccas by a single penetration (ekapaṭivedha) and comprehends by a single comprehension (ekābhīsamaya).

405 See above, pp. 175–6, 180.
406 See for example Dighanikāya III 213 and 273; Majjhimanikāya I 494 and 289. For Āṅguttaranikāya II 156–7, see below, pp. 187–8.
406a So read, instead of ‘yuganandhā’ in the Pali Text Society edition.
406b Pāpañcasūdāṇī V 104: ‘yuganaddhā ti ekakkhaṇikayuganaddhā. ete hi aśīnasmim khaṇe samāpatti aśīnasmim vipassanā ti evam nāṇākkhaṇikā pī honti, ariyamagge pana ekakkhaṇikā. For nāṇākkhaṇa and nāṇārammaṇa opposed to ekakkhaṇa and ekārammaṇa, see also Buddhaghosa’s commentary on the Saṃyuttaniyā (Sāratthappakāsini I 158), and Dhammapāla’s on the Itivuttaka (Paramatthadipani [II], I 132). The Paramatthadipani II also deals with samatha and vipassanā as yuganaddhā (II 29).
406c Pāpañcasūdāṇī I 73: evam tiṇi lakkhaṇāni āropetvā paṭīpatiyā vipassanam pavattento sotāpattimaggaṃ pāpunāti, tasmiṃ khaṇe cattāri saccāni ekapaṭivedhen’ eva paṭīvijjhati, ekābhīsamayena abhisameti. For ekābhīsamaya see also pp. 176–7.
The *Petakopadesa* has defined (p. 122) *samatha* in terms of *samādhi*, non-distraction and non-dispersal of thought, as well as of calming and one-pointedness of *citta*. And *vipassanā* has been defined there as analysis bearing on the *dhammas*, analytical reflection (*vīmānśā*), weighing, *nāṇa*, *vijjā* and *pañña* as well as various forms of illumination (*obhāsa*, *āloka*, *ābhā*, *pabhā*). This text then goes on to remark (pp. 123–4) that by developing *samatha* one comprehends the material (*rūpa*), thereby eliminating desire (*taṅkhā*) and so realizing *cetovimutti* by detachment from passions (*rāgavirāga*). And by developing *vipassanā* one comprehends the ‘mental’ (*nāma*), thereby eliminating nescience (*avijjā*) and so realizing *paññāvimutti* by detachment from *avijjā*. Correlations on the one hand between Quieting, cultivation of *citta*, elimination of the passions, *rāgavirāga* and *cetovimutti*, and on the other between Insight, cultivation of *pañña*, elimination of *avijjā* and *paññāvimutti* are also to be found in the *Anguttaranikāya* (I 61), where both *samatha* and *vipassanā* are described as pertaining to knowledge (*vijjabhāgiya*). In the *Visuddhimagga*, *nāma* is associated with the person whose Vehicle is Quieting (*samathayānikā*, xviii. 3–4); and *rūpa* is linked with the person whose Vehicle is pure Insight (*suddhavipassanāyānikā*), this correlation being however possible also for the *samathayānikā* (xviii. 5). It is further stated in the *Petakopadesa* (pp. 134–5) that *samatha* and *vipassanā* together constitute the fourth *ariyasacca*, the Path. And the *Nettippakarāṇa* (pp. 110–11) has specified that *samatha* consists in both the *silakkhandha* and the *samadhikkhandha* of the Eight-fold Path, whilst *vipassanā* is made up of its *paññākkhandha*.

It is also explained in the *Petakopadesa* (pp. 133–5) that the intuition (*abhisamaya*) of the four *ariyasaccas* takes place in a single time (*ekakāla*), a single moment (*ekakkhaṇa*) and a single thought (*ekacitta*). In a single time, moment and thought, too, the syzygy of *samatha* and *vipassanā* accomplishes four functions, namely comprehension of *III* (by *parinābhisamaya*), comprehension of its origin (by *pahanabhisamaya*), comprehension of its stoppage (by *sacchikiriyabhisamaya*), and comprehension of the Path (by *bhavanabhisamaya*). This is followed by the stage of vision (*dassanabhumi*) where the Stream-winner (*srotāpanna*) does not fall back (*avipākatadhamma*) and is fixed (*niyata*, in Rightness).

In the *Petakopadesa* (p. 249) it is moreover explained that
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Vipassana preceded by samatha is for one who understands through a mere mention (ugghatitānū) — i.e. for the person receiving the 'soft' (mudukā) teaching and training in higher discriminative knowledge (adhipaññasikkhā); that samatha preceded by vipassana is for one to be trained gradually (neyya) — i.e. for the person receiving the 'sharp' (tikkhā) teaching and higher training pertaining to citta (adhicittasikkhā); and that the conjunction of samatha and vipassana is for one who understands through expatiation (vipacitānū) — i.e. for the person receiving a teaching that is both 'sharp' and 'soft' (tikkhamudukā) and training in higher ethics (adhisīlasikkhā).

The correlations thus made of samatha with rūpa and the adhipaññasikkhā and of vipassana with nāma and the adhicittasikkhā are noteworthy.

The Nettippakarana confirms (p. 125) the correlation of samatha with the ughatitānū and of vipassana with the neyya type of person. And it specifies (p. 100–01) that samatha was taught by Bhagavat to the person of sharp faculties (tikkhindriya, who receives the adhipaññasikkhā), vipassana to the person of dull faculties (mudindriya, who receives the adhisīlasikkhā), and both samatha and vipassana to the person whose faculties are middling (majjhindriya, who receives the adhicittasikkhā). The three teachings in question are perhaps to be understood here as serving as antidotes for the use of the three types of person mentioned. However this may be, the question arises as to how these correlations might relate to Mo-ho-yen’s view that his teaching of understanding Mind, with its quietistic and non-analytical tendency, is especially suited to advanced disciples whose faculties are sharp.

In its typology of persons (puggala) the Puggalapaññatti has proposed a fourfold categorization according to which some persons achieve cetosamatha without achieving adhipañña dhamma-vipassana, some do the reverse, some achieve both together, and others achieve neither. 407

An interesting classification in the present context is the one found in the Yuganaddhasutta of the Āṅguttaranikāya. 408 There Ānanda says that whenever a monk or nun declares having

achieved Arhathood, he or she is endowed with one of four Paths (magga), namely the Path cultivating vipassanā preceded (pubban-gama) by samatha, the Path cultivating samatha preceded by vipassanā, the Path cultivating samatha and vipassanā yoked together (yuganaddha), and the Path where the monk’s ‘mental’ is seized by agitation with respect to the dhammas.409 In his translation of the Visuddhimagga Nañamol has translated: ‘A bhikkhu’s mind is seized by agitation about highest states’;410 but in his translation of the Patisambhidāmagga the same writer has rendered this by ‘A bhikkhu’s mind is agitated by overestimation of ideas [manifested in contemplation]’.411 While the first three maggas are obviously based on the principle that Quieting and Insight are cultivated either successively or together, the last magga poses a problem. Yet, with regard to this fourth Path too, the text continues by saying that there exists a time when (the meditator’s) mind internally comes to rest, settles, becomes one-pointed and is concentrated.412 For him the Path is then produced. And (just as with the first three Paths) for the person who observes, cultivates and practices this fourth Path, the fetters (sāmyojana) are thrown off and the traces (anusaya) cease.

