The Vitalistic Antecedents of the Ātman-Brahman Concept

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The classical literature of the Vedānta darśana employs the terms sat, cit, and ānanda to characterize the nature of ultimate reality (ātman-Brahman), though such descriptions, as Deutsch points out, "... are not so much qualifying attributes of Brahman as they are the terms that express the apprehension of Brahman by man." The classical Vedānta teachers such as Śańkara and Rāmānuja are also insistent that the vitalistic principle (prāṇa) is merely a phenomenal rather than an ultimate reality. At the same time, these teachers maintain that their views are nothing more than interpretations of the Vedāntic scriptures, primarily the Upanisads. In what follows I shall seek to demonstrate that the views of both Śańkara and Rāmānuja are, in most cases, misinterpretations of the relevant Upanisads by (a) showing that in many Upanisads, prāṇa is regarded as an ultimate reality and (b) indicating how Upanisadic conceptions of ātman and brahman frequently incorporated features that were originally employed to characterize prāṇa.

Pre-Upanisadic Concepts of Prāṇa

The recognition of *prāṇa* as an ultimate principle actually pre-dates the *Upaniṣads*. In the *Atharva Veda* (11.4) *prāṇa* is described as the ultimate source, ground and controller of all. This hymn, according to A. H. Ewing, presents us with 'the highest meaning of *prāṇa*,' with *prāṇa* as the 'primeval cosmic principle.' The passages where this primeval status is most clearly established are:

Vs I Homage to prāṇa in whose control is this all, who hath been lord of all, in whom all stand firm.

- Vs 10 Breath (prāṇa) clothes (anu-vas) human beings (praṇa) as a father clothes a dear son; breath is lord of all, both what breathes and what does not.
- Vs 12 Breath is Virāj, breath is the directress, breath all worship, breath is the sun, the moon; breath they call Prajāpati.
- Vs 15 Breath they call Mātariśvan; breath is called the wind; in breath what has been and what will be, in breath is all established (pratisthita).4

That the conception of prāṇa set out above was held by a number of Vedic teachers, is evident from an examination of later texts such as the Aitareya Āraṇyaka and the Śatapatha Brāhmana. The first of these contains five component Āraṇyakas, the second of which divides naturally into two parts. Part one (adhyāyhas 1–3) deals with the uktha (the high chant of the Rgveda) whilst part two constitutes what is more generally known as the Aitareya Upaniṣad. The material dealing with prāṇa is found almost entirely in part one.

To understand the views about $pr\bar{a}na$ that are held by the author of this text one needs to begin with the story of the faculties trying to determine which of them is the hymn (uktha), this being employed as a synonym for the supreme principle (2.1.4). Speech, sight, hearing and mind all quit the body but it only falls when the $pr\bar{a}na$ departs. Similarly, each in turn returns to the body but only on the return of $pr\bar{a}na$ is it re-animated. At this demonstration of the $pr\bar{a}na$'s supremacy the other faculties proclaim that:

...breath only is the hymn. Let men know that breath is the hymn. The gods said to breath, 'Thou art the hymn, thou art all this, we are thine, thou art ours.'5

The identity of $pr\bar{a}na$ and uktha can then, presumably, be read back into 2.1.2, where it is said that all existence springs from the uktha.6 Certainly, the verses following 2.1.3 simply reiterate this view in a variety of ways, a reiteration that is continued throughout $adhy\bar{a}yas$ 2 and 3.2.1.5 commences with the statement that, "The gods carried him forward." The most logical identity of 'him' is the $pr\bar{a}na$ -who-is-the-uktha and this is confirmed by Sāyaṇa, the only traditional commentator to comment on the entire $\bar{A}ranyaka$.8 Also, in 2.1.5 there is a distinction made between $pr\bar{a}na$ and $ap\bar{a}na$ and each is placed on a level with other faculties (speech, etc). So we read:

Day is breathing forth (prāṇa), night is breathing down (apāna). Speech is fire, sight yonder sun, mind the moon, hearing the quarters ... 9

Then we are told that:

...this is the union of those sent forth. 10

'Those sent forth' are obviously the faculties, speech, etc, which are regarded as the forms of deities residing in the body. "This," as Keith points out, "is obscure" but a reasonable interpretation, given the context, would be that it is the *prāṇa*-which-is-the-*uktha*. *Prāṇa* and *apāṇa* would then simply be derivatives of this in the same way that speech etc, are.

In 2.1.6 we are again reminded of the ultimate nature of *prāṇa* when we are told that:

... all of this is covered by $pr\bar{a}na$. This ether is supported by $pr\bar{a}na$...¹²

Such a power is obviously a creative force and the remainder of the adhyāya and the whole of the next are devoted to establishing a link between, if not the identity of, prāṇa, the cosmic puruṣa and Prajāpati. The powers of prāṇa (which is called 'this person' in 2.1.7 and 'he who shines' in 2.2.11) are that he creates earth, fire, sky, heaven, the sun, the quarters, the moon, the waters and Varuṇa (lord of the moral order (rta) and the deep water). Furthermore, he is, "all these verses, all these Vedas, all sounds (ghoṣa)..." a list which, presumably includes the thirty-six syllabled bṛhati metre, which is 'the whole self'.¹⁴ Finally, we may note that in 2.2.3 Indra tells Viśvamitra that he (Indra) is prāṇa, Viśvamitra is prāṇa and all creatures are prāṇa.

We can thus conclude that in this part of the Aitareya Āranyaka, the only part dealing at all comprehensively with the topic of prāṇa, the vital force is considered to be the source of all and the ground or being of all.

