

“Citta, Mano, Vinnana—A Psychosemantic Investigation”

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Citta, Mano, Vinnana—a Psychosemantic Investigation

IN this report,¹ an attempt will be made to clarify the psychological contents of the above Pali terms. The approach is psychological rather than linguistic.

Citta is most commonly translated by: thought(s), mind, heart, mood, emotion, idea, reasoning, attitude, consciousness.

Mano: mind, thought, inner sense.

Viññāna: consciousness, discriminative consciousness, rebirth-consciousness, /relinking/ consciousness, cognition, intellect, intellection, intelligence.

Many of the English terms are very vague. The reason may be either that the corresponding Pali terms are equally vague or that the exact meaning of them is not known. Some of the English terms for the same Pali terms have a very different meaning (e.g. “mind” means an independent psychological agency; “thought” is probably intended to mean conscious processes of a predominantly cognitive character, “heart” an emotional, evaluative center in human personality; if we then, for instance, find the passage in S II 273: “Ariye tuṇḥibhāve cittaṃ saṅṭhapehi, ariye tuṇḥibhāve cittaṃ ekodiṃ karohi, ariye tuṇḥibhāve cittaṃ samādaha” translated by “Establish thy *mind* in the Ariyan silence. Lift up thy *heart* therein. Plant thy thought therein” — then we may well ask ourselves whether these different meanings of *citta* were intended by the Pali-writer or if the translator is just careless.) Psychological passages in translations of Pali texts have often proved meaningless to me. Therefore, an investigation has seemed desirable.

Method

Passages illustrating the use of the terms included in the investigation have been collected from the following works: *Dīgha-nikāya*, *Majjhima-*

1. This investigation was conducted at the University of Ceylon, Peradeniya. I thank the University for most generous assistance, esp. Dr. J. D. Dhirasekera. I am also greatly indebted to Professor K. N. Jayatilleke, Professor W. S. Karunaratne, and Mr. B. Cooke. My wife has helped me to collect the material.

nikāya, Aṅguttara-nikāya, Saṃyutta-nikāya, Dhammapada, Suttanipāta, Udāna and Itivuttaka (the PTS editions have been used: quotations refer to pages in these, only for Dhammapada and Suttanipāta to number of stanza). It was considered that these were homogeneous enough to permit a non-historical treatment. As this is not a statistical investigation, no completeness was aimed at, but an attempt was made to include as many different contexts as possible: I aimed at semantic completeness.

The theoretical framework of this study was provided by C. E. Osgood, G. J. Suci, and P. H. Tannenbaum, *The measurement of meaning* (Urbana 1957). Their method can of course not be used on historical material, but their insistence that meaning can be defined by relating a studied concept to a semantic space is a fruitful point of departure. Now the dimensionality of the semantic space of psychological terms is not known, but some sort of provisional "semantic differential" can still be constructed. I have tried to follow the intentions of Osgood by putting *systematic questions* to the texts and by especially studying *relations* between terms as expressed in the texts.

Citta

1. *Superordinated concept: dhamma* (e.g. A I 10) which is a vague term used mainly as a collective term for all conscious phenomena. It is used for all psychological terms, even *nibbāna*.

2. *Entity or process ?*

We usually think of a machine as an entity: it has a certain structure and functions as a unit; it is limited in space and has a certain duration over time. If we, on the other hand, were unable to see the machine itself but could study its functioning and its products, then we would speak in terms of processes: we could describe certain movements, the change from raw materials to finished products. We can make the same distinction in psychological matters, and choose our words accordingly. When we use a word like "mind", we think of something rather permanent, and the momentary perceptions, feelings, impulses and imaginations are said to be produced in it. The mind has a structure, it can produce processes, and it can be used as an instrument—so it is a typical entity.

On the other hand, the difference may not be so great on the psychological plane as on the physical. If you study your conscious experiences, perhaps you will at first find only a stream of processes. But after a while,

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you will discover recurrent themes and process-sequences and you will find regularities and habits of thoughts. The processes are then fitted into a structure which is seen to be more or less fixed, more or less like an "entity". So, although most of the continuity depends on processes or structures that are not conscious and therefore "behind the curtain", we may firmly believe in an entity like the "mind".

In order to decide whether *citta* is an entity or not, we must investigate whether it is described as independent or dependent, permanent or momentary, productive or produced, initiating or passive, actor or act.

It is possible to find passages where *citta* is clearly said to be a product: "Mā ... akusalaṃ cittaṃ cinteyyatha" (S V 418), "Don't think unskilled *citta*".— "Samudaya-dhammānupassī vā cittaṃ viharati, vāya-dhammānupassī vā cittaṃ viharati." (D II 299). "He keeps on seeing an arising phenomenon in *citta*, or he keeps on seeing a passing phenomenon in *citta*." Here, *citta* seems to mean "thought". Usually *citta* seems much more personified to an independent agency. It has a will of its own: "Bhikkhu cittaṃ vāse vatteti, no ... cittaṃ vāse vattati" (A IV 34), "A monk makes his *citta* turn according to his wish; he does not turn by the *citta*'s wish". Further: "... cittaṃ nīyati loko" (S I 39), "the world is led by *citta*". According to D II 36, "Vipassissa ... cittaṃ nāmi no dhamma-desanāya," "The *citta* of Vipassi was inclined not to preach the doctrine".— *Citta* is an authority that can be pleased or displeased: "... ayaṃ me puggalo cittaṃ n'ārādheti" (M I 341), "that person does not appeal to my *citta*". And: "... mayi cittaṃ pasannam" (M II 145), "your *citta* was pleased with me."

Citta reacts as an emotional center according to S I 53: "Niccamastrastam idaṃ cittaṃ". "This *citta* is always terrified", — and S II 226 "na ca na uppanno lābhasakkarasiloko cittaṃ pariyādāya ṭhassatīti", "and when gains, favours, and flattery come to us, they shall not take lasting hold of our *citta*".

In the very numerous passages where the improvement and development of *citta* is described, it is often done in wordings reminding us of some instrument which is to be improved by removing obstructing particles (*rāga*, *dosa*, *moha*, e.g. M II 27), by cleaning (*cittaṃ parisodheti*, D I 71; *cittāni virajayitvā* "cleansing their *cittas*", D II 274), by giving it support (*ādhāro*, S V 20), by making it straight (*cittam attano ujukam akāṃsu*,

S I 26; ujum karoti, Dh 33) like a bow, or makes it luminous (sappabhāsaṃ cittaṃ bhāveti, “creates a luminous *citta*”, D III 223; pabhassaram, A I 10; see also A IV 86, A I 256, S V 92: *Citta* is compared to gold free from defilements; it can also be done luminous by concentration on light). In this way, *citta* is made *mudu* and *kammañña*, “pliable” and “fit for work” (A IV 421; cf. S V 92 and A I 256). In other cases, the terminology used reminds rather of the taming of animals, e.g. cittaṃ ... dantaṃ guttaṃ rakkhitaṃ saṃvutaṃ, “the *citta* that is tamed, controlled, guarded and restrained” (A I 7)cittaṃ, abhininnāmeti, “he bends down his *citta*” (A II 211).

In all these and similar cases, *citta* seems to be conceived predominantly as an entity. But in perhaps the majority of the 240 passages included in this study of *citta*, the matter cannot be strictly decided. There seems to be a very gradual transition from the one extreme to the other. We may conclude that *citta* often is an entity that acts independently or as an instrumental unit but that the word on the other hand may be used for the produced processes themselves.

3. *Is citta the self?*

Only once is it explicitly denied that *citta* is the self (S II 94), while it is very often denied that *viññāṇa* and the other *khandhā* are the self. When H. V. Guenther in “Philosophy and psychology in the Abhidhamma” (Lucknow 1957) constructs diagrams illustrating different Abhidhamma-views on the mind, he places *citta* in the center of a number of concentric circles. This can only mean that he considers *citta* as the self around which everything is arranged. In the Nikāyas there are only indirect indications that the person identifies himself with *citta*. It happens, e.g., that the grammatical subject in coordinated sentences is first *citta*, then seemingly without any special reason becomes the person himself: “Ujugatam ev’ assa tasmiṃ samaye cittaṃ hoti Tathāgatam ārabba, ujugatacitto kho pana ... ariya-sāvako labhati atthavedaṃ, labhati dhammavedaṃ ... ” “At such time his *citta* is firmly fixed on the Tathāgata; with upright heart the Ariyan disciple wins knowledge of the welfare, he wins knowledge of the doctrine ... ” (A V 329). See also “Kāmarāgena ḍayhāmi, cittaṃ me pariḍayhati”. “I am burning with desire, my *citta* is consumed” (S I 188). In the love-song, D II 266, it is said “Tayi gathita-citto ’smi cittaṃ viparinamitaṃ”. “I am provided with a *citta* tied to you: my *citta* is changed”. We find here the same change of grammatical subject, and in a case like this it becomes clear how closely related the *citta* sometimes is to the self. — On the other hand, it is never said that *citta* is the self. On the contrary, the texts usually

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take care to distinguish between the person and his *citta*. A few examples will illustrate this. “Ahaṃ iminā cittena nikato vañcito paladdho”. “I have been defrauded, deceived and cheated by this mind” (M I 511). “Cittam te tatthe gamenti dūre”, “They send their *citta* far away in that (dispute)” (SN 390). See also A IV 34, quoted above.

In conclusion: *citta* is not the self but it often stands for the person and the identification is then not far away.

4. *The monk's problem-child*

As we have seen in some of the above quotations, the monk can certainly not identify himself with this *citta* — on the contrary it sometimes gives him life-long trouble. It has to be tamed, but it is *dūrakkha*, “difficult to guard” and *dunnivāraya*, “difficult to hold back” (Dh 33), *dussamādaha* “hard to compose” (S I 48), *niggahetabba*, *paggahetabba*, *sampahaṃsitabba*, *ajjupekkhitabba*, “to be checked”, “to be exerted”, “to be gladdened”, “to be looked after” (A III 435). It is a difficult but important task to train *citta*, because “citte ... arakkhite kāyakammaṃ pi arakkhitaṃ hoti vacīkammaṃ pi arakkhitaṃ hoti manokammaṃ pi arakkhitaṃ hoti” (A I 261), “when *citta* is unguarded, bodily action is also unguarded, speech and mental action are also unguarded”, and we shall see in a later section how great the difference is between the trained and the natural *citta*.

5. *Is citta consciousness?*

It is said in Dh 37 that *citta* is *asarīra*, “incorporeal”. It is often contrasted with the body. In S IV 293 f, a distinction is made between *kāya saṅkhāro*, “activity of body”, *vacīsaṅkhāro*, “activity of speech”, and *cittasaṅkhāro*, and the latter is defined in the following way: “*Saññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā* etc *dhammā cittaapaṭibaddhā, tasmā saññā ca vedanā ca citta-saṅkhāre ti*” which has been translated “Perception and feeling are mental processes dependent on mind. Therefore are they called ‘the activity of mind’”.

No indication has been found that *citta* could be either a physiological or a purely behavioral entity. As we shall find later, *citta* is sometimes spoken of as moving in space (e.g., *phandana*, “trembling”, Dh 33, *dūraṅgama*, “far-travelling” Dh 37), but it probably means non-physical movement. When describing moral and emotional traits in *citta*, terms are sometimes used which imply a certain type of behavior, but it is the attitude behind that seems to belong to *citta*.

It is more difficult to decide, to what extent sub-conscious processes in the psychological sense belong to *citta*. We can, of course, consider it self-evident that when traits like anger, pride, desire are ascribed to *citta*, it does not mean that they must be manifest all the time: the tendency, the disposition is enough. In this way, we have introduced the subconscious, but the distinction was seldom made. There is an early Pali term for latent tendencies of this type, *anusaya*, which is attributed to *ceto*, never to *citta* (they are more or less synonyms, see discussion below!) We find a typical context in S III 13: “Rūpadhātuyā ... yo chando yo rāgo yā nandi yā taṅhā ye upāyupādānā cetaso adhiṭṭhānābhinivesānusayā tesaṃ khayā virāgā nirodhā cāgā paṇissaggā cittaṃ suvimuttaṃ”. “By the destruction of, the indifference to, the cessation, the giving up, the utter surrender of that wish, that desire, that pleasure, that craving, that approach and grasping, that decision, indulgence and *disposition* in *ceto* directed to the form-element, the *citta* is fully freed”. We shall also find later, that several of the traits, which often are called *anusayā* (or rather the traits to which tendencies — *anusaya* — are mentioned), are attributed to *citta*. In the main, *citta* must be understood as an unanalyzed conscious entity.

6. *The attributes of the untrained citta.*

Citta is described with a wealth of attributes. We have seen that *citta* can, and should, be trained, so we must distinguish between the natural and the trained *citta*. Generally, *citta* is found to be too independent and mobile (Dh 326 “... acāri caritaṃ yenicchakaṃ yatthakāmaṃ yathāsukhaṃ”, “... would wander formerly as it liked, as it desired, as it pleased”), too unsteady (*capala*, Dh 33) and easily distracted (*vikkhitta*, A IV 32).

(a) *Perception.* We have already quoted SIV 293 f where it is said that *saññā* (perception) and *vedanā* (feeling) are dependent on *citta*. In S IV 125 we find that *rūpa* (forms) touch (*phassati*) *citta*, and only a trained *citta* can avoid to be influenced. In the natural state, therefore, *citta* is sensitive to impression, without being a center of perception.

Citta can be directed and is then an instrument of attention. In A IV 422 the phrases *cittaṃ paṭivāpeti* (“he turns his *citta* away from”) and *cittaṃ upasaṃharati* (“he concentrates his *citta* on”) are used in this meaning. Cf. the opposites *saṅkhitta* — *vikkhitta* (“attentive — unattentive”) used about *citta* in D I 97.

(b) *Intellectual traits.* In A I 9 the expression *cittena ... ñassati*, “understand with *citta*” is used. The phrase *aññācittaṃ upatṭhapeti*, “he

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applies the *citta* to understanding” is often found, e.g. A III 437. In A IV 402 paññāya suparicita, “well provided with wisdom” is said about *citta*. These are all quotations from descriptions of the developed *citta*, but the potentialities of intelligence are of course there from the beginning.

(c) *Memory.* *Citta* is an instrument for the recollection of former existences which is made possible through training. See M I 22 “pubbenivāsānussatiñāyā cittaṃ abhininnāmesim”, “I directed my *citta* to the knowledge and recollection of former habitations”. The higher knowledge which is called *abhiññā* is attributed to *citta* (A IV 421, A I 254). Free ideas are a function of *citta*, as in A V 107, where *citta* is said to be “provided with” (paricita) ideas (*sāññā*) of impermanence, not-self, danger, disinterestedness and so on. What is said in Dh 326, “idaṃ pure cittaṃ acāri cāritam ... yatthakāmaṃ ...”, “this *citta* would wander formerly as it liked ...” probably refers to the free imaginative function of *citta*.

