


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Consolation and a parable: two contacts between Ancient Greece and Buddhists

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Preamble

The war between claimants that Buddhism provided inspiration for the canonical gospels and enemies of all such notions, commencing about 1880, was at its height about 1916, pausing for breath during the First World War. It rumbled on into 1995.¹ Dr. Christian Lindtner finds in St. Matthew actual translations of Buddhist Sanskrit texts, to the annoyance of Buddhologists. The prudent hold their fire, awaiting fresh ammunition.² About a hundred parallels hitherto detected, as between New-Testament passages and Buddhist texts can be classified as startling, impressive, suggestive, and feeble. They remain irritants despite problems of chronology and self-serving prejudices. The protagonists in this warfare can be classified as: ‘maximalists’,³ who find a Buddhist idea beneath innumerable Christian verses; ‘minimalists’,⁴ who grudgingly admit that some ‘influence’ must have occurred; and ‘nihilists’,⁵ who deplore all suggestions of contact between the first Christian missionaries and their seniors, their Buddhist counterparts. We are recommended to ridicule ‘pseudo-scholars’ and ‘third-rate minds’. Mentors of this writer’s youth were utter ‘nihilists’.

One ‘stand-off’ between ‘maximalists’ and ‘nihilists’ coincided with a resurgence of pro-Buddhist activity from certain sinologists. T. Richard (‘Timothy Richard of China’) summarized the Lotus Sutra in his *New Testament of Higher Buddhism*,⁶ which, annotated by the Hon. Mrs. Elizabeth A. Gordon with New-Testament texts of ‘varying degrees of approximation’, formed the basis for her *World-Healers, or the Lotus Gospel and its Bodhisattvas compared with early Christianity*,⁷ followed by her *Asian christology and the*

¹ R. Stehly, ‘Bouddhisme et Nouveau Testament. À propos de la marche de Pierre sur l’eau (Matthieu 14: 28s.)’, *Revue d’Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses*, 57, 1977: 433–7; N. Klatt, *Literarkritische Beiträge zum Problem Christlich-buddhistischer Parallelen* (Cologne: Brill, 1982); R. C. Amore, *Two Masters, one message* (Kuala Lumpur, 1985); E. R. Gruber and H. Kersten, *The original Jesus. The Buddhist sayings of Christ* (Eng. vers.; Shaftesbury: Element, 1995) (original title *Der Ur-Jesus. Die buddhistischen Quellen des Christentums* (Munich: Langenmüller, 1994).

² F. H. Hillyard, *The Buddha, the Prophet, and the Christ* (London: Allen, 1956). Albert Schweitzer was of this view.

³ R. Seydel, A. J. Edmunds and P. Carus. For their bibliographies see J. B. Aufhauser, *Buddha und Jesus in ihren Paralleltexen* (Bonn: Marcus & Weber, 1926); Gruber and Kersten, *Original*; J. D. M. Derrett, *The Bible and the Buddhists* (Bornato in Franciacorta: Sardini, 2000). A friend of Edmunds, but an original scholar, was E. W. Burlingame, an enthusiastic but not unqualified ‘maximalist’: see his *Buddhist Legends ... Dhammapada Commentary* (Harvard Oriental Studies, 28–30. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921, reprinted London: Pali Text Society, 1979).

⁴ W. O. E. Windisch, O. Pfeleiderer (*Conceptions of Christ*, 1905), G. A. van den Bergh van Eysinga, R. Garbe and P. Fiebig. See n. 3 above for bibliographies. M. Fuss, *Buddhavaçana and Dei Verbum* (Leiden: Brill, 1991) does not commit himself. Sympathetic minimalists include M. Winternitz, W. Kirfel (1956), and G. D’Alviella, *Ce que l’Inde doit à la Grèce. Des influences classiques dans la civilisation de l’Inde* (Paris: Geuthner, 2^e 1926).

⁵ J. E. Carpenter, C. R. E. von Hartman, G. W. Stewart (in Hastings’ *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, vol. 2, 1913: 287–8), C. F. Aiken, G. Faber, C. Clemen, K. Beth (a vehement ‘nihilist’). E. J. Thomas defected to ‘nihilism’ (*The life of Buddha as legend and history*, 3^e 1949, reprinted London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975: 248). L. de La Vallée Poussin and E. Lamotte were ‘nihilists’ of the highest calibre.

⁶ Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1910. Clark was and is a well-known publisher in biblical studies.

⁷ Revised edition, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Maruzen Kabushiki Kaisha, 1913).

Mahāyāna.⁸ Her work was admired by an Oxford professor of Chinese, W. E. Soothill, who, with Bunno Kato, produced *The Lotus of the Wonderful Law or the Lotus gospel. Saddharma Pundarika Sūtra. Miao-fa lien hua ching*.⁹ A more dithyrambic celebration of the (Mahāyāna) Lotus Sutra in the context of Christian mission could hardly be imagined.

Attempts to solve our problem are clouded by vested interests. The air clears once debate centres upon intercourse (apart from well-known fables) between Ancient Greece and the Indian cultural world (including Afghanistan). What was the arena of contact? When and how could reception have taken place? What were the states of the novelties which editors admired; and how did they handle them? Every parallel must be examined in depth and its exoticism calibrated.¹⁰ To plot the frontiers of Hellenism will always interest students of archaeology, of numismatics in particular, and the other plastic arts.

Now we examine two parallels not handled by protagonists. One (the vocabulary of consolation) illustrates traffic from West to East, the other (the maxim of the Lame and the Blind) the opposite motion. When foreign ideas are adopted they tend also to be adapted, as Christian preachers are known to have adapted pagan forms and motifs. The ground is already prepared. One explanation is agreed between a rabbinist and a hellenist:

Borrowings in religion, at least in the field of ideas, are usually in the nature of the appropriation of things in the possession of another which the borrower recognizes in all good faith as belonging to himself, ideas which, when once they become known to him, are seen to be the necessary implications or complements of his own.¹¹

Beside the clumsy *Quellenforscher* who presumes against any artist's being original,¹² a principal enemy to research is the familiar objection, 'Similar circumstances give rise to similar responses'—and the Golden Rule is an example. In fact identical problems can provoke varied solutions.¹³ Meanwhile, some of our parallels contain complex and sharp particulars that could hardly have been invented more than once. That India received much from the Greeks was shown in the old work of G. D'Alviella,¹⁴ which approached the problem with reserve, patience and balance. He demonstrated what Greece was then known to have received from India, without suggesting that Judaism, Christianity, or any late hellenistic movement received more than an aroma from India, which does seem to have contributed something.¹⁵ India's interchange with Israel remains uncharted,¹⁶ but it falls outside our present scope. The Brahminical depot in *fifth-century* Alexandria (probably employed in

⁸ Tokyo, 1921.