These four Paths are reproduced and explained in the Patisambhidāmagga (II 92–103), and then commented on in the Saddhammappakāsini (pp. 585, 586 f.) and Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga (xx. 105–12). According to the Patisambhidāmagga (II 101–03), in the description of the fourth Path the word dhamma refers to an illumination that arises when one reflects on things as impermanent (aniccato manasikaroto obhāso uppajjati), Ill (dukkhato) and not-self (anattato). And in each case agitation (uddhacca) – that is, distraction (vikkhepa) – results from advertizing to this illumination. Hence, a ‘mental’ that is thus seized, or ‘seduced’, by agitation does not correctly know what is presented (upaṭṭhāna) as impermanent, Ill and not-self. This ‘illumination’ is counted as

409 The PTS ed. reads dhammuddhaccaviggaśtaṃ, and the Nālandā ed. reads dhammuddhaccaviggaśtaṃ mānasam.
412 Ānguttaranikāya II 157: taṃ cittam ajjhattam eva santithati samisiṇāti ekodi hoti samādhiyati. Compare for example Mahāsūṇatasutta and Cūḷasūṇatasutta (Majjhima-nikāya III, pp. 105 ff., 111 f.).
one of the ten ‘Sub-Afflictions of Vipassanā’ that are said to affect
an inexperienced meditator. Buddhaghosa has explained this
obhāsa as vipassanobhāsa ‘illumination from Insight’.⁴¹³

Although the full implications of this fourth Path are perhaps
not altogether clear, the obstacle formed by agitation with respect
to the dhammas (dhammuddhacca) may be relatable to the case
where, in meditation, discriminative knowledge (prajñā) be-
comes excessive and overwhelms śamatha. This situation – which
could affect the person described as dhammayoga in the Āṅguttara-
ānikāya (III 355), as opposed to the jhāyī(n), and also the
sukkhavipassaka or ‘dry inspector’⁴¹⁴ – has of course been fully
and explicitly recognized by Kamalasilla, for example in his
Bhāvanākrama III (pp. 9–10). Nevertheless, Mo-ho-yen’s depreci-
ation of analytical investigation may be a later example of the
attitude just mentioned of meditators who were especially on
their guard against the mental agitation that can arise in a person
given to analysis of the dhammas. Although this danger has been
noted in the Pali texts just cited, there is in them no rejection or
condemnation of analysis and inspection in favour of dhāyāna and
Quieting alone.⁴¹⁵

This yoking together of Quieting and Insight is known equally
from Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa (viii. 1d; cf. v. 59). And in
the four (maula)dhyānas the Path (pratipad) is described as being
easy (sukhā) owing to the effortless procedure (ayatnavāhitvāt)
that is due to equilibrium of śamatha and vipaśyana; but it is

⁴¹³ Visuddhimagga xx. 107.

It is possible that it is such a light-experience that was criticized by the Hva šaṅ
Mahāyāna, quoted in the bSam gtan mig sgron, as being characteristic of the Śrāvaka and
Pratyekabuddha, and as being linked with a condition of notionlessness (asamatā) that a
practiser should not fall into through his practice of non-objectification (f. 83a: mi dmigs
bzin du snan žiṅ [gsal bar šes pas ḫun ḫos dan] ral sans sgyas ži ba phyogs par mi ltun [ci yan šes
pa mi dmigs pas ’du šes med par mi ltun mi g-yo žiṅ yonis su gsal lo snam pa’i rtog pa med pas rtog
par mi ’gyur]).

⁴¹⁴ See Visuddhimagga xxxiii. 18.

On the sukkhavipassaka (and suddhavipassanāyānika), see Visuddhimagga viii. 237 and
xviii. 5; Saddharmapokāsini, pp. 563, 584. Cf. Nyanatiloka-Nyanaponika, Buddhist
dictionary⁴ (Colombo, 1980), p. 215; and S. Z. Aung, Compendium of philosophy (London,
1910), pp. 55, 75. On vipassanā as ‘rough’ or ‘brittle’ (lukhabhūta), in contradistinction to
śamatha as ‘soft’ or ‘malleable’ (jiniddhabhūta), see Saddharmapokāsini, p. 281.

⁴¹⁵ On śamatha and vipaśyana in Pali sources, see L. Cousins in Buddhist studies in honour
difficult (duḥkhā) on the threshold-stage (anāgamyā) preliminary to the first dhyāna, on the interval-stages (dhyānāntara) between dhyānas, and, very significantly, in the (three) ārūpyas also (vi. 66). In the anāgamyā and the dhyānāntaras, procedure requires effort because śamatha is deficient there; conversely, in the ārūpyas the need for effort is due to deficiency in vipaśyanā (vi. 66).

A related theory is found in the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (p. 84) in connexion with the viśuddhina-gaṇika mārga, where a link is established between a deficiency in either śamatha or vipaśyanā and the difficulty of the Path based on either the anāgamyā or the ārūpyas. On the contrary, the Path based on dhyāna is easy owing to the fact that there śamatha and vipaśyanā proceed in a syzygy (yuganaddhavāhitvāt).

The yoking of śamatha and vipaśyanā is similarly known from a number of further Mahāyānist treatises such as the Mahāyānasūtra-trālamkāra (xiv. 8–10) and its Bhāṣya (iv. 19, xi. 8–12 and 67, xviii. 49 and 66), the Bodhisattvabhumi (xiii, p. 207), and Prajñākara-mati’s Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (viii. 4).

The conjunction of Emptiness and Means is furthermore known under the name of sarvakaravaraṇopetā śunyatā to Sāntideva, who has quoted the Ratnacūḍāsūtra on the subject in his Śīkṣāśāstramuccaya (xv, pp. 272–3). This Sūtra – which is quoted in this connexion also by Kamalāśila (Bhāvanākrama II, p. 59, and III, p. 27) – emphasizes that dhyāna is to be accompanied by all modes – such as generosity and the other virtues and salvific means – and is realized through the mode of Emptiness (sarvakaravaraṇopetā śunyatākārabhīṃhitṛtyam dhyānām dhyāyati, p. 272.11). In the Sūtra the sarvakaravaraṇopetā śunyatā is described as lacking neither in generosity (dana) nor salvific means (upāya), etc.

This Emptiness endowed with all excellent modes is thus the opposite of the isolated emptiness-principle mentioned above (p. 184).

\[\text{\footnotesize 416 See also the Abhidharmadīpa (ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna, 1959) vi. 4, n. 440.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 417 Or vidarsanī: Abhidharmadīpa vi. 4, no. 440, with the Vībhāṣāprabhāvytti.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize For one whose faculties are sharp (tikṣhendriya), furthermore, super-knowledge (abhijñā) too is rapid (vkṣyā) since there is no procedure with effort (ayatnavāhitvāt). But when a person’s faculties are weak (mudhindriya) super-knowledge is slow (dhandhā). See Vībhāṣāprabhāvytti on Abhidharmadīpa vi. 4, no. 440.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 418 For the parallel notion of sarvakāra dhyāna, see Bodhisattvabhumi i. 13, p. 209.}\]
The theoretical contrast and the tension in practice between a scholar-philosopher who concerns himself with the analysis of the factors of existence – the dhammayoga – and the pure concentrated meditator – the jhāyi(n) – is one that has been made clear in a Sūtra of the Aṅguttaranikāya (III 355–6). It is parallel to, and at least in certain cases closely linked with, the distinctions made in the Buddhist tradition between a person concerned principally with philosophical and religious learning and teaching (Pāli pāriyatti; cf. Tib. bṣad pa) and a person who devotes himself above all else to spiritual practice and realization (Pāli pātīpatti and pātivedha; cf. Tib. sgrub pa, etc.), between the teacher (dhammakathikā) and the ascetic (paṇsukulika, tapassī(ṇ)), or even between the cenobitic monk dwelling in or near a village (gāmavāsi(ṇ)); compare the vargaśārin), and ministering also to the religious needs of laymen, and the reclusive and perhaps idiorhythmic forest-dwelling anchorite (āraṇīka; cf. the type of the khādgaśāṇaka). (In one place, furthermore, the Aṭṭhakathā on the Aṅguttaranikāya has recorded a difference between Paṇsukulikas and Dhammakathikas, in which the latter prevailed.)

Such contrasts reflect the antithesis, well known in Indian thought, between analytical thinking (pratisaṃkhyāna, sāṃkhya) and spiritual exercise (yoga, bhāvanā). It is related to the pair of spiritual types – identified by La Vallée Poussin after the Sāmyuttanikāya (II 115–18) – of on the one side the monk Musila (Musila, Mūsila) who silently assented to being regarded as an Arhat all of whose impurities are exhausted (khiṇasava) after he had declared that he ‘knew’ and ‘saw’ that the cessation of existence (bhavanirodha) and Nirvāṇa are equivalent, and on the other side the monk Nārada who, even though he knew this equivalence, still did not agree to being regarded as an Arhat because he did not reside in actual and immediate ‘bodily contact’ (kāyena phusitvā vihar-) with the highest state of spiritual realization. The distinction between knowing about the highest and

420 L. de La Vallee Poussin, Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 5 (1937), pp. 189–222. For the sense of ‘in the body’ (kāyena), see Cūlasaṇñatasutta, Majjhimanikāya III 107–08 on the animitto cetosamādhi. Cf. L. Schmithausen in K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (eds.), Studien
directly realizing it is compared in this Sutra with the difference between a traveller in a wasteland who, when seeing a well, identifies what is in it as 'water' (that is, a concept or word) and a traveller who drinks the water.