All the functions quoted here are referred to the trained *citta*. The fundamental dispositions must, however, be there from the beginning, although nothing seems to be ever said about the untrained *citta* in these respects. We go on to describe the natural *citta* proper.

(d) *Intellectual qualities of the untrained citta.*

Two of the *āsavā*, namely *diṭṭhāsava* and *avijjāsava* (the obsessions of false views and lack of true knowledge) are of a more intellectual character (D I 84, D II 81). Further: *moha* (lack of correct judgment, D III 270), *vicikicchā* (doubt, D I 71), *vikkhitta* (unattentive, D I 79).

(e) *Emotional qualities.*

We must distinguish between feelings and emotions. Feeling is the evaluation from the individual point of view that normally accompanies every perception or cognitive process: we call them “pleasant” and “unpleasant”. This evaluative aspect is not so often attributed to *citta*, but we find, e.g. in M II 145, that *citta* may be “pasanna”, “pleased”, that it suffers (“pahaññati”, S IV 73), that “sārīrikā dukkhā vedanā cittaṃ na pariyādāya tiṭṭhanti” (S V 302), “painful feelings make no impression on my *citta*”.

By emotion proper we understand a state of affectivity or lack of balance. This side of human psychology is usually attributed to *citta*

paritassanā, trembling, nervousness (S III 16),
uddhaccakukkucca, excitement and worry (D I 71).

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padosa, anger (D I 71).
 kāmmāsava, obsession of sensual pleasures (D I 84).
 sapattaka, hostile (D I 228).
 savera, full of anger (D I 247).
 āvila, turbid (A I 9).
 utrasta, terrified (S I 53).
 abbhuta, astonished (S I 178).
 uddhata, unbalanced (S V 112).
 līna, sluggish (S V 112).
 phandana, trembling (Dh 33).
 capala, unsteady (Dh 33).

(f) *Dynamic qualities.*

Dynamic are the traits called which lead or motivate to actions, e.g. needs and drives. The border between these and the emotional traits is, of course, never very well defined.

Taṇhā, the most common word for “desire”, is not often ascribed to *citta*, but in Dh 154, *citta* is said to have “attained to the extinction of all desires” (*cittaṃ taṇhānaṃ khayāṃ ajjhagā*). More commonly attributed to *citta* are *abhijjhā* (covetousness) and *lobha* (greed), found together in M I 36. Very common is *rāga*, sometimes translated by the more emotional word “passion”, sometimes by the more dynamic word “desire” (S I 185). One of the *āsavā* is *bhavāsava*, clinging to existence (D I 84).— Absence of dynamic qualities could be called *thīnamiddha* (“lethargy and drowsiness”, D I 71) or *pamāda* (“indolence”, M I 36). — The most important dynamic traits are, therefore, more or less regularly attributed to *citta*.

(g) *Moral traits.* The moral “defilements” (*upakkilesā*) seem all to belong to *citta*: Most of them are enumerated in M I 36 together with some that are mentioned already:

byāpāda, “malevolence”
 upanāha, “malice”
 makkha, “hypocrisy”
 paḷāsa, “spite”
 issā, “envy”
 macchhariya, “stinginess”
 māyā, “deceit”
 sāṭheyya, “treachery”

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thambha, "selfishness"
māna, "arrogance"
atimāna, "pride"
mada, "conceit"

7. *The attributes of the trained citta.*

(a) *Cognitive and intellectual qualities.* On the highest level of the eightfold path (sammāsamādhi), the adept attains to cittassa ekaggaṭā, "one-pointedness" (D II 217). He is not disturbed by his sense-perceptions: "Evaṃ sammāvinnuttacittassa ... bhikkhuno bhusā ce pi cakkhuvīññeyyā rūpā cakkhussa āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, nev'assa cittaṃ pariyādiyanti, amissikātaṃ ev'assa cittaṃ hoti, t̥hitaṃ āñejjappattaṃ, vayaṃ c' assānupassati". (A III 377). "If objects cognizable by the eye come very strongly into the range of vision of a monk with wholly freed *citta*, they do not obsess his *citta*, and his *citta* is untroubled, firm, having won to composure; and he watches it go". (The last *assa* seems to refer to *citta*; if so, *citta* means "conscious processes"). Temporarily he may attain to saññāvedayitanirodha, and "Yo ca khvāyam ... bhikkhusaññāvedayitanirodhaṃ samāpanno, tassa pi kāyasaṅkhāro niruddho paṭipassaddho vacisaṅkhāro niruddho paṭipassaddho cittasaṅkhāro niruddho paṭipassaddho" (S IV 294). "In him who has attained the ceasing of perception and feeling, the activity of body has also ceased, become calmed. So also have the activities of speech and *citta*."

His *citta* has been trained to be an instrument for higher knowledge (*abhiññā*), for the attainment of *iddhi*, for hearing heavenly sounds, for understanding others' *citta*, for remembering his own former births, for seeing other beings pass from existence to existence, and so on (described, e.g. D I 77-84). His *citta* is not directed outwards (apaṇihitaṃ bahiddhā, S V, 159). He can direct his *citta* and he "brings it towards the deathless element" (amatāya dhātuyā cittaṃ apasaṅkarati (A IV 422). His *citta* is characterized by paññā (wisdom, D II 81) and aññā (knowledge, D III 53).

(b) *Emotional traits.* *Citta* becomes free from āsavā and taṇhā (D II 81, Dh 154). It does not react emotionally on sense-impressions (S V 302). It is vūpasanta (calmed D I 71), samāhita (serene, D I 76), āñejjappatta (imperturbable D I 76), avera (free from anger D I 247), danta gutta rakkhita saṃvuta (tamed, controlled, guarded, restrained A I 7), anāvila (untroubled, A I 9), sukhāvaha (bringer of happiness Dh 35). The general impression is unemotionality and stability.

(c) *Dynamic traits.* The needs and desires were characteristic of the natural *citta*. The trained *citta* is, however, also motivated to action, and motivations are still to be found, although the desires have gone. This is often expressed in a negative way: “*Yaṃ cittaṃ vītarāgaṃ vītadosaṃ vīramohaṃ — itosamuṭṭhāna kusalasīlā* (M II 27). “That *citta* which is free from desire, free from hate and free from illusion—originating from this are the skilled moral habits.” This is an interesting passage showing that the motivation to good actions is to be found in *citta* and that these purely negative expressions have a very positive meaning. It is also interesting to note that they are all considered dynamic, although *dosa* is more emotional and *moha* more intellectual.

Other dynamic words, positively expressed, are found in D III 239 where *citta* is said to “incline towards ardour, devotion, perseverance and exertion” (*namati ātappāya anuyogāya sātaccāya padhānāya*).

On the dynamic side, the training therefore results in a change from impulses and desires to will and determination, from immaturity to maturity, from fickleness to character.

(d) *Moral traits.* *Citta* is made an effective (*kammaniya*, *mudu*) instrument for skillful (*kusala*) action, *Citta* has been made *asaṅkiliṭṭha* (pure, D I 247), *avyāpanna* (free from malice, D I 71), *assava* (obedient, S N 23), *anaṅga* (free from blemish, A II 211). One of its chief characteristics is *mettā* (friendliness, D III 237). At the same time it is *vivekaninna vivekaṇa vivekapabbhāra vupakaṭṭha* (tending to aloofness, leaning to aloofness, inclining to aloofness, remote, M III 111), which probably indicates a certain aversion to all social activity, good as well as bad.

8. *Is citta personal ?*

Citta could be an inner core, e.g. some sort of life-force, very much similar in all individuals, or it could be an individually formed center. The latter is true. It is naturally open to impressions from the outside (S IV 293) and it has a great number of emotional, dynamic and intellectual characteristics that give it an individual form. It can also be understood, interpreted: “*cittaṃ me samaṇo Gotamo jānāti*” (S I 178) “the recluse Gotama knows my *citta*” (or possibly: what I am thinking). “*Idha ... bhikkhu parasat-tānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cittaṃ pi ādisati ... iti pi te cittaṃ ti*” (D I 213). “Here a monk tells (reads) the *citta* of other beings, of other individuals ... saying: — ‘so is your *citta*’”. — “*No ce ... bhikkhu paracittapariyāya-*

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kusalo hoti, atha 'sacittapariyāyakusalo bhavissāmi'ti'" (A V 92) "though a monk be not skilled in (knowing) other people's *citta*, he can decide: 'I will be skilled in (knowing) my own *citta*'".

The training of *citta* seems to result in a greater homogeneity. But the result depends on the type of training. One-sided training, for instance, may give wrong result. So if a monk trains only *samādhi*, then "taṃ cittaṃ kosajjāya saṃvatteyya". "his *citta* will be liable to indolence", if he trains only *paggāha* (energy), then "taṃ cittaṃ uddhaccāya saṃvatteyya", "his *citta* will be liable to distraction"; and if he trains only *upekkhā* (equanimity), then taṃ cittaṃ na sammā samādhīyeyya āsavānaṃ khayāya", "his *citta* will not be perfectly poised for the destruction of the āsavā" (A I 256). — Even a liberated *citta* can still be identified, see S I 194, "tesam ... cetasā cittaṃ samannesati vippamuttaṃ nirupadhim", "he intuitively discerned the *citta* of these as being freed, desireless". Therefore, the individuality remains, even in arahants.

9. *Is citta an instrument ?*

We have repeatedly referred to *citta* as an instrument: for attention understanding, for attaining higher knowledge and certain supernatural powers. The instrument-aspect is no doubt there, but it is less conspicuous than its independence. Its development is an end in itself and for the *citta's* own good. Just as the training of a child may consist in making him do things, so the *citta* is used as an instrument for its own development.

10. *The ultimate fate of citta.*

What happens to *citta* in death? S V 370 provides an answer: "... tassa yo hi khvāyam kāyo rūpī ... taṃ idheva kākā va khādanti ... yañca khvassa cittaṃ dīgharattaṃ saddhāparibhāvitam sīla- suta- cāga-paribhāvitam, taṃ uddhagāmi hoti visesagāmi", "though this formed body of his be devoured by crows (or other animals), — yet his *citta*, if longtime practiced in faith, virtue, learning and renunciation, moves upward and goes to distinction". Here we are very close to an un-Buddhistic soul-theory, according to which *citta* survives death. It can be found also in other passages, where it is connected with the idea of rebirth. "Avidvā manaso vitakke hurāhuraṃ dhāvati bhanta-citto" (U 37). "Without understanding the thoughts of *mano* he runs with restless *citta* from existence to existence". — "Anāvattidhammaṃ me cittaṃ kāmabhavāyā-ti paññāya cittaṃ suparicitaṃ hoti" (A IV 402) "My *citta* is not of such nature that it will return to the plane of sense-pleasures'.—(knowing this) his *citta* is well

provided with wisdom". In these passages we find an indication that *citta* in normal cases is reborn. The same is implied in D III 258 "Tassa evaṃ hoti—'Aho vatāhaṃ kāyassa bhedaṃ param maranā khattiya-mahāsālānaṃ vā brahmaṇamahāsālānaṃ vā gahapati-mahāsālānaṃ vā saḥavyataṃ uppaj-jeyyan ti'. So taṃ cittaṃ dahati, taṃ cittaṃ adhiṭṭhati, taṃ cittaṃ bhāveti. Tassa taṃ cittaṃ hīne vimuttaṃ uttariṃ abhaviṃ tatr' uppattiyā saṃvattati". "He thinks, 'Ah! if only I may be reborn at the dissolution of the body after death as one amongst wealthy nobles, or brahmins, or householders!' This *citta* he holds fixed, firmly established, and develops it.—His *citta* set free in a lower range, and not developed to anything higher, conduces to rebirth within that range." This passage is, however, a little doubtful, as *citta* here, at least in the middle sentence, has a clear process-meaning and therefore may be used simply for *viññāna*.

When, in other contexts, the process-meaning seems to be intended, e.g., in D II 299, it is stressed that *citta* "is something that comes to be" (*samudaya-dhamma*) and "something that passes away" (*vaya-dhamma*).

It is often said that *citta* is *suvimutta*, "liberated" or *vimuccati* "is liberated". What does it mean?

"Paññā-paribhāvitaṃ cittaṃ sammad eva āsavehi vimuccati seyyathīdaṃ kāmāsavā bhavāsavā diṭṭhāsavā avijjāsavā ti" (D II 81). "*Citta*, when thoroughly developed through wisdom, is set quite free from obsessions, that is to say from the obsessions of sensuality, becoming, wrong views and ignorance". Another definition is already quoted from S III 13, according to which *citta* is freed through the destruction of the desire directed towards the five *khandhā*. Still more clear is the passage S III 45: "Rūpadhātuyā (later, the whole sentence is repeated for: vedanādhātuyā, saññādhātuyā, sankhāradhātuyā, viññānadhātuyā) ce ... bhikkhuno cittaṃ virattaṃ vimuttaṃ hoti anupādāya āsavehi, vimuttattā ṭhāma, ṭhittattā santussitaṃ, santussitattā na paritassati aparitassam paccattaññeva parinibbāyati". "If a monk's *citta* is unattached to the form-element (feeling, perception, the activities, consciousness) and is free from it without giving it support through the *āsavā*—then it is steadfast by its freedom, content by its steadfastness, through its contentment it does not crave further: and free from craving it by itself attains to *parinibbāna*". As freedom from the *āsavā* is usually mentioned as the final attainment through which arahant-ship is won, we have ample evidence that *citta* is thought to be that which reaches the state of *nibbāna*. A characteristic of Buddhist meditation is that the meditating

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person knows through all the levels how far he has attained. When the ultimate realization has come, even then he knows that it has come and what it means. Therefore, some part of his conscious personality is left, and everything points to the fact that this function is attributed to *citta*. In addition to the already quoted evidence, let us point to a passage in A I 8, where it is said: “paṇihitena cittaena ... nibbānam sacchikarissati”, “with a *citta* that is well directed ... he will realize *nibbāna*.” So, when the work is done, the instrument is still there, registering the fact.

II. Abnormal states of *citta*.

There are some references to abnormalities in *citta*. According to S III 1, *citta* may be ill (*ātura*), and a certain householder is admonished, so to train himself that his *citta* is healthy although his body is ill: the illness is to identify the *khandhā* with *attā*.