⁹ Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930, reprinted London: Curzon Press, 1987. This is a collection of edited selections from the Lotus Sutra with some summaries.

¹⁰ A task admirably undertaken in Derrett, *Bible*, taking some sixty examples. Aufhauser placed parallel texts side by side with negative or positive exclamations.

¹¹ G. F. Moore, *Judaism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927, reprinted 1958), vol. 2: 394–5, approved by M. Hadas, *Hellenistic culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 74. J. D. M. Derrett, 'An Indian metaphor in St John's gospel', *JRAS*, 3rd series, 9/2, 1999: 271–86 at p. 286.

¹² G. Highet, *The classical tradition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 499.

¹³ Derrett, *Bible*, app. II (the problem of precedence at table).

¹⁴ G. D'Alviella, *Ce que l'Inde*. His first edition appeared in 1897. He makes much use of A. Weber, *Die Griechen in Indien* (SB Berlin, 1890: 901ff.).

¹⁵ Derrett, 'An Indian metaphor'; J. D. M. Derrett, 'St John's Jesus and the Buddha', *Archiv Orientalni* 68/1, 2000: 71–82.

¹⁶ J. D. M. Derrett, 'A Moses-Buddha parallel and its meaning', *Archiv Orientalni* 58/4, 1990: 310–17 (one may add that the story of Karna resembles that of Moses); J. D. M. Derrett, 'Diffusion: Korah and Devadatta', *Archiv Orientalni* 63/4, 1995: 330–3. The Bronze Serpent of Numbers 21: 9 and John 3: 14 is found in Buddhist texts. Derrett, *Bible*, 66 (no. 26).

translation work, like their counterparts in China)¹⁷ was not known to D'Alviella. It too must be left for another study. But if Greek and Israelite ideas were available to Buddhists of the first or second centuries we need not doubt that the gospels also entered their libraries.

Consolation

Bereavement being universal one would expect consolation to be uniform in objects and methods. Admittedly Christian consolation has peculiar features which modify, whilst following, pagan conventions in the genre.¹⁸ Jewish consolation, not neglecting Job, acknowledges the will of the 'just Judge' who requires mourners to be comforted¹⁹ as he himself mourns and needs to be consoled.²⁰ Periods of mourning are defined, and the statuses of 'sorrowers' and of 'mourners' are respected.²¹

That a friend should seek to console a mourner even in silence is universal, and not confined to the learned who know the conventions.²² Cruelly but realistically one may point out that to indulge in mourning is self-serving (Cicero and Plutarch). If Academics and Peripatetics allowed moderate grief, mourning (α ματαιοπονία) can be rejected as ridiculous by Cynics, by Epicureans as irrational, and by Stoics as reprehensible and womanish (Plutarch, *Mor.* 112F–113A). Aristotle (*N.E.* 9.11, 4) and Seneca (*ep.* 63.13) find it dishonourable in men, though if one cannot resist the urge grieving should be shortened (Sulpicius to Cicero, *fam.* 4.5). Mourners are mourning their own loss (Plut., *Mor.* 111E). Curtailment of mourning was desired by Seneca,²³ Shakespeare,²⁴ and opponents of Queen Victoria's mourning. The Bible limits mourning even in dire circumstances (Deuteronomy 21: 10–14; cf. *Qumran Temple Scroll* LXIII. 1–14). But one who consoles a mourner may overdo it, and be accused of mocking him/her.²⁵

The ancient Greek and Roman genre called *consolatio*²⁶ has nothing in common with Buddhist 'consolations', save the truth that many have died. A

¹⁷ The story of Damascius at Photius, *Bibliotheca* (ed. Bekker, Berlin, 1825, vol. 2, 340) is entirely plausible. That they were totally ignorant of Christianity is unlikely.

¹⁸ The leading texts are 1 Thessalonians 4: 13–14 and 1 Corinthians 15: 12–21. R. C. Gregg, *Consolation philosophy. Greek and Christian paideia* (Patristic Monograph Series 3, Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1975), 69, 153–6, 194–5. Other texts used include Isaiah 61: 1–3; Psalm 119: 50, 76; 1 Corinthians 14: 3; 2 Corinthians 1: 3–4; Colossians 4: 11; Matthew 5: 4; Luke 16: 25; John 14: 18–20; 16: 22, and particularly 19: 26–27. Suffering is discipline. J. G. James, 'Consolation, comfort', in J. Hastings (ed.) *ERE* 4, 1911: 71–3; 'Consolation' in *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* vol. 1, 367; 'Comfort', *ibid.*, 341. See John 11: 19–31 (irony).

¹⁹ Genesis 18: 25; 2 Timothy 4: 8; G. Friedlander, *Laws and customs of Israel* (London: Shapiro, Vallentine, 1921), 221. Babylonian Talmud, *Ket.* 8b translated and commented on by C. G. Montefiore and H. Loewe, *Rabbinic anthology* (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company, 1963), 436–7.

²⁰ T. E. Fretheim, *The suffering of God* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 130–36. Micah 1: 8 and Isaiah 22: 4 are dealt with on p. 161. *Pesiqta' R. Kahana* 16.9. 2 Esdras 10: 5–17.

²¹ A. Edersheim, *Sketches of Jewish social life* (London: Religious Trust Soc., 1908), 173–5; Friedlander, *Laws*, 201–4, 217–32; C. Roth (ed.), *Standard Jewish encyclopedia*, new edition (London: Allen, 1966), 1370. 'Mourning', *Oxford dictionary of the Jewish religion* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 484–5. Cf. Seneca, *ep.* 63. 13 (trans. R. M. Gummere, *Seneca ad Lucilium* in vol. 1 (London and New York: Heinemann, 1917), 435).

²² Sixty years ago I attempted to console a Jain merchant who had lost his only son through typhoid fever. I dwell on elementary domestic hygiene to which he listened with the fortitude of Job.

²³ Seneca, *ep.* 63.1; 99.14, 19; *ad Marciam de consolatione* 1.5–7; Ps. Plutarch, *Mor.* 111E. Cf. Mencius VII A 39 (trans. D. C. Lau, *Mencius*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970, 171).

²⁴ *Hamlet* I, ii, 1–16, 70–73, 87–116; Cf. R. Burton, *Anatomy of melancholy* II, iii, 5 (edn. London, 1977, 180–5).

²⁵ Sophocles, *Antigone* 834–52.