In A.Ā. 2.1.8 we are informed that it is knowledge of prāṇa, of how it functions and how it exists in the human body, 'the hiding place of brahman', that brings immortality. Why this should be so can be inferred from a study of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa. In 1.4.3.8 there is a reference to the 'antasthā prāṇa' (the middle or central prāṇa) which Ewing regards as synonymous with the 'madhyama prāṇa' of the Upaniṣads. 15 He also suggests that here the clear intention of the verse is to present prāṇa as 'the controlling influence', the 'Inner Ruler' which is 'an active, conscious, even Divine Force which dominates the entire organism'. 16 Eggeling translates thus:

... what central breath [antasthā prāṇa] there is (in the body) ... that one indeed is the internal motive force of the breathings ... And whosoever knows that internal motive force of the breathings, him they regard as the internal motive force.¹⁷

If Ewing is correct then we have here a concept which is almost identical to the *Upaniṣadic antaryāmin* (inner controller). The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa also equates prāṇa with the immortal element in man (Ś.B. 2.2.2.8–15; 10.2.6.18) and states that the prāṇas, which are 'the highest thing of all this universe' (8.7.4.21), are immortality (9.1.2.32). Mythically, this is presented in terms of the division of Prajāpati in Ś.B. 10.1.4.1:

Now at the beginning, Prajāpati was (composed of) both these, the mortal and immortal – his vital airs alone were immortal, his body mortal ...

Such a division is also reflected in the human being; hence Ś.B. 6.7.1.11 informs us that,

... that part of the vital air which is immortal is above the navel and streams out by upward breathing; but that which is mortal passes by and away from the navel ...

A crucial part of this knowledge of *prāṇa* is, as was noted above in connection with the *Aitareya Āranyaka*, that it exists in two principal modes, a unitary one, when it is the foundation of all existence and the inner controller of the individual, and diversified one, when it is the various cosmic forces and the breaths and faculties which exist in the body. Hence, 8.7.3.21 informs us that,

... this vital air $[pr\bar{a}na]$ whilst being one only, extends over all the limbs, over the whole body. ¹⁸

and 11.1.2.3 explains that:

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... this sacrifice is the blowing (wind) $[v\bar{a}yu = pr\bar{a}na]$: he blows, as it were, as a single one, but when he has entered into man he is divided into ten parts.¹⁹

Most statements about the number of $pr\bar{a}nas$ in the S.B. suggest that there are ten of them. However, some texts increase the number by varying amounts; hence we find references to eleven (8.4.3.8; 11.2.1.2), twelve (12.3.2.2) and thirteen (3.8.4.1).

The unified $pr\bar{a}na$ enters the body by way of the head²⁰ and then spreads throughout, infusing every limb.²¹ In doing so it nourishes and vitalizes the body.²² Those parts not reached by the $pr\bar{a}na$ dry up and wither away.²³ The distribution of $pr\bar{a}na$ appears to be effected by means of definite pathways, though the text is not clear on this.

The vitalisation of the body appears to be the result of the activities of the five prāṇas: prāṇa, apāṇa, vyāṇa, udāṇa and samāṇa. However, as was noted in connection with the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, the one prāṇa also manifests as the different sensory faculties. There are various lists of these in the Ś.B. The 'prāṇas in the head' or 'the prāṇas of Prajāpati' (7.5.2.6, 9.2.2.5 and 9.3.3.8) are mind (manas), eye (cakṣus), breath (prāṇa), ear (śrotra) and voice (vāc). The eyes, ears, nostrils and mouth are the seven prāṇas mentioned in 7.5.2.8—12 and the same list, with speech substituted for mouth, is found in 9.3.1.10—12. Hence, when prāṇa diversifies in the body it manifests as both vital forces (the five prāṇas) and perceptual faculties.

This is not all, for, as we might expect from the inclusion of manas among the list of prāṇas, prāṇa is also the source, if not the substance of mentation. Thus, "... Savitṛ is the mind and the thoughts are the vital airs ...", 24 and "... the divine inspirers doubtless are the vital airs, for these inspire all thoughts ...". 25

A similar sentiment is found in $A.\overline{A}$. 2.3.5, where we are told that:

... the self that is speech is imperfect, since a man understands if driven to thought by breath (prāṇa), not if driven by speech.²⁶

Thus, in many parts of pre-Upanisadic Vedic literature the vitalistic principle, $pr\bar{a}na$, is presented as the self-existent source of everything, the ground or being of ephemeral mortal forms. It is diversified as $pr\bar{a}na$, $ap\bar{a}na$, etc., the perceptual faculties and, possibly, thoughts. One who knows this, who knows the deity, knows the supreme $pr\bar{a}na$, knows the immortal (which is the true essence of a person) and attains immortality. We have here, then, the same salvific scheme that dominates the Upanisads. At the heart of this scheme, however, resides the vital principle, the $pr\bar{a}na$, not $\bar{a}tman$ or Brahman.

Prāṇa as an ultimate principle in the Upanisads

An examination of all references to *prāṇa* in the *Upaniṣads* reveals that the prominent view is quite similar to that already outlined with regard to pre-*Upaniṣadic* literature: *prāṇa* is the primeval source of all and the immortal inner essence of individuals which manifests in the body as the various breaths (*apāṇa*, etc.) and faculties. In a number of instances this is presented in an unambiguous manner, in others, however, close analysis is required to demonstrate their espousal of such a view.

However, this is not the only view of prāṇa to be found in the Upanisads. In a number of places it is presented as what I shall call a cosmic principle, i.e. one which is derived from the fundamental principle but which itself is the source of further manifestations at the level of phenomenal or individualised existence. In yet other places we find accounts of prāṇa only as it appears at the phenomenal level. In some cases these could be taken to be statements about the phenomenal manifestation of a higher principle which is assumed but not referred to. In others, however, it is clear that the author(s) are operating with a different model of existence than that assumed in the passages referred to above and that, in these instances, prāṇa does not have the high status ascribed to it by the other accounts.