A comparable tension and contrast (but not necessarily contradiction) between meditative enstasis and intellectual analysis is to be found in the discussion reported in the Anguttaranikāya between Mahākoṭṭhita/Mahākoṭṭhika, who held that the kāyasākṣin is best because of the predominance in him of the faculty of concentration (samādhi), and Sāriputta, who held that the dōṣṭi-prāpta is best because of the predominance in him of the faculty of discriminative knowledge (prajñā).421

5. Absence of Notion (samjñā) and Non-mentation (amanasikāra)

Another fundamental teaching ascribed by Kamalāśīla to an unnamed opponent in the passage of the third Bhāvanākrama quoted above,422 namely that nothing at all should be thought on and that there should be neither recollective attention (smṛti) nor mentation (manasikāra) – a teaching attributed to Mo-ho-yen/Mahāyāna in the Chinese and Tibetan documents from Dunhuang and in the later Tibetan historical and doxographical tradition –, cannot fail to evoke types of meditation in the form of the Samāptis and Vimokṣas that are well known from the Buddhist tradition. Some aspects of this topic have already been touched on above in connexion with the method of leaping with respect especially to the naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana and the samjñāved[ay]ita-nirodha, the last two of nine sequential stages in meditation.423
In the first Arūpya-attainment (samāpatti) corresponding to the fourth Liberation (vimokṣa) and the seventh Sovereignty-sphere (ārūpa-samājñāyatana), the meditator—who at this stage has transcended all apperceptive notions relating to the visible-material (rupasaṃjñā) and has ceased to take as his object of mentation (manasikāra) the apperceptive notions of multiplicity (nānātvasaṃjñā)—reaches the sphere of the infinity of space (cakāśānāntya-yatana). Later, in the fourth Arūpya-Samāpatti corresponding to the seventh Vimokṣa, the meditator reaches the sphere described as comprising neither (distinct) notions nor total absence of (indistinct) notions (naivasaṃjñāna-saṃjñāyatana) at the 'peak of existence' (bhavāga). Finally—and of particular importance in the present context—the meditator reaches the Attainment of along with e.g. vedana; see Abhidharmakośa ii. 24.

An association of manasikāra with sannāsaññā is to be found in the old canon, as is also the amanasikāra of sets of sannā (e.g. Cūlasāññatasutta, Majjhimanikāya III 104–09). Amanasikāra of the notion of the multiple (nānattasaññā) is set forth as a goal in the ikṣasanātiyayatana in the Majjhimanikāya (I 436) and Aṅguttaranikāya (IV 425). In the Upaśīva section of the Suttāniṇḍa (1070–2), the person endowed with attention (satāma) is associated with both ākiccañṇā and saññāvimokkha; and in the Tuvātakasutta of the Suttāniṇḍa (916, 933), the sato is associated on the one hand with the eradication of papañcasaṅkāhā (on which see 874) and on the other with examination (vimaṭṭha) and knowledge (aññāya) of dhamma. Compare Udānavarga xxix. 3 for mati and saññā. The Sūtra quoted in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā iii. 12 (p. 273) places manasikāra in dhīyāṇa; compare L. Schmithausen in Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus, p. 226.


The Suttāniṇḍa contains much that is relevant to the problem of saññā, smṛti and understanding (prajñā). In addition to the passage from the Upaśīva section just cited, see the Māgandiyasutta which associates the saññāvivaranatta, who is free from the ganthas, and the paniñvīmutta, who is free from mohas (; dīṭṭhi) (Suttāniṇḍa 847); and the Kalāhavivadāsutta (especially 874, on saññānidanā papañcasaṅkāhā and the avoidance not only of saññā but also of its negative). Some aspects of the question have been interestingly discussed, with reference to 'proto-Mādhyamaka' and Čhan, by L. Gómez, Philosophy East and West 26 (1976), pp. 137–65.

While Ratnakaraśānti, Sāratamā viii. 2–6, describes (the first) three vimokṣas as rūpin, he characterizes the last five as arūpin (ed. Jaini, p. 175). The same author also states that while the first three are Liberations from the nirmāṇāvarana, the last five are Liberations from the sāntavihārasamāpattiyāvarana. (On the samāpattiyāvarana, cf. Ratnakarabhāga ii. 45 with iii. 29.)


This stage is sometimes described as involving saññā, as in the compound nevasaññāna-saññāvatanasaññā; see Aṅguttaranikāya IV 414 and Majjhimanikāya III 107. Compare L. Schmithausen in: K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (eds.), Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus, pp. 224 n. 87, 225 n. 95, 229–32, 235 n. 130.

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Stoppage or Cessation (niruddhasamāpatti), i.e. the ninth and final consecutive stage (anupūrvavānihāra) in meditation corresponding to the eighth Viṃokṣa,\(^{426}\) where he transcends that stage which was still bound up with notions, however subtle and indistinct, and realizes immediately – 'in the body-aggregate' (kāyena)\(^{427}\) – the stoppage of all notions and feelings (samjñāved[ay]iti nirodha).\(^{428}\) In this final stage, then, the exercitant is regarded as one who has achieved a simulacrum of Nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasadāśa, Bhāṣya vi. 43).\(^{429}\)

Now it is of very considerable significance that the samjñāvedayitanirodha, together with the four preceding Samāpattis which make up the non-material (ārūpya) levels of the Bhāvanāmārga and follow on the four Dhyānas making up the material levels, is not regarded in the whole of the Buddhist tradition as leading directly to supreme and perfect Awakening and Nirvāṇa. Thus, in some standard accounts of his Awakening, the Buddha is stated to descend from the Ārūpya-Samāpattis (when he is even said to have attained them at all) and to achieve Awakening directly from the fourth Dhyāna belonging to the rūpadhātu.\(^{430}\) And according to the Mahāyāna and Mantrayāna, anuttarasamyaksambodhi is attained by a buddha on the level of the Akanihit-sphere (or Ghanavyūha) of the Suddhāvāsa, the highest of the rūpāvacāra, where he then abides in his sambhogakāya, that is, in one of the two rūpakāyas. It is thus clear that the final five (or four) successive Ārūpya-Samāpattis – the last of the nine (or eight) consecutive stages – occupy a place somewhat apart in the plan of meditative exercises leading to the attainment of Nirvāṇa and the supreme and perfect Awakening of a buddha.


\(^{427}\) For the meaning of kāyena see pp. 168, 191–2, 198.

\(^{428}\) For the meaning of samjñā see D. Seyfort Ruegg, Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub (Paris, 1973), pp. 76 n. and 116 n. (‘notion différenciatrice, apperception’); L. Schmithausen, loc. cit., p. 214 n. 51 (‘ideation’).


\(^{429}\) See L. Schmithausen, loc. cit., p. 214 f.

\(^{430}\) Cf. L. Schmithausen, loc. cit., pp. 203–04 (on the 'stereotyped detailed description' of the Path of liberation).
The supreme degree of Samāpatti and Vimokṣa, the samājñāve-
dayitanirōdha which is recognized in classical Buddhist literature as belonging to the Ārya alone,431 is moreover very clearly distin-
guished both from the attainment of unconsciousness (asamjñi-
samāpatti, asamjñāsamāpatti) and from the unconsciousness of the āsāmijñikā state, that is, from two states that are not counted as Vimokṣas forming part of the āryamārga and which are not cultivated by the Buddhist Ārya as components of his consecutive stages (anupūrvavaihāra) of spiritual practice.432

As for the Bhāvanāmārga, in Buddhist soteriology it may be either mundane (laukika) or transmundane (lokottara), quite unlike the Darśanamārga which is always transmundane and pure.433 The transmundane Bhāvanāmārga is of course the pure (anāsrava) one practised by the Ārya, which includes the four Ārūpya Samāpattis culminating in the ‘peak of existence’ (bhavagra) and then issuing in the nirodhasamāpatti. On the contrary, for the practiser of the mundane Bhāvanāmārga, detachment from the bhavagra is not possible because he has no access to a state higher than it on the basis of which he could so detach himself.434 This mundane and impure (sāsrava) Bhāvanāmārga is accordingly one that is not specific to the Ārya, though it may once have been practised by him too; it can precede the Ārya’s Darśanamārga and does not have as its object the four Noble Principles (āryasatya) as such (Bhāṣya, vi. 1). An Ārya may have acquired detachment (vairagya) previously by means of this laukikamārga, but the acquisition of such detachment is then a mundane one (vi. 46ab). The fruits of asceticism (śrāmanyaphala) of a Sakṛdāgāmin and an Anāgāmin can even be obtained by this laukikamārga (vi. 53cd).