²⁶ C. Buresch, *Consolationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptorum historia critica* (Leipzig: Hirschfeld, 1886); J. Bauer, *Die Trostreden des Gregorius von Nyssa in ihrem Verhältnis zur antiken Rhetorik* (Marburg: Universitäts-Buchdruckerei, 1892). Gregg, *Consolation* is masterly. 'Consolatio', in *Oxford Classical dictionary*, ³1996, 378.

classical *consolatio* will remind us that all are mortal;²⁷ death is not to be feared;²⁸ mishaps are common, many worse than yours;²⁹ death exempts or releases from life's miseries;³⁰ the child's cry at birth foretells all; time heals griefs;³¹ life itself is a loan;³² the virtues of the deceased are important;³³ his/her achievements or satisfactions sufficed;³⁴ and mourning beyond conventional limits is undesirable.³⁵ Celebrated authors do not dwell on the deceased's future (save them who have become stars);³⁶ and few³⁷ suggest that mourner and mourned will meet again, a Christian consolation.³⁸ They do not dwell on hell. Cynics, Stoics, Epicureans and Greek epigrammatists find such myths unhelpful. Stoics believe the dead feel nothing, and are not to be pitied.³⁹ Ancestors may receive new recruits to the shades; and metempsychosis is rarely alluded to.⁴⁰ We observe that none of this hurts or belittles the mourner: but one does suddenly hear a sharp note.

Lucian speaking of Demonax (c. A.D. 150) relates one of his facetiae. He was a Cynic and was privileged to instruct anyone without apology or tact.

He went to a man who was mourning his son and had shut himself up in the dark (a known practice: Plut., *Mor.* 113B), and told him that he (Demonax) was a *magus* and could raise the boy's image, if only he could name three individuals who had never mourned for anyone. The father hesitated for long, but could not mention one. Demonax said, 'Absurd man do you imagine that you alone suffer the unendurable, seeing there is no one exempt from mourning?'

Demonax did not invent this sally, which has no place in the conventional

²⁷ *Greek anthology* VII. 481. Cicero, *fam.* 4.5. 4. Plut., *Mor.* 116B, 118D; Horace, *Odes* I. 28/1, II. 14. Seneca, *ad Polybium de consolatione* i. 4, xi. 1-4; Seneca, *ep.* 99.8. Lucretius, *de rerum natura* iii. 870-972. Julian, *ep.* 69 (412C). Gregg, *Consolation*, 64, 158-9.

²⁸ Plato, *Apol.* 29A, 40C. Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 38, 91; 47, 112; 49, 117. Ecclesiastes 7: 2. Shakespeare, *2 Henry IV*, III, ii, 37, 40; *Romeo and Juliet* III, iv, 4.

²⁹ Homer, *Il.* 24.46-9; Juvenal, *Sat.* 13.9-10, 53, 60, 126-7, 135, 143, 159-61. Ps.-Plutarch, *Mor.* 103B-C, 106A-C; Crantor, *ibid.*, 104C-D; Basil, *ep.* 5.4.

³⁰ Crantor, at Plut., *Mor.* 114B, 108C. *D. Greek anthology* VII. 308, 574, 603, 604. Priam would have been happier had he died earlier! Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 39, 93; 41, 98. Ps. Plato, *Axiochus*, ed., trans. E. H. Blakeney (London, 1937). Seneca, *ep.* 99, 13. Gregg, *Consolation*, 69, 176-9. Death ends uncertainty as to possible joys: Cicero, *fam.* IV. 5, 3; *Tusc.* i. 40, 96; 48, 110-16. Some types of death avoid worse: Sophocles, *Ant.* 817-22. Shakespeare *Julius Caesar* III, i, 101-02.

³¹ Cicero, *Fam.* IV. 5, 2, 4, 5; Seneca, *ep.* 63.12; *ad Marciam* 1.5. Comically Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra* I, ii, 167, points out that death can be lucrative for some.

³² Cic., *Tusc.* i. 39, 93; Plut., *Mor.* 106F-107A, 116B. *Axiochus* 365B; Epictetus, *Encheir.* 11. Gregg, *Consolation* 40, n. 4, 160-1. Cf. *Majjhima-nikaya* LIV, i. 366-7.

³³ Plato (?), *Menexenus*. Fame will survive the virtuous: Cic., *Tusc.* i. 38, 91. Cf. Thucydides 2. 44. The praise of the dead boy at Plut., *Mor.* 120A-B is excellent consolation; Plut., *Mor.* 608D. Gregg, *Consolation*, 44-5, 59, 140. *Aboth de R. Nathan* 14.

³⁴ Cicero, *fam.* IV. 5, 5. Plut., *Mor.* 111B. Libanius, *ep.* 393.

³⁵ Horace, *Odes* II. 2; 9, 9-17; Seneca, *ep.* 63. 13; 99. 1. Plato (?), *Menexenus* 247-8; Plut., *Mor.* 105F; *ibid.*, 609B. Gregg, *Consolation*, 169. Babylonian Talmud, *Mo'ed Qatan* 27b. Friedlander, *Laws*, 221, 232. Shakespeare, *2 Henry IV*, III, ii, 37-40; *Romeo and Juliet* III, iv, 4, also *Twelfth Night* I, i, 25-31. Cicero, *Or.* 43, 148.

³⁶ *Greek anthology* VII. 64, 337(?), 391. Sen., *ad Marc.* 25.1-26.7; Plut., *Mor.* 120B-C, 121F; Libanius, *ep.* 393, 11. 15-18; Libanius, *or.* 18, 296. Gregg, *Consolation*, 57, 64, 209 (Elysian fields). Statesmen's souls go to Olympus: *Greek anthology* VII. 362, 363, 570, 672.

³⁷ *Greek anthology* VII. 25, 61, 131, 260, 370 (five instances out of over 740 printed). At no. 23 such joys are doubted. Cf., Socrates at Cic., *Tusc.* I.41, 98.

³⁸ Gregg, *Consolation*, 180-81, 194-5, 198. However, one notices Antiphanes (*fl.* 380 B.C.): Mourning your dearest friends, be wise in grief (πενθεῖν μετρίως) / They are not dead, but on that single road / Which all are bound to travel, gone before. / We too, in after days, shall overtake them; / One road-house shall receive us, entered in / To lodge together for the rest of time. Gilbert Murray *et al.* (ed.) *Oxford book of Greek verse* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), no. 451, p. 465, translated by T. F. Higham in T. F. Higham and C. M. Bowra (ed.) *Oxford book of Greek verse in translation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), 518. Seneca., *ep.* 63.16 (*praemissus est*).

³⁹ Cic., *Tusc.* I.7, 14; 8, 15; 37, 90; 38, 91-2. Plut., *Mor.* 109E-F.