In D I 20, it is said about a group of gods called Manopadosikā: “Te aññaṃaññaṃhi paduṭṭha-cittā kilantakāyā kilanta-cittā”. “Wicked-minded toward each other, they are weak-bodied and weak-minded”. It is not known what is meant here: possibly the basic idea is that a certain amount of energy is required in order to stay on a certain level of development; changes in this karmic force manifests itself in certain mental and bodily changes; if the moral behaviour is not up to requirements, the karmic force weakens and the being is reborn in a lower state.

In Dh 137 and 138 it is said that a man who inflicts pain on the innocent and harmless, will be punished by suffering, loss, bodily injury, difficult illness or *cittakkhepa*: “loss of *citta*”. A similar expression is found in S I 126, where it is described how the daughters of Māra try to seduce the Buddha and afterwards comment on their lack of success with the words: “Yaṃ hi mayaṃ samṇaṃ vā brāhmaṇaṃ vā avītarāgaṃ iminā upakkamena upakkameyyāma hadayaṃ vāssa phaleyya, uṇhaṃ lohitaṃ vā mukhato uggaccheyya, ummādaṃ vā pāpuṇeyya cittavikkhepaṃ vā.” “For if we had approached after this fashion any recluse or brahmin who had not extirpated lust, either his heart would have cleft asunder, or hot blood had flowed from his mouth or he had become crazy or have lost his *citta*”. If a person has developed *mettā cetovimutti*, i.e., “mind-release through friendliness”, his *citta* is not *khipitabba* (“to be upset”, S II 265). In S I 207 it is said: “If you do not reply, I will either upset your *citta* (*cittaṃ khipissāmi*) or split your heart”. In this case *citta* is something that can be lost, thrown away. This use of the word becomes natural, if *citta* is taken to be the personal core

of purposeful consistency, some sort of superordinated organizing agency. We have already noticed (see e.g. M III 156 cited above) that in some contexts this interpretation seems probable (although it is often implied that this superordinate force takes *citta* to task and induces it to development or uses it as an instrument), and we are again very close to an identification between *citta* and the self. In strong emotional experiences it is this normal purposefulness and organized behaviour that is upset.

12. *Has citta inner organization ?*

We have seen that *citta* is conceived as individually formed and that a great number of traits, especially of an emotional, dynamic and moral character, are attributed to it. It is sometimes described as the guiding purposiveness in life. Therefore, it comes very close to the psychological concept of personality.

By personality is meant an individual organization of traits: there is a guiding purposiveness, a hierarchy of motives, a more or less consistent "style of living". Personality may change and can be "developed" and "deranged", but there is continuity and unity. It is both psychological and physical, both structural and functional.

Like personality, *citta* is an organizing factor and it has an individual structure: we have seen that a person's *citta* can be recognized and interpreted by others. We find, on the other hand, few traces of an organization of all the traits that are said to belong to it: it is often even doubtful whether the traits really are meant to form part of *citta* or whether they are conceived as external. If *citta*, for instance, gets rid of the five *upakkilesā*, is *citta* itself changed through the process? But in many cases, the formulation indicates that a real change takes place: the frequent use of *bhāveti*, "cultivate", "make grow", indicates that: A III 245 *subhāvita*, "well developed", M III 149 *cittabhāvanā*, "development of *citta*". When it is said that *citta* becomes one-pointed (D II 217), this can only refer to a concentration and unification of all forces within *citta*, a redistribution of the inner organization.

In S V 92, we find *citta* compared to gold with certain impurities; if these are removed, the gold becomes soft, pliable, luminous and workable: "Evam eva kho ... pañcime cittassa upakkilesā, yehi upakkilesehi upakkilīṭṭhaṃ cittaṃ na ceva mudu hoti, na ca kammaniyaṃ na ca pabhassaram pabhāṅgu ca na ca sammā samādhīyati āsavānaṃ khayāya." "In the same

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way, there are these five impurities of the *citta*, tainted by which *citta* is neither fine, nor pliable, nor luminous, nor frail, nor perfectly composed for the destruction of the *āsavā*". This passage may imply that *citta* is transformed through the impurities; but an implication that *citta* by itself and originally was pure as gold need not be read into it.

The development of *citta* consists in getting rid of bad traits and replacing them by good ones. In descriptions of this process we find that certain bad traits are more fundamental and difficult to get rid of than others: the last ones to disappear are the *āsavā*. The traits that are developed are, among others, *mettā* and *paññā*. Therefore we find traces of an hierarchical organization in *citta*.

So far, *citta* has turned out to be rather similar to personality. But there are differences also:

(a) We may speak about "our" personality as about something outside us, but in reality, we always identify ourselves with our personality, and the psychological ego is contained in it. *Citta* is much more frequently placed as object of activities and conceived as "outside" the speaker (it should, e.g., be "restrained"). But as we have found, identification is also frequently implied.

(b) *Citta* is a more limited concept, as it mainly covers only conscious phenomena. The individual differences are not much elaborated upon in the Nikāyas.

(c) The instrumental aspect, common in *citta*, is not frequent with regard to personality.

(d) *Citta* is often said to be independable and to change quickly. Personality may also change and it may be "unstable", but continuity is

We may conclude that *citta* rather may be called a center within personality a conscious center for activity, purposiveness, continuity and emotionality. The vague term "mind" may, after all, be the best translation, although it does not cover the emotional and moral aspects.

A note on *ceto*

Ceto is a derivation of the root *cit* just as *citta*, but it is much more limited in use. It is to be found only in genitive and instrumental case, and

in compounds, and it seems to be used in a rather limited number of contexts. The following observations are based on material mostly collected from D and M.

Ceto is often consciously and intentionally treated as a synonym of *citta*. In S III 232, the need and desire produced through the senses is called *cittassa upakkileso* but in the following sentence it is referred to as *cetaso upakkileso*. In S IV 125 it is said that *rūpā* touch *citta* again and again but: *cittaṃ na pariyādāya tiṭṭhanti*, “without completely taking hold of *citta*”. This is then summed up with the expression *cetaso apariyādānā*, “by their failure to take hold of *ceto*”.

In A V 207 *vigatābhijjhena cetasā* is immediately followed by *abhijjhāya citta* *parisodheti*.

The following comparisons give also an impression of the close relations between *ceto* and *citta*.

<i>Ceto</i>	<i>Citta</i>
<i>cetaso ekodibhāva</i> ,	<i>cittaṃ ekodhihoti</i> ,
D I 74	A I 254
<i>mettāsahagatena cetasā</i>	<i>mettā-cittaṃ bhāveti</i>
D I 251	D I 167
<i>cetovimutti</i>	<i>cittaṃ suvimuttam</i>
M III 146	S III 13
<i>parisuddhena cetasā</i>	<i>citte parisuddhe</i>
M III 94	D I 76
<i>cetosamādhim</i>	<i>cittasamādhi</i>
M III 108	S IV 350
<i>ceto-pañidhi</i>	<i>pañihitena cittena</i>
D III 259	A I 8
<i>cetaso upakkilese</i>	<i>cittassa upakkilesā</i>
D III 49	S V 92
<i>cetaso pariyādāna</i>	<i>cittaṃ pariyādāya</i>
S III 16	S II 226
<i>cetasā averena, avyāpajjhena</i>	<i>avera-citto, avyāpajjhacitto</i>
D I 251	D I 247
<i>cetovimuttim paññāvimuttim</i>	<i>cittaṃ paññāṇca bhāvayam</i>
D III 78	S I 13

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We find that *ceto* at least to some extent is just a synonym of *citta*: the upakilesa are attributed to both, and also some emotional traits. Both must be concentrated and both attain liberation. Further, both are engaged in supernatural perception, e.g., mind-reading (*cetasā ceto paricca vidito*, “by my *ceto*, of ... is known to me” M I 210, and frequently; compare A I 170, “*evam pi te mano, ittham pi te mano iti pi te cittan ti*”, “thus is your *mano*, such and such is your *mano*, thus is your *citta*; in some contexts *citta* and *ceto* are combined, e.g. S I 194, “... *cetasā cittam sammanesati vippamuttam* ... “he discerned with his *ceto* the *citta* of these as being freed ...”

Ceto has a number of traits (cognitive, emotional, dynamic, and moral) of the same type as those attributed to *citta*. We find, for instance, the five *ceto-khilā*, “the obstructions of *ceto*”: doubt about the master, about the doctrine, about the order, about the training, and anger towards the fellow-monks (D III 237 f). And further, the five *cetaso vinibandhā*, “bondages”: desire for sensual pleasures, for the body, for visual things; excessive eating and sleeping; living a religious life for rebirth as a god (D III 238). The group *adhittāna*, *abhinivesa* and *anusaya* (decision, indulgence and disposition) is consistently attributed to *ceto* (e.g. M III 32). In D III 259 we find *ceto-paṇidhi*, “aspiration of *ceto*”. In M III 50, we are told that *akusalā dhammā* follow if somebody lives with *abhijjhāsa* (*ahagatena cetasā*, *vyāpādasahagatena cetasā* and *viheṣāsahagatena cetasā* (*ceto* given over to covetousness, malevolence, harmfulness): they are all called *cittuppāda*, “creation of *citta*”. All this makes *ceto* appear as a dynamic center, not very unlike *citta*.

In some special aspects, *ceto* has a profile of its own.

I. The instrumental aspect is much more pronounced, especially for knowledge, thinking and concentration, “... *dhamma cetasā anuvitakketi anuvicareti* ...” (D III 242), “he reflects and meditates over the doctrine in his *ceto*”, “... *mama cetasā cetoparivitakkaṃ aññāya*” (M I 168), “... who knew with his *ceto* the reasoning in my *ceto*”, “... *addasaṃ Bhagavantam ... Māgadhake paricārake ārabha aṭṭhikatvā manasikatvā sabba-cetaso samannāharitvā nisinnam: ‘Gatiṃ tesam jānissāmi abhisamparāyaṃ, yaṃ-gatikā te bhavanto yamabhisamparāyāti’*”. (D II 207). “I saw the Lord ... sitting down to think over, to cogitate upon, to concentrate his whole *ceto* upon the deceased Magadhese adherents: “I will know their fate, their future; where these people are going, what their future will be.”

2. This stress on concentration and supernatural knowledge becomes especially prominent in contexts where the ways to liberation are described. Very often we find the combination *ceto-vimutti paññā-vimutti*, usually translated “freedom of mind and freedom through intuitive wisdom”. It is often (e.g. M I 73, D III 78) said to depend on the destruction of *āsavā* and is therefore the same process as described in D I 84 “*kāmāsavā pi cittaṃ vimuccati bhavāsavā pi cittaṃ vimuccati avijjāsavā pi cittaṃ vimuccati. ‘Vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam’ iti ñānaṃ hoti*”, “*citta* is freed from the influx of sensual pleasure, from the influx of rebirth, from the influx of ignorance; he knows: ‘in liberation it is freed’”. *Cetovimutti* is analyzed into five types in M I 296-298:

- (a) *adukkhamasukhā cetovimutti* which is attained in the fourth *jhāna*.
- (b) *animittā cetovimutti*: the monk does not pay any attention to any signs (conditions) and enters on *animittaṃ cetosamādhim*, the concentration that is signless.
- (c) *ākīñcaññā cetovimutti*: the monk passes quite beyond the plane of infinite consciousness and thinks ‘There is nothing at all’.
- (d) *suññatā cetovimutti*: the monk meditates “*suññamidaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā*”, “this is void of self or of what pertains to self”,
- (e) *appamāṇā cetovimutti*: the monk suffuses the whole world with a *ceto* that is *mettā-sahagata*, *karuṇā-sahagata*, *muditā-sahagata*, *upekkhā-sahagata*, “filled with friendliness, compassion, joy, equanimity”.

We find that all these belong to different levels of meditation. The *appamāṇā cetovimutti* is an idea that returns quite often and is unique for *ceto*: the conscious processes of a meditating person are here conceived as a sort of energy that can be directed and fill the whole world “just as a mighty trumpeter makes himself heard”, D I 251) and is probably thought to have beneficial influence on its objects. In the 4th *jhāna* the monk is said to suffuse his whole body “*parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena*”, “with utterly clean and pure *ceto*” (M III 94), just as somebody might wrap up his whole body with a white cloth.

To sum up: *Ceto* is a synonym of *citta* but is used especially for its instrumental, cognitive, meditative, and supernatural functions.

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Mano.

Mano seems to be much easier to grasp than the other concepts discussed in this paper. Its essential function, as inner sense, is the same as is commonly met with in earlier Indian psychology.

1. *Is mano consciousness ?*

In for instance D I 70 *mano* is described as an instrument for knowledge of *dhammā*: “*manasā dhammaṃ viññāya*”, “when he cognizes a phenomenon with his *mano* ...” *Mano* is generally found mentioned as one of the senses, and just as the eye has *rūpa* as object, *mano* characteristically has *dhamma*. In D III 242, it is used with *anupekkhati*: “*dhammaṃ manasā anupekkhati*”, “he contemplates the doctrine in *mano*”. In SN 834 we find “*manasā diṭṭhigatāni cintayanto*”, “thinking over the theories in *mano*”. *Mano* is therefore a center for conscious processes.

2. *Is mano an entity ?*

When using the word “center” above, we implied that *mano* has more character of entity than of process. Is that justified? By center we mean a more or less permanent although changing structure used as an instrument for producing or containing processes of a certain type: a sense is a structure transforming physical energy to signals that can be interpreted by the organism. *Mano* is sensitive to and a repository of *dhammā* received from the other senses: “*Imesaṃ kho ... pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ nānāvisayānaṃ nānāgocarānaṃ na aññamaññassa gocaraviṣayaṃ paccanubhontānaṃ mano paṭisaraṇaṃ, mano ca nesaṃ gocaraviṣayaṃ paccanubhotīti*” (M I 195). “Of these five senses, different in range, different in field (=modality), not reacting to the field and range of each other, *mano* is the refuge (center?), and *mano* reacts to their field and range”. *Mano* is, therefore, a coordinating center for the other senses, and perhaps an instrument for recollecting past events (=memory).

The same idea of an instrumental center returns, for instance, in SN 1142. “*Passāmi naṃ manasā cakkhunā va*”. “I see him with *mano* as with my eye”. Similarly in SN 1005 “*manasā pucchite pañhe vācāya vissajessati*”, “he will answer in words the questions you have asked in *mano*”. Cf. M I 191 “*Ajjhattiko ce ... mano aparibhinno hoti ...*” “If the internal *mano* is unbroken ...” and S I 197 “*... vanaṃ pavitṭho, atha me mano niccharati bahiddhā*”, “(I have) gone into the forest, but my *mano* goes astray outside”. I have not found any passage where *mano* is used

with a clear process-meaning, but there are very many contexts, where a process-meaning *could* well be implied. *Mano* in S I 197 just quoted, seems to be personified and objectified, but a meaning “thought”, “imagination” is not excluded. In all the cases where *manomaya* is used, it may mean “produced by the *mano*” or “consisting of a mental image”, which in reality could be the same thing. The question may be more or less artificial but I conclude that *mano* is primarily thought of as an entity.