Clearly the characterisation of prāṇa as a cosmic or phenomenal principle by Vedāntins such as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja can be supported by reference to the above-mentioned passages, e.g. B.A.U. 1.2; C.U. 1.1, 3.12–18 and 6; T.U. 1–3; Katha Upaniṣad 4 and 5; P.U. 3; Mait. U. 2.6–7. Nevertheless, by far the most frequent way of presenting prāṇa in the Upaniṣads is as an ultimate principle. Many of these accounts are picked out for consideration by Bādarāyaṇa because of their 'problematic' nature (i.e. they present prāṇa, not ātman or Brahman, as the ultimate principle). His hermeneutical strategy in the Brahmasūtra is essentially designed to show

that *Upanisadic* teachers who presented *prāṇa* as the ultimate did not really mean what they said. In their own ways Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja echo this sentiment. My aim in this section is to demonstrate that Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and other Vedāntins who followed them have, in fact, distorted the message of the above-mentioned teachers.

Passages in the *Upaniṣads* where *prāṇa* is presented as an ultimate principle can be divided into two groups: straightforward and metaphorical. The straightforward passages are *B.A.U.* 1.6.1–3, 2.3.1–6, 3.9, 4.4.7 and 4.4.22; *C.U.* 3.15.4, 4.3.1–4, 4.10.4–5 and chapter 7; *P.U.* 2; *Muṇḍ. U.* 3.1.4 and *Kauṣ. U.* 4.20. The metaphorical passages are those which present the various faculties arguing about their respective status, particularly about which of them is supreme: *B.A.U.* 1.3, 1.5.22 and 6.1.1–14; *C.U.* 1.2.1–14 and 5.1.1–15; *Kauṣ. U.* 2.14 and 3.3, and *P.U.* 2.1–13. Of these *B.A.U.* 1.3 and *C.U.* 1.2.1–14 are versions of the same account. The same is true for *B.A.U.* 6.1.1–14 and *C.U.* 5.1.1–15.

Some of the straightforward passages offer simple statements about the ultimacy of *prāṇa*, e.g. *prāṇa* is everything (*C.U.* 3.15.4, *Kath. U.* 2.3.2); *prāṇa* is Brahman (*C.U.* 4.10.4–5); *prāṇa* is the *ātman* (*Muṇḍ. U.* 3.14). Others develop related themes from different perspectives and these warrant more detailed discussion.

One theme is that of the two aspects of the ultimate: an unmanifest and a manifest; an immortal and a mortal; a mobile and an immobile; a transcendent and an existent; the one god and the many gods (B.A.U.2.3.1-6,3.9). In every case $pr\bar{a}na$ is identified with the first item in each pair.

Another theme is that of the single source and the many manifestations. Thus, in B.A.U. 3.9, where it is stated that prāṇa is the one god (eka deva), we are told that the 33 gods are but manifestations of that one god and that the eleven Rudras are the ten prāṇas (prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna, vāc, cakṣus, śrotra, nāsā, manas?) and ātman (here meaning body or, possibly, ego (ego/personality). Atman (self) is declared to be none of these prānas (neti, neti). This latter ātman is obviously to be distinguished from the eleventh of the prānas and would thus seem to equate with the one god, the prāna, which has the prānas as its manifestations. Similarly, B.A.U. 4.3-4 equates ātman, Brahman and prāna. This ātman/Brahman/prāna is the light within the heart, abides in the space within the heart, is immortal, is the lord, controller and ruler of all and is the one made of consciousness among the prānas (vijñānamaya prānesu). This ātman/Brahman/prāna has, as its manifestations, vijnāna, manas, prāna, cakṣus, śrotra, pṛthivī, apas, vāyu, ākāśa, tejas, atejas, kāma, akāma, krodha, akrodha, dharma, adharma and everything (sarvamaya). The gods worship it as the light of lights (*jyotiṣām jyotiḥ*) and as life immortal (*āyuramṛta*).

The equation of $\bar{a}tman$, Brahman and $pr\bar{a}na$ can also be deduced from a consideration of verses which connect with B.A.U. 2.3.6, where it states that "... the $pr\bar{a}na$ s are truth and this (eṣa) is the truth of those (teṣām)." This $pr\bar{a}na$ which is the truth of the truth is the person in the right eye, the

essence of the truth. In B.A.U. 2.1.20 ātman is described as the truth of truth (satyasya satyam) and in C.U. 4.15.1 as the person seen in the eye, who is without fear, immortal, Brahman.

The final passage presenting prana as an ultimate principle that I will comment on is C.U. 7. This chapter does not, on the surface, present prana as an ultimate principle for it distinguishes it from ātman. However, in my opinion this view has been redacted into an original account which presented prāṇa as the ultimate principle. The chapter deals with Sanatkumāra's instructions to Nārada on the progressive worship of Brahman. The teaching begins with the statement that worshipping Brahman as name $(n\bar{a}ma)$ is quite legitimate. However, we are told that speech $(v\bar{a}c)$ is greater than name; in turn, mind (manas) is greater than speech; will (samkalpa) is greater than mind; thought (citta) is greater than will; contemplation (dhyāna) is greater than thought; understanding (vijñāna) is greater than contemplation; strength (bala) is greater than understanding; food (anna) is greater than strength; water (ap) is greater than food; heat (tejas) is greater than water; ether (ākāśa) is greater than heat; memory (smara) is greater than ether; hope $(\bar{a} \pm \bar{a})$ is greater than memory; breath/life (prāna) is greater than hope.

At this point the narrative changes. Whereas each of the preceding sections ended with the words "Venerable Sir, is there anything greater than ...? Yes, there is something greater than ... Do, Venerable Sir, tell me that ..." section 15, where it is stated that $pr\bar{a}na$ is greater than $a\bar{s}a\bar{a}$, ends with:

Prāṇa is all this. Verily, he who sees this, thinks this, understands this, becomes an excellent speaker [ativādin]. Even if people should say to him, 'you are an excellent speaker', he should not deny it.²⁷

The following section introduces a different kind of treatment, where concepts such as truth (satya), understanding (vijñāna) and faith (śraddhā) are described. It is clear that this set of verses forms part of a different analysis than that offered by the first set. Instead of commenting on the relative merits of the different concepts Sanatkumāra introduces them as being desirable to understand. Hence, each of the sections from sixteen to twenty-three, which introduces the concept of the infinite (bhūma), ends with the words "Venerable Sir, I desire to understand ...". The infinite is described in the following two verses, after which we read in 25.1, "Now next, the instruction with regard to the self-sense (ahamkāra)." The following verse (25.2) introduces "the instruction in regard to the self (ātman)", which is described as being "this all". Then, in 26.1, we are told that prāṇa springs from the ātman (ātmatah prāṇah), hope (āśā) springs from the self, memory springs from the self and so on back down the list in 7.1.3–15.