⁴⁰ Plut., *Mor.* 611E; Cic., *Tusc.* I.49, 118.

scheme of *consolatio*. Legend traces it to the fertile mind of the fifth-century B.C. philosopher Democritus of Abdera, who consoled king Darius for the loss of his wife in exactly this way.⁴¹ Neither Democritus nor Demonax shared the man's grief, nor did they suggest that others did or should. Such 'consolation' strikes us as derisory, for we regard true consolation as sharing the loss,⁴² perhaps observing that the gain from a relationship now lost does endure. The poet, indeed, lives on in his verses;⁴³ and virtue survives the virtuous.⁴⁴ The Democritus-Demonax consolation was brutal; which is not to say it was ineffective. Pseudo-Callisthenes' *Alexander romance* (emerging in the third century A.D.)⁴⁵ contains a similar device. In an apocryphal last letter to his mother⁴⁶ Alexander the Great enjoins her to prepare a memorial banquet:

'Let no one come who knows past or present sorrow; for I did not intend this banquet for sorrow but for joy.' But no one could be found, great or small, rich or poor, who had known no sorrow, and so no one came. Olympia perceived Alexander's wisdom, observing that he wrote this as a consolation for those whom he left, in order that they should realize that what happened was nothing unusual ...

The mourner could actually advertise for individuals who have not mourned! A few Western 'nuclear' families might now pass that test. If in Greece or Rome separate domiciles existed,⁴⁷ in, say, India the joint family was continually celebrating births and deaths. The notion was meaningful there.

Though rational attempts to console are not unknown (*Āṅguttara-nikāya* iii. 57–62), the definitive formula of Buddhist 'consolation' is at *Mahā-parinirvāṇa-sūtra*, ch. 6 (*Dīgha-nikāya* XVI, text ii. 140, 156–63).⁴⁸ The Buddha says *vaya-dhammā samkhārā*, 'all component (or composite) things are subject to decay'.⁴⁹ Repeated at his demise we hear *aniccā samkhārā, taṃ kut' ettha labbā' ti*,⁵⁰ 'Impermanent are all component things; how is it possible (they should not be dissolved)?' This is repeated by the god Brahmā Sahampati,⁵¹

⁴¹ Pliny, *H.N.* 7. 181; Julian, *ep.* 69A–C (trans. W. C. Wright, Loeb Classical Library, *Julian*, vol. 3, 230). Gregg, *Consolation*, 6. Lucian, *Demonax* 25 (trans. A. M. Harmon, Loeb Classical Library, *Lucian*, vol. 1, 158–9). F. A. Paley, *Greek wit* (London: Bell, 1881), no. 257, pp. 74–5.

⁴² Luke 7: 13; John 11: 35; 2 Corinthians 1: 4; Philippians 2: 1–30. Plut., *Mor.* 102A. Basil, *ep.* 29.1. Aristotle, *N.E.* 9.11, 3–4 (1171b2–13) is illuminating. Pity is rare in the *Greek anthology* (VII. 511 is alone). Solidarity in grief does figure in Cic., *fam.*, IV. 5, 1.6; Confucius, *Analects* VII. 9.

⁴³ *Non omnis moriar* (Horace, *Odes* III. 30, 6). *Greek anthology* VII. 12, 16, 17, 80, 407. Sen., *ad Marc.* I. 3–4. He could confer immortality on others: Theognis 237–52.

⁴⁴ Homer, *Il.* 24. 507–51; Plato, *Menexenus*; Pliny, *ep.* 6.16; Sen., *ad Marc.* 9.2, 15.1, 16.3; *ep.* 13.99 (99. 6, 22). Plut., *Mor.* 106A. *Greek anthology* VII. 590, 673, 680, 690.

⁴⁵ A. B. Bosworth, 'Pseudo-Callisthenes', *Oxford Classical dictionary*, ³1996, 1270 (historical nucleus small, sources unstable).

⁴⁶ Ps.-Callisthenes (ed. C. Mueller), *Life of Alexander* III. 33; trans. R. Stoneman, *The Greek Alexander romance* (London: Penguin, 1991), 156.

⁴⁷ Sen., *ad Marc.* 24.1. *Greek anthology* VII. 743 (the 29 children).

⁴⁸ Trans. T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha* (London: Luzac, ³1951), vol. 2, 173–85). Cf. *ibid.*, 192–6 (*Jātaka* 95). See also *Dīgha-nikāya* XVII.16, text ii, 198; trans. ii, 231. Cf. *Jātaka* 317, trans. H. T. Francis and R. A. Neil in E. B. Cowell (ed.) *The Jātaka*, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897), 38–9; also *Jātaka* 328, trans., *ibid.*, 63–4; and 354, trans. 107–11 (reference to F. Bacon, *Advancement of learning*, many editions, I, viii, 1).

⁴⁹ Text ii, 156¹⁻²; trans. Davids, *Dialogues*, 173. *Vaya*, 'decay', is the opposite of *uppāda*, 'origination'. Cf. *Mahāvagga* I. 23, 5.

⁵⁰ Text ii, 158²⁶; trans., ii, 179. Cf. Epictetus, *Encheir.* 3: a jug is breakable, a child or wife mortal (*ἀποθανόντος γὰρ οὐ παραχθίση*). Plut., *Mor.* 106D: *τί γὰρ θανασιόν ... εἰ τὸ φθαρτὸν ἐφθαρταί*; (the corruptible be corrupted?). *Āṅguttara-nikāya* i, 286; trans. F. L. Woodward, *Book of the Gradual Sayings* (London: Pali Text Society, 1932, reprinted 1979) vol. 1, 264–5; ii, 142–3; trans. E. M. Hare, same title, vol. 3 (*ibid.*, 1934, reprinted 1973), 109; iv, 100, 103; trans. Hare, *ibid.*, vol. 4 (*ibid.*, 1935, reprinted 1978), 64, 67; v. 187–8; trans., v. 129; *Saṃyutta-nikāya* i, 199; trans., i, 253.

⁵¹ Text ii, 157³⁻⁵; trans., ii, 175. For the phrase 'How is it possible?' see *Saṃyutta-nikāya* v. 163–4; also XXII §18(7).

by the god Sakka,⁵² and by Anuruddha, the clairvoyant (*Samyutta-nikāya* I, 14, §1; LII, 8, 1–2), who admits the weeping monks have lost a ‘dear one’. They are not free from the ‘passions’: ‘We must become distinct from dear ones’.⁵³ Composite things are impermanent: Mahā Kassapa repeats it,⁵⁴ a lesson familiar to *arahants* (approx. ‘saints’),⁵⁵ and *devatās* (godlings).⁵⁶ The self-possessed do not indulge in dramatic mourning (as in fact mourners for the Buddha did [*Culla-vagga* XI.1, 1]). Severance from dear ones brings impassibility, not misery (cf. *Manu* 6. 62; 12. 79). In metempsychosis one cannot trace an individual’s births and rebirths. Buddhists would agree that reason should moderate the *πάθη* (passions), including sorrow; for birth itself implies mortality, *natthi jātassa amaraṇam*.