3. *Is mano an instrument ?*

We have already quoted passages proving that *mano* is an instrument of ideation. As a matter of fact, the instrumental meaning clearly dominates all other usages. It can be seen in some very frequently occurring compounds, e.g. *manosankhāra* (activity of *mano*), *mano-vitakka* (thoughts of *mano*), *mano-sucarita* (good action by means of *mano*).

There are, however, also indications of a more independent meaning.” *Sabbaloke ca me mano nābhiramissati, sabbalokā ca me mano vuṭṭhahissati*” (A III 443). “My *mano* shall find no delight in any world; my *mano* shall rise above every world”.—“*Haranti maññe mano vanāni samādhim alabhamānassa bhikkhuno*” (M I 16) — “I think forests distract the *mano* of a monk who does not attain *samādhi*”.—“*Na brahmaṇass’ etad akiñci seyyo yadā nisedho manaso piyehi*” (Dh 390) “It is no slight benefit to a brahmin when he holds his *mano* back from the pleasures of life”.

In sum, the word *mano* is used for some conscious agency, mainly instrumental to the purposes of other agencies, but sometimes used without instrumental implications.

4. *Functions of mano.*

We have stressed that *mano* is chiefly conceived as an inner center with a predominantly instrumental function. We shall now investigate the areas of function more closely.

(a) *Perception.* In M III 216, 18 applications of *mano* (*manopavicārā*) are mentioned: “*Cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā somanassaṭṭhānīyaṃ rūpaṃ upavicarati domanassaṭṭhānīyaṃ rūpaṃ upavicarati, upekhaṭṭhānīyaṃ rūpaṃ upavicarati; sotena saddaṃ sutvā—pe—; ghānena gandhaṃ ghāyitvā—pe—; jivhāya rasaṃ sāyitvā—pe—; kāyena phoṭṭhabbaṃ phusitvā—pe—; manasā dhammaṃ viññāya somanassaṭṭhānīyaṃ dhammaṃ upavicarati domanassaṭṭhānīyaṃ dhammaṃ upavicarati upekhaṭṭhānīyaṃ*”

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dhammaṃ upavicarati". "Having seen a form with the eye, one experiences the form as (standing on—) connected with pleasure, distress or neutral feeling. Having heard a sound with the ear, — having smelt a smell with the nose, — having tasted a flavour with the tongue, — having felt a touch the body, — having become conscious of a *dhamma* with *mano*, one experiences a mental state connected with pleasure, distress or neutral feeling." Here, two functions of *mano* are clearly indicated: the function of knowing or cognizing mental states, ideas and so on, which are referred to above, and the function of receiving and experiencing the impressions directly from the other senses. According to Buddhist way of thinking all perception involves an immediate evaluation from the individual point of view: perception and feeling together belong therefore to the *manopavcārā*. In M I 191 it is stated that if the internal *mano* is intact and external *dhammā* come in focus and there is an appropriate contact, then the appropriate part of *viññāna* will appear. ("Tato ... ajjhattiko ce mano aparibhinno hoti bāhirā ca dhammā āpāthaṃ āgacchanti tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti, evaṃ tajjassa viññānabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti"). This seems to be a good description of a perceptual process: if we are to be conscious of something, a functioning sense-organ is required; this must be focussed on the object; and there must be proper contact (contact probably refers to the physical impingement of the object on the sense-organ by which the primitive sensations are produced). The *dhamma* is in this case described as external; so it may be used as a comprehensive term for all external stimuli.

(b) *Attention*. In S II 24 we find the exhortation: "suñātha sādhu-kam manasi karotha bhāsissāmīti", "listen, give your *mano* thoroughly, and I will speak. The phrase *manasi-karoti* is used in many forms to express attention, e.g. in the frequently found formula: "ātappaṃ anvāya padhānaṃ anvāya anuyogaṃ anvāya appamādaṃ anvāya sammā-manasikāraṃ anvāya tathārūpaṃ ceto-samādhiṃ phusati yathā samāhite citte aneka-vihitaṃ pubbe nīvāsaṃ anussarati", "by means of ardour, of exertion, of application, of vigilance, of highest attention, he attains such concentration of mind that he, with concentrated *citta* remembers his various existences in the past". We may conclude that attention and concentration are connected with *mano*.

(c) *Intelligence and thinking* are also clearly functions of *mano*. See SN 834, "Atha tvaṃ pavitakkam āgamā, manasā diṭṭhigatāni cintayanto" "Then you started to speculate, reflecting on the views in your *mano*. *Mano* is often combined with *vitakka*, "reflective thought": "ito samuṭ-

ṭhāya manovitakkā ... snehajā attasambhūtā ...” “hence spring the reflective thoughts of *mano*: born of love and arisen in self” (S I 207). The already quoted passage in SN 1005 gives an instance of mental questioning, which we would call a thought-process.

(d) *Memory and ideation.* Memory is not directly attributed to *mano*, but as the “repository” of the other senses (S V 218) and the center of all kinds of ideational activity, memory must be very much involved in its activities. In D II 176 it is said about a lady: “*manasā pi no aticāri, kuto pana kāyena*”, “she was never, even with her *mano*, unfaithful, how much less with the body”, and here evidently that type of ideation that we call imagination is referred to. The same imaginative function we have already met in S I 197: “(I have) gone into the forest, but my *mano* goes astray outside”. A little more vague is an interesting passage in SN 1144: “*Jiṇṇassa me dubbalathāmakassa ten’ eva kāyo na paleti tattha, saṃkappayattāya vajāmi niccaṃ, mano hi me ... tena yutto*”. “Because I am old and feeble, my body does not go there, but in my intentions I always go there, for my *mano* is joined to him”. *Saṃkappa* is here used for the planning and longing thought-activity; *mano* could refer to a daydreaming function or to emotional attachment. The word *manomaya* is frequently used about images created by *mano*. “*Puna ca paraṃ ... akkhātā mayā sāvakānam paṭipadā, yathā paṭipannā me sāvakā imaṃhā kāyā aññaṃ kāyaṃ abhinimminanti rūpim manomayaṃ sabbāṅga-paccāṅgim abhinindriyam*”. (M II 17). “And again, a method has been described by me for disciples, practicing which disciples of mine from this body produce another body, with form and made by *mano*, having all its major and minor parts, not deficient in any sense. The origin of these images was probably the ability to create clear mental images: but it is evident from, for instance, A III 122 that the pictures so created were believed to have independent reality, filling space although without material body: “*kālakato aññataraṃ manomayaṃ kāyaṃ upapanno, tassa evarūpo atabhāvapaṭilābho hoti, seyyathā pi nāma dve vā tīṇi vā Māgadhikāni gāmakkhettāni*” ... “when he died he was reborn in a body made by/of *mano*, and the form that he took was such that it filled two or three Magadhan village fields”.

(e) *Feelings and emotions*

M III 216 was quoted above, where the 18 *manopavicārā* were given and which proves that the feelings also were considered as felt by *mano*. Cf. S V 74 “*Manasā dhammaṃ viññāya manāpaṃ ...*”, “with *mano* cognizing a pleasant phenomenon ...”, and “*Agati yattha Mārassa, tattha me*

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nirato mano", "Out of reach of Māra my *mano* is pleased (S I 133). — "Padhānāya gamissāmi, ettha me rañjati mano" (SN 424). "I will go and exert myself, in this my *mano* delights *jhāna*". — "dandham hi karoto puññaṃ pāpasmiṃ ramatī mano" (Dh 116), "If a man is slack in doing good, his *mano* delights in evil".

Even emotions are sometimes attributed to *mano*: "Ayam eva mahat-taro kali, yo sugatesu manam padosaye" (SN 659) "This is a greater sin: to make *mano* angry towards the happy ones", — "manopakopam rak-kheyya" (Dh 233) "let one be watchful of irritation in *mano*" — "santam tassa manam hoti" (Dh 96), "his *mano* is calm".

It is clear from these passages that *mano* can feel pleased or displeased, irritated or calm.

(f) Needs, purposiveness and will.

Dynamic traits are often attributed to *mano*. See, for instance, D II 275 "Puccha ... maṃ paṇham yaṃ kiñci manas' icchasi", "Ask me whatever question you wish in your *mano*". — D I 18: "Iti mamañ ca manopañidhi, ime ca sattā itthattam āgatā", "So was my *mano*'s wish, and these beings came there". — D III 103: "Yathā imassa bhoto mano-saṃkhārā pañihitā, tathā imassa cittassa anantarā amuṃ nāma vitakkaṃ vitakkessati", "Just as this good man's *mano*-activity is directed, so will he later direct the thought of this *citta*". — SN 228: Ye suppayuttā manasā dalhena nikkāmino Gotama — sāsanamhi ..." "Those who have applied themselves well with a firm *mano* to the discipline of Gotama and are freed from desire ..." — We also often find the compound *mano-sañceta* (e.g., D III 228) meaning "will" or "purposiveness".

Mano is generally conceived as an active agency, not only as a sense, content with passively receiving impressions and passing them on. We need only point to the frequent occurrence of expressions for actions performed by *mano*, *kāya* and *vācā*: "Pañcahi thānehi kula-puttena uparimā disā samaṇa-brāhmaṇā paccupaṭṭhabbā: mettena kāya-kammena, mettena vacī-kammena, mettena mano-kammena ..." (D III 191), "In five ways should a clansman minister to recluses and brahmins as the zenith: by friendly acts in behaviour, speech and *mano* ..." — "Parisuddho no manosamācāro bhavissati ..." (M I 272). "Our conduct in *mano* shall be perfectly pure ..."

We conclude, that active attitude is one of the aspects of *mano*. This leads us naturally over to the question of the moral implications of the thoughts and acts of *mano*.

(g) *Mano as moral agency*

Mano can perform good and bad actions. "Manoduccaritaṃ hitvā, manasā sucaritaṃ care" (Dh 233). "Having abandoned the bad actions of *mano* he should practise good actions with *mano*". Khattiyo ... kāyena duccaritaṃ caritvā, vācāya duccaritaṃ caritvā, manasā duccaritaṃ caritvā ... (D III 96) "a khattiya who has led a bad life in deed, word and *mano* ..." In M I 373 it is said that a *mano-kammaṃ* is more blamable if it is bad, than works of body or speech. It follows that the evil purpose is felt to be the only real evil and that it is attributed to *mano*. This connection between purpose and the activity of *mano* perhaps lies behind the compound paduṭṭha-mana-saṃkappo in M III 49: "Vyāpannacitto kho pana hoti paduṭṭha-mana-saṃkappo: Ime sattā haññantu vā vajjhantu vā ucchijjantu vā vinassantu vā mā ahesuṃ vā ti, iti vā evarūpaṃ ... manosamācāram sevato akusalā dhammā abhivaḍḍhanti kusalā dhammā parihāyanti." "He is malevolent in his *citta*, corrupt in *mano* and intentions (or: intentions of *mano* ?), and thinks: 'May these beings be killed or slaughtered or annihilated or destroyed, or may they not exist at all'. If this kind of conduct of *mano* is followed, unskilled states of mind grow much, skilled states of mind decrease".

5. *Is mano personal ?*

The answer to this question is yes, because everything that comes in through the senses passes through *mano*: it must therefore be individually formed. There is also direct evidence. According to A I 170, both *mano* and *citta* are interpreted in thought-reading: "Katamañ ca ... ādesanāpāṭi-hāriyaṃ ? Idha ... ekacco nimittena ādisati, evaṃ pi te mano ittham pi te mano iti pi te cittan ti". "And what is the marvel of thought-reading ? In this case somebody can declare by means of a sign: "Thus is your *mano*. Such and such is your *mano*. That is your *citta*' ". From this follows also that *mano* must have some interior organisation, but nothing is ever said directly about this matter.

6. *The fate of mano.*

Mano is described as changing and ephemeral. "Manañca paṭicca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviññānam; mano anicco vipariṇāmi aññathābhāvī; dhammā aniccā vipariṇāmino aññathābhāvino" (S IV 69). De-

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pendent upon *mano* and mental states, *mano-viññāna* arises. *Mano* is impermanent, changing, becoming something different. The mental states are impermanent, changing, becoming something different". — Cf. S I 116 "Tav' eva pāpima mano tava dhammā tava mano-samphassa-viññānāyatanam; yattha ca kho pāpima natthi mano natthi dhammā natthi mano-samphassa-viññānāyatanam agati tava tattha pāpima ti". "To you, O evil one belong (the senses and their objects and) *mano*, the mental states, and the field of consciousness created by contact with *mano*. But where there is no *mano*, no mental states, no field of consciousness created by contact with *mano*, there is no access for you, Evil One". — *Mano* is therefore normally subject to change and death, but there is another possibility: to calm *mano* by training (in Dh 96, it is said about the arahant: "santaṃ tassa manam hoti", "his *mano* is calm").

7. Can *mano* be influenced and trained ?

There are many indications in the texts that *mano* is to be trained and plays an important part in meditation. "Manasā saṃvuto siyā" (Dh 233). "May he practice restraint of *mano*". — "Na brāhmaṇass' etad akiñci seyyo yadā nisedho manaso piyehi" (Dh 390) "It is no slight benefit to a brahmin, when he holds his *mano* back from pleasures". — "Yad āvilattam manaso-vijaññā, 'kaṇhassa pakkho' ti vinodayeyya". (SN 967) "What he recognizes to be disturbance of *mano*, may he drive that off as an associate of Māra". — We find that *mano* should be concentrated, turned from outside things and "developed" (*mano-bhāvanīyā bhikkhū*, "monks who are developing *mano*", D III 36). But it is also said, that one should not restrain *mano* from everything but only from what is evil: "Na sabbato mano nivāraye; na mano sayatattam āgatam; yato yato ca pāpakaṃ, tato tato mano nivāraye" (S I 14) "One should not restrain *mano* from everything: not when *mano* has attained self-control. Whatever is evil, one should restrain *mano* from that". *Mano* plays in this respect a purely instrumental part: it has to do its work and then stay in the background. It is never said that *mano* attains liberation or that it survives death.

Vinnāna

General characteristics.

Viññāna is a more complex concept than the two others discussed in this paper, and its unity has sometimes been denied. Here we shall first test the hypothesis that it may have been conceived as a unit. After that, we shall compare it with the other two concepts by confronting it with the same questions as we used earlier. We start by quoting some crucial passages suitable as corner-stones for a coming definition:

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1. Kittāvata nu kho viññāṇan-ti vuccatīti. — Vijānāti vijānātīti kho, tasmā viññāṇan-ti vuccati, kiñ-ca vijānāti: sukhan-ti pi vijānāti, dukkhan-ti pi vijānāti, adukkham-asukhan-ti pi vijānāti (M I 292). “In what respect it is called *viññāṇa* ?” “It is called *viññāṇa* because it notices, it notices (*vijānāti*: discriminates, becomes aware). And what does it notice? It notices pleasure, pain and neutral feeling”.