What is peculiar about 26.1 is that none of the qualities listed between 16.1 and 25.1 are mentioned as springing from the self. This creates a distinct sense of discontinuity. The continuity can be restored, however, by

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taking 7.25.2 and 7.26.1 and placing them immediately after 7.15.4. In fact, this is what William Beidler does in his interpretation of this chapter though he does not indicate that he is doing so. The only problem with such a move is that 7.15.4 and 7.25.2 seem to contradict each other. The former states that prāna is everything (prāna hy evaitāni sarvāni bhavati); the latter makes an almost identical claim about ātman (ātmaivedam sarvam iti) whilst at the same time, in the next verse, stating that prāna is derived from the ātman. It is this incompatiliblty which, I would suggest, explains why 7.16-25 was interpolated at this point. If the redactor wanted to subordinate prāna to ātman it would be foolish for him simply to add 7.25.2 and 7.26.1 onto 7.15.4 for the incompatibility just discussed would be readily apparent. What better way to disguise it than by creating a break between the statement exhalting prana and that exhalting atman? If the interpolation could have a style which created the impression of continuity all the better. This, I would suggest, is exactly what we have here: an original text presenting prāna as the ultimate principle which has been modified by two additions. One of these begins either halfway through 7.25.1, where ahamkāra is introduced, or at 7.25.2, where ātman is introduced. The purpose of this addition is to subordinate all the principles mentioned in 7.1-15 to the ātman. The second addition comprises 7.16 to 7.24.2 or 7.16 to 7.25. The purpose of this addition is to obscure the incompatibility of the statements in 7.15.4 and 7.25.3. C.U. 7.1-15 thus constitutes a complete unit in its own right and presents prāṇa as the ultimate principle.

The view of prāṇa presented above finds its clearest Upaniṣadic expression in the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad, the only early Upaniṣad not commented on by Śaṅkara. In Kauṣ. U. 4.20 Ajātasātru teaches Dṛpta Bālāki of the Gargya clan, as he did in B.A.U. 2.1.17. The teaching is that during sleep speech (vāc) together with all names, eye (cakṣus) together with all forms, ear (śrotra) together with all sounds and mind (manas) together with all thoughts enter the prāṇa. On waking, the prāṇas proceed from the self (atman = prāṇa), the gods (deva) from the prāṇas and the worlds (loka) from the gods. We are then told that the prāṇa, the intelligence-self (prajñātman) enters the bodily self (śarīrātman) up to the hairs and nails like a razor in a razor case: "on that self these other selves depend as upon a chief his own men".29

It is clear that there is much in common between this passage and B.A.U. 1.4.7. It seems likely that one borrowed from the other or that they both drew on a common srouce. The Kausitaki account is more detailed and makes it clear that the ātman/Brahman of B.A.U. 1.4.7. and 10 is the prāṇa/prajñātman, this last term being used to indicate the supreme self in A.U. 3. Similarly, the context in which these equations occur is also found at B.A.U. 2.17 where the term vijñāna-maya-puruṣa is employed to refer to the ātman. It would appear, then, that the terms prāṇa, ātman, prajñātman, vijñāna-maya-puruṣa and Brahman were regarded as being synonymous in meaning by a number of Upaniṣadic teachers. This Kauṣītaki account, because it

draws the various elements from other places together, thus gives substance to what elsewhere was simply inference.

The other passages where prana is presented as an ultimate principle I have dubbed metaphorical. They deal in different ways with a contest between the various faculties for supreme status. By and large, these accounts reiterate what has been said above about the nature of prana in pre-Upanisadic and Upanisadic literature. They can thus be seen to support my interpretation of that material. In these stories prāna is presented as a major cosmic principle or as the one ultimate principle from which all else derives. At the material level of creation it diversifies itself to produce both the physical aspects of existence and the more subtle aspects which animate the physical ones. All these accounts describe the subtle manifestations in terms of the sensory faculties plus mind (manas), speech (vāc) and breath (prāṇa), the manifestation most directly derived from and closest in nature to the original cosmic prāṇa. Almost every account makes prāṇa an immortal principle and the Kauṣītaki accounts make it the intelligence self (prajnātman) and the self (ātman). Hence, as in the pre-Upanisadic accounts, prāna gives rise to mentation - through the manas - and, perhaps expressed more clearly here than in the earlier material, it is that reality which can be described as consciousness or intelligence (prajñā) or as self (ātman).

The Vitalistic Blueprint

It is clear from the foregoing that within the *Vedic* tradition a considerable number of teachers regarded *prāṇa* as the ultimate principle of existence, the immortal source and foundation of everything else, the inner controller of all living beings, unitary in itself but diversified within beings in a variety of ways. Knowledge of this immortal, unitary *prāṇa* constitutes the goal of the religious life. Yet *prāṇa* is not the only term employed to designate this ultimate principle. In the *Upaniṣads* descriptions that are virtually identical to those of *prāṇa* mentioned previously can be found associated with the terms *ātman* and Brahman. The main passages offering such descriptions are *B.A.U.* 1.4.7, 2.1.17, and 4.1.2; *A.U.* 1.2; *Mait. U.* 6.1–3, and 8, and *Kena U.* 1.