The Buddha knew the fate of an individual deceased,⁵⁷ ignoring mourning.⁵⁸ He did not mourn even his disciples Sāriputta and Moggallāna (*Samyutta-nikāya* v. 163–4). Mourning proves mourners’ failure to rid themselves of ‘craving’ (ibid., XV. 1 §3; XXXV §§63–4, 88, 94). A ‘passion’ had fuelled their grief.⁵⁹ To have a dear one (*piya*) is to have sorrow (*dukkha*); loss of him/her manifests ‘clinging’.⁶⁰ Attachment, being this-worldly, hinders attainment of *nirvāna*,⁶¹ as illustrated by the case of Visākhā, an episode in the *Udāna*⁶² and in Buddhaghosa’s commentary on the *Dhammapada*.⁶³ The former, canonical, is probably the older, while Buddhaghosa (fifth century) tries to be traditional rather than original. Visākhā may have found her ‘consolation’ by the Buddha brutal. She is forced to admit that deaths are common (cf. *Samyutta-nikāya* XV, 1 §3). The Buddha told her, in effect, that if she mourned for her grandson it was her own fault—she should have freed herself from affection, conformably (in fact) to *Dhammapada* 213: *pemato jāyatī soko, pemato jāyatī bhayaṃ* (from affection arise grief and fear).

Who finds the ‘Visākhā’ style of consolation helpful, corresponding very

⁵² Text ii, 157^{8–9}; trans., ii, 175.

⁵³ Text ii, 158⁶ (*kaṃ āvuso mā socittha, mā paridevitta*); trans., ii, 177. Text ii, 158^{8–9} *nānābhāvo vinā-bhāvo aññathā-bhāvo*. Cf. *Samyutta-nikāya* XLII §11; text iv. 327–8; trans., iv. 232–4. At *Majjhima-nikāya* LXXXVII, text ii, 106–12; trans. I. B. Horner vol. 2, 292–6, affection is said to originate grief (*piyajātikā*)—no attempt is made to console the man mourning the loss of his only son.

⁵⁴ Text ii, 162–3; trans., ii, 184–5. *Samyutta-nikāya* XXII §90.

⁵⁵ Text ii, 158; trans., ii, 177.

⁵⁶ Text ii, 158; trans., ii, 178–9.

⁵⁷ ‘Bound for heaven’: *Majjhima-nikāya* XXII, i, 142; trans. I. B. Horner, *Middle Length Sayings* (London: Pali Text Society, 1976), vol. 1, 182; *Dīgha-nikāya* XVI, text, ii, 141; trans., ii, 154. Devadatta, enemy of the Buddha, was swallowed up by the earth, but promised (so the Mahāyāna) ultimate bliss. Cf. *Samyutta-nikāya* XXXV §90; trans. Woodward, *Kindred sayings*, vol. 4 (1980), 36. The fates of suicides are divined casuistically (e.g. *Samyutta-nikāya* XXII §87).

⁵⁸ Cf. Jātaka 352 and 454 (M. Winternitz, *History of Indian literature*, New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1977, vol. 2, 142). Though thinking of Avalokiteśvara will release creatures from troubles (*Suddharmapundarīka* 24.17, 25) and Bodhisattvas are concerned for others as for themselves (*Bodhicaryāvatāra* 8.90, 117; 10.2), consolation of mourners is not their specific task.

⁵⁹ *Dhammapada* XVI. 3 (213) cited below. *Dīgha-nikāya* XV, text ii. 56–57, trans., ii. 52.

⁶⁰ *Samyutta-nikāya* LVI, xii, 4(iii); trans. v. 371. *Majjhima-nikāya* ii, 263; trans., iii, 48. Aśvaghoṣa, *Buddhacarita* XXVII at E. Conze, *Buddhist scriptures* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959, reprinted 1971), 64. Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga*, text 498, 503, 505; trans. Nāṇamoli (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1975), 567, 572, 574.

⁶¹ Sorrow, lamentations, and pain arise from *piyaṃ* (pleasure); *piye asanto na bhavanti*, ‘where *piyaṃ* is not, these are not’.

⁶² *Udāna* VIII. 8. Text ed. F. Steinthal (London: Pali Text Society, 1885), 91–2; trans. D. M. Strong, *The Udāna* (London: Luzac, 1902), 126–7. There is a new version by F. L. Woodward, 1948. E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme indien* (Louvain la Neuve: Institut orientaliste, 1976), 698–9. Since this section does not contain a ‘pithy saying’ it may not be an original part of the *Udāna*.

⁶³ Commentary on *Dhammapada* XVI. 3 Visākhāvatthu. Text, ed., H. C. Norman (London: Pali Text Society, 1912), vol. 2, 278–9; trans. E. W. Burlingame, *Buddhist legends*, vol. 3, 84–5. ‘He that is free from affection neither sorrows nor fears’.

crudely to the Stoic ideal of ἀπάθεια, which even the great author on *consolatio*, Crantor, abandoned for μετριοπάθεια, a moderate grief? An attempt was made to refurbish it with the exotic story of Kisā Gotamī. She had once uttered a blessing on Gotama,⁶⁴ which is found in several cultures.⁶⁵ Now she comes to him begging him to revive her child.⁶⁶ Her story is found in the commentary on the *Therī-gāthā*,⁶⁷ and in the *Mūla-sarvāstivāda-vinaya*.⁶⁸ The latter does not contain the Buddha's injunction (the crux of the story), so even that late compilation fails to include what Buddhaghosa has provided,⁶⁹ which Winternitz, following Thiessen in 1880, believed antedated Western parallels.⁷⁰ Vague as it is, the approximate dating of these versions and allusions is consistent with the following story's having been imported from outside the Theravāda tradition.

Kisā Gotamī came with her dead child to the Buddha for a medicine to revive him. Gotama agreed if she would bring mustard-seed from a house in which no son, husband, parent, or slave had died. She went from one house to a third [so the Therī-gāthā version], discovered her error, informed the Buddha, took the corpse to the charnel-ground, and the story ends happily: she may defy the death-dealing Māra.⁷¹ No doubt she resembles Merope in Euripides: *τεθνᾶσι παῖδες οὐκ ἐμοὶ μόνῃ βρωτῶν* (besides myself other women have lost children [Plut., *Mor.* 110D]).