(In a similar definition, S III 87, a number of tastes are given as examples).

Viññāṇa therefore definitely has something to do with consciousness.

2. This is further elaborated upon in numerous passages like D III 243: “Cha viññāṇa-kāyā. Cakkhu viññāṇaṃ, sotaghāna-, jivhā-, kāya-, mano viññāṇaṃ.”

“(There are) six manifestations of *viññāṇa*: visual, auditory, olfactory, sapid, tactual and mental (belonging to the inner sense).”

Viññāṇa is, therefore, awareness of inner processes coming from the senses (perceptual processes) or from memory (ideational processes).

3. In S III 103 *viññāṇa* (just as the other *khandhā*) is called *anicca dukkha viparināmadhamma*, “impermanent, painful, liable to change”, and in the same context a way of escaping from *viññāṇa* (*viññāṇassa nissaraṇaṃ*) is mentioned. *Viññāṇa* is, therefore, certainly a process, not an entity.

4. Through its inclusion in the *paṭiccasamuppāda*, between *saṅkhārā* and *nāma-rūpa* (see e.g. S II 3 f), *viññāṇa* is understood to be conditioned and itself a condition.

5. “*Viññāṇāhāro āyatim punabhāvabhiniḍḍattiyā paccayo.*” (S II 13 “The type of food called *viññāṇa* is the support (cause) of renewed becoming, of birth in the future”. *Viññāṇaṃ ... mātu kucchiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātu kucchismiṃ samucchissathati?*” (D II 63) “Were *viññāṇa* not to descend into the mother’s womb, would *nāma-rūpa* arise therein ?” (rhetorical question).

We can conclude that *viññāṇa* is, in some way or other, the important agency in the Buddhist conception of rebirth.

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6. In M I 256, the view is refuted that “*tad-ev’ idaṃ viññāṇaṃ sandhāvati saṃsaratī, anaññan-tī*”, “this *viññāṇa* itself runs on, fares on, nothing else”, by referring to what the Buddha had said, “*paṭiccasamuppamaṃ viññāṇaṃ*”, “*viññāṇa* arises through condition”.

Although *viññāṇa* is the agency of rebirth, it is not itself reborn: it is not some sort of permanent soul that migrates through a number of existences (the view that *viññāṇa* is *attā*, i.e. a permanent self, is frequently refuted, e.g. M III 18).

The background

In order to visualize a concept like this, we must keep the following considerations in mind:

1. The universe as conceived by the Buddha is governed by ethical laws. All individual life can be compared with waves of energy running through time but without material unity, consisting of individual organisms, each working its way, and by means of its activity, which is always viewed from the aspect of its ethical effectiveness, forging its own future. Although the individuals, at any chosen moment of time, are considered as separate, and although the ethics of Buddhism is not purely social, they are much closer to each other and dependent on each other than is commonly held in Western psychology: ethics is all-important. The continuity in the material diversity of the series of rebirths must be something that can transmit ethical resultants just as a wave of energy can run through different types of matter and on its way change its form because of the momentary matter and itself cause changes in the matter. This “wave of energy” is called *viññāṇa*.

2. We would expect that the idea of an agency of rebirth would be shaped under the impression of certain introspective observations. We would expect that certain mental contents that seemed to indicate or explain the function of *kamma* in an ethical universe and, at the same time, give a foundation to the Buddhist doctrine of liberation, would have been collected to form the concept of *viññāṇa*. Observations of this type were maybe:

- (a) the continuity of the conscious processes, (e.g. the laws of association)
- (b) the inner causality, the experience of inner force (drives, needs) which are felt to be causes of actions,

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- (c) the accumulating function of memory, the ability to recollect, earlier experience, our continuous change,
- (d) the moral judge in consciousness (of forgotten origin which makes it seem a universal law) making our actions seem good or bad,
- (e) the inner freedom of imagination in dreams and daydreams,
- (f) the possibility of stopping the whole mental process.

An hypothesis

We formulate the hypothesis that the concept of *viññāṇa* is a unitary and empirical concept formed under the influence of observations of this type. If this is true, we would expect *viññāṇa* to be:

1. a continually flowing process (not a static structure),
2. principally dynamic, experienced as force,
3. principally conscious, but with a subconscious component, because most of the content is not always present (former existences are rarely remembered; the act of rebirth is not conscious); it should be able to remember former existences,
4. transmitter of karmic effects, modifiable by experiences,
5. a free-moving force, not bound in time and space (e.g., connected with dreams and free imaginations),
6. an explanation of rebirth in terms of consciousness,
7. a process that can be stopped and thereby the whole karmic process.

The hypothesis tested

1. *Is viññāṇa a process?*

We have already seen that *viññāṇa* is produced through the work of the senses and that it is perishable, changeable and conditioned. It was, therefore certainly not conceived as static. This view is confirmed in M I 259, “cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjate viññāṇaṃ, cakkuviññāṇaṃ-t’ eva saṅkhaṃ gacchati”, “if *viññāṇa* arises dependent on eye and forms it is known as visual consciousness”. In D III 105, *viññāṇa* is compared to a stream: “purisassa ca viññāṇasotaṃ pajānāti ubhayato abbochinnaṃ idhaloke paṭiṭṭhitaṃ ca paraloke paṭiṭṭhitaṃ ca”, “he understands a man’s *viññāṇa*-stream as uninterrupted at both ends and supported both in this world and in the other world”. Here, *viññāṇa* is visualized as a stream flowing through a string of existences, in time. What constitutes a stream is not the water-particles, which may be endlessly rearranged and even replaced by some completely different type of particles, but the energy and the momentary form.

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There are other metaphorical descriptions of *viññāṇa* which seem to suggest a more static structure. See e.g. A I 223: “*kammaṃ khettaṃ viññāṇaṃ bijaṃ taṇhā sineho avijjāni-varaṇaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsaṃyojanānaṃ hīnāya dhātuyā viññāṇaṃ patitṭhitam*”. “*Kamma* is the field, *viññāṇa* the seed, *taṇhā* the moisture. Of beings that are hindered by *avijjā*, fettered by *taṇhā*, *viññāṇa* gets support in low conditions”. The seed is of course changing, but still an entity. — In a parable, S IV 195, *viññāṇa* is personified and called the lord of the city (*nagarasāmi*). — In S I 122, Māra is looking for the *viññāṇa* of Godhika who had died. But Godhika was *parinibbuta*, and therefore his *viññāṇa* was *appatitṭhita*, i.e. “without support”, but it is taken for granted that, had it not been so, *viññāṇa* would have survived as an entity and therefore an easy prey to Māra. As belonging to the popular pulpit style, this should certainly not be taken too literally: usually it is emphatically stressed that *khandhā*, of which *viññāṇa* is one, are dissolved at death; here *viññāṇa* has been used as *citta* is used in many similar contexts.

2. *Is viññāṇa dynamic ?*

Viññāṇa is not described as principally dynamic, as demanded by hypothesis no. 2. This follows already from the above-mentioned definition M I 292 and from passages like D III 243, where it is given a purely cognitive and ideational function. Dynamic traits can, however, also be found. In M III 226, *viññāṇa* is given the attribute *anusāri*, “striving after”. In S III 9 f, *viññāṇa* is said to be *rāga-vinibaddha* (“tied with desire”) to *rūpadhātu*, *vedanādhātu*, *saññādhātu*, and *sankhārādhātu*, which are called the home (*oka*) of *viññāṇa*. This must mean that *rāga* is experienced through *viññāṇa*. Cf. S III 103, “*yo viññāṇasmiṃ chandarāgavinayo chandarāgapahānaṃ*”, “the restraint of wish and desire, the removal of wish and desire which are in *viññāṇa*”, which probably refers to the confrontation of *chandarāga* with a counterforce within *viññāṇa*. — “*Tassa tam upekkham abhinandato abhivadato ajjhosāya tiṭṭhato tan nissitaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ tad upādānaṃ*”. (M II 265) “If he rejoices in this equanimity, approves of it and clings to it, *viññāṇa* is dependent on it and grasps after it”. Here the function of clinging is attributed to *viññāṇa*. In S III 47, *viññāṇa* (and the other *khandhā*) is given the attributes “*sāsava upādāniya*”, “connected with *āsavā* and *upādāna*”, which could mean that these factors, as conscious, work through *viññāṇa*. Both are at least partly dynamic qualities: *upādāna* means, (a) “attachment”, “clinging”, (b) “material”, “fuel”. Clinging naturally arises from *taṇhā* (as is said in the *paṭicca-samuppāda*-series): this conscious attachment is material for *bhava*; which means simply that if we want to live, we shall go on living. Cf. SN 1055:

“*viññāṇam bhava na tiṭṭhe*”, “do not set your *viññāṇa* on bhava!” i.e. “do not affect a new birth by consciously striving for it!” Of special interest in this context are the four *āhārā* (foods, sustenances), mentioned e.g. in MI 261: *kabalinkāra āhāra* (material food), *phassa* (sensory contact), *mano-sañcetanā* (mental striving), *viññāṇa*. It is said that they all arise from *taṇhā* (*ime cattāro āhārā taṇhānidānā taṇhāsamudayā taṇhājātikā taṇhā-pabhavā*) and that their purpose is to maintain creatures that have come to be, or to assist those seeking birth (“*bhūtānaṃ vā sattānaṃ ṭhitiyā sambhavesiṇaṃ vā anuggahāya*”). They are, therefore, active in the process of rebirth. S II 13 is more specific and mentions only *viññāṇa* as having this function, while S II 101 treats them all as equally important: as targets of *taṇhā*, by means of which “*patiṭṭhitaṃ tattha viññāṇaṃ virūlhaṃ*” (“*viññāṇa* is supported and becomes fruitful”) and then “*atthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti*” (“there is descent of name-and-shape”).

The meaning is perhaps that *taṇhā* operates through *viññāṇa*, although not really belonging to *viññāṇa*. *Taṇhā* may become conscious through *viññāṇa*: in that case we would find active processes in *viññāṇa*.

On the other hand, *manosañcetanā*, which means “conscious striving”, is distinguished from *viññāṇa*, and therefore we must presuppose active processes outside *viññāṇa*. In S III 60, we find *sañcetanā* identified with *sañkhāra*, and the close contact between *sañkhāra* and *viññāṇa* is well documented through the *paṭṭicasamuppāda*-series. It can also be seen from the use of *abhisañkhāra* in S III 53 f: “*Tad-apatīṭṭhitaṃ viññāṇaṃ avirūlhaṃ anabhisañkhārañca vimuttam*”, “Without that support *viññāṇa* has no growth, is without *sañkhāra* and is freed”. According to M III 279 f, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *sañkhāra* and *viññāṇa* arise because of *phassa* (*mano-samphassa-paccayā*): so they are all parallel and, at least partly, conscious.

Sañkhāra has not been included for analysis in this study, but we can refer to a study by Jayatilleke (“Some problems of translation and interpretation”, UCR, vol. VII, 1949, p. 208-225), where it is shown that *sañkhāra* is a dynamic concept, best described by words like “purposive activity”, “dispositions”, “vital impulse” and that it covers also subconscious processes. If we need not imply a time-sequence but could treat *viññāṇa* and *sañkhāra* as complementary concepts (this will be discussed below), the two together would satisfy our search for a dynamic agency. Jayatilleke seems to imply this interpretation when he says that “... the probability is... that this part of the stream of Consciousness consisted of these dynamic *sañkhāras* ...”

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3. *Has viññāṇa a subconscious component ?*

We have noted that *viññāṇa* in principle is consciousness and need not collect more evidence for this. But in order to explain the continuity, the influence of *kamma*, and the possibility to remember former existences, we assumed an unconscious component in *viññāṇa*. This is rarely mentioned. It can, however, be seen from D III 134, that *viññāṇa* is used in connection with recollection of former existences: “Atītam ... addhānaṃ ārabbhā Tathāgataṃ satānusāri viññāṇaṃ hoti”, “concerning the past, the Tathāgata has *viññāṇa* reminiscent of existences”. Concerning a possible unconscious component, we have found only one passage worth discussing. In S II 65, two factors of importance for rebirth are distinguished, “Yaṅca ... ceteti yaṅ ca pakappeti yaṅca anuseti, ārammaṇaṃ etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā, ārammaṇe sati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti”. “That which we will and that which we intend and that which lies as dormant tendencies — this becomes a basis for a state (prevalence, duration) of *viññāṇa*. If the basis is there, there will be a state of *viññāṇa*”. A few lines further down, this group of verbs is divided into two, and it turns out that *ceteti* and *pakappeti* are not necessary as basis for the state of *viññāṇa*: *anuseti* is sufficient: “No ce ... ceteti no ce pakappeti atha ce anuseti, ārammaṇaṃ etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā, ārammaṇe sati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti”. “Even if we do not will or intend, but there still is a dormant tendency — this becomes a basis for a state of *viññāṇa*. If the basis is there, there will be a state of *viññāṇa*”. As *anuseti* probably refers to unconscious, i.e. latent, processes: tendencies and dispositions (the translation of Woodward misses the point), this could be taken as a proof of the close connection between *viññāṇa* and the unconscious.

The attempt to find an unconscious component in *viññāṇa* has not been very successful. One explanation could be the process-character and indistinctness of *viññāṇa*: the unconscious aspects may be there without being expressed. Another explanation may be found in the close association between *viññāṇa* and *saṅkhāra*: as mentioned above, *saṅkhāra* has an unconscious component.

4. *Is viññāṇa the transmitter of karma ?*

The karmic effects (the karmic memory) are connected to *viññāṇa*. “Avijjā-gato yaṃ ... purisapuggalo puññaṃ ce saṅkhāraṃ abhisāṅkharoti, puññūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ. Apuññaṃ ce saṅkhāraṃ abhisāṅkharoti, apuññūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ”. (S II 82) “If an ignorant man performs an act of merit, *viññāṇa* becomes pure (“acquires merit”). If he performs

an act of demerit, *viññāṇa* becomes impure." The same transmitting function is referred to when *viññāṇa* is called *anabhisaṅkhāra*, "without *saṅkhāra*", i.e. "without accumulation of *kamma*". See further discussion under 6.