According to Yaśomitra, Quieting (śamatha) is characteristic of this laukikamārga, full liberating knowledge (ājñā) being on the

431 Abhidharmakośa ii. 43.
432 See Abhidharmakośa ii. 41–42; cf. É. Lamotte, Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, iii, p. 1299; below, p. 196 f.
433 Abhidharmakosabhāṣya vi.1, 45c; and vii. 22. Cf. Asanga, Abhidharmasamuccaya, pp. 68–69; L. de La Vallée Poussin, L’Abhidharmakośa, ii, p. 117; viii, pp. 144–6; Lamotte, Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, ii, p. 1027; iii, p. 1274. See however Kathāvatthu i. 5, which denies that the worldling (puthujjana) eliminates kāmarāgavaihāra. It is to be recalled also that the naivaṃsāmijñāṇāsāmijñāyatana is not counted as anāsrava and lokottara; see above, note 351 and below, p. 200.
434 Abhidharmakosabhāṣya and Vyākhyā vi. 45; cf. viii. 20.
The practiser of the Path then either acquires its fruits consecutively in the manner of the anupuṣṭika, attaining in order (kramāt) the Srotāpattiphala (when the Darṣanamārga turns into the transmundane Bhāvanāmārga) and the Sakṛdāgāmiṇiphala (on the Bhāvanāmārga). Alternatively, before entering the Darṣanamārga, he may have practised a mundane Bhāvanāmārga in the condition of a worldling (prthagjanavastha) and have thus freed himself from the defilements/afflictions (kleśa) of the Kāmadhātu, becoming either a Bhūyovītarāga or a (Kāma-)Vītarāga. The Buddha himself is cited as an example of one who has followed the latter procedure.

In Buddhism three distinct states are characterized by the absence of notions, or unconsciousness. The factor termed 'the notionless' (āsamarśa) is classified in the dharma-theory of the Vaibhāṣika-Abhidharma as a citta-viprayukta-sārṣikā that brings to a stop both mind (citta) and the mental factors (caitta) for beings known as āsamarśasattvas (Abhidharmakośa ii. 41bc). Its fruition (vipāka) is located in the sphere of the Bṛhatphala-deities (ii. 41d) – i.e. on the level of the fourth Dhyāna (Bhaṣya iii. 2cd and 6c) – and it is described as one of the nine residences of beings (sattvāvāsa, iii. 6d). Another factor, also classified as a citta-viprayukta-sārṣikā and located on the level of the fourth Dhyāna (iii. 6c), is the āsamarśasamāpatti; and it too has

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435 Abhidharmakośavāryākhyāti ii. 16d and vi. 46ab. For śamatha and manaskīra on the laukika level according to Asaṅga, see Abhidharmasamuccaya, p. 68.
436 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya vi. 33; cf. 11.16 and viii. 14 on the anupuṣṭika.
439 In the Mahāyānapradīpta (Sakaki’s ed., § 104, nos. 1987–9), the asamarśaka, together with the asamarśasamāpatti and the nirodhasamāpatti, appears in the list of caitasaka-dharmas. This may be an error of redaction, for they are preceded by the viprayukta-sārstikās prāpti and aprāpti and followed by jīvita and nikāyasabhāga, etc. However, the question as to what
the function of stopping both *citta* and the *caittas* (ii. 42). The
difference between these two forms of unconsciousness is that the
*āsanīṅika*, as fruition (*vipāka*), is neutral (*avyākṛta*), whereas the
*āsanīṅisamāpatti* is wholesome (*śubha = kuśala*, ii. 42). The latter is
cultivated by ordinary worldlings (*prthāgjana*), who take it to be
release (*niḥsaraṇa*) and liberation (*mokṣa*), whereas the Āryas
consider it a *vinipātasthāṇa* (ii. 42d). It is furthermore described as
being the product of great mental effort (*mahābhīsāṃskārasādhya*,
ii. 42). These two states are in the Buddhist tradition clearly not
thought of as being characteristic of the Buddhist Path.

These two forms of notionlessness are accordingly carefully
distinguished from the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra* already mentioned
above termed ‘attainment of cessation of notions and feelings’
([*saṃjñāved(ay)ita*nirodha-samāpatti] – the ninth of the Samāpattis
which follows on the four Ārūpyas after the ‘peak of existence’
(*bhavāgra*) and the eighth Vimokṣa – which also has the function
of stopping both *citta* and the *caittas*.*

It differs from the two
forms of notionlessness just mentioned by being cultivated only
by the Ārya. Following on the fourth Ārūpya – the *naivasamājñā-
naśasamājñāyatana* sphere where notions are so subtle that it can be
described as neither with nor without notions – it is defined as
‘born of the peak of existence’ (*bhavāgra*) and as good (*śubhā
= kuśala*, ii. 43bc). This stage is attained through a mental act
relying on the notion of residence in quietude (*śāntavihārasamājñā-
pūrvaka manasikāra*, ii. 43b). However, even though it is described
as a simulacrum of Nirvāṇa (*nirvāṇasadgaśa*, vi. 43cd), one can
still fall away from the *nirodhasāmāpatti* (ii. 44d); for it is acquired
by effort (*prayogalabhya*) rather than by pure dispassion (*vairāgya,
kind of consciousness may subsist in the *nirodhasamāpatti* is an old one (see n. 440).

The *Mahāvyutpatti* also evidently counts (no. 2297) the *asamjñāsattvas* in the ninth
*sattvāvāsa* – i.e., apparently, on the level of the *saṃjñāvedayātanirodha* – rather than in the
fifth *sattvāvāsa* pertaining to the fourth Dhyāna of the Rūpāvacāra (cf. Dīghanikāya III
263). See also *Abhidharmakośa* iii. 6. (The *Mahāvaśu* (I, p. 127-S) seems in addition to
imply a criticism of the *saṃjñāvedayātanirodha*. See Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit
Dictionary*, s.v.)

*Abhidharmakośa* ii. 432; cf. ii. 44d, vi. 43cd, 64a and viii. 33. On the persistence of
subtle thought in this *nirodhasamāpatti*, see L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L’Abhidhārma kośa* viii,
p. 207 n. 6, and ii, p. 211 n. 3; *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, *La Siddhi de Huan-tsang*, pp. 204 ff.,
406 ff.

Cf. *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* on *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 93-5.
ii. 44a). And only in the case of a Buddha — for whom there is nothing produced through effort (prāyogika) — is the nirodhasamāpatti acquired in virtue of Awakening. (bodhilabhya, ii. 44a). According to the Vaibhāṣikas, furthermore, because in the nirodhasamāpatti there is no citta, the Non-returner (anāgāmin) Ārya who attains this Samāpatti takes a 'body-aggregate' (kāya) as support; and he is then termed a kāyasākṣin in so far as he realizes this Nirvāṇa-like factor through a ‘body-aggregate’ (kāyena, vi. 43cd).

The nirodhasamāpatti has also been defined in Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya (pp. 10–11), where it is distinguished from the asālījasamāpatti on the ground that the latter issues from a mental act relying on the notion of release (niḥsaraṇasamājñāpūrvaka manasikāra) on the part of one free from passion (vītarāga) on the Śubhakṛṣṇa level of the third Dhyāna, but not yet free from passion above this level; whereas the nirodhasamāpatti issues from a mental act relying on the notion of residence in quietude (śāntavihārasamājñāpūrvaka manasikāra) for a Vītarāga on the level of the Ākiṃcanyāyatana. As for the asāṃjñika, it differs according to the Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya (p. 9) from both the asāṃjñisaṃpatti and the nirodhasamāpatti in so far as it lacks manaskāra; whereas the latter are both specified with respect to several factors one of which is manaskāra.