B.A. U. 1.4.7

The Brāhmana of which this verse is a part opens with the words ātmaivedam agra āsit purusavidhah: "In the beginning this (world) was only the self (ātman), in the shape of a person." The following verses then describe the process of creation through the bifurcation of the self into man and woman. These transform successfully into all living forms. Verse five then informs us that "he became the creation" (tatah sṛṣṭir abhavat) and verse seven that at the time 'this' was unmanifest (tadhedam tarhy avyākṛtam āsit), it became manifest

through name and form ($n\bar{a}mar\bar{u}pa$). He (the $\bar{a}tman$) entered that which had become manifest,

even to the tips of the nails, as a razor is (hidden) in the razor case, or as fire in the fire source. Him they see not for (as seen) he is incomplete, when breathing he is called breath ($pr\bar{a}na$), when speaking voice ($v\bar{a}c$), when seeing eye (caksus), when hearing ear (srotra) when thinking mind (manas). These are merely the names of his acts ... The self is to be meditated upon for in it all those become one.³¹

In verse ten, echoing verse one, we are told that in the beginning this (self? world?) was Brahman (brahma vā idam agra āsit). This Brahman, like ātman in verse one, became the whole creation (tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat). These verses thus serve to equate ātman and Brahman. The whole section, however, is highly reminiscent of statements about prāṇa who, as seen, is incomplete, who manifests as prāṇa, vāc, cakṣus, śrotra and manas and who is ultimately the unitary immortal source of all. In other words, the pattern employed in this text to establish ātman/Brahman as the fundamental principle is one which is clearly modelled on earlier accounts of the nature of prāṇa.

B.A.U. 2.1.17

This verse describes how the $vij\bar{n}\bar{a}na-maya-puruṣa$ (the person made of consciousness) takes the consciousness ($vij\bar{n}\bar{a}nam$) of the $pr\bar{a}nas$, here referring to the various faculties, into itself and resides in the space within the heart ($antar-hrdaya-\bar{a}k\bar{a}\dot{s}\dot{a}$) during sleep. The verse ends with the statement "when the breath ($pr\bar{a}na$) is restrained, speech ($v\bar{a}c$) is restrained, the eye (cakşus) is restrained, the ear (frotra) is restrained, the mind (frotra) is restrained." Verse twenty indicates that this $vij\bar{n}\bar{a}na-maya-puruṣa$ is, in fact, the $frotrat{a}tman$, from which come all $frotrat{a}tman$, all worlds ($frotrat{b}ta$), all deities ($frotrat{a}tman$) and their truth is this ($frotrat{a}tman$)". 32

Here again we have the connection between the $pr\bar{a}nas$ (faculties/vital breaths) and the self ($\bar{a}tman$). The relationship between the two is identical to that which in other contexts operates between the unitary $pr\bar{a}na$ and the diversified $pr\bar{a}nas$.

B.A. U. 4.1-2

There are seven verses in the first *Brāhmana* of this chapter, for which Radhakrishnan provides the sub-heading "Inadequate definitions of Brahman".³³ It is part of Yājñavalkya's teaching. Here he asks King Janaka of Videha what other teachers have said about the highest Brahman (*parama brahman*). Upon receiving this request Janaka states that Jitvan Śailini says "speech (*vāc*) is the highest Brahman", Udanka Śaulbāyana says "breath (*prāna*) is the highest Brahman", Barka Vārṣṇa

says "the eye (caksus) is the highest Brahman", Gardhabhivipita Bhāradvāja says "the ear (śrotra) is the highest Brahman", Satyakāma Jabāla says "the heart (hrdaya) is [the highest] Brahman". To all these claims Yājñavalkya has just one reply: "This Brahman is only one-footed, Your Majesty", i.e. it is incomplete or inadequate.

However, Yājñavalkya himself makes no statements about the nature of the highest Brahman. Rather, in 4.2 he asks Janaka where he will go after death. Janaka admits his ignorance and asks Yājñavalka to enlighten him. Yājñavalka points out the person in the right eye is Indra (İndha) and the person in the left eye is his wife (Virā). These two are united in the space within the heart and move in that channel $(n\bar{a}d\bar{i})$ which goes upward from the heart. Nourishment flows to them through the channels (hitah) of the heart. "Therefore that (self composed of *Indha* and *Virā*) is, as it were, an eater of finer food than the bodily self (śarira ātman)."34 The next verse (v.4) then states that his (the self's) western side are the western breaths, the eastern side, the eastern breaths, etc. but the self (ātman) is not this, not this (neti, neti); (see C.U. 3.13.1-6 for a correlation between individual breaths and each of the five directions). The ātman is then described in exactly the same words that are found in the description of the ātman in B.A.U. 3.9.26: it is incomprehensible, indestructible, unattached, unfettered, free from suffering and injury.

These two *Brāhmaṇas* constitute what is obviously a version of the competition of the faculties. *Vāc*, *prāṇa*, *cakṣus*, *śrotra*, *manas* and, here, *hṛdaya* are all deemed to be incomplete expressions of Brahman. The complete expression appears to be *ātman*, who is said to be none of the *prāṇas* (here linked with the various directions; in 3.9 stated to be *prāṇa*, *apāṇa* etc.) and to be incomprehensible etc. Again, there can be little doubt that the manner of introducing and describing the *ātman* is modelled on other accounts where the unitary *prāṇa* occupies the place of the *ātman*. Here, however, instead of the *ātman* which is *prāṇa* occupying the body completely like a razor in a razor case, as in *Kauṣ U*. 4.20, it abides in the heart.