Beautiful as it is, Sir Edwin Arnold's *Light of Asia* (1879) settles no technical problems within Buddhism. Yet Book 5, the Consolation of Kisā Gotamī (based on Buddhaghosa) illustrates my thought.⁷² Originally she was 'consoled' by the discovery that death was ubiquitous and living things impermanent. But this was not credible by 1879. Arnold adds, '... the whole wide world weeps with thy woe. The grief which all hearts share grows less for one. Lo! I would pour my blood if it could stay Thy tears and win the secret of that curse which makes sweet love our anguish ...'. If this is consolation, the historical Buddha had no time for it, though the blood hyperbole would make sense in the Mahāyāna: a Bodhisattva might look at such problems in such a way.

⁶⁴ Nidānakathā, trans. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist birth stories or Jataka tales* i (all published) (London: Trübner, 1880), 79–80, E. J. Thomas, *Life*, 53–4, 240.

⁶⁵ Derrett, *Bible*, 64 (no. 23). Add: Ovid, *Metam.* 4.324. *Pesiqta'* de R. Kahana 56.5; W. G. Braude and I. J. Kapstein, *Pesiqta de-Rab Kahana* (London, 1975), 488.

⁶⁶ Thomas, *Life*, 110–11.

⁶⁷ *Thera- and Therī-gāthā*, ed. H. Oldenberg and R. Pischel (London: Pali Text Society, ii, 143–4; trans. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Psalm of the early Buddhists*, vol. 1, *Psalm of the Sisters* (London: Pali Text Society, 1909), x, 63 (pp. 106–10). *The teaching of Buddha* (Tokyo: Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai, ⁹¹1979), 186–8. The comment that innumerable people have died occurs at *Therīgāthā* 33 (vv. 51–5), the commentary in 49 (vv. 112–16); 69 (vv. 312–18).

⁶⁸ Kisā Gautamī underwent all imaginable bad luck and became a nun at last. J. L. Panglung, *Die Erzählstoffe des Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya analysiert auf Grund der Tibetischen Übersetzung* (Studia Philologica Buddhica Mon. Series 3; Tokyo: Reiyukai Library, 1981), 194–6. Cf. *Therīgāthā* 218–19 (text, 144; trans., 109).

⁶⁹ *Commentary on the Dhammapada* VIII. 13, ed. H. C. Norman, ii, 272–5, abbreviated *ibid.*, XX. 11, Norman, iii, 431–3; trans. Burlingame, *Buddhist legends*, ii, 258–60; iii, 165–6. T. Rogers, *Buddhaghosa's parables* (London: Trübner, 1870), 98–102. Jacob H. Thiessen, *Die Legende von Kisāgotamī. Eine literarische Untersuchung* (Breslau, Kiel, 1880) (p. 70). This rare work is at the British Library, shelf-mark 14098 d. 22(1). Thiessen uses Buddhaghosa on the *Dhammapada*. In his view a Buddhist fable went to Greece. Winternitz, *History*, ii, 106, 193–4, 199.

⁷⁰ See n. 69.

⁷¹ *Samyutta-nikāya*, text, i, 129–30; trans. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Book of the Kindred Sayings*, vol. 1 (London: Pali Text Society, 1979), 162–3; Davids, *Psalm of the Sisters*, 182–3; Winternitz, *History*, ii, 58–9.

⁷² Sir Edwin Arnold, *The Light of Asia or the Great Renunciation (Mahābhinishkramana)* (London: Kegan Paul, 1902), 80–3. I am indebted to Dr. Gillian Evison for sight of this intriguing passage. A tendency to equate the Buddha with Christ is observable here as elsewhere.

I submit that ground prepared by Viśākhā was ready for Kisā Gotamī, the idea passing from West to East. Democritus' 'philosophy' sharpened mourners' appreciation of their situation. Buddhism installed repeated deaths as the pivot of its teaching. *Nirvāṇa* is deathlessness, whereupon consolation becomes a problem. One avoids mourning by denying attachment to living beings. Such is Buddha's reasoning, not the Greeks'. The story of Kisā Gotamī is in fact superfluous, but illustrates how the West, adding nothing to Buddhism doctrinally, has provided an intriguing embellishment.

The lame and the blind

The maxim 'the lame and the blind' could remind a rabbinical scholar of a Jewish joke. Two egregious males, one lame the other blind, invented a means of doing mischief with impunity. Alas, they were caught. The story is almost unknown to Western folklore, missing from phrase and fable.⁷³ One may object that they occur in Greek epigrams and in Epiphanius, but in both they are exotic. The particularity betrays the rogues' provenance.

The maxim of the lame and the blind (Skt. *pañgvandha-nyāya*) arose in India. Once the lame man had mounted the shoulders of the blind the beggars could maximize their effectiveness. The maxim figures as a technique of applying Vedic scripture, in ritual or secular contexts. Two texts, ineffective independently, may become viable in conjunction. Two testimonies which fail, separately, to prove anything, may be cogent jointly. So says the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, the Indian science of exegesis.⁷⁴ Furthermore the Indian school of philosophy called Sāṃkhya (one of the Buddha's teachers, Ālāra, seems to have been an adherent) used the maxim to explain the uneasy relationship between the soul or spirit (*puruṣa*) and the bodily nature (*prakṛti*).⁷⁵ It is uncertain how old this use is, but it can hardly be later than early centuries A.D. The upshot is this: *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are distinct, engaged in a dance. Mutually antagonistic, the soul or qualiteless consciousness on the one hand and the non-intelligent physical nature on the other are mutually dependent. Surely this Sāṃkhya image, or the maxim it used, was available to Buddhists during the long period during which Graeco-Indian intellectual exchange occurred?

Buddhaghosa, using traditional material, tells a tale at *Visuddhimagga* 18.35.⁷⁶

'Name' and 'Form' are each without power on its own. Mentality lacks

⁷³ Missing from *Aesop. The Complete Fables*, trans. O. and R. Temple (London: Penguin, 1998); *Babrius & Phaedrus*, ed. and trans. B. E. Parry (Loeb Classical Library, 1965), an eighteenth-century edition of Aesop included it (in an Indian form?) under the heading 'Modern fables': R. Dodsley, *Select fables of Esop and other fabulists* (Gainsborough: Mozley, 1813), 121–2 (fable 36) (infirmities have positive aspects). Dodsley's selection appears in a first edition in 1761.