442 In the Culasūṇatasutta (Majjhimanikāya III 107-08), the animitto cetosamādhi — which (like the nirodhasamāpatti) follows on the nevasānasānaññīyatana and is the object of manasikāra — is said to be deliberately constructed (abhisaṅkhata) and intentionally formed (abhisaṅkṣetiyata), so that it is impermanent (anicca) and subject to cessation (nīrodha-dhamma). But it nevertheless leads to pacification and stabilization of citta, and finally to the freedom of citta from the kāmāsava, bhavāsava and avijjāsava, and thus to liberation. Compare the Atthakānakāgarasutta (Majjhimanikāya I 350–2) on the contemplation of the successive stages up to and including the ākiṃcanaññīyatana as abhisaṅkhata and abhisāṅcetita, and accordingly as anicca and nirodhadhamma.

The Mahāmālukīyāsutta (Majjhimanikāya I 436–7) lists neither the nevasānaññīsaññīyatana nor the saññāvedayātanirodha as a basis for liberating knowledge; and it mentions the amatī dham as the final goal.

In Majjhimanikāya I 333, one who has entered this state of saññāvedayātanirodha is said to look like one who is dead (kālakato). Cf. N. Hakamaya, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (IBK), 23/2 (1975), p. 1083.

443 See above, pp. 168-70, 191-2, 194.

444 On the nirodhasamāpatti in the Vījñānavāda, see Hakamaya, loc. cit., pp. 1081–1074, where attention is called (following Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasamgraha i. 7) to the absence of the manovijnāna and the kliṣṭamanas, and to the presence of the ālayavijnāna, in this samāpatti.
In a Sūtra of the old canon found in the Anussativagga of the Aṅguttaranikāya, it is furthermore stated that the expert, ‘thoroughbred’ person (purisājānīya) does not rely in his meditation on the elements earth, water, air and fire and on the four Ārūpya-spheres. For such a meditator, each notion (saṃjñā) – beginning with that of earth and extending to the nevasaṃānāsaṃānāyatana – is dissolved (vibhūtā) in earth and so forth.445

It is worthy of notice that although the Samāpatti and Vīmokṣa attainments have been accepted by Mahāyānasūtras in their treatment of Dhyāna,446 they are in no way specifically linked with the Mahāyāna. They are also acknowledged in such Mahāyānist treatises as the Ratnagotravibhāga – where the tranquil Dhyānas and Samāpattis are mentioned in passing (i. 73) – and in the Abhisamayālanākāra – for example in the section (viii. 2) dealing with the qualities of the advayajñānātmaka dharmakāya (where it is specified that the nine Samāpattis are successive) and in the commentaries on Chapter ii.

In certain respects the final Samāpatti of the Stoppage of notions and feelings (saṃjñāvedayitanirodha), not to speak of the lower states of ‘notionlessness’ known in the Buddhist tradition as the asaṃjñisamāpatti and the āsaṃjñika, seems to correspond to what is known in Pātañjalayoga as citta-vṛttinirodha (Yogasūtra i. 2), in other words to what Erich Frauwallner termed the Yoga of suppression (Unterdrückungsyoga) in contradistinction to the eight-membered (aṣṭāṅga) Yogic path described in other parts of the Yogasūtras.447

Now it is to be observed that in the old canon it has been explicitly stated that penetration with full liberating knowledge is

achieved only to the extent that there is meditative absorption involving an apperceptive notion (yāvatā saññāsamāpatti tāvatā aññāpātivedha).\textsuperscript{448}

This principle has been specifically invoked in Asaṅga’s \textit{Abhidharmasamuccaya} and its Bhāṣya, where it is concluded that the naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana – viz. the fourth Ārūpya described as neither involving the total absence of all notions nor as comprising (distinct) notions – is mundane (laukika) rather than transmundane (lokottara), and that the āryamārga is not to be found at its level. While the naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana is thus not regarded as transmundane, the samjñāvedayitanirodha is classified as lokottara in so far as it is the outcome of the āryamārga involving liberating knowledge.\textsuperscript{449}

According to the \textit{Abhidharmasamuccaya}, the Ārūpya-attainments are totally infused with Quieting (śamathaikarasa). Yet, according to this same source and its commentary, a set of seven mental acts (manaskāra) makes for the attainment not only of the four Rūpa-Dhyānas but also of the four Ārūpyas up to and including the sphere where ideation subsists in a form that can be described as neither total absence of notions or as containing (distinct) notions (naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana). The \textit{Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya} moreover specifies that the second of these seven forms of mental act, the ādhimokṣika manaskāra, transcends learning (śrūta) and reflection (cintā) and realizes both Quieting (śamatha) and Insight (vipaśyanā) having as object the phenomenal sign of the characteristic of gross quiet (audārikaśāntalakṣaṇānimittālambana).\textsuperscript{450} In the relevant summary verse (uddāna) of the Śrāvakabhūmi, the Dhyānas and Ārūpyas are connected with mental acts; and the vijropama-samādhi is identified as the sixth kind of mental act, the prayoganiśtha manaskāra.\textsuperscript{451} This placing of vipaśyanā as well as śamatha in the four Ārūpyas is noteworthy.

\textsuperscript{448} Aṅguttaranikāya IV 426. For the Sanskrit version of this Sūtra-text, see Asaṅga, \textit{Abhidharmasamuccaya}, p. 69, and \textit{Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya}, p. 81. And for a discussion of this, and of the meaning of the compound aññāpātivedha, see L. Schmithausen, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 224 and p. 229.

\textsuperscript{449} See Asaṅga, \textit{Abhidharmasamuccaya}, p. 69; \textit{Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya}, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{450} See \textit{Abhidharmasamuccaya}, p. 68; \textit{Abhidharmasamuccayabhaṣya}, p. 80.

As mentioned above, the state of saṃjñāvedayitanirodha has been described as being perceived as a simulacrum of Nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa-saṅgata) and as tranquil (śānta) on the level of the Anāgāmin and Kāyasākṣin. Now Buddhist tradition knows of a path which, independently and taken all by itself, leads exclusively to quietude (śamaikāyana).

In the old canon, the ekāyana maggo was of course the way of the four Applications of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna = smṛtyupasthāna) that, uniquely, leads to the realization of Nirvāṇa. In some places, however, the term śamaikāyana came to be used in connexion with a class of persons who seek a more or less cataleptic calm, that is, with persons attached, in terms of the Three-Vehicle (trīyāna) theory, to the śrāvakagotra considered as a ‘genus’ fundamentally different from the bodhisattvagotra. A Śrāvaka of this particular class would therefore be unable ever to attain the supreme Awakening (anuttarasamāyaksambodhi) of a buddha, unlike the type of Śrāvaka who on the contrary turns towards bodhi.

Now, according to the Ratnagotravibhāga (ii. 58–59), those persons who, being established on the path of calm, conceive the notion that they have achieved Nirvāṇa (prāptanirvāṇasamjñin = myaṅ 'das thob 'du šes can) are deflected from their earlier postulation (purvagraha) by the teachings of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra; and being thus made to mature in the supreme Vehicle (uttama yana, viz. the Mahāyāna), they receive the prophecy (vyākaraṇa) that they are to achieve supreme bodhi. Furthermore, according to a text quoted by Haribhadra in his commentary on the section of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra that treats of the Single Vehicle (ekāyana) – a text close to the Bodhicittavivaraṇa ascribed to Nāgārjuna – those persons whose minds are tormented by Saṃsāric existence (bhavād uttrastamānasāḥ), and who conceive the notion that they have achieved Nirvāṇa (prāptanirvāṇasamjñin) once their life-span is spent, have in fact not really achieved Nirvāṇa but merely the cessation of birth in the three realms of

452 See for example Dīghanikāya II 290; Saṃyuttanikāya V 167, 185.
existence. They therefore require to be awakened by the buddhas so that they may eliminate unndefiled nescience (akliṣṭājñāna) and thus also finally become buddhas.454

Mo-ho-yen’s teaching, which lays so much emphasis on the elimination of discursive thinking (sems pa), recollective attention (dran pa) and mentation (yid la byed pa), presents some very noteworthy parallels to what a practiser achieves in the Samāpttis and Vimokṣas, and in particular in the Samāpatti where notions and feelings have come to a stop (saṃjñāvedayitanirodha). For clarifying the background to his teachings, and in order to appreciate the criticisms that Kamalāśīla and his school have directed against what they considered to be an unbalanced and disproportionate stress on eradicating any and every trace of analytical thinking, the above-mentioned theories of meditative practice need to be borne in mind.