A.U. 1.2

This is complex text which is difficult to interpret but, given the foregoing analysis of other *Upaniṣadic* passages and the argument set out below, its status as an account of the nature of ātman which is 'modelled' on similar accounts of the nature of prāṇa is not difficult to appreciate. The story line is that of the ātman creating the universe. First he creates the worlds (loka), which are water (ambhas), light space or light rays (marīci), death (māra) and water (apas). Water (ambhas) is above heaven or sky (dyaus), which is its support. The light space (marīci) is the atmosphere; death (māra) is the earth (pṛthivī) and beneath that are the waters (apas). Many translators take the following verses to teach that puruṣa was then created out of the waters by the self. The text reads "so 'dbhya eva puruṣam samudhṛtyāmūrchayat", "55 and this

could legitimately be rendered as something like, "from out of these (udbhya-ablative plural) he took and gave form to the puruṣa". In other words, the puruṣa was derived from all the worlds created by the self and not just from the waters. Then the ātman broods over (abhyatapa) the puruṣa and 'hatches' (nirabhidyata) the world guardians (lokapāla), which are the various faculties and phenomena, from the parts of the puruṣa's body. The pattern of derivation can be set out as follows:

mouth (mukha)	\rightarrow	speech $(v\bar{a}c)$ \rightarrow	fire (agnı)
nostrils (nāsike)		breath (<i>prāṇa</i>)	wind (vāyu)
eyes (aksini)		sight (cakṣus)	the sun $(\bar{a}ditya)$
ears (kamu)		hearing (śrotra)	directions (diśā)
skin (tvac)		hairs (loma)	plants and trees (osadhivanaspatya)
heart (<i>hṛd</i>)		mind (manas)	moon (candra)
navel (nabhi)		digestive faculty (apāna)	death (mṛtya)
phallus (śiśna)		semen (reta)	waters $(\bar{a}pa)$

Once created, these divinities (devata): speech, fire, breath, wind, sight, sun, hearing, directions, hairs, plants and trees, mind, moon, digestive faculty, death, semen and waters, all fall into (prāpatan) the great ocean (mahatyamava) where they experience hunger and thirst. They then ask the ātman to find them somewhere to become established (pratisthita) and eat food. They are offered a cow and then a horse but both are deemed to be inadequate. Then the/a puruṣa is offered and this is found to be an acceptable home. Each of the principles/deities in the right hand column enters the one from which it was derived and these, in turn, enter into the parts of puruṣa's body from whence they came. Hunger and thirst, however, are then left without an abode, so the ātman allows them to enter the puruṣa along with the other principles/deities. Finally, the ātman produces material form (mūrti) from the water(s) (a/āpa) and this acts as food.

We are then presented with a version of the contest of the faculties. Food tries to escape being consumed by the *purusa*, who tries to seize it with each of his faculties in turn: speech, breath, sight, hearing, skin, mind, generative organ and digestive faculty (*apāna*).³⁶ It is the digestive faculty alone that is able to seize the food. Then comes a peculiar statement: "Vāyu is the grasper of food, Vāyu is the one who lives on food." Vāyu, of course, is derived from *prāṇa* in the first list so why it is introduced at this point is unclear.

So constituted, the individual purusa seems to be complete. It is a microcosm of the macrocosm and has the ability, indicated by the list of derivations, to apprehend phenomena and satisfy the needs of hunger and thirst. The ātman wonders how (or whether) the purusa, as it is constituted, can live

without him. He then considers the means by which he could enter this being and dismisses each of the routes listed in columns one and two since he does not identify himself (solely?) with any faculty or part of the body. He thus decides to enter through the door called 'the cleft' (vidṛti), located at the crown of the head (sīman). Once inside, he perceives 'this very person – 'etam eva puruṣa' (i.e. himself?) as brahma tataman' (just that supreme one). The following verse tells us that this perceiver (the ātman) is Indra, whose abode is often stated to be in the right eye.

The purpose of the whole chapter seems to be the presentation of a view which not only makes the self the source of all existence but also makes external phenomena derive from the *puruṣa*. The facts that the *ātman* is the ultimate identity of all the worlds, faculties and phenomena, that he enters the body through the top of head and that he is identified with Indra all remind one of *prāṇa*, which in other contexts does all these things and has all these characteristics.

The final chapter of this *Upaniṣad*, just four verses long, supports this connection. It provides information about the nature of the *ātman*. The sanskrit is not clear, however, and verse one could be either a series of questions and answers or just a series of questions.

Hume points out that all the published texts of this Upanisad open with the words ko 'yam though Müller, Bohtlingk and Deussen amend it to ko yam. Given the context, I would favour the amendation for the issue would then be cast in familiar mould: that of the faculties competing. Hence, verse one would read:

Who is he whom we worship as the ātman? Which one is the ātman? [Is it he] by whom one sees, or [he] by whom one hears, or [he] by whom one smells odours, or [he] by whom one speaks speech, or [he] by whom one distinguishes between the sweet and the unsweet?

The impled answer is 'None of these', and this would certainly fit with the conclusions of all other similar competitions. However, instead of straightforward answers, verse two provides a list of mental phenomena, all of which are stated to be names of intelligence (prajnāna). Verse three then informs us that this prajnāna is everything. It is Brahman, Indra, Prajāpati and all the gods. It is the five elements, the foundation (pratisthita) of all things, the guide or eye (netra) of all things. The final verse tells us that 'he', '37' by means of the intelligence-self (prajnātman), left this world and, having obtained all his desires in the world of heaven, became immortal (svarge loka sarvān kāmān aptvāmṛtaḥ samabhavat). '38

The prajñātman thus seems to be the self referred to in verse one. Such a conclusion would put this text in agreement with the other *Upaniṣad* of the Rgveda, the Kauṣītaki, in employing the term prajñātman to refer to the supreme self. There, of course, the prajñātman is explicitly equated with prāṇa and such an equation would not be out of character here. If so, we see,

once again, that the concept of *prāna* has been employed as a kind of blue-print for the presentation of *ātman* as the supreme principle.