⁷⁴ K. L. Sarkar, *Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation as applied to Hindu law* (Calcutta, 1909); A. S. Nataraja Ayyar, *Mīmāṃsā jurisprudence (The Sources of Hindu Law)* (Allahabad, 1952); P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmasāstra*, 5 vols. (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1930–1962), vol. 3, ch. 32; vol. 5, ch. 28–30. Derrett, *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft* 58/2, 1956, 234 n. 170*.

⁷⁵ Bhīmācārya Jhalkīkar, *Nyāyakośa* (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 49. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1928), 986^{21–23}; Mādhavācārya, *Sarvadarśana-samgraha* (Bibliotheca Indica 62 & 142, Calcutta, 1858), 153; R. Garbe, *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie. Eine Darstellung des Indisches Rationalismus, nach den Quellen bearbeitet* (Leipzig, 1894), 164; S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian philosophy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1941), vol. 2, 248–335, esp. pp. 283, 285, 328. At p. 288 no. 4 there is our maxim. Gaudapāda's commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (third century A.D.) understood the lame and the blind commenced partnership when deserted by fellow travellers in a forest.

⁷⁶ Text published in London for the Pali Text Society, 1920–1 and in the Harvard Oriental Series, no. 41, 1950. Trans. H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in translations* (Harvard Oriental Series 3. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1896), 184–6, and by Nāṇamoli, 691.

efficient power, it requires the support of materiality. A man born blind and a cripple wanted to go somewhere. The blind man said to the cripple, 'Look, I can do what should be done by legs, but I have no eyes to see what is rough or smooth'. The cripple said, 'Look, I can do what should be done by eyes, but I have no legs with which to go and come'. The blind man made the cripple climb up on his shoulders. Sitting on the blind man's shoulders the cripple ordered, 'Leave the left, take the right ...'. The blind man has no efficient power ... The cripple has no efficient power ... But there is nothing to prevent their going when they support each other.

The story is analogous to the drum without bandsman; or the boat without rowers. Mentality and materiality require each other to be effective—yet they remain distinct.

The maxim is at home and reflects the use made of it in the Sāṃkhya. Buddhaghosa relied on the notoriety of the image. The *Greek anthology* takes for granted an educated acquaintance with the maxim.⁷⁷

Leonidas of Alexandria (mid-first century A.D.).

The blind beggar supported the lame one in respect of feet, and gained in exchange eyes not his own. Both half-complete persons were fitted together in the nature of a unit, providing reciprocally what was lacking to each other.

Plato the Younger (date unknown).

A blind man took on his back a man maimed in his limbs, lending feet and borrowing eyes.

Antiphilus of Byzantium (mid-first century A.D.).

Both maimed beggars, one in respect of his eyes, the other of his steps: each serves the other. For the blind, taking the weight of the lame man on his back, treads out his path with foreign eyes. One nature suffices for both, for in each case what was wanting to each they combined to make a whole for each other.

The apocryphal rogues are luxuriously exploited in Judaism. There the pair (*hīgēr* and *sūmā*) is notorious. The fourth–fifth century writer against heretics, Epiphanius, gives a long excerpt from an ancient author named Ezekiel,⁷⁸ who tells how a king disdained a lame man and a blind man, and they meditated revenge. The lame said to the blind, 'Carry me' (v. 10), and so the former moved under the direction of the latter. They laid waste the king's garden. One pair of footprints could be traced. The king placed the lame on the blind and punished both. Just so God is ignorant of nothing, the culprit's excuses are brushed aside; soul and body are condemned together.

Rabbis relate a colloquy on the subject between 'Antoninus' (Marcus Aurelius?) and a Jewish sage. The Tannaïtic midrash *Mekilta de R. Ishmael* (third century A.D.)⁷⁹ not only knew this story⁸⁰ but expected its readers to do

⁷⁷ *Greek anthology* IX. 11–13b, trans. W. R. Paton, Loeb Classical Library, *Greek anthology* vol. 3, 1983, 8–9. The idea is taken up in Islam: F. H. Dieterici, *Philosophie der Araber im X. Jahrhundert n. Chr.* (Leipzig, 1876, 1879), vol. 1, 116; and see n. 94 below.

⁷⁸ c. 50 B.C.–A.D. 50. J. B. Mueller and S. E. Robinson, 'Apocrypha of Ezekiel (first century B.C.–first century A.D.)', in J. H. Charlesworth (ed.) *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 2 vols., 1 (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983), 487–95. Excerpted from Epiphanius, *Against heresies*, 64.70, 5–17 (*Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderten* 31, 515–17).

⁷⁹ I take all such dates from H. L. Strack and G. Stemberger, *Einleitung in Talmud und Midrasch* (Munich: Beck, 1982).

⁸⁰ *Mecilta. Ein tannaïtische Midrasch zu Exodus*, trans. J. Winter and A. Wünsche (Leipzig: Hinrich, 1909), 120. *Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael*, ed., trans. J. Z. Lauterbach (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1933, reprinted 1961), vol. 2, *Shirata* 2 (on *Exodus* 15: 1), lines 127–33, p. 21. E. E. Urbach, *The Sages—their concepts and beliefs* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975), vol. 1, 223.

so, for it gives the introduction only. *Midrash Rabbah Leviticus* IV. 4–5 (fifth century) has the story at length.⁸¹ The *Mekilta de R. Šime'on b. Yochai* (fourth century) gives a succinct version.⁸² The *Babylonian Talmud, Sanh.* 91a–b (perhaps sixth century) is usually cited on the point. The lame and the blind were, strangely, appointed Watchmen of the king's orchard. They proceeded to rob the orchard. The lame protested, 'How can I move about?'; and the blind, 'Obviously I cannot see!' The king put the lame on top of the blind and judged them concurrently.⁸³ Just so the soul and body will be joined after the resurrection and such excuses will be ignored. The popular parable figures in a string of references⁸⁴ compiled by B. Young in association with D. Flusser.⁸⁵ It must have been from Jews that writers on the resurrection adopted the idea⁸⁶ and Athenagoras (*On the Resurrection* 15, 18, 20–25) seems, in the second century, to have derived his argument from a similar source, and this is certainly the case with Epiphanius.⁸⁷

From the *Sāmkhya* to the Talmud the theme remains the same: soul and body, distinct, are jointly responsible for acts, and have a joint fate. G. F. Moore, well advised,⁸⁸ opined that the Jewish parable was derived from India.