Kamalāśīla and his school may in addition have feared that the Hva śāi’s meditative methods approached perilously closely the cataleptic state of notionlessness (asaṃjñīsamāpatti) that arises for a worldling (prthagjana) on the level of the fourth Dhyāna, as a result of his desire for deliverance (mokṣakāmatā) when he conceives the idea of release (nihsaranasaṃjñīn), but which (as already noted) has not been accepted by Buddhist tradition as forming an integral part of the Ārya’s Path of meditative realization.455 What Kamalāśīla has stated in his Bhāvanākrama regarding the resemblance between his unnamed opponent’s view concerning the absence of recollective attention (asmṛti) and mentation (amanasikāra) and the suppression of thinking (cittaniruddha) which a worldling can achieve on the level of the fourth Dhyāna seems indeed to have to be understood in this way.456 Kamalāśīla has furthermore called attention to the resemblance

455 See above, p. 195 f.
456 Bhāvanākrama III, pp. 15–17. This can refer to the state of the Bhatphala-gods of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ii. 41 and iii. 2 (cf. above, p. 196). See also Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ii. 41bc on the asaṃjñīka as cessation of citta and the caittas among the asaṃjñīsattva (cf. i. 28 and iv. 84) gods.
that would apparently arise between a Śrāvaka absorbed in the meditation of cessation (nirodhasamādhisamāpanna), where no phenomenal signs (nimitta) are present, and a Bodhisattva who would accomplish together all six Perfections (pāramitā) without cultivating generosity (dāna) and the like when undue emphasis is placed on dhyāna alone as embracing in itself all other pāramitās.457

In the account of the Great Debate given in the sBa bzhed and related sources, moreover, Kamalaśīla is reported to have objected against the Hvaśān’s teaching the argument that if one were entirely to eliminate thinking, etc., one would not differ from a person who has fainted or fallen into senselessness, or from certain gods of the higher spheres (khams goñ ma’i lha), so that it would be necessary to conclude that, if not thinking really were to lead to Awakening, beings in these states of unconsciousness would equally have to be considered as liberated.458

In one respect this question of nirodha and the suppression of all notions recalls the distinction made in the Abhidharma between nirvāṇa as pratisamkhyānirodha — that is, liberation consciously achieved through knowledge defined as a specific prajñā (cf. Abhidharmakośabhāṣya i. 6a) — and apratisamkhyānirodha, which is mere cessation due to the absence of the necessary conditions (pratyaya). This point arises in the theory of meditation of the animitānimitta-samādhi with respect to apratisamkhyānirodha in the aspect of quietude (sāntākāra, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya viii. 26cd).

A further basic teaching of Mo-ho-yen, frequently mentioned in the Cheng-li chūeh as well as in the Tibetan Dunhuang documents, was that all (false) notions (hsiang, wang hsiang) should be abolished.459 The expression ‘(false) notion’ is explained in the Cheng-li chūeh as designating all movements of

458 See sBa bzhed, G, p. 69; S, p. 59; mKhas pa’i dga’ston, ja, f. 117a–b. Compare Nañ Nīma’od zer, Chos byun Me tog sniin po, f. 431a–b (with variants). Cf. for example Vasubandhu, Trisūlīkā 16.
thinking that grasp objects; while ‘all’ is explained as covering everything from infernal existences up to just below the level of a buddha. But by ‘watching Mind’ (k’an hsin), which eliminates the Impregnations, these notions are made to disappear according to Mo-ho-yen.

Apart from the scriptural sources cited in the Cheng-li chüeh, this doctrine could of course find support for example in a passage from the Kāśyapaparivarta (§ 144): ‘For the monk absorbed in the attainment of the stoppage of notions and feelings, there is nothing further that needs to be accomplished’.

Parallels to Mo-ho-yen’s teaching are to be found in particular when a Sūtra is referring to the level of ultimate reality (paramārtha) and to non-duality (advaya). Thus, in Chapter viii of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, the Bodhisattva *Bhadrajyotis proposes a description of entry into non-duality in terms of the absence of both movement (of thinking, g-yo ba) and of (false) mentation (rlom sens: manyanā), and also in terms of the absence of any (karmic?) qualification/entitlement (lhag par bya ba: adhikāra?) and freedom from the same (lhag par bya ba dain bral ba). And further on in the same chapter the Bodhisattva *Sīṃhamati proposes a description of entry into non-duality in terms of the non-production of any notion (samjñā), pure or impure, and even of the non-arising of absence-of-notion (’du šes med par gyur pa).

In reply to a question as to whether Auditors fond of quietistic cessation can have access to the Mahāyāna, Mo-ho-yen is nevertheless stated in the Cheng-li chüeh to have said that, for a person residing in the notionless, there is no seeing of the Mahāyāna, so that one should keep from attaching oneself to absorption without notions.

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460 Demiéville, Concile, p. 75 and n. 7.
461 Cheng-li chüeh, ff. 129a, 135a f., 150a f. On k’an hsin, see P. Demiéville, Concile, pp. 43, 51, n. 52, 78, 125, 158. The corresponding Tibetan expressions are sems la bita (attested in the Tibetan Dunhuang documents, e.g. Pelliot tibétain 823r (1); Stein 468 (1b), 689), sems rigs pa, and sems ‘phrod pa (attested in dPa’ bo gtsug lag phren ba’s mkhas pa’i dga’ ston, ja. f. 120b6). See above, p. 100.
462 samjñāvedayitanrodhasamāpattisamāpannasasya bhikṣor nāstīyuttārikarāṇīyam (quoted e.g. in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā i., p. 48).
463 Cheng-li chüeh, f. 132a (Demiéville, Concile, p. 71).
It is furthermore to be noted that the bSam gtan mig sgron has also ascribed to the Hva šan Mahā yan the teaching that notions (samjnā) are not to be stopped ('du šes dgag par yani mi bya, f. 83a4). In the same context, the recognition through awareness of the nescience-related mental factors that (mental) instability is faulty and the stoppage of the latter are both described as the ‘Srāvaka’s nirodha’ (ma rig pa’i sems byun ba tshor bas g-yo ba skyon tu rig ste bkag na ŉan thos ’gog pa’o, f. 83a2). Hence one should not fall into notionlessness through objectification of the anoetic (ci yani šes pa mi dmigs pas ’du šes med par mi ltun, f. 83a5–6). In a parallel passage from Pelliot tibétain 117 the restriction ‘of the Srāvaka’ is also to be found.464 According to statements reproduced in Stein 709 (f. 4a-b), the Mahāyānist way of no-mind is said to be like that of neither the non-Buddhist nor the Śrāvaka.465

Wang Hsi’s Cheng-li chüeh has moreover repudiated the suggestion that the state of not thinking taught by Mo-ho-yen could be legitimately equated with either the unconscious state of the Bṛhatphala-gods, who are placed immediately below the Śuddhāvāsa level in the fourth Dhyāna, or with any unconscious state reached by a worldling by means of a mundane, non-lokottara path.466

It is finally of special importance to observe that for Mo-ho-yen – and indeed for so much of the classical tradition of later Buddhism (whether or not it postulates either an aloyavijnāna or an amalavijnāna) – the Bhavanamārga and the state of cessation of notions and feelings (samjnāvedayitanirodha) is not strictly speaking entirely ‘mind-less’: the discursive and proliferating activity of thinking has indeed been brought to a stop at the highest level of the Path, but Mind (sems [nīd] = citta[tā]; Chinese hsin) subsists in some more or less fine form. According to Mo-ho-yen it is then discursive thinking (sems pa), as connected with recollective attention (dran pa) and mentation (yid la byed pa), that is to be relinquished; but (innate) Mind is to be recognized in face-to-face confrontation (sems la blta ba = Ch. k’an hsin; sems rtogs pa, sems no ’phrod pa).