Mait. U. 6.1-3 and 8

He (the self) bears himself in two ways, as he who is breath (praṇa) and he who is the sun (āditya). Yonder sun, verily is the outer self; the inner self is breath ... There are, assuredly, two forms of Brahman, the formed and the formless. Now that which is formed is unreal (asatya); that which is formless is the real (satya); that is the Brahman, that is the light. That which is the light is the sun ... The self (ātman) is the lord (īśāna), the beneficent (śambhu), the real (bhava), the terrible (rudra), the lord of creation (prajāpati), the creator of all (viśvasyk), the golden germ (hiranyagarbha), truth (satya), life (prāṇa), spirit (haṃsa), the ordainer (śāstā), the pervader (viṣṇu), Nārāyaṇa [abode of man], the shining (arka), [the] vivifier (savita), the upholder (dhātā), the maker (vidhātā), sovereign (samrāj) Indra, the moon (indur) ... He who has all forms, the golden one, who is all-knowing, the final goal, the only light, who gives heat, the thousand rayed, abiding in a hundred places, the life (prāṇa) of creatures, the yonder sun, rises.³⁹

Once again, the concept of self ($\bar{a}tman$) as it is presented in this material appears to be employed as a synonym for the unitary $pr\bar{a}na$. In the Śatapatha $Br\bar{a}hmana$ Agni is often put in the same role as the unitary $pr\bar{a}na$. Hence, in Ś.B. 10.3.3 I-8 we are told that Agni manifests in the body as speech, eye (sight), mind (mentation), ear (hearing) and 'the agni who is everything here': $pr\bar{a}na$. This is exactly the kind of statement which, elsewhere, describes the manifestation of the unitary $pr\bar{a}na$ in the body. The first four pass into $pr\bar{a}na$ during sleep and emerge again on waking. Cosmically, fire corresponds to speech, the sun to the eye, the moon to the mind, the ear to the quarters and Vāyu to $pr\bar{a}na$. Similar correspondences are found throughout the Śatapatha $Br\bar{a}hmana$. Numerous references make Agni, Vāyu, (or $pr\bar{a}na$) and Āditya the three principal manifestations of Agni⁴⁰ and in other places there are statements about Agni which exactly parallel those made about the $\bar{a}tman$ in the above-quoted Upanisadic text, namely that Agni is the sun ($\bar{a}ditya$) in the cosmos and breath ($pr\bar{a}na$) in the individual.

In this *Upanisadic* passage the sun (āditya) is the formless (amūrta) and real or true (satya) aspect (rūpa) of Brahman. In B.A.U. 2.3.1–6 we have a similar account. Here the formless (amūrta) and real or true (sat) aspects (rūpa) of Brahman are prāna. Taking all this information together it is clear that although it is not explicit in the text the author is drawing on a range of established associations and equivalences where the unitary Agni, the unitary prāna and the ātman can all be equated. This Agni/prāna/ātman is the real, unformed Brahman, the supreme principle which manifests as a variety of cosmic and individualized phenomena. In the final analysis, however, all these manifestations are unreal (asat or asatya).

Kena Up. 1

Brahman is described as the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, the speech of the speech, the eye of the eye and the prāṇa of the prāṇa (1.2). Brahman is not expressed through speech but is that by which speech is expressed; is not thought by the mind but is that by which the mind thinks; is not seen by the eye but is that by which the eye sees; is not heard by the ear but is that by which the ear hears; is not breathed by the breath (prāṇa) but is that by which the breath breathes. A later verse of the same Upaniṣad (3.1) tells us that Brahman once conquered for the devas and they gloried in his conquest (a reference to B.A.U. 1.3 and C.U. 1.2. 1–14 where prāṇa defeats the asuras?). It would appear, therefore, that here again we have an example of the prāṇa concept being employed as a 'model' for the description of Brahman.

Conclusion

Overall, I think the foregoing analyses demonstrate that, in some *Upaniṣadic* circles at least, the concepts of $\bar{a}tman$ and Brahman were developed on the basis of already existing conceptions of $pr\bar{a}na$. I am not claiming, however, that *Upaniṣadic* accounts of $\bar{a}tman$ and Brahman are always to be understood in this way. Some *Upaniṣads*, such as the $\bar{I}s\bar{a}$ and the $M\bar{a}nd\bar{u}kya$, do not mention $pr\bar{a}na$ at all and it could hardly be argued that their presentation of $\bar{a}tman$ and Brahman are derived from descriptions of $pr\bar{a}na$. The same applies to the $\hat{S}vet\bar{a}svatara$ *Upaniṣad* which mentions $pr\bar{a}na$ only once (2.9). Despite these qualifications it is obvious, in the light of the foregoing that the characterization of $pr\bar{a}na$ as found in the writings of Bādārayaṇa, Śankara, Rāmānuja and other classical Vedāntins constitutes a far from accurate interpretation of the *Upaniṣads*.

Just why these influential Vedānta teachers were so rigorous in their denial of any equation between $\bar{a}tman/B$ rahman and $pr\bar{a}na$ is a complex issue in itself but one explanation which links with later developments is that the $pr\bar{a}na$ concept is not philosophically user-friendly. It has already been noted how the meaning of the term $pr\bar{a}na$ changes according to the level of description being employed, and this makes it difficult for philosophers to use it in a precise way. It should be mentioned that the same was true of $\bar{a}tman$ in the pre-Upaniṣadic literature, where it had a range of meanings from trunk, through body to self, breath and spirit. By the time of the Upaniṣads though, it had lost its more physical meanings.

Prāṇa is also a dynamic reality, constantly moving, constantly changing. For the later Vedāntins such an entity could not be truly real. For them, only that which did not change could be real. Linked with this is the fact that the Vedānta tradition came increasingly under the influence of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. Although the author of the Brahmasūtra and theologians such as Śaṅkara frequently criticize the Sāṃkhya school for

being unorthodox, a general pattern that can be discerned is that the later the Vedāntin text the more Sāṃkhya concepts are assimilated.

This process can be traced back at least as far as the Katha Upanisad, and there is plenty of evidence from the great epic, the Mahābhārata, that Vedic versions of Sāmkhya existed alongside non-Vedic ones. The former were promulgated by brahmins; subscribed to the view that purusa was single and unitary; incorporated the Vedic gods into their systems; and reckoned that a householder could gain release as well as a renouncer. The latter criticized the brahmins for conducting animal sacrifices and thus breaking the code of ahiṇṣsā; subscribed to the view that there were many purusas; made no reference to gods in their descriptions of the world; and emphasized the importance of renunciation.