5. *Is free ideation attributed to viññāṇa ?*

Little is said in the Nikāyas about dreams, but free ideation is often connected with *viññāṇa*. We find, for instance, the expression *mano-viññāṇa*, "the *viññāṇa* of the inner sense", see e.g. M III 32: "*mano-viññāṇa-viññātabbā dhammā*", "conscious processes cognizable through the *viññāṇa* of the inner sense". An example of what may be included in *mano-viññāṇa* is given in M I 293: "Nissatṭhena ... pañcahi indriyehi parisuddhena manoviññāṇena kiṃ neyyan-ti. — Nissatṭhena ... pañcahi indriyehi parisuddhena manoviññāṇena ananto ākāso ti ākāsaṇaṅcayatamaṃ neyyaṃ, anantaṃ viññāṇaṇ-ti viññāṇaṅcāyatanaṃ neyyaṃ, natthi kiñcīti akiñcaññāyatanaṃ neyyan-ti". "What is knowable by purified *viññāṇa* of the inner sense, without use of the five sense-organs? — Thinking, 'Space is unlimited', the plane of unlimited space is knowable by pure (meaning "by itself" or "clear") *viññāṇa* of the inner sense without use of the five sense-organs; thinking, '*Viññāṇa* is unlimited'; the plane of unlimited *viññāṇa* is knowable; thinking, 'There is nothing at all', the plane of emptiness is knowable". Here we find examples of purely conscious activity without direct support from the senses. Probably all such "free" activity is a function of *viññāṇa*. This interpretation seems to be confirmed in S III 68, where different types of *viññāṇa* are enumerated (the formulation indicates that the enumeration is intended to be complete): "Yaṃ kiñci viññāṇaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhantaṃ vā bahiddhā vā olārikaṃ vā sukhumāṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā, yaṃ dūre santike vā ..." "Every *viññāṇa* whatever, be it past, future or present, be it inward or outward, gross or subtle, low or high, far or near ..." This enumeration is strange if it were to mean the different types of *viññāṇa* found in different people rather than the changing conscious contents, e.g., ideas concerning the past, ideas concerning the remote, concerning low things, external things, and so on.

We conclude that free mental activity is a function of *viññāṇa* and that our hypothesis is satisfied on this point.

6. *Can viññāṇa explain rebirth ?*

Essential for rebirth are, according to A I 223, already quoted, *kamma*, *avijjā*, *taṇhā*, and *viññāṇa*. "We note the presence of the dynamic factor

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taṅhā here. More often, the three factors *saṅkhāra*, *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa* are said to constitute the mechanism of rebirth (cf. D II 63 quoted above). *Saṅkhāra* corresponds to *kamma* in the former enumeration.

There is an affinity between *kamma* and the next existence: “*kamma dāyādā sattā ti vadāmi*” (M I 390), “I say: creatures are heirs to actions”. For instance, a person who performs aggressive acts of body, speech and thought is reborn in an aggressive world (*savyāpajjhaṃ lokam uppajjati*): there he is affected by aggressive *phassā*, and from them aggressive *vedanā* arise (A I 122, M I 389).

The conscious wish for rebirth plays an important part in the rebirth-process. One of the *āsavā* is *bhavāsava*. This wish comes to expression through *viññāṇa*, and you can “set *viññāṇa* on becoming”, with the phrasing used in SN 1055 quoted above. In other cases, *citta* is used in this context: “*Tassa evaṃ hoti: Aho vatāhaṃ, kāyassa bhedaṃ parammaraṇā khattiyamahāsālānaṃ saḥavyataṃ uppajjeyyan ti. So taṃ cittaṃ dahati, taṃ cittaṃ adhiṭṭhāti taṃ cittaṃ bhāveti; tassa te saṅkhārā ca vihāro c’evaṃ bhāvitā bahulikā tā tatr’ uppattiyā saṃvattanti. Ayaṃ ... maggo ayaṃ paṭipadā tatr’ uppattiyā saṃvattati*”. (M III 99 f). “It occurs to him: ‘O that at the breaking up of the body after dying I might arise in companionship with the nobles’. This *citta* he holds fixed, firmly established, and develops it. These aspirations (*saṅkhārā*) and this insisting of his, developed thus, zealously practiced, conduce to rebirth there. This is the way, this is the course that conduces to rebirth there”. Cf. the similar passage in D III 258 and D I 20, both already quoted. The actions of a person may also bear fruit in this life: *Āṅgulimāla*, for instance (M II 97-105) was a robber who became an arahant. This did not save him from being severely wounded by sticks and stones that were not aimed at him. The Buddha explained it as a fruit of his *kamma*.

Rebirth is to Buddhism not a metaphysical theory but an empirical fact. An adequately trained person can recall his former existences and even those of other persons. The general idea of mental causality was probably common at the time of the Buddha, and he had only to stress that it functions according to strict ethical rules. Its functioning can often be observed in the present life, where many happenings seem to be rewards and punishments. As the law of *kamma* is causal and moral and works through consciousness by means of affinities, it is well known and can be manipulated. Consciousness was felt to be the medium of this law, pro-

bably of the following reasons: (a) The actions (behaviour, speech, thoughts) are, or can become, conscious. (b) They are automatically judged in consciousness as good or bad (or, more scientifically, as *kusala* or *akusala*). (c) Consciousness is felt to change through the influence of dynamic factors, and of impressions from the outside. (d) Consciousness is felt to be able to influence matter and transcend matter, (e) Consciousness can be changed through training.

As *viññāṇa* is in its rebirth-aspect felt to be empirical and to consist of processes only, without much inner unity, there is no reason to distinguish between the perceptual *viññāṇa* and rebirth-*viññāṇa*. These are the following positive reasons for *not* doing so: (a) When *viññāṇa* in *paticcasamuppāda*-context is analyzed, it is done according to sense-fields (S II 3 f). This may not mean that *viññāṇa* consists of these parts, but only that any conscious process may be seen from these aspects. (b) *Saikhāra*, which in some contexts is analyzed into bodily, verbal and mental activity (S II 3 f), in other contexts according to sense-fields (S III 60), can influence *viññāṇa* through ordinary sense-channels. (c) As we have already seen, *viññāṇa* is connected with and influenced by *upādāna* and *taṇhā* which are both ordinary conscious processes, said to condition rebirth. (d) Rebirth can partly be directed through conscious wishes as described above. (e) In *nibbāna* the rebirth-*viññāṇa* has ceased. This is expressed in the following way in S I 116: “Tav’ eva pāpima mano tava dhammā tava mano-samphassa-viññāṇāyatanam. Yattha ca kho pāpima natthi mano natthi dhammā natthi mano-samphassa-viññāṇāyatanam agati tava tattha pāpima ti”. “Yours, O Evil One, is only *mano*, the mental content and the field of *viññāṇa* produced through contact with *mano* (the other sense-fields mentioned before in the same way). But where none of them exist, there is no access for you, Evil One.” — A person who has attained *nibbāna* is therefore free from perception-*viññāṇa* and free from *Māra*. So the two types of *viññāṇa* are quite clearly considered as identical.

Sometimes *viññāṇa* is found twice in the same context, and it may be difficult to decide, whether the same meaning is intended or not. See, e.g., M III 260: “Na viññāṇam upādiyissāmi, na ca me viññāṇanissitam viññāṇam bhavissati”. “I will not grasp after *viññāṇa* and so will have no *viññāṇa* dependent on *viññāṇa*”. The same is said about a large number of cognitive factors and the other *khandhā*. That is, to say, that there is a form of *viññāṇa* dependent on cognitive processes, and probably *viññāṇa* in its rebirth-aspect is intended, as the context deals with meditation. As

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the factors mentioned are mostly perceptions and ideas without much mystery about them, rebirth-*viññāṇa* probably also simply is ordinary consciousness. It would be strange to maintain, e.g., that a metaphysical *viññāṇa* could arise from the cognitive *viññāṇa*: they must both consist of similar conscious processes.

This explanation can apply also to passages as the following. “Yo viññāṇe chandarāgavinayo chandarāgapahānaṃ, idaṃ viññāṇe nissaraṇaṃ” (M III 18). “The removal and rejection of need and desire for *viññāṇa* is an escape from *viññāṇa*”. The rebirth-aspect is probably intended in the second place. But a simpler explanation is that it is possible to get rid of *viññāṇa* (in all aspects) (just as the other *khandhā*) simply by not needing it. The same idea is more elaborately expressed in S III 53: “(Rūpadhātuyā ..., Vedanāya dhātuyā ..., Saññādhātuyā ..., Saṅkhārādhātuyā ...) Viññāṇadhātuyā ce ... bhikkhuno rāgo pahīno hoti, rāgassa pahānā vacchijjatārammaṇaṃ patitthā viññāṇassa na hoti”. “If desire for (body, feeling, perception, activities and *viññāṇa* be abandoned by a monk, by that abandonment of desire its foothold is cut off, and there is no support for *viññāṇa*.” This could mean that through freedom from the sense-perception-*viññāṇa* (together with the other *khandhā*), *viññāṇa* (in its rebirth-aspect) is without support and — as the text continues — becomes *anabhisankhāra* (free from *kamma*-accumulations) and *parinibbāyati* (attains *parinibbāna*). This is an interesting attempt to connect the *khandha*-series with the *paṭicasamuppāda*-series.

A way of attaining this cessation of *viññāṇa* (with reference both to the *khandha*-context and its *paṭicasamuppāda*-context) is perhaps hinted at in D I 223, where it is asked where the elements find no footing. The answer is: “Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato paṇaṃ. Ettha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vayo na gādhati. Ettha dīghañ ca rassañ ca anuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ. Ettha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesañ uparujjhati. Viññāṇassa nirodhena etth’ etaṃ uparujjhati”. “*Viññāṇa* is without attributes, endless, drawing back from everything. Here earth, water, fire, and wind, and long and short, fine and coarse, pleasant and unpleasant find no footing. Here *nāma* and *rūpa* are destroyed without trace. By the cessation of *viññāṇa* all this also ceases to be”. According to the commentary *viññāṇassa nirodha* means *nibbāna*. In the first line a special level of meditation seems to be intended (the limitless *viññāṇa*, where no specified objects are experienced. This practice may end up in the cessation of *viññāṇa*: that is, rebirth-*viññāṇa* is made to cease by means of emptying the empirical *viññāṇa* — because they are identical).

7. *Can viññāṇa be stopped ?*

Because of its prominent part in the mechanism of rebirth, *viññāṇa* is a central concept in the process of liberation. “Yaṃ kiñci dukkhaṃ sambhoti, sabbaṃ viññāṇa-paccayā (SN 734), “Whatever pain arises, is all in consequence of *viññāṇa*: A way to become free from suffering is to calm *viññāṇa*: “*Etam ādinavaṃ ñatvā dukkhaṃ viññāṇapaccayā viññānupasamā bhikkhu nicchāto parinibbuto*” (SN 735). “Knowing this evil consequence that suffering is born of *viññāṇa*, the monk after calming *viññāṇa* is free from desire and attains *parinibbāna*”. — “Bahiddhā ... viññāṇe avikkhitte avisaṭe sati ajjhataṃ asaṅghite, anupādāya aparitassato āyaṭiṃ jātijarāmaraṇa-dukkhasamudaya-sambhavo na hoti” (M III 223). “If *viññāṇa* is undistracted and unbound externally and free internally, then for him who thus does not crave and grasp, there will be no origin or rise of the suffering connected with birth, old age and death”. The calming of *viññāṇa* is here described as freeing from craving and grasping.

In other contexts, the frequently occurring word *nirodha*, “cessation”, is used: “Ajjhatañ ca bahiddhā ca vedanaṃ nābhinandato, evaṃ satassa carato viññāṇam uparujjhati” (SN IIII). “For him who both inwardly and outwardly does not delight in *vedanā* (sensation, feeling), for him who thus lives mindful, *viññāṇa* ceases”. — “Ye ca kho keci ... samanā vā brahmaṇā vā evaṃ viññāṇaṃ abhiññāya evaṃ viññāṇasamudayaṃ abhiññāya evaṃ viññāṇanirodhaṃ abhiññāya evaṃ viññāṇa-nirodhagāminiṃ paṭipadaṃ abhiññāya viññāṇassa nibbidā virāgā nirodhā anupādā vimuttā te suvimuttā.” (S III 61) “Moreover, whatsoever recluses or brahmins, by thus fully understanding *viññāṇa*, its arising, its ceasing and the way leading to its ceasing by the disgust, at by the fading out of, by the ceasing of *viññāṇa* are liberated without grasping, — they are truly liberated”. As pointed out in connection with D I 223, there may not be any fundamental contradiction between calming and cessation.

In, for instance, S III 61 and M I 53, the way to the cessation of *viññāṇa* is indicated: the noble eightfold way (“*Ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo viññāṇanirodhagāminī paṭipadā*”). Most important in this connection are the exercises belonging to *samādhi*, where *viññāṇa* frequently is mentioned. See, for instance, M I 293, referred to above, where three of the higher levels of meditation are attributed to *viññāṇa*: the level of unlimited space, of unlimited *viññāṇa* and of emptiness. We find frequently a more complete description of the different levels, where however the experiences are

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said to be achieved by means of *saññā*. To sum up the sequence, we find that separate ideas first are gradually expelled from consciousness, starting with the cognitive ideas: feelings remain but give way to a general experience of equanimity; by expelling all cognitive ideas of separate objects, it is possible to visualize the empty and infinite space. (D I 183: *bhikkhu sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā paṭigha-saññānaṃ atthagamā nānatta-saññānaṃ amanasi-kārā 'ananto ākāso ti' ākāsañācāyatanam upasampajja viharati*), "the monk, by passing beyond the perception of form, by putting an end to sense-reaction, by paying no attention to perceptions of diversity thinks: "The space is infinite", and reaches up to and remains in the mental state of infinite space".) This experience is then made still more abstract and contentless by being directed inwards and changed to a visualization of consciousness (always: *viññāna*) as infinite. Here, the distinction between internal and external has gone (D I 183 f: "*bhikkhu sabbaso ākāsañācāyatanam samatikkamma 'anantaṃ viññānaṃ' ti viññānañcāyatanam upasampajja viharati*", "the monk, by passing quite beyond the mental state of infinite space thinks: 'consciousness is infinite' and reaches up to and remains in the mental state of infinite consciousness"). Then the monk tries to get rid also of the visualization of *viññāna* and replaces it with the experience that neither this endless consciousness nor anything else exists: he is then above both objects and their names and visualizes endless emptiness (D I 184: "*bhikkhu sabbaso viññānañcāyatanam samatikkamma 'na'atthi kiñcīti' ākiñcaññāyatanam upasampajja viharati*", "the monk, by passing quite beyond the mental state of infinite consciousness, thinks: 'nothing exists', and reaches up to and remains in the mental state of nothingness"). The normal function of consciousness, to present information in images and symbols, is now nearly thrown out of gear by letting one single image, which is so vague it is nearly no information at all ("nothing is"), fill the whole consciousness. Through its very vagueness, the image is close to abolishing itself; and with it, consciousness in the ordinary sense also goes. This is what happens in the next stage, a transitional stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (S IV 217: "*nevasaññānāsaññāyatanam samāpannassa ākiñcaññāyatanasaññā niruddhā hoti*", "when one has attained the mental state of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the consciousness of nothingness has ceased"). Then the summit is reached:

"So kho ahaṃ Ānanda aparena samayena sabbaso nevasaññānāsaññāyatanam samatikkamma saññāvedayitanirodham upasampajja viharāmi, paññāya ca me disvā āsavā parikkhayam agamaṃsu." (A IV 448). "And presently, Ananda, passing wholly beyond the mental state

of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, I entered and abode in the cessation of perception and feeling and I saw by wisdom that the obsessions were completely destroyed”.