464 Cf. Gómez in Studies, p. 112.
465 Cf. Stein 710, f. 5b.
466 Cheng-li chüeh, ff. 131a–b, 148a–b (Demiéville, Concile, pp. 62 ff., 130 ff.).
After considering samathavipasyāna-yoga in Chapter vii of his Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (P, f. 351a) which is described as a bhāvanākrama — and in connexion with the statement taken from the Bhavasamkrānti ascribed to Nāgārjuna that the world proceeds from conceptual construction (vikalpa) which in its turn issues from mind (ciṅā), and that mind proceeds from bodily-structure (lus = kāya) which has therefore to be analysed, Bhavya has observed (f. 352a-353a) that knowledge (śes pa = jñāṇa) rests nowhere, that [in reality] there is no mental construction as anything at all (cir yañ mi rtog), no thinking on anything (ci la yañ sens pa med pa), no dwelling in any extreme positions, no arising of cognition in the form of anything whatever (śes pa ci'i no bor yañ ma skyes pa), and that non-predication as anything at all is to be realized in meditation (ci yañ ma yin par bsgom par hya'o). This text specifies that analytical prajñā (so sor rtog pa'i śes rab) is itself free from appearance (snañ ba med pa: nirābhāsa).

To illustrate the point that at this level knowledge itself no longer exists (śes pa rañ ñid kyañ med par gyur pa), the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (f. 352b) refers to the Kāśyapaparivarta’s comparison of analytical investigation (pratyaveksā) and the faculty of transcending discriminative understanding (prajñendriya) with fire produced from rubbing together two pieces of wood which both consumes the wood from which it is produced and is thus itself extinguished, a comparison cited also by Kamalaśīla. So the ‘fuel’ of philosophical theory (Ita ba = darśana, dṛṣṭi) is declared to be consumed; and when theory thus comes to a stop, the fire of knowledge itself no longer arises, while all afflictions/defilements (klesā) are then consumed. The Madhyamakaratnapradīpa describes this process as a Gross Yoga (rags pa'i nal 'byor) that it

467 Bhavasamkrānti 7. Compare Section ii of the Tīkā ascribed to Maitreyanātha (ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, 1938, p. 89 f.). Cf. C. Lindner, Nāgārjuniana (Copenhagen, 1982), p. 13. On the relation between ciṅā and kāya, see Abhidharmakosabhāṣya ii. 44d (p. 72), as well as the sources on the nāma-rūpa concept.
contrasts with the Subtle Yoga based on nirābhāsa and māya-like Mind, for which it refers to the Lalitavatārasūtra (Sagāthaka 256–7).

Later the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa takes up again the themes of non-mentation (amanasikāra, f. 354b7), single-moment Awakening (ekakṣaṇābhisambodhi, f. 355a2) and single-moment understanding (ff. 358b–359a, 360a6), and refers as well to Awakening in the vajropamasamādhi (ff. 356a4, 359a1) and progressive engagement (kramavṛtti) on the Path of the Bodhisattva (f. 358a6, following the Dharmaññītastava ascribed to Nāgārjuna, verse 91). In particular, it is stated that bhāvanā should be cultivated by freeing oneself from both smṛti and manasikāra (f. 354b7). Consideration is given also to the question as to how one avoids becoming a person exclusively given to quiet (zī ba phyogs gcig pa) by taking recourse in the complete rūpakāya and in the apratīṣṭhitanirvāṇa (f. 360a, by which the Bodhisattva does not enter into Nirvāṇa in order to be able to work for the benefit of living beings by making use of salvific means or upāyasyas).

It thus appears that the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa belongs to the long line of treatises concerned with the question of amanasikāra and asmrṭī, and that in its treatment of a Mādhyamika’s bhāvanā-krama it addresses certain problems also discussed in Tibet at the time of the Great Debate of bSam yas.

The question thus arises of the date and exact authorship of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa. In the bsTan’gyur catalogues, this work has been attributed implicitly to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya, the (sixth-century) Mādhyamika author of the Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamakahrdayakārikās; and this ascription has been explicitly made by some modern scholars.469 This attribution is however far from being certain. In the first place, the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa mentions favourably, and cites as authorities, Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti – two masters who have usually been placed in the seventh century – even though the latter was the chief

opponent and critic of Bhāvaviveka, the author of the Prajñāpradīpa. Moreover, it quotes a verse (f. 354a3–4) to be found in the Abhāramśa Dohākoṣa of Saraha, and it describes the author of this dohā as ‘teacher’s teacher’ (bla ma’i bla ma); in other words, the author of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa may have been the grand-pupil of Saraha, the teacher (also known as Rāhulabhadra) of Ārya-Nāgārjunapāda, who lived perhaps in the seventh century. Finally, beside many other texts often placed at the earliest in the seventh century such as the Bodhicittavivarana (also ascribed to Nāgārjuna), it quotes (f. 361b) a ‘prophecy’ on Nāgārjuna from the Mañjuśrīmūlatantra, whereas the Rājavyākaraṇaparivarta of the Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa in its form now known to us contains — in addition to a differently worded vyākaraṇa on Nāgārjuna — another ‘prophecy’ relating to King Gopāla who founded the Pāla dynasty in Bengal (rg. c. 770–810 or 775–812). In other words, it is possible that the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa was composed by an author who lived after the seventh century, and perhaps as late as the ninth century, and that he was either a contemporary or perhaps even a successor of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. It was indeed in the eighth century that the bhāvanākrama-theme attracted special attention among Madhyamikas, as is demonstrated not only by Kamala-

470 P, mi, f. 77a2. This has been noted too by Lindtner, Wiener Zeitschrift ... 26 (1982), p. 175.
471 See Seyfort Ruegg, in Indological and Buddhist studies, p. 511. If this is so, the author of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa could have been a disciple of the Deutero-Nāgārjunapāda since the latter was a disciple of Saraha = Rāhulabhadra.

It is of course possible that the version of the Tantra quoted in Bhavya’s Madhyamakaratnapradīpa did not contain the vyākaraṇa relating to King Gopāla, which could be a later interpolation; and the date of Gopāla is not therefore necessarily a terminus ad quem for dating the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa. But the references to other texts, such as Saraha’s Dohā and the Bodhicittavivarana, as well as the citation of both Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti as authorities would seem to suggest a very late seventh-century date at the earliest, and more probably a date in the eighth or even ninth century.

473 This is the opinion of Y. Ejima, as quoted by Lindtner in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sudasiens 26 (1982), p. 183.
sīla’s three Bhāvanākramas but also by the *Bhāvanāyogamārga (or *Yogabhāvanāmārga?) of Jñānarabha which insists too on the need to examine Mind alone (rañ gi sems kho na la brtag par bya’o).\footnote{D, f. 4a3. A Bhāvanākrama is also ascribed in the bsTan ’gyur to (a) Nāgārjuna. A Yogabhāvanāmārga, or Bhāvanāyogamārga, by Kamalaśīla is included in the bsTan ’gyur.}

Hence, although our knowledge of the history of Madhyamaka thought is admittedly fragmentary and partly based on hypothetical reconstruction, the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa might be thought to fit especially well into a period later than the sixth century when Bhāvaviveka, the author of the Prajñāprādīpa and Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās, in all likelihood lived. (On the contrary, were it possible to demonstrate that this text belongs to the sixth century too, this would show that important points at issue in the Great Debate were being discussed in bhāvanākrama-form by Indian Mādhyamikas two or three centuries earlier than the time of Kamalaśīla and Mo-ho-yen.) Thus the bhāvanākrama section of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa is of very considerable interest in considering Indian views on the points being discussed at the Great Debate of bSam yas.

7. Silence

Following the example of Vimalakīrti to which he has explicitly referred,\footnote{See Cheng-li chiüeh, ff. 154b–155a (Demiéville, Concile, p. 156).} Mo-ho-yen was an advocate of the philosopher’s silence: ‘Tout ce que j’ai dit, avant comme après, n’était conçu que pour répondre aux questions, en me référant aux textes de śūtra; et ce n’était nullement le vrai système de ma méthode de Dhyāna. Mon système est sans attribut de parole, sans attribut de différenciation due à notre propre esprit; c’est la vérité vraie, qui ne se transmet et ne se confère que par le silence, le chemin du langage étant coupé. Si l’on se met à débattre du pour et du contre, du juste et du faux, il n’en résulte que dispute. Le recueillement est comme une eau de saveur unique, mais les vues de chacun sont différentes ...’\footnote{Cheng-li chiüeh, ff. 154b–155a (Demiéville, Concile, p. 156).}

According to the Mahāyāna as a whole, ultimate reality is in
itself inexpressible discursively (anabhilāpya, nirabhilāpya) and conceptually unthinkable (acintya). Silence is thus so to speak the only adequate way of signifying reality. As said by Candrakīrti (Prasannapadā i. 1, p. 57), ultimate reality (paramārtha) corresponds to the silence of the Nobles (āryaṁ tuṣṇībāvah). And according to the Tathāgataguhyaśūtra, between the night of his awakening to supreme and perfect Awakening and his Parinirvāṇa, no syllable (akāra) is uttered by the Tathāgata. This principle of inexpressibility and silence is mentioned in a number of texts such as the Saṁādhīrājasūtra and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakakārikās.