The Sāṃkhya cosmology is very orderly. One *tattva* (principle) emerges from another in a pre-determined order; the faculties (*indriya*) are neatly divided into two sets of five: the faculties of perception (*buddhāndriyas*) on the one hand, and the faculties of action (*karmendriyas*) on the other; the *puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya is immutable, not subject to change.

Sāmkhya thus appeals to an orderly philosophical mind and its highest principle, puruṣa, is immutable. In fact, later Vedāntins tend to take Upaniṣadic references to prānas as references to the indriyas of Sāmkhya. However, scrutiny of Upaniṣadic passages referring to prāna reveals that the lists of prānas in the Upaniṣads never include the karmendriyas of Sāmkhya. This shows just how far the later Vedāntins were prepared to go in the direction of misrepresenting Upaniṣadic teachings in the service of their own ideas.

A study of references to *prāna* in the *Brahmasūtra* and in the writings of Śańkara and Rāmānuja, the two most influential Vedānta teachers, reveals much the same thing. As mentioned earlier, the primary task of the author or authors of the *Brahmasūtra* was to deal with problematic passages from the *Upaniṣads*, that is, passages that were difficult to interpret within the framework of emerging Vedānta philosophy.

Most of these problematic passages dealing with $pr\bar{a}na$ are, in fact, those presenting $pr\bar{a}na$ as the ultimate principle or where $pr\bar{a}na$ seems to be the source of mentation or cognition. In all cases, the aim of Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja is the same: to claim that the *Upaniṣadic* teachers did not mean what they said when they described $pr\bar{a}na$ as the source of everything or identified it with $\bar{a}tman$ or $br\bar{a}hman$. Consequently, the literature of the Vedānta school (except the Upaniṣads themselves) has little to say on the concept of $pr\bar{a}na$. When it is mentioned it is usually to comment that $pr\bar{a}na$ is a purely phenomenal principle which has nothing to do with sentience or cognition.

With these considerations in mind, a rather bold and provocative conclusion seems appropriate. It is this. On the subject of *prāṇa* the great Vedānta commentators wilfully misrepresented the teachings of the

Upaniṣads. By doing so they rendered a great disservice to those who turn to them for guidance when seeking to understand the message of those ancient scriptures.

Notes

- 1. Deutsch, 1969, p. 9.
- 2. See, for example, their commentaries on *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.23(24); 1.1.28–31 (29–32); 1.3.39 (40–4) and 1.4.16–18. Numbers in parentheses refer to Rāmānuja's arrangement
- 3. Ewing, 1903, p. 9.
- 4. Whitney, 1905, pp. 632-3.
- Keith, 1969 [1925], p. 205.
- 6. *Op. cit.* p. 201.
- Op. cit. p. 206.
- 8. See loc. cit.
- 9. Loc. cit.
- 10. Loc. cit.
- II. Loc. cit in.
- 12. *Op. cit.* p. 208.
- 13. *Op. cit.* p. 213. 14. *Op. cit.* p. 220.
- 15. Ewing, 1903, p. 7.
- 16. Loc. cit
- 17. Eggeling, 1882, (1) p. 121.
- 18. Idem, 1895, (4) p. 144.
- 19. Idem, 1900, (5) p. 3 cf. 5.2.4.10 and 11.1.2.3.
- 20. 7.5.1.22.
- 21. 1.3.2.3, 8.3.4.5, 10.2.6.15 and 10.3.1.5.
- 22. 8.2.2.8.
- 23. 8.1.4.1, 8.7.2.14, 8.7.3.6.
- 24. 6.3.1.13 and 15.
- 25. 7.1.1.24.
- 26. Keith, 1969 [1925]. p. 220.
- 27. Radhakrishnan, 1953, pp. 468-83.
- 28. *Op. cit.* p. 487.
- 29. Radhakrishnan, 1953, p. 791. This passage makes the existence of the worlds (loka) dependent on the gods (deva) which, in turn, are dependent on the prāṇas (prāṇa, apāṇa, etc.) which, in turn, are dependent on prāṇa/prajñātman. Such an arrangement reverses the common Upanisadic pattern of emphasizing cosmology over psychology by making the cosmos (the adhidaivata realm) dependent on the individual (the adhyātma realm).
- 30. Op. cit. p. 163.
- 31. Op. cit. p. 166 (slightly amended).
- 32. My translation.
- 33. Radhakrishnan, 1953, p. 246.
- 34. Op. cit. p. 253.
- 35. Op. cit. p. 515.
- 36. We may note here that whilst speech, breath, etc. all come from column two, skin and generative organ come from column one. Furthermore, the order of digestive faculty and generative organ are reversed in the 'seizing' list. Exactly why skin replaces hairs here is not clear. Radhakrishnan suggests that 'touch' is what is implied. The reason why touch, which would have been the most logical entry in column two, was initially displaced by hairs was probably that the author (or redactor) wanted to get 'oṣadhivanaspaṭya' into column three and this would seem to be a peculiar derivation from touch. The reason for the reversal of sisna and apāna is more obvious. The writer wanted to end the list with the only successful faculty. The reason for the original order would seem to be the simple physical progression from higher to lower: heart, navel, and phallus.

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- 37. Purusa or ātman, not, as many commentators suggest, Vāmadeva.
- 38. Radhakrishnan, 1953, p. 524.
- 39. Op. cit. pp. 816-7 and 821-2.
- 40. e.g. 6.3.3.16; 6.7.4.4; 7.1.1.22-23; 8.5.2.8; 9.1.1.23; 9.2.1.21 and 10.6.2.1-11.

Abbreviations

$A.ar{A}.$	A itareya $ar{A}$ ranya k a
A.U.	Aitareya Upanisad
B.A.U.	Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad
C.U.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Kath. U.	Katha Upanisad
Kauṣ. U.	Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad
Mait. U.	Maitri Upanisad
Mund. U	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
P.U.	Praśna Upanisad
Ś.B.	Śatapatha Brāhmana
T.U.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad

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