The last passage describes a state of trance where the ordinary, everyday consciousness does not function (further description follows). It is of special interest to note, that this experience here is said to be accompanied by the knowledge that *āsavā* are destroyed. This usually means that the person has attained *nibbāna*.

This passage may be compared with M III 32, a part of which has been discussed already. It is said that when the desire (*taṇhā*, among others) for all the sense data has been stopped — “then I know that my *citta* is freed”. And the whole passage is summarized in the following words: “Evaṃ kho me ... jānato evaṃ passato imesu chasu ajjhattikabāhiresu āyatanesu anupādāya āsavehi cittaṃ vimuttan ti”. “So, as I know thus and see thus in respect of these six internal and external sense-fields, I can say that my *citta* is freed from the *asavā* without grasping”. Here, the experience of liberation is put in direct connection with the facts of sense-perception and sense-*viññāṇa*: liberation is attained by stopping the need for them.

So far, it seems that *saññāvedayitanirodha* is identical with *viññānanirodha*. There is nothing impossible in that interpretation, as consciousness (in the ordinary sense) certainly is made to stop in the summit of meditation, and when consciousness goes, the desires that work through it, and the feeling of pain must also go. *Viññāṇa* is sometimes identified with *saññā* and *vedanā*: “Yā ca ... vedanā yā ca saññā yañca viññāṇaṃ ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visaṃsaṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetum” (M I 293). “That which is feeling and that which is perception and that which is *viññāṇa* — these states are related, not unrelated, and it is not possible to lay down a difference between these states, having analyzed them again and again”.

According to D III 228 (to be discussed later), on the other hand, *viññāṇa* depends on *saññā*.

In M I 296, a dead man is compared with a man who has attained *saññāvedayitanirodha*:

- (a) The living body has:
 āyu, vitality
 usmā, heat
 viññāṇa.

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- (b) In the dead body:
kāyasaṅkhārā niruddhā, bodily action has ceased
vacīsaṅkhārā niruddhā, verbal activity has ceased
cittasaṅkhārā niruddhā, mental activity has ceased
āyu parikkhīṇo, the vitality is destroyed
usmā vūpasantā, the heat is calmed
indriyāni viparibhinnāni, the sense-functions are broken asunder.
- (c) In the person who has attained saññāvedayītanīrodha:
kāyasaṅkhārā niruddhā, bodily action has ceased
vacīsaṅkhārā niruddhā, verbal activity has ceased
cittasaṅkhārā niruddhā, mental activity has ceased
āyu aparikkhīṇo, the vitality is not destroyed
usmā avūpasantā, the heat is not calmed
indriyāni vipasannāni, the sense functions are purified.

We find that the question about the fate of *viññāṇa* is evaded. The expression “indriyāni vipasannāni” seems rather to imply that the chances of fine and accurate perceptions have become better. On the other hand it would, strictly speaking, follow from the cessation of the three *saṅkhāra* that *viññāṇa* also has ceased.

From this discussion, the conclusion cannot be drawn that saññāvedayītanīrodha *could* be identified with *nibbāna* and *nibbāna* therefore be some sort of unconsciousness. The saññāvedayītanīrodha is a state of short duration, and it does not seem to have been much cultivated. But the levels below this have been highly estimated as workable means to get rid of desires and worries (dissolve them, not “repress” them) and to deprive sense—objects of their interest. The ideal was perhaps to make consciousness permanently free from attributes and limits (D I 223). So, even conscience would stop working (Dh 267) and the monk would not be aware of any karmic consequences of his acts.

A systematic summary

We shall now try to define *viññāṇa* by asking the same questions as used earlier in this paper.

1. *Is viññāṇa consciousness?*

We have already quoted evidence for a positive answer (M ' 292, D III 243). There is small evidence for an unconscious component (S II 65).

2. *Is viññāṇa an entity ?*

It is possible to find passages, e.g. S IV 195 and S I 122, already quoted, which could favour an entity-theory, but in general, *viññāṇa* is described in process-terms. It arises as a product: “cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajati viññāṇam, cakkhuvīññāṇan-t’eva sañkhaṇi gacchati” (M I 259), “if *viññāṇa* arises dependent on eye and forms, it is called eye-*viññāṇa*”; and so on for the other senses. It depends on the body: “Ayaṇi kho me kāyo rūpī ..., idaṇ ca pana me viññāṇaṇi ettha sitaṇi ettha paṭibaddhaṇi” (D I 76). “This body of mine has form ...; and therein is this *viññāṇa* of mine bound up, on that does it depend”. It appears and disappears depending on conditions: “Saṅkhārasamudayā viññāṇasamudayo, saṅkhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho, ayaṇ-eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo viññāṇa-nirodha gāminī paṭipadā” (M I 53), “From the arising of activities *viññāṇa* arises; from the stopping of activities, *viññāṇa* stops; from the stopping of activities, *viññāṇa* stops; the way leading to the stopping of *viññāṇa* is this noble eightfold path”.

3. *Is viññāṇa an instrument ?*

When *viññāṇa* is described in process-terms, an instrumental function is usually not pointed out. However, as consciousness, it has the function of “making things known” to the person (M I 292, quoted above). This is said quite clearly in M III 242: “Athāparaṇi viññāṇaṇi yeva avasissati parisuddhaṇi pariyodātaṇi, tena viññāṇena kiñci jānāti. — Sukhaṇi ti pi vijānāti; dukkhaṇi ti pi vijānāti; adukkham-asukhaṇi ti pi vijānāti”, “There-upon *viññāṇa* alone will be left which is quite pure and clean. With that *viññāṇa* he knows something: he becomes aware of pleasure, he becomes aware of pain and he becomes aware of neutral feeling.”

4. *Functions of viññāṇa*

(a) *Perception.* *Viññāṇa* has a perceptive function and its processes are classified according to senses. In M I 293, quoted above, it is stated that it is not possible to lay down any difference between *vedanā*, *saññā* and *viññāṇa*. According to D II 338, the body (*kāya*) can perceive things through the senses and become aware of mental states through *mano* (*manasā pi dhammaṇi vijānāti*), only if it has life, heat and *viññāṇa*. — In M III 32 a distinction is made between (need for) “cakkhusmiṇi ..., rūpe, cakkhuvīññāṇe, cakkhuvīññāṇa-viññāṭabbesu dhammesu” and so on down to “manasmīṇi ... dhamme manovīññāṇe manovīññāṇa-viññāṭabbesu dhammesu”. “Eye, form, visual *viññāṇa*, ideas cognizable through visual *viññāṇa*

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... *mano*, idea, *mano-viññāṇa*, ideas cognizable through *mano-viññāṇa*".
What is meant here is probably:

<i>For the five senses:</i>	<i>For mano:</i>
sense-organ	the inner sense
object, stimulus	ideas, mental images
perceptual images	conscious manipulation. (Cf. M I 293)
mental images	images of memory, imagination, etc.

To every sense-field belong *dhammā*, i.e. mental images, which can be experienced and "understood" through the *viññāṇa* of that field, and, as *dhammā*, constituting the field also of *mano*. *Mano* receives the perceptual images belonging to the senses; they are interpreted and manipulated (for instance, in thinking) by *manoviññāṇa*; but *mano* has also *dhammā* of its own, namely the images produced in memory and imagination; these may be referred to here as *manoviññāṇaviññātabba dhamma*.

Saññā and *vedanā* could perhaps be called part-functions of *viññāṇa*, although by *viññāṇa* is understood mainly the end-product of the perceptual process: the resulting images and ideas, and has perhaps an interpreting, understanding and manipulating function. It is therefore further removed from the real objects than the two other functions. *Mano* is here described as especially concerned with the images of memory, imagination and thinking. It is doing the basic work for *viññāṇa*, just as the other senses, but is, according to modern ways of viewing these matters, on a higher level as it is working with material that has probably already been conscious in one form or another or formed in the "subconscious".

Further support for the view that *viññāṇa* is in some way based on *saññā* and *vedanā* is provided by the following two passages. In D III 228 are mentioned the four supports of *viññāṇa*, among them: "Saññūpāyaṃ vā ... viññāṇaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭhati saññārammaṇaṃ saññāpatitṭhaṃ nandūpavesanaṃ vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjati". "*Viññāṇa* is firmly supported by means of *saññā*, with *saññā* as object, with *saññā* as support, it attains to happiness, growth, increase and full development". In S III 9 f, rūpadhātu, vedanādhātu, saññādhātu and saṅkhārādhātu are called the "home" of *viññāṇa*. — It should on the other hand not be forgotten that *saññā* often is used for "higher" mental functions than perception.

This view about *saññā* and *viññāṇa* does not agree with a passage in E. R. Sarathchandra, "Buddhist psychology of perception" (1958), where it is said; "In the Nikāya formulas of sense-perception *saññā* is said to occur after *viññāṇa*, and ... we might infer that *saññā* meant a later stage in the process ..." (p. 16). He bases this view on M I III f: "cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi". "Dependent on the eye and forms arises visual perception, the concurrence of the three is contact, dependent on contact is feeling (and sensation), what one feels one recognizes and what one recognizes one thinks about". If a temporal sequence were implied here, *saññā* would come after *viññāṇa*. But as Professor Jayatilleke has pointed out ("Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge", London, 1963, p. 435 f), *vedanā*, *saññā* and *vitakka* could be meant to occur simultaneously with *phassa*. Grammatically, "tiṇṇaṃ ... vitakketi" can be taken as an appositional expansion of "cakkhuviññāṇaṃ", explaining the whole *viññāṇa*-process.

(b) *Higher intellectual functions*

Attention is not usually attributed to *viññāṇa*, but as every conscious function it can be disturbed. "Tathā tathā ... bhikkhu upaparikkheyya, yathā yathā upaparikkhato bahiddhā cassa viññāṇaṃ avikkhittaṃ hoti avisaṭṭam ajjhataṃ asaṅghitaṃ anupādāya aparitassato āyatiṃ jātijarāmaranadukkkhasamudayasambhavo na hoti". (I 93 f). "A monk should investigate (things) in such a way that his *viññāṇa*, as he investigates, is not scattered and rambling externally and also not unconcentrated internally. And without grasping, as he is without craving, there shall be no arising in the future of suffering resulting from birth, old age and death". What is referred to here, is not so much attention in connection with perception but in connection with intellection. This free ideational activity is often attributed to *viññāṇa*, as already mentioned (M I 293, S III 68). As to memory, it is said that *viññāṇa* remembers former existences (D III 134), but *viññāṇa* does not operate through the ordinary memory.

(c) *Feelings and emotions*

We have already shown that feelings belong to *viññāṇa* (M III 242, M I 292). Emotions are never mentioned in connection with *viññāṇa*.

(d) *Dynamic and moral traits*

We refer to a previous discussion which shows that *viññāṇa* to some extent has a dynamic side. It is rarely mentioned in connection with the moral side of man's behaviour.

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5. *Is viññāṇa personal ?*

Viññāṇa must be personal as so great a part of the conscious life of the person is contained in it. It is also sometimes — against the general trend — personified to some sort of personality (S IV 195, S I 122, as quoted above). Usually it is stressed that *viññāṇa* should not be identified with the self: “na viññāṇam attato samanupassati, na viññāṇavantaṃ vā attānaṃ, nāttani vā viññāṇaṃ, na viññāṇasmim vā attānam”. (M III 18) “He does not regard *viññāṇa* as self, nor self as having *viññāṇa*, nor *viññāṇa* as in self, nor self as in *viññāṇa*”. And S III 68 “... sabbaṃ viññāṇaṃ netaṃ mama nesoham’asmi na meso attāti evaṃ etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya datṭhabbam”. “All *viññāṇa* must be thus regarded, as it really is, by right insight: “this is not mine; this is not I; this is not my self”. Its inner organisation is of course effectively masked through its subdivision according to sense-fields, and therefore its personal uniqueness can be denied as thoroughly as is done here. Still, the *viññāṇa* that is effective in the process of birth is entirely personal.

6. *Can viññāṇa be influenced or trained ?*

As *viññāṇa* has nothing to do with emotions and the moral behaviour of man, it need not be trained in the same way as *citta*. The process of meditation, however, is much concerned with *viññāṇa*. As we have already seen, the purpose of these exercises is to stop and tranquillize the conscious processes, and then empty the internal space and break its limitations. In this way, calmness and detachment can be effected. Finally, consciousness temporarily can be made to cease completely. A rich variation of methods has been devised for this purpose.

Comparisons

Table I is a semantic differential offered as a summary of our findings. It is constructed as a quantitative rating-scale: to the left we find the variables which we have considered in this work, and the columns correspond to the degree in which the concepts are endowed with the attribute.

Column O: no trace of this attribute has been found in connection with the concept, or, a clear statement is found that this attribute is lacking.

- „ 1: doubtful references to the attribute are found in connection with the concept.
- „ 2: It is fairly certain that the attribute can be ascribed to the concept.
- „ 3: It is clearly and unequivocally stated that the concept has this attribute.

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A rating-scale is meant to be exact and looks very quantitative and reliable, so it must be clearly stated that a good deal of subjective judgement is involved in it. To make it easier for the reader to form his own judgement (and perhaps make his own ratings), we append a few references which can be looked up in this paper.

In some cases, a concept has been given two ratings, namely, when clear statements for both can be found. There is then a contradiction in the concept itself.

From the chart we find that all our concepts are conscious (including or consisting of conscious processes), changing, personal and complex (in the sense that they have many functions and are not described without contradictions).

None of them corresponds to our concepts of personality and the ego, although both *citta* and *viññāna* are very central concepts (i.e. have central functions, essential for the person, and therefore close to identification with the ego). They are all more or less empirical concepts, although metaphysical aspects are mentioned in connection with *viññāna* and *citta*. *Mano* seems to be more instrumental, more like a center with defined functions than the other two: it is just given, like the other senses, and is never said to be caused or conditioned: it seems to be an organ like eyes and ears and therefore given in birth; whether it can be changed or improved by training is also doubtful.