The maxim of the lame and the blind later played a role in the exegesis of Exodus 15: 1, the commencement of the Song of Moses, echoed by Miriam at 15: 21. The rabbis, uninterested in ancient armament, took the words literally: 'The horse and his rider he has thrown into the sea'. Since the horses are not mentioned at Exodus 14: 17, 28, 26, 28, mention of them at 14: 23; 15: 1 and Deuteronomy 11: 4 raised an ethical problem.⁸⁹ What harm had the horses done? Moralizing exegesis occurs in the Neofiti and Fragment Targums:⁹⁰ Both horses and riders were proud (!) and exultant and deserved their fate. Haggai 2: 22 illustrates the idea. But Philo (first century), detecting an allegory here, saw in the horses our physical nature and in the riders the Mind.⁹¹ Elsewhere the riders have been identified as demons⁹² (hence the fate of the Gadarene Swine, Mark 5: 12–13).⁹³ Rashi (1040–1105) explains that each horse and his

⁸¹ Trans. J. Israelstam (London and New York: Soncino Press, ³1983), 53–4. Psalm 50: 4 is called up, also Exodus 15: 1.

⁸² Ed. J. N. Epstein and E. Z. Melamed (Jerusalem: Mekizey Nirdanim, 1955), 76¹³–77²⁴.

⁸³ *Sanh.* 91a–b is copied by Young (n. 85 below) at p. 65 and quoted by Moore (n. 11 above) at vol. 1, 487–8; also Urbach, *The Sages*, vol. 1, 223; vol. 2, 786. The passage is translated by H. Freedman, in *Seder Neziqin III Sanhedrin* (London: Soncino Press, 1935), 610–11.

⁸⁴ Midrash Tanhuma, *Wayyiqra'* 6 (ninth century?); Tanhuma (Buber's edition) *Wayyiqra'* 12 (trans. in Moore, *Judaism*, vol. 1, 487); *Yalqūt Šim'onī* (13th century), I, *Remez* 464; L. Wallach, 'The parable of the blind and the lame', *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 65, 1943, 333–5; Wallach, 'The colloquy of Marcus Aurelius with the patriarch Judah I', *Jewish Quarterly Review*, 31, 140–1, 259–86; J. Heinemann, *Agadot vetoldotehem* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1974), 27.

⁸⁵ Brad H. Young, *Jesus and his Jewish parables. Rediscovery of the roots of Jesus' teaching* (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 64–6, 113.

⁸⁶ A 'ghost' reference to Tertullian, *de resurrectione* is not verified at present.

⁸⁷ See n. 78.

⁸⁸ Moore, *Judaism*, vol. 1, 487 n. 1; vol. 3, 148 n. 206. Apart from Garbe, *Die Sāmkhya-Philosophie* (n. 75 above) he was probably advised by E. W. Hopkins, an expert of his period (1930).

⁸⁹ See the two *Mekilta*-s. Ps.-Philo, *Liber antiquitatum biblicarum* X.6 (first century A.D.) *currus et equos* (v.l. *equites*) (ed. G. Kisch, Notre Dame, 1949, 142; trans. D. J. Harrington at Charlesworth, *Pseudepigrapha*, vol. 2, 317 ('horsemen' probably original)). A Samaritan targum had doubts about the horses and read 'footmen' (ed. A. Tal, *Samaritan targums to the Torah* (Heb.) (Jerusalem, 1980), 279).

⁹⁰ Targum Neofiti, Exodus 15: 1; Fragment Targum *ibid.* (as indicated at Exodus 15: 9 *dy 'tg'wn wrdafw*—their pursuit was the result of their self-exaltation. M. L. Klein, *Fragment-Targums*, vol. 2 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1980), 129.

⁹¹ Philo, *Legum allegoriae* ii, 101–2, 103; *Agric.* 82–3, 88–9; *Somm.* ii, 269–70; *Ebr.* 111.

⁹² St Jerome on Psalm 75. The rider is the demon who bears the spurs.

⁹³ Derrett, *Studies in the New Testament*, vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 47–56; Derrett, 'Spirit-possession and the Garasene demoniac', *Man*, 14, 1978, 286–93.

rider were thrown *together*, each attached to the other (*ṣ^enēyhem q^eṣūrīm*), like conspirators. The maxim is a natural illustration of this idea.

Meanwhile in India herself, rather than during his studious peregrinations, the seventeenth-century Sufi sage Sheikh Ahmed Faruqi of Sirhind (Punjab) acquired the parable of the lame and the blind for Sufis' use. Contrasted with that pair, a deaf man and a dumb man were unable to help each other since they had no third party to help them—no wisdom such as would enable them to attend, as invited guests, the (Sultan's) banquet.⁹⁴

Conclusion

Regarding Consolation, a specifically Greek idea has been attributed to the Buddha Gotama. There is an increase of vividness in his teaching. Regarding the lame and the blind, an Indian idea, most probably mediated by Buddhists, was received with interest in the West. It debouched finally in Jewish stories, as vital as those of the remote Indian parent, the Sāṃkhya. The gain in vividness is accompanied by a gain in substance: there is the joint liability of soul and body to divine judgement. The period when this cultural contact took place can be conjectured to have been when 'Ezekiel' wrote, the centuries before and after the common era.

No single individual can have mediated Greek witticisms to Indians or sent Indian wit home. Favourable conditions existed during several centuries, from before Alexander the Great to the close of the Parthian empire.⁹⁵ Clearchus of Soli, a Peripatetic philosopher, stayed in Ai Khanum in the far north of Afghanistan, and was intimate with Sogdia and Bactria, the latter a distribution centre for Indian culture. About 310 B.C. he put up a verse inscription at Ai Khanum attesting the hero-cult of Cineas, founder of the colony.⁹⁶ Then there is the Heliodorus Pillar at Besnagar of two centuries later.⁹⁷ Both Clearchus and Heliodorus will have had knowledge of Asian 'wisdom'; and Indians' interest in Yavana (Greek) sciences is beyond doubt (D'Alviella).

⁹⁴ Idries Shah, *Tales of the dervishes* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), 209–10. I owe this reference to Peter Drinkwater *cultor rerum reconditarum*.

⁹⁵ Doubts as to the availability of mythology regarding the birth of Apollo to authors describing the birth of the Buddha (descendant of the Sun) (Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit literature* (London: Kegan Paul, 1932), 298) are unjustified. That such Greek mythology did reach India was seen by E. Senart (1882) and cf. J. D. M. Derrett, 'Homer in India: the birth of the Buddha', *JRAS*, 3rd series, 2/1, 1992, 47–57. For the range of hellenistic material in the relevant areas see R. Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), 559.

⁹⁶ See *Oxford Classical dictionary*, s.v. Cineas (1); Clearchus (3); *Oxford History of the Classical World* (1986), 347–8, 844. Diogenes Laertius i, 9.

⁹⁷ For Heliodorus' pillar see Derrett, *Bible*, 95, n. 57.