In the old canon, Noble Silence (ariyo tuṣṇībhāvo) is praised on the same level as speech relating to Dhamma (dhammī kathā); either one preaches the Dhamma, or one enquires of another, or again one does not disdain Noble Silence (ariyaṁ vā tuṣṇībhāvam nātimaṇṇati). This Noble Silence—placed on the level of the second Dhyāna and described as resulting from the cessation of reflection and investigation (vitakkavicarāṇāṁ vūpasāma)—involves internal quiet (ajjhattam sampasādanam), concentration of mind (cetaso ekodibhavo), freedom from reflection (avītakka) and investigation (avicāra), and origination from samādhi. Moreover, the Dharma to which the Buddha awakened is so subtle and profound that it can barely be communicated, as a consequence of which the Buddha at first hesitated to teach it until requested by Brahmā for the sake of people.

Not altogether unconnected with this principle of the conceptual and verbal inexpressibility—that is, the non-discursiveness—of reality may have been the idea that it was by a single sound only that the entire Dharma was communicated. The thesis of the ‘univocality’ of the Buddha’s speech was maintained by all

477 See the Tathāgataguhyaśūtra quoted in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā xviii. 7 (p. 366) and xxv. 24 (p. 539). Cf. Prajñākāramati, Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā ix. 16.
478 Saṁādhīrājasūtra, Chap viii and xxxii; Nāgārjuna, Madhyamakakārikās, Chap. xviii; cf. Nīlākūṭīmānasūtra 7 and Acintyasūtra 23. See also Lankāvātārasūtra iii, p. 142-4; Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra (ed. Oshika), iii, p. 24 (Lamotte, L’enseignement de Vimalakīrti, p. 147); viii, p. 75 (Lamotte, p. 317); x, p. 86 (Lamotte, p. 342); Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā i, p. 57; Śāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra ix. 35-36.
479 Udāna, p. 11.
480 Anguttarānīkāya IV 153.
481 Saṁyuttanīkāya II 273.
482 Mahāvagga pp. 4-5; Majjhimanīkāya I 167-168; Saṁyuttanīkāya I 136; Aṅguttarānīkāya II 131; Mahāvastu III, p. 314. Cf. Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā xxiv. 12, and Ratnavālī ii. 18.
branches of the Mahāsāṃghika school according to Vasumitra;\(^{483}\) it was rejected, however, by the Sarvāstivādins,\(^{484}\) who also (like the Mahāsāṃghikas who held the Buddha’s speech to be in accordance with reality)\(^ {485}\) did not accept that all the Buddha’s Sūtras are definitive in sense (nītārtha).\(^ {486}\) In a similar context, the idea of a single sound as ‘expressive’ of the Buddha’s teaching is attested in the Bhaddacaripranidhānāraja (verse 30: ekasvara) and in the Daśabhūmikasūtra (ix, p. 79: ekaghoṣodāhāra). In the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra we find gṣuni gṣig ‘single utterance’.\(^ {487}\)

This notion of ‘univocality’ probably stands to that of silence, and to that of the inexpressibility or ineffability of absolute reality, as does the notion of the Single or Unique Vehicle (ekāyāna) – so often alluded to by Mo-ho-yen – to that of the ultimate non-existence of any Vehicle at all (āyāna) in the Lankāvatārasūtra\(^ {488}\) – also emphasized by Mo-ho-yen.\(^ {489}\)

In his preference for Noble Silence and for the Single Vehicle or even the Non-Vehicle, therefore, Mo-ho-yen clearly stands in one major line of Buddhist thought attested in older Sūtras and then stressed by the Mahāyāna.\(^ {490}\)


\(^{485}\) Vasumitra, op. cit., p. 5: don ji lla ba bžin ṅid du: yathārtha; see also Bhavya, op. cit., p. 23. Cf. A. Bareau, Journal asiatique 1954, p. 239; Sectes, p. 58 (no. 5).

\(^{486}\) Vasumitra, op. cit., p. 12; Bhavya, op. cit., p. 27. Moreover, according to Vasumitra’s account, buddhas are always in absorption (mān par hṣag pa), which accounts for their not uttering any name (mini, p. 5). But Vinitadeva states that according to the Lokottaravādin-Mahāsāṃghikas even one who is samāhita speaks; see his *Samayabhedoparacanacakre Nīkāyabhedopādarsana-nāma-sangrahā (Tibetan translation, ed. E. Teramoto and T. Hiramatsu), p. 41. Compare Kathavatthu xvii. 2 (Vetullavāda), p. 560, on dhamma being taught by an ‘emanation’ (abhinirmitta) – i.e., so to say, by xenoglossy/xenophony. See also Hōbōgirin s.v. bonnon, butsugo and button.


\(^{488}\) Lankāvatārasūtra ii. 131; iii. 1; vī. 1; Sagāthaka 188, 245 and 315.

\(^{489}\) Demiévillé, Concile, pp. 66, 119, 151.

\(^{490}\) Since these doctrines are well known and have been frequently studied, there is no need to insist further on them here. See for example G. M. Nagao, *Studies in Indology and Buddhology* (S. Yamaguchi felicitation volume, Kyōto, 1955), pp. 137–51; Lamotte, *L’enseignement de Vimalakīrti*, pp. 44–46, 317–18; D. Seyfort Ruegg, ‘On the knowability and expressibility of Absolute Reality in Buddhism’, *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (IBK)*, 20/1 (1971), pp. 1–7; The literature of the Madhyamaka school, pp. 34–35.
the extent to which the current of thought which Mo-ho-yen represents adopted an extreme ‘ideoclasm’ and was essentially logophobic or misologic. Mo-ho-yen would seem in any case to have wished that his silence should on no account be some kind of ‘learned ignorance’.

When Mo-ho-yen cites the eschewing of disputes and learned strife as one motive for adopting silence,\textsuperscript{491} he is also standing in a main line of Buddhist thought. Eirenicism is in fact already mentioned in passages of the old canon. Moreover, the Mādhyamika’s rejection of any dogmatic assertion \textit{(pratijñā)}, in terms of the binary positions of conceptual thinking \textit{(vikalpa)} or of the ‘tetralemma’ \textit{(cattuśkoti)}, was connected at least in part with his refusal to engage in vain disputes \textit{(vivāda)} about entities.\textsuperscript{492} Nevertheless, whilst the Mādhyamika seeks to eschew assertions of the kind just mentioned together with the related antagonistic positions without necessarily rejecting all philosophic expression,\textsuperscript{493} Mo-ho-yen appears to have been inclined to distance himself from all philosophical and religious discourse in favour of a form of quietism (verging sometimes on ataraxia) combined with the pure experience and non-discursive awareness of an ineffable and unanalysable reality (perhaps verging sometimes on pleasure in the empty).\textsuperscript{494}

\textsuperscript{491} Cheng-li chüeh, f. 155a (Demieville, Concile, p. 156).

\textsuperscript{492} See for example Nāgārjuna, \textit{Yuktisāṭikā} 47, 51; \textit{Ratnāvali} ii. 4.


\textsuperscript{494} On ẑi ba phyogs gcig pa and ston pa bag la ḫal (ba), and on the true Dhyāna \textit{(bsam gtan)} of Ma ha yan, see for example Pelliot tibétain 117 as well as 116 (116 and 190), 121, 812r, and 813 (8a–b). (For the allusion to this theme in Bhavya’s \textit{Madhyamakaratnapradīpa}, see above, p. 207.) Mo-ho-yen and his followers no doubt intended to steer clear of any desire for mere tranquillity and of nihilistic emptiness. Cf. above, pp. 201–202
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