As to the functions, the chart gives a fairly clear picture. *Mano* is the center for perception (to which also feeling belongs), attention, ideation, memory, and thinking, so far clearly a cognitive center. It has also an active and directive side, but engaged only in the higher directive processes, in which the original needs are less important than planning, consistency, will and character; it is therefore important as a moral agency.

Citta is sensitive to information and can be developed more than the others. It can be made an instrument for thought processes and especially super-knowledge. But originally it is afflicted with all the primitive and morally objectionable emotions and selfish needs. It can be trained to stability and purposive energy and plays then a more central part in the moral behaviour than *mano*.

Viññāna is less active than the other two. It is engaged in perception (and feeling) and ideation but plays no prominent part in the higher cognitive processes. Except for its *karma*-transmitting functions (about which very little is said and in which perhaps *sañkhāra* plays a more important part), it would have been simply a name for perceptive and ideative processes.

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Chart 1.

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL

c =citta
m =mano
v =viññāna

	0	1	2	3
1 Entity		v		c m
2 Process		m		c v
3 Conscious				c m v
4 Subconscious	m	c v		
5 Active			v	c m
6 Independent	v		m	c
7 Surviving	m v	(v)	c	
8 Changing				c m v
9 Caused	m		c	v
10 Instrument			c v	m
11 Can be trained		m		c v
12 Attains liberation	m v	(v)		c
13 Personality	m v		c	
14 Self	m v	c		
15 Personal				c m v
<i>Functions</i>				
16 Perception			c	m v
17 Super-knowledge	m		v	c
18 Attention		v	c	m
19 Memory, ideation		c		m v
20 Intelligence, thought		v		c m
21 Feeling		c		m v
22 Emotion	v	m		c
23 Needs, drives	m		v	c
24 Will, purposiveness	v			c m
25 Activity, initiative		v		c m
26 Moral traits	v			c m
<i>The concept</i>				
27 Empirical	(v)		c	m v
28 Complex				c m v
29 Central		m		c v

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References to the semantic differential

A. *citta*

(1) M I 341, D II 36. — (2) S V 418, M III 45. — (3) Dh 37, S IV 293 f. — (4) S III 13. — (5) D III 239, S I 39. — (6) M I 511, A IV 34, S I 39. — (7) S V 370, U 37. — (8) S II 94, D II 299, A I 10. — (9) D II 299. — (10) A III 437, A IV 422, M I 22. — (11) D I 77-84. — (12) S III 45, D II 81. — (14) A IV 34, M I 511, D II 266. — (15) S I 178, D I 213. — (16) S IV 125. — (17) D I 77-84. — (18) A IV 422. — (19) M I 22. — (20) A I 9, A IV 402. — (21) M II 145, S V 302. — (22) S III 16, D I 71. — (23) Dh 154, M I 36. — (24) D III 239, A IV 39, D II 36. — (25) S I 39, A IV 34. — (26) M I 36, D III 237.

B. *mano*

(1) M I 295. — (2) S III 46. — (3) D I 70, D III 242, SN 834. — (5) D III 191, M I 272. — (6) A III 443, M I 16, S I 197. — (7) S IV 69, S I 116. — (8) S IV 69. — (10) SN 1142, D II 176. — (11) D III 36. — (15) A I 170. — (16) M III 216, M I 191. — (18) S II 24. — (19) S V 218, D II 176, S I 197. — (20) S N 834. — (21) S V 74, M III 216. — (22) Dh 96, Dh 233. — (24) D I 18, D III 228. — (26) Dh 233, M I 373. — (28) M III 216. —

C. *viññāṇa*

(1) S IV 195, S I 122. — (2) M I 259, S III 103. — (3) M I 292, D III 243. — (4) S II 65. — (5) M III 226, M II 265. — (6) M III 279 f. — (7) SN 1111, S III 61, (S I 122), D III 105. — (8) S III 103. — (9) S II 3 f, M I 256. — (10) M III 242. — (11) M III 223, M I 293. — (12) S III 53. — (14) M III 18, S III 68. — (15) S I 122, S II 65. — (16) S III 87, M III 32. — (17) D III 134. — (18) I 93 f. — (19) S III 68, M I 293. — (20) I 93 f. — (21) M I 292, M III 242. — (23) S III 103, M II 265. — (25) M III 226. — (26) S II 82 (27) M. I 292, (D II 63).

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Relations


1. *Viññāṇa* forms part of both the *khandha*-series: *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṅkhāra*, *viññāṇa*, and the *paṭiccasamuppāda*-series. The former is the factors constituting personality or the aspects under which it may be seen. The latter is a similar but much more elaborate series of psychological factors, arranged in a sequence of dependence. It has sometimes been called a causal nexus, but positive correlation rather than causal necessity is implied in *paṭicca*. Therefore, the series should primarily be taken as a series of correlative interdependences: a time-sequence is certainly implied in some cases but in principle all the links may well be simultaneous. The purpose of the series seems to have been to explain man's natural state of *dukkha* (*bhava*, *jāti*, *jarā-maraṇa* etc.) and show a way to overcome it. The starting point is sometimes said to be *avijjā*, sometimes *viññāṇa*, and it is usually stressed that *dukkha* can be eradicated by the cessation (*nirodha*) of these and the other factors.

A strict time-sequence cannot have been intended, as different arrangements can be found, and an interdependence is sometimes stressed. In M I 261, for instance, it is said “*cattāro āhārā taṇhānidānā taṇhāsamudayā taṇhājātikā taṇhāpabhavā*”, “the four types of provision (to which *phassa*, *manosañcetanā* and *viññāṇa* belong) have thirst as the provenance, thirst as source, thirst as birth, thirst as origin”. In the *paṭiccasamuppāda*-series, *taṇhā* comes later than *viññāṇa*. And according to S II 13 “*viññāṇāhāro āyatim punabhavābhiniḅbattiyā paccayo*”, “the consciousness-provision is the condition of renewed becoming and birth in the future”: only after that, the six sense-fields and contact are mentioned. In D II 32 and 63 it is stated that *nāmarūpa* depends on *viññāṇa*, which itself depends on *nāmarūpa*. — In M I 261 we find the sequence *phassa—vedanā—taṇhā—viññāṇāhārā*. — In S II 3 ff, *saṅkhāra* is analyzed into *kāya-*, *vacī-* and *citta-saṅkhāra* (of which the last-mentioned in S IV 293 is analyzed into *saññā* and *vedanā*). — *Nāma* is divided into *vedanā*, *saññā*, *cetanā*, *phassa* and *manasikāra*. The result is, that *vedanā* comes to be contained three times in the series, *saññā* twice and *phassa* twice. The interpretation of *avijjā* and *saṅkhāra* as belonging to a previous existence is impossible, as it would make *nibbāna* unattainable in this life: *nibbāna* is the cessation of *dukkha* which is effected through the cessation of *avijjā*. But it is impossible to eradicate the *avijjā* of a former existence. It must be maintained that the present *dukkha* depends on a present *avijjā*: that is the condition for making them both cease. We conclude that interdependence rather than a strict time-sequence was intended.

Both the *khandhā*-enumeration and the paṭiccasamuppāda-series can be seen as an analysis of personality. The emphasis is different, and they are constructed for different purposes, but the contents are the same in principle. All the *khandhā* can be found at least once in the paṭiccasamuppāda-series as explained in S II 3 ff. The correlational aspect can be found also in the *khandhā* as *viññāṇa* is said to depend on the other *khandhā* (S III 55). In the following formulations the common ground of the two series is stressed: “n’ atthi khandhādisā dukkhā” (Dh 202), “there is no pain like *khandhā*”; “paṭiccasamuppānā ... pañc’-upādānakhandhā” (M I 191) “the origin of the five *khandhā* is conditioned”, “ime ... upādānakkhandhā chandamūlakā” (M III 16), “these *khandhā* have desire as root”. In the last quotation *chanda* is used for “desire”, but its meaning is not far removed from *taṇhā* which we find in the paṭiccasamuppāda-series. *Citta* is freed by losing interest in the *khandhā* (M III 30), that are dissolved only in death (M I 49, “khandhānam bhedo ... idaṃ vuccati maraṇam”). In S III 59-61, on the other hand, the cessation of the *khandhā* is aimed at: “Ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo rūpa-(vedanā-, saññā-, saṅkhāra-, viññāṇa-) nirodhagāminī paṭipadā”, “this noble eightfold path is the way to the cessation of form (feeling, perception, purposive activity, *viññāṇa*).”

It is interesting to note that *viññāṇa* in some cases is said to depend on *taṇhā*, in other cases on *saṅkhārā*, as these are the two active, dynamic factors in the paṭiccasamuppāda-series, partly because we here find the dynamic counterpart to *viññāṇa* which itself is conceived as rather passive, partly because we are reminded of the current psychoanalytic theory that consciousness has originated as vicarious satisfactions of frustrated needs.

2. It is a distinctive feature of the processes belonging to *mano* (M III 216), *saññā* (A III 413), *phassa*, *vedanā*, *viññāṇa*, *taṇhā* (S II 3 f), that when analyzed, they always have been broken up according to the six sense-fields (*saḷāyatanam*). By breaking them up in this abstract way, their unity can be denied and their identification with the self be prevented. Only *citta* is never analyzed in this way. Table 2 is an attempt to show the relations between the concepts treated in this paper. A few explanations follow. (a) The general outline of the chart has been derived from M III 32, where the crucial concepts are put in relation to each other. In this passage, which has already been discussed, it is said that *citta* through *taṇhā* is bound to the senses, their objects, the perceptions and the perceptual images (also included in the *dharmā*), and further to *mano* and its functions. *Citta* is freed from the *āsavā* through the ending of *taṇhā*. Therefore *citta* is placed to the



right; connected by the "adhesive tape" of *tanhā* to the perceptual and ideational functions which here are subdivided according to sense fields. (b) To the extreme left we find the physical stimuli. It sometimes seems doubtful if the words *rūpa*, *sadda*, etc., are meant to refer to the physical stimuli or the perceptual image they produce in the observer: *rūpa*, e.g., is sometimes translated by "body", "matter", sometimes by "form". Guenther (op. cit. p. 151) tries to avoid the dualism by offering the translation "Gestalt" for *rūpa*. This is, however, not possible, as Gestalt in psychology is a subjective term meaning "mental form," and is used to stress that the experienced form may not correspond to the material form (it can also equally well be used for all sense-fields). In the Nikāyas, the distinction has been made, but the two concepts have not always been kept apart: the same words are used for both. In M I 190 f, *rūpa*, and so on, including *dhamma*, are called *bāhirā*, "external", in contrast to the senses which are called *ajjhattika*, "internal" or "personal". And when it in S IV 68 is said that *cakkhuvīññāṇa* originates from *cakkhu* and *rūpa*, there is no doubt that the external objects are referred to. In D II 110, a clear distinction between external and internal *rūpa* is made: "Ajjhattaṃ rūpasaññī eko bahiddhā-rūpāni passati...". "When a man who perceives forms internally, sees external forms ...". The same distinction is made in M I 138 f: "yaṃ kiñci rūpam atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ, ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā, olārikaṃ vā sukhumanṃ vā, hīnaṃ vā paṇitaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā ...", "whatever form, past, future, present, internal or external, gross or subtle, mean or excellent, far or near ...". By *ajjhattaṃ* the forms are referred to as conscious mental images in contrast to the objects as physical facts. — The *rūpa* included in the *paṭiccasamuppāda*-series (in *nāmarūpa*) must refer to the internal form, otherwise it could not be conditioned by the purely psychological *viññāṇa* and not disappear in *nibbāna*.

For the internal *rūpa*, *cakkhuvīññāṇa* may sometimes be used, but this term covers the feelings as well and may refer to non-perceptive images. We therefore need *rūpa*, *sadda* etc. in two places in our chart.

(c) In M I 191 it is said that there will be no perception without proper contact (*samannāhāra*, more often called *phassa* or *samphassa*): this is therefore to be placed between the two *rūpa*, *sadda* etc.

(d) *Dhammā* are of two types: the perceptual *dhammā*, which are the perceptual images produced through the perceptual process, and the ideational *dhammā* consisting of memory images and new productions through imagination and thought. *Mano* is a center of both perception and free

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ideation, and it perceives, stores, and manipulates both types of *dhammā*. Here, the sensations are given their feeling-tones, and therefore, both *saññā* and *vedanā* may be functions of *mano*, (as indicated in M III 279 f). The enumeration of the 18 *mano-upavicārā* (M III 216) has been followed here.

(e) It is not possible to lay down a definite order between *mano-upavicārā* and the processes of *viññāṇa*: they may be more or less the same, and it is also stated that no difference can be laid down between *vedanā*, *saññā*, and *viññāṇa*. For reasons already mentioned, *viññāṇa* has, however, been put to the right of the processes of *mano*.

(f) *Citta* is here not conceived as an end-product of the other processes but as an agency influenced by and normally interested in the activities sometimes described as performing them. This is in agreement with the general trend, expressed, for instance, in S III 46: “*thāmase parāmase asati rūpasmiṃ (vedanāya, saññāya, saṅkhāresu, viññāṇasmiṃ) cittaṃ virajjati vimuccati anupādāya āsavehi*”. “As there is no more stubborn perversity in him, his *citta* turns away from form (feeling, perception, activities, *viññāṇa*) and is released by not grasping at the *āsavā*”. Here the *khandhā* are clearly conceived as factors outside *citta*. — *Saññā* and *vedanā* sometimes (e.g., S IV 293) called *citta-saṅkhāra*, “activities of *citta*”.

In as far as the process-meaning of *citta* is implied, the processes of *viññāṇa*, especially *mano-viññāṇa*, must be included, but also some special activities, particularly the higher cognitive processes and dynamic processes.

(g) We may note that all the five *khandhā* are mentioned in the chart; only *kāya-saṅkhāra*, “bodily behaviour”, and *vacī-saṅkhāra*, “verbal behaviour”, to which also thought-processes are counted (an extreme behaviorism before Watson!) are not there. It is, however, outside the scope of this work to pursue the problem of relationships between our concepts and the *khandhā* any further.

While all perceptive functions, most ideative functions, feelings and most dynamic processes are included in the chart, many vital parts of the human psyche are left outside. Of the dynamic traits only the natural inborn needs are mentioned: where should we place motivations for good actions? Where is the will? Where is the moral judge? And where are the channels through which the normal qualities influence *viññāṇa*? And how could we fit in the rest of the *paṭiccasamuppāda*-factors? Only further research can complete the picture